The Atomic Bomb is What States Make of it: A Constructivist Approach to Sanctioning Iran

This piece was published in the Spring Issue Print Edition (Volume 11)

“There is no “logic” of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy.”

• Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It

Abstract:

For decades, questions about how to engage Iran have vexed American policymakers. Critics of engagement argue Iran is a threat to stability and needs to be contained, with sanctions imposing pressure. On the other hand, proponents of engagement claim that sanctions and pressure are ineffective, merely empowering hardliners in Iran. These debates grew in intensity following the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), where the Obama administration lifted sanctions in exchange for limits on Iran’s nuclear program. The debate has only grown since the Trump administration withdrew from the deal, leaving the United States at an impasse in 2021—should the JCPOA be rejoined or sanctions continued? While both sides have merit, this article argues that the current debate suffers from a limitation. In evaluating sanctions, much of the existing literature appeals to a strictly rationalist account of how actors make decisions, positing that countries such as Iran behave solely as self-interested actors pursuing economic and security-related goods. This paper aims to broaden the scope of the debate over U.S.-Iran policy by introducing a new perspective, constructivism, that begins not by asking how sanctions affect Iran’s self-interest, but instead by defining what Iran’s interests, values, and motivations are. Exploring social science, Iranian history, culture, and population-level dynamics, this paper concludes that sanctions can and have been effective against Iran, not merely because of economic pressure but because of what sanctions represent to Iran’s leaders and people: isolation, dependence, stigma, and exclusion. These motivations—traceable to culture, popular sentiment, and history—are often missed in contemporary sanctions literature. As a result, this paper prescribes how the United States can use this to form effective policy, proposing a dual track of pressure and engagement to achieve a novel deal that improves on the framework of the JCPOA.

Introduction:

“This agreement represents our best chance to stop an Iranian bomb without another war in the Middle East;”[1] “We have found the best available option by peaceful means rather than pursuing a worse option through war.”[2]

“The Iran deal is defective at its core;”[3] “This was a horrible, one-sided deal;”[4] “At the heart of the Iran deal was a giant fiction that a murderous regime desired only a peaceful nuclear energy program.”[5]

Since its birth in July of 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or “Iran Deal” has been mired in controversy, with some labeling it a masterstroke that will hold off Iranian proliferation and others viewing it as a tragic mistake. Proponents argue that the deal ensures Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon is delayed, if not destroyed, while opponents claim that Iran will pocket the sanctions relief and, continuing their uranium enrichment, wait for the day when the deal expires. Both sides surely have merit, but the opponents of the deal won out in May of 2018, when President Donald Trump announced withdrawal from the JCPOA. The other parties involved in the negotiation, namely Iran and European allies, announced their commitment to remain by the terms of the agreement even following U.S. withdrawal, but it was to no avail—the imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran resulted in the deal entering a death spiral, and Iran eventually ceased compliance.

Since then, relations between the U.S. and Iran have become as bad as ever. Following the resumption of sanctions, the Iranian economy has cratered, entering a recession of historic proportions. Meanwhile, the killing of Iranian Major General Qassim Suleimani in January of 2020 resulted in a political crisis that culminated in a downed airliner over Iran and an attack on a U.S. airbase in Iraq. Near the one-year anniversary of Suleimani’s killing, Iran seized a South Korean tanker in a gambit to pressure South Korea to aid them in skirting U.S. sanctions. Around the same time, Iran announced that they would begin enriching uranium at an alarmingly high level of 20%, putting them within reach of enrichment that would suffice for creating a nuclear bomb. Yet, upon doing so, Iranian leaders made sure to emphasize that this could all end, provided the United States return to compliance with the JCPOA.

Against this backdrop, President Biden has a choice: he can take Iran up on its offer and rejoin the JCPOA, or he can push for something additional. An old negotiating adage is to never accept the first offer: the stronger strategy is to use it as a starting point and use it to secure something even better. This logic is applicable in the case of the JCPOA. While superior to no deal, the JCPOA contains many defects that could be ameliorated by a follow-on deal. The United States should maintain a redline on uranium enrichment, refuse sunset provisions, and walk away from any deal that fails to include those elements.  Doing so is necessary for the sanctity of the non-proliferation regime. Notably, Iran is the one making overtures, not the United States: this signals that the United States holds the leverage.

However, Iran will not be an easy negotiating partner. U.S. policy on Iran is a graveyard of decades of ineffective sanctions and failed attempts at diplomacy. This paper approaches the question of U.S. sanctions by asking a simple question: what makes sanctions effective in general, and what makes them effective in the case of Iran? In doing so, the paper notes two features of current debates surrounding sanctions and Iran. First, such debates are grounded primarily in theories that rely on assumptions of rationalism, positioning Iran as a utility-maximizing state that will respond rationally to economic pressures. Second, discussions of sanctions within the realist tradition focus primarily on Iran as a coherent political entity, with little to no discussion of how internal regime dynamics affect Iranian responses to sanctions.  

This paper argues that these assumptions may obscure as much as they illuminate. Instead, sanctions should be examined through a constructivist lens, or the “social perspective” theory of sanctions. Sanctions do not solely operate as a means of applying economic pressure, but instead have power through what they signify: isolation from the international system, labeling a state as a pariah.

The thesis of this paper is that Iran’s strategic culture, history, and internal regime dynamics make sanctions uniquely effective, a perspective that is obscured by the rationalist and realist assumptions of contemporary analysis on Iran. A detailed study of Iran, both over the past several centuries and today, serves to derive a set of ideational variables that motivate Iran, variables that can be influenced through a sanctions regime. Coupled with an analysis of the precarity of the Iranian regime in the face of current protests, sanctions may “punch above their weight,” doing more to alter Iranian behavior than traditional literature on sanctions may suggest. This helps to explain why, despite their overall ineffectiveness across multiple countries, sanctions were effective in getting Iran to come to the negotiating table for the JCPOA initially.

The paper then concludes with a specific proposal for how U.S.-Iran policy should be negotiated in light of this new constructivist understanding of sanctions. While a pressure track of sanctions is desirable, it must be designed with a set of clearly demarcated carrots and sticks, a calibrated set of incentives aimed to induce compliance. A pressure track must be accompanied by an engagement track. Recent social science has indicated that engagement and tit-for-tat reciprocity can be effective as a negotiating tactic, findings that are especially salient in the case of Iran. Using these tactics, the United States will be able to seek to negotiate and achieve a better alternative to the JCPOA: a deal that includes a prohibition on uranium enrichment and avoids the use of sunset provisions.

The paper makes a necessary contribution to the literature. The dominant trend in discussing U.S. policy towards Iran has been security-centric, approaching it from a positivist lens that views Iran as security-seeking and the Iranian nuclear program as a threat to U.S. interests. While most literature on this question applies a liberal or realist lens, this paper contributes a constructivist perspective, analyzing the ideational variables that motivate Iran. Relatedly, the paper includes one of the only analyses of sanctions from a constructivist perspective, situating U.S. sanctions on Iran within the context of Iranian culture and society, perspectives that are frequently overlooked.

While providing a useful analytic for understanding Iranian behavior, the paper also explicates these observations within the context of specific policy recommendations, creating a set of actionable steps for policymakers to negotiate a successful improvement to the JCPOA. This synthesizes previously separate aspects of the literature. Many scholars recommend improvements to the JCPOA, while many others study sanctions, and more yet analyze Iranian culture. Comparatively few, however, examine the intersection of these three literature bases. Instead of keeping these traditions separate, the paper analyzes them together and contributes a useful theoretical lens of constructivism. By possessing a deeper understanding of what motivates Iran, backed by social science, policymakers can hopefully achieve results in negotiations that exceed expectations.

Section 1: U.S.-Iranian Conflict

Tensions between the United States and Iran reached a boiling point on January 3, 2020, when Iranian Major General Qassim Suleimani was killed by a targeted U.S. drone strike near Baghdad International Airport.[6] The leader of the powerful Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp, Suleimani was known to be the architect of significant Iranian intelligence and military operations, and his assassination dealt a crippling blow to Iran’s geopolitical planning.[7] In an official statement following the drone strike, the Pentagon claimed that Suleimani was “actively developing plans to attack American diplomats and service members in Iraq and throughout the region.”[8]

While the killing of Suleimani was the most salient example of a deterioration in U.S.-Iranian relations, the problem is more protracted than the killing of a single military commander. This killing takes place against the backdrop of unprecedented sanctions and economic decoupling, disputes over Iranian support for terrorism and attempts at a nuclear program, and disagreements about the role that Iran should have in the Middle East. It has been argued that Iran views itself as a great power waiting to emerge, tapping into a rich cultural heritage that dates back as far as the days of the Persian Empire, when what is modern-day Iran had significant geopolitical influence not only in the region, but across the globe.[9] Additionally, as a theocracy, Iran sees its mission as spreading Islam throughout the region, supporting militant groups such as Hezbollah.[10] In contrast, the U.S. view of Iran is markedly different: from the U.S. perspective, Iran is a state sponsor of terror, an unstable theocracy dangerously close to acquiring a nuclear weapon, and a provocateur in an already-unstable region.[11]

However, a turning point ostensibly took place in 2008 with the election of President Barack Obama. As he campaigned on achieving change both domestically and abroad, many wagered that President Obama would aim to overturn the established consensus on U.S.-Iran relations. In 2009, President Obama recorded a video intended for Iran where he expressed hope for a “new beginning,” communicating the sentiment directly to the people of Iran.[12] While acknowledging that the two countries had “serious differences that have grown over time,” President Obama indicated a desire to “seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect.”[13]

Six years later in 2015, the result was a historic agreement: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), colloquially known as the “Iran Deal.” One of President Obama’s signature foreign policy accomplishments, the JCPOA was reached between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany). The core of the deal was simple, offering sanctions relief in exchange for restrictions on Iran’s nuclear problem. According to the White House, prior to the deal Iran could have produced one bomb’s worth of fissile material within 2 to 3 months. Known as the “breakout time,” this is an estimate of how quickly Iran could proliferate if it “sprinted toward a bomb.”[14]

As part of the JCPOA, the United States obtained several key guarantees. First, Iran was required to reduce its centrifuges by two-thirds, reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98%, and limit uranium enrichment to 3.67%.[15] The enrichment limit of 3.67% is particularly critical. Iran had previously been enriching at 20%, which is known to be a major technological milestone—enrichment at 20% crosses the highest technological hurdle to enriching at 90%, which is weapons-grade enrichment.[16] Second, Iran was required to provide comprehensive inspection access to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), allowing sweeping inspections of its nuclear facilities.[17] In addition, Iran had to close several nuclear facilities. According to the White House, these steps taken in conjunction would raise Iran’s breakout time from 2-3 months to at least 1 year.[18] With this extended window, the United States would have a year to calibrate responses if Iran were sprinting toward a bomb.

In exchange, Iran received numerous benefits. First and most critically, Iran received a tremendous amount of sanctions relief.[19] While sanctions remained in place for conventional weapons, terror support, human rights abuses, and destabilizing regional activities, the United States and international parties lifted all nuclear-related sanctions.[20] These international sanctions were starving the Iranian economy of over 100 billion dollars a year, and Iran was desperate to attain this much-needed relief.[21] Second, Iran was permitted to enrich uranium below the 3.67% enrichment cap imposed in the deal. This was a historic and unprecedented guarantee.[22] Traditionally, the United States has told non-nuclear states that, if interested in nuclear energy, they would be permitted light-water reactors, which the United States will assist with building. However, enrichment for the purpose of nuclear energy has traditionally been a red line, as allowing enrichment runs a risk that weapons-grade material could be enriched. However, the JCPOA allowed Iran to enrich, a guarantee afforded to no other country. Third, Iran secured a “sunset provision” in the agreement, allowing the restrictions on Iran’s centrifuges to expire after 10 years and the limitations on uranium to disappear after 15 years.[23]  

However, in 2018, President Trump withdrew from the deal and unilaterally resumed sanctions, having claimed that it was the “worst, horrible, laughable” in 2015, and arguing that it lacked verification, lost U.S. negotiating leverage, and did not secure assurances concerning Iranian regional activities.[24] For about a year after the U.S. resumed sanctions, Iran remained in compliance with the JCPOA. However, in June 2019 Iran announced that it would renege on the key components of the deal, increasing enrichment of uranium beyond the 3.67% cap and that it would increase its stockpile.[25] Every few months, Iran ramped up enrichment further, moving to 4.5% enrichment by July 2019, developing more advanced centrifuges in September 2019, and injecting uranium gas into centrifuges in November 2019.[26] Following the January 2020 strike on Qassim Suleimani, Iran announced that it would not be complying with any aspect of the deal, and by January 2021 Iran was enriching at the precarious 20% level, providing the capacity to quickly reach the weapons-grade level of 90%.[27]

However, Iran has not gone unscathed during this time. Following the 2018 resumption of sanctions by the United States, Iran has been hit harder than ever. With the reimposition of banking and oil sanctions, Iran’s economy has fallen into a devastating recession. By October of 2019, Iran’s annualized GDP growth rate was -9%, a far cry from its 12% number in October 2016 after sanctions relief was provided.[28] Within a year, Iranian oil production plummeted from nearly 4 million barrels a day to barely 2 million barrels a day, and the Iranian currency (the Rial) lost 50% of its value against the U.S. dollar.[29] Inflation soared to 30.5% in 2018, with inflation particularly high for food items; the IMF estimated that Iran’s meat products were 116% more expensive in April 2019 than in the prior year.[30]

The combined effects of economic breakdown, a global pandemic, and existing discontent with the government have fomented mass protests and disruption in Iran. There have been organized protest movements for years, and they have grown more protracted and frequent as time has gone on.[31] There have been over 2,500 protests from January 2018 to October 2019, demonstrating an increased pace from previous years.[32] Notably, June 2018, the bazaari protests involved urban merchants taking to the streets to protest currency devaluation, resulting in industry shutdowns in some sectors.[33]

Many analysts have argued that the economic situation has grown increasingly precarious for Iran, and that Iran is desperate to cut a deal. Due to their desperation, Iran may be more willing to run risks. In early January 2021, Iran seized a South Korean oil tanker, aiming to gain leverage to gain “access to hard currency oil revenues frozen in South Korean banks because of US sanctions.”[34] January 2021 was a notable month—during the one year anniversary of Qassim Suleimani’s assassination, President Trump dispatched B-52 bombers and a nuclear-powered submarine to the Persian Gulf to maintain order in the event that Iran attempted destabilizing activities.[35] Iran, facing total economic breakdown, is playing a game of chicken by trying to show the United States that “it has potent cards to play” while falling short of justifying a U.S. military response.[36]

 The tactic is aimed at negotiating with President Biden. The combination of destabilizing regional activities and enrichment of uranium at 20% are clear negotiating tactics: Iran aims to communicate that “the longer Biden waits, the more 20 percent-enriched uranium Iran will have and the closer it will be to ‘breakout’.”[37] If Iran’s activities were not a clear enough signal, Iranian statements are. Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, wrote online that “Our measures are fully reversible upon FULL compliance by ALL.” This indicates a clear desire to get sanctions relief immediately.

Section 2: The Conventional Wisdom on Sanctions

For decades, the United States has had sanctions in some form imposed on Iran. Following the 1979 Iran Revolution, Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy and took diplomats hostage. The consequences were sanctions and the freezing of $12 billion in Iranian assets.[38] In 1984, the U.S. Department of State designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism and imposed additional sanctions.[39] In 1992, the U.S. Congress passed the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, imposing sanctions for Iran’s under the pretense  transfer of technology related to chemical, biological, nuclear, or advanced conventional weapons.[40] In 1996, the U.S. Congress went after the Iran petroleum industry, believing that the industry was contributing to Iran financing terrorism—this culminated in the Iran Sanctions Act.[41] While the aforementioned sanctions were primarily unilateral, international sanctions began to take force in 2007 due to concerns about the Iranian nuclear program. The UN Security Council, concerned about uranium enrichment, unanimously adopted Resolution 1747 to slap sanctions on Iran for nuclear program violations.[42] This was followed by 2008’s Resolution 1803 and 2010’s Resolution 1929 which continued to tighten nuclear-related sanctions on Iran, accompanied by domestic policy passed by the European Union and the U.S. Congress directly targeting the Iranian financial sector.[43]

Considered within the broader context of U.S. foreign policy, the extensive use of sanctions is unsurprising. Operating as the center of the world’s financial institutions, the United States possesses extensive leverage, able to use sanctions to cut other countries off from access to capital or financial institutions. Against an adversary, this offers the potential to do substantial damage to the economies of other nations while still falling below the threshold of armed aggression. Commonly referred to as “a measure between wars and words,” sanctions allow U.S. policymakers to feel as if they can “do something” when facing an international crisis.[44]

However, existing empirical research is less than enthusiastic about the efficacy of sanctions. Known as the “sanction paradox,” the academic literature for a period of time overwhelmingly was dominated by the view that, while often used, sanctions “do not work.”[45] A groundbreaking study of sanctions was published in 1985 by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot (henceforth HSE).[46] Examining 115 cases of sanctions from 1914 to 1990, they found that sanctions achieved success in 40 cases (34% in total). In possibly the most well-known criticism of sanctions and the HSE study, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” Robert Pape argued that of those 40 cases, few are legitimate successes, finding only 5 successful cases of sanctions out of the 115.[47] Pape argues this is due to a number of factors: states are willing to tolerate external pressure to achieve national interests, can use administrative capabilities to mitigate the economic damage, and can shift damage to the people instead of harming the ruling elite.[48] As a result, Pape claims that sanctions go beyond merely being a “moderately robust arrow in a policymaker’s quiver;” instead, sanctions “have succeeded in only 5 of 115 attempts…a weak instrument.”[49] In a notable response piece by Elliot of HSE, she claims that Pape’s study “sets up a straw man and then boldly proceeds to knock it down,” noting that Pape defines a successful sanctions regime unduly narrowly by focusing on economic sanctions “used in isolation from other tools.”[50] Instead, Elliot claims that while sanctions are of “limited utility” they may be effective, given that the “success rate importantly depends on the type of policy or governmental change sought” and that “it is not true that sanctions ‘never work’.”[51]

Regardless of which methodological choice was ultimately correct, there is clearly an area of consensus: both HSE and Pape are in agreement that sanctions, in the majority of cases, are not effective. More recent empirical evidence has found that the record of sanctions is not uniform, but larger than zero, with a success rate lying between 10% and 30%, depending on the study and methodological choices.[52]

Much of the literature on sanctions is based on a rationalist paradigm of international relations that presumes a set of utility-maximizing, security-seeking states who will respond optimally to a set of externally imposed pressures. In the literature on sanctions, the dominant question of study is how sanctions affect these rational interests, evaluating the extent to which sanctions can apply economic pressure to alter behavior. Known as the “rational actor assumption” in international relations, this presumes a unified and monovalent set of interests that are pursued by states within the international system.[53]

More broadly, this approach must be situated within the realist (and neorealist) tradition of international relations. A tradition with roots extending back thousands of years, realism is the political tradition that emphasizes the competitive and conflictual side of international relations. The objective that all actors hold is attaining power, achieving national interest, and acting against threats to their national security. While classical realism “places emphasis on human and domestic factors” in its study of how political actors aim to achieve security, a major revolution in international relations theory was achieved through the advent of neorealism in the late 1970s.[54] Attributed primarily to Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics (1979), neorealism establishes that there are three levels of analysis: the system, the state, and the individual. For Waltz, the only relevant level of analysis is the system-level. As “external pressure seems to produce internal unity,” changes at the system-level have effects on all levels. Accordingly, the ways that states interact with one another is explained not by individual choices or regime-types, but rather by the pressures exerted on them by an anarchic international system. In this anarchic international system, there is no guarantor of security and no relevant institution that can serve as guarantor. As a result, states can only attain security through self-help and the pursuit of power. Neorealism, while accepting the realist precepts of rationalism and security-seeking, goes a step further: states will hold those as immutable goals due not to individual leaders or regime-type, but rather due to a structural proclivity of the international system.

Much of the literature on sanctions operates within the grammar of rationalism, positing that sanctions will or will not work due to the pressure they can successfully exert on a state. For proponents of sanctions, they will be effective if they can raise costs for a state to a level sufficient for inducing a change in behavior. In contrast, sanctions are unsuccessful if the pressure is too low. In both cases, whether sanctions succeed or fail is determined through the prism of rationalism, or how an objective, utility-maximizing agent would response to external pressures imposed by another actor in the international system.

However, a puzzle emerges: if sanctions are to be understood through a rationalist paradigm, why are the actions of states in relation to sanctions neither uniform nor rational? Examples abound of times when sanctions should have been enough to rationally sway a behavior, but the state incurred unacceptable economic costs in order to pursue a less-valuable objective. Similarly, if the recent empirics are accepted that find sanctions effective in 10-30% of cases, it is hard to explain why sanctions work in some cases but not in others.

A salient example of this phenomenon is Iran, where some have argued that sanctions have been unusually effective. In particular, the targeted sanctions imposed on Iran in 2007 by the UN Security Council and United States have been lauded for their success in applying economic pressure sufficient to force Iran to come to the negotiating table, accepting the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) in 2013 and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.[55] According to Yesun Yoon, this was a classic ‘carrot and stick’ sanctioning model—robust international sanctions tightened the screws on Iran from 2007 to 2013, resulting in Iran agreeing to an interim deal in 2013 that granted “temporary and modest sanction relief” of $7 billion.[56] Having whet Iran’s appetite for aid with the initial relief, this was followed by the subsequent JCPOA that promised relief totaling $100 billion for full compliance with its terms and conditions.[57]

The success of this strategy was due to the economic and political damage that had been wrought by years of U.S. containment. At the start of the Obama administration, with the exception of Hezbollah, Iran lacked military presence anywhere outside of Iran and Lebanon. At the same time, oil and financial sanctions were substantially damaging the Iranian economy—Iran’s perceived security and economic interests were at stake.[58] According to a study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, sanctions had a deleterious effect on Iran’s main source of revenue, oil exports, with economic sanctions costing Iran over $160 billion in oil revenues since 2012.[59] Specifically, the effects were most acute in 2012 and 2013, with GDP in 2012 plummeting by 7% and staying negative in 2013; the Iranian rial collapsed 51% in 2013, with inflation spiking 35%.[60] Notably, these effects track closely to the timing of negotiations over the JPA and the subsequent JCPOA. Iran, facing the worst of sanctions during this time, went to the negotiating table.

Why were sanctions more effective in Iran than in other cases? Much of the existing academic literature in recent years has tried to find a cogent theory for what defines “effective” as opposed to “ineffective” sanctions. The Peterson Institute for International Economics noted that effective sanctions are defined by measures that hit hard, financial controls being a big part of the sanctions package, and the enforcement of the package through international cooperation.[61] The presence of these variables in the case of the Iran nuclear sanctions were therefore a part of the regime’s success. A separate analysis by Brian O’Toole also claims that sanctions can be designed in ways to maximize effectiveness.[62] Lauding the effectiveness of the Iran nuclear sanctions and sanctions on the Soviet Union, O’Toole argues that sanctions may work “as part of a comprehensive and executable strategy.”[63] Put differently, sanctions work when they have a clear objective. The receiving state must know a set of actionable steps that will result in sanctions relief, allowing sanctions to operate as a “stick” that can easily be avoided by acceding to the demands of the sanctioning country. For O’Toole, this distinguishes Iran nuclear sanctions from sanctions on Cuba or Venezuela. The former aimed at a specific behavioral change (an end to uranium enrichment), while the latter were general behavioral sanctions for the more vague “human rights abuses.”[64] For sanctions to be effective they must be calibrated, leaving them capable of being lifted if behaviors change.    

An additional contributing element to sanction efficacy is making sanctions multilateral, rather than just unilateral. According to Mortlock and O’Toole, multilateral sanctions demonstrate international resolve, which communicates to the target the longevity of the sanctions; they will be therefore less able to secure workarounds and re-route economic benefits through other means, convincing them to surrender early on.[65] One notable example of a challenge in unilateral sanctions arises in the case of sanctions on North Korea. China, not wanting regime collapse in North Korea, actively works to assist North Korea in circumventing unilateral U.S. sanctions.[66] A comprehensive study by Dizaji et al. also lends credence to the view that multilateral sanctions are meaningfully distinct from unilateral sanctions. Studying reductions in military spending associated with sanctions from 1960 to 2017, Dizaji et al. found that multilateral sanctions reduced spending by 77% in the long run, while the chances of success of unilateral sanctions were “statistically insignificant.”[67]

It is clear that the sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program contain many of these features—they were multilateral in nature (supported by the UN Security Council and allies in the European Union), had a specific policy objective, and were calibrated to reward or punish specific behaviors. Some criticisms of Iran sanctions (such as the 2014 analysis by Agnese Macaluso) allege that the sanctions did not trigger a change in policy but instead changed only the Iranian government’s strategy.[68] However, this draws an unnecessary separation between government strategy and policy change. The objective of the sanctions was to put an end to Iran’s nuclear program, and the result was that Iran was willing to come to the negotiating table and accept limits on their program. Regardless of whether one ultimately holds up the JCPOA as a success or not, the sanctions did achieve their stated objectives. Additionally, many of the criticisms of sanctions that Macaluso makes (lacking a clear objective, focusing on regime change, and being uncoordinated) are not true of the multilateral sanctions that were focused primarily on Iran’s nuclear program. As Macaluso acknowledges, in February 2013 Ayatollah Khamenei had refused to negotiate with those that “take up arms against the nation of Iran” but, by September 2013, had declared that Iran would support diplomatic compromise based on the notion of a “heroic flexibility.”[69] This is the sign of a sanctions regime that was effective in securing its goal of getting Iran to negotiate.

All of the above analysis has one key commonality: it approaches the debate over the efficacy of sanctions from the perspective of rationalism and, subsequently, neorealism. Effective sanctions regimes are predicted on the basis of their ability to apply destabilizing amounts of pressure to economies, creating an incentive for a rational player to maximize gains and push to have sanctions neutralized. Multilateral sanctions are theorized to be more effective by demonstrating a greater degree of resolve, while calibrated sanctions are understood to work due to the ability for the targeted state to be coaxed through a “carrot and stick” incentive structure. Under such an incentive structure, benefits or “carrots” are offered to induce desirable behavior, while punishments or “sticks” are held out as deterrents for undesirable behaviors. This also implicitly relies on a precept of realism: the determinant in foreign policy is a material set of interests that relate to security and power. A country such as Iran will want a strong economy and military and will resist sanctions imposed by other international actors to ensure its self-interest is attained.

Section 3: Constructivism and a New Theory of Iranian Sanctions

However, much of the contemporary literature surrounding sanctions is unduly narrow in its focus on rationalism and its appeal to neorealism. This is because the power of sanctions transcends the neorealist understanding of power as directly compelling behavior. Defined by German sociologist Max Weber as “the likelihood that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance,” political scientist Michael Brzoska notes that power can have many faces.[70] Power can operate directly by influencing decision-making, indirectly through shaping the ways in which decision-making occurs, and ideologically through shaping norms of proper behavior.[71] Traditional research on sanctions has focused on the more traditionally realist understanding of power as direct, stating that sanctions work (or do not work) due to imposing economic or military hardships on security-seeking, rational actors. According to Brzoska, “[t]hose targeted are seen as rational decision-makers, who will compare the benefits of actions with their costs. Sanctions which are sufficiently large to tip the balance in such a way that costs outweigh benefits will result in the changes of behavior desired by those mandating the sanctions.”[72]

 However, the second and third forms of power have been neglected in the contemporary debate over sanctions. Sanctions can have power that is not just direct but also ideological, serving as a means of enforcing norms and operating as an important symbol within the liberal international system. Under this broader perspective that includes ideational as well as material variables, “[t]he hope is that sanctions will lead to a change in the targeted behavior not because the cost-benefit calculus is affected, but because social relationships are influenced by the sanctions…[t]his view on sanctions, which could be called the social perspective, moves the analysis away from individualistic cost-benefit calculations into the direction of constructivist ideas about appropriate behavior shaped by norms and ideas.”[73]

Contrary to the neorealist tendency to focus exclusively within the Waltzian third level of analysis (the system level), such an approach recognizes that “[s]ocial relationships on several levels can be relevant: relationships within the decision-makers’ family, among the elite group in a country, but also relationships among countries.”[74] This situates the “social perspective” theory of sanctions squarely within the constructivist theory of international relations. Constructivism is contrasted with realism and liberalism as one of the three central categories of major international relations theories. Realism and liberalism differ dramatically from each other in the assumptions they rely on and prescriptions they make for international politics. While realists believe in an inherently conflictual international sphere that makes cooperation temporary and unreliable, liberals believe that strong institutions and democratic values can engender cooperation.[75]

However, despite their many differences, both realists and liberals rely on one central assumption that is not shared by the constructivists: the positivist/rationalist assumption of a utility-maximizing, security-seeking state. Both realism and liberalism accept as given that states have an interest in attaining security and are primarily focused on the Waltzian third level of analysis, or how states interact with one another at the level of the international system; disagreements surround the extent to which cooperation can be found within the anarchic system of international politics. However, constructivists dispute this positivist/rationalist assumption, arguing that knowledge and, subsequently, the interests of states are socially constructed as opposed to being immutably defined.[76] Illustrating the social construction of reality, Alexander Wendt gives the example of nuclear possession—we find 500 British nuclear weapons less threatening than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons. There is nothing intrinsic to the British weapons (the material structure) that make them less threatening; instead, our reaction is driven by the meaning given to the material structure (the ideational structure).[77] Therefore, threats to security within international politics do not have an intrinsic valence. Rather, the social context imbues them with meaning.

This directly challenges the starting point of anarchy in international politics, accepted by both realism and liberalism. For realism and liberalism, states attempt to navigate their way through an anarchic international system in the hopes of attaining security; the anarchic structure of the international system determines the behavior of states.[78] In contrast, constructivists argue that the relationship between structures and actions is not one-dimensional. Instead, “agency and structure are mutually constituted…structures influence agency and…agency influences structures.”[79] Instead of being an immutable characteristic of international politics, “anarchy is what states make of it.”[80] States have the ability to internalize alternate norms or find values contrary to those that require enmity, anarchy, or security-seeking behavior.

Closely related to the above discussion of agency is the constructivist view of identities and interests. While realism and liberalism view states as having a fairly uniform interest of security-attainment, constructivists view identities and interests as being socially constructed.[81] These interests are shaped by culture, nationalism, and a variety of other ideational forces. For example, a uniform interest in security cannot explain why the India-Pakistan border is defined by disputes while the U.S.-Canadian border is not. Similarly, the notion that states will without fail seek power and influence is difficult to square with the actions of countries such as Switzerland that have positioned themselves as a neutral party in many international disputes.[82] Instead, constructivists argue that states construct images of themselves. Interests are not prefigured to be security-driven, but are instead constructed by the state in accordance with its socially constructed identity.[83]

Beyond identifying the motivating factors for individual states, constructivists provide analysis of how such constructed identities shape politics at the international level, contributing to the formation of international norms.[84] Over time, repeated interactions between agents gives birth to norms and expectations of behaviors; these constrain behaviors, prescribe actions, and shape what states view as the “right thing to do.” One salient example is what Nina Tannewald refers to as the “nuclear taboo,” arguing that states have come to internalize a norm that nuclear use is unacceptable, contributing to the construction of an international political standard standard.[85]

This paper aims to situate sanctions within a broader lens of power than is typically assumed, evaluating power not just as direct but as ideological. Using Brzoska’s social perspective theory of sanctions, this paper hopes to explain the efficacy of Iranian sanctions through a different lens. International sanctions are not merely effective by changing the cost-benefit calculations of targeted states, but rather are effective because of what they convey. In contrast to the rationalist perspective, sanctions do not work merely through direct harm to a nation. Instead, “effects on the relationships…are the measure,” with effective sanctions not being defined solely by the amount of pressure, but rather knowledge of the targeted group, their values, and their relationships.[86] Sanctions can serve a role in enforcing particular international norms or messages; this is particularly effective if the sanctions come from international actors “deemed to be of importance” to the target state.[87] From this perspective, in “moving from rationalist to constructivist thinking, the power of sanctions here is their role in strengthening rules and norms of future appropriate behavior.”[88]

From this perspective, there are two key aspects of U.S. sanction policy towards Iran that get overlooked by the trend towards realism and rationalism in assessing sanctions. Due to the assumption of rationalism, the symbolic and norm-related effects of sanctions have gone under-examined. Similarly, due to the fixation of realism on the third level of analysis, an examination of the inner workings of Iranian domestic politics has been obfuscated. Yet, in both cases, these are particularly salient factors for assessing why sanctions have been (and will be) effective in Iran. This paper argues that sanctions represent a form of exclusion and coercion that is unacceptable to the Iranian government due to critical cultural and national norms. Additionally, the political and economic ramifications of sanctions have resulted in strong pressure from below, with ordinary Iranians protesting the conditions present. Both of these factors are not adequately captured by the realist and rationalist assessments of sanctions, yet are determinative factors in explaining the success of Iranian sanctions. They will be addressed in turn, beginning with the social perspective theory of sanctions applied to Iran and Iran’s social identities.

Mahdi Mohammad Nia argues that the realist approach to international relations uniquely fails to explain Iranian foreign policy, which is driven largely by the set of domestic and historical forces at play. Nia points to the relative continuity in Iranian foreign policy since the 1990 collapse of the Soviet Union. The most significant system level transformation in terms of distribution of power has had little effect on the strategies of Iranian foreign policy, which has witnessed “relative stability” since then.[89] Nia argues that this presupposes a materialistic set of interests that Iran has, making the same rationalist assumption that was criticized earlier. Instead of “implementing its interests in terms of low-cost options and instruments…Iran’s foreign policy has been more consistent with ideological interests than national ones.”[90] Nia argues that one can find eight key drivers for Iranian foreign policy that transcend the material interests of security-seeking, rational states, but are illuminated through a constructivist analysis.[91]

The first point of emphasis is the logic of responsibility, or the “ideological objectives that a state pursues out of the nation-state borders as an ideological ‘duty’.”[92] This is contrasted with the logic of consequentiality, which holds that foreign behaviors of a state are adopted due to their consequences. This responsibility stems from the theocratic nature of the state, and Iran has committed to a responsibility that “undertakes the fraternal commitment towards all Muslims, and unsparing support of the oppressed of the world…defending the rights of all Muslims.”[93] This can be seen prominently in the support for Islamic resistance movements, including the financing of jihad globally. These efforts aim at “establishment of a united single world community to rescue deprived and oppressed nations…”[94]

The second point of emphasis is the discourse of counter-hegemonism, derived from the Islamic rule of “Nafy-e Sabil,” or domination over Muslims.[95] The rule is derived from the Koran, stating that “there is no law to allow domination of infidels over Muslims and ways are closed to foreign hegemony over Muslims.”[96] In practice, this manifests itself through a desire in Iran to avoid foreign domination, seeking out alliances with other nations in the third world, Islamic world, and Asia. Examples include joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, urging discourses such as “Look-East Policy” and “South-South Alliances,” and ties with Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Bolivia.[97] During the Cold War, Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed that “We don’t get along with any of the powers. We will be under the domination of neither America nor the Soviet Union.”[98] This runs contrary to the realist assumption that states will either “balance or bandwagon” with great powers in a bipolar system —such theories would predict that Iran would be drawn into either the Soviet or American sphere of influence, lending more credence to an ideological view of Iranian foreign policy.

The third point of emphasis is the notion of independence and self-sufficiency, particularly when related to indigenous technology. Having been rendered dependent and subservient to the West for much of the 19^th and 20^th centuries, Iranian leaders believe that Iran must be “self-sufficient enough to be economically independent and economically independent enough to be politically independent.”[99] This also informs much of Iran’s views on their nuclear program, viewing it as a symbol of independence and economic leverage that Iran could exert over Western nations.

The fourth point of emphasis is the discourse of “Persian Nationalism.” This has been present across markedly different regimes. Just as the Shah promised Iranian independence and encouraged Iranians to yearn for the days of the ancient Iranian Empire and its sphere of influence, Ayatollah Khamenei has argued that Iran’s size, historical significance, and cultural superiority require a strong regional role.[100] Once again, this has proximity to the Iranian nuclear program: Iranian leaders, believing themselves to be a continuation of great Persian leaders of the past, argue that they should have the same nuclear fixings as other great powers.

The fifth point of emphasis is the discourse of the “enemy.” Fueled by the “history of intervention, manipulation, and exploitation of the country by foreign powers,” this discourse creates a common enemy that is continually opposed to the interests of the Iranian people.[101] This discourse of the enemy, frequently understood to be the West, results in a distrust of the outside world and an understanding that the outside powers want to harm Iranian interests. Nia noted that it is “difficult to find a speech of Iran’s officials without emphasizing the role of enemy to destruct the Islamic Republic of Iran,” and she finds one speech of Ayatollah Khamenei that mentioned “enemy” 16 separate times.[102] 

The sixth point of emphasis is the discourse of “Islamic Unity” and “Islamic Solidarity,” working to create unity among the Islamic states, ensuring strong economic and political ties across Islamic countries.[103] In the words of Ayatollah Khomeini, “[o]ur Islamic scheme…is to create a kind of unanimity of view among Moslems of the world, to unite the Islamic countries, to establish fraternity among different Moslems of the world, to make a pledge with all Islamic governments of the world.”[104]

The seventh point of emphasis is the discourse of “Martyrdom,” “Jihad,” and “Fearlessness.” This understands warfare as a moral duty provided it is undertaken “as a sign of commitment to the true faith.”[105] Military strategy therefore transcends a simple understanding of victory or defeat–the value instead is about waging a war against oppression and injustice, taken pursuant to an Islamic duty.

The eighth and final point of emphasis is the discourse of “justice,” contributing toward a revisionist approach to foreign policy. Since the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian leaders have seen the international system as an unfair and hierarchical system that unequally distributes power among nations.[106] This is an extension of the Islamic revolutionary viewpoint that the world is structurally divided along antagonistic lines – there is good, and there is evil, with no possibility of compromise. No matter what costs are incurred, Iran therefore has a duty to seek the attainment of justice, even at the cost of economic prosperity or security.[107] This logic is unrecognizable from the realist standpoint, which holds economic and security-related benefits to be sacrosanct. Yet, Ayatollah Khamenei has said that he “prefers defeat to the victory that could be achieved through injustice or oppression,” choosing to wage “justice-driven policies” against Israel while incurring tremendous economic and political costs.[108] 

If these eight principles are the driving forces for Iranian foreign policy, effective sanctions need to closely map onto these interests. After all, these eight principles define the Iranian identity and subsequent interests, serving as the benchmarks by which Iran defines successful foreign policy.

On face, it seems that these principles would doom any type of negotiations at the outset. Many of these principles pit Iran against the West (and therefore the United States), with a “previously constructed identity that…determines who is ‘friend’ and who is ‘enemy.’”[109] This creates a self-perpetuating cycle where internal normative structures configure the United States as the enemy, prompting antagonistic policies that force antagonistic responses, validating the initial view of the United States as the enemy.[110]

However, the way out of this cycle is by emphasizing cooperative, reciprocal norms, which position the United States as a potential partner as opposed to the enemy. Here, the United States would approach relations with Iran from the standpoint of reciprocal benefit. Approaching Iran with a good-faith effort to find compromise and reach a mutual understanding has a greater chance of eliciting a positive reaction in response. The dynamics in the relationship are after all, tit-for-tat: an antagonistic action from the United States can be expected to elicit an antagonistic response from Iran. However, this goes both ways. A positive action can elicit a positive response.[111]

This is confirmed by various diplomatic episodes between states with diametrically opposed interests and antagonistic relationships, such as the United States and Iran or the United States and North Korea. With North Korea, the United States sought diplomacy by emphasizing in the late 1990s that there would be an assurance of no nuclear strikes on the country. This spurred arms control diplomacy, which was arguably successful until an eventual relationship breakdown. What caused the breakdown? Some attribute it to “aggressive and confrontational norms” pushed by the Bush administration that labeled North Korea part of the “axis of evil,” antagonizing North Korea.[112] In this example, we see a clear pattern: a tit-for-tat exchange where an initial assurance elicited a positive response, but a later negative action spurred a reciprocal negative response.

This has also been demonstrated in the case of Iran. During the Clinton administration, there was a concerted effort to facilitate engagement and cooperation with Iran diplomatically, and Iranian President Khatami responded by attempting to increase Iranian engagement with Western counties while accepting suspension of uranium enrichment.[113] Similarly, diplomatic overtures by President Obama resulted in diplomatic talks and the eventual JCPOA. In contrast, sudden confrontational approaches have empowered hardliners, resulting in Iran becoming more adamant about the need for a strong nuclear program and support for jihadist groups abroad. A major turning point was the policy of the Bush administration (exemplified by the “Axis of Evil” remarks, around the same time that Iranian President Ahmadinejad came into power). As noted by Nia, “…whenever Iran faced a confrontational normative environment, the state responded more aggressively toward international community.”[114]   

As outlined in Nafy-e Sabil, a fundamental wrong for Iran’s regime is the notion of being governed by non-Muslim nations, a system of rule by the infidels. For Iranian leaders, this is manifested in the current structure of the international order, with institutions that they perceive as existing primarily to secure Western interests. No example is more salient than that of international finance, where the United States exists as the epicenter of Western economics and financial control, having unprecedented sway over capital access. Sanctions, cutting Iran off from such a system, offer a notable “stick”. Iranian financial interests are directly targeted by the Western-led system, hampering the ability for Iran to attain what it believes to be sovereignty and self-governance. However, sanctions can also offer a notable “carrot”—the promise of access to capital. Iran can be granted an assurance that sanctions, once imposed, will, with protracted behavioral changes, remain lifted. This affords Iran a sphere of relative inviolability from the economic Sword of Damocles that the United States otherwise possesses.

Sanctions can also notably target the Iranian emphasis on independence and self-sufficiency, as it relates to indigenous technology. As sanctions strategies have grown more sophisticated, policymakers have become attuned to the value of targeted sanctions that harm particular industries. It is here that sanctions present a stick—the United States can use sanctions to directly undercut the Iranian nuclear energy industry, preventing the acquisition of necessary materials for a fledging nuclear program. As the aforementioned Dizaji et al. study indicated, multilateral sanctions have been associated with a 77% reduction in military spending in previous cases.[115] The flip side of such sanctions is that they also present a carrot—sanctions relief can also ensure that Iran can pursue technological sovereignty. While a nuclear program should remain off-limits, there are alternate ways to achieve technological and energy independence. Some have proposed an alternative that works with Iran to help them develop a light water reactor and nuclear fuel. This offers Iran all of the benefits of nuclear energy, but without the latent risk of nuclear proliferation.[116]

The final way that sanctions can target a core Iranian ideological interest is through the principle of Persian nationalism. For centuries, Persia was at the center of the global stage, a veritable world power that had untold influences on other cultures in the surrounding areas. Those days are long gone, with Iran now existing as an isolated state. Iran lacks military presence anywhere outside of Iran and Lebanon, is an international economic pariah, and lacks much of a seat in international fora. Much of this is due to the role of sanctions, which serve as a means of isolating states from one another. This is particularly true of the UN Security Council sanctions, which secured a coalition of many of the world’s greatest powers to shame and ostracize Iran over its nuclear program. However, it can also be true of unilateral, “secondary sanctions” carried out by the United States, which forced firms to choose between doing business with the United States or with Iran. Such choice was no choice at all, and firms fled from Iran, contributing to its isolation. An isolated state is no great power, and sanctions thus serve as a valuable stick. However, the carrot is also present—Iranian leaders are keenly aware of the uptick in business and economic growth that took place in 2016 after sanctions relief was provided, with economic growth roaring back at a 6.4% clip following a contraction of 1.8% the year before.[117] 

However, as the previous sections have discussed, there have been far too many sanctions regimes that have been rendered ineffective due to poor design choices. Subsequent sections will discuss how a sound sanctions regime can be designed to maximize leverage following the breakdown of the JCPOA.

Section 4: The Regime’s Precarious Footing

In addition to the social perspective theory of sanctions justifying why sanctions are effective against Iran, there is an additional component that is too often overlooked by realist analyses of sanctions: the internal regime pressures that Iran faces. This may create an additional sense of urgency for Iran to find sanctions relief.

To understand the pressure that Iranian leaders face to cut a deal requires understanding the internal state dynamics in Iran. This is due to the fact that economic pressure is, by itself, not a sufficient condition for sanctions to produce a change in behavior. When leaders of a country are secure in their power and able to insulate themselves from the deleterious effects of sanctions, sanctions may produce little to no change at all.[118] After all, leaders of many sanctioned countries are among the most authoritarian leaders in the world: harm to their people is of no real consequence provided it does not threaten their own self-interest.[119] One example is North Korea. Subject to perhaps the most onerous sanctions regime in history, North Korea has withstood sanctions for an extended period of time, despite sanctions suppressing nearly all economic activity. The Kim Regime has a strong grip on power and is able to retain prosperity for the ruling class, which gives no real incentive to cave to U.S. sanctions.[120] Thus, a necessary condition for sanctions efficacy is to directly affect the leadership of a country, either affecting their economic interests or making them fear that they will lose their grip on power.

This paper contends that the current internal political situation in Iran is precarious enough that sanctions will threaten the self-interest of Iranian leaders. Ruling against the backdrop of the 1979 revolution, the Ayatollah and his government are well aware that nothing is permanent when it comes to their lease on power. The Iranian leaders understand that their hold on power requires them to secure prestige and economic benefit to their people, and that Iranians are not averse to rising up and demanding change when it fails to come from the government. Whether perceived or actual, the threat of regime change creates a motivation for Iranian leadership to cut a deal before the economy deteriorates too dramatically. Such a view affords the United States greater leverage than a view focused just on the effectiveness of sanctions across other countries. The unique nature of Iran’s system of government makes sanctions likely to deliver more leverage than in other nations.

By these metrics, the Islamic Republic under the two Ayatollahs has been a dismal failure, raising questions as to the legitimacy of the regime. 12 million Iranians live below the absolute poverty line, with 25 to 30 million living below the poverty line; one-third of Iranians are in danger of falling into poverty.[121] 14% of Iranians live in tents, and 50% of the workforce lacks regular employment. According to official statistics, one out of every eight Iranians are unemployed, and projections of unemployment for 2021 have gotten as dire as 26% under poor conditions.[122] These challenges extend beyond poverty to political and economic challenges relating to mismanagement, corruption, nepotism, and an undiversified economy that is nearly entirely petrol-reliant, with no prospects of structural diversification.[123] Inequality has also spiraled out of control, with Iran’s Gini Coefficient remaining over 0.40 for an extended period of time.[124] The Gini Coefficient is taken to represent inequality. A score of 0.0 is perfect equality, while 1.0 is perfect inequality. A 0.40 score indicates higher-than-average inequality. On the question of inequality, Djavad Salehi-Isfahani found that inequality in 2002 was similar to the level of inequality in 1972, noting that “[t]he findings on inequality raise important questions about the nature of the Islamic Revolution. Did it significantly affect the power structure as a social revolution of its magnitude should have…the finding that inequality in 2002 was about the same as in 1972 raises questions about the significance of the Islamic Revolution as a social and political revolution.”[125]

As a result, it comes as no surprise that protests have existed in Iran for some time. However, the scale and fervor of recent protests provides further support for the view that the Iranian regime stands on precarious ground. Throughout Iranian history, protests in Iran have been a common way for ordinary Iranians to register their discontent. One of the earliest protests in modern-day Iran took place in 1890 with the “Tobacco Protests,” when the shah granted a monopoly over the tobacco industry in Iran to a British subject. Merchants rose up, creating a protesting alliance between the bazaaris (merchant class) and the ulema (Muslim leaders).[126] As discussed previously, the Constitutional Revolution was also a notable protest surrounding economic stagnation and corruption, which resulted in a parliament being formed during the Qajar dynasty.[127] Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the modern-day theocracy, a number of protests have also had particular political significance. In the Squatter Protests from 1991 to 1994, urban squatters protested across Tehran, Shiraz, Arak, Mashad, Ghazvin, and Tabriz, protesting attempts to evict them.[128] In the Green Movement, protests broke out challenging the controversial 2009 Iranian presidential election results.[129] From 2011-2012, Iranians took part in the groundswell of protests sweeping the Arab world during the “Arab Spring,” building off of the success of the Green Movement.[130]

While many of these protests died down, with future protests it may be different. A 2019 study of protests in Iran from the 1890s to the present concluded that “while protests in Iran are not new, the number and breadth of protests today are significant compared to previous years.”[131] While the current protest movement “remains fractured and lacks central leadership…”[132] unlikely coalitions are possible, as when the secular intelligentsia formed an alliance with religious leaders to topple the regime of the shah in 1979. Indeed, the protests of 1979, historical protests, and the protests of today share a common through-line—they are largely driven by economic grievances. As noted in the 2019 study, “economic grievances have triggered the vast majority of protests in Iran, a trend which has historical precedents in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. These grievances frequently include rising unemployment, increasing prices of basic commodities, growing inflation, or a recession.”[133] Since the notable Dey Protests of October 2019, there have been over 4,200 protests registered in Iran, occurring in nearly every province of the country.[134] In 2020, the problem became even more pronounced following the incident where Iran accidentally destroyed a Ukrainian passenger jet. Referring to the incident as putting Iran “closer than ever before” to regime collapse, former National Security Advisor Jim Jones claimed that this was a significant turning point for the protests.[135] Following the airliner incident, thousands of Iranians marched in the streets protesting the regime, with chants of “they are lying that our enemy is America, our enemy is right here” and “death, death to the dictator.[136]”

In the West, this has led to prognostications of regime change, with former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton noting that “with the recent protests in Iran, we can see the danger the regime is in.”[137] This was echoed by U.S. Representative Gerry Connolly, who noted that the “clerical rule’s days are numbered.”[138] While these predictions are perhaps premature, the protests show no sign of abating, as the economic problems for the regime remain protracted. U.S. sanctions continue to do severe economic damage, as inflation has skyrocketed while the country has entered a recession.

Decades after the 1979 Revolution, many Iranians question whether the goals of the revolution were achieved. The Iranian Revolution promised three goals: social justice, freedom and democracy, and independence from great power tutelage.[139] In many theocratic systems, the ability for the government to deliver promised benefits to its people is irrelevant; such governments can maintain a veneer of legitimacy through the religious beliefs of their citizens. However, Iran is different—the power of the theocracy was not achieved due to the devout religious beliefs of the Iranian people, but through a series of coalitions formed between secular and religious groups. These coalitions were formed due to the perceived efficacy of the rule of the Ayatollah; failure to achieve the promised benefits would directly undermine the legitimacy of the theocratic system.

Demonstrating the lack of power that religion holds, Tehran political science professor Sadegh Zibakalam argued that a referendum on the Islamic Republic held today would find that over 70% of Iranians oppose the system. This unpopularity spans multiple groups—the wealthy, academics, clerics, villagers, and urban residents.[140] Moreover, what Iranians find important from government is not religious in nature but decidedly more secular: development and a reduction in poverty. The revolution of 1979 was not framed in solely Islamic terms, but instead through the lens of supporting the mostazafin (the downtrodden). This concept is best understood as Marxist-Islamist, rendering the Islamist regime and religion a vehicle for advancing the interests of the marginalized within the shah’s regime.[141] Indeed, one of the primary allures of the Islamic Republic was the promise of shifting from a pro-urban, elite-centered system to a pro-rural and pro-poor approach that prioritized the development of infrastructure in the countryside.[142]

Recent studies have highlighted the dwindling role that religion plays in an increasingly secularized Iran. One study found that only 32% of respondents explicitly identified as Shia Muslims, in contrast to the monolithic depiction of Iran as a Shia nation.[143] While 90% of respondents described themselves as hailing from religious families, 47% reported losing some religious focus within their lifetime. Over 60% admitted to not performing the daily Muslim prayers, and 60% said that they did not observe the fast of Ramadan.[144]

In light of these conditions, one can gain a greater appreciation for the seeming urgency in which Iran has approached the question of sanctions relief in 2021. While a traditional realist analysis of sanctions does capture the economic pressure that sanctions engender, the inner workings of the Iranian regime might be obfuscated by the system-centric level of analysis. Yet, in the case of Iran, the desire for economic relief and international inclusion is strong at the grassroots, which adds additional pressure in favor of cutting a deal.

Section 5: Crafting a Nuclear Deal

As demonstrated thus far, the United States possesses ample leverage at this juncture to secure a beneficial deal with Iran. The negotiating strategy that was undertaken to achieve the JCPOA is a prime example of how a new deal should be achieved. Targeted, multilateral sanctions secured leverage over Iran, forcing Iranian leaders to come to the negotiating table. However, the JCPOA had numerous defects, with allowing uranium enrichment and permitting sunset provisions being the most notable. The United States, in negotiating a new deal with Iran, should not settle for the JCPOA. Instead, the United States comes to the negotiating table from a position of strength, with Iran having made the initial offer (resumption of the JCPOA). This section discusses how the United States should secure a better deal, using the analysis in the prior sections as the basis for a sanctions-driven carrot and stick strategy that secures leverage over Iran.

The first step is to ensure that the United States approaches the negotiations with leverage. For the most part, this step has already been attained. The Iranian economy is in shambles, protests are accelerating, and many of the activities undertaken by Iran in 2021 (such as the event surrounding the South Korean tanker) indicate that the regime knows it is in a state of emergency. U.S. policymakers need to approach negotiations with the awareness that Iran has made the first offer, and that Iran has less ability to wait the United States out than the converse—the United States is not in dire economic straits.

To ensure that leverage is held, existing United States sanctions need to be tightened to the greatest extent possible. Secondary sanctions have been a highly effective tool, ensuring that companies that deal with Iran are barred from much of the global financial system. This has resulted in foreign companies having to choose between business with the United States and business with Iran. While the existing sanctions are already quite onerous, further sanctions are possible. Over the past several years, a graduated approach to sanctions has been applied, with additional sanctions being slapped on oil, banking, and even individual officials in government.[145] The United States should continue these steps, formalizing them by subjecting sanctions to a defined schedule that gradually escalates them the longer that Iran continues to have a nuclear program that engages in uranium enrichment. This makes U.S. escalation predictable and knowable in advance. Demonstrating adherence to such an escalation ladder early on will convince Iran that attempting to wait out the United States is futile, increasing the incentive to cut a deal.

The second step is to approach U.S. allies about embarking on multilateral sanctions. This will admittedly be challenging, considering the degree to which the United States acted unilaterally in abrogating the JCPOA and resuming secondary sanctions without the blessings of the international community. However, the United States should approach transatlantic allies from the standpoint of wanting to build upon the JCPOA, using it as a framework for a stronger deal. As argued by Barbara Slavin, there may be appetite for the United States to work with European allies on reaching an interim agreement that addresses the nuclear issue with Iran.[146]

This will be a tough ask, and the United States will need to make the case to allies that a re-entry into the JCPOA is insufficient. As part of this, the United States will want to emphasize that the international security environment has changed notably since the JCPOA in 2015. Since then, Iran has carried out an increasingly destabilizing set of regional activities (particularly following the killing of Suleimani) and, most critically, is enriching uranium at an unacceptably high level. Officials from France, Germany, and the UK have acknowledged that enriching at 20% is the nuclear equivalent of crossing the Rubicon, arguing that this is “increasingly severe and non-reversible.”[147] This should be the major selling point for the United States. Enriching at 20% puts Iran dangerously close to weapons-grade enrichment. Allowing Iran to enrich at a lower level once the 20% threshold has been crossed (as a return to the JCPOA would permit) is unacceptable—the only recourse is to forbid enrichment altogether.

As a result, there may be appetite in Europe for a more stringent deal, even if public statements call for President Biden to return to the JCPOA. One unnamed European diplomat acknowledged that a return to the JCPOA is “probably not sufficient,” while EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell expressed deep concern about recent Iranian uranium enrichment.[148]

Achieving multilateral sanctions is ideal—both the traditional realist and the constructivist social perspectives on sanctions are in agreement about that fact. For the realists, multilateral sanctions ensure a unified front that minimizes defections and ensures that the targeted country cannot easily wait out the sanctioning country. For the constructivists, multilateral sanctions contribute to the perception that the sanctions are a true form of social shunning, a powerful force for a country that desires inclusion within the international arena. As such, the ideal mechanism would utilize the “snapback” sanctions at the UN Security Council, ensuring a multilateral coalition was present to enforce sanctions against Iran. Coupled with existing U.S. sanctions, this would apply considerable pressure. However, the perfect should not be made the enemy of the good. If multilateral sanctions cannot be attained, continuing to ratchet up U.S. secondary sanctions is the next best option. The dire straits that Iran’s economy is in since the resumption of unilateral sanctions demonstrates that those are quite effective, operating as the next-best option.

The third step is for the United States to clearly communicate to Iran a timeline as to how sanctions will gradually intensify, using the aforementioned “escalation ladder” of sanctions. This makes punitive steps undertaken by the United States eminently knowable. However, the United States should not offer only sticks; there must be a clearly defined carrot. Instead of a vague, punitive sanction that loosely is related to behavior, the United States should make clear what its demands are and what conditions are sufficient to lift the sanctions. The United States should emphasize that sanctions are strictly geared towards preventing the development of Iran’s nuclear program.

Critically, Iran should be offered some small relief early on. This will help demonstrate that the United States is negotiating in good faith and provide an easily attainable way for Iran to de-escalate the current crisis. Iran should first be offered a small amount for ceasing to reverse uranium at or above 20%, with relief being offered gradually as Iran enriches at a lower and lower level. There should also be a connection between the commencement of negotiations with U.S. officials and sanctions relief, offering Iran some small sanctions relief for agreeing to negotiate.

This calibrated, clear approach to sanctions is supported by the evidence. Sweeping behavioral sanctions without a clear end in sight offer no incentive to comply because the target state lacks a clear guarantee that a change in behavior will result in relief.[149] In contrast, a targeted approach with clear, actionable goals allows Iran to secure some gain by de-escalating. The fourth step is to begin negotiating with Iran on a new nuclear deal. Iran has expressed an interest in returning to the JCPOA, which is a good starting point for negotiations. However, the JCPOA had numerous flaws, and should not be accepted. The United States should instead make clear at the outset that there are three redlines that must be observed for any deal to be acceptable. First, there must be an instant moratorium on uranium enrichment above the level of 20%. Such enrichment runs a dangerously high risk of allowing Iran to get close to weapons-grade enrichment. Second, any final deal must not permit Iran to enrich at any level, among the completion of the deal. This will be explained at length in the subsequent paragraphs, but enrichment offers Iran a permission that is unprecedented. It erodes the sanctity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and risks empowering other states to act rashly in the hopes of eventually securing a guarantee of enrichment. Third, the final deal must be extended permanently, without the use of the JCPOA’s sunset provisions. Such provisions run a high risk of Iran waiting for the expiration of the deal to break out and develop weapons in a destabilizing matter.

As part of this, the United States should enter with the realization that negotiating a new, landmark agreement will take time. Additionally, Iran has emphasized that they expect sanctions relief before returning to compliance with the JCPOA, risking an impasse.[150] One idea in the interim is a short-term “less for less” deal, where the United States provides limited sanctions relief in exchange for Iran scaling back its enrichment.[151] While this cannot and should not replace a broader set of negotiations, it offers both sides a benefit, ensuring that Iran gets limited sanctions relief while the United States ensures that Iran’s breakout time is less threatening.[152]

The fifth and final step for the United States to take is to hedge, ensuring that there are contingency plans in case the deal breaks down. To do so, the United States must emphasize that it views enrichment of uranium at or above 20% as a grave security threat and will respond accordingly. A decade ago, Iran approaching the 20% level almost resulted in an Israeli strike against Iranian facilities, and the United States should emphasize that the security imperative present then is equally present now.[153] If Iran refuses to abide by this moratorium, the United States should gradually escalate militarily, with the final and most severe step including an offensive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. If U.S. concerns are communicated clearly and credibly, Iran would likely abide by this moratorium and not risk a conflagration.

While these steps are necessary for maximizing leverage and attaining a deal, the question remains: what will the deal include? Building off of the framework of the JCPOA, the United States should insist on a new and improved version that substantially reduces the risk of proliferation in the medium- and long- term. According to Matthew Kroenig, the problem with the JCPOA is that it “only delays rather than stops Iran’s quest to develop nuclear weapons.”[154] The fundamental issue is that the JCPOA does not forbid uranium enrichment but allows it to continue at a low level. Kroenig argues this allows two paths to the bomb. The first is the “patient path,” due to the sunset clauses in the JCPOA.[155] After 15 years, Iran will be able to simply build a uranium enrichment program with no constraints. The second path is that Iran can reap the benefits of sanctions relief, grow its economy, and simply exit the agreement. While proponents of the deal claim that the United States can get tough with Iran after both of those scenarios, Kroenig argues that the United States will have lost its leverage at that point. Sanctions relief will have removed much of the economic pressure, while other countries will be reluctant to undo trade ties with Iran.[156]

The other core weakness of the JCPOA in addition to the sunset provisions is that it allows Iran the right to enrich. Beyond the risks that this creates for the sunset provisions, this is intrinsically dangerous. Kroenig notes that the United States has spent half a century working to prevent other countries from enriching. This was a de facto redline for U.S. non-proliferation policy.[157] In contrast, the JCPOA is an “international stamp of approval…setting a dangerous precedent.”[158]

However, these defects can be remedied by a “return to the pressure track” in the pursuit of a new, better deal.[159] Past experience has demonstrated that pressure and sanctions can, for many of the aforementioned reasons, achieve tangible results. Iran suspended uranium enrichment in 2003 among fears that the invasion of Iraq portended a threat to Iranian sovereignty; Iran also did accept a return to the negotiating table following onerous sanctions during the Obama administration.[160] Sanctions and pressure have not been the issue. Rather, “Washington erred…in letting up too early.”[161]

However, a successful deal also can offer Iran numerous benefits. The most obvious is sanctions relief, which can allow a return to economic success, similar to what happened following the JCPOA. However, it is possible for Iran to achieve the benefits of nuclear energy without uranium enrichment. Since the advent of the nuclear age, the United States has been stalwart in its commitment to helping other nations attain the benefits of nuclear energy, living up to Article IV of the NPT’s commitment to the “inalienable right…to develop research production and use of nuclear energy.”[162] The list of countries with “peaceful nuclear programs” (programs incapable of acquiring weapons-grade uranium or plutonium) is extensive. Countries such as Mexico, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, and more have vibrant nuclear energy programs without enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium.[163] Instead, the United States allows these countries to operate light-water reactors while supplying these countries with nuclear fuel for reactors. The danger is for states to operate heavy-water reactors and produce their own nuclear fuel, which creates the proliferation risk: a state that can produce nuclear fuel for nuclear reactors can also make fuel for nuclear weapons.[164]

While such a deal may seem unlikely, it is vital to remember that the United States holds the leverage, and not Iran. Additionally, even unlikely deals can materialize. As noted by Kroenig, few would have predicted the suspension of enrichment in Libya in 2003, but it materialized suddenly, to the surprise of many.[165] Through sound negotiating tactics, an end to Iranian enrichment is possible.

However, tactful negotiations will be essential, recalling the constructivist insights that were discussed in Section 3. Iran approaches negotiations with the West not from the vantage point of a security-seeking actor but, like all countries, with interests that are deeply informed by its culture and history. Being mindful of this will be vital for effective negotiations. The United States should make sure that negotiations are reciprocal, with tit-for-tat responses that aim to create a feedback loop of positive engagement. Beyond the empirical and theoretical evidence discussed in Section 3, modern social science evidence vindicates such an approach. An analysis by Nicholas Wright and Karim Sadjadpour titled “The Neuroscience Guide to Negotiations with Iran” sought to explain Iran’s stances psychologically.[166] Wright and Sadjadpour quote the Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, lamenting that Iran is “being told that you cannot do what everyone else is doing” in being forbidden from having a nuclear program.[167] Recent psychological evidence has confirmed that perceived unfairness is among the most deeply ingrained and pervasive emotions that we feel, impeding our innate desires for accommodation. In fact, “[m]ore than three decades of lab experiments show that humans are prepared to reject unfairness even at substantial cost. This is based on our biology.”[168]

Wright and Sadjadpour use the example of the “ultimatum game” where an individual is given $10 and proposes a split with a second player (e.g., $9 for herself and $1 for the second person).[169] Despite the second player being given an offer for free money, studies find that the second player rejects offers involving less than 25% of the money around half the time.[170] To illustrate how innate this impulse is, Wright and Sadjadpour also give the example of a famous study involving non-human primates—when two monkeys are instructed to carry out a task and only one is rewarded, the other monkey throws a fit.[171]

Iran is no exception, and many of their behaviors can be viewed through this prism. For example, in 1951 Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh moved to nationalize the British-run Iranian Oil company, incurring tremendous economic costs and a British embargo for little economic upside.[172] An irrational economic decision, Iran likely undertook it to resist an inequitable profit-sharing arrangement. Similarly, Iran has taken on billions of dollars in economic losses under a sanctions regime in recent years for a nuclear energy program that could provide only a fraction of Iran’s energy needs, “debilitat[ing] its chief sources of income—oil and gas revenue—in order to pursue a project with little comparable payoff.”[173]As former Iran nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian noted, “the nuclear issue today for Iranians is not nuclear—it’s defending their integrity, independent identity against the pressure of the rest.”[174]

Moreover, unfairness is in the eye of the beholder, with parties frequently disagreeing on what constitutes an injustice. As Wright and Sadjadpour outline, both the United States and Iran view themselves as the wronged party[175]. To the United States, Iran is a sponsor of terror that has resulted in egregious wrongs toward U.S. forces in the Middle East. To Iran, the United States is a powerful hegemon that aims to crush the God-given duty of spreading Islam throughout the world, with Iran being the David to the West’s Goliath that persists in the face of military and economic pressure. In many ways, this represents a Hegelian tragedy: each side positions itself as the hero while simultaneously assuming the role of a villain from a different perspective.

As dire as the social science research may seem, there remains a way out. The best response when “both sides…feel they have a monopoly of fairness” is aiming to start a feedback effect of engagement and accommodation.[176] This is consistent with the conclusions in Section 3 about engagement with Iran and should form the basis for a U.S. negotiating strategy, using the principles of reciprocity, accommodation, and tit-for-tat positive responses. While studies have found that humans innately resent unfairness, other studies have found that this is not mutually exclusive with an innate desire for cooperation and accommodation. Wright and Sadjadpour note this in the context of a “trust game” where the first player is given money (e.g., $20) and can invest any portion of it (e.g., $10) with the second player.[177] The investment immediately triples, and the second player can decide how much of the money to repay. Scientists found a remarkable result—when cooperation breaks down with investments declining, individuals would “build cooperation by making unilateral conciliatory gestures in the form of high repayments – despite the risk that these generous overtures will simply be pocketed and not reciprocated.”[178]

This may have an analogue in the case of U.S.-Iran relations. Some analysts perceived the election of moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani as the Iranian gesture of accommodation, following the hostility of President Mahmoud Ahmadeinjad.[179] Unilateral gestures of accommodation are salient and can trigger a positive feedback effect that creates further forms of engagement. When undertaken at an unexpected time, these can be powerful images of conciliation. There exist many examples of this strategy. In 1977, Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat made a surprise address to the Israeli Knesset, a dramatic peace overture to great effect.[180] In 2009, President Obama released a surprise video message to the people of Iran and wrote multiple private letters to Ayatollah Khamenei, which “impressed upon the Iranian public that America was interested in turning the page.”[181] Years later, this was followed by an unexpected phone call between Presidents Rouhani and Obama, resulting in the overture being reciprocated with engagement.

This lends itself well to the negotiating approach sketched in this section. President Trump, by withdrawing from the JCPOA, has set the United States on the pressure track with regards to U.S.-Iran policy. President Biden should not let his foot off the gas, maintaining the pressure. However, President Biden does have the opportunity to make overtures to Iran while simultaneously applying pressure. This juxtaposition of pressure with engagement will make any overture unexpected and, if the neuroscientific is correct, all the more effective. Coupled with careful, calibrated sanctions that offer Iran a clear path to relief, Iran will find a deal all the more effective. Additionally, as Wright and Sadjadpour stress, mutual understanding and empathy is vital to overcoming the distrust created by perceived unfairness.[182] The United States has an opportunity to express in negotiations understanding and empathy for some of the objectives that Iran has, emphasizing that it understands the inalienable right that Iran has to nuclear energy and its desire to meet Iran in the middle on a peaceful nuclear program. Negotiators should also skillfully frame any negotiations as a recognition of the regional and global significance that Iran now has. As mentioned in Section 3, prestige and a desire for international influence is a powerful driver for Iranian behavior and may supersede pure security maximization. Approaching negotiations with that in mind can ensure a positive spin on negotiations, making Iran more prone to engagement. 

Conclusion

Contemporary debates over sanctions, including toward Iran, suffer from a critical flaw—they falsely presume that a tool of economic warfare can solely have economic significance. This has led to a paradox. Despite convincing evidence that sanctions are not effective, sanctions have been inexplicably effective at achieving U.S. objectives with Iran, under particular conditions. This paper aims to situate the sanctions debate within a new context, arguing that sanctions should be seen through a constructivist lens that considers their signification for the target country. From such a perspective, sanctions serve a useful isolating function, creating costs for Iran that fall outside of the typical realist frame. Coupled with recent social science on negotiating, this creates the basis for an effective strategy towards Iran: a dual-track approach of pressure and engagement, using sanctions to secure a superior alternative to the JCPOA that relegates Iran’s proliferation ambitions to the dustbin of the 20^th century.

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References

[1] The White House, “The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon,” The White House, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal

[2] Ibid

[3] Agence France-Presse, “Key Trump Quotes On US Withdrawal From Iran Nuclear Deal,” NDTV, May 9, 2018, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/key-trump-quotes-on-us-withdrawal-from-iran-nuclear-deal-1849334

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid

[6] Crowley, Michael, Falih Hassan, and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim Suleimani, Commander of Iranian Forces,” The New York Times, January 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html

[7] Ibid

[8] Ibid

[9] Wright, Nicholas, and Karim Sadjadpour, “What Neuroscience Can Teach Us About Making a Deal With Iran,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 14, 2014, https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/14/what-neuroscience-can-teach-us-about-making-deal-with-iran-pub-54191

[10] Ibid

[11] Ibid

[12] NPR, “Obama Makes Overtures To Iran In Video Message,” NPR, March 20, 2009, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102156925

[13] NPR, “Obama Makes Overtures To Iran In Video Message,” NPR, March 20, 2009, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102156925

[14] The White House, “The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon,” The White House, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal

[15] Haltiwanger, John “Here’s what’s in the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran that Trump abandoned and Biden pledged to restore,” Business Insider, December 2, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-nuclear-deal-explained

[16] Gambrell, Jon, and Isabel Debre, “Iran starts 20% uranium enrichment, seizes South Korean ship,” Associated Press News, January 4, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/iran-uranium-enrichment-20-percent-ab0930064c446114506b8d085941cf84

[17] Haltiwanger, John “Here’s what’s in the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran that Trump abandoned and Biden pledged to restore,” Business Insider, December 2, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-nuclear-deal-explained

[18] The White House, “The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon,” The White House, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal

[19] Haltiwanger, John “Here’s what’s in the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran that Trump abandoned and Biden pledged to restore,” Business Insider, December 2, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-nuclear-deal-explained

[20] The White House, “The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon,” The White House, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal

[21] Robinson, Kali “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 4, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal

[22] Kroenig, Matthew “How to Unwind the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The American Interest, February 11, 2016, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/02/11/how-to-unwind-the-iran-nuclear-deal/

[23] Haltiwanger, John “Here’s what’s in the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran that Trump abandoned and Biden pledged to restore,” Business Insider, December 2, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-nuclear-deal-explained

[24] BBC News, “Trump on the Iran deal: ‘Worst, horrible, laughable,’ BBC News, April 26, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-41587428

[25] Haltiwanger, John “Here’s what’s in the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran that Trump abandoned and Biden pledged to restore,” Business Insider, December 2, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-nuclear-deal-explained

[26] Ibid

[27] Santora, Marc “Iran Increases Uranium Enrichment at Key Nuclear Facility,” The New York Ties, January 4, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-uranium-enrichment.html

[28] BBC News, “Six charts that show how hard US sanctions have hit Iran,” BBC News, December 9, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48119109

[29] Ibid

[30] Ibid

[31] Jones, Seth G., and Danika Newlee, “Iran’s Protests and the Threat to Domestic Stability,” CSIS, November 2019, 1-2, https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-protests-and-threat-domestic-stability

[32] Ibid

[33] Ibid

[34] Slavin, Barbara “FAST THINKING: What’s Iran thinking?” Atlantic Council, January 4, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/fastthinking/fast-thinking-whats-iran-thinking-uranium-enrichment-south-korea-tanker/

[35] De Luce, Dan “Iran tries to increase its leverage in future negotiations with President-elect Biden,” NBC News, January 5, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-tries-increase-its-leverage-future-negotiations-president-elect-biden-n1252833

[36] Slavin, Barbara “FAST THINKING: What’s Iran thinking?” Atlantic Council, January 4, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/fastthinking/fast-thinking-whats-iran-thinking-uranium-enrichment-south-korea-tanker/

[37] Ibid

[38] Kumar Sen, Ashish “A Brief History of Sanctions on Iran,” New Atlanticist, May 8, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-brief-history-of-sanctions-on-iran/

[39] Ibid

[40] Ibid

[41] Ibid

[42] Ibid

[43] Kumar Sen, Ashish“A Brief History of Sanctions on Iran,” New Atlanticist, May 8, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-brief-history-of-sanctions-on-iran/

[44] Brzoska, Michael“The Power and Consequences of International Sanctions,” May 19, 2014, https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/19/the-power-and-consequences-of-international-sanctions/

[45] Ibid

[46] Clyde Hufbauer, Gary, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Barbara Oegg, “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,” Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 3^rd edition,(2007), 155-160

[47] Pape, Robert A., “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, (Fall 1997), 90-93, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539368

[48] Ibid

[49] Pape, Robert A., “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, (Summer 1998), 66-69, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539263

[50] Elliott, Kimberly Ann “The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), 50-52, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539262

[51] Ibid

[52] Brzoska, Michael “The Power and Consequences of International Sanctions,” May 19, 2014, https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/19/the-power-and-consequences-of-international-sanctions/

[53] Kahler, Miles “Rationality in International Relations,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, (Autumn 1998), 919-920, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601362

[54] Joseph, Jonathan “Realism and Neorealism in International Relations Theory,” The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, (September 2014), https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118474396.wbept0864

[55] Yoon, Yesun “Assessment of the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions: The Case of Iran, North Korea, Myanmar, and Cuba,” Naval Postgraduate School, June 2017, 16-22, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046592.pdf

[56] Ibid

[57] Yoon, Yessun “Assessment of the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions: The Case of Iran, North Korea, Myanmar, and Cuba,” Naval Postgraduate School, June 2017, 16-22, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046592.pdf

[58] Loyola, Mario “Obama Should Never Have Appeased Iran,” The Atlantic, January 12, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/obama-should-never-have-appeased-iran/604744/

[59] Jung, Euijin “Iran Sanctions: A Successful Episode,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 29, 2016, https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/iran-sanctions-successful-episode

[60] Ibid

[61] Ibid

[62] O’Toole, Brian “Sanctions are effective – if used correctly,” New Atlanticist, November 4, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sanctions-are-effective-if-used-correctly/

[63] Ibid

[64] O’Toole, Brian “Sanctions are effective – if used correctly,” New Atlanticist, November 4, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sanctions-are-effective-if-used-correctly/

[65] Mortlock, David, and Brian O’Toole, “US Sanctions: Using a Coercive Economic and Financial Tool Effectively,” Economic Sanctions Initiative, (November 2018), 6, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/US-Sanctions-Using-a-Coercive-Economic-and-Financial-Tool-Effectively1.pdf

[66] Ibid

[67] Dizaji, Sajjad F.“Do Sanctions Constrain Military Spending of Iran?” Defense and Peace Economics, (2019), 1-5, https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1622059

[68] Macaluso, Agnese “The Apparent Success of Iran Sanctions,” The Hague Institute for Global Justice, Working Paper 2, (August 2014), 1-3, https://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Working-Paper-2-Iran-Sanctions_1409326879.pdf

[69] Macaluso, Agnese “The Apparent Success of Iran Sanctions,” The Hague Institute for Global Justice, Working Paper 2, (August 2014), 19, https://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Working-Paper-2-Iran-Sanctions_1409326879.pdf

[70] Brzoska, Michael “The Power and Consequences of International Sanctions,” May 19, 2014, https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/19/the-power-and-consequences-of-international-sanctions/

[71] Brzoska, Michael “The Power and Consequences of International Sanctions,” May 19, 2014, https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/19/the-power-and-consequences-of-international-sanctions/

[72] Ibid

[73] Ibid

[74] Ibid

[75] Walt, Stephen M.  “The Difference Between Realists and Liberals,” Foreign Policy, July 11, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/11/the-difference-between-realists-and-liberals/

[76] Theys, Sarina “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” February 23, 2018,

Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory

[77] Ibid

[78] Ibid

[79] Ibid

[80] This is the title of Alexander Wendt’s famous article on constructivism, published in 1992 by International Organization

[81] Theys, Sarina “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” February 23, 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/23/introducing-constructivism-in-international-relations-theory/

[82] Morris, Kate, and Timothy J. White, “Neutrality and the European Union: The case of Switzerland,” Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3 (7), 104-111.

[83] Theys, Sarina “Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” February 23, 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/23/introducing-constructivism-in-international-relations-theory/

[84] Ibid

[85] Tannewald, Nina “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use,” International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Summer 1999), 433-468, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601286

[86] Brzoska, Michael “The Power and Consequences of International Sanctions,” May 19, 2014, https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/19/the-power-and-consequences-of-international-sanctions/

[87] Brzoska, Michael “The Power and Consequences of International Sanctions,” May 19, 2014, https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/19/the-power-and-consequences-of-international-sanctions/

[88] Ibid

[89] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 279-280, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[90] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 279-280, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[91] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 283, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[92] Ibid

[93] Ibid

[94] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 283 http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[95] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 283-284, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[96] Ibid

[97] Ibid

[98] Ibid

[99] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 285, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[100] Ibid

[101] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 285-287 http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[102] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 285-287, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[103] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 287, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[104] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 287-288, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[105] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 288, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[106] Ibid

[107] Ibid

[108] Ibid

[109] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 289, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[110] Ibid

[111] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 290, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[112] Ibid

[113] Nia, Mahdi Mohammad “Title: A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, (March 2011), 290, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._4;_March_2011/31.pdf

[114] Ibid

[115] Dizaji, Sajjad F.  “Do Sanctions Constrain Military Spending of Iran?” Defense and Peace Economics, (2019), 1-5, https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1622059

[116] Kroenig, Matthew “How to Unwind the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The American Interest, February 11, 2016, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/02/11/how-to-unwind-the-iran-nuclear-deal/

[117] Shanda Consult, “Iran: 12.5% Economy Growth of Iran from 04/2016-03/2017,” Mondaq, August 7, 2017, https://www.mondaq.com/economic-analysis/616720/125-economy-growth-of-iran-from-042016–032017

[118] Yoon, Yesun “Assessment of the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions: The Case of Iran, North Korea, Myanmar, and Cuba,” Naval Postgraduate School, June 2017, 7, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046592.pdf

[119] Ibid

[120] Yoon, Yesun “Assessment of the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions: The Case of Iran, North Korea, Myanmar, and Cuba,” Naval Postgraduate School, June 2017, 26-28, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046592.pdf

[121] Fathollah-Nejad, Ali “Four decades later, did the Iranian revolution fulfill its promises?” Brookings Institute, July 11, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/07/11/four-decades-later-did-the-iranian-revolution-fulfill-its-promises/

[122] Ibid

[123] Fathollah-Nejad, Ali “Four decades later, did the Iranian revolution fulfill its promises?” Brookings Institute, July 11, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/07/11/four-decades-later-did-the-iranian-revolution-fulfill-its-promises/

[124] Ibid

[125] Ibid

[126] Jones, Seth G., and Danika Newlee, “Iran’s Protests and the Threat to Domestic Stability,” CSIS, November 2019, 2, https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-protests-and-threat-domestic-stability

[127] Ibid

[128] Ibid

[129] Ibid

[130] Ibid

[131] Ibid

[132] Ibid

[133] Ibid

[134] Ibid

[135] Turak, Natasha“Iran is closer ‘than ever before’ to regime collapse, says former Obama security advisor,” CNBC, January 13, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/13/iran-is-closer-than-ever-before-to-regime-collapse-says-former-obama-security-adviser.html

[136] Ibid

[137] Jones, Seth G., and Danika Newlee, “Iran’s Protests and the Threat to Domestic Stability,” CSIS, November 2019, 1, https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-protests-and-threat-domestic-stability

[138] Ibid

[139] Ibid

[140] Fathollah-Nejad, Ali, “Four decades later, did the Iranian revolution fulfill its promises?” Brookings Institute, July 11, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/07/11/four-decades-later-did-the-iranian-revolution-fulfill-its-promises/

[141] Fathollah-Nejad, Ali, “Four decades later, did the Iranian revolution fulfill its promises?” Brookings Institute, July 11, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/07/11/four-decades-later-did-the-iranian-revolution-fulfill-its-promises/

[142] Ibid

[143] Arab, Pooyan Tamimi, and Ammar Maleki, “Iran’s secular shift: new survey reveals huge changes in religious beliefs,” The Conversation, September 10, 2020, https://theconversation.com/irans-secular-shift-new-survey-reveals-huge-changes-in-religious-beliefs-145253

[144] Ibid

[145] Verma, Pranshu, and Farnaz Fassihi, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Iran’s Oil Sector,” The New York Times, October 26, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/world/middleeast/trump-sanctions-iran-oil.html?auth=login-email&login=email

[146] Geranmayeh, Ellie, Barbara Slavin, Sahil Shah, “Renewing Transatlantic Strategy on Iran,” Atlantic Council, (November 2020), 3, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Transatlantic-Strategy-Iran-IB.pdf

[147] BBC News, “Iran nuclear deal: Why do the limits on uranium enrichment matter?” BBC News, January 14, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48776695

[148] Washington Post, “Europe sees a narrow window for Biden to revive Iran nuclear deal,” Washington Post, January 17, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/iran-nuclear-europe-biden/2021/01/16/b0e45352-54f1-11eb-acc5-92d2819a1ccb_story.html

[149] O’Toole, Brian, “Sanctions are effective – if used correctly,” New Atlanticist, November 4, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sanctions-are-effective-if-used-correctly/

[150] Washington Post, “Opinion: Biden doesn’t need to rush back into the Iran nuclear deal,” Washington Post, January 19, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/19/biden-doesnt-need-rush-back-into-iran-nuclear-deal-defuse-tensions/

[151] Ibid

[152] Ibid

[153] Gambrell, Jon “Iran plans 20% uranium enrichment ‘as soon as possible,’” Associated Press News, January 1, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-dubai-iran-iran-nuclear-united-arab-emirates-384717b592f8a7012b02d8627f36763a

[154] Kroenig, Matthew “The Return to the Pressure Track: The Trump Administration and the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Volume 29, Issue 1, (January 2018), 2, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1420529

[155] Ibid

[156] Ibid

[157] Kroenig, Matthew “The Return to the Pressure Track: The Trump Administration and the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Volume 29, Issue 1, (January 2018), 3, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1420529

[158] Ibid

[159] Kroenig, Matthew “The Return to the Pressure Track: The Trump Administration and the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Volume 29, Issue 1, (January 2018), 3-5, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1420529

[160] Kroenig, Matthew “The Return to the Pressure Track: The Trump Administration and the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Volume 29, Issue 1, (January 2018), 6-8, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1420529

[161] Kroenig, Matthew “The Return to the Pressure Track: The Trump Administration and the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Volume 29, Issue 1, (January 2018), 5, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1420529

[162] Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text

[163] Kroenig, Matthew “How to Unwind the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The American Interest, February 11, 2016, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/02/11/how-to-unwind-the-iran-nuclear-deal/

[164] Ibid

[165] Ibid

[166] Wright, Nicholas, and Karim Sadjadpour, “What Neuroscience Can Teach Us About Making a Deal With Iran,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 14, 2014, https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/14/what-neuroscience-can-teach-us-about-making-deal-with-iran-pub-54191

[167] Wright, Nicholas, and Karim Sadjadpour, “What Neuroscience Can Teach Us About Making a Deal With Iran,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 14, 2014, https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/14/what-neuroscience-can-teach-us-about-making-deal-with-iran-pub-54191

[168] Ibid

[169] Ibid

[170] Ibid

[171] Ibid

[172] Ibid

[173] Ibid

[174] Ibid

[175] Wright, Nicholas, and Karim Sadjadpour, “What Neuroscience Can Teach Us About Making a Deal With Iran,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 14, 2014, https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/14/what-neuroscience-can-teach-us-about-making-deal-with-iran-pub-54191

[176] Ibid

[177] Ibid

[178] Ibid

[179] Ibid

[180] Wright, Nicholas, and Karim Sadjadpour, “What Neuroscience Can Teach Us About Making a Deal With Iran,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 14, 2014, https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/14/what-neuroscience-can-teach-us-about-making-deal-with-iran-pub-54191

[181] Ibid

[182] Ibid