China with Global Characteristics: Why the Global Order is Safe from China’s Growing Influence

Image Caption: Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers a speech in the Great Hall of the People, outlining his vision for the potential for Chinese leadership in the world at a time when Western powers are wrestling with their attitudes towards globalization.


Introduction

In October 2017, President Xi Jinping addressed the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in the Great Hall of the People.[I] Every detail – from the Hall’s perfectly symmetrical layout, the orderly proceedings and well-crafted speech, to the unanimous applause – was carefully choreographed aimed at the Chinese masses. But beyond the members of the Congress, President Xi had another audience in mind. In a clear tone, he recommended that other countries draw on “Chinese wisdom” and offered the world a “Chinese approach” to solve pressing global problems.[ii] To this point, however, it was not applause that President Xi received from his global audience. Instead, he had stirred mixed feelings amongst his global crowd. Many took the message as a hint of China’s desire to shed its old form of “low-profile” diplomacy for more ambitious foreign adventures, while others saw it as a prologue to a Sino-centric global order. Whatever the talks and speculations may be, fears and scepticisms dominated. Following China’s unveiling of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, concerns have been raised over Beijing’s plans to rewrite the rules of the global economic order. Elsewhere, ongoing tensions between the United States and China in the South China Sea led many to see both major powers locking in a “Thucydides’ Trap,” a phrase popularised by Harvard Professor Graham T. Allison and commonly refering to the notion that conflict and war inevitably result when a rising power seeks to challenge the established leader of the international order.[iii] Taking a quick glance, it seems that many view the future between China and the global order as far from promising. Rather than stretching its arms out in embrace of a more prosperous China, the global community seems to recoil in fear and suspicion over its growing confidence and ambitions.

Not What You May Think

By contemporary standards, China is seen as a growing revisionist power. By definition, a revisionist power is one that is dissatisfied with the existing international arrangements and seeks changes to expand its power and influence globally. But a revisionist is not the same as a revolutionary. By taking a close-up examination of China’s global disposition and its underlying motivating factors, the global community may discover a different reality: China is not a usurper biding its time to upturn the current global order, but an interested stakeholder in maintaining the existing order, together with its institutions and norms. This essay will explore how the world may be seeing a more familiar China with globalist characteristics far from its reputation as a maverick.

Global Currency, Not Yuan

There is little doubt that China has been the greatest beneficiary of the liberal economic order. Since its ascension into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, China’s GDP more than tripled in less than a decade.[iv] With this growing economic clout came greater influence, and China wasted no time in making its presence felt in the global economic environment. However, these moves came with repercussions to China’s global image. Since the launching of the Belt and Road infrastructure programme in 2013 and followed by the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015, concerns have been raised over China’s alleged ambitions to create new economic alternatives to bypass U.S. dominance and global institutions led by liberal democracies.[v] Yet such prophecies of a Chinese economic insurgence are premature and missing the real point. In his writing to the Foreign Affairsmagazine, Evan A. Feigenbaum relates China’s new economic initiatives as a strategy of “portfolio diversification” that reflects a growing Chinese desire – and ability – to complement existing economic arrangements with new, bigger platforms that better reflect its increasing power and status.[vi] While there is no hiding that China is dissatisfied with the inadequacies of current economic infrastructures, a disgruntled China does not necessarily have revolutionary instincts to overturn the existing order.

Conversely, China has not left the global pack at all. It remains the third-largest contributor to AIIB’s closest competitor, the Asian Development Bank (ADB),[vii] and it continues to play an active role in global economic conferences and meetings. On a different note, China’s leadership in regional economic partnerships, such as the AIIB and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), can help create a more concerted and effective Asian response to global problems. For example, in 2016, the ADB estimated that the total funding required for Asia’s infrastructural investment was close to US $1 trillion a year until 2020, of which existing measures could support only 60%.[viii] As such, the formation of the AIIB can be seen as an innovative instrument that applies timely fixes to the economic infrastructure in Asia. At the same time, there is no doubt that a more economically resilient and vibrant Asia can better respond to global problems and manage global demands. Besides, the idea of infrastructural development in Asia is not a Chinese invention. Instead, it was first articulated by former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the World Bank, and the ADB at the beginning of this century.[ix] As such, by casting their disapproving glance at an idea that was first articulated by themselves, the United States and world’s attitude towards China’s leading role in Asia’s infrastructural development seems to lack persuasion and consistency. It seems that a fundamental change in how the world recognises China’s global policies and understands its intentions is necessary.

Essentially, a more integrated global market and prosperous trade serve the interest of China’s rapidly expanding economy. Especially at times when China is facing huge economic pressures at home, maintaining a stable and functioning global economy has never been more important for Chinese leaders. In many aspects, the relationship between China and the global economy is mutual: a thriving global economy will help Chinese leaders to both accomplish its economic goals of completing China’s transition to a developed country and as an external stabiliser for internal pressures. As such, it does not seem very wise for Chinese leaders to threaten and compromise a global system where much is at stake for China. For example, the future of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is very much premised upon the state of the global economic order. Paradoxically, China may actually be seen promoting global values more than its own. The world should take comfort that greater economic integration and cooperation are purchased with a global currency, not Yuanalone.

Political Reform in China: The Unexpected Student

On the political front, differences in state ideologies and political systems are long thought to hinder any form of meaningful interactions between China and the global world. Despite China’s impressive economic growth achieved since it carried out modernising reforms in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping, domestic and political reforms have come at a more modest pace. As such, much of the world remains ambivalent and skeptical about a rising China that supposedly seeks to uphold a rules-based system and values of the global order. However, interactions of political ideas between the Chinese and global systems have been significant and produce more positive results than what many have come to acknowledge. In her essay titled “Autocracy with Democratic Characteristics,” Professor Yuen Yuen Ang suggests that contrary to common criticisms and doubts, the Chinese political system, in fact, has been responsive to democratic norms and reforms. Indeed, over the years, political reforms have gradually transformed the Chinese bureaucracy, and it has become more recognisable through its incorporation of democratic principles, such as meritocracy, accountability and performance management.[x] However, this is not to suggest that the real issues of corruption and accountability have become less relevant or important in the Chinese political context today. Despite its efforts at creating a modern and efficient bureaucracy, there remain powerful vested interests and countervailing socio-political forces that preempt significant and meaningful internal transformations. Nonetheless, what should also be considered is that though political changes might have seemed unsatisfactory based on global standards, the progress made – no matter how incremental it may be – by the Chinese political systems and its adaptability are real. Contrary to mainstream ideas, the Chinese political system presents itself not as a monolithic, rigid structure but as a flexible, “unique hybrid”[xi] that has managed to find a comfortable negotiating space between its own political traditions and cultures and global norms of democratic and institutional practices.

While the model of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” appears to herald the success of the “Chinese way,” the ingenuity of this “Chinese way” is as much derived from unique Chinese strengths as it is from a strong understanding and adaptation of global ideas. Contrary to common belief, global influences do actually balance and shape, if not inspire, Chinese political processes. Of course, as China’s power and influence grows, Chinese leaders may find themselves less inclined to be seen as a student. But this should not come as a surprise. The logic goes that with rising power comes growing confidence in one’s ideas and practices. Nonetheless, the exchange of political ideas between China and the world will continue as Chinese leaders are aware that the strength of its hybrid system lies in an ability to adapt and accommodate different ideas and practices. Rather than standing as a threat to China’s political systems, global systems and institutions actually act as a useful textbook for Chinese leaders to modernise and reform its own political infrastructure. Additionally, it behooves the global community to take greater confidence in its democratic systems and global institutions; only functioning democracy and a strongglobal system will further encourage China to learn and adapt. It is through active engagement and transfers of global democratic norms and practices that more substantial political reforms can manifest in China.

The Geopolitical Picture: The U.S. and China in the South China Sea

Perhaps no other place does one breathe a greater air of tension between the United States and China than in the South China Sea. On 4 October 2018, an American destroyer USS Decaturcame within fifty meters from a Chinese warship near disputed islands in the South China Sea.[xii] Furthermore, the United States Navy is planning to conduct more assertive “freedom of navigation operations” (or FONOPs) in the South China Sea to deter its Chinese counterparts.[xiii] Indeed, China’s growing intransigence in the South China Sea has grabbed many headlines and fanned fears over China’s ambitions to challenge U.S. hegemony. But does this muscular posture necessarily point to Chinese aspirations to challenge U.S. leadership, or indicate Beijing’s willingness to risk war against the United States in a bid for regional hegemony? Both are unlikely.

To put things into perspective, the picture of an Asia-Pacific region devoid of U.S. leadership and the dismantlement of its alliances is unnerving to both regional leaders and Beijing. For decades, the U.S.-led security frameworks and military partnerships have been a cornerstone of the region’s security infrastructure. Through these elaborate systems, the United States has played a central role in shaping multilateral relations and influencing regional dynamics. However, a U.S. military withdrawal would change all that in two significant ways. First, a U.S. pull-out from the region would leave a vacuum that no country, including China, is willing or able to fill. Second, the absence of U.S. leadership could lead to a dismantling of the region’s security infrastructure, which would raise serious security concerns over Japan’s possible remilitarisation[xiv] and escalation of conflicts at the Korean peninsula. In addition, the absence of an integrated security framework can throw the entire region into a state of anarchy, which would then breed uncertainty and insecurity among leaders. In such a tensed and volatile environment, a single episode could spark off a “domino effect” that would prove disastrous for the entire regional infrastructure. And given its geographical proximity and historical antagonisms and legacies involved, both the “Japanese question” and the “Korean question” will deliver many difficulties and pose serious security threats to Beijing. Granted, a strong U.S. military presence and well-functioning alliances may frustrate Chinese leaders who seek to expand its sphere of influence. But the geopolitical situation is far too delicate for us to see it only as a U.S.-China competition. Variables such as regional stability and legacies influence Beijing’s decision-making and foreign policy as well. Thus, Chinese leaders know better than anyone else that living alongside a stable hegemon remains a far better option than a historical throwback to a modern “warring states period” (zhan guo shi daior战国时代). With the themes of unification and peace featuring prominently in both its history and popular culture, the Chinese population are just as dedicated to peace as they are fearful of anarchy and war. Thus, as a matter of rationality, a stable and peaceful order in the region certainly matters more to China than who helms the order.

On the other hand, Chinese military efforts in the region may represent a more defensive mentality than it appears on the surface. Instead of using it as a geopolitical first step to challenge U.S. military systems and the regional power structure they maintain, Chinese military efforts in the South China Sea are more targeted at protecting what Beijing claims as China’s “core interests.”[xv] As ambiguous and debatable these claims can be, talks of Chinese intentions for a military showdown with the United States might have been exaggerated. As Michael Beckley says, “the main threat to U.S. primacy is not China’s rise but geopolitical hyperventilation, which emboldens China and encourages reckless U.S. foreign adventures and domestic underinvestment.”[xvi] Therefore, a better understanding of the various stakes involved in the region can provide us with a more nuanced side of the story. While China is a growing revisionist power aimed to expand its influence and secure vital interests, it is neither a revolutionary power bent on overthrowing the existing global order[xvii] nor a maverick determined to override current rules. The rattling is loud between the United States and China, but their sabers are more than likely to remain well sheathed.

The Middle Kingdom: Trends in Chinese History

An essential but often overlooked factor when it comes to mapping contemporary Chinese global trajectories is China’s own history. Throughout Chinese history, power and destiny were recurring themes that often guided and determined the rise and fall of empires. But, historically, the Chinese population have not come to associate power and destiny with global leadership and expansions. While Chinese empires certainly had expansionist tendencies, these were nevertheless regional and limited in scope. Instead, Chinese empires created what this essay describes as the “Confucian-Tribute system.” In these systems, empires developed their own sphere of influence, marked by their cultural homogeneity and similarity (i.e. Confucianism). Also, foreign populations and cultures were mainly seen as incompatible to a Sinocentric, Confucian order. While Chinese emperors exerted considerable influence in its vicinity, they looked no further to the outside world and remained largely disinterested, if not hostile, to global developments. A prosperous Middle Kingdom uninterrupted by external influences was a far higher priority than the making of a global empire.

However, the problem lies not just with an inability to see from a Chinese historical point of view, but the tendency for many to draw assumptions on the course of modern developments from a Eurocentric perspective.[xviii] From the beginning of the Portuguese Maritime Empire in the 15thcentury to the Spanish exploration of the Americas, and from the British Colonial Empire to the “Dollar Empire” of the United States, the modern history of empires in the Western world seems to provide a convincing template on the global trajectories of power and expansion. In each case, the rise of a new hegemon alters the balance of power by dissolving the old order and establishing a new one in its image. Predictably, against this background of the Western experience, interpretations and understandings of China’s contemporary rise have not escaped from a trap of “linear developmentalism,”[xix] explained by Anievas and Nisancıoglu in “How the West Came to Rule” as the assumption that “European experience of modernity is a universal stage of development through which all societies must pass.”[xx] However, European – or Western – history is not synonymous with global history. Just as the West takes pride and draws inspiration from its history, it is only as logical that the Chinese people look into its past to appreciate contemporary events and developments. Thus, a starting point to reach a more reasonable understanding of China’s present behaviours and actions is first to recognise the historical developments and cultural forces that have come to shape Chinese identities over time. From its construction of the Great Wall to the teachings of Confucianism and its creation of the Tribute System, it is not difficult for one to realise that on global aspirations and leadership, Chinese history inspires few and justifies little – less to say of arousing ambitions to challenge the liberal global order. Without a convincing reference to its past, it is hard to imagine that the Chinese people would come to endorse a national agenda for global dominance.

So what exactly is the “Chinese solution” that President Xi wants to sell to the world, and how should the world react to a more visible China on global affairs? In their essay to the Foreign Affairs magazine, Campbell and Ely suggest that many have already begun questioning conventional wisdom by arguing that “as a leading beneficiary of this liberal international order… Beijing would have a considerable stake in the order’s preservation and come to see its continuation as essential to China’s progress.”[xxi] Similarly, the ongoing trade wars and rising military rows between the United States and China seem to give ammunition to talks of a return of the “Thucydides Trap” and provide vivid depictions of a defiant China jockeying for power with the “old guards” of the liberal global order. However, underneath this screen of pessimism and fears may lie a different reality. In many respects, the idea that China could be shaped into a more responsible stakeholder through active engagement remains true, if not more so than ever today.

On the issue of trade wars, rhetoric may seem divorced from its empirical reality. For example, according to the S&P Global Market Intelligence, total trade in dollar terms between the United States and China grew 14.3% in August, including an export expansion of 9.8% that exceeded market expectations of 7.8%.[xxii] While it still takes time for an economic equilibrium to be reached and for tariffs to show more measurable effects, the world should also bear in mind that important vested interests and benefits of free trade will continue to act as powerful inertia to a rollback on trade between the world’s two largest economies. In the South China Sea, things are not as bleak as they seem either. Fundamentally, rising tensions between the United States and China in the South China Sea are less sparked by the irreconcilability of vital national interests than a mix of mismanagement of foreign policy and poor communication between Washington and Beijing. In this geopolitical drama, problems are accentuated not by poor actors, but poor scripts. Nonetheless, promising signs are already showing. In a speech made in the Pentagon on 23 September, U.S. Defence Secretary James Mattis told reporters that it is important “to have a relationship with China” and efforts have been made to find a way out of this geopolitical impasse.[xxiii]

While it is necessary for the global community to grasp the gravity of a deteriorating U.S.- China relations on both economic and political fronts and to remain cautious as to how far China would go to follow a rules-based order, we should also not let ourselves down the paths of unwarranted fears and pessimism.Instead, as Michael Beckley suggests, a better alternative is “to maintain deep economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties while taking sensible steps to keep it in check.”[xxiv] In response to China’s growing visibility and influence, the global community should draw strength and inspiration from engagement with China, rather than retreat from fear or suspicion. As a new rising power, China continues to search for its new identity and position in this fast-changing global environment. For that, a positive and welcoming global community can offer the necessary guidance and motivation to encourage China to trade its conservative domestic agenda for a more global one that emphasises on universal values. As Professor Kevin McGahan from the National University of Singapore reminds us, global leaders should appreciate that global norms and values are also actively shaping Chinese identities and influencing its behavior on the global stage.[xxv]

Conclusion

Across the board, the world is witnessing a surge of globalisation driven by a Chinese rhythm. For the very first time, China is expected to overtake Japan to become the second largest contributor to the United Nations (UN) general budget in 2019,[xxvi] and it now boasts more troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council.[xxvii] Elsewhere, China portrays itself as a champion of global values on multilateralism, globalisation and rules-based systems. For example, in his speech themed “Multilateralism, Shared Peace and Development” to the 73rdUN General Assembly, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledged China’s support for the international order and multilateralism.[xxviii] As if China’s position on globalisation and its promotion of global values were not noticeable, U.S. President Trump’s speech at the same UN General Assembly,[xxix] with its recognisable nationalist and “America First” rhetoric, provided a sharp contrast. Interestingly, at a moment when the United States fails to live up to its expectations and threatens to withdraw itself from the very global order that it had painstakingly created, China, on the other hand, seems to defy speculations and preserves the global order instead.

As elaborated earlier in this essay, to understand China’s contemporary foreign policy and global manoeuvers one must first recognize the mutual interests between China and the global world. For China, its leaders need no nudging to see that since the country’s opening up and modernisation in the 1980s, it has benefited from active participation in global institutions and operating within global rules. Conceivably, China recognises that its interests are best protected through the preservation of the current order; otherwise, it risks losing benefits should the order disintegrate. For the global community, it can be beneficial to begin recognising how China’s successful economic transformation and its growing influence in the global community are just as much success of the “Chinese story” as it is part of the “global story.” For, though written in a different language, the text for the global agenda is similar: free trade, multilateralism and globalisation. Thus, a more balanced approach that encourages China to play a greater role in global affairs and with efforts to shape it into a more responsible stakeholder should be adopted. In times when forces of protectionism and nationalism seem to be sweeping fast across the world, China’s complementary brand of multilateralism and globalisation offers welcoming grounds to uphold cherished values of the global order. As such, the world should confidently walk towards a new era of globalisation beckoning with promise, not resignation. Looking ahead, it may not be a maverick that the world is seeing, but a China with global characteristics.


About the Author

Zhou Xizhuang Michael is a second-year undergraduate at the National University of Singapore majoring in Global Studies and specialising in East Asia, Foreign and Public Policy, and the French language. Michael is interested in global governance and international relations and enjoys reading history and literary classics.


Endnotes

[i]Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2018, 60.

[ii]Ibid., 60.

[iii]Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.

[iv]Permanent Mission of China to the WTO, “China in the WTO: Past, Present and Future,” World Trade Organisation, published on December 2012, accessed September 22, 2018, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/s7lu_e.pdf.

[v]Evan A. Feigenbaum, “China and the World: Dealing With a Reluctant Power,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2017, 33.

[vi]Ibid., 36

[vii]Ibid., 36

[viii]Ibid., 36

[ix]Ibid., 38

[x]Yijia Jing, Yangyang Cui, and Danyao Li, “The Politics of Performance Measurement in China,” Policy and Society34, no. 1 (2015): 49, accessed August 10, 2018, doi: 10.1016/i.polsoc.2015.02.001;
see also, Andrew Podger (澳大利亚国立大学), and Bo Yan (西安交通大学), “Public Administration in China and Australia: Different Worlds but Similar Challenges (中国和澳大利亚的公共行政管理:不同的世界,相似的挑战),” Australian Journal of Public Administration72, no. 3 (2013): 215-217, https://doi-org.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/10.1111/1467-8500.12023.

Yangyang Cui, and Danyao Li. “The Politics of Performance Measurement in China.” Policy and Society 34, no. 1 (2015): 49-61. Accessed August 10, 2018. doi: 10.1016/i.polsoc.2015.02.001.

[xi]Yuen Yuen Ang, “Autocracy With Chinese Characteristics: Beijing’s Behind-the-Scenes Reforms,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2018, 43.

[xii]“Hot water: Chinese and American warships nearly collide,” The Economist, October 4, 2018, accessed October 4, 2018, https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/10/04/chinese-and-american-warships-nearly-collide.

[xiii]Terry Ng, “US navy plans major show of strength in South China Sea as warning to Beijing,” South China Morning Post, October 4 2018, accessed October 4, 2018. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2166910/us-navy-plans-major-show-strength-south-china-sea-warning.

[xiv]William J. Crowe Jr., and Alan D. Romberg, “Rethnking Security in the Pacific,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1991 Issue, accessed September 30, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1991-03-01/rethinking-security-pacific.

[xv]Edward Wong, “Security Law Suggests a Broadening of China’s ‘Core Interests’,” The New York Times, July 2, 2015, 2015, accessed September 18, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/world/asia/security-law-suggests-a-broadening-of-chinas-core-interests.html.

[xvi]Michael Beckley, “Stop Obsessing About China: Why Beijing Will Not Imperil U.S. Hegemony,” Foreign Affairs, September 21, 2018, accessed October 2, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-09-21/stop-obsessing-about-china.

[xvii]“Tortoise v hare: Is China challenging the United States for global leadership?” The Economist, April 1, 2017, accessed October 1, 2018, https://www.economist.com/china/2017/04/01/is-china-challenging-the-united-states-for-global-leadership.

[xviii]Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancıoglu, How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism(London, [England]: Pluto Press, 2015), 4.

[xix]Ibid., 5.

[xx]Ibid., 5.

[xxi]Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2018, 67.

[xxii]Kenneth Rapoza, “Trade War Update: China Trade Unfazed By Trump Tariffs,” Forbes, September 11, 2018, accessed October 2, 2018,https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2018/09/11/trade-war-update-china-trade-unfazed-by-trump-tariffs/#104c276a6b84.

[xxiii]Reuters, “US Defence Secretary James Mattis ‘looking for way ahead’ after China scraps military talks in sanctions protest,” South China Morning Post, September 25, 2018, accessed September 26, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2165623/us-defence-secretary-james-mattis-looking-way-ahead-after-china.

[xxiv]Michael Beckley, “Stop Obsessing About China,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-09-21/stop-obsessing-about-china.

[xxv]Interview with Professor Kevin McGahan, Global Studies Programme, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore.

[xxvi]King Adriana King, “China set to surpass Japan as No.2 contributor to UN,” Nikkei Asian Review, August 15 2018, accessed September 2, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/China-set-to-surpass-Japan-as-No.-2-contributor-to-UN.

[xxvii]Xinhua, “China’s contribution to peacekeeping ‘extremely important,’ says UN peacekeeping chief,” China Daily, July 2, 2017, accessed September 30, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-07/02/content_29964537.htm.

[xxviii]“Wang Yi Attends the General Debate of the 73rdSession of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and Delivers a Speech,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 29, 2018, accessed September 29, 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1601122.shtml.

[xxix]Mythili Sampathkumar and Harriet Angerholm, “Trump UN speech – President laughed at by world leaders as he boasts of achievements amid condemnation of Iran,” The Independent, September 25, 2018, accessed September 25, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/un-general-assembly-live-updates-trump-speech-security-council-iran-north-korea-syria-russia-china-a8553781.html.


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