Coverage and Reach, Affordability and Capacity? Gauging the Feasibility of the Mozambican Welfare State through Considerations of Divisive Internal Politics, International Agency Prescriptions, and South-South Cooperation

Abstract

With cash transfer programmes, food subsidies, and other social protections, Mozambique’s welfare state addresses several critical areas of extreme poverty or vulnerability. Yet, the government, under Frelimo leadership, has been unable to extend coverage to all qualifying households. This paper contends that the feasibility of Mozambique’s welfare state does not rest, however, on political or electoral constraints, considering the circumstances of Renamo opposition and Frelimo commitment to social protection. Rather, its feasibility concerns affordability and capacity, as the International Monetary Fund and the International Labor Organization have posited. By tracking past involvements of both international agencies (ie. the World Food Programme, the United Nations, etc.) and foreign governments (ie. Brazil), this paper contextualizes how past efforts have improved fiscal space and institutional capacity in order to expand coverage. After providing relevant case studies and legislation, this paper concludes that the absence or deficiencies of these two factors appear to be the most pressing litmus tests of Mozambique’s welfare state feasibility going forward.


Introduction 

For the past decades, and especially the last ten years, the question of whether to extend or curb social protections has piqued the curiosity of state governments, international agencies, and donors from all corners of the world and sides of the ideological spectrum. In particular, the mechanisms by which to improve existing social protections have sparked not only fierce debate, but also raised eyebrows. Many Sub-Saharan African countries, principally those with high poverty rates and vulnerable group incidence, present ample room for investigating the practices needed for better coverage. In this study, I examine the feasibility of welfare state-building in one particular case: Mozambique.

In Mozambique, social protection can be compartmentalized into three levels: basic, compulsory, and complementary social security.[i] In its basic, noncontributory coverage, cash transfers and other services are afforded to the poorest households as well as what the government considers the most susceptible segments of the population, including disabled individuals, the chronically ill, and households with vulnerable children or orphans. Conversely, both compulsory and contributory social security systems rely on formal sector employment and public service, covering old-age pensions, sickness, maternity benefits, hospitalizations, cash death grants, and even allowances for burial expenses; the complementary social security primarily augments the compulsory system. These systems provide at least partial coverage for several target areas with the intent of reducing poverty and inequality, promoting inclusive growth, galvanizing domestic consumption, and investing in human capital, amongst other positive benefits and externalities.[ii]

Yet, these only came to fruition after the country gained its independence from Portugal in 1975, a process facilitated by a ten-year guerrilla war waged between Portuguese colonial rule and the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo),[iii] a group founded on Marxist-Leninist ideology.[iv] Upon its victory,  the Frelimo entered a prolonged civil war with the Renamo, or Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, backed at the time by the anti-communist Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization.[v] During this period, countries began adopting structural adjustment programmes (SAPs),[vi] at the behest of international agencies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, both of which Mozambique joined in 1984 amidst economic crisis.[vii] With Pretoria attempting to destabilize the Frelimo government and supporting the Renamo, despite the 1984 Nkomati Accord, the Frelimo ruling party adopted the IMF-suggested Programa de Reabilitação Ecónomica (PRE), or Economic Rehabilitation Program.[viii] By shedding much of its centralized socialist planning, and replacing it with small-scale, capital-oriented projects that dismantled state-owned farms and other properties, the government relinquished its hold over the economy and attempted to acquire greater legitimacy domestically and internally.[ix]

However, with two-thirds of the population in absolute poverty in 1989,[x] the World Bank’s SAPs only tackled the poorest ten percent. In contrast, cuts in government spending on food subsidies, education, health, and other services prompted strikes in the public sector and from trade unions. These cuts deteriorated living standards, spurred a massive rural exodus, raised unemployment and malnutrition, and reached what IMF and World Bank officers called a riot threshold, or the brink of socio-economic collapse. This brief historical context facilitates deeper, and more appropriate, understanding of existing political motivations behind Mozambique’s welfare practices, especially since 1992; this was the year when the Acordo Geral de Paz, or Rome General Peace Accord, was signed by Afonso Dhlakama, the Renamo opposition leader, and Joaquim Chissano, the second Mozambique President in an unbroken chain of Frelimo succession.

In this paper, I elaborate on the feasibility of welfare-state building under Frelimo rule, namely since 1992. The first section contains an explanation of the Frelimo’s commitment to improving social protection programs, with particular attention given to its first attempts at social assistance through the Programa Subsídio de Alimentos, or its Food Subsidy Program; its comprehensive Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers; and its dynamic with the existing Renamo opposition. The second section considers what most international agencies and much of the literature consider the two core constraints, affordability and institutional capacity, inhibiting the feasibility of welfare-building in the country. This section also presents counterpoints that provide alternative views on fiscal space expansion and methods of welfare improvement. The third section assesses international agencies’ participation, donor pressures, and aid targeting that have impacted the government’s ability to both increase and streamline its programmes. Lastly, the fourth section stresses Lusophone collaboration, particularly Brazil’s leadership, in shaping welfare practices. These sections have all been designed with the aim of not only evaluating the Frelimo’s past successes and challenges with welfare-state building, but also determining the viability of its future.

 

A Political Commitment to Social Protection

As aforementioned, establishing democracy in Mozambique involved a violent, lengthy process that encompassed both an external war with a former colonial power and an internal war over state control.[xi] Against this backdrop, the Frelimo concentrated its resources on waging a fight against the Portuguese and, later, the Renamo.[xii] Though it had begun as a Marxist-Leninist vanguard, the Frelimo transformed into a state government that adopted free-market policies championed by the World Bank and eventually permitted a multi-party democratic system.[xiii] However, there has never been a democratic turnover for presidential office. Under both the People’s Republic of Mozambique (1975-1990) and the Republic of Mozambique (1990-present), the President has always been affiliated with the Frelimo, despite regular election cycles, two-term limits, and two-round voting systems.

Albeit the Renamo has won several provinces in past presidential elections, it has never attained a majority of votes, nor has it managed to constitute a majority in the Parliamentary Assembly. With the latter, its closest attempt was in 1999 with the formation of an electoral union that acquired 117 seats.[xiv] The fraction of the 250 seats gained had dwindled in 2004 (90 seats) and 2009 (51 seats), though with a sizable bump in 2014 (89 seats).[xv] Because of its continuous minority status, the Renamo has arguably been unsuccessful in posing a credible threat to Frelimo control. Starting in 2013, the Renamo has staged an insurgency, oscillating between intermittent, short-lived ceasefires and ambushes on health clinics and conflict with military guards,[xvi] understanding that its chances to reclaim government control in the voting booth are realistically slim.

The historical absence of a viable competitor in elections has not only allowed the Frenamo to dictate the country’s terms of social welfare, but also signals that the issue of political feasibility arguably does not seem to heavily influence the Frenamo’s decisions when formulating social protection programmes. The elections technically allow for competition, but the record of continuous victory suggests that other factors more persuasively account for the Frenamo’s social protection pursuits. It would be useful to compare the number of Frenamo parliamentary members elected in each election cycle with the average or total social welfare spending across the five years between elections to see if a correlation exists. However, the data are unavailable since only two elections have occurred since the crux of social protection programmes have been launched.

Similar to Chile’s Programa Nacional de Alimentación Complementaria (1987), Zambia’s Kalomo District Social Cash Transfer Scheme (2004), and Malawi’s Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot Scheme (2006), Mozambique’s Programa de Subsídios de Alimentos, or PSA, was created to reduce extreme poverty and counter food scarcity.[xvii] Started in 1990, prior to the end of the Civil War, the Frelimo initiated a basic social protection program that targeted the elderly, those with disabilities or chronic illness, and expectant mothers suffering from malnutrition.[xviii] Due to its specific design, the criteria for selection comprised a means-test for income level and health professional certification for either illness, age, and even pregnancy. Despite being a targeted program, the PSA has traditionally benefited dependents or relatives of direct beneficiaries, mostly children and spouses. Unlike European transfers that oftentimes have been restricted in their ability to reach the young, unemployed, or single parents, the family compositions in Southern Africa, including Mozambique, have enhanced income transfers’ effects.[xix]

Alongside countries such as Angola, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, Mozambique has experienced severe food insecurity due to not only political conflict, humanitarian crisis, and economic liberalization, but also fluctuating commodity prices, unpredictable weather patterns, and unfavorable terms of trade.[xx] In rural communities, natural disasters such as drought and poor agricultural technology have rendered self-sufficient farming difficult. Because of family structure allowing for benefits to percolate, past food insecurity, and unpredictable agricultural conditions, the PSA has been an essential step in reducing extreme poverty, in informal and agricultural sectors especially, despite its limited targeting of the poorest ten percent from select categories.[xxi] One can argue that the Frelimo made this decision to gain popularity and legitimacy. But, that argument first has little academic credence, and second, would be relatively weak when considering that financial resources that could otherwise have been employed in the War were used to furnish a food subsidy program targeted only towards a few vulnerable groups who were typically unhelpful in combat. Additionally, factoring in the intuitive lack of viable electoral opposition under a one-party system, the PSA appeared to be established largely independent of considerations regarding political advantages.

Over the past decades, the Frelimo government has largely shaped the program’s coverage, overseeing it through the Instituto Nacional de Ação Social or the National Institute of Social Action (INAS).[xxii] Originally, the Council of Ministers had charged the Gabinete de Apoio à População Vulnerável, or GAPVU,[xxiii] with distributing cash grants.[xxiv] As a unit within the Ministry of Finance, GAPVU began with 2000 beneficiaries and by 1995, it reached 80,000,[xxv] which was still a fraction of the households classified as destitute. Admittedly, seven years into the program, the Frelimo replaced the GAPVU with the INAS, because of corruption from distribution officers, ineligible beneficiaries, and loopholes.[xxvi] For instance, despite the fact that more than half of Mozambique’s population resided in the cities of Maputo and Matola, the smaller cities of Tete and Nacala possessed comparable and often higher numbers of transfer recipients.[xxvii] Nonetheless, this subsequent action of ensuring program integrity, when coupled with the government’s initial decision to create the PSA, points to possible apolitical, or at least non-electoral, dimensions of social protection policy formation.

Whereas the PSA was an early example of the government’s willingness to engage in social protection, the subsequent, more recent steps to establish a social protection floor are dually notable. Beginning with the 2007 Social Protection Law that determined diverse funding mechanisms and preliminary programmes,[xxviii] the government strikingly set social protection universalization as an objective, though it acknowledged that an ambition of this magnitude would be realized incrementally.[xxix] Besides defining social protection as a right, this law erected three pillars holding up the welfare state.[xxx] First, under the jurisdiction of the INAS and the MMAS, basic social protection would necessarily be provided to the most vulnerable. Second, the Ministério do Trabalho, or Ministry of Labor (MITRAB), would superintend the contributory social security system. Lastly, the private sector would furnish complementary social security alongside the foundational system.[xxxi]

In order to fortify the legislative social protection frameworks, the 2007 Law was then supplemented by the Regulamento de Articulação do Sistema de Segurança Social Obrigatório (49/2009) and the Regulamento do Subsistema de Segurança Social Básica (85/2009).[xxxii] While the former regulated the contributory social security system, as well as the non-contributory basic social protection floor, the latter intended to initiate the process of adopting a platform of even greater coverage titled the Estrategia Nacional de Segurança Social Básica (2010-2014), or the ENSSB I.[xxxiii] Up to this point, primarily Frelimo policymakers had acknowledged the benefits of inclusive growth and the necessity of certain protections (ie. PSA), but there was surrounding fear that social programs, particularly social assistance endeavors, would cultivate dependency on government transfers. Yet, greater national and international consensus emerged determining that such a condescending portrayal of the poor was inaccurate.[xxxiv] Ensuingly, in April 2010, the Council of Ministers approved the ENSSB I,[xxxv] which they hoped would be used to execute medium- and long-term goals, including increases of basic protection coverage for the poor and vulnerable; enhancements in distribution efficiency and targeting; and consistent coordination amongst different programmes and services.[xxxvi]

Though no data could be found regarding the impact of the elite’s perception of the poor, as was surveyed in Malawi,[xxxvii] Mozambique appears to retain at least a political ruling class in the Frelimo that sees expanding social protection as an immediate concern.  As part of the new wave of social protections, alongside Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program, Kenya’s Orphans and Vulnerable Children Program, and South African child support grants and pension schemes,[xxxviii] Mozambique’s recent laws and plans underscore a receptive attitude and comprehensive preparation toward making the country’s welfare state more attainable.

 

The Core Issues: Lacking Fiscal Space and Institutional Capacity

Unlike in Latin American countries such as Brazil where popular pressures largely shape the political feasibility of implementing social protection reform while holding onto office, the absence of political constraints in Mozambique begs the question: what factors inhibit the country from universalizing coverage?

To determine this, it is important to establish how to best increase coverage. Intuitively, the 2007 Social Protection Law that dictated the right to social protection and set the cornerstone for the ENSSB (and the subsequent ENSSB II) is the first indicator. Since the Council passed the Law, the INAS budget has steadily increased, albeit dipped slightly in 2016 (Figure 1). This budget increase corresponded, first, with an increase in the value of social cash transfers that INAS is charged with overseeing. While in 2007 the minimum transfer alloted was USD $3.3 and the maximum was USD $10,[xxxix] both those values have increased to USD $8.6 and USD $17, respectively, by 2014.[xl] Approved by the Council of Ministers, this was one of several revisions that affected the composition of non-contributory social assistance.

Figure 1: The 2007 Social Protection Law’s Increase on the INAS Budget

Source: the United Nations on Mozambique Report: “UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique”

Another change was the near-doubling of INAS employees from 2005 where the Institute had 700 workers to 2013 where it possessed over 1300 workers to superintend and carry out the country’s welfare programs.[xli] Without sufficient workers, the Institute was severely limited in its ability to discharge social assistance, particularly to rural, more distant, and subsequently, underserved regions. Despite the Civil War-era migration that prompted rapid urbanization and displacement, sizable poor communities still exist in rural areas that pose challenges of programme reach. And, because for a long time, much of the INAS registry for social assistance and insurance was paper-based, lapses were seemingly inevitable due to misplaced, damaged or incomplete documentation.

Unsurprisingly, though, a primary determination of household coverage appears to be the INAS budget. In other words, it follows the notion that improvements in how much INAS can spend will be matched by an increase in the number of households it can accomodate. Undoubtedly, the numbers in Figure 1 are extremely rough due to, beyond other reasons, limited data in both number and scope. But, they provide a general idea that an increase in budget will have positive results. For instance,  the increase in fiscal space from 0.18% in 2018 to 0.5% in 2014 has corresponded to an increase in households covered from 183,000 to 427,000.[xlii] Yet, these are still relatively low budget allocations for similar programs in other parts of Africa and Latin America.

However, it cannot be overlooked that besides a quantitative increase in the budget, there was also a qualitative improvement in INAS’s capacity. Notably, INAS has increased its presence from 11 districts to 30 since 2005, despite no additional funding directly for transportation costs.[xliii] The rudimentary paper-based system was replaced with an online registry called the Social Security Information System, along with a training centre for staff to learn to use it. Additionally, INAS now has physical infrastructure in all provinces, allowing it to expand its reach. With a new Public Works Programme (PASP) and consolidation of existing social programmes,[xliv] the government has furthered coordination amongst different members of the ENSSB I rollout.

Consequently, the question of welfare feasibility is not dependent on divisive electoral politics or political constraints, so much as it pertains to room for better fiscal space and institutional capacity, as both the International Labor Organization and the World Bank suggest.[xlv] Like many other African countries, the fiscal space afforded to social protection assistance in Mozambique was and is relatively low compared to the world average. For instance, in 2005, INAS received 0.16 percent of GDP, in contrast to a global standard of 1.5 percent, if not higher.[xlvi] The International Monetary Fund estimates that 2.3 percent of GDP in additional fiscal space could be created between 2012 and 2022,[xlvii] as a result of a booming natural resource sector in the medium term, as well as modernizing social protection agencies, primarily INAS, and overcoming bureaucratic impasses.[xlviii]

Despite policymakers interest in social protection programmes, especially after Mozambique (alongside Lesotho, Namibia, and others) signed onto the 2006 Livingstone Call for Action on National Social Protection Strategies in Africa,[xlix] fiscal space has been limited. A joint ILO-UNICEF collaboration report not only calls for better transparency from the government, but also underscores the need for improved fiscal space.[l] Based on IMF estimates, an increase in fiscal space will correspond with an increase in fiscal revenue, further external grants for budget consolidation in INAS and MGCAS, and necessarily spending reprioritization in the ENSSB (Figure 2).[li] Eventually, the threshold of fiscal space required could be met to ensure social protection coverage for all targeted or vulnerable groups the IMF deems critical. Yet, it does not appear that this has been the case thus far.

Figure 2: IMF estimates for fiscal space creation in Mozambique, 2012-2022

In examining political arguments and discourses made in Anglophone East and Southern Africa, Seekings aims to first, analyze the arguments international organizations, particularly the ILO, proffer in discussions of affordability. Then, he contextualizes the politics of affordability in Botswana, South, Africa, Zambia, and Zanzibar. With case studies spanning different years and geographic areas, Seekings reasons that the “affordability of new or expanded social protection programmes depends on more than assessment of the fiscal costs or the poverty-reducing or developmental benefits.”[lii] Unlike Seekings, who concludes that “even the poorest countries [have] the fiscal space to expand social protection for the poor,” I cannot definitively claim one way or another that fiscal space exists already within Mozambique’s budget, especially considering several international agencies’ consensus otherwise. Hence, the argument is not how to best create the fiscal space: whether that be through tax revenues like in Brazil, or public expenditure redistribution like in Costa Rica and Thailand, or natural resource revenues like in Bolivia and Mongolia. Rather, I contend that earmarking fiscal space, whether it is through government budget reshuffling or international aid, is crucial based on historical and predictive methods. Though Mozambique’s case might differ slightly from the four Seekings selected – for example, the Frelimo, unlike Zambia’s governments, has demonstrated few qualms in taking responsibility or expanding donor-initiated cash transfer programmes (ie. PSA, Bolsa Escola) – it holds that Mozambique’s ability to expand its social protection programmes does not rest solely on financial resources. After all, increasing INAS or similar agencies’ budgets will be insufficient unless met with proper institutional enhancements.

Despite improvements in staff size and physical presence, problems remain in reaching beneficiaries. INAS could adopt a system similar to Malawi, Ethiopia, and Zambia, where community organizers collect and distribute benefits, manage eligibility, and select recipients.[liii] But, INAS would then be susceptible to reinforcing social disparities or patronage relationships. In the past, INAS has relied on sub-regional distribution with non-profit coordination, but to best improve the efficiency and effectiveness of benefit allocation under a centralized system, improving institutional capacity is an utmost concern. Granted, new operational procedures, including a single registry, outsourcing payments to online, and a grievance mechanism for beneficiaries to report issues, improved INAS’s management and dispersion of assistance.[liv] Yet, these changes are hindered by institutional factors outside administrative effectiveness, including narrow criteria for benefit recipients that leave some groups, such as self-employed and informal workers as well as (interestingly) musicians, inadequately covered.[lv] Poor information dissemination has also contributed to popular misconceptions that social programs do not extend beyond social security.[lvi]

At a momentous juncture, perspective toward Mozambique welfare development changed when the joint 2013 ILO and IMF report found that policy alternatives could feasibly empower the government to expand protection spending beyond 1.5 percent of its GDP.[lvii] According to agency experts, expanding INAS programmes, increasing transfer values, implementing the ENSSB, and more were possible. Such steps and further courses of action would be rendered difficult, should Mozambique not manage to locate the fiscal space (existent, as Seekings suggests, or not, as the 2013 ILO and IMF report finds) along with institutional improvements.

 

Factoring in the International Community

Although Mozambique’s relationship with international organizations started precariously with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s neoliberal attitudes and austerity measures,[lviii] the international community’s most recent involvement has contributed extraordinarily to the successful implementation of old and new social protections. With budget deficits and administrative inexperience, the government has sought external help, with several international organizations aiding the INAS and other organs. Albeit these organizations might prioritize their own aims and targets (ie. HelpAge focuses on old-age pensions), the general consensus is that their involvement has primarily helped, rather than hindered, Mozambique in building and sustaining its welfare system. Amongst other players, the International Labor Organization, UNICEF, and the World Bank have been pivotal.

Based on its Recommendation 202 in which it pledged to help realize social security as a human right,[lix] the International Labor Organization (ILO) has assisted in boosting low levels of coverage. In 2005, the ILO partnered with the Portuguese Ministry of Labor and Social Solidarity to produce the STEP Portugal Programme,[lx] which provides direct social protection guidance to Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP).[lxi] Carried out by the ILO Social Security Department and funded by Portugal, the Programme aims to provide technical assistance for creating, executing, and assessing public social security policy. Further, it underscores the integral role of social protection for development and poverty alleviation in Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and São Tomé e Principe (Figure 3).[lxii] Through training sessions, exchange visits, online tools and reference documents in its Information Center on Social Protection (CIPS),[lxiii] and experts’ counsel, the STEP Portugal Programme has both allowed for greater spending on Mozambican social protection agencies and has improved their capabilities. This was only an initial step, too, in ameliorating the limited and fragmented coverage of Mozambique’s social policy instruments.[lxiv]

Figure 3: Annotated Map of Portuguese-Speaking African Countries (PALOP)

Source: STEP Portugal Programme

More recently, the ILO has overseen the implementation of an online registry, including the Social Security Information System, and it has collaborated with Mozambique’s Ministry of Women and Social Action (MMAS) to analyze the ENSSB I for areas of improvement that should be addressed in the ENSSB II.[lxv] With the MMAS in 2014, it brought together 200 policymakers, welfare staffers, civil society members, donors, UN agencies, and more to examine the first ENSBB’s results, reinforce common objectives, and formulate new programmatic policies for inclusion in the following ENSSB.[lxvi] As its ENSSB evaluation concludes, areas exist in which further improvement is critical, including child-specific protection, nutritional and maternal health, and HIV/AIDS coverage. Granted, the ILO’s work has not been above criticism, including concerns that it has established an unsustainable relationship of dependency with Mozambique and that it has pressured the government into prioritizing certain protections that align with the ILO’s mission over matters the Mozambican government considers more important. Yet, its work has provided technical and financial support that have made broader coverage possible.

The ILO has not acted alone, but rather in working groups (Figure 4), which occasionally are overly complicated and create bureaucratic obstacles with overlapping (sometimes contradictory) priorities. Yet, three main international agencies, including the ILO, have spearheaded the UN Joint Programme on Social Protection.[lxvii] The other two, the United Nation Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme, have also facilitated better technical capacity, as well as evaluated different programs currently underway in Mozambique. Between 2005 and 2015, the United Nations worked with the ILO, UNICEF, and WFP to establish a framework for increasing fiscal space and program effectiveness. In the first five years, they established a legal basis for social protections, which they conjointly elaborated through assisting in the gradual construction of ENSSB I. As a flagship country for the One United Nations Initiative,[lxviii] Mozambique has received help from disparate UN coordinated efforts that have enabled greater coverage, strengthened the budgeting and capacity of internal Mozambique instruments such as MMAS and INAS, and reduced the government’s administrative and transaction costs.[lxix] Moreover, the UN’s joint efforts have guaranteed direct resources for social protection programmes, expanded social protection beyond the INAS’s scope, and increased donor interest from high-profile domestic and international stakeholders, including from the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and private benefactors.[lxx]

Figure 4: Institutional governance in the Mozambican social welfare system

Source: the United Nations in Mozambique

Together with the ILO, UNICEF has published joint budget briefs providing counsel to the Frelimo government. By itself, UNICEF has suggested key ways of improving targeted transfers for vulnerable populations, specifically the transfers earmarked for expectant mothers, malnutrition, and families.[lxxi] In 2010, it evaluated the impact of the Programa de Susídio de Alimentos (PSA),[lxxii] noting that too few benefits were being distributed to only a fraction of those who needed them. UNICEF concluded that the subsidy, which hovers around USD $5 per beneficiary and USD $1.8 for each dependent, up to four dependents, only reached ten percent of those eligible, a distressingly small minority.[lxxiii] Despite recognizing that governments in Mozambique and other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa are naturally concerned with the long-term liabilities of social protection assistance, UNICEF has advocated for expanding the country’s budget for social protection, reduced administrative workload, streamlined operational procedures through improved targeting and case management, and amplified the effect of multi-sector responses, all while paying heed to the room for improvement in administrative effectiveness and fiscal allocation.[lxxiv]

In October 2011, as the Council of Ministers approved a package of new programmes to reform the ENSSB, the World Bank, alongside the ILO and UNICEF, conducted a Social Protection Expenditure Review (SPER) that concluded that budget increases were vital.[lxxv] Additionally, the Bank, keeping in line with its tradition of more free-marketed-oriented recommendations, spearheaded the publication of the manual for the Public Works Programme the Mozambican government has steadily engaged with,[lxxvi] though not without difficulties. Similarly, the International Monetary Fund has advocated for efforts to increase state budget allocations through exchange visits between Mozambique, other African countries, and Latin American countries with more developed social protection programs.[lxxvii]

As part of the mandated Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Mozambique must submit to the IMF and the World Bank, the Poverty Reduction Action Plans (PARPs) have outlined the macroeconomic and structural conditions of the country, as well as described the ongoing protection services the government provides and international collaborations it has pursued.[lxxviii] Like in the PRSPS for Ghana, Rwanda, and Uganda, policy recommendations are being translated into National Social Protection Strategies, or the PARPs in Mozambique’s case.[lxxix] To monitor the implementation of the PARPs, different international actors, including non-profits, have kept policymakers accountable in providing coverage. However, both dearth in earmarked fiscal space and lackluster institutional capacity continuously arise as key issues inhibiting the full-fledged execution of planned programs. Each PARP has come with its own set of objectives, which arguably, as Brito contends, have not been fulfilled satisfactorily.[lxxx] Yet, the PARPs have reflected a change in attitude towards social protection, seeing as the first (2001-2005) made no mention of a social protection floor as a priority area,[lxxxi] while the second (2006-2009) and third (2011-2014) have enshrined it as a centerpiece of policy going forward. Demonstrably, the incremental progress each PARP had has enabled the subsequent PARP to concentrate efforts to better administrative targeting, univeralize, or at least expand, coverage, and facilitate interagency coordination. If the PARPs reveal fundamental flaws, those rest primarily in the ability, rather than willingness, of the government agencies to push social protection, at least for vulnerable populations they have deemed at-risk (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Vulnerability Cycle According to the ENSSB I[lxxxii]

Source: The Mozambican ENSSB II

In combating malnutrition, the World Food Programme turned its sights not only to the aforementioned PSA, but also to piloting alternative implementation apparatuses, including payments in vouchers or bank cards. It has worked with local households in evaluating eligibility criteria and constructed capacity-building programmes for INAS officials in the field, working on a micro-level to ameliorate the impacts of poverty.[lxxxiii]

Broadly, despite restrictions on the government budget and administrative hurdles, international organizations such as the ILO, WFP, and UNICEF have assisted Mozambique in making significant strides towards improving the number of households covered by social protections in ways that would likely have been difficult otherwise.

 

South-South, Brazil-Mozambique Cooperation

Besides international contributions to Mozambique’s welfare state, foreign government involvement, specifically Brazil’s, has allowed for social protection programs to expand.

In 1999, Portuguese-speaking countries integrated themselves into an organization called the comunidade dos países da língua portuguesa (CPLP), which was financed by its members and whose first gatherings were held in Maputo with the Mozambican President, Joaquim Chissano, leading the meetings.[lxxxiv] This integration soon bore greater fruit when two years later, Chissano and some government representatives traveled to Brazil where they learned about programmes the Cardoso government had taken on to alleviate poverty. The primary takeaway from these initial twenty-first century encounters was the opportunity to observe Brazil’s flagship Bolsa Escola program, which had improved education rates in Brazilian communities.[lxxxv] To this point, as mentioned prior, Mozambique had already created the Gabinete de Apoio a População Vulnerável (GAPVU) in the 1990s, later restructured into INAS,[lxxxvi] which provided cash transfers for vulnerable groups. However, intensified rural conflict due to Civil War and its aftermath of tense relations between the Frelimo and Renamo led to massive illiteracy, school destruction, and even teacher killings.[lxxxvii] Many families were unable to send their kids to schools, keeping them on farms instead.

Thus, in 2003, Mozambique decided that, with direction from the Brazilian Embassy and two Brazilian organizations, it would launch its own version of Brazil’s Minimum Income for School Attendance (MISA) programme, providing monthly grants to families sending school-aged children to be educated. Though NGOs and foreign aid were the primary instruments of Brazilian policy transfer to Mozambique,[lxxxviii] the Mozambican government was content in adopting iterations of Bolsa Escola and the National School Feeding Program (PNAE),[lxxxix] which would provide meals to all public, philanthropic, and community schools.[xc] The former was made possible upon proposals presented by the Brazilian institutions, Missão Criança, or Mission Child, and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, or the Brazilian Agency for Cooperative Development (ABC). [xci]

The Mozambican Ministry of Education then adopted their suggestions, piloting a collaborative initiative in which the Brazilian Embassy would partially contribute to, manage, and collect funds from the Brazilian business community for Mozambique’s Bolsa Escola. Despite key improvements in assisting both students and alphabetizing many mothers (who were trained by Ministry officers to fill out forms), the program was severely constrained by a meager fiscal budget of USD $720,000 (2006) and bureaucratic procedures. To be more effective at ameliorating extreme poverty, the education sector would have to earmark around 1.5 percent of its budget, which would amount to about USD $2 per month per family member.[xcii] Yet, because the government depends primarily on external assistance to sustain Bolsa Escola, the situation is extremely susceptible to changes in Brazilian generosity. Moreover,  issues of institutional capacity exist that limit the government’s ability to ensure schooling, including lack of student transport, teacher accountability for student absences, and proper nutritional support. Though positive effects have arisen out of increased maternal literacy, improved quantity and quality of food and medical assistance, and better housing conditions, the coverage Bolsa Escola provides is currently limited. This is primarily not due to its selection criteria where families with children between 6 and 16 years-old who possess at least 90 percent school attendance are eligible for conditional transfers,[xciii] but rather by the financial viability of long-run, self-sufficient execution. Other hindrances include language constraints between project staff and local communities, issues with invalid or nonexistent birth certificates, information asymmetries, frequency of house visits, irregular or lost payments, and the number of staffers overseeing the program. In fact, when the program was first implemented in 2003, only two officers were charged with seeing it through. From the 100 families first tested, only 81 actually received the transfers in the end.[xciv]

Between 2004 and 2010, Brazil’s development cooperation with Mozambique multiplied five times over as a result of Lula’s focus on Africa;[xcv] aside from Mozambique, Brazil also helped Ghana through technical assistance with designing LEAP.[xcvi] Lula shifted the government’s policy-making lens outwards in the face of Brazilian domestic disputes and impasses between the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB). Consequently, South-South development cooperation was stressed as a new form of social protection development, rather than traditional sources of aid; notably, skepticism towards private and business donors had percolated due to serious impairments in state budgeting capacity and (ongoing) corruption allegations. Furthermore, increased Chinese economic involvement in the region generated greater international awareness of African social protection dynamics,[xcvii] with the general understanding that existing programs were insufficient in covering more than half of vulnerable, eligible beneficiaries.

Policy transfer, however, is “fundamentally demand-driven.”[xcviii] Albeit Mozambique’s adoption of Brazilian social programs allowed for Brazil to garner greater praise for its welfare practices,[xcix] the Frelimo government ensured that bilateral involvement would assist its population. Recognizing the successes of Brazil’s Sistema Único de Saúde, or universal healthcare system, as well as its comprehensive HIV/AIDs research, Mozambique’s Joaquim Chissano and Lula signed a protocol in Maputo that pledged greater scientific and technological cooperation in areas of health.[c] Brazil had also created a Grupo Temático de Cooperação Internacional em Saúde (GT-CIS), which it had charged with extending certain basic healthcare to other places in South America, Haiti, and particularly the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries. In response to the HIV/AIDS crisis, Mozambique set up a Sociedade Moçambicana de Medicamentos (SMM), or Mozambican Society of Medicine charged with determining and arranging the necessary retroviral medications the country lacked. With Brazilian assistance, a factory was built in Mozambique to supply treatment and curb the disease spread.

Brazilian cooperation with Mozambique, specifically in healthcare and education, have been essential to combating not only extreme poverty, but also targeting vulnerable segments of the population that would otherwise have been overlooked. Yet, the absences of allocated fiscal space and institutional capacity (e.g. bureaucratic or ineffectual procedures, scientific understanding, etc.) for the Mozambican government to internalize the Bolsa Escola programme and respond effectively to the HIV/AIDS crisis have rendered these programmes dependent on Brazilian magnanimity.[ci] This is a possible concern going forward due to an unpredictable political situation in the country.

 

Conclusion

In many contexts, most notably Latin American, political considerations constrain, deter, or incentivize policy-makers in their ability to carry out social protection policy. However, the question of whether or not a welfare state is feasible in Mozambique depends less on electoral or political pressures. Not only have the Frelimo ruled uninterruptedly since the Civil War ended, but also the Renamo have yet to pose a credible threat to displace either the Frelimo presidential succession or its parliamentary majority. Quantitative data regarding voting breakdowns, specifically proportions of Renamo or Frelimo representation, per election cycle compared with increases or decreases in average social protection spending in the five years in-between cycles would prove useful to check if such a link exists. Yet, the best approach currently available is a qualitative historical overview, which points to predictable electoral victories for the Frelimo.

As a consequence, to better understand how to heighten coverage, or increase the number of households that receive some form of assistance or insurance, we observed a statistically significant, and unsurprising, relationship between the number of households covered and the budget of the National Institute for Social Action (INAS). This showed that the increases in past fiscal space and improvements in institutional capacity have enabled Mozambique to extend the services it provides. Based on international agencies’ reports, conclusions can be drawn that in Mozambique’s circumstances, limited budgeting and lackluster implementation have hurt the country’s attempts at furthering assistance. Moving forward, unlike possibly other cases, the questions of affordability and capacity will be instrumental in consolidating and maintaining Mozambique’s welfare state. There are further mechanisms of improving fiscal space, outside those considered, including domestic taxation, that can be examined, albeit their appropriateness should contextualize the high poverty and inequality rates that the country possesses. This paper primarily focused on collaboration with international agencies, such as the International Labor Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations; foreign governments, including the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Netherlands; and South-South cooperation with Brazil, which have all enabled better social protection access through addressing concerns of fiscal space and capacity with direct financing, technical assistance, policy transfer, and more.

Yet, for the Mozambican welfare state to be viable in not only its current form, but also in line with government ambitions (ie. ENSSB II, etc), significant headways need to be made.

 


Works Cited

 

Alcobia, Carla. “Mozambique.” Social Protection: Building Social Protection Floors and Comprehensive Social Security Systems, International Labor Organization, 12 Sept. 2016

Almeida, Celia; Campos, et al. “A Concepção Brasileira de Cooperação Sul-Sul Estruturante em Saúde.” RECIIS Revista Eletrônica de Comunicação, Informação & Inovação em Saúde, vol. 4, p. 25-35., 2010.

Basto, Maria Benedita. “Writing a Nation or Writing a Culture? Frelimo and Nationalism during the Mozambican Liberation War.” Sure Road? Nationalisms in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, edited by Éric Morier-Genoud, Brill, 2012, pp. 103–107.

Bowen, Merle L. “Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 2 (1992): 255-79.

Bowker, Tom, et al. “Mozambique’s Invisible Civil War.” Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 6 May 2016

Boyce, Ethan. “Mozambique Political History, and Environmental Situation.” Mozambique Political History, and Environmental Situation.

Brito, Luís de. “Pobreza, ‘PARPAS’ e Governação.” Desafios Para Moçambique, 2011, pp. 25–42.

Buur, Lars, et al. State Recognition of Local Authorities and Public Participation: Experiences, Obstacles and Possibilities in Mozambique. Centro De Formacãƒo Juridica Et Judiciária, Ministério da Justíca, 2007.

“Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF , 17 Aug. 2015,

Criação do Instituto Nacional da Acção Social (INAS), Decreto nº 28/97, Maputo, Mozambique, 10 de Setembro de 1997.

Cunha, Nuno, et al. “Towards a Mozambican Social Protection Floor.” International Labour Office Social Security Department Geneva , Joint ILO & IMF Report, 2013, 34.

Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga

Timilsina. “MOZAMBIQUE.” In The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq, 93-106. RAND Corporation, 2005.

Ellis, Frank, et al. “Coordination and Coverage.” Social Protection in Africa, Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 73–74.

Estratégia Nacional De Segurança Social Básica.” Republic of Mozambique, Mar. 2010, pp. 1–35.

Falange, Sergio, and Luca Pellerano. “Social Protection Reform in Mozambique and the New Basic Social

Security Strategy.” International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2 Feb. 2016.

“IMF Country Report No. 13/200.” IMF Country Report No. 13/200, July 2013. International Monetary Fund.

Kalebe-Nyamongo, Chipiliro, and Heather Marquette (2014), ‘Elite Attitudes Towards Cash Transfers and  the Poor in Malawi’, DLP Research Paper 30 (Birmingham: Developmental Leadership Programme, University of Birmingham).

“The Livingstone Call for Action.” Social Protection – a Transformative Agenda, Mar. 2006.

Lavinas, L.; 2003. Encouraging School Attendance in Mozambique by granting a minimum income to parents. International Social Security Review, Vol 56, 3-4/2003.

Leite, Iara Costa, et al. “Brazilian South–South Development Cooperation: The Case of the Ministry of Social Development in Africa.” Journal of International Development, 10 Nov. 2015.

Low J, Garrett J and Ginja V. ; 1998. Redes Formais de Segurança Social num Ambiente Urbano. Lições Extraídas do Programa de Subsídio de Alimentos em Moçambique. In “Pobreza e Bem-Estar em Moçambique. Primeira Avaliação Nacional (1996-97).

Massingarela , Cláudio, and Virgulino Nhate. “The Politics of What Works: A Case Study of Food Subsidies and the Bolsa Escola in Mozambique .” Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Feb. 2006, pp. 3–4.

Manning, Carrie L. “Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000.” Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000, Praeger, 2002, pp. 53–54.

Milani, Carlos R.S., and Roberta Nunes Lopes. “Cooperação Sul-Sul e Policy Transfer Em Saúde Pública: Análise Das Relações Entre Brasil e Moçambique Entre 2003 e 2012.”Associação Brasileira De Relações Internacionais , Carta Internacional , 30 Oct. 2014

Mozambique: First Review Under the Policy Support Instrument and Request for Modification of Assessment Criteria-Staff Report; and Press Release. International Monetary Fund, 20 Dec. 2010.

Mozambique Social Protection Assessment Review of Social Assistance Programs and Social Protection Expenditures.” Human Development Department Social Protection Unit Africa Region, World Bank, 23 Oct. 2012, pp. 94-94.

MZ-Preparation and Supervision of the Pilot Public Works Program. The World Bank, 7 Nov. 2011

Niño‐Zarazúa, Miguel and Barrientos, Armando and Hulme, David and Hickey, Sam, Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Getting the Politics Right (2012). World Development (2012), Vol. 40, No. 1.

One United Nations Pilot Initiative in Mozambique. World Health Organization.

Repartição de Nutrição, 1990. Ministério de Saúde. Comentários sobre o Programa do GAPVU. Mimeograph, 1990.

Republic of Mozambique. “Republic of Mozambique: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper .”IMF Country Report No. 11/132 , International Monetary Fund, June 2011.

Ribas, Rafael P, et al. “O Programa Subsídio De Alimentos Em Moçambique: Avaliação Da Linha De Base.” International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, United Nations Development Programme, Oct. 2011.

Seekings, Jeremy. “’Affordability’ and the Political Economy of Social Protection in Contemporary Africa.” Centre for Social Science Research, Dec. 2016, pp. 1–31.

“Step Portugal Programme: Extending Social Protection in PALOP Countries.” Social Protection Platform, International Labor Organization

Soares, Fábio Veras, and Clarissa Teixera . Avaliação Do Impacto Da Expansão Do Programa De Subsídio De Alimentos Em Moçambique. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, Dec. 2010.

Social Security Speaks Portuguese in Africa. International Training Centre of the ILO, 18 Oct. 2010

Wheeler, Jack. “Mozambique.” New Insurgencies: Anti-Communist Guerrillas in the Third World, edited by Michael Radu, Routledge, 2017.

World Bank. 2011. Mozambique – Preparation and Supervision of the Pilot Public Works Program Project. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank. 2012. Mozambique – Social protection assessment : review of social assistance programs and social protection expenditures. Washington, DC : World Bank.

 


Endnotes

[i] Alcobia, Carla. “Mozambique.” Social Protection: Building Social Protection Floors and Comprehensive Social Security Systems, International Labor Organization, 12 Sept. 2016

[ii] “Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF , 17 Aug. 2015,

[iii] Bowen, Merle L. “Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 2 (1992): 255-79.

[iv] Basto, Maria Benedita. “Writing a Nation or Writing a Culture? Frelimo and Nationalism during the Mozambican Liberation War.” Sure Road? Nationalisms in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, edited by Éric Morier-Genoud, Brill, 2012, pp. 103–107.

[v] Wheeler, Jack. “Mozambique.” New Insurgencies: Anti-Communist Guerrillas in the Third World, edited by Michael Radu, Routledge, 2017.

[vi] Bowen, Merle L. “Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 2 (1992): 255-256.

[vii] Ibid., 257.

[viii] Ibid., 261-263.

[ix] Buur, Lars, et al. State Recognition of Local Authorities and Public Participation: Experiences, Obstacles and Possibilities in Mozambique. Centro De Formacãƒo Juridica Et Judiciária, Ministério da Justíca, 2007.

[x] Bowen, Merle L. “Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 2 (1992): 255-256.

[xi] Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina. “MOZAMBIQUE.” In The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq, 93-106. RAND Corporation, 2005.

[xii] Bowen, Merle L. “Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 2 (1992): 254-261.

[xiii] Manning, Carrie L. “Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000.” Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000, Praeger, 2002, pp. 53–54.

[xiv] Boyce, Ethan. “Mozambique Political History, and Environmental Situation.” Mozambique Political History, and Environmental Situation.

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] Bowker, Tom, et al. “Mozambique’s Invisible Civil War.” Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 6 May 2016

[xvii] Niño‐Zarazúa, Miguel and Barrientos, Armando and Hulme, David and Hickey, Sam, Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Getting the Politics Right (2012). World Development (2012), Vol. 40, No. 1.

[xviii]  Bowen, Merle L. “Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 2 (1992): 272.

[xix]  Niño‐Zarazúa, Miguel and Barrientos, Armando and Hulme, David and Hickey, Sam, Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Getting the Politics Right (2012). World Development (2012), Vol. 40, No. 1.

[xx] Ibid.

[xxi] Ribas, Rafael P, et al. “O Programa Subsídio De Alimentos Em Moçambique: Avaliação Da Linha De Base.” International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, United Nations Development Programme, Oct. 2011.

[xxii] Ellis, Frank, et al. “Coordination and Coverage.” Social Protection in Africa, Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 73–74.

[xxiii] Repartição de Nutrição, 1990. Ministério de Saúde. Comentários sobre o Programa do GAPVU. Mimeograph, 1990.

[xxiv] Massingarela , Cláudio, and Virgulino Nhate. “The Politics of What Works: A Case Study of Food Subsidies and the Bolsa Escola in Mozambique .” Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Feb. 2006, pp. 3–4.

[xxv] Ibid, 11.

[xxvi] Low J, Garrett J and Ginja V. ; 1998. Redes Formais de Segurança Social num Ambiente Urbano. Lições Extraídas do Programa de Subsídio de Alimentos em Moçambique. In “Pobreza e Bem-Estar em Moçambique. Primeira Avaliação Nacional (1996-97).

[xxvii] Ibid.

[xxviii] Alcobia, Carla. “Mozambique.” Social Protection: Building Social Protection Floors and Comprehensive Social Security Systems, International Labor Organization, 12 Sept. 2016

[xxix] Falange, Sergio, and Luca Pellerano. “Social Protection Reform in Mozambique and the New Basic Social Security Strategy.” International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2 Feb. 2016.

[xxx] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF, 17 Aug. 2015.

[xxxi] Ibid.

[xxxii] Ibid.

[xxxiii] “Estratégia Nacional De Segurança Social Básica.” Republic of Mozambique, Mar. 2010, pp. 1–35.

[xxxiv] James Ferguson’s 2015 “Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution” explains this new finding nicely.

[xxxv] Mozambique: First Review Under the Policy Support Instrument and Request for Modification of Assessment Criteria-Staff Report; and Press Release. International Monetary Fund, 20 Dec. 2010.

[xxxvi] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF, 17 Aug. 2015.

[xxxvii] Kalebe-Nyamongo, Chipiliro, and Heather Marquette (2014), ‘Elite Attitudes Towards Cash Transfers and the Poor in Malawi’, DLP Research Paper 30 (Birmingham: Developmental Leadership Programe, University of Birmingham).

[xxxviii] Niño‐Zarazúa, Miguel and Barrientos, Armando and Hulme, David and Hickey, Sam, Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Getting the Politics Right (2012). World Development (2012), Vol. 40, No. 1.

[xxxix] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF, 17 Aug. 2015.

[xl] Ibid.

[xli] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF, 17 Aug. 2015.

[xlii] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF, 17 Aug. 2015.

[xliii] Ibid.

[xliv] World Bank. 2011. Mozambique – Preparation and Supervision of the Pilot Public Works Program Project. Washington, DC: World Bank.

[xlv] “Mozambique Social Protection Assessment Review of Social Assistance Programs and Social Protection Expenditures.” Human Development Department Social Protection Unit Africa Region, World Bank, 23 Oct. 2012, pp. 94-94.

[xlvi] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF, 17 Aug. 2015.

[xlvii] “IMF Country Report No. 13/200.” IMF Country Report No. 13/200, July 2013. International Monetary Fund.

[xlviii] Cunha, Nuno, et al. “Towards a Mozambican Social Protection Floor.” International Labour Office Social Security Department Geneva , Joint ILO & IMF Report, 2013, 34.

[xlix] “The Livingstone Call for Action.” Social Protection – a Transformative Agenda, Mar. 2006.

[l] Cunha, Nuno, et al. “Towards a Mozambican Social Protection Floor.” International Labour Office Social Security Department Geneva , Joint ILO & IMF Report, 2013, 34.

[li] IMF Country Report No. 13/200.” IMF Country Report No. 13/200, July 2013. International Monetary Fund.

[lii] Seekings, Jeremy. “’Affordability’ and the Political Economy of Social Protection in Contemporary Africa.” Centre for Social Science Research, Dec. 2016, pp. 1–31.

[liii] Niño‐Zarazúa, Miguel and Barrientos, Armando and Hulme, David and Hickey, Sam, Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Getting the Politics Right (2012). World Development (2012), Vol. 40, No. 1.

[liv] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF , 17 Aug. 2015.

[lv] Ibid.

[lvi] Ibid.

[lvii] Cunha, Nuno, et al. “Towards a Mozambican Social Protection Floor.” International Labour Office Social Security Department Geneva , Joint ILO & IMF Report, 2013, 34.

[lviii] Massingarela , Cláudio, and Virgulino Nhate. “The Politics of What Works: A Case Study of Food Subsidies and the Bolsa Escola in Mozambique .” Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Feb. 2006, pp. 3–4.

[lix] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF , 17 Aug. 2015,

[lx]  Alcobia, Carla. “Mozambique.” Social Protection: Building Social Protection Floors and Comprehensive Social Security Systems, International Labor Organization, 12 Sept. 2016

[lxi] “Step Portugal Programme: Extending Social Protection in PALOP Countries.” Social Protection Platform, International Labor Organization

[lxii] Ibid.

[lxiii] Social Security Speaks Portuguese in Africa. International Training Centre of the ILO, 18 Oct. 2010

[lxiv] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF , 17 Aug. 2015,

[lxv] Ibid.

[lxvi] Ibid.

[lxvii] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF , 17 Aug. 2015.

[lxviii] One United Nations Pilot Initiative in Mozambique. World Health Organization.

[lxix] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF , 17 Aug. 2015.

[lxx] Ibid.

[lxxi] Massingarela , Cláudio, and Virgulino Nhate. “The Politics of What Works: A Case Study of Food Subsidies and the Bolsa Escola in Mozambique .” Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Feb. 2006.

[lxxii] Soares, Fábio Veras, and Clarissa Teixera . Avaliação Do Impacto Da Expansão Do Programa De Subsídio De Alimentos Em Moçambique. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, Dec. 2010.

[lxxiii] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF , 17 Aug. 2015.

[lxxiv] Ibid.

[lxxv] World Bank. 2012. Mozambique – Social protection assessment : review of social assistance programs and social protection expenditures. Washington, DC : World Bank.

[lxxvi] MZ-Preparation and Supervision of the Pilot Public Works Program. The World Bank, 7 Nov. 2011

[lxxvii] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF , 17 Aug. 2015.

[lxxviii] Republic of Mozambique. “Republic of Mozambique: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper .”IMF Country Report No. 11/132 , International Monetary Fund, June 2011.

[lxxix] Niño‐Zarazúa, Miguel and Barrientos, Armando and Hulme, David and Hickey, Sam, Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Getting the Politics Right (2012). World Development (2012), Vol. 40, No. 1.

[lxxx] Brito, Luís de. “Pobreza, ‘PARPAS’ e Governação.” Desafios Para Moçambique, 2011, pp. 25–42.

[lxxxi] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF , 17 Aug. 2015.

[lxxxii] It elaborates the cyclical effect of vulnerability: the red circle reads “pregnancy and primary infancy,” the orange circle reads “school age,” the brown circle reads “adolescence,” the blue circle reads “adults,” and the green circle reads “old age.”

[lxxxiii] Capitalising on UN Experience: The Development of a Social Protection Floor in Mozambique.” United Nations in Mozambique, UNICEF , 17 Aug. 2015.

[lxxxiv] Massingarela , Cláudio, and Virgulino Nhate. “The Politics of What Works: A Case Study of Food Subsidies and the Bolsa Escola in Mozambique .” Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Feb. 2006.

[lxxxv] Ibid.

[lxxxvi] Criação do Instituto Nacional da Acção Social (INAS), Decreto nº 28/97, Maputo, Mozambique, 10 de Setembro de 1997.

[lxxxvii] Massingarela , Cláudio, and Virgulino Nhate. “The Politics of What Works: A Case Study of Food Subsidies and the Bolsa Escola in Mozambique .” Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Feb. 2006.

[lxxxviii] Leite, Iara Costa, et al. “Brazilian South–South Development Cooperation: The Case of the Ministry of Social Development in Africa.” Journal of International Development, 10 Nov. 2015.

[lxxxix] Ibid.

[xc] Massingarela , Cláudio, and Virgulino Nhate. “The Politics of What Works: A Case Study of Food Subsidies and the Bolsa Escola in Mozambique .” Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Feb. 2006.

[xci] Leite, Iara Costa, et al. “Brazilian South–South Development Cooperation: The Case of the Ministry of Social Development in Africa.” Journal of International Development, 10 Nov. 2015.

[xcii] Lavinas, L.; 2003. Encouraging School Attendance in Mozambique by granting a minimum income to parents. International Social Security Review, Vol 56, 3-4/2003.

[xciii] Massingarela , Cláudio, and Virgulino Nhate. “The Politics of What Works: A Case Study of Food Subsidies and the Bolsa Escola in Mozambique .” Chronic Poverty Research Centre, Feb. 2006.

[xciv] Ibid.

[xcv] Leite, Iara Costa, et al. “Brazilian South–South Development Cooperation: The Case of the Ministry of Social Development in Africa.” Journal of International Development, 10 Nov. 2015

[xcvi] Niño‐Zarazúa, Miguel and Barrientos, Armando and Hulme, David and Hickey, Sam, Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. Getting the Politics Right (2012). World Development (2012), Vol. 40, No. 1.

[xcvii] Leite, Iara Costa, et al. “Brazilian South–South Development Cooperation: The Case of the Ministry of Social Development in Africa.” Journal of International Development, 10 Nov. 2015

[xcviii] Milani, Carlos R.S., and Roberta Nunes Lopes. “Cooperação Sul-Sul e Policy Transfer Em Saúde Pública: Análise Das Relações Entre Brasil e Moçambique Entre 2003 e 2012.”Associação Brasileira De Relações Internacionais , Carta Internacional , 30 Oct. 2014

[xcix] Almeida, Celia; Campos, et al. “A Concepção Brasileira de Cooperação Sul-Sul Estruturante em Saúde.” RECIIS Revista Eletrônica de Comunicação, Informação & Inovação em Saúde, vol. 4, p. 25-35., 2010.

[c] Milani, Carlos R.S., and Roberta Nunes Lopes. “Cooperação Sul-Sul e Policy Transfer Em Saúde Pública: Análise Das Relações Entre Brasil e Moçambique Entre 2003 e 2012.”Associação Brasileira De Relações Internacionais , Carta Internacional , 30 Oct. 2014

[ci]  Milani, Carlos R.S., and Roberta Nunes Lopes. “Cooperação Sul-Sul e Policy Transfer Em Saúde Pública: Análise Das Relações Entre Brasil e Moçambique Entre 2003 e 2012.”Associação Brasileira De Relações Internacionais , Carta Internacional , 30 Oct. 2014

 

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