Destitute and Desolate: Colombia’s Compassion to Venezuela’s Vulnerability

This essay won 1st Place in the 2024 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Evaluate an example of a foreign policy, historical or contemporary, that can be considered a success.”

One month’s salary should be enough to uphold a household, yet, it’s only enough to buy
a street hot dog in Venezuela.¹ In the past decade, Venezuelan citizens have been starved by hyperinflation and output shortages imposed by Venezuela’s corrupt leaders. This economic collapse has led to a mass exodus of over 7.7 million Venezuelan citizens — a feat that comes ranked highly in the largest forcibly displaced crisis in the world.² While surrounding countries such as Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, and Chile have instituted measures to limit these migrants through increased border security and required identification, one country opens its arms to the famished: Colombia’s open door policy to Venezuela serves as a beacon of success in humanitarianism — a light that shines brightly in a world of polarization and conflict.

The genesis of Venezuela’s economic crisis begins with Hugo Chavez, an esteemed
leader who built his platform by blaming government corruption and Venezuela’s elite for
economic inequality. With oil prices surging by 34% in 2004, Venezuela’s petroleum-dependant
economy skyrocketed.³ To maintain his presidency, Chavez strived for popularity with the poor,
spending billions to increase social welfare and healthcare through his Bolivarian Missions.⁴
Chavez’s spending led to a growing deficit of $3.8 billion in 2006, implying that if oil prices
dropped, these plans could not be continued — which is precisely what took place.⁵ After
Chavez’s death in 2013, his appointed right-hand man, Nicolas Maduro, faced the consequences
of a 45% plummet in oil prices in 2015.⁶

As professor Michael McCarthy states in Venezuela’s Crisis: Beyond Economic
Explanations: An Interview with Michael McCarthy, “due to the vested economic interests
entangled with the ruling coalition, Maduro essentially faced a choice to reform at the risk of
being sacked internally or cast his lot with the military to hold on to power.”⁷ Thus, Maduro,
unable to withstand the change and power-hungry, exploited Venezuela’s currency system by
setting an exchange rate only attainable by select allies (10 bolivars per US dollar).⁸ In doing so,
the Venezuelan currency became worthless; the majority of Venezuelans began obtaining their
dollars on the black market, where one US dollar is worth thousands more in bolivars.
Furthermore, with total control over the food supply, the Venezuelan military buys food at the
value set by Maduro and resells it on the black market for enormous profits — demolishing food supplies for Venezuelans nationally. Subsequently, Maduro’s power stays locked; the food
supply scheme allows his allies and military to continuously support him.

“…I want to leave, we’re out of power, I am with the kids and feeling desperate’, so I told
her,’ we have to go’” pleads a Venezuelan refugee.⁹

In this state of turmoil, Colombia reaches its hand out to Venezuela, implementing
multiple responses to assist the nearly three million migrants that crossed its border over the next
nine years.¹⁰ The initial migrations in 2015 resulted in heightened security and social work
presence on prominent points on the border between Venezuela and Colombia: emergency care,
childbirth care, shelters, vaccinations, legal assistance, psychological assistance, to name a few.
As numbers of Venezuelan migrants rose in 2017, the management of the migrant population
strengthened as the Colombian government opened additional migration stations, resulting in
seven open stations between both countries. Additionally, the creation of the Special Permanence
Permit (Permiso Especial de Permanencia or PEP), granted temporary residence and access to
social services and markets to Venezuelans residing in Colombia, allowing migrants to stay in
the country for up to two years and utilize its resources.¹¹ In 2021, the Venezuelan crisis
aggravated, yet, Colombia only responded with increased compassion by allowing renewals of
the PEP.. Since its commencement up until 2020, over 700,000 Venezuelan migrants have been
granted permanence. The Colombian government formally established a regularization procedure
for Venezuelan migrants with Decree 216 of 2021, enabling them to seek for a 10-year
temporary status (TPS).¹²

“Here in Colombia, selling sweets on the street is seen as a job, but in Venezuela we see
it as begging for money, like if I was saying ‘gift me something, help me out’” says a refugee.
In its cultural context, Venezuela and Colombia coexisted as allies in the past, and
furthermore, were one country referred to as Gran Colombia. Once formally abolished in 1831
and decades later in the 80s, Colombia faced its own internal crisis with a rebel group named the
FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). Subsequently, seven million Colombians
were displaced, to which many fled to Venezuela. In a way, Colombia’s compassion exists as the
returning of a favor from decades prior. Through a continuation of such a partnership,
Colombia’s open border policy accomplishes further unification.

While Colombia’s actions reflect humanitarian values for Venezuela, some limitations
fester. In the long run, Colombia may not be able to keep up with balancing the rising influx and
its own problems such as crime. Moreover, the Venezuelan migrants face issues of harsh
working conditions; 40% of migrants work more than 60 hours a week. ¹³Even more, refugees find it more difficult to find full time work; more than 25% work fewer than 20 hours a week.
This seesaw of employment provides for a shaky employment system that requires nuanced
attention.

“The people I have met have been an absolute blessing…In Venezuela when you get
together all you talk about is politics…whereas here you speak about food, about what you’re
going to have, you talk about sharing,” a refugee remarks. Alongside the migrant stations
between their border, both Venezuelan and Colombian music play simultaneously. On highway
signs, messages of “Colombia and Venezuela, united forever” display proudly.¹⁴ The chants of
“your flag is my flag” symbolize the cultural success of Colombia’s open door policy; a clear
cultural unity that glows in the face of starved adversity.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Colombia Fighting for Peace, taken on Oct. 20, 2016, Photo by Leon Hernandez | Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

1. Vox. “Why Colombia has taken in 1 million Venezuelans.” YouTube, Vox, 27 November 2018,
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NU0RqwweuWY&list=PLJ8cMiYb3G5czofUrrizDiyC_yNLOe_CF&index=95
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