Since the Indian invasion of 1947, the northern state of Jammu and Kashmir has been plagued by fierce armed conflict and political tension. Kashmiri insurgents have organized into over a dozen regionalist rebel groups and demand independence from India or accession to Pakistan. In its efforts to counter this movement, India’s central government has employed martial law and has “pursued a policy of repression which has resulted in massive human rights violations.”[1]
Systematic sexual violence is one of the most prevalent and potent tactics used to disempower Kashmiri militants and their communities. According to a 2006 study by Doctors Without Borders (MSF), nearly 12 percent of Kashmiri women have endured “a violation of their modesty associated with an act of sexual violence that varies from rape to inappropriate touching since 1989”—an abnormally high proportion even for conflict zones.[2] Far from random, these attacks are part of an organized strategy to “to punish, intimidate, coerce, humiliate and degrade” Kashmiri insurgents. After establishing the current state of the Indo-Kashmiri conflict, this paper will explore the Indian army’s primary motivations for employing rape as a military tactic. More specifically, I will discuss the ways in which sexual violence can “collectively dishonor” Kashmiri communities, compromise women’s ability to fulfill traditional gender roles, and emasculate Kashmiri men. Finally, this paper illuminates feminist and gender theory that provide a framework for understanding why sexual warfare is such a potent weapon in armed conflicts.
Background
In order to effectively analyze sexual violence as a military tactic, we must first outline the relevant historical context of the Indo-Kashmiri conflict. Since 1947, Kashmir has been involved in three full-scale wars as a result of Indian and Pakistani border disputes. These conflicts have caused as many as 100,000 casualties, 11,784 refugees, and 6,193 asylum seekers as of 2013.[3] In 2005, MSF reported that the majority of Kashmiris surveyed had been exposed to crossfire (86 percent) and round-up raids (83 percent). Further, abnormally high numbers of civilians reported being subjected to maltreatment (44 percent), forced labor (33 percent), and kidnapping (17 percent).[4] Politically, the Kashmiri government has been paralyzed by competing Indian, Pakistani, and local voices and has been marked by “rigged elections, corruption, dissent, and awry political coalitions,” according to ethnographer and Kashmiri scholar Anther Zia.[5] Ethnographer Saiba Varma states that these armed and political conflicts “reified the sense that Kashmir was nothing more than a border dispute between the two states.” In the late 1980s, widespread agitation for independence and autonomy (locally referred to as azadi) reached a climax, and over a dozen armed insurgent groups began aggressively protesting Indian occupation with guerilla warfare, violent political demonstrations, and what Varma even calls “terrorism. [6]“
Instead of convincing the Indian government to relinquish Kashmir or grant autonomy, however, “the Indian state views the armed ‘insurgency’ as Pakistan-sponsored terrorism designed to destabilize a secular, Indian democracy,” according to Varma.[7] The pro-azadi movement has actually increased the Indian military presence in Kashmir. As of 2011, between 300,000 and half a million Indian troops were stationed in Kashmir to monitor a population of 10 million civilians.[8] In Cultural Anthropology, Zia states that the soldier-to-civilian ratio is roughly one soldier for every 20 Kashmiris—the highest proportion of any conflict zone in the world.[9]
The intense militarization of Kashmir sets the stage for human rights violations. Anther Zia is worth quoting at length on the effect of militarization on Kashmir’s social climate:
In a siege-like atmosphere, a perpetual war is indistinguishably weaved into the Kashmiri civilian life…. The soldiers, armed with all kinds of live ammunition, are ubiquitous presences holed up in sandbag bunkers, across the length and breadth of the region. There are checkpoints everywhere; streets and neighborhoods are continuously patrolled. Civilians are frisked and checked for identification. There are frequent crackdowns, cordons, encounters, bomb blasts, and raids. Cross-firing and ambushes between the military and armed militants occurs frequently, in which combatants and noncombatants are killed. On the borders, the Indian and Pakistani armies stand in a face off.[10]
Perpetual conflict facilitates paranoia, censorship, and corruption, and “the rhetoric of ‘national security’ that accompanies militarized environments is effectively employed to deny people the freedom of expression and avenues to pursue justice,” according to Freny Manecksha from Himāl South Asian Review.[11] In Kashmir, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act and the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, implemented in the early 1990s, allow Indian troops to use force against any person, permit unwarranted arrests and indefinite detainments, and grant military officers legal immunity against any action. Because militants are often indistinguishable from civilians, “any Kashmiri citizen may be subjected to human rights abuses by armed troops.” Between 8,000 to 10,000 Kashmiris have disappeared as a result of these laws, and according to Zia, “the majority of these civilians belong to financially disadvantaged classes, which left their families in dire circumstances.”[12] Sexual violence is another prevalent human rights abuse. MSF reported in 2005 that Kashmir has the highest rate of sexual violence in any conflict region, and the vast majority of assaults are perpetrated by police and security forces.[13] Indian security forces use rape as a form of domination and retaliation against civilians, many of whom are accused of sheltering militants or have been ordered to identify insurgent relatives. Of the 12 percent of Kashmiri women subjected to sexual abuse of this nature since 1989, the victims are generally poor women from vulnerable low-caste and tribal minority groups.[14]
It is essential to note that targeted rapes are not simply the exploits of individual, independent actors. An extensive Human Rights Watch (HRW) report argues that the Indian army’s sexual violence is an organized tactic, endorsed (privately, if not publicly) by military higher-ups. In numerous accounts, victims recall the systematic, organized manner in which they were raped. One woman from the HRW study describes her assault as calculated and efficient: “One soldier kept guard on the door and two of them raped me.” Another account form the South Asian Network for Secularism and Democracy describes her assault as “not as an endless orgy of a horde of rampaging beasts, but as a quiet and efficient military operation, carried out by trained men.”[15] Later in this paper, I will also discuss government policies that enable security forces to use sexual warfare with legal impunity. Overall, overwhelming evidence indicates that sexual warfare is endorsed and enabled by both the Indian government and its military officers.
Kashmir’s long history of militarized conflict, human rights violations, and fierce grassroots insurgency set the stage for the analyses presented in this paper. The insurgent movement was borne out of calls for autonomy, but has led India to further militarize Kashmir and prioritize security over human rights. The next section of this paper explores Indian security forces’ motivations for incorporating targeted rape in its counterinsurgency strategy.
Collective Shaming and Terrorizing Kashmiri Women
The Human Rights Watch made a key observation about Kashmir’s insurgent movement in describing its source of power. In “Rape in Kashmir, A Crime of War,” HRW states that small villages are the primary providers of food, shelter, financial resources, and intelligence for insurgent groups.[16] Militants fight for the autonomy of Kashmiri communities, and it is from these small communities that they derive their power. Indian security forces attack female villagers’ izzat (honor, pride), and their communities by extension, via targeted rape.
In Kashmiri society, an individual’s honor is closely tied to the honor of his or her family, community, and the Kashmiri nation at large. A female’s chastity is a core component of her izzat (or sense of honor), and her sexual practices are highly regulated by the male head of household in order to safeguard community izzat.[17] For example, in many communities, women observe purdah, or the practice secluding and veiling themselves from men. In conservative areas of Kashmir, women are not allowed to eat, speak, or even sit in the same room as a man to whom she is not related. The importance of female chastity was made explicit by protests sparked by the murder and rape of two Kashmiri women in 2009. According to anthropologists Thomas van der Molen and Ellen Bal, the protesters’ banners read, “Chastity of our mothers and sisters dearer to us than life.”[18]
Insurgent groups are fueled by the strength and regional pride of small communities; community honor, furthermore, is closely tied to female purity and chastity. This relationship has informed Indian military strategy. Human Rights Watch asserts that this is strategy has, in fact, been widely implemented by security forces in Kashmir:
Rape often occurs during crackdowns, cordon-and-search operations. Security forces engage in collective punishment against the civilian population…. Rape is used as a means of targeting women whom the security forces accuse of being militant sympathizers; in raping them, the security forces are attempting to punish and humiliate the entire community.[19]
The women who experience such an attack experience severe physical and emotional consequences, often for years after the event. Through the lens of “collective shaming,” sexual assault also shatters the izzat both of the women who have been assaulted and their male relatives. The men have been robbed of their “control” over women’s sexual practices and have failed to protect the izzat of their mothers, wives, and daughters. In conservative communities where this “protector” role is an essential responsibility for the head of household, a sexual assault (and the forced impregnation that occasionally accompanies the rape) permanently compromises the man’s honor. In this way, according to Molen and Dal, “the authorities have deliberately inflicted collective dishonor—and in fact defeat—through appropriating Kashmiri men’s control of women’s izzat. “[20]
At the same time, Indian soldiers “calculate that local response will hold the woman responsible” for her rape to a large extent.[21] The consequences for women are manifold and are the subject of extensive feminist literature. A breach of chastity is considered sinful regardless of the circumstances under which a woman had sex. Although the sexual act was not consensual, the victim is labeled as impure and unfaithful. It is nearly impossible for a rape victim to get married, and because her izzat impacts the community at large, her rape can tarnish the purity and marriage prospects of all women in her community. According to Molen and Bal, “in addition to the pain caused by the actual crime, raped women tend to face yet another burden, as men are usually categorical in their refusal to marry anyone from a ‘village of raped women.’” Ruth Seifert states that, as a result of the collectivized identity of female community members, the “rape of one woman not only destroys her physical and psychological existence, but also acts as a ‘symbolic rape of that community.’” [22] If a married woman is raped, her marriage and familial relationships often splinter due to the woman’s perceived impurity. Crumbling family structures further compromise the community honor and solidarity.
Two potent examples show the tangible consequences of collective dishonor in Kashmiri communities. In 1991, the Indian army launched a search and interrogation operation in Kunan Poshpora, a small village in Kupwara district that allegedly sheltered and supplied insurgents. As part of their operation, the security forces gang-raped as many as 100 women in less than 24 hours. According to Hafsa Kanjwal in SAGAR research journal of University of Texas Austin, after the assault, victims “complained of ostracism from their families and communities because of the ‘shame’ associated with having been raped.” As predicted, this shame extended beyond their individual families. Kanjwal reported that “not a single marriage proposal had been received for any woman, raped or not, in the village for years after the incident.”[23]
The 2004 sexual assault of 16-year-old Hameeda is another notable example. Hameeda lived in a small pro-azadi village of the Kupwara district, and her cousin was a confirmed militant. According to the Himāl South Asian Review, Hameeda was abducted from school and tortured by two police officers in an effort to procure information about her cousin’s whereabouts. When she failed to cooperate, an Indian army official gruesomely raped her. In her interview with Himāl, Hameeda states that her parents had to beg for her release; “My father took the cap from his head, placed it on the officer’s feet and pleaded with him before he let me go.” For years after her assault, Hameeda was labeled a “spoiled good,” and her “relatives told my mother I was no longer acceptable. People would come up to my father feigning sympathy and make indecent proposals about me.” Hameeda’s effort to seek monetary compensation from the government for her assault led to the disintegration of her marriage, and after years of societal estrangement, she internalized much of the shame projected on her by the community and developed chronic depression.[24]
From these examples, we see that Indian military strategy is informed by the collectivized identity of Kashmiri communities. Sexual assaults have cascading consequences on marital and familial solidarity and are extremely effective at attacking Kashmiri national honor. As a result, rape is employed as a military strategy to compromise the communities from which insurgents draw their majority of their support.
Targeting female mental health and productivity
Women carry out many of the fundamental day-to-day activities that enable Kashmiri societies to function. In traditional communities, they oversee the household, harvest crops, raise children, and, occasionally, manage finances. Most importantly, perhaps, is their historic role as bearers of cultural identity. In her book Writing Diaspora, Yasmeen Hussain explain that, “culture is not genetically inherited but is instilled by upbringing within a given cultural context or a given set of parallel contexts.” As mothers, women often have the task of instilling cultural knowledge in their children.[25] In traditional households, they are often (though not always) the primary nurturers, educators, and religious instructors and therefore play an important role in bestowing ethics and values on the new generation.[26] These historically female roles are vital to the health of local communities and the Kashmiri society at large.
Sexual warfare is an extremely effective weapon in compromising women’s ability to succeed in these roles. Rape has severe effects on the mental health of its victims and hinders their ability to be competent mothers. According to a study by Psychology of Women Quarterly medical journal:
Even when evaluated many years after sexual assault, survivors are more likely to have major depression, alcohol and drug abuse/dependence, generalized anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder…. The somatic effects of rape can include injuries such as suicide and homicide, chronic illness, and range of reproductive health consequences…. More dire social effects of rape occur in societies where stigma of rape is pronounced, like many parts of South Asia and the Middle East.[27]
In many cases, Kashmiri communities misplace the blame of a sexual assault on the victim (as illustrated in examples from the previous section), which compounds the psychological burden on women. According to Kanjwal, many victims internalize the shame, impurity, and worthlessness projected on them. Unfortunately, this guilt can lead to depression and frequently results in broken marriages, family estrangement, or even suicide.[28]
When victims are struggling with severe physical pain, mental disorders, and broken support networks, it is more difficult for them to effectively fulfill gender roles in the home. According to the logic of village honor, a mother who is shamed by her community cannot be a fully respected educator or nurturer for her children. An “impure” wife is less effective in her role as a marital partner and child bearer. A sister, aunt, or grandmother who is depressed and publicly ridiculed may be less willing to manage her household and engage with her community.
Sexual warfare psychologically cripples women. Not only does the assault inflict psychological damage on the victim, the conservative Kashmiri context ensures that women will have an additional burden placed on them by their communities. As a result, rape effectively breaks down the family and cultural network that enables a community to thrive.
Male intimidation and disempowerment
In traditional societies like Kashmir, the male head of household is responsible for protecting a woman’s wellbeing. It is the man’s religious and cultural obligation to safeguard her chastity, as previously mentioned. Through this lens, when his wife or daughter is raped, the man has failed his charge in the most grievous and irreversible manner. If the woman is often raped as a direct consequence of the man’s political position, he is especially culpable for her assault. Additionally, Indian security forces often rape women in front or just out of reach of their male relatives to inflict maximum shame. Fauzia, a 60 year old widow, was attacked under such circumstances and relates the story in the “Ethnography of Social Trauma in Jammu and Kashmir” recorded by TM Shah:
Soldiers enter the house, put the gun at the temple of my father and tie up the younger men. They demand food and after consuming it, they hold the hand of the most beautiful daughter in front of the parents and brothers and take her to another room and rape her throughout the night. They separate men folk outside and molest and rape women inside…. We have to obey; otherwise they either kill our men on flimsy grounds or beat them to pulp or do something like that.[29]
Sexual warfare is explicitly used to attack men’s roles as protectors and serves to demoralize and intimidate them. In theory, when a man’s household suffers from the aftermath of a rape in the long term, he may not fulfill other social expectations of raising a healthy and productive family.
The government’s tacit legal endorsement of sexual warfare further intimidates and threatens Kashmiri men and their families. Recall the story of Hameeda, the 16-year-old girl from Kupwara district who was raped after failing to provide a military official with information about her militant cousin. After the assault, Hameeda’s father repeatedly filed charges and a First Information Report (FIR) against her rapist. Not only were his pleas blatantly ignored, Himāl reports that “the police filed a case against Hameeda and her cousin and came to her house in civilian clothes issuing threats.” Her rapist was awarded a medal from the Indian government despite being implicated in numerous other human rights violations, and he was recommended for a UN Peacekeeping Force officer position. Hameeda’s story typifies two aspects of military rape in Kashmir: (a) a general inability for victims to bring their assailants to justice and (b) the tacit endorsement of sexual violence by military officials. Feminist researcher Cynthia Cockburn elaborates on this plight, saying that “while everyone was hearing numerous accounts of rape, few complaints were reaching the courts…. Since there was no protection of witnesses against harassment and threat, the prosecution found it difficult to persuade people to give evidence against perpetrators.”[30]
In fact, according to HRW, the Indian government has only publicly prosecuted one case of sexual assault since 1990. The authors of the HRW report go on to state that “by failing to prosecute and punish those responsible, or make known any action taken against security forces charged with rape, the Indian authorities have signaled that the practice of rape is tolerated.”[31] When they do respond to charges and press reports, government officials brand the victims as militant sympathizers, dismiss their testimonies, and justify the actions of their soldiers in the name of national security.[32]
The Indian government’s unwillingness to protect victims or sincerely investigate sexual crimes enables security forces to employ rape as a weapon. Individual soldiers see that the consequences for sexual warfare will be minimal or swept under the rug by military higher-ups. In the words of Nicola Henry, “[soldiers’] self-deterring reactions may become weakened, thus lowering their inhibitions against engaging in sexual aggression” and increasing the usage of rape in conflict situations.[33] In short, Kashmiri men are demoralized and intimidated not only by their inability to physically protect their women, but also by the legal and political institutions that promote sexual warfare against their communities.
Deploying feminist theory: Why is rape an effective weapon?
The analyses and anecdotes presented prove that the consequences of sexual warfare extend far beyond the physical act of the assault itself. Although we have analyzed the Indian military’s motivations for employing rape in armed conflict, several questions go unanswered. Why do sexual attacks inflict widespread shame on a community? Why are men crushed by their inability to control women’s sexuality? Why is rape such a visceral attack on both women and their male relatives? Feminist theory illuminates an underlying relationship between gender, sexuality, and power that explains why rape is such a potent weapon.
In the words of Runyan and Peterson in Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium, “gender refers to socially learned behaviors, repeated performances, and idealized expectations that are associated with prescribed roles.” Gender is defined by society and independent from biological sex. Across cultures and time, societies have assigned different levels of power to the “masculine” and the “feminine” depending not only on one’s proscribed gender, but his or her race, class, sexuality, and nationality. Runyan and Peterson argue that in each culture, there is a specific combination of these traits that confers the most power on an individual: the “hegemonic masculinity.”[34] In Kashmir, for example, the fair-skinned, heterosexual, physically strong, economically empowered male Muslim is perceived as the hegemon. Masculinity also depends on the extent to which a man adheres to cultural norms, many of which we have seen in previous sections: devoting himself to Islam; educating himself and his offspring; protecting his women’s sexual purity; providing for his family and protecting its honor; arranging desirable marriages for his children; serving his community and nation. To embody all of these traits is to confer on oneself the most political and economic power. The “subordinated” masculinities, therefore, lack some or all the hegemonic attributes and are labeled as feminine, non-masculine, and less powerful.[35]
This power dynamic is further reinforced in a military context. Traits associated with hegemonic masculinity are often linked to the concepts of leadership and military prowess. Runyan and Peterson state that “masculinity includes elements of courage, competition, assertiveness, and ambition that are difficult to disassociate from physical aggression and violence, especially when males are systematically placed in situations where proving their manhood involves aggressive behavior,” like the military and armed conflict.[36] Although exceptions might exist in operations that focus on peacekeeping and stealth missions, the masculine hegemon is the archetypal leader in conflict situations, and to be masculine is to be powerful in a military context.
Sexual warfare, therefore, is a potent weapon because it is a direct affront on an enemy’s masculinity. Indian security forces target specific aspects of masculinity to disempower a Kashmiri militant, including his ability to protect his wife, arrange suitable marriages for his children, protect the family honor, and serve his nation. The Kashmiri insurgent is feminized, and the aggressor asserts his power and dominance. In doing so, the Indian security forces assert their superior masculinity over their enemies and, in the most primal and visceral sense, disempower their adversaries.
Conclusion
This paper explored numerous ways in which Indian security forces employ sexual warfare to demoralize, dominate, and intimidate Kashmiri men and women. Rape is used to collectively shame a community by dishonoring individual women. Sexual assault is employed to psychologically damage wives and mothers, triggering the breakdown of vital marital and family relationships. Public rape and legal and political protections for soldiers undermine male heads of household in their cardinal roles as family protectors. Feminist theory sheds light on why sexual warfare is so effective at disempowering Kashmiri communities; by emasculating their adversaries, Indian security forces strip male leaders of their power. In each of these ways, Indian security forces attack the heart and soul of the insurgent movement: small communities that provide militants with the majority of their resources and support.
Joseph English (’17) is a Global Affairs major in Davenport College.
Works Cited
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Henry, Nicola, Tony Ward, and Matt Hirshberg. “A Multifactorial Model of Wartime Rape.” Elsevier 9, no. 5 (2003): 535-54. Accessed November 24, 2014. <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article-/pii/S135917890300048X>.
Human Rights Watch. “Rape in Kashmir: A Crime of War.” Human Rights Watch 5, no. 9 (1993): 1-5. Accessed November 24, 2014. <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/05/01/rape-kashmir>.
Hussain, Yasmin. “Identity and Gender across Generations of British South Asians.” In Writing Diaspora: South Asian Women, Culture and Ethnicity. London: University of Leeds, 2005.
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Manecksha, Freny. “Autonomy under Siege.” Himāl South Asian Review Magazine of Politics and Culture, January 7, 2014, 1-4.
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Endnotes
[1] Human Rights Watch. “Rape in Kashmir: A Crime of War.” Human Rights Watch 5, no. 9 (1993): 1-5. Accessed November 24, 2014. <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/05/01/rape-kashmir>.
[2] Manecksha, Freny. “Autonomy under Siege.” Himāl South Asian Review Magazine of Politics and Culture, January 7, 2014, 1-4.
[3] Human Rights Watch. “Rape in Kashmir: A Crime of War.” Human Rights Watch 5, no. 9 (1993): 1-5. Accessed November 24, 2014. <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/05/01/rape-kashmir>.
[4] De Jong, Kaz, and Saskia Van De Kam. “Conflict in the Indian Kashmir Valley II: Psychosocial Impact.” Conflict and Health 2 (2008). November 24, 2014. <http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1752-1505-2-11.pdf>.
[5] Zia, Anther. “Kashmir at War.” The Kashmir Walla: A Magazine of Art, Politics & Society, October 25, 2011, 2-3.
[6] Varma, Saiba. “Interrogating the “Post-conflict” in Indian- Occupied Kashmir.” Cultural Anthropology, 2014, 1. Accessed November 24, 2014. <http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/506-interrogating-the-post-conflict-in-indian-occupied-kashmir>.
[7] Ibid.
[8] “India ‘to Cut Kashmir Troops by a Quarter'” BBC News, January 14, 2011, South Asia sec. Accessed November 24, 2014. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12190425>.
[9] Zia, “Kashmir at War.” 2-3.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Manecksha. “Autonomy under Siege.” 1-4.
[12] Zia, “Kashmir at War.” 2-3.
[13] Hussain. “Identity and Gender across Generations of British South Asians.”
[14] Human Rights Watch. “Rape in Kashmir: A Crime of War.” 1-5.
[15] Menon, Nivedita. “Remembering Mass Rape and Torture by Indian Army in Kashmir.” South Asian Network for Secularism and Democracy. January 23, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014. <http://sansad.org/remembering-mass-rape-and-torture-by-indian-army-in-kashmir/>.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Van Der Molen, Thomas, and Ellen Bal. “Staging “small, Small Incidents”: Dissent, Gender, and Militarization among Young People in Kashmir.” Focaal Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 60 (2011): 93-107. Accessed November 24, 2014. <http://www.academia.edu/-4439050/2011_Staging_small_small_incidents_Dissent_gender_and_ militarization_among_young_people_in_Kashm-ir_Focaal_- _Journal_of_Global_and_Historical_Anthropology_60_93-107>.
* For the purposes of this paper, the “Kashmiri nation” is defined as the society connected by geography, language, history, ethnicity, kinship networks, and/or culture. This nation is not to be conflated with the Kashmiri state (i.e. government) or the Indian nation-state.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Human Rights Watch. “Rape in Kashmir: A Crime of War.” 1-5.
[20] Van Der Molen, Thomas, and Ellen Bal. “Staging “small, Small Incidents”: Dissent, Gender, and Militarization among Young People in Kashmir.” 93-107.
[21] Littlewood, Roland. “Military Rape.” Anthropology Today 13 (1997): 7-16. Accessed November 24, 2014. <www.jstor.org/stable/2783037>.
[22] Seifert, Ruth. “The Second Front: The Logic of Sexual Violence in Wars.” Elsevier 19 (1996): 35-43. Accessed November 24, 2014. <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/027753959500078X>.
[23] Kanjwal, Hafsa. “Women in Kashmir: A Feminist Autoethnography.” SAGAR South Asia Research Journal 20 (2011): 57-61. Accessed November 24, 2014. <static.squarespace.com/static/5195078de4b0af15cc42c774/t/51bfba89e4b0356bbe298c39/1371519625770/Sagar-XX.pdf>.
[24] Manecksha. “Autonomy under Siege.” 1-4.
[25] Hussain, Yasmin. “Identity and Gender across Generations of British South Asians.” In Writing Diaspora: South Asian Women, Culture and Ethnicity. London: University of Leeds, 2005.
[26] Mortada, Syeda. “The Notion of Women as Bearers of Culture in Monica Ali’s Brick Lane.” BRAC University Journal 7 (2010): 53-54. Accessed November 24, 2014. <http://dspace.bracu.ac.bd/bitstream/handle/10361/895/Mortada.pdf?sequence=1>.
[27] Koss, Mary, Lori Heise, and Nancy Russo. “The Global Health Burden of Rape.” Psychology of Women Quarterly 18 (1994): 518-29. Accessed November 24, 2014. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1994.tb01046.x/abstract>.
[28] Kanjwal. “Women in Kashmir: A Feminist Autoethnography.” 57-61.
[29] Shah, TM. 2012. Ethnography of Social Trauma in Jammu and Kashmir. Master of Science dissertation, Kansas State University. Ann Arbor: ProQuest/UMI, 2014. <http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/2097/13631/TamannaShah2012.pdf?sequence=3>.
† Although the soldiers were convicted, they failed to ever serve jail time.
[30] Cockburn. “War against Women: A Feminist Response to Genocide in Gujarat.”
[31] Human Rights Watch. “Rape in Kashmir: A Crime of War.” 1-5.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Henry, Nicola, Tony Ward, and Matt Hirshberg. “A Multifactorial Model of Wartime Rape.” Elsevier 9, no. 5 (2003): 535-54. Accessed November 24, 2014. <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S135917890300048X>.
[34] Peterson, V. Spike, and Anne Sisson Runyan. “Gender and Global Issues; Gendered Lenses on World Politics; Gender and Global Security.” In Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium. 4th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010.
[35] Henry, Nicola, Tony Ward, and Matt Hirshberg. “A Multifactorial Model of Wartime Rape.” 535-54.
[36] Ibid.