Honorable Mention – Disaggregating the Coercive Apparatus: The Competing Calculi of Parallel Security Institutions in Egypt and Tunisia

“Our revolution is your revolution,” yelled General Rachid Ammar to more than 1000 demonstrators in the Tunis public square, relieving the infamous coercive apparatus of its most infamous function of regime maintenance.[1] Yet on the same day as newspapers broke the news about the army’s shifted loyalties, they noted the “marauding” and “violence” of the police, another element of the coercive apparatus.[2] Similar events transpired in Egypt a month later. In 2011, the coercive apparatus so often associated with the “robustness of authoritarianism”[3] imploded, pitting interior security forces under the Ministry of the Interior on one side and the military–particularly the army–on the other. This fracture seriously challenges the idea of bundling up Arab security sectors into “the coercive apparatus” and suggests a need to reevaluate their distinct identities. In particular, scholars generally agree that security institutions like Arab ones make decisions based on calculated, strategic interests.[4], [5], [6] In the Arab Spring, evidently, the interests of the interior forces and the military did not coincide. In the following pages, the paper first traces the historic power dynamic between the two most important wings of the security apparatus and then considers the key differences in interests that caused the split at the time of the protests. The ultimate claim is that age-old competition and hostility between the interior forces and the army made the army’s defection more probable. Given this background, when the time and opportunity for the defection decision came, key in-the-moment differences in interests and structure made the army’s defection easier and more sensible than that of the internal forces. In fewer words, a history of inter-organ competition followed by a unique instance of regime weakness persuades one party–in this case, the army–to defect.

Literature Review

The fundamental principle behind this paper is to reject the impression of a homogenous security apparatus. In fact, coup-proofing literature establishes that Arab regimes deliberately and uniquely constructed parallel militaries to counterweight the regular armed forces, which they saw as sources of potential coups.[7], [8] In the past, coup-proofing has manifested in the form of dual militaries (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia), praetorianistic control over the armed forces (Yemen, Syria) or serious underdevelopment (Libya)[9]. In order to become the desired “army to watch the army,”[10] these parallel forces had to become another military rather than a paramilitary force, reporting directly to the regime leader through some chain other than the regular defense ministry.[11] After 9/11 Arab states, including Egypt and Tunisia, invested heavily in the “militarization” of the police under the Ministry of the Interior to become a suitable alternative to the armed forces.[12], [13] Given these trends, it is possible to see at least some similarity in the characters and aggressive capabilities of the two organs. If they had wanted, both could have acted in the same repressive manner in 2011 in Egypt and Tunisia–yet only one chose to do so, emphasizing a difference in strategic interests that surpassed any similarity in character.

There are also some lessons to be understood from works on civil-military relations. Historically, dictators such as Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, Bashar al-Assad, Habib Bourghiba and Ben Ali have sold themselves as civilian leaders. They asserted their “suzerainty” over the armed forces, marginalizing the latter politically.[14] Some scholars have described this as “arguably extensive distancing of Tunisia and Egypt’s militaries from politics by their autocratic presidents.” By denying armies input into policy-making processes, autocracies assembled “securitocratic” systems based on “pervasive intervention of internal security agencies in all aspects of civil life.”[15] In both Tunisia and Egypt, the military had rarely been called upon to participate actively in repressing political activity[16]. The day-to-day policing and repression was left to the Interior Ministry and its police force – “uniformed or plainclothes.[17]” In general, both coup-proofing and civil-military relations works underline the distrust (or cautious skepticism) that regimes like Egypt and Tunisia had for their militaries – as we shall see, this attitude influenced the decision-making of the army.

While coup-proofing allegedly protects against ousting attempts from within the coercive apparatus, it does not anticipate one like the Arab Spring and yet had a profound influence on the events that unfolded. Coup-proofing addresses from a different lens a problem affirmed by Eva Bellin, Zoltan Barany and Hicham Bou Nassif: “the coercive apparatus begs for disaggregation.”[18] In order to unravel the calculus of defection and loyalty, we need to ask how divided the “guys with guns” really are.[19] Bou Nassif points to two possible disaggregations:[20] a horizontal one differentiating the military from the security establishment and a vertical one separating the elite officers from the rank-and-file. Due to space reasons, this paper focuses primarily on the horizontal breakdown of the apparatus but acknowledges the rich insights that a vertical analysis might offer.

Case Selection

Egypt and Tunisia serve as the primary pro-cases while China is considered as a counter-case at the end. The cases were chosen with three ideas in mind. Firstly, the coercive machineries in all three are more clearly defined and divided between the Interior Ministry’s police and the army. Due to the opaque nature of security organs, information can be difficult to obtain; cases like Libya, with its many local militias, Saudi Arabia, with its royal divisions, and Bahrain, with its outsourced mercenaries, defy consistent analysis. Secondly, all countries followed a similar trajectory whereby the military was called in when the dictator realized that either the Interior Ministry had failed[21] to “stem the uprising” or had been overwhelmed by it. This enables a consideration of the military’s direct response to the security sector’s ‘call for help’ and its valuation of its vested interests relative to the security regime’s interests. Finally, the homogeneity of both countries’ populations means that sectarian divides do not skew the decision-making calculus. This paper aims to keep the lack of sectarianism constant across cases because sectarian reasons add a whole new dimension to the decision-making calculus. Consider the case of Bahrain, in which various security wings remained on the same side and fulfilled different repression functions.[22] It has often been argued that defection did not occur because of the Sunni army’s loyalty to the Sunni royal family.[23] This paper’s aim is to infer why two distinct wings of the same coercive apparatus made different defection decisions under similar conditions, not why two different militaries in two different countries made different calls. Hence, by substantially varying the conditions under which security forces chose to repress, sectarian cases disable comparison with cases like Egypt and Tunisia.

The Relationship between the Military and Internal Security Agencies

First, we will consider the clash of interests between the army and the Interior Ministry to illustrate how a legacy of distrust split the military and internal organizations. The split pitted the two organs on opposite sides; the regime chose to join the internal agencies, which meant that the split with the internal agencies also meant a split with the regime by proxy. In some cases, the regime deliberately orchestrated the rift e.g. with resource distribution. In other cases, however, the regime retroactively chose to side with the internal agencies e.g. inter-organ political crises. Ultimately, this past progressively widened the Ministry-military gulf – it made the military’s defection more probable than that of the police (etc.) and set the scene for the defection when the moment of pressure struck (this is considered in the next section).

Competition for resources

In both Egypt and Tunisia, the two bodies have continually fought for limited state financial resources. In Tunisia, the “security establishment… had long viewed the military as its competitor for state financial resources,”[24] especially because of the oscillation and uncertainty of the regime in budget allocation. Despite Bourghiba’s lack of enthusiasm for the armed forces, he allocated more funds to the military than to the police during his presidency.[25] As the table on the next page demonstrates, the division of money between the Interior Ministry and the military has fluctuated substantially. Generally, both organs have experienced increases and decreases together but the Ministry’s budget has increased at a much faster rate and absorbed decreases more resiliently (except the anomalous year of 1996-7). It could be argued that this allocation was not anomalous since the Tunisian military was smaller and tasked with limited roles like disaster relief and border patrolling.[26] However, regardless of justification, the military felt disillusioned with the lack of resources, considering itself “disadvantaged vis-à-vis the civilian bureaucracy”[27] as early as 1980; the disadvantage seems to have worsened during Ben Ali’s reign.

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Table 1 Distribution of defense budget under Ben Ali[28]

The Tunisian military felt it had not received sufficient material to carry out its mandate[29] and needed more basic comfort and amenities like sleeping bags for its troops.[30] This competition was a robust influence on the army’s calculus particularly because the military–beyond the dissatisfaction of dealing with lack of material and basic necessities–saw the competing “civilian bureaucracy,” “the several oligarchs allied with the presidential couple” and “police organizations” as “ostentatiously corrupt.”[31]

Like its counterpart, the Egyptian armed force faced “intense competition over resources and institutional turf battles.”[32] Scholars have further argued that it was during Mubarak’s tenure that Egypt decisively evolved from a military to a police state.[33] More specifically, armed forces’ “contempt for the Interior Ministry and its associated police and security agencies deepened during the last decade of Mubarak’s rule.” Analysis of defense budgets in Egypt reveals similar patterns to those in Tunisia as the following graphs illustrate.

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Figure 1 Trends in defense budget spending in Egypt

In the last decade (2005-12), the Interior Ministry’s budget increased tremendously while the military’s budget staggered after initial increases even if it was always higher in absolute terms. The fact that the military’s budget was generally high is not surprising, given the greater size and responsibilities of the EAF compared to Tunisian forces. But the patterns here underscore an increasing political preference for a stronger interior ministry relative to the army. On the other hand, the Interior Ministry was largely assimilated into the “widening circle” of economic activities associated with Gamal Mubarak and the neoliberal policies he promoted.[34] And this is exactly why this economic competition had noticeable bearing on the military’s calculus–by the late 1990s, Gamal Mubarak, the man expected to succeed Hosni Mubarak, and his circle of “businessmen” and “police and security forces… [they] relied extensively on” “began to threaten the military’s stake in the economy.”[35]

A history of distrust and political friction

There is more to the story than just economics. In a way, the nature of coup-proofing and police militarization made collision between internal security and the army almost inevitable because of the paranoid and skeptical way in which one kept a check on the other. In Tunisia, an epochal example of this is the Barakat Al-Sahil affair.[36] In May 1991, the minister of the interior ‘Abd Allah Qallal revealed that the police had uncovered a coup plot. This was soon accompanied by a humiliating confession by Army Captain Ahmad ‘Amara, who confirmed that a conspiracy to impose “Sharia Law and Iranian-style theocracy” had been manufactured at Barakat al-Sahil, a hamlet near the coastal town of Hammamet. This national spectacle is a perfect example of controversial coup-proofing in action–a heavily militarized police monitoring the activities of an apolitical military and punishing it to keep the regime safe. One hundred and thirteen officers, 82 noncommissioned officers and 49 soldiers (all from the army, navy and air force) were detained in relation to the alleged coup.[37] Several of these officers held senior positions: 21 were Majors, 45 were Captains and 37 were Lieutenants. Moreover, there is compelling evidence that they were tortured into confessing at the Ministry of Interior rather than the Ministry of Defense, the body normally responsible for their disciplining. Nassif effectively summarizes the polarizing implications of this event: “Through the Barakat al-Sahil affair, the RCD machinery and the security establishment humiliated the officer corps and, by extension, the entire armed forces.”[38] The affair convinced Ben Ali that the “true pillars of the regime” were “the party and the security establishment” and bolstered the security establishment, which not only moved closer to the regime but also became more confident about future meddling in the army’s affairs. In fact, the affair explains the anomalous 9.7-5.9% budget split in 1992. To put things in perspective, the affair exemplifies the unavoidable tensions that fester in parallel security systems. Events like these obviously heightened the army’s animosity towards the police apparatus but also made them view the regime, the party and the police as an aggregate hostile group.

In Egypt, the specific incidents have been quite different but the outcomes are similar. Under Mubarak, the Interior Ministry became “a terrifying bureaucratic empire” with about 34 departments. By 2002, the Ministry represented 21 percent of state employment and had 25 officers for every 1000 citizens, a ratio greater than the Soviet Union’s.[39] At the time of the 2011 uprising, the Ministry was estimated to have 1.5-1.7 million personnel on its payroll, including up to 850,000 policemen and 300,000-400,000 informers.[40] At the same time, most recent figures put the entire military at just 450,000.[41] The numbers themselves speak to the high potential of inter-institutional crises. These crises have been primarily tied to the deliberate apoliticization and weakening of the military by the regime in favor of the Interior Ministry. The Officers’ Republic in Egypt often describes the apparent penetration of the military “deep into the state apparatus” but this did not imbue the military with an “exceptional political role.”[42] One crucial event here was the shaming of Abu Ghazala, a particularly popular general with both the public and the army. Ghazala had served in the 1948 and 1956 wars,[43] often “attacked the police’s draconian methods”[44] and was “widely regarded as the natural successor to Mubarak.”[45] However, under him, the military’s growing involvement in Egypt’s military, industrial and agricultural sectors “offset… [a] diminishing role in politics.” However, Mubarak and the Interior Ministry were not gung-ho about this. In 1991, Mubarak abruptly replaced Ghazala with the sycophantic Tantawi probably because Ghazala was definitely more popular than Mubarak and a threatening political rival. In April 1993, the Ministry jumped to reduce his chances of re-entering civilian politics and claimed he was involved in the scandalous Lucy Artin affair, an explosive case of sex, bribery and political abuse that tarnished Ghazala’s image as devout and professional. Over the years, it became clear to the military that “they were serving a regime that had marginalized their leaders and undermined their corporate interests in the name of professional subordination” at a time when they were promised institutional sovereignty.[46]

The Independent Relationship of each Organ with the Regime and the Masses

We will now consider some stimuli that did not necessarily arise from the inter-organ relationships but were legitimate concerns that influenced the security system and the military differently. It has already been established that the agency-army tussle over the years disenchanted the military but actually wooed and benefited the security forces. However, each organ also had independent relationships, which produced independent strategic interests. Among these, the crucial ones were internal cohesion in relation to the masses and post-revolt survival in relation to the regime. As we shall see, compared to the military, internal cohesion made defection more necessary while regime dependence made defection more practically viable for the military. 

Internal cohesion and subordinate loyalty

Several authors have advanced the idea that Arab militaries, especially in Tunisia and Egypt were particularly concerned about “internal cohesion” and loyalty of their rank-and-file.[47], [48] Before we move to the main argument, it is important to establish that internal cohesion should logically also be a concern for the Ministry. In fact, common arguments like empathy with the protesting masses or political grievances against the regime could apply to riot police as much as soldiers in tanks. In Tunisia, police officers worked more than 12 hours a day, earning less than the wages of bus driver.[49] In Egypt too, they were “ill-fed, poorly lodged, sleep-deprived and donned wretched uniforms.”[50] The subordinates evidently did not share the economic privileges of the higher ranks, like the common soldier. Moreover, at least Egypt had already faced a historic mutiny from the Central Security Forces in 1986 for similar socioeconomic grievances against the regime. Since the rank-and-file composed the vast majority of the apparatus and did the dirty work, it was their thinking, not the elite officers’ that mattered–spontaneous defection at the bottom would put the entire structure in disarray.

The main argument here concerns the top leadership of each of the organs. Each organ’s leadership factored subordinate loyalty when deciding whether to defect or repress and discovered different conclusions. Two differences made internal cohesion a far more pressing factor for the army and both differences can be understood in terms of the organ’s interactions with the popular masses.

Firstly, the army and the police varied vastly in terms of public support and popularity.[51] Whether before or after the revolution, in both Tunisia and Egypt,

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Figure 2 Public opinion about political institutions in Egypt

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Figure 3 Public level of trust in political institutions in Tunisia

more than 70% of the public viewed the military favorably whereas only about 40% viewed the police/general security the same way. The army is arguably the most popular institution in both countries. A defected soldier would be received with open arms and enthusiasm. At the same time, it is well established that years of police brutality and Interior Ministry humiliation was a huge driving force behind the Arab Spring.[52] All this suggests that if the police/security agencies defected, it is unlikely that the general public would have embraced them. In ways, defection was a zero-sum game–the losses involved in sticking with the Ministry relative to the risks of defection (losing the already meager economic livelihood and potential rejection and outrage) were less.

Secondly, cruelty against hordes of unarmed civilians was not new to the Interior Ministry and its forces. In Tunisia, security forces resorted to “increasingly brutal tactics and indiscriminate uses of force.” In Egypt, too, police brutality was never limited to the regime’s political opponents. Amnesty International has validated these claims: “Egyptian police routinely… arresting ordinary citizens… [used] cruel methods to interrogate prisoner[s].”[53] Kandil best summarizes this situation’s relevance: “police torture transcended the boundaries of frequent practices to become standard behavior… automatically applied without effort or reflection… violence had become second nature.”[54] The highly “results driven” security establishment also mistreated and abused fellow officers, establishing clear penalties if results were not achieved.[55], [56] On the other hand, cases of military crackdown against civilians are few and far between. “The armed forces, by contrast, stayed out of the business of squelching domestic dissent.” It is possible that several desensitized police officers treated the Arab Spring repression as usual business while others considering defections were deterred by the consequences if they did. In the armies, such mistreatment and penalties were not common and pro-revolution sympathies seemed to exist in the higher echelons from “day one.”[57]

To summarize, the army elites–already frustrated by a legacy of disagreement with the regime and Ministry structure–also realized that their subordinates could feasibly defect because of the culture of dealing with the public. Violent crackdown had few precedents, and public admiration meant defection could seem attractive. On the other hand, the Ministry felt the opposite about its own subordinates who only stood to lose if they defected and were seemingly desensitized to the brutality.

Dependence on the regime and self-sufficiency

In addition, militaries and security agencies considered the extent of their own dependency on the regime and their ability to exist and prevail without it. This dependence could be assessed in a political and economic sense. On one hand, the Interior Ministry was inextricably tied to the regime. A major structural reason for this was the “high degree of centralization,”[58] whereby the security sector received all its resources from the central or national government. Thus, the Ministry quite obviously saw the regime that was “filling its coffers” as its “employer and raison d’être.”[59] Politically, the people associated the Ministry with the dirty work of the regime.[60] On the other hand, the economic dependence holds true for the army to a large extent in both Tunisia and Egypt as well. But both militaries had worked around this–as long as the armies had alternative resources, they could absorb the risks and losses associated with the regime’s downfall, an outcome that was favorable in other aforementioned ways. In Tunisia, the Army and its senior leaders “did not depend on Ben Ali for resources or access to power, which lessened their investment in sustaining him office.”[61] This is not to suggest that the Tunisian military could survive without the central government’s budget allocation. Instead, this suggests that the army was not the benefactor of any special resources or privileges due to their association with the regime. Their allotted budget was guaranteed under the constitution and owing to the needs of national security and border control. Moreover, partly due to army’s popularity, General Ammar saw potential to be “de facto the key power broker in the country.” Tunisian military personnel subsequently “participated in the arrest of key officials” and defended the interim government from “threats posed by Ben Ali loyalists.”[62] By taking charge against the security services and getting involved in political spearheading, the Tunisian military could also solve the problem of economic competition with the Ministry that was mentioned earlier. To clarify, the anticipated political clout for the Tunisian army was sizably lesser than the Egyptian army’s but it had a role to play–in fact, the Tunisian army preferred to play politics only to a certain extent and then return to the barracks.

Egypt is an odd case where the army’s dependence on the regime was matched by staggering independence. Regardless of its tendrils in the state, the Egyptian army was an avid proponent of self-sufficiency (al-iktifa’a al- thati)[63] and expanding the meaning of national security to mean economic and social welfare. The Egyptian military’s economic empire can be dated to the time of Abu Ghazallah. The army continued to invest in agriculture, food production and land reclamation, producing “everything from flat screen televisions and pasta to refrigerators and cars… in over 35 factories.” By one estimate, the military commands up to 40% of the Egyptian economy.[64], [65] While Mubarak had facilitated and allowed the acquisition of these lucrative businesses and even though Gamal’s rise threatened this economic military empire, the military’s economic establishment as it stood in 2011 was fairly independent and resilient. And of course, the Egyptian military, unlike the Tunisian one, receives $1.3 billion from the US, covering about 80% of its military procurement,[66] a substantial expense. Moreover, in political terms, just like the Tunisian military, as the most trusted public institution, the Egyptian forces expected a forthcoming role as the arbiter of the revolution–they would direct their own economic fate. Conversely, the entrenchment of the Interior Ministry and police is reinforced by the immediate aftermath of the revolts. The police felt an “initial sense of shock and retreat” and the “sector [initially] fell into the shadows.”[67]

In summary, the Egypt and Tunisia’s armies are different in terms of self-sufficiency (Egypt was clearly more but Tunisia was self-sufficient in a different way) but were self-sufficient nonetheless or had the political foresight to become so, at the time of the revolutions.

On the Brink: Timeliness of the defection

An important concern here is why the defector defected when it did but not before. Indeed, a major theme in this paper is time. In the past, the military always kept its historic forced subordination in relation to the Ministry when making decisions–the Interior forces saw the relationship as favorable. More centrally, in terms of the present, the circumstances of the Arab Spring brought those factors from the past to a climax. Here, it is useful to acknowledge that the Arab Spring was unprecedented in its magnitude and anomalous in its impact.[68] Although the military had been disillusioned for a while, defection was only seriously considered because of a favorable set of circumstances that the protests generated. At the point of defection, the interior security forces were at their weakest, the probability of regime collapse was highest and subsequent risks associated with defection were lowest.

Kandil describes the military’s timely arrival on the streets of Egypt as “an army that had been subdued by the its two other ruling partners rolled confidently into the streets.”[69] At this point, the regime and the police had completely placed their bets on the army to save the day e.g. “the police cautiously deployed its forces but stayed away from hot spots, preferring to let the military handle the situation.”[70] The military, however, acted with intelligent, political foresight. The Tunisian army, for example, “deployed to the cities… and stood by while security forces used extreme tactics… including live ammunition” and “tried to calm… by interposing themselves between the protesters and police.”[71] By capitalizing on the unique ‘breaking point’ of the regime, the army “enhance[ed] its social position” and “avoid[ed] the disdain Tunisians heaped on the police…”[72] Hence, the strategic timing and circumstances added fuel to the grievances the military had accumulated and emboldened it to defect.

The counter-case: China, Tiananmen Square and Lack of Defection

One useful counter-case where defection did not occur is that of the People’s Liberation Army during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Although China is not part of the Middle East, it provides a worthwhile comparison in two ways. For one, the broad authoritarian model of the China and several Middle East countries–particularly Egypt and Tunisia–is similar. In fact, it has been compellingly claimed that many Middle Eastern states adopted China’s “authoritarian capitalism,” economic reforms without political liberalization.[73]  More importantly, the Tiananmen protests were a singularly unexpected and serious threat to the Communist regime.[74] They therefore created a similar set of conditions as the Arab Spring, temporally and politically, for the Chinese PLA and People’s Armed Police (PAP). Briefly, the events unfolded in this order.[75] Throngs occupied Tiananmen Square in April 1989 in response to Hu Yaobang’s death. Initially, the PAP mobilized to control the crowd and disperse protesters but they were quickly overwhelmed and constrained.[76] By mid-May, the PLA moved in, following declaration of martial law. Yet in the final turn of events, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, the PLA and PAP remained on the same side.

The explanatory differences are several. For one, the Chinese military and internal security forces did not have a history of strained ties. They never particularly competed for resources–between 1983 and 1989, just before the protests, the PAP was primarily “looking for funding sources to supplement woefully inadequate state allocations” whereas the army was well-endowed.[77] Moreover, there were no coup-proofing tensions in China since the forces were not as parallel. The PAP was constructed as an independent institution in 1982, and before that, it was always a wing of the PLA.[78] Even in 1982, the PAP was accountable to the Central Military Commission rather than an Interior Ministry, which ensured smother alignment of interests. We can also consider the independent institutional relationships with the public. In the public’s case, the two organs were not viewed too differently because, unlike in the Middle East, both organs worked cooperatively and quite often to quell protest.[79] China did not have one Interior Ministry that had bloodied hands and a remote, inactive and prestigious army, so a split like Egypt’s or Tunisia’s could not happen between the PLA and PAP. It is worth mentioning that the temporal importance and pressure of the protests were similar in Tiananmen and the Egypt/Tunisia Arab Spring. Tiananmen too presented a rare moment for the military to consider defection but because factors like the historical split and convincing in-the-moment strategic interests did not match up, both forces remained loyal and on the same side of history.

Conclusion and Looking Ahead

On a final note, it is evident that the coercive apparatus in the two countries where the Arab Spring caused perhaps the most rupture was not only internally heterogeneous in structure but also in strategic interests and decision-making calculi. Defection also does not always occur when the factors mentioned in this paper are present–historical periods and high-pressure ‘breaking points’ matter. As a disclaimer, it is important to acknowledge that decision-making is not always possible to unravel and justify, especially when closed institutions like the military and Interior Ministry in a closed region like the Middle East are involved. To add insights to the currently lacking literature on defection and coercive apparatus disaggregation, the paper suggests the following areas for research:

(1) Further horizontal disaggregation of the security apparatus into the army, navy, air force, thugs, police and spies;

(2) Disaggregation analysis in countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Yemen, analyzing esoteric institutions like the Republican Guard and keeping in mind the ethnic and sectarian influences on calculi;

(3) More vertical analysis and differentiation between the high-, medium- and low-rank officers and their varying interests and needs;

(4) Deeper look into the Interior Ministry to chart out the extent of and reasons behind any defections;

On balance, further research and some of this paper’s structure will help untangle the interesting dance that a country’s coercive organs engage in: “Sometimes they are in conflict (no matter how muted), and at other times they are in alliance, but their aim is always to further their interests.”[80]

 

Arvin Anoop (’18) is a sophomore in Jonathan Edwards College.

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[1] Kirkpatrick, David D. “Chief of Tunisian Army Pledges His Support for ‘the Revolution’.” The New York Times. January 24, 2011. Accessed February 22, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/world/africa/25tunis.html?_r=0.

[2] Kirkpatrick, David D. “Chief of Tunisian Army Pledges His Support for ‘the Revolution’.” The New York Times. January 24, 2011. Accessed February 22, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/world/africa/25tunis.html?_r=0.

[3] Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 44 (2012): 127–49.

[4] Zoltan Barany, “Comparing Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military,” Journal of Democracy 22 (2011): 31.

[5] Barry Rubin, “The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics”, MJ Vol. 5, No.

[6] Kirkpatrick, David D. “Chief of Tunisian Army Pledges His Support for ‘the Revolution’.” The New York Times. January 24, 2011. Accessed February 22, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/world/africa/25tunis.html?_r=0.

[7] Quinlivan, James T. 1999. Coup-proofing. International Security 24, (2): 131

[8] Louër, Laurence. 2013. Sectarianism and coup-proofing strategies in Bahrain. Journal of Strategic Studies 36, (2): 245-260

[9] Droz-Vincent, Philippe. 2011. From fighting formal wars to maintaining civil peace? International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, (3): 392-394

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[11] Quinlivan, 141.

[12] Sayigh, Yezid. 2011. Agencies of coercion: Armies and internal security forces. International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, (3): 403-405

[13] Kirkpatrick, David D. “Chief of Tunisian Army Pledges His Support for ‘the Revolution’.” The New York Times. January 24, 2011. Accessed February 22, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/world/africa/25tunis.html?_r=0.

[14] Kirkpatrick, David D. “Chief of Tunisian Army Pledges His Support for ‘the Revolution’.” The New York Times. January 24, 2011. Accessed February 22, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/world/africa/25tunis.html?_r=0.

[15]Sayigh, Yezid. “Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. October 27, 2011. Accessed February 22, 2015. http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfm?fa=show.

[16] Brooks, Risa. 2013. Abandoned at the palace: Why the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali regime in January 2011. Journal of Strategic Studies 36, (2): 205-220

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[20] Nassif, Hicham Bout. 2015. A military besieged: The armed forces, the police, and the party in bin ‘ali’s tunisia, 1987-2011. International Journal of Middle East Studies 47, (1): 65

[21] Kandil, Hazem (2012-11-13). Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt’s Road to Revolt (p. 226). Verso Books. Kindle Edition.

[22] Louër, Laurence. 2013. Sectarianism and coup-proofing strategies in bahrain. Journal of Strategic Studies 36, (2): 245-260

[23] Lee, Terence, 1972- Defect or defend [electronic resource] : military responses to popular protests in authoritarian Asia, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. (Baltimore, Md. : Project MUSE, 2015)

[24] Nassif, 70

[25] Nassif, 70

[26] Brooks, 210

[27] Souhayr Belhassen, “La Reve de l’Uniforme,” Jeune Afrique, No. 1043, December 1980, p. 182.

[28] Nassif, 75

[29] Ware, L. B. 1985. The role of the tunisian military in the post-bourguiba era. Middle East Journal 39, (1): 27-27

[30] Nassif, 73

[31] Nassif, 74

[32] Sayigh, Yezid. 2012. Above the state: The officers’ republic in Egypt

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[35] Salem, Sara. “The Egyptian Military and the 2011 Revolution.” The Egyptian Military and the 2011 Revolution. September 6, 2013. Accessed February 22, 2015. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/14023/the-egyptian-military-and-the-2011-revolution-.

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[40] “Brief: Missed Opportunity: The Politics of Police Reform in Egypt and Tunisia.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 7, 2015. Accessed April 22, 2015. http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/17/missed-opportunity-politics-of-police-reform-in-egypt-and-tunisia.

[41] “Egypt’s Military: Key Facts.” CNN. February 15, 2011. Accessed February 22, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/14/egypt.military.facts/index.html.

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[49] Sayigh, Yezid. “Reconstructing the Police State in Egypt.” Carnegie Middle East Center. August 22, 2013. Accessed February 28, 2015. http://carnegie-mec.org/2013/08/22/reconstructing-police-state-in-egypt.

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[51] “Chapter 2. Views Toward Key Leaders, Groups, and Institutions.” Pew Research Centers Global Attitudes Project RSS. April 25, 2011. Accessed March 22, 2015. http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/04/25/chapter-2-views-toward-key-leaders-groups-and-institutions/.

[52]“The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings.” Arab Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2013): 184-206.

[53] http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR318.pdf

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[55] Sayigh, Reconstructing the police state

[56] Daragahi, Borzou. “A Tunisian State Police Officer Shares Harrowing inside View.” Los Angeles Times. February 03, 2011. Accessed March 13, 2015. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/03/world/la-fg-tunisia-police-20110202.

[57] Kandil, Kindle p. 226

[58] Sayigh, Reconstructing the Police State, #

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[60] Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. “Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring Military Defections and Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria.” Journal of Peace Research 50.3 (2013): 337-49. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.

 

[61] Brooks, 216

[62] Brooks, 215

[63] Frisch, Hillel. “Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army.” MERIA: Middle East Review of International Affairs 5.2 (2001): 1-12. Web. 20 Apr. 2015.

[64] Gelvin, 2012

[65] Hammer, 2011

[66] Gaub, Florence. “Arab Military Spending: Behind the Figures.” April 27, 2014. Accessed March 15, 2015.

[67] Sayigh, The Politics of Police Reform in Tunisia and Egypt

[68] Acemoglu, Daron, Tarek Hassan, and Ahmed Tahoun. 2014. The power of the street: Evidence from egypt’s arab spring. CEPR Discussion Papers dp,

[69] Kandil, 226

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[73] Arsenault, Philip. “China and the Authoritarian Model: The Relationship between Economic Freedom and Economic Growth.” Academia.edu.

[74] Taylor, Alan. “Tiananmen Square, 25 Year Ago.” The Atlantic. June 4, 2014. Accessed February 27, 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/06/tiananmen-square-25-years-ago/100751/.

[75] “A Brief Chronology of Events at Tiananmen Square (1989) | Asia for Educators | Columbia University.” Accessed February 22, 2015. http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_tiananmen_timeline.htm.

[76] Cheung, Tai Ming. 1996. Guarding china’s domestic front line: The people’s armed police and china’s stability. The China Quarterly 146, (146): 525-547

[77] Cheung, 527

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[79] Tanner, Harold M. “The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Internal Security Challenges.” The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (2010): 259-266.

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