Reverse Cap-and-Trade for Refugees: A Proposal to Ameliorate the Refugee Crisis in the European Union through a System of Quotas and Markets

Written by Jordan Farenhem

Introduction

From 2014 to 2017, over 1.8 million refugees were accepted by member states of the European Union.[1] In 2015 alone, over a million refugees sought asylum and were taken in by the EU.[2] In 2017, out of the over 702 thousand refugees applying for asylum in the EU,[3] only 437 thousand were accepted,[4] but in 2018 that number was estimated to be only around a quarter of a million.[5] This change does not represent a declining need to take in refugees, but rather illustrates the unwillingness of various EU states to do so. The United Nations Human Rights Campaign recognizes 21 million people around the world as refugees, including “3.2 million or so refugees awaiting decisions for asylum.” This situation is the result of the lack of nations willing to take in refugees, even when they are wealthy and have substantial infrastructure to handle an influx of refugees.[6] In an effort to increase the amount of refugees taken in by nations and to reduce the number of stateless people, the European Union should institute a reverse cap-and-trade-style system to allocate refugees among its member nations. This would ultimately ensure the number of refugees accepted by the European Union does not decrease over time and would allow for refugees to be distributed based on the economic and social ability of a country to accommodate refugees.

The Cap-and-Trade Policy

Currently, cap-and-trade policies exist for reducing carbon emissions. These policies give carbon-emitting businesses an allocated amount of emissions that can be produced in a given time period, and if a business produces more emissions than their allocation, they are fined (usually in the form of increase in taxes). If the business is emitting less than their allocation, they can auction off their remaining emissions to another business.[7] A similar type of system should be used for refugee quota allocation; this system allows for a free market system to exist and satisfy the preferences of individual nations, while also placing value on a principled goal of helping displaced people. In this the quota allocation policy, the terms “refugees” and “asylum seekers” will be used interchangeably, since the vast majority of asylum seekers entering Europe today are refugees, and most available data does not specify when these populations differentiate. Most nations prioritize refugee asylum applications over those of other asylum applicants,[8] but the quota system prescribed by reverse cap-and-trade should ultimately apply to all asylum applicants. Individual nations will have complete freedom to choose which type of asylum applicants they accept to fill their quotas, but refugees comprise up the assumed majority of these applicants.

The European Union should require member states accept at least 0.1% of its population worth of refugees each year (based on estimates of the country’s population from the previous year). If a country does not wish to take in this number of refugees, it can pay other nations to accept its refugee allotments in a marketplace-style setting. Unlike emissions-based cap-and-trade systems, in this plan a country pays another to take a portion of its refugee allocation. A country will be able to set the amount it is willing to give another country per assigned refugee, and other countries can choose to accept the offer or reject it in which case the monetary offering can be raised until there is a willing recipient. If no country is willing to accept another country’s allocated refugees, the country that is originally assigned the refugee will be required to accept its quota’s worth of refugees. A country that does not comply with this system will be penalized with sanctions and fines imposed by the European Union. These will be deemed significant enough to deter nations from not abiding by the reverse cap-and-trade policy, although this paper will not address the exact details of these penalties.

For example, Germany has a population of 80,457,737 people as of July 2018,[9] so under this system Germany would be required to take in 80,458 refugees in 2019. If Germany were only willing to take in 50,000 refugees in 2019, then it would be able to offer their remaining 30,458 refugees at a hypothetical compensation of €10,000 per refugee (estimates of the predicted prices will be addressed later). Another country, e.g. France, could then accept 25,000 of these refugees in addition to its own quota of 67,364 refugees,[10] and receive €250,000,000 from Germany. France would now be agreeing to take in a total of 92,364 refugees, and Germany’s total quota would be reduced to 55,458. If no other country is willing to accept Germany’s refugees, Germany would be required to take in the remaining 5,458 refugees (in addition to the 50,000 Germany already decided to take in) or receive significant sanctions and fines from the European Union. With the 28 current countries of the European Union having a total population of 517,111,329,[11] this system would make Europe the home to approximately half a million new asylum applicants each year.

There is no certainty that a policy such as this one would pass in the European Parliament. The European Parliament requires a simple majority, 376 votes, out of its 751 total seats to pass a piece of legislation.[12] While it is impossible to be certain of what each Member of European Parliament’s (MEP) vote will be, it is possible to determine national popular support for absorbing more refugees through analysis of polling data in a given country. Proportions of the nation supporting increased refugee absorption should be used to roughly determine what percentage of a country’s MEPs will vote in favor of pro-refugee absorption policies, such as the cap-and-trade system discussed here. Doing so, however, relies on the assumption that MEPs vote in-line with the views of the people they are elected to represent, which may not be accurate; nonetheless, analyzing popular voting data provides the best method of determining likely voting outcomes.

When asked in a Spring 2018 Pew Research Survey whether they would support or oppose taking in refugees, Spanish citizens responded “support” with the highest rate in the EU at 86%.[13] Assuming MEPs mirror the general population, 46 of Spain’s 54 MEPs should support pro-refugee absorption policies, such as the proposed cap-and-trade system.[14] Similarly, with 83% support for refugee absorption at Dutch popular polls,[15] 22 of the 26 MEPs for the Netherlands should support this policy.[16] Following this logic, there appears to be majority support in the European Parliament,  with approximately 77% of people across the 28 member countries and thus 77% of MEPs should–in theory­–support of taking in more refugees.[17] However, when factoring in the notion that individuals may support particular refugee policies at the national level, but may not support policies that are imposed by the European Union, these predictions become significantly more difficult to approximate. A 2017 Pew Research Survey found that in Spain and The Netherlands, only 34% and 24% of respective citizens supported the EU controlling refugee policies in their nation.[18] In fact, among the 9 EU member nations surveyed in this study, the median level of support for EU control­ of refugee policy–rather than national control–was 23%.[19] With the cap-and-trade refugee allocation system, quotas and penalties are imposed by the EU, but individual nations are still given some degree of control over their allocations in a market-place setting. This nuance makes it difficult to predict support in the European Parliament.

For the purpose of analyzing the effects of such a policy, and thus potentially changing how individual citizens may feel about using a cap-and trade refugee system, this paper will assume that such a policy is able to pass in the European Parliament. All EU member nations will be assumed to abide by the system without any drastic backlash or scenarios like Brexit occurring. This paper will also assume there will be limited movement of refugees within the Schengen Area, since refugees are not legally subject to the same rights of free movement as EU citizens or people travelling with visas.[20] Currently, the country in which a refugee first arrives is legally responsible for handling that refugee’s asylum claim.[21] In the context of the reverse cap-and-trade system, this regulation will still apply until a country has satisfied its refugee allotment. However, once a given country has satisfied its allotment of refugees–either through absorption or paying another country to take its remaining allocated refugees–the responsibility for refugees who enter that country will be transferred to a country that has not yet met its own quota. For example, Greece has a population of 10,761,523,[22] so its refugee quota would be 10,762. In 2018 alone, Greece has seen 29,764 migrants enter its sea borders alone,[23] meaning once the first 10,762 refugees enter and claim asylum in Greece, the remaining refugees will be reassigned and transferred to another country that has not yet fulfilled its quota, unless Greece chooses to take a portion of another country’s assigned refugees and increases its own quota. The quota of each EU member nations’ refugee intake under the cap-and-trade policy as well as each country’s current refugee intake are outlined in the following table (Figure 1). For the purpose of this analysis, the United Kingdom will not be considered in this system due to its current efforts to leave the European Union.[24]

Figure 1

EU Member Nation Asylum Applicants Accepted in 2017[25] 2019 Refugee Allocation under Cap-and-Trade[26] Net Change in Refugees under Cap-and-Trade
Austria 25,200 8,793 -16,407
Belgium 12,585 11,571 -1,014
Bulgaria 1,695 7,057 5,362
Croatia 100 4,270 4,170
Cyprus 1,254 1,237 -17
Czech Republic 145 10,686 10,541
Denmark 2,365 5,810 3,445
Estonia 95 1,244 1,149
Finland 3,430 5,537 2,107
France 32,565 67,364 34,799
Germany 261,620 80,457 -181,163
Greece 10,455 10,762 307
Hungary 1,290 9,826 8,536
Ireland 760 5,068 4,308
Italy 31,795 62,247 30,452
Latvia 135 1,924 1,789
Lithuania 285 2,793 2,508
Luxembourg 1,125 606 -519
Malta 760 449 -311
Netherlands 7,810 17,151 9,341
Poland 510 38,421 37,911
Portugal 500 10,355 9,855
Romania 1,245 21,457 20,212
Slovakia 60 5,445 5,385
Slovenia 150 2,102 1,952
Spain 4,090 49,331 45,241
Sweden 26,775 10,041 -16,734
Total: 428,799 452,004 23,205

Comparison to Alternative Quota Systems

This system of purely population-based quotas aims to circumvent issues inherent to inflexible quota systems. The 2015 quota system enacted by the EU to redistribute 120,000 refugees faced immense backlash, specifically from Central European states.[27] While many states who largely oppose to EU-level refugee quotas will likely still disapprove of a reverse cap-and-trade refugee allocation policy, the reverse cap-and-trade policy allows individual states to adjust their quotas in a marketplace setting. Thus, while this system will require nations incur additional costs (either the cost of taking in refugees or of paying another country to take its refugees), this system still poses a significantly more flexible option than rigid quota systems.

A reverse cap-and-trade system with a quota indexed to population size is preferable to a quota indexed on economic factors for several reasons. First, most infrastructure programs are designed to only handle a given nation’s population size and not significantly more people, regardless of that country’s wealth. For example, Italy and Malta have relatively similar GDPs per capita;[28] however, Italy has approximately 130 times the population of Malta,[29] meaning an influx of several thousand refugees would be easily accommodated by Italy but would likely overwhelm and collapse Malta’s infrastructure due to a population shock. Second, wealth inequality would likely mean the GDP of a country per capita is significantly higher than a figure reflecting the living conditions of the majority of people within that country, meaning that providing more refugees to wealthier countries would not guarantee those refugees a decent quality of living. Third, using economic data from previous years can be thoroughly inconsistent with a country’s current economic conditions and thus not adequately reflect a country’s ability to accept refugees. Indexing the quota to population provides more stability in the yearly quota because in a short period of time, it is far less likely for population than for economic conditions to vary. The “marketplace” environment that the reverse cap-and-trade system creates also means that countries can adapt their refugee intake to their economic conditions in comparison to the economic conditions of other countries. As a result, this system does still reflect the economic ability of countries to take in refugees, but on a more stable and comparative basis.

Creating a “Marketplace of Refugees”

To understand how the reverse cap-and-trade “marketplace” of refugees will operate, it is crucial to understand the current intake and distribution of refugees across Europe; today, Germany accepts the significant majority of refugees. In 2017, Germany accepted 261,620 applications for asylum, which is 61% of the total amount of refugees legally accepted by EU member nations.[30] This is in addition to the approximately 890,000 and 280,000 refugees Germany accepted in 2015 and 2016 respectively.[31] While Germany has shown a decline in the number of refugees it is willing to accept over the years, it still remains the leader in refugee intake by a significant margin. Along with Germany’s powerful economy which can handle a large population increase, Angela Merkel’s attempts to maintain Germany’s image as the leader of the EU is likely among the chief causes for Germany’s willingness to absorb refugees.

While there is an increasingly negative public attitude towards refugees and Islamophobia is on the rise in Germany–likely due to an increase in terror attacks attributed to refugees and Muslim populations[32]–Germany has not experienced any significant economic or social harm from taking in refugees. Anti-refugee and immigration groups argue that accepting immigrants and refugees leads to massive unemployment and significant increases in violent crime. Analysis of data from 2014 to 2017 prove that both of these claims are inaccurate. There was no indication that refugees displaced native workers, and in fact, the only groups who faced increased odds of unemployment were the refugees themselves.[33] While it would be preferable for these refugees to have jobs than to be unemployed, it is almost certain that refugees would prefer to be unemployed and living in Europe than remain in the country from which they were originally displaced. Refugees and immigrant populations have also been shown to have positive impacts on wages among native populations. A 13 year-long study that accounted for variables such as inflation, which performed a regression against general wage increases found that having a large influx in population of relatively low-skilled workers (e.g. the vast majority of the refugee populations entering Europe) leads to an approximately 2% increase in wages among low-skilled native workers.[34] The study also found there is no relevant change in higher-skilled positions as for the most part; refugee populations do not have language proficiency or an education considered relevant in their country of resettlement, so there is little competition with high-skilled native populations. Regarding crime, a study specifically analyzing the increase in refugees in Germany found there was no significant increase in crime since Germany started accepting large quantities of refugees in 2014, and the only statistically noticeable increases in crime were found to be crimes involving drug usage and fare-dodging.[35] These are fundamentally victimless crimes and thus impose little in terms of negative externalities on native citizens.

Since the majority of German attitudes toward refugee absorption are not significantly negative, based on current numbers, it is likely that Germany will continue to accept its approximately 250,000 refugees per year. If this is the case, Germany accept approximately 170,000 refugees above its assigned quota under the reverse cap-and-trade policy. It is also likely Germany would be willing to accept significantly more refugees under this policy due to the financial compensation that would exist if these additional refuges were offered by another country aiming to reduce its refugee intake. Accepting large quantities of refugees, especially taking in more than prescribed by a quota, is also incredible for a country’s public image. When viewed as selfless and charitable actors, countries like Germany reassert themselves as moral authority figures, increasing their soft power and their ability to form alliances and impact decisions in intergovernmental organizations like the European Union, United Nations, and NATO.[36] Thus, Germany is likely to remain the largest acceptor of refugees.

Currently, France and Italy are the only other countries in the EU that accept more than 30,000 refugees a year,[37] an amount of refugees significantly behind Germany, and approximately half of what each country would be responsible for taking in under the reverse cap-and-trade policy. While France is recognized as having the third strongest economy in the EU, behind only Germany and the United Kingdom,[38] it takes in disproportionately fewer refugees than Germany. This is largely reflective of the significant anti-immigration and anti-refugee attitudes currently present and emerging in France. Non-refugee immigrant populations, ethnic minorities, and refugees have been facing significant increases in discrimination as French nationalism has expanded, likely due to several recent terrorist attacks in France and more broadly throughout Europe.[39] French President Emmanuel Macron has expressed interest in reducing the intake of migrants,[40] likely indicating that even with the reverse cap-and-trade quota requiring France to take in over twice as many refugees as it currently accepts,[41] it is improbable France will take in more refugees. As a result, France likely would be among the countries with the largest quantities of refugees it intends to offer other nations. France’s government also has the funds to be able to fairly compensate other countries for its share of refugees; thus, this system would likely not cause tremendous backlash among the French people who would likely prefer spending money than taking in more refugees. Italy has the fourth strongest economy in the European Union,[42] and like France, is currently only taking in approximately half as many refugees as it would be required to accept under the reverse cap-and-trade program.[43] This also indicates that Italy will probably be one of the nations trying to offer away the largest quantities of their allocated refugees under the reverse cap-and-trade program.

Pricing and Payments

In this paper, in order to determine the price that nations would be willing to pay others to absorb an assigned refugee, the examples of France and Italy will be used as the primary exporters and Germany will be counted as the primary importer; these countries will likely engage in large-quantity transactions and have large enough budgets to set market prices. While Spain, Poland, and Romania will also now be required to take in 20 to 40 thousand more refugees each year than they currently accept, it is assumed that these countries would be willing to accept a significant quantity before resorting to trying to export their remaining quotas. This is because there is little marginal cost to taking in an initial several thousand refugees as they do not yet pose a strain on infrastructure and government resources, and these countries currently take in incredibly few refugees. These countries also have less spending power than France and Italy,[44] meaning there would be less ability to impact market prices. France and Italy would likely be able to offer countries more money per refugee, and a nation would rationally accept a higher offer. Thus, at least until Italy and France have run out of surplus refugees to offer to other countries, remaining nations will have little capacity to set market prices. This does not mean that they will never be able to set prices though, as there is a high chance Germany would be able to take in both Italy and France’s refugees. The next highest offers, likely from Spain, Poland, and Romania who would still be willing to offer relatively high payments per assigned refugee, will then control market price.

The price a country is willing to pay for another country to take in its refugees can be calculated as similar to the amount of money a country currently spends on the refugees it does accept. According to an August 2017 report by the European Commission, France described the average cost on the government of each refugee as being €11,900.46 for the average duration of a refugee’s stay in France.[45] Similar data is not available for Italy, but it can be assumed to be in a comparable price range.  In determining price, Germany (or another country willing to receive additional refugees) would know that if France were to offer Germany less than €11,900 per refugee, France would be offering less than they would be paying to accept that refugee. France would thus be at a net-gain in money in comparison to if they were required to keep each refugee. Germany would then be able to renegotiate the price to make it at least equal to what France would spend on each refugee, in this case being €11,900. However, in addition to the purely economic cost of each refugee, there is also a large social and political cost associated with taking in large quantities of refugees. As previously stated, France is growing ever-more intolerant and unwelcoming towards refugees as they see refugees as being responsible for increases in crime and an overall decrease in French prosperity. Macron knows he will lose whatever remaining approval rating he has and there will be more backlash against the French government if large amounts of refugees are permitted to enter France. Knowing how desperate France is to reduce their refugee intake, Germany could ask for higher monetary compensation per refugee in a way that would prescribe to the formula:

OFFER AMOUNT = ECONOMIC COST + SOCIAL COST

While obviously the social and political costs cannot be quantified, they are likely equal to a small yet significant increase in the offer amount per refugee. Therefore, Germany would be able to demand at least €11,900 with this number likely being able to reach upwards of €15,000 per refugee if countries are in dire need of getting rid of portions of their allocation. Other nations would need to compete with this offer in order for Germany to be willing to engage in a deal with them, so the market price per refugee can be calculated as approximately €12,000 per refugee.

Assuming this market price, France would pay Germany €417,588,000 to take all the 34,799 extra refugees France would be assigned under the cap-and-trade system. This accounts for only around 0.01% of France’s GDP,[46] meaning it would likely be a cost France could afford and would be more willing to pay, in comparison to accepting an additional 34,000 refugees. Italy would be willing to offer similar amounts for their refugees. Were Germany to accept 181,163 refugees more than its quota to maintain status quo levels of intake, assuming this market price holds, Germany would be receiving an additional €2 billion per year under the cap-and-trade policy. This would ultimately give Germany the capacity to continue accepting at least an equal number of refugees as it accepts in the status quo. However, the influx of billions of Euros would likely incentivize Germany to accept significantly more refugees than it currently does as there would no longer be public pushback due to the idea that refugees are an economic strain on the country. With these additional funds, Germany could also increase the quality of welfare provided to refugees, which would likely decrease the amount of drug offenses and fare-evasion crimes that are currently observed at slightly above average levels among refugee populations. This could reduce the narrative that refugees increase crime,[47] likely leading to the decrease of stigma and discrimination against refugees, as well as to countries across the European Union slowly developing increasing willingness to absorb refugees.

Conclusion

Ultimately, if implemented, the refugee cap-and-trade system this paper explores would only increase the total refugee intake across the European Union by 23,205 refugees per year in comparison to the refugees taken in during 2017.[48] The goal of the system in the short-term is not to radically increase the number of asylum applications accepted by countries in the European Union, but rather to ensure that intake of refugees does not continue to decrease and the allocation of refugees across Europe is distributed based on the willingness and capacity of individual nations to accept refugees. Without quotas or incentives, the European nations have little incentive to offer asylum to refugees, and a rigid, inflexible quota system as implemented by the European Parliament in 2015 has shown to be ineffective. In its worst case, the cap-and-trade system maintains close to current levels of refugee intakes even if it does not increase favorability of refugees. However, the policy is likely to have significant positive signaling effects.

Operating on the platform that countries are saving money by taking in their quota of refugees or even earning money by taking in more than their quota of refugees, Europeans can increasingly see refugees as a positive contribution to their countries. By re-orienting the public’s mindset in this direction, a reverse cap-and-trade policy will work to break down stigmas and discrimination currently faced by refugee populations. Once this happens, countries in Europe and around the world will perhaps find an increased willingness to welcome refugees, bettering the lives of millions of displaced persons from around the world.


About the Author

Jordan Farenhem is currently an undergraduate sophomore in Pauli Murray College at Yale University majoring in Political Science. He is specifically interested in the fields of post-conflict reconstruction and the effects of conflicts on non-combatants.  


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Endnotes

[1] Jon Henley, “What Is the Current State of the Migration Crisis in Europe?” The Guardian, November 21, 2018, accessed December 08, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/what-current-scale-migration-crisis-europe-future-outlook.

[2] Henley, “What Is the Current State of the Migration Crisis in Europe?”

[3] Frontex. Applications for asylum in the European Union (EU) from 2009 to 2017 (in 1,000 people)*, accessed December 12, 2018, https://www.statista.com/statistics/454836/number-of-asylum-applications-in-the-eu/ 

[4] Eurostat. Number of accepted first instance asylum applicants in Europe in 2017, by country, accessed December 12, 2018, https://www.statista.com/statistics/459815/accepted-asylum-applicants-europe-by-country/.

[5] Henley, “What Is the Current State of the Migration Crisis in Europe?”

[6] Kavitha Surana, “Why Do Some Countries Get Away With Taking Fewer Refugees?” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2017, accessed December 08, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/12/why-do-some-countries-get-away-with-taking-fewer-refugees-united-states-china/.

[7] Robert N. Stavins, “A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change,” Harvard Environmental Law Review 32, no. 2 (2008): 293-372

[8] Phillip Connor, “Europeans Support Taking in Refugees – but Not EU’s Handling of Issue,” Pew Research Center, September 19, 2018, accessed December 09, 2018, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/19/a-majority-of-europeans-favor-taking-in-refugees-but-most-disapprove-of-eus-handling-of-the-issue/.

[9] CIA, The World Factbook. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Continually updated, accessed December 08,2018. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

[10] CIA, The World Factbook

[11] CIA, The World Factbook

[12] Simon Hix and Bjørn Høyland, The Political System of the European Union, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 54-61.

[13] Phillip Connor, “Europeans Support Taking in Refugees – but Not EU’s Handling of Issue.”

[14] Europa, “Members of the European Parliament,” European Parliament, 2014, accessed December 09, 2018, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/home.

MEPs per country are based upon the 2014 election assignments. These are not indicative of the changes that will be incurred during the 2019 European Parliament Elections.

[15] Connor, “Europeans Support Taking in Refugees – but Not EU’s Handling of Issue”

[16] Europa, “Members of the European Parliament”

[17] Connor, “Europeans Support Taking in Refugees – but Not EU’s Handling of Issue”

[18] Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike, and Dorothy Manevich, “Most Europeans Think Brexit Bad for EU and UK,” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, June 15, 2017, accessed December 09, 2018, http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/15/most-europeans-judge-brexit-as-bad-for-eu-and-uk/.

[19] Stokes, Wike, Manevich, “Most Europeans Think Brexit Bad for EU and UK”

[20] James McAuley and Luisa Beck, “How Free Movement, a Founding Principle of the E.U., Became Less Free,” The Washington Post, July 18, 2018, accessed December 09, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/how-free-movement-a-founding-principle-of-the-eu-became-less-free/2018/07/17/8e140c0c-7f04-11e8-a63f-7b5d2aba7ac5_story.html?utm_term=.143c8ef8a778.

[21] “World Report 2018: Rights Trends in European Union,” Human Rights Watch, January 18, 2018, accessed December 09, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/european-union#.

[22] CIA, The World Factbook

[23] “Mediterranean Situation,” The Mediterranean Refugees/Migrants Data Portal, December 7, 2018, accessed December 09, 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean.

[24] At the time of writing and completing this paper, no deal had yet been reached regarding the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union following the “Brexit” referendum. This paper will assume the United Kingdom will no longer be a member of the European Union in 2019 and onwards.

[25] Eurostat. Number of accepted first instance asylum applicants in Europe in 2017, by country, accessed December 12, 2018, https://www.statista.com/statistics/459815/accepted-asylum-applicants-europe-by-country/. This only reflects the number of asylum applicants that were accepted by each country. The number of applicants whom were not accepted is significantly higher, specifically in peripheral countries.

[26] Allocations based on population numbers listed for each country as of July 2018 by the CIA’s World Factbook multiplied by 0.001.

[27] Ian Traynor and Patrick Kingsley, “EU Governments Push through Divisive Deal to Share 120,000 Refugees,” The Guardian, September 22, 2015, accessed December 12, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/22/eu-governments-divisive-quotas-deal-share-120000-refugees.

[28] The World Bank. “GDP per capita.” The World Bank Data, continually updated, accessed December 12, 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.

[29] CIA, The World Factbook

[30] Eurostat. Number of accepted first instance asylum applicants in Europe in 2017, by country

[31] Stefan Wagstyl, “German Refugee Intake Drops 70% in 2016,” Financial Times, January 11, 2017, accessed December 12, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/e7d56a47-0644-36fb-926b-b16aedc24300.

[32] Wagstyl, “German Refugee Intake Drops 70% in 2016.”

[33] Markus Gehrsitz and Martin Ungerer, “Jobs, Crime, and Votes: A Short-Run Evaluation of the Refugee Crisis in Germany,” January 2017, accessed December 12, 2018, IZA Discussion Paper No. 10494. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2903116

[34] Mette Foged and Giovanni Perri, “How Immigrants and Job Mobility Help Low-skilled Workers,” Vox CEPR Policy Portal, April 19, 2015, accessed December 12, 2018, https://voxeu.org/article/how-immigrants-and-job-mobility-help-low-skilled-workers.

[35] Markus Gehrsitz and Martin Ungerer, “Jobs, Crime, and Votes: A Short-Run Evaluation of the Refugee Crisis in Germany.”

[36] Jeremy Salt, “Turkey and Syria: When “Soft Power” Turned Hard,” Middle East Policy Council, , accessed December 13, 2018, https://www.mepc.org/journal/turkey-and-syria-when-soft-power-turned-hard.

[37] Eurostat. Number of accepted first instance asylum applicants in Europe in 2017, by country

[38] Eurostat, “Which Member States Have the Largest Share of EU’s GDP?” Europa, May 11, 2018, accessed December 12, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20180511-1?inheritRedirect=true.

[39] Andy J. Semotiuk, “France Struggles with Its Immigrants In The Midst Of National Security Concerns,” Forbes, January 17, 2018, accessed December 12, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/andyjsemotiuk/2018/01/17/france-struggles-with-its-immigrants-in-the-midst-of-national-security-concerns/#64f653295efc.

[40] Gabriel Bristow, “This Immigration Law Has Exposed the Brutal Limits of Macron’s Liberalism,” The Guardian, February 22, 2018, accessed December 12, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/22/immigration-macron-liberalism-migrants-refugees.

[41] See Figure 1

[42] Europa, “Which Member States Have the Largest Share of EU’s GDP?”

[43] See Figure 1

[44] This is reflective of the GDPs of these nations in comparison. This is according to Eurostat’s “Which Member States Have the Largest Share of EU’s GDP?” released in 2018. For simplicity, spending power is calculated purely on GDP and not current national debt’s or budget surpluses.

[45] European Commission. “EMN Ad-Hoc Query on Average cost and average length of reception for asylum seekers.” European Migration Network. August 4, 2017, accessed December 12, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/2017.1229_-_average_cost_and_average_length.pdf
This is calculated from the numbers available in the report. The daily cost of having a refugee in France is €24.09 and the average stay of a refugee in France is 494 days. The total cost is found by multiplying the average cost per day by total average days.

[46] The World Bank. “GDP.” The World Bank Data, continually updated, accessed December 12, 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.

[47] Markus Gehrsitz and Martin Ungerer, “Jobs, Crime, and Votes: A Short-Run Evaluation of the Refugee Crisis in Germany.”

[48] See Figure 1

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