On May 19, 2024, former Iranian president Ibraheem Raisi, among other comrades, died in an aircraft accident in Iran. Either he was killed in a natural accident or with the help of external involvements, The region was deeply shaken by the news, particularly after a two-day search for the president’s missing aircraft. However, Raisi was an influential conservative politician who served in different positions in the republic. Furthermore, Raisi was broadly perceived as the foremost contender to succeed Khamenei, garnering support from Iran’s ruling elite and influential factions (Rasana 2024). Six weeks later, on July 5, the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian won the Iranian presidential election. A new era of Middle East dynamics would begin. Pezeshkian’s election would influence new developments in the region.
Conservatives and Reformists
Conservatives adhere to the ideological tenets of the Islamic Revolution. Pragmatic conservatives adhere to conservative principles but favor practical social and cultural reforms over ideological fervor. They also advocate for economic deregulation. The reformists represent the ideological left within the Iranian political system. They advocate for economic openness, liberalization, and rapprochement with the West (Mohebali 2016). However, regarding Middle Eastern interactions, reformers seek closer relations with other Middle Eastern countries. The significant principles of the republic are the same for both conservatives and reformists, but reformers are more open to using dialogues and negotiations. They also push to ease tensions and engage in regional cooperation. For instance, Rezaei (2017) demonstrated that the Dialogue of Civilizations by President Khatami (1997-2005), who was considered the godfather of the reformers, offered a complementary vision for a renewed commencement in Iran’s strained relations with the Middle East (Rezaei 2017). Additionally, the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) alleviated tensions with Western powers and diminished regional discord by indicating Iran’s readiness for peaceful negotiations, thus indirectly enhancing relations with neighboring countries such as Oman and Iraq (Javed and Ismail 2017). During this deal, Hassan Rouhani, another reformist, was the president of the Islamic republic.
Reformists and Iraq
Historically, Iranian reformists have maintained distinct relationships with Iraqi parties, politicians, and groups, in contrast to those of the conservatives. In a recent interview, Alyasiri stated “Reformists in Iraq align more closely with moderate political forces. These forces are, to some extent, recognized and accepted by Western superpowers” (Alyasiry 2024). Conversely, the conservatives maintain closer ties with right-wing Iraqi powers that the West does not favor. The moderate powers in Iraq seek the stability of the country, recalling resolving conflicts through discussions. So, this Iranian-Iraqi moderate power could be a privilege for Iran to evaluate and reform its regional picture.
Reformist and The Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine)
As mentioned before, Iran’s major principles remain the same every time reformers take control. By way of illustration, Iran extended military and financial assistance to Hezbollah as a component of its plan to mitigate Israeli influence in the area during all reformist presidential periods (Rezaei 2017). Nevertheless, they have tried to maintain a new shape of interaction built on discussions and alliances. In May 2003, a memorandum of understanding about the potential establishment of a free trade area between the two countries was signed during Khatami’s visit to Damascus (Risseeuw 2018). Such agreements were established during reformers’ periods, which could explain their philosophy of how to deal with these countries.
Reformists and the GCC
Similarly, reformers have worked towards cooperation with GCC countries. In 1998, Khatami’s visit to Saudi Arabia represented a pivotal advancement in bilateral relations. This resulted in the 1999 Saudi-Iranian security accord, which aimed to mitigate terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime (Rezaei 2017). He also, through diplomatic efforts, tried to bridge differences between Iran and other Gulf countries like the UAE (Momeni 2021). In the same vein, nuclear diplomacy, GCC concerns, and the Hormoz peace initiative during Rouhani’s administration are good examples of reformist cooperative policy.
Pezeshkian’s international stances and views before the presidency
Pezeshkian, like all reformists, does not debate the fundamental principles of the republic. In April 2019, when he was a parliament member, he denounced the Trump administration’s designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization (Alef 2019). In June 2019, he stated that “the IRGC has dealt a strong punch to the mouths of the United States with what it did in shooting down a highly advanced American drone in the Persian Gulf” (Alef 2019). However, we can infer that he is not internally in favor of the IRGC according to his statement later in June 2024 when he said, while wearing an IRGC uniform, “The IRCG is different from what we saw now” (Eslahatnews 2024). He criticized the Iranian government several times. In 2009, in a speech, he criticized the way that the government treated protesters by quoting Imam Ali, the first Imam of the Shia, “Do not kill people like animals” (Mehrabi 2024). Such stances could offer a clear understanding of Pezeshkian’s belief in the Iranian regime. On the international scale, during his election campaign, he underscored the reestablishment of diplomatic engagements with the West, the restoration of the JCPOA, and initiatives to alleviate sanctions. Pezeshkian contended, “With sanctions, one can perhaps survive, but one cannot progress.” He emphasized the necessity of de-escalating tensions with the West: “We seek good relations with Europe based on mutual respect and equality. The lack of political relations with the United States should not lead to costly tensions and conflict” (Azizi 2024). Furthermore, in his first electoral debate on June 25, 2024, He emphasized the significance of cultivating robust partnerships with neighboring nations as a fundamental aspect of his foreign policy. He also asserted that enhancing relations with neighboring countries is essential for regional stability and prosperity (PressTV 2024).
President Masoud Pezeshkian
During his first official press conference, Pezeshkian said, “We are brothers with the Americans as well” (Radio Free Europe 2024). Although he asserted that this brotherhood depends on the Americans’ will to seek peace with Iran, his statement shocked many. Once Pezeshkian was elected, he started to move with his and the reformists’ philosophy. On September 10, he visited Iraq. He met with prominent Iraqi officials, including the Iraqi president Abdul Latif Rashid and the prime minister Mohammed Shia’ Alsudani. He also met with the Iraqi political parties’ leaders in the meeting hosted by Sayed Ammar Alhakim, president of the Al-Hikma National Movement, on September 11. In these meetings, he illustrated the importance of Iraq as a significant player in the region in the sense of regional interactions. He also stated, “Iraq remains a strategic priority for Iran.” As a result of this dialogue, Iraq and Iran signed agreements covering areas such as economic cooperation, infrastructure development, education, and security collaboration (ISPI 2024). In his address at the 79th United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 2024, he expressed a willingness to reopen nuclear negotiations, which could represent a change in Iran’s diplomatic posture (AP News 2024). On the other hand, he denounced Israel’s military operations in Gaza and Lebanon as “atrocities.” He urged the reevaluation of regional strategies and underscored the necessity of sanctions relief while also advocating for the acknowledgment of Iran’s security concerns (AP News 2024). Additionally, the Arab neighbors of Iran are still skeptical about the new president’s capacity to moderate Iran’s foreign policy, particularly its support for militant factions throughout the Middle East. He also mentioned “Iran has consistently sought to improve relations with its Arab neighbors” (Haghirian 2024).
Forecasting the future
According to Kamrava, it is probable that Iran will continue to develop its political and economic relations, and potentially even its security cooperation, with its neighbors. Raisi’s “Look East” policy and good neighborly relations have thus far succeeded in accomplishing several of their stated objectives (Kamrava 2024). In addition, the agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Iran and Egypt during Raisi’s era, despite the development in Iran’s relations with Qatar since 2017, can serve as a solid and fundamental base from which Pezeshkian can launch to create better relations. Furthermore, in the aftermath of Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination, officials from the GCC and Iran participated in multiple phone calls and bilateral consultations, including an emergency summit in August (Haghirian 2024). The recent stance of Saudi Arabia by crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman who stated “the Kingdom will not cease its diligent efforts to establish an independent Palestinian state” could strengthen the Iran-Saudi deal (Asem 2024). As a result, the Gaza crisis could be another important element to forging closer relations between some Arab countries and Iran.
Pezeshkian and Iraq
Pezeshkian will be inclined towards moderate political forces in Iraq. This inclination will help to increase the level of stability in Iraq because these forces are more discussable. That would also give Iran more opportunities to enhance its relations with other Western and MENA countries by mediating these powers, such as the meditation of Alhakeem between Iran and Egypt during the Raisi era.
Economy under Pezeshkian’s administration
Pezeshkian is aware that one of his most important goals is economic recovery. He is seeking new economic cooperation with GCC countries, Turkey, China, and even the United States. In his first debate, he emphasized the necessity of economic cooperation with neighboring countries, suggesting that shared economic interests may underpin enhanced diplomatic relations (PressTV 2024). Presumably, he will manage good economic cooperation with GCC countries and other countries around the world. The American sanctions will remain, which could be a significant challenge for achieving his economic recovery goal.
Pezeshkian and Israel
Pursuing anti-Israel policies is one of Pezeshkian’s most fundamental principles. Regardless of what he really believes, he will likely remain committed to supporting this Islamic cause, providing assistance to Gaza, Lebanon, and others affected by the Israeli presence in the region, whether through humanitarian, economic, political, or even military means, according to Iran’s vision of support. Iran’s relationship with Israel is a hindrance in its evolving relations with many countries.
Cultural impact under Pezeshkian administration
In all likelihood, Pezeshkian will try to spread cultural influence across different countries in the region. In this way, he will tie the regional public mind together. This could be reflected in the political interactions. He will also try to enhance the diplomatic envoys of Iran, giving them more space regardless of the former governments that depended on specific non-diplomatic actors to build Iran’s regional relations.
In conclusion, Iran’s presidential election resulted in the victory of reformer Masoud Pezeshkian, signifying a new phase in foreign relations. Reformists, embodying the intellectual left in the Iranian political framework, champion economic openness, liberalization, and reconciliation with the West. Reformers are more open to dialogues and negotiations, aiming to ease tensions and engage in regional cooperation. Iran’s reformists have maintained distinct relationships with Iraqi parties, politicians, and groups while maintaining ties with moderate political powers in the Levant. They have also built new cooperation with the GCC countries. However, Masoud Pezeshkian has criticized the Iranian regime and the IRGC but has also emphasized the importance of diplomatic engagements with the West and the restoration of the JCPOA. He has visited Iraq, signed agreements, and expressed a willingness to reopen nuclear negotiations. Pezeshkian has also urged the reevaluation of regional strategies and sanctions relief while acknowledging Iran’s security concerns. However, Arab neighbors of Iran remain skeptical about his ability to moderate Iran’s foreign policy, particularly its support for militant factions. Under Pezeshkian’s administration, Iran is expected to continue developing its political, economic, and security relations with its neighbors, as demonstrated by Raisi’s “Look East” policy and agreements with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Gaza crisis could also be a key factor in tying Arab countries with Iran. He also aims for economic recovery and seeks new economic cooperation with GCC countries, Turkey, China, and the US. He believes that shared economic interests can enhance diplomatic relations, but American sanctions may pose a challenge. Additionally, Pezeshkian will focus on supporting the Islamic cause and supporting Gaza and Lebanon, which could hinder Iran’s evaluation of relations with many countries. His cultural impact is likely to spread Iranian influence across different countries in the region, tying regional populations together and improving diplomatic ties. This could be reflected in political interactions and the expansion of diplomatic envoys despite the dependence on non-diplomatic actors in previous governments.
References
Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Pezeshkian, taken on July 6, 2024, Photo by AP | Image sourced from FMT | CC License, no changes made
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