King Democracy: Do Democratic Nations Mitigate Conflict Over Transboundary Freshwater Resources Better than Other Nations?

Abstract

The prospect of water wars and conflict over water are ideas that are frequently dramatized in media and also studied by scholars. It is well-established that bona fide wars are not started over water resources, but conflict over water does exist and is not well understood. One would suppose, as scholars often do, that dyads composed of two democratic nations would be the best at mitigating conflict and promoting cooperation over freshwater resources. General conflict research supports that supposition, as does the argument that democracies must be best at avoiding conflicts over resources because they excel at distributing public goods. This study provides empirical evidence showing how interstate dyads composed of various governance types conflict and cooperate over general water and water quantity issues relative to each other. After evaluating the water conflict mitigating ability of democratic-democratic, democratic-autocratic, and autocratic-autocratic dyads, this study finds that democracy-autocracy dyads are less likely to cooperate over general water issues and water quantity issues than the other two dyad types. Nothing certain can be said about how the three dyad types compare to each other in terms of likelihood to conflict over water quantity issues. However, autocracy-autocracy dyads seem to be most likely to cooperate over water quantity issues. These findings support the established belief that democratic-autocratic pairs struggle to cooperate while also encouraging greater scrutiny of the belief that democracies must be best at cooperating over water resources.

 

Introduction

At one time the literature on water cooperation and conflict was fraught with predictions of devastating water wars in the coming millennium.[1] Those fears may have subsided over time (as humanity has not yet experienced a water war), but the study of water cooperation and conflict has grown substantially. Some aspects of the field have remained the same. For instance, there are still many varying definitions of water scarcity and stress, and scholars continue to praise democratic governments as handling the complexities of water the best.[2] Discussions of conflict, water availability, and water resource management are all important conversations to have as the world’s population increases and climate change threatens freshwater systems.

With increasing demand for and decreasing supply of water, more people might experience the strains that come with forgoing certain uses of water and even restricting water use to basic needs. The world is already seeing this phenomenon happen. For example, it is now acceptable for residents of California to report their neighbors for improper water use.[3] Israel has experienced tension with neighboring nations accusing it of wasting its limited water on agriculture.[4] Debate over the proper use of water resources has the potential to ignite conflict, promote cooperation, or cause both in sequence. In addition, water use can be a pawn in more complex cooperation or conflict events between nations.

Transboundary freshwater resources have the potential to influence the dynamics between nations, which must decide whether to conflict or cooperate over them. This conflict need not arrive in the form of full-blown warfare. Instead, the conflict is often acted out through political maneuvering and choice statements made through the press.[5] This paper aims to investigate whether the occurrence of cooperative and conflictive events over transboundary freshwater resources is related to the governance structure of nations; do democratic nations really mitigate conflict over transboundary freshwater resources better than other nations?

 

Literature Review

General conflict studies have existed for many generations, in both philosophical and empirical forms. The study of government interaction and conflict is also fairly well-developed. However, it tends to focus more on public goods distribution, treaties, and sanctions than on specific environmental considerations. The literature that does emphasize water and other environmental considerations concentrates on the idea of resource curse in addition to water quantity and location. General conflict studies have only recently begun to incorporate environmental considerations such as water resource management and distribution. Many variables influence how governments interact with each other over the issue of transboundary freshwater resources. This paper aims to empirically address freshwater conflict as it relates to governance and thus requires a review of governance literature.

Many are quick to laud democracies as being the best at mitigating interstate conflict over natural resources.[6] However, very little thought is given to the possibility that autocracies might be better than democracies at handling interstate transboundary freshwater resource conflict. Autocracies might, in fact, be better at handling this type of conflict because they are very centralized and have meticulous distribution systems and networks. Perhaps they are better at distributing water and, thus, better at mitigating conflict over it. Because there are so few studies that analyze governance structure as it relates to conflict and water, it is important to look generally at the strengths and weaknesses of various governance structures to determine whether democracies really are superior cooperators in the case of transboundary freshwater resources.

Democracies are known for being good at distributing public goods. One study by Benjamin A. Olken compared direct, election-based plebiscites in Indonesian villages to representative meeting forms of government in other Indonesian villages and found that the election-based plebiscites yielded more cooperation and higher satisfaction ratings. The plebiscites and their less democratic counterparts, the representative meetings, were tasked with community-based development projects aiming to improve distribution of public goods. This study shows that the more democratic a system is, the better it will be at promoting cooperation over public good distribution.[7] Connecting the Olken study to discussions about democracy and cooperation over the distribution of water is simple. However, one must keep in mind that the Olken study covered very local, small-scale projects that did not necessarily focus on water distribution but instead covered a wide range of public goods.[8] There are other studies that look at democracies and public good distribution that encompass a broader scope.

For instance, Robert Deacon compared democracies and dictatorships on an interstate level and found that national-level democracies are better at distributing public goods. However, Deacon does not take conflict or cooperation over public good distribution into account. His paper also looks at public goods generally, not water specifically.[9] Once again, though, it is easy to see how the findings of his study could be extrapolated to water resources.

Democracies also excel at cooperating with each other. In a study that encompassed thirty-five years of international conflict data, John R. O’Neal et al. found that country-pairs consisting of two democracies cooperate better than all other country-pairs.[10] The study found that democracies are most cooperative with each other over trading, which involves high levels of interaction.[11] Unlike this paper, O’Neal does not differentiate between country-pairs that consist of only one or fewer democracies.[12] While it is important to note that democracies are good at cooperating with each other, one must also consider the reality that they do not do well at cooperating with non-democracies.

A good mechanism to look at interactions between democracies and non-democracies is through sanctions. David Lektzian and Mark Souva provide a thorough review of sanction literature. Their most relevant insight is that most sanctions that exist in the world fall into the category of democratic states sanctioning non-democratic states. They also find that the most common reason for failed sanctions is that democratic nations do not target the elite of the non-democratic nations properly and thus do not get the economic and political outcome that they desire.[13] This discussion of the successes and failures of democracy is very relevant to an analysis of conflict between basin-sharing dyads. If interactions between democracies and autocracies usually fail to produce the intended results, then perhaps democracies and autocracies cannot cooperate over freshwater resources through the simple mechanism of frequent interactions as the Nils Petter Gleditsch et al. findings would suggest.[14]

The literature on public goods distribution and sanctions just reviewed could be used to support the argument that two democracies must be better at mitigating conflict over water than two autocracies or a democracy and an autocracy. Since most of the literature in favor of that argument also draws on philosophy, those philosophical arguments deserve some examination.

The debate on the merits of democracies and autocracies can be traced back to Locke, Hobbes, and Kant. A myriad of other thinkers have refined and added on to those Enlightenment ideas throughout the years. A good review of the history of those arguments may be found in Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs by Michael W. Doyle. The most relevant philosophical arguments in favor of democracies being best at mitigating conflict over water are that liberal democracies are war averse and more bonded than an established liberal democracy and an autocracy.[15] Ultimately, both the empirical and philosophical literature lead many to conclude that democracies must be best at mitigating transboundary freshwater resource conflict and avoiding water wars.

Near the turn of the millennium, many speculated that one of the largest problems of the twenty-first century would be water wars. Academics predicted conflicts the likes of which the world had never seen centered on shared waterways between nations.[16] The world has not seen water wars quite yet, but that does not mean that examining the relationship between water and conflict is not relevant. Integrating the water-conflict nexus with governance structure allows us to question our traditional views of “good government” in new and interesting ways. This paper will attempt to do just that by investigating the relationship between governance structure and conflict over transboundary freshwaterways.

 

Methodology

This paper will investigate the relationship between instances of conflict and cooperation over transboundary freshwater resources among country pairs and the governance structure of those countries. Control variables will include previous history of conflict, various measures of water scarcity and water stress, geopolitical variables, levels of development, and press neutrality (because the conflict and cooperation data originates from press reports). The goal of this investigation is to answer the question: “are pairs of democracies better at mitigating conflict over transboundary freshwater resources than other co-riparian country pairs?”

This paper will attempt to answer that question by investigating the following hypotheses:

 

Hypotheses

H1: A democratic-autocratic country pair is the worst at avoiding and mitigating conflict over transboundary freshwaterways relative to democratic-democratic country pairs and autocratic-autocratic country pairs.

H2: An autocratic-autocratic country pair is not as good at avoiding and mitigating conflict over transboundary freshwaterways as a democratic-democratic country pair, but it is better at avoiding and mitigating conflict over transboundary freshwaterways than a democratic-autocratic country pair.

The above hypotheses address the claim that democracies are better at avoiding conflict over transboundary freshwaterways.

H3: A democratic-autocratic country pair is more likely to conflict over water quantity issues related to transboundary freshwater resources relative to democratic-democratic country pairs and autocratic-autocratic country pairs.

While the first hypothesis addresses all cooperation and conflict over transboundary freshwater resources, this hypothesis specifically investigates conflicts over water quantity.

H4: An autocratic-autocratic country pair is more likely to conflict over water quantity issues related to transboundary freshwater resources than a democratic-democratic country pair but it is less likely to conflict over the quantity of transboundary freshwater resources than a democratic-autocratic country pair. While the second hypothesis address all cooperation and conflict over transboundary freshwater resources, this hypothesis specifically investigates conflicts over water quantity.

H5: A democratic-autocratic country pair is less likely to cooperate over water quantity issues related to transboundary freshwater resources relative to democratic-democratic country pairs and autocratic-autocratic country pairs. This hypothesis specifically investigates cooperation over water quantity.

H6: An autocratic-autocratic country pair is less likely to cooperate over water quantity issues related to transboundary freshwater resources than a democratic-democratic country pair, but it is more likely to cooperate over the quantity of transboundary freshwater resources than a democratic-autocratic country pair. This hypothesis specifically investigates cooperation over water quantity.

The third through sixth hypotheses address the pro-democracy public goods distribution argument by focusing on water quantity events. All hypotheses will be tested by a multivariate analysis of the following variables.

 

Data[17]

The dataset used in this paper comes from Gleditsch et al.,[18] Kalbhenn,[19] Monty Marshall and Ted Gurr,[20] J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey,[21] and Douglas M. Gibler.[22] The Gleditsch et al. paper investigates the role that rivers as borders play in conflict between basin-sharing dyads.[23] The Kalbhenn paper specifically investigates conflict and cooperation over transboundary freshwater resources.[24] Marshall and Gurr created the Polity IV dataset, which provides governance and political stability variables.[25] Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey created the National Material Capabilities dataset, which includes information on population and development.[26] Finally, the Gibler dataset provides information on alliances.[27] The dependent conflict/cooperation variable is negative for cases of conflict and positive for cases of cooperation. The magnitude of the absolute value of the variable increases as conflict or cooperation gets more intense. Instances of conflict and cooperation over transboundary freshwater resources and their intensity were determined from interpretation of news articles written on the subject (Appendix A). Most water conflict studies look at non-water specific conflicts and control for river basin-sharing. Because this study uses water-specific conflict and cooperation events (a less common choice), common conflict and geopolitical control variables could behave differently than would be expected.

The control variables for conflict include binary variables that describe whether the countries are found in the Middle East/North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa; a binary variable that describes whether the countries are considered to be “major powers”; a binary variable that describes whether the countries in the dyad have an alliance; and a binary variable indicating inconsistent regimes.[28] Controls for location in the Middle East/North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa were included because these regions have more pronounced resource stress than others.[29] A country’s status as a major power is also important because major powers have the most resources and broadest international interests.[30] Alliances are important to consider because they control for the presence of amicable relationships (or lack thereof) between states.[31] Finally, the inconsistent regimes variable controls for the increased conflict that those governments are often associated with.[32]

To control for water scarcity and water stress, the natural log of the area (km2) of the river basin located in the upstream state and a binary measure of dryness based on rainfall measures are used. Both of those variables have been found to be significantly correlated with the onset of fatal militarized interstate disputes (MIDs).[33]

The geopolitical controls include system size, the natural log of the distance (km) between the capital cities of the states, natural log of population, and a measure of contiguity. System size was included to control for the finding that conflict decreases between non-neighboring countries as the number of non-neighboring dyads increases.[34] The natural log of the population in the dyad is included because it has been found to be significantly correlated with conflict.[35] The natural log of energy consumption per capita in the dyad, and the square of that value, control respectively for the effects of development on conflict and the idea of the environmental Kuznet’s curve.[36]  Finally, the type of news source is included as a variable to control for the fact that not all news sources used to retrieve conflict/cooperation information were independent.[37]

The Middle East/North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, major power, alliance, contiguity, and system size variables were not found to be significantly correlated with conflict in the Gleditsch et al. study. However, those variables will be included in this paper’s analysis because they have been found to be significant in conflict literature of the past.[38] For more summaries of the aforementioned variables, please see Appendix B.

Two strengths of this analysis are that it takes a plethora of variables into consideration and actually considers water events instead of general conflict events. While many control variables are used, it is impossible to address all the factors that are known to influence conflict and water-sharing dynamics. In some cases, such as that of water scarcity and stress, there is not even an academic consensus on the proper way to measure these variables[39]. Therefore, it is possible that the unintentional omission of important variables could lead to biased results. Another weakness of this analysis is that the conflict/cooperation variable only covers a ten-year time span (from 1997-2007) and originates from reviews of news coverage. Thus, the sample size is not very large and could be biased towards events that tend to attract more media coverage, such as ones that occur in densely populated areas or affect a large number of people. Sampling bias also seems to favor democratic-democratic pairs because they make up the largest proportion of dyad type in the dataset.

The variables that originated from the Gleditsch et al. 2006 dataset only covered years through 2001. In order to be able to analyze a ten-year span of data, the maximum value was coded for the contiguity, proportion of the basin in the upstream state, distance between capital cities, major power, Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and system size variables. That decision was made because it seems unlikely that any of those values would change between 2001 and 2007. However, there is a chance that those values did change and, thus, it is important to consider the possibility that the assumptions necessary to increase sample size might not accurately reflect the reality of some of the geopolitical factors in consideration.

 

Models

To test the hypotheses, six multivariate linear regressions were run on the IRCC conflict/cooperation variable controlling for the variables described above. The models were conditioned upon the governance structure of the country pairs: democratic-democratic, democratic-autocratic, and autocratic-autocratic as determined by the Polity IV dataset.[40] The equations describing the regressions that were run can be found below.

 

Testing the Hypotheses

H1: A democratic-autocratic country pair is the worst at avoiding and mitigating conflict over transboundary freshwaterways relative to democratic-democratic country pairs and autocratic-autocratic country pairs.

In this model, the sign and significance on the coefficient of the variable will indicate an increase or decrease in the conflict/cooperation outcome  relative to other dyadic governance relationships. ={-6,-5,-4,-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,4,5,6} as defined by the IRCC database (Appendix A).[41]

 

H2: An autocratic-autocratic country pair is not as good at avoiding and mitigating conflict over transboundary freshwaterways as a democratic-democratic country pair, but it is better at avoiding and mitigating conflict over transboundary freshwaterways than a democratic-autocratic country pair.

In this model, the sign and significance on the coefficient of the variable will indicate an increase or decrease in conflict/cooperation probability relative to two democracies. ={-6,-5,-4,-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,4,5,6} as defined by the IRCC database (Appendix A).[42]

 

H3: A democratic-autocratic country pair is more likely to conflict over water quantity issues related to transboundary freshwater resources relative to democratic-democratic country pairs and autocratic-autocratic country pairs.

In this model, the sign and significance on the coefficient of the variable will indicate an increase or decrease in the conflict outcome relative to other dyadic governance relationships. Yit denotes the instance of a conflict specifically over water quantity.

 

H4: An autocratic-autocratic country pair is more likely to conflict over water quantity issues related to transboundary freshwater resources than a democratic-democratic country pair, but it is less likely to conflict over the quantity of transboundary freshwater resources than a democratic-autocratic country pair.

In this model, the sign and significance on the coefficient of the variable will indicate an increase or decrease in conflict probability relative to two democracies. Yit denotes the instance of a conflict specifically over water quantity.

 

H5: A democratic-autocratic country pair is less likely to cooperate over water quantity issues related to transboundary freshwater resources relative to democratic-democratic country pairs and autocratic-autocratic country pairs.

In this model, the sign and significance on the coefficient of the variable will indicate an increase or decrease in the cooperative outcome relative to other dyadic governance relationships. Yit denotes the instance of cooperation specifically over water quantity.

 

H6: An autocratic-autocratic country pair is less likely to cooperate over water quantity issues related to transboundary freshwater resources than a democratic-democratic country pair, but it is more likely to cooperate over the quantity of transboundary freshwater resources than a democratic-autocratic country pair.

In this model, the sign and significance on the coefficient of the variable will indicate an increase or decrease in cooperation probability relative to two democracies. Yit denotes the instance of cooperation specifically over water quantity.

 

Results

Governance Type and Water Event Scores

Table 1 shows the results of the multivariate regression testing H1. This hypothesis contends that a democratic-autocratic country pair is the worst at avoiding and mitigating conflict over transboundary freshwaterways relative to democratic-democratic country pairs and autocratic-autocratic country pairs. The results show that dyad pairs of one democracy and one autocracy are slightly more likely to conflict over transboundary freshwaterways than the other two dyads in question. That finding conforms with established beliefs on the instability and disagreement-ridden nature of democracy-autocracy relationships.[43] The majority of independent variables used in this regression yields significant coefficients, half of which has anticipated signs and half of which does not. Population, basin, and dryness coefficients are all negative. Those findings are consistent with Gleditsch et al. findings.[44] Gleditsch et al. found system size to be indicative of cooperation,[45] but these results do not. Alliance, capital city distance, and independent news coefficients are all positive, as expected. Those factors are known to be indicators of cooperation.[46]  On the other hand, the Kuznet’s control variable, which is usually indicative of cooperation, takes a negative value in this regression. The four variables with positive coefficients where negative coefficients were expected (major power, contiguity, Sub-Saharan Africa, and partially-independent news) are relatively large in magnitude. The result for contiguity is especially surprising because it is known to be one of the strongest indicators of conflict, not cooperation.[47] However, it is possible that the relationship between contiguity and conflict differs when only water events are considered. The unconsolidated regimes and Middle East/North Africa variables are not significant and the dyad development variable is omitted because of collinearity.


 

Table 1. Testing the relationship between governance type and water event scores.

Variable H1 H2
Unconsolidated Regimes

-0.12

(0.14)

-0.12

(0.16)

Development Omitted Omitted
Dyad Size

-0.14***

(0.043)

-0.14***

(0.043)

Major Power

0.42***

(0.13)

0.36***

(0.14)

Alliance

0.21***

(0.067)

0.20***

(0.068)

Distance

0.13**

(0.052)

0.13**

(0.052)

Contiguity

0.65*

(0.34)

0.71**

(0.34)

System Size

-0.40***

(0.11)

-0.41***

(0.11)

Middle East/North Africa

0.15

(0.095)

0.075

(0.11)

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.51***

(0.12)

0.51***

(0.12)

Basin Upstream

-0.033***

(0.0079)

-0.034***

(0.0079)

Dryness

-0.33***

(0.76)

-0.31***

(0.077)

Kuznet’s

-0.67***

(0.024)

-0.053**

(0.026)

Partially Ind. News

0.28***

(0.10)

0.28***

(0.10)

Independent News

0.36***

(0.11)

0.39***

(0.11)

Democracy-Autocracy

-0.19**

(0.076)

-0.094

(0.097)

Autocracy-Autocracy

0.19

(0.12)

Constant

1.77*

(0.69)

1.91***

(0.69)

N 3858 3858
R-squared 0.095 0.095

 

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, standard error in parentheses

H2 posits that an autocratic-autocratic country pair is not as good at avoiding and mitigating conflict over transboundary freshwaterways as a democratic-democratic country pair, but it is better at avoiding and mitigating conflict over transboundary freshwaterways than a democratic-autocratic country pair. The results from the multivariate regression run to test that hypothesis can be found in Table 1. Neither of the governance variables is significant in this regression output, but most of the control variables are. Once again, dyad size, alliance, capital city distance, basin, dryness, and independent news variables yield expected results. Major power, contiguity, system size, Sub-Saharan Africa, Kuznet’s, and partially independent news variables do not. Contiguity boasts the largest coefficient and dyad development is once again omitted due to collinearity. The unconsolidated regimes and Middle East/North Africa variables are, again, not significant. This regression did yield very similar coefficient values as H1, and, for the most part, the standard errors are not as large relative to those from H1 outputs.

 

Governance Type and Water Quantity Conflict

H3 states that a democratic-autocratic country pair is more likely to conflict over water quantity issues related to transboundary freshwater resources relative to democratic-democratic country pairs and autocratic-autocratic country pairs. Table 2 shows the results from the multivariate analysis testing H3. The democracy-autocracy outcome is not significant and fewer control variables are significant than in the larger-sample size H1 and H2. The unconsolidated regimes, dyad size, Sub-Saharan Africa, and dryness variables all yield the expected positive coefficients and are significant. The Kuznet’s coefficient is significant and unexpectedly positive while the major power, alliance, and Middle East/North Africa variables are significant and unexpectedly negative. Once again, the largest significant coefficient is one with an unexpected sign; major power is usually an indicator of conflict because of the large military capabilities of major powers.[48]

 

Table 2. Testing the relationship between governance type and water quantity conflict events.

Variable H3 H4
Unconsolidated Regimes

0.12*

(0.63)

0.13

(0.080)

Development Omitted Omitted
Dyad Size

0.080***

(0.024)

0.079***

(0.024)

Major Power

-0.28***

(0.070)

-0.29***

(0.077)

Alliance

-0.12***

(0.038)

-0.12***

(0.039)

Distance

-0.050

(0.032)

-0.049

(0.032)

Contiguity

-0.15

(0.15)

-0.15

(0.15)

System Size

0.056

(0.072)

0.055

(0.072)

Middle East/North Africa

-0.11**

(0.048)

-0.12**

(0.055)

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.23***

(0.067)

0.23***

(0.068)

Basin Upstream

-0.0015

(0.0056)

-0.0015

(0.0056)

Dryness

0.20***

(0.040)

0.20***

(0.040)

Kuznet’s

0.032***

(0.012)

0.034**

(0.014)

Partially Ind. News

-0.030

(0.050)

-0.030

(0.050)

Independent News

-0.088

(0.061)

-0.087

(0.061)

Democracy-Autocracy

0.050

(0.037)

0.058

(0.053)

Autocracy-Autocracy

0.013

(0.066)

Constant

-0.35

(0.34)

-0.34

(0.34)

N 1125 1125
R-squared 0.10 0.10

 

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, standard error in parentheses

H4 states that an autocratic-autocratic country pair is more likely to conflict over water quantity issues related to transboundary freshwater resources than a democratic-democratic country pair, but it is less likely to conflict over the quantity of transboundary freshwater resources than a democratic-autocratic country pair. The results from the multivariate regression analysis testing H4 can be found in Table 2. All of the patterns established in the results from H3 in terms of significance and anticipated sign of coefficients hold true in the results from H4 except that the unconsolidated regimes variable is not statistically significant in this model. The major power variable once again has the largest magnitude coefficient and is shown to be negatively correlated with conflict, which is not consistent with previous findings.[49] H3 and H4 employ a smaller sample size than H1 and H2, but the R-squared values are slightly larger.

 

Governance Type and Water Quantity Cooperation

H5 posits that a democratic-autocratic country pair is less likely to cooperate over water quantity issues related to transboundary freshwater resources relative to democratic-democratic country pairs and autocratic-autocratic country pairs. The results of the multivariate regression testing that hypothesis are shown in Table 3. The results show that democracy-autocracy pairs are slightly less likely to cooperate over water quantity than the other dyad types in question. In this model the unconsolidated regimes, major power, alliance, Middle East/North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, dryness, and independent news variables are significant with the major power and Middle East/North Africa variables having an unexpected sign. The major power and Middle East/North Africa coefficients are both positive in these results, leading to the interpretation that they are indicators of cooperation. As has previously been noted, those two variables have classically been thought of as conflict indicators. Once again, the major power coefficient was the largest, but its effect is not as pronounced in this model and it is in previous models.

 

 

Table 3. Testing the relationship between governance type and water quantity cooperation events.

Variable H5 H6
Unconsolidated Regimes

-0.15**

(0.068)

-0.057

(0.087)

Development Omitted Omitted
Dyad Size

-0.014

(0.026)

-0.016

(0.026)

Major Power

0.19**

(0.076)

0.13

(0.083)

Alliance

0.14***

(0.041)

0.12***

(0.042)

Distance

0.011

(0.034)

0.018

(0.034)

Contiguity

0.16

(0.16)

0.23

(0.16)

System Size

-0.048

(0.077)

-0.06

(0.078)

Middle East/North Africa

0.091*

(0.052)

0.038

(0.060)

Sub-Saharan Africa

-0.16**

(0.072)

-0.15**

(0.073)

Basin Upstream

-0.0069

(0.0061)

-0.0071

(0.0061)

Dryness

-0.15***

(0.043)

-0.15***

(0.043)

Kuznet’s

-0.015

(0.013)

-0.0012

(0.015)

Partially Ind. News

0.065

(0.054)

0.063

(0.054)

Independent News

0.16**

(0.065)

0.17***

(0.066)

Democracy-Autocracy

-0.090**

(0.040)

-0.017

(0.057)

Autocracy-Autocracy

0.13*

(0.071)

Constant 0.51 0.58
N 1125 1125
R-squared 0.058 0.073

 

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, standard error in parentheses

H6 argues that an autocratic-autocratic country pair is less likely to cooperate over water quantity issues related to transboundary freshwater resources than a democratic-democratic country pair, but it is more likely to cooperate over the quantity of transboundary freshwater resources than a democratic-autocratic country pair. The results from the regression ran to test that hypothesis are found in Table 3. Results show that a dyad composed of two autocracies is more likely to cooperate over a water quantity event than a dyad composed of two democracies. Four control variables are found to be significant and have expected coefficient signs: alliance, Sub-Saharan Africa, dryness, and independent news (largest coefficient in magnitude). The R-squared value from this regression is slightly better than that from the regression testing H5.

 

Comparing Governance and Conflict/Cooperation Outcomes

To have a reference, the mean of the three types of events studied (IRCC, conflict over quantity, and cooperation over quantity) was found for each dyad type (Table 4). In each case a dyad composed of two autocracies showed the strongest trends towards cooperation. Democracy-democracy dyads show the strongest trends toward conflict in all three cases. It should be noted that the two-autocracy dyads are by far the least common, followed by the democracy-autocracy dyads.

Table 4. Mean water event outcome by dyad type.

IRCC Conflict over Quantity Cooperation over Quantity Number of Observations
Democracy-Democracy 1.46 0.097 0.30 2191
Democracy-Autocracy 1.57 0.070 0.31 1136
Autocracy-Autocracy 1.70 0.038 0.74 531

 

Conclusion

Two of the three hypotheses comparing democracy-autocracy dyads to democracy-democracy and democracy-autocracy dyads are affirmed by the results of the multivariate regression analyses. Dyads composed of one democracy and one autocracy are more likely to conflict in general freshwater interaction events and less likely to cooperate in quantity-focused freshwater interaction events. There is no evidence to indicate that democracy-autocracy dyads conflict more than other dyad types over freshwater quantity events.

Of the three hypotheses that posit dyads of two democracies conflicting less than other dyad types, only one is affirmed by the results of the multivariate regression analysis. Results are not significant enough to yield an answer to the question of how democracy-democracy dyads compare in the case of general freshwater events and the question of how democracy-democracy dyads compare in the case of freshwater quantity conflict events. However, the results of the final regression show that autocracy-autocracy pairs are significantly more likely to cooperate over water quantity issues than democracy-democracy pairs are. The democracy-autocracy variable is not significant in the water quantity cooperation regression. Thus, no comparison can be made between all three dyads in that case.

The interaction results for governance and conflict/cooperation variables show that interactions between two autocracies are, on average, more cooperative than any other interaction type considered. In general, all three dyad types cooperate over water quantity much more than they conflict, and they all conflict over water quantity about equally as often.

Six control variables stand out as worthy of further discussion after regressions were run on the dependent variables when the governance type was known (Appendix C). Water scarcity is a conflict indicator for general water events regardless of the governance type. However, it seems to have a more prominent effect when at least one autocracy is present (C-1). Vally Koubi et al. found water scarcity to be a driver of cooperation, but they were not looking at water-specific events.[50] Dyad size is negatively correlated with water quantity cooperation when at least one autocracy is present (C-3). It is positively correlated with all conflict types and negatively correlated with water quantity cooperation in democracy-autocracy pairs. This trend consistent with the Gleditsch et al. findings that show likelihood of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) increasing with increasing population.[51] The percent of the river basin in the upstream state is positively correlated with all types of cooperation and negatively correlated with water quantity conflict in democracy-autocracy pairs. That is not consistent with Gleditsch findings, which found the basin variable to be an indicator of increased MIDs.[52] The alliance and contiguity variables are positively correlated with all types of cooperation and negatively correlated with water quantity conflict in democracy-democracy dyads. The alliance outcome is to be expected from studies of general conflict, but the contiguity outcome is surprising.[53] Finally, the only valid variable related to development, the Kuznet’s variable, is the only one that is not significant in any of the cases (C-1, C-2, C-3).

The results of this study could have important implications for the selection of control variables in water conflict studies.

 

Discussion

Democracies are frequently lauded as paragons of cooperative behavior and a sound control for peace in analyses of freshwater conflict.[54] The justification for those statements and uses are sound: democracies promote the liberal peace and cannot be matched in their ability to distribute public goods.[55] As has been mentioned before, freshwater poses a unique case. It cannot be solely defined as a public good nor examined with a resource curse eye.[56] The consideration of the presence of democratic government as a stabilizing factor in studies of freshwater conflict should be scrutinized.

The results of this paper show that “the stabilizing force of democracy” might not be as relevant as previously assumed in the case of freshwater interaction events. Dyads composed of two autocracies were shown to cooperate more than democratic pairs over water quantity events and generally showed more cooperative trends. Those results call into question the validity of the public goods distribution argument that praises democracies for their ability to handle issues of water quantity. That is not surprising considering the fact that freshwater is frequently not a public good.[57]

It should be noted that this analysis did employ a small sample size with especially small occurrences of democracy-autocracy and autocracy-autocracy dyads. A number of variables that are typically strong indicators of conflict were actually found to be relatively strong indicators of cooperation in this study. That could be a sign of errors in the model. Or it could be a side-effect of the fact that water events are very unique and might not be directly comparable to other interaction events such as wars and conflicts over expensive, point resources. Variables that should be investigated more include water scarcity measures, the percent of the river basin in the upstream state, and contiguity because they seem to interact with water events differently than they do with general conflict events. Those variables, in addition to dyad size and the presence of an alliance, should continue to be used in water conflict studies because of their consistent significance and influence. Future studies would do well to employ a greater sample size with more accurate post-2001 geopolitical variables than this study. Or, perhaps even better, future studies could investigate the use of different conflict and geopolitical control variables because traditional ones do not seem to be as relevant to water conflict as is thought.

The results of this study show that greater scrutiny is required in the selection of control variables for freshwater conflict studies. The “stabilizing force of democracy” might not be as relevant as scholars argue. Generally, there is a need for better control variables that more accurately represent the dynamics of water-specific events. Perhaps, once appropriate control variables are found, transboundary freshwater conflict studies can yield robust results that pave the way for tangible improvement in water conflict-stricken areas.

 

Appendix A*

IRCC Value Name
6 Alliance (Ratification of Freshwater Treaty)
5 Official Support (Signing of Freshwater Treaty)
4 Agreement/Commitment
3 Agreement of Low Scale
2 Verbal Support
1 Minor Official Changes, Talks or Policy Expressions
0 Neutral Acts
-1 Mild Verbal Expressions Displaying Discord in Interactions
-2 Strong Verbal Expressions Displaying Hostility in Interaction
-3 Hostile Actions
-4 Breaking Diplomatic Relations
-5 Any Violent Acts (not war)
-6 Violent Conflict (formal war)

*Descriptions of IRCC conflict/cooperation variables adapted from Kalbhenn 2011.

 

Appendix B*

Variable Name Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Value Maximum Value Number of Observations
alliance1 0.29 0.45 0 1 5881
anydryhh 0.51 0.50 0 1 5881
mcontiguity 1.29 0.52 0 2 5881
newdyadsize 17.94 1.21 14.03 21.61 5881
ind 0.083 0.28 0 1 5881
ircc 1.54 1.79 -5 6 5881
mlnbasinupstream 8.42 5.16 0 15.18 5816
mlndistance 6.39 0.91 1.61 8.60 5816
lndyaddevelopment -6.08 1.16 -8.82 -3.29 5881
lnsqdyaddevelopment -12.16 2.32 -17.64 -6.57 5881
mmajorpower 0.13 0.34 0 1 5816
mmideastnaf 0.20 0.40 0 1 5816
onedemocnew 0.28 0.45 0 1 5881
partlyind 0.092 0.29 0 1 5881
mssa 0.33 0.47 0 1 5816
msyssize -0.16 0.74 -3.85 0 4053
quantconflict 0.31 0.46 0 1 1500
quantcoop 0.52 0.50 0 1 1500
twoautocnew 0.15 0.35 0 1 5881
unconsolidatednew 0.055 0.23 0 1 5611

*Descriptions of the variables used in this study.

 

Appendix C

Table 1. Regression results from models testing the relationship between the control variables and the IRCC water event scores when governance type is known.

Variable Democracy-Autocracy Autocracy-Autocracy Democracy-Democracy
Unconsolidated Regimes Omitted Omitted

0.12

(0.21)

Development Omitted Omitted Omitted
Dyad Size

-0.12*

(0.061)

0.035

(0.22)

-0.19***

(0.069)

Major Power

0.60**

(0.25)

-0.71

(0.67)

0.42*

(0.22)

Alliance

-0.20

(0.14)

0.071

(0.18)

0.34***

(0.10)

Distance

0.11

(0.098)

0.31

(0.19)

0.12

(0.78)

Contiguity

0.89

(6.20)

21.73*

(11.73)

1.01***

(0.36)

System Size

-0.64

(1.68)

-5.90*

(3.21)

-0.51***

(0.13)

Middle East/North Africa

-0.071

(0.17)

0.28

(0.27)

-0.18

(0.26)

Sub-Saharan Africa

1.10***

(0.21)

0.16

(0.31)

0.52***

(0.19)

Basin Upstream

0.045***

(0.017)

-0.0034

(0.022)

-0.070***

(0.011)

Dryness

-0.61***

(0.14)

-0.65**

(0.27)

-0.23**

(0.12)

Kuznet’s

-0.020

(0.043)

0.076

(0.082)

-0.029

(0.039)

Partially Ind. News

0.51***

(0.17)

0.69**

(0.31)

-0.068

(0.14)

Independent News

0.029

(0.24)

-0.36

(0.54)

0.58***

(0.13)

Constant

0.94

(6.34)

-21.38

(12.42)

3.01***

(1.08)

N 1136 531 2191
R-squared 0.16 0.052 0.11

 *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, standard error in parentheses

 

Table 2. Regression results from models the relationship between the control variables and water quantity conflict events when governance type is known.

Variable Democracy-Autocracy Autocracy-Autocracy Democracy-Democracy
Unconsolidated Regimes Omitted Omitted

0.42***

(0.13)

Development Omitted Omitted Omitted
Dyad Size

-0.099***

(0.034)

0.047

(0.17)

0.0072

(0.043)

Major Power

-0.61***

(0.17)

-0.23

(0.43)

-0.14

(0.16)

Alliance

0.048

(0.096)

-0.071

(0.091)

-0.28***

(0.075)

Distance

0.13*

(0.076)

-0.071

(0.14)

0.043

(0.056)

Contiguity

-4.97

(10.78)

Omitted

-0.36**

(0.17)

System Size

1.52

(2.89)

Omitted

0.14

(0.11)

Middle East/North Africa

-0.058

(0.11)

-0.19*

(0.11)

-0.37***

(0.13)

Sub-Saharan Africa

-0.0038

(0.12)

0.44***

(0.12)

-0.12

(0.14)

Basin Upstream

-0.054***

(0.014)

0.012

(0.017)

0.0063

(0.0077)

Dryness

0.21**

(0.091)

0.17

(0.10)

0.034

(0.076)

Kuznet’s

0.012

(0.025)

0.032

(0.030)

0.036

(0.024)

Partially Ind. News

-0.15**

(0.075)

-0.052

(0.13)

0.099

(0.076)

Independent News

-0.17

(0.14)

-0.082

(0.20)

-0.090

(0.074)

Constant

3.43

(10.74)

0.062

(2.25)

0.73

(0.58)

N 290 189 646
R-squared 0.17 0.20 0.098

 *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, standard error in parentheses

 

Table 3. Regression results from models the relationship between the control variables and water quantity cooperation events when governance type is known.

Variable Democracy-Autocracy Autocracy-Autocracy Democracy-Democracy
Unconsolidated Regimes Omitted Omitted

-0.25*

(0.13)

Development Omitted Omitted Omitted
Dyad Size

-0.077**

(0.036)

-0.52**

(0.21)

0.10**

(0.045)

Major Power

0.57***

(0.18)

1.26**

(0.53)

-0.041

(0.17)

Alliance

-0.18*

(0.10)

0.16

(0.11)

0.22***

(0.078)

Distance

-0.088

(0.082)

0.36**

(0.17)

-0.12**

(0.058)

Contiguity

-14.43

(11.66)

Omitted

0.39**

(0.18)

System Size

3.69

(3.13)

Omitted

-0.14

(0.11)

Middle East/North Africa

-0.068

(0.12)

0.056

(0.13)

0.27**

(0.13)

Sub-Saharan Africa

0.098

(0.13)

-0.25*

(0.15)

0.075

(0.14)

Basin Upstream

0.061***

(0.016)

0.0060

(0.021)

-0.022***

(0.0080)

Dryness

-0.11

(0.098)

-0.20

(0.13)

-0.086

(0.079)

Kuznet’s

-0.0034

(0.027)

-0.017

(0.037)

0.0070

(0.024)

Partially Ind. News

0.10

(0.081)

0.31*

(0.16)

-0.020

(0.079)

Independent News

0.44***

(0.15)

-0.19

(0.25)

0.23***

(0.077)

Constant

16.18

(11.61)

7.33***

(2.79)

-0.70

(0.60)

N 290 189 646
R-squared 0.17 0.14 0.078

 *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, standard error in parentheses

 

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Buhaug, Halvard, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. “The Death of Distance? The Globalization of Armed Conflict.” In Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization, edited by M. Kahler and B. Walter, 187–216. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228685014_The_death_of_distance_The_globalization_of_armed_conflict.

Deacon, Robert. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and the Provision of Public Goods.” Working paper, Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2003. http://escholarship.org/uc/item/9h54w76c.

Doyle, Michael W. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 205–35. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265298.

Falkenmark, Malin, Jan Lundquist, and Carl Widstrand. “Macro-Scale Water Scarcity Requires Micro-Scale Approaches: Aspects of Vulnerability in Semi-Arid Development.” Natural Resources Forum 13, no. 4 (November 1989): 258–67.

Feitelson, Eran. “Implications of Shifts in the Israeli Water Discourse for Israeli-Palestinian Water Negotiations.” Political Geography 21, no. 3 (March 2002): 293–318.

Furlong, Kathryn, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Håvard Hegre. “Geographic Opportunity and Neomalthusian Willingness: Boundaries, Shared Rivers, and Conflict.” International Institutions 32, no. 1 (2006): 79-108.

Gibler, Douglas M. International Military Alliances, 1648-2008. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2009.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter. “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature.” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 3 (May 1998): 381–400.

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Halliday, Fred. “Military Conflict: War, Revolt, Strategic Rivalry.” In The Middle East in International Relations, 167–92. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Hegre, Håvard. “Gravitating toward War: The Gravity Model of Trade and the Liberal Peace.” Presented at the 3rd General Conference of the European Consortium of Political Research, September 2005.

Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992.” The American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 33–48.

Kalbhenn, Anna. “Liberal Peace and Shared Resources—A Fair-Weather Phenomenon?” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 6 (November 2011): 715–35.

Koubi, Vally, Gabriele Spilker, Tobias Böhmelt, and Thomas Bernauer. “Do Natural Resources Matter for Interstate and Intrastate Armed Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (August 2013): 227–43. doi:10.1177/0022343313493455.

Lektzian, David, and Mark Souva. “An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 6 (December 2007): 848–71.

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O’Neal, John R., Francis H. O’Neal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett. “The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85.” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (February 1996): 11–28.

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Rijsberman, Frank R. “Water Scarcity: Fact or Fiction?” Agricultural Water Management 80, no. 1-3 (February 2006): 5–22.

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Footnotes

[1] Joyce R. Starr, “Water Wars,” Foreign Policy 82 (Spring 1991): 17-36.

[2] Frank R. Rijsberman, “Water Scarcity: Fact or Fiction?” Agricultural Water Management 80, no. 1-3 (February 2006): 5-22; Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature,” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 3 (May 1998): 381-400.

[3] The City of San Diego, “Pure Water San Diego,” 2015, http://www.sandiego.gov/water/purewater/purewatersd/index.shtml.

[4] Eran Feitelson, “Implications of Shifts in the Israeli Water Discourse for Israeli-Palestinian Water Negotiations,” Political Geography 21, no. 3 (March 2002): 293-318.

[5] Anna Kalbhenn, “Liberal Peace and Shared Resources—A Fair-Weather Phenomenon?” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 6 (November 2011): 715-35.

[6] Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment,” 381-400.

[7] Benjamin A. Olken, “Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 2 (May 2010): 243-67, doi:10.1017/S0003055410000079.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Robert Deacon, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and the Provision of Public Goods” (working paper, Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2003).

[10] John R. O’Neal, Francis H. O’Neal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett, “The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85,” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (February 1996): 11-28.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] David Lektzian and Mark Souva, “An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success,” Jounral of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 6 (December 2007): 848-71.

[14] Nils Petter Gleditsch, Kathryn Furlong, Håvard Hegre, Bethany Lacina, and Taylor Owen, “Conflicts over Shared Rivers: Resource Scarcity or Fuzzy Boundaries?” Political Geography 25, no. 4 (May 2006): 361-82.

[15] Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 205-35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265298.

[16] Starr, “Water Wars,” 17-36.

[17] This section draws heavily on Gleditsch et al.,“Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82; Kalbhenn, “Liberal Peace and Shared Resources,” 715-35; Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013,” last modified June 5, 2014, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm; J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965,” in Peace, War, and Numbers, ed. Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48.

[18] Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82.

[19] Kalbhenn, “Liberal Peace and Shared Resources,” 715-35.

[20] Marshall and Gurr, “Polity IV Project,” http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm.

[21] Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, “Capability Distribution,” 19-48.

[22] Douglas M. Gibler, International Military Alliances, 1648-2008 (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2009).

[23] Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82.

[24] Kalbhenn, “Liberal Peace and Shared Resources,” 715-35.

[25] Marshall and Gurr, “Polity IV Project.”

[26] Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, “Capability Distribution,” 19-48.

[27] Gibler, International Military Alliances.

[28] Marshall and Gurr, “Polity LV Project.”

[29] Fred Halliday, “Military Conflict: War, Revolt, Strategic Rivalry,” in The Middle East in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 167-92.

[30] Håvard Hegre, “Gravitating toward War: The Gravity Model of Trade and the Liberal Peace” (3rd General Conference of the European Consortium of Political Research, September 2005).

[31] Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82.

[32] Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992,” The American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 33-48.

[33] Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82.

[34] Arvid Raknerud and Håvard Hegre, “The Hazard of War: Reassessing the Evidence for the Democratic Peace,” Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 4 (November 1997): 385-404.

[35] Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Kalbhenn, “Liberal Peace and Shared Resources,” 715-35.

[38] Halliday, “Military Conflict,” 167-92; Hegre, “Gravitating toward War”; Josh A. Vasquez, “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality,” Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 2 (August 1995): 277-93; Raknerud and Hegre, “The Hazard of War,” 385-404.

[39] For example, the Falkenmark indicator defines countries that cannot sustain 1700 cubic meters of water per capita per year as water stressed (see Malin Falkenmark, Jan Lundquist, and Carl Widstrand, “Macro-Scale Water Scarcity Requires Micro-Scale Approaches: Aspects of Vulnerability in Semi-Arid Development,” Natural Resources Forum 13, no. 4 (November 1989): 258-67). Meanwhile, the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) differentiates between physical water scarcity and economic water scarcity, thus placing value on a country’s means (see Rijsberman, “Water Scarcity,” 5-22). The Water Poverty Index focuses on water security at the household level (see Rijsberman, “Water Scarcity,” 5-22).

[40] Marshall and Gurr, “Polity IV Project.”

[41] Kalbhenn, “Liberal Peace and Shared Resources,” 715-35.

[42] Ibid.

[43] David Lektzian and Mark Souva. “An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 6 (December 2007): 848-71.

[44] Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Gibler, International Military Alliances; Marshall and Gurr, “Polity IV Project”; Kalbhenn, “Liberal Peace and Shared Resources,” 715-35; Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82; Halvard Buhaug and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “The Death of Distance? The Globalization of Armed Conflict,” in Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization, ed. M. Kahler and B. Walter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 187-216.

[47] Vasquez, “Why Do Neighbors Fight?” 277-93; Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82; Kathryn Furlong, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Håvard Hegre, “Geographic Opportunity and Neomalthusian Willingness: Boundaries, Shared Rivers, and Conflict,” International Institutions 32, no. 1 (2006): 79-108.

[48] Hegre, “Gravitating toward War.”

[49] Ibid.

[50] Vally Koubi, Gabriele Spilker, Tobias Böhmelt, and Thomas Bernauer, “Do Natural Resources Matter for Interstate and Intrastate Armed Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (August 2013): 227-43, doi:10.1177/0022343313493455.

[51] Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Vasquez, “Why Do Neighbors Fight?” 277-93; Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82; Furlong, Gleditsch and Hegre, “Geographic Opportunity and Neomalthusian Willingness,” 79-108.

[54] Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment,” 381-400; Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82.

[55] Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment,” 381-400.; Gleditsch et al., “Conflicts over Shared Rivers,” 361-82; Olken, “Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods,” 243-67; O’Neal et al., “The Liberal Peace,” 11-28; Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” 205-35.

[56] David Zetland, “Water and the Economy,” Growing Blue (blog), June 27, 2012, http://growingblue.com/blog/economics/water-and-the-economy/; Koubi et al., “Do Natural Resources Matter,” 227-43.; Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “The Curse of Natural Resources,” European Economic Review 45 (2001): 827-38.

[57] Zetland, “Water and the Economy.”

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