Since the end of British occupation in 1948, Myanmar has been mired in constant ethnic and political violence. It is believed that over fifty non-state armed groups are currently vying for power across Myanmar, leaving the country in a near permanent state of chaos. However, the historic semi-arid heartland of the country––the Dry Zone––had remained relatively untouched. That was until a 2021 military coup sparked open rebellion in the region. The Tatmadaw, the current military government of Myanmar, looked to quickly quell the unrest. Their solution was the formation of a paramilitary organization known as the Pyusawhti. Since its inception, the organization has been accused of inciting terror against civilians, dragging the Myanmar’s refuge from civil war in into extreme violence.
Originally created from a loose coalition of Buddhist nationalists, veterans, and members of the Tatmadaw-associated Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP); the Pyusawhti were designed to combat the growing influence of anti-Tatmadaw rebel groups in the region such as the People’s Defense Forces (PDF). What makes the Dry Zone conflict particularly brutal is its existential nature. The Pyusawhti have justified their violence as self-defense. Factions within the Pyusawhti fear for their lives because of PDF assassination campaigns against suspected Tatmadaw sympathizers and informants. Whether paramilitary members are in support of the military government or not, they are forced to resort to state-sponsored violence as a means of community defense against rebel forces.
To understand the Pyusawhti as a paramilitary force, there must be an understanding of its dynamic with civilians in the Dry Zone. The creation of the Pyusawhti polarized a formerly politically diverse region. Civilians could no longer remain neutral and were forced to pick sides or potentially face political violence from either the government or rebels. This environment spurred the radicalization of civilians, many of whom were not previously hostile, towards the rebel movement. Now a majority of villages in the region support the PDF, leaving only a small number of isolated pro-regime villages. Current figures show the Pyusawhti being outnumbered by PDF forces by a ratio of nearly 4:2. Public support is so meager that on recent deployment in Yangon to suppress an anti-coup protest, Pyusawhti forces were forced to retreat and even had some soldiers taken by civilians as prisoners.
With only a limited number of villages under their control, the Pyusawhti have resorted to intimidation and extortion in order to maintain their control over an increasingly dissatisfied population. A common tactic is kidnapping and murdering suspected rebel sympathizers, such as the brutal torture and killing of PDF fundraiser Sandar Win in the Pyusawhti controlled Pauk Township. The group has also been reportedly taking part in extortionary activities outside of its territory. A recent raid in the rebel-controlled Ye Township involved the attempted extortion of money from a small tea shop.
Though they do function as a paramilitary organization, the Pyusawhti are a relatively unsophisticated one. The Tatmadaw in theory provide impunity for the Pyusawhti’s and protect them from rebel retribution. However, widespread dissatisfaction with the coup has forced the Tatmadaw to spread their forces increasingly thin. Thus, it is currently unable to provide effective support to the Pyusawhti. This can be seen as paramilitary strongholds like the Pale Township are successfully attacked by PDF forces at increasing rates. The Pyusawhati’s vulnerability to civilians because of lackluster government support has weakened the group.
With relations between the United States and Myanmar already strained, further funding and development of paramilitary forces threatens to damage them further and could potentially result in a regional power vacuum, leading to more violence.
There are two things the United States can do to help try and stabilize the situation in Myanmar: increasing sanctions and working with international bodies like the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute violations of international law. In terms of sanctions, the United States has already taken steps in this direction with the passage of H.R.5497 BURMA Act in 2022 authorizing targeted measures against the military government while allocating aid for rebel groups. But more action is needed in order to bring the military government into line. With Southeast Asia playing a critical role in countering Chinese expansion, it is essential that stability is restored in the region.
Sanctions against senior members of the military junta through economic or visa restrictions can send the message that the United States is serious about the restoration of Myanmar’s democratic government. The same is true with assisting in the capture and trial of individuals accused of committing war crimes. Anything otherwise would be a failure to follow through on the goals set by the White House’s new National Security Strategy’s focus on supporting democracy and building a bulwark against China in Asia.
With conflict in Ukraine and the Middle East, instability in West Africa, and an upcoming Presidential election at home, Myanmar seems to have been forgotten. The United States needs to refocus on the region and work to bring Myanmar’s democratically elected leadership back into power.
Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: General Photos: Myanmar, taken on Mar. 7, 2015, Photo by Asian Development | Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made