The Yale Review of
International Studies

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Dear Reader:

It is with great pleasure that we present you with this fall's intercollegiate edition of the *Yale Review of International Studies.* Now in its second year, the intercollegiate issue has officially become an institutionalized part of the *Review*, and we believe that this commitment affirms the core of our mission statement: to provide a student voice for the broader international studies community.

    This year, our staff reached out to faculty and students at over twenty universities across the nation—pooling together what we believe to be the most diverse showcase of academic talent yet. The issue features topics such as the history of Romania's oil industry; Chinese nationalistic cyber-hacking; and the imperial gendering of Britain's East African campaign. To our contributors and friends at Yale, Harvard, Wellesley, the University of Chicago, Georgetown, and Berkeley, we owe you our deepest thanks and gratitude; you certainly made this intercollegiate issue quite special.

    Also included in our publication is an editorial comment on Israeli pinkwashing and an interview with agronomist and 1970 Nobel Peace Prize recipient Dr. Norman Borlaug. 2014 marks the fifth year since Dr. Borlaug's passing, and the *Review* would like to honor his memory and legacy by encouraging our audience to spend some time reading about his amazing work. Please don't hesitate to contact us if you would like to further the discussion on these opinion pieces; we're more than happy to act as a conduit for scholarship and dialogue.

    Last, and certainly not least, we'd like to present a revamped design for the Review. None of this would have been at all possible without our fantastic layout team or the support of the Yale International Relations Association. We hope that this new striking look symbolizes the exciting

things to come for this journal. Be on the lookout for additional scholarship, speaker conferences, and online content as the year progresses.

Working with peers at other universities these past two years has been nothing but an immense pleasure, and we are already excited for our next open issue, which will appear in fall 2015 after this year's Yale exclusive winter issue and our spring Acheson Prize issue. For now though, please enjoy the publication, and as always, we hope that you will consider us as a platform for your own work.

Sincerely,
The Editors

"The Basic Scientific Problems that Call Upon People"

AN INTERVIEW WITH
NORMAN BORLAUG

April 20, 2009

This interview has been lightly edited for clarity.

Dr. Norman Borlaug (March 25, 1914–September 12, 2009) was an American biologist, humanitarian, and Nobel Laureate who dedicated his life towards developing semi-dwarf, disease-resistant, and high-yield wheat varieties. Referred to as the "father of the Green Revolution", Borlaug led the introduction of these wheat strains in Mexico, Pakistan, and India during the mid-20th century—saving billions of people from starvation. His work eventually led to a directorship at the International Wheat Improvement Program, and later the Eugene Butler Endowed Chair in Agricultural Biotechnology at Texas A&M University. He is one of seven people in American history to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, President Medal of Freedom, and Congressional Gold Medal.

In order to honor the memory and legacy of Dr. Borlaug, the *Yale Review of International Studies* has published the following interview by senior editor Andrew Tran, who met with Dr. Borlaug in April of 2009.

AT It's a great honor to be able to speak with you today, Dr. Borlaug. We heard from Ed Runge [a Texas A&M professor and your colleague since 1984] about a rust epidemic in Uganda. Could you update us on the situation?

NB Well, this race of rust in Uganda is capable of stacking most of the commercial wheat varieties that are grown in South Asia and the Middle East. As a matter of fact, our own varieties are susceptible to it also. So before you have serious

epidemics, you have to have certain conditions early in the process of the crop so that there's a lot of inoculum to set an intensive epidemic. So just because the varieties are susceptible, if the environment, the distribution of the rainfall and the temperature are not correct, you may escape a serious epidemic for several years because of the environmental issues. And that's essentially the situation and the way it is in South Asia and most of the U.S. and Australia, and South America at the present time. The reports that a recent event made available by the International Rust Laboratories in Australia and the U.S. indicate that the current crop is a good one and there are no serious losses, but that doesn't mean that there won't be serious losses in the next few years. And so the new varieties, which are resistant to these new races have to be multiplied and distributed, and that's no small job. It takes three years to multiply the seed. Once you're sure that it's resistant, you need to cover the area now covered by susceptible varieties. So there's a big job ahead.

In our research into your work, we came across the Borlaug hypothesis. Could you explain the concept?

Well the hypothesis is that there is continuing development of new strains, largely by two means: mutations, or by crossing previous races between two or more of the previous races—and that's a complicated thing. Crops have to grow through a third host. But both of those avenues make it very difficult to have long time resistance to all the races in a given region.

Dr. Borlaug, you also speak a lot on education—what would be your main points in educating the public on the issue of world hunger?

Well, on education, you've got one main problem: you've got to convince political leaders that you have the funds to cover the additional work that's required—and not just the research work to build and test new varieties for resistance—but also to demonstrate the value of these new varieties. And that takes money. But you can't get the money up unless you can convince the political leaders of the country to put up money for the multiplication of new varieties.

What is the greatest challenge facing Africa besides the rust wheat problem?

Well I would say it's the lack of trained people in third world countries, because without trained scientists, you can't develop these new wheat varieties with high yield, adaptation, and resistance to the old varieties. Doing so doesn't only take money and time; it takes people committed to that cause.

What do you consider to be your greatest legacy?

Well I guess it would be the international testing and training program that I have been advocating for more than two decades. There are all kinds of people committed to these programs, and through them we see that basic scientific problems call upon people regardless of political ideology, and we see that regardless of whether a country is communistic or a meritocratic dictatorship or a democracy, folks are willing to devote their time.

How can young people who are inspired by your work get involved in the fight against world hunger?

When I came into the picture, at that time, back in the early '60s, there were a few very influential groups that had seemingly been convincing the world that the problem on the food front from alleviating hunger and human misery, was beyond control—that the population was already too great. And if it didn't continue to grow, just to feed the numbers that were already on the planet Earth would soon lead to complete disaster of hunger and death. And of course I didn't believe that, and so I battled and I said we had the technology, and I've been involved in developing part of it for Asia and Latin America and I spent a lot of my effort during the '60s battling all of this negative propaganda. The Population Monster was one of the books that was hard to undermine and contest because it had convinced so many political leaders that things were controlled. But look what happened. When I got things going, that not only solved the problem in India and Pakistan, but later China and much of Latin America. So to the young people,

I say: invest soundly in research, and the research is only one aspect. Then you've got to demonstrate the value of that research on farms. And third, you've got to get economic policies on availability of the right kind of fertilizer at reasonable prices distributed throughout the countries where the food problem is critical.

If you are looking to go into action, I would also recommend that you consult your own Director of Extension of your Department of Agriculture to put you in contact with the best sources of information.

Thank you very much, and I hope you get well soon.

Thank you—the best of luck to you. When you're 95 years of age you can't do the things you could when you were 65, but I want to do what I can to be useful.

Andrew Tran ('16) attends Yale University.

A Selective Sanctuary

"Pinkwashing" and Gay Palestinian Asylum-Seekers in Israel

JOSH FENG

Every June, the LGBTQ community celebrates pride month. And every year, Tel-Aviv is marketed as a must-visit gaycation destination. From the rainbow-decorated streets filled with scantily-clad, chiseled men to the seemingly endless beach parties and gay bars, Tel-Aviv has been widely regarded as the "world's best gay city." Israel is also one of few countries in the world that grants legal recognition to same-sex couples regarding property tax benefits, inheritance taxes, and housing aid (though this doesn't extend to marriage). When "Don't' Ask Don't Tell" was repealed in the US, the Israeli Defense Force had already openly supported gay soldiers for years. But across the border in the streets of Palestine's Ramallah, the rainbow flags and gay bars characteristic of Tel-Aviv's pride celebrations are completely absent. Like the majority of Middle Eastern states, Palestine outlaws homosexuality—a cold reality that leaves the country's LGBTQ community with little room for freedom of expression.

In 2008, Tel-Aviv University researchers Michael Kagan and Anat Ben-Dor of Tel-Aviv University published a report titled, *Nowhere to Run: Gay Palestinian Asylum-Seekers in Israel.* An interview with "D", a 20-year old from the West Bank, aptly describes the social and religious barriers that Palestinian sexual minorities face:

> "In Palestinian culture, being homosexual is . . . a disgrace to [the homosexual's] entire family and an abomination against Islam. It is also viewed as an act against the *Palestinian struggle for independence . . .* the sanctions are extremely harsh, beginning with physical and verbal abuse and often ending in death at the hands of one's own family or others."

As shown by other testimonies from Kagan and Ben-Dor's research, gay Palestinians do not only suffer at the hands of their family; oftentimes, other civilians, armed militias, and or official authorities use a variety of means to torture and abuse sexual minorities. This ranges from beatings, stabbings, burnings, prolonged immersion in sewage water, and forced starvation among others.

In order to escape this persecution, many gay Palestinians[1] seek refuge in Israel. But even in such an "LGBTQ-friendly" country, these individuals continue to face discrimination. If discovered by Israeli authorities, they are often detained and sent back to the West Bank or Gaza where they face the same abuse they fled from—perhaps even facing death. Others who manage to stay in Israel must live a life of secrecy and hardship, often relying on drug networks or prostitution rings to survive.

Yet the behavior of Israeli authorities towards gay Palestinians contradicts the state's binding legal agreements. Israel is a state party to both the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (CRCR) and the 1967 CRCR Protocol, which as outlined by Article 1 of the CRCR, would place LGBTQ individuals who flee homophobic violence and lack government protection under the formal definition of "refugee". Additionally Article 42 of the CRCR prevents states from entering reservations onto this definition. This means that any state party to the CRCR cannot deny rights by changing the definition of what constitutes a "refugee" under Article 1 of the CRCR.

Israel's legal obligation to protect Palestinian LGBTQ refugees is further demanded by other articles within the CRCR. Article 33 of the CRCR requires signatories to provide asylum to refugees—as defined by Article 1 of the same treaty—on the principle of non-refoulement, that is, "the prohibition of forcing foreigners to return to territories where they would be in danger". Moreover, Article 3 requires "contracting States [to] apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion, or country of origin." Yet Israel does not fully honor either of these legal commitments. Beyond its deportation policies, Israel excludes all Palestinians from formally applying for refugee status via the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the National Status Granting Board (NSGB).

Israel's current policy regarding Palestinian asylum-seekers not only places gay Palestinians at risk, but also violates the international humanitarian law it is bound to. Clearly, there is a disjunct between stated intentions and actual policy; while gay Palestinians should be provided asylum in Israel, discrimination still continues on the basis of race and country of origin. As Kagan and Ben-Dor mention, Israeli authorities seem to conflate Palestinians seeking asylum with those seeking right-of-return.

"The right to seek asylum invokes a separate body of law from the debate over refugee return; the Palestinians we [Kagan and Ben-Dor] discuss

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1 Though it is quite likely that many LGBTQ persons in Palestine suffer from similar treatment, the sources drawn upon focus largely on homosexual males. For the sake of accuracy, specific terminology is used throughout this piece.

in this report [*Nowhere to Run*] are seeking international protection in Israel as a foreign country, not return or repatriation to ancestral homes."

The 2003 Citizenship and Entry to Israel Law, which prohibits granting a visa or a permit to stay in Israel to a Palestinian resident of the Occupied Territories, does have narrow exceptions that may apply to refugees. However, few have successfully obtained this status. In most cases, gay Palestinians' best option is to seek asylum in a third country, most often in Europe.

There is also the matter of Israeli "pinkwashing". Israel's emphasis on its positive LGBTQ rights track record allows it to glorify itself as a socially enlightened society while condemning Palestinian and other Arab attitudes towards LGBTQ individuals. Some argue this behavior serves to cover up some of the larger injustices perpetrated by Israel against Palestine. By focusing solely on LGBTQ issues, the complexity of Israeli-Palestinian relations threatens to be oversimplified, also closing dialogue on intersectionality and the multitude of social factors that also affect LGBTQ rights. In addition, this "pinkwashing" paradigm perpetuates an even larger "West-Arab World" dichotomy by highlighting the gap between Palestine and Israel in terms of LGBTQ rights. This not only hampers grassroots Palestinian/Arab advocacy organizations trying to secure LGBTQ rights in Palestine, but also efforts to secure aspects of peaceful macro-relations between the US, Canada, and Europe with the Middle East.

Though other factors such as religion, history and politics play a large role in Palestine's current LGBTQ rights situation, adding a Western cultural connotation to LGBTQ rights combines two concepts that should exist in completely separate spheres. If "the West" is to attempt to improve the situation for LGBTQ individuals in the Middle East, care must be taken to avoid patronizing actions reminiscent of the region's imperial past. LGBTQ rights should not be mistaken as a "colonial project."

Ideally, the situation for gay individuals in Palestine should improve. In the meantime, Israel needs to rethink its refugee policy. Rather than enforce sweeping blocks to Palestinian asylum-seekers, a case-by-case review of applicants strikes a better balance between asylum and security. But Israel's intransigence—namely its lumping of all Palestinians into one category—shows what Israel is willing to sacrifice in the name of security. In reality, there is a huge disconnect between Tel-Aviv's "gay friendliness" and Israel's stance on LGBTQ rights. And though the human rights corpus should be upheld universally, the debate over granting gay Palestinians asylum in Israel is still seeped in a geo-political context.

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ESSAYS

The Outsiders

How The Lives of Margaret Thatcher and Angela Merkel Created Modern Europe

DHRUV C. AGGARWAL

"We want the Community to move forward as twelve . . . Europe is strongest when it grows through willing co-operation and practical measures, not compulsion or bureaucratic dreams."
—MARGARET THATCHER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS (1990)

"Nobody in Europe will be abandoned. Nobody in Europe will be excluded. Europe only succeeds if we work together."
—ANGELA MERKEL IN THE BUNDESTAG (2010)

Leo Tolstoy began *Anna Karenina* with one of the famous opening lines in literature—"all happy families are alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." However, if one were to look at all successful, "happy", female heads of state, two figures would stand out: Margaret Hilda Thatcher and Angela Dorothea Merkel. Yet the two could not have been more different, both in terms of style and substance. While Thatcher reveled in being dramatic and forceful, Merkel has made a political living out of being low-key and consistent. Thatcher staked her eleven-year premiership and absolute domination of the Conservative Party on her refusal to agree to the single currency suggested by the Delors Commission. Merkel—who enjoyed the highest approval ratings of any Chancellor in postwar Germany and governed an economically resurgent colossus—had to lean on both Christian Democrats and opposition Members of Parliament to formulate a European bailout package that did not compromise the monetary stability of her own country.

Thatcher believed passionately in the economic freedom of the individual, frenetically privatized stagnant state enterprises, and was famous for declaring, "There is no such thing as society." Merkel, on the other hand, presides over a state that spends a third of its GDP on welfare (including education), and has proved to be malleable when it comes to vital issues of state, such as the minimum wage.[1]

This paper, however, will argue that if one looks beyond the particular sets of beliefs held by the two women, their backgrounds are surprisingly similar. And this extends

[1] To form her 2007 Grand Coalition with the Social Democrats, Merkel agreed to enforce a minimum wage in some industrial sectors, despite earlier refusing to contemplate any wage floors. At the time of writing this paper, the SPD had demanded a uniform minimum wage across the German economy to ally with Merkel after the results of the 2013 Bundestag elections.

2 Allen Allport, "Mrs. Thatcher's Liberties," in *The Political Legacy of Margaret Thatcher*, ed. Stanislao Pugliese (London: Politico's, 2003), 29–40.

3 Nancy Isenson, ed., "East German Stasi Tried to Recruit Merkel as a Spy," *Deutsche Welle*, May 19, 2009, <http://www.dw.de/east-german-stasi-tried-to-recruit-merkel-as-a-spy/a-4265402>.

4 Allport, "Mrs. Thatcher's Liberties," 29–40.

far beyond the fact that both were elected three times by generally fickle and fractious electorates. Indeed, both women grew up in societies that could be seen as having lost their sheen. Thatcher came of age hunting for her scholarship to Somerville, Oxford, just as Churchill lost to the devilish Left in 1945. From her perspective, postwar Britain had become a socialist state at war with the kind of free enterprise her father's Grantham grocery store had symbolized.[2] Never content with socialism or the Communist regime, Merkel decided not to follow in the footsteps of her mother and become a teacher; she refused to funnel the propaganda of the East German regime in the classroom. A brilliant student who excelled at Russian and mathematics, Merkel would go on to get a doctoral degree in quantum chemistry, but managed to evade being recruited by the Stasi.[3]

Additionally, this paper shall focus on the evolution of these women's views on Europe by emphasizing that these powerful women were far more than just prisoners of the nation-states in which they grew up. Section One, "Freedom Fighters Under God", shall examine how the upbringing of these two women affected their eventual understanding of "freedom" for individual and states. The next chapter discusses how the women's quest for education—Thatcher's at Oxford and Merkel's at Leipzig—was a determinant of how driven and successful they became. Their adeptness at building relationships with party members, maintaining political coalitions, and garnering support to buttress their position toward Europe is covered in the third section. "Caesars Looking Outwards" aims to chronicle how these two leaders influenced European and foreign affairs in their respective tenures as premier—specifically examining the bearing of their economic policies, electoral success, and cults of personality on the process of European integration. The concluding chapter sums up the similarities in the political and personal challenges faced by these women, and how these experiences led them to influence the histories of their countries and of Europe.

FREEDOM FIGHTERS, UNDER GOD

The British historian Alan Allport, writing a decade after Thatcher's fall from power, asserted that there were really two sides to the icon of liberal capitalism.[4] The first was a Millian Margaret (in reference to John Stuart Mill), prizing the individual as his own autonomous unit, deserving and needing freedom from the overarching state. The second was the High-Tory Burkeian Margaret (a la Edmund Burke), striving to preserve the "morality" upon which the British society she knew depended for its character. Millian Margaret

denationalized public industries, dismantled monopolies and sold council houses. Burkeian Margaret toughened divorce laws, wanted the BBC to be more patriotic in its programming, and opposed increasing rights for homosexuals. A Millian Margaret who sought an individualized, society thus coexisted with the Burkeian Margaret who idolized the Britain of her youth—a country moored in Victorian and Georgian values.[5] This paper contends that the reason for this duality in Thatcher's ideas of individual freedom lies in her religious background growing up in Grantham of the 1930s.

The decade of the Thirties was not a glorious time for Britain or its inhabitants. The Empire's economic and political superiority was at an end: families lined up in "dollar queues" during the depression, and Chamberlain's appeasement policies had failed to stem the Nazi regime in a resurgent, menacing Germany. Margaret Roberts, however, remembered her childhood in Grantham as being an "idyllic blur."[6] Her father, Alfred Roberts, was the archetypal small entrepreneur, a specialist grocer who was a devout Methodist. From very early on in her life, Thatcher was instructed about the benefits of the liberty of economic exchange; her father's store saw Indian rice, Kenyan coffee, and Caribbean sugar make their way to English breakfast tables. The spirit of free enterprise was complemented by a culture of charity and self-denial intricately linked to the Roberts family's faith. Thatcher's early life was as much about helping out in the grocery shop as it was about chapel, Sunday school, civic organizations, and private charity. She was convinced by her father that Adam Smith's theory of the Invisible Hand ensured that ultimately, the free trade of goods and services would lead to the betterment of both society and marketplace.[7] It was because of this conviction that the Millian and Burkeian sides of Margaret Thatcher the freedom fighter were able to coexist.

The nationalization, public overspending, and punitive taxation that would come to define the postwar British economy outraged both the Millian and Burkeian sides of the future baroness. She saw how the expanding role of the government ate away at the entrepreneurial activities of communities such as her relatively depression-sheltered Grantham locality. Thatcher watched her political mentor Edward Heath feebly try to stand up to striking miners, and disastrously call for an election that resulted in a hung house in February 1974; these events would only set the stage for Labour to win in a rematch later that year. In addition to the decline of economic liberty, what struck Thatcher was the rapid erosion of the morals that had bound her childhood community together.[8] Official records available from the Home Office show that 234,372 crimes were recorded in England and Wales in 1935, while 2,105,631 crimes occurred in 1975.[9] Hence,

5 Ibid.

6 Margaret Thatcher, *The Path to Power,* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 118.

7 Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years,* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 11.

8 Allport, 29–40.

9 United Kingdom Office for National Statistics (online data tables).

10   Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks
      by President Obama and Chancel-
      lor Merkel in an Exchange of Toasts,"
      The White House, June 7, 2011, <http://
      www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
      office/2011/06/07/remarks-president-
      obama-and-chancellor-merkel-
      exchange-toasts>.

11   Stefan Kornelius, *Angela Merkel: The
      Authorized Biography,* (Richmond:
      Alma Books, 2013), 76.

12   Ibid., 77.

13   Ibid., 19.

in fighting for freedom from the destructive government Leviathan, Thatcher indulged her Millian sympathies for individual freedom, and held fast to her Burkeian notions of morality and social order.

Just as Thatcher grew up seeing the shackles of a socialist state weigh down on capitalist Britain, so too did Merkel see an iron-fisted one-party regime rule a portion of her divided country for thirty-five years. However, while Thatcher emphasized the importance of lifting socialist restrictions, Merkel never mentioned freedom for most of her political career. In the Western world, much of the attention on her after her repeated election to the office of Chancellor has focused on her East German background. Even President Obama mentioned it at length while bestowing the Presidential Medal of Freedom upon her.[10] However, characteristically, Merkel regards freedom and values to be personal, rather than political matters, and made it a point earlier in her career not to belabor her East German background. It wasn't till 2000 that, after becoming CDU chairman, she even mentioned freedom in her speeches. In 2003, she defined freedom as ". . . the joy of achievement, the flourishing of the individual, the celebration of difference, the rejection of mediocrity, personal responsibility."[11] The best illustration of this separation of Merkel's personal story and her role as Chancellor is best shown by her response to pleas from Yulia Tymoshenko's daughter. The younger Tymoshenko tried to reference Merkel's background opposing Communist rule while asking for German help in securing the former Ukrainian Prime Minister's release. Merkel felt manipulated: she declined to intervene, putting her role as German Chancellor ahead of any personal affinities.[12]

Merkel may be different from Thatcher in that she doesn't make freedom a cornerstone of her oratory or public image. However, this cannot obscure the great extent to which Merkel felt alienated from the GDR while growing up. A pastor's daughter, she always lived in a world that was more cut off and free from the overwhelming propaganda that most East Germans were immersed in. She would later claim that the family almost never watched East German television except the sports programs, while surreptitiously watching West German television. She knew the names in the Western German cabinet by heart, and heard about the election of Gustav Heinemann as President of the Federal Republic on a transistor radio while hiding in her school's bathroom. She chose to study physics because it was a subject that gave her the most opportunity as an East German woman for self-betterment and travel.[13]

Just as Thatcher never forgot the lessons Alfred Roberts taught her in his grocery store, Merkel could never ignore the

profound sense of loss she had felt when the Berlin Wall was erected on August 13, 1961. The Kasners—Angela, her parents, her brother and sister—were returning along with Merkel's Hamburg-based maternal grandmother from a holiday in Bavaria that very day. They noticed the barbed wire and soldiers—it was to be the grandmother's last holiday with the family.[14] The separation of her family, a plight shared by many Germans, was the reason Merkel would never identify with the new East German state. It was this lack of identification that taught her when to keep quiet and avoid being sucked into the orbit of the all-powerful socialist state. When the Stasi came to enlist her, she pretended to be frank and "confided" in them that she had a hard time keeping secrets. A career in the Communist secret service skillfully dodged, Merkel went on to travel throughout Europe as part of her quantum chemistry research. We can see here the East German origin of Merkel's generally reticent operating style. "...Learning when to keep quiet was a great advantage in the GDR period," she would say. "It was one of our survival strategies."

Both Thatcher and Merkel hence grew up as conscientious dissenters, with their countries being ruled during their childhood by political dispensations each found repugnant. Thatcher would always think of herself as the grocer's daughter battling the socialist establishment, and Merkel saw herself as a victim of German partition opposing Communist rule over her nation. Though reticent and more circumspect, Merkel too would find her political journey to be informed by her formative experiences growing up in the Communist GDR.

RAYS OF REBELLION

The young Margaret Roberts and Angela Kasner were also deeply affected by their families' emphasis on the importance of education. Thatcher would recall in her memoir *The Downing Street Years* that dancing and other frivolities were frowned upon in the Roberts household, and Sundays were meant exclusively for religious thought and discussions.[15] Even knitting and sewing were taboo. With most avenues of childish frivolity shut off by her parsimonious and religious father, Margaret saw herself working constantly, whether at the grocery store or proving herself on scholarship at the Tony Kesteven and Grantham Girls' School. One of the main motivations for Thatcher's aspirations for higher education and a shot at Oxbridge was the desire not to end up like her mother Beatrice, who was committed to a life of housework.[16]

Thatcher applied to Somerville College, Oxford, to read chemistry, and though initially unsuccessful, was accepted when a student dropped out of the program. Her tutor at the college was Dorothy Hodgkin, still the only British woman

14   Ibid.

15   Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 11.

16   Robin Harris, "Margaret Thatcher's Family: The mother Maggie pitied—and the sister she left behind…and the puritanical father who wouldn't pay for an inside loo and banned her from playing snakes and ladders on Sunday," *The Daily Mail*, April 15, 2013, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2309623/Margaret-Thatchers-family-The-puritanical-father-wouldnt-pay-inside-loo.html>.

17 Daniel Weinbrin, "Oxford may have snubbed Margaret Thatcher—but higher education owes her a debt," *The Telegraph*, April 9, 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/universitye-ducation/9980159/Oxford-may-have-snubbed-Margaret-Thatcher-but-higher-education-owes-her-a-debt.html>.

18 Thatcher would ultimately have her revenge, though—her foundation's £2 million gift to establish a center for entrepreneurship went to Cambridge, as did her private papers.

to ever win the Nobel Prize for chemistry. Thatcher would eventually claim she regretted having studied chemistry, telling friends that a degree in law would have better prepared her for the political career she always wanted. Yet the tutelage of Hodgkin would still hold importance, as Thatcher was given the opportunity to conduct research on X-ray crystallography. The three years Thatcher spent working at chemical industries after graduating personally exposed her to the industrial world she was to later shape. Thatcher eventually left the field of chemistry to pass the bar in 1953—six years before she took the plunge in elections for Parliament.

Thatcher's time at Oxford shaped her in two important ways. Firstly, coming from a modest background—her puritan father refused to be "excessive" and spend on indoor plumbing—she was now confronted with legions of upper-middle class, professionalist peers. The ability to blend in with those more privileged than her, and to indeed thrive in such an alien environment, becoming, for example, the first president of the Oxford University Conservative Association, would serve her well in her later political career. Surely, the success she enjoyed in the male-dominated circles of Oxford prepared her for the challenges she would face in her rapid ascent in the equally patriarchal and posh upper echelons of the Conservative Party.

The second way in which her time at Oxford shaped Thatcher's premiership was via the insight she gained into the workings of higher education. Her stint as a chemist and researcher had imbued her with a sense of pragmatism, and thus scientific research would have to prove its usefulness as a major criterion for why it should receive government funding. Alas, Thatcher's priorities primarily lied elsewhere. When she was education secretary in 1976, the UK cut public education funding in exchange for a bailout by the International Monetary Fund. In 1981, as Prime Minister, Thatcher gave universities a month to make across-the-board reductions amounting to 18 percent of operating budgets. Academic posts were eliminated, student grants reduced, and the process for tenure removed. Thatcher's biggest change to scientific education, however, was something no previous premier had thought of—she made government funding of scientific research selective, picking and choosing between "basic" and "applied" research activities.[17] Thatcher could do this since she was not an outsider to the world of science. Yet despite her academic background, Thatcher would ironically have a tenuous relation with left-leaning academia. Oxford would eventually refuse to grant her the customary honorary degree in 1985—the first such snub to any Prime Minister to have graduated from the university.[18]

Angela Merkel delved even deeper into the academic hierarchy than Thatcher, going on to write a doctoral thesis in

quantum chemistry. Just as Thatcher's Oxford connection put her in a league radically different from her humble Grantham origins, Merkel's study of physics at Leipzig helped her secure a comfortable position for herself within East German society. Excelling in her academics at both Leipzig and the Berlin Academy of Sciences, Merkel soon realized how her field of study meant she had certain extra liberties. For instance, she was able to travel far more than the ordinary citizen. Merkel made several journeys to the Heyrovsky Institute at Prague to conduct research, and participated in exchange programs with the Soviet Union.

However, this constant travel also further bred Merkel's sense of discrete rebellion against the socialist system. After only being allowed to travel in groups and for official purposes, she decided to take a risk and try breaking the rules. In 1982, Merkel embarked upon a hitchhiking trip through southern Russia and the Caucuses—a journey that took her all the way to Azerbaijan. When confronted by police, Merkel would oftentimes use her formidable command over the Russian language to help her group steer clear of trouble. This sense of rebellion sometimes became potentially quite risky; on a trip to Poland, she picked up propaganda material issued by the trade union Solidarity.[19] Being caught with this by the Stasi would have landed her in an extremely unenviable position, with charges of treason and criminal punishment a real possibility.

Merkel's exposure to the grimy Communist world deeply informed her yearning to visit West Germany, a place she had not seen since the erection of the Berlin Wall. In 1986, she finally received the requisite permissions to visit Hamburg for a cousin's wedding. Observing the high-speed trains, the general cleanliness, and the palpably different sense of freedom of the West, Merkel says she knew then that socialism was never going to last.[20] Hence, the opportunities afforded to Merkel by her higher education were transformative for her political resolve, just as Thatcher's Oxbridge connection allowed her to occupy positions of power and forge an indomitable will.

COUPS AND COMPROMISES

A story widely told in London toward the end of Margaret Thatcher's tenure describes a dinner meeting of her cabinet at the Savoy. The waiter asked Mrs. Thatcher what she wanted for appetizers. "A shrimp cocktail," she reportedly said. The main course? "Beef Wellington." The potatoes? "Mashed." And how about the vegetables? "Oh," Mrs. Thatcher replied, "they'll take care of themselves."[21]

Margaret Thatcher adopted a style of governing that was almost Presidential in its separation of prime ministerial

19 Kornelius, 28.

20 Isenson, "East German Stasi tried to recruit Merkel as a spy," 2009.

21 Bruce Dessau, "Margaret Thatcher had the last laugh in comedy," *The Guardian,* April 10, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2013/apr/10/margaret-thatcher-launched-thousand-comedy-careers>.

22   Shirley, Williams."Shirley Williams: How Margaret Thatcher Changed Britain," *The Independent,* April 8, 2013. <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/shirley-williams-how-margaret-thatcher-changed-britain-8564673.html>.

23   Michael Genovese, "Margaret Thatcher: Revised, Revisited, Re-examined, and Reappraised," in *The Political Legacy of Margaret Thatcher,* ed. Stanislao Pugliese (London: Politico's, 2003): 368-393.

24   Shirley, Williams. "Shirley Williams: How Margaret Thatcher Changed Britain," April 8, 2013.

power from the authority of cabinet and Parliament. By all accounts, she resented the collegial model of cabinet government, wanting less of a cabinet and more of an "echo-chamber," as many alleged.[22] But this single-minded assault on the traditional method of governance and Prime Ministerial limitations was not born overnight: its origins lied in Thatcher's ascent in the patriarchal Conservative party.

It was only through an extraordinary confluence of circumstances in the aftermath of the World War II that Thatcher and Thatcherism came to power. The Conservative party, after its humiliating drubbing at the polls in 1945, was forced to assent to trade unions, and their demands for social services in health and education. The party's weakness would persist for the next 30 years, as the government could do little to rule over labor unions. It was in these dire economic straits, with the dogged resistance of labor unions holding back sorely needed economic reforms, that the British political system saw the emergence of Thatcher . In addition to a slow postwar recovery, the "sick man of Europe" had failed to produce a "true" Conservative who could challenge Heath (who is this?). But as financial woes continued, and labor unrest broke out during the Callaghan administration, Thatcher was virtually handed the keys of 10 Downing Street.[23]

Gender, however, would be an essential part of Thatcher's dealings with both her Conservative colleagues and Labor opponents. In fact, had Thatcher been a man, she may have even been less successful in her political-savvy. Most of Thatcher's political friends and foes were men educated at posh English public schools, individuals unaccustomed to dealing with women in powerful positions. In some sense, Thatcher was a "political cross-dresser," selectively choosing when to use her femininity toward political aims; this strategy disconcerted male politicians. For instance, France's President Mitterand found Thatcher attractive, and would bring her flowers at each of their meetings.[24] Thatcher was not too shy to marshal her feminine appeal to connect with male foreign leaders, or browbeat domestic opponents either. "Mrs. Thatcher is more difficult for me to oppose," said Neil Kinnock, Labour leader. "I've got however much I try to shrug it off an innate courtesy towards women that I simply do not have towards men."[25] Thatcher's role as Britain's first female prime minister even created an entire "-ism" after Thatcher—an honor even Sir Winston Churchill did not enjoy.

Gender, along with a few other factors, was also integral to rise of Angela Merkel. At first glance, it would seem incongruous for Merkel, a Protestant woman from East Germany, to cement any hold on the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which was a patriarchal Catholic party based in the South. However, it was precisely her belonging to these religious, gender, and geographic categories that enabled her

to be seen as a "party-manager," along the lines of Chancelors Adenauer and Kohl. In fact, CDU documents from at least the 1950s showed lists of prospective candidates for party committees actively looking for "Protestant women" to be included. Merkel's reputation as a non-sectarian figure who never overly identified with any particular strain within the party further helped her case.[26] Moreover, when Kohl was forming his cabinet after the 1990 elections following reunification, he faced a quandary over including East Germans in his cabinet. 400,000 Easterners—a full 4 percent of the GDR adult population—had worked for the Stasi. Hence, finding qualified East Germans for cabinet posts was a challenge for the first chancellor of reunified Germany. Merkel was appointed Minister of Women and Youth, one of three easterners appointed to the cabinet and the only one to stay in her position for the entire tenure.[27]

One of Merkel's colleagues once commented that "Angela Merkel could have been assigned to the Bat Ministry of the United Nations and she would have made something out of it."[28] Indeed, as Minister of Women and Youth, Merkel made an immense impression on Kohl, who became her political mentor. She was appointed as Environment Minister during his next tenure, from 1994 to 1998. Like Thatcher, Merkel was plucked out of obscurity by a male political mentor and at first assigned ministries that somehow related to women. Thatcher was Education Secretary, Merkel Minister for Women and Youth. And just like Thatcher, Merkel paved her own path to power by becoming the person to fell that same mentor. Just as Thatcher challenged Heath to win the leadership of the Conservative Party, Merkel became the first CDU leader to denounce Kohl publicly after a campaign finance scandal.

Thatcher and Merkel had much more in common when it came to their intraparty policies than having to topple former male mentor en route to party leadership. Gender was both relevant and irrelevant for both of them—it helped them get spotted and nominated, surely, but took a backseat when they performed well at ministerial, party leader and eventually prime ministerial or chancellor levels. In dealing with predominantly male colleagues, they may have had different approaches—Thatcher famously always surrounded herself only with men, while Merkel has many women in her inner core of advisers—but a common theme in these was their use of the fact that they were historical anomalies. The grocer's barrister daughter knew she could get the Conservative grandees in a spot, and the female physicist born to an East German pastor recognized her utility to the Christian Democrats—and they made full use of this.

25 Gail Sheehy, "The Blooming of Margaret Thatcher," *Vanity Fair,* June 1989, <http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/1989/06/margaret-thatcher-198906>.

26 Sarah Williarty, *The CDU and the Politics of Gender in Germany: Bringing Women to the Party,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 168.

29 Ronald Butt, "Mrs. Thatcher: The First Two Years," *The Sunday Times*, May 3, 1981, <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104475>.

30 Data courtesy Britain's Office of National Statistics.

31 United Kingdom Department for Business Innovation and Skills, "Trade Union Membership 2012: Statistical Bulletin," May 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/299291/bis-13-p77-trade-union-membership-2012-corrrection.pdf>.

32 Mike Ridley, "Margaret Thatcher 1925-2013: How she bashed miners and the unions but backed yuppies," *The Mirror,* April 9, 2013, <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/margaret-thatcher-dead-how-bashed-1819966>.

CAESARS LOOKING OUTWARDS

Thatcher entered office with a clear set of policy directives seeking to break the post-war consensus she so despised: a monetarist approach to tackle the astronomical levels on inflation under Labour rule; cuts across the board in excessive public spending; and the denationalization (or, as her government called it, "reprivatization") of the public industries that had become economic white elephants. The role of economic policy in achieving Thatcher's political goals thus cannot be overstated. "Economics are the method," she once said. "The object is to change the soul."[29]

What must be noted, of course, is that for all the messianic rhetoric, Conservative policies did not always match up to Thatcher's political demagoguery. Initially, inflation shot up drastically, reaching double digits (10.3 percent) in 1979 just a month after Thatcher became Prime Minister. Two years later, it was 11.7 percent. However, a series of steps taken by her government to control the interest rates would tame inflation through the eighties, keeping it at 2-5 percent. Moreover, public spending was also cut, but not as drastically as popular culture then may have led one to believe; from 44.6 percent of GDP in 1979, it fell to only 38.9 percent by 1990. The composition of this expenditure, however, changed from housing, education, and public transportation to increased defense and law and order spending.[30]

Thatcherism's economic impact was also seen on many other fronts. Privatization in the 1980s led to the sale of assets in key industries like British Petroleum, Rolls Royce, and British Steel. The labor strikes that had paralyzed the Heath and Callaghan administrations were defeated by Thatcher and her unwavering resolve; after her administration bought eighteen months' worth of coal in advance, Thatcher was able to wait out a bruising year-long coal miners strike, and hence recorded a massive victory over the most powerful trade union in Britain. In 1979, there were 13.2 million members of British trade unions, a number that decreased to just 9.8 million by 1990.[31] Thatcher's "Big Bang" reforms thus ensured a boom that would run through the 1980s, and even created a new class of young, Thatcherite upwardly mobile entrepreneurs—the "yuppies."[32]

The creed of Thatcher's economic policy at Britain stemmed from her childhood distaste for the postwar consensus: the overreaching state stifling entrepreneurship in favor of the "greater good." This motivation cannot be understated in examining Thatcher's policies applied toward the wider Western European theater. Central to Thatcher's embrace of the European Community was her distaste for another institution: the British Commonwealth. Thatcher

saw the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as the "enemy from within," and did not want British policy to be dictated by those she thought were more interested in the welfare of other nations.[33] Foreign aid was cut dramatically during her administration, and her opposition to the Commonwealth would reportedly bring her into conflict with her only boss—the Queen (Head of the Commonwealth).[34]

In dealing with the larger European community, Thatcher was a pragmatist, utilizing European institutions to pursue British national interests. After all, growing up in the 1930s had taught her how appeasement politics could wreak havoc on a country's foreign policy. In 1981, Thatcher lobbied for the inclusion of Southern European countries—Spain, Portugal, and Greece—in order to counteract the influence of a powerful French-German coalition. Following this victory, she hammered through a deal at European Council meetings at Stuttgart and Fontainebleau in 1983-84: Value Added Tax (VAT) ceilings were severed from budgetary discipline and Britain would no longer be overburdened by imbalances in the European budget. Perhaps no other policy victory was as significant, however, as Thatcher's swift and outright condemnation of Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands. Under her authority, Britain's foreign services became free to pressurize the Americans and the United Nations.[35]

Thatcher was equally adept at selecting Europe as her primary focus in foreign policy, even overruling American objections. The Community's 1980 Venice Declaration on the Middle East, which sought to expand the peace process started at Camp David and recognize the rights of Palestinians as well as Israelis, did not go down well with the US. Thatcher was also not averse to a European foreign policy, and certainly permitted the Europeanization of many aspects of British decision-making on global issues. This was helped by European solidarity supporting Britain on several occasions during her premiership: the Community condemned the American invasion of Bermuda in 1983,[36] and opposed American attempts to extend US domestic law to British companies selling technology to the Soviet Union.

Thatcher is best known for her falling out with the European Union, and this too can be traced back to her personal ideology. In 1985, Thatcher's Britain sided with Greece to adamantly oppose the Dooge Committee recommendations incorporated in the Single European Act—which replaced unanimous consent with the idea of qualified majorities; unfortunately, she was to be completely outvoted by countries wishing to speed up the decision-making process in the community.[37] This is much like her dislike for popular subsidies and programs that were desirable for a multitude of people, but in the way of individual freedom and choice. Similarly, the concept of qualified majorities may have

33   Sue Cameron, "Whitehall shouldn't risk losing its memory," *The Telegraph*, April 3, 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/margaret-thatcher/9969589/Whitehall-shouldnt-risk-losing-its-memory.html>.

34   Queen Elizabeth II has made the Commonwealth her single-largest focus in foreign affairs, devoting an enormous portion of her time and energy over the past 60 years to its development as an international institution. On her 21st birthday, even while George VI was still on the throne, she declared in South Africa: "I declare before you all that my whole life whether it be long or short shall be devoted to your service and the service of our great imperial family to which we all belong."

35   David Allen, "British Foreign Policy and West European Co-operation," *In British Foreign Policy Under Thatcher*, ed. Peter Byrd, (Oxford: P. Allan, 1988), 35-53.

36   The invasion was a rather ignoble chapter in the Special Relationship between the United States and Britain—the Queen is still technically the Head of State of Grenada.

37   Subroto Roy, and John Clarke, eds, *Margaret Thatcher's Revolution Revised Edition: How It Happened and What It Meant,* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005).

38   Ibid.

39   Kornelius, 208

40   Ibid., 210.

been appealing to most countries, but Thatcher saw it as a dangerous move that would threaten Britain's ability to block moves that would damage its national and strategic interests.[38] However, much like her political career in Britain, she managed to make the best of being in an unpopular position, and used her negotiation skills to temper opposing opponents' plans. She used her proven abilities of coalition-building and "hand bagging", honed through a lifetime of dealing with powerful male colleagues, to push through British initiatives like the internal European market and increased cooperation in defense and security policy.

It is a tradition of the modern European Union that the head of government of the presiding country address the European Parliament at Strasbourg. When France held the presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy made a subtle change in the parliament hall before speaking. The head of government is supposed to wait in a seat before being called to the speaker's lectern, and like every other seat in the hall it is numbered. Sarkozy did not like the fact that he was sitting in a chair numbered "2", and so he had the number erased from the chair.[39]

Angela Merkel could not care less for numbers and appearances on such occasions; after her training as a theoretical physicist, she tended to focus much more on the facts and arguments she needed to impress upon fellow European heads of state. Delivering her presidential address on January 17, 2007, Merkel stated:

> "The heart and soul of Europe is tolerance. Europe is the continent of tolerance. It has taken us centuries to understand this. On the road to tolerance we have had to live through many disasters. We have persecuted and annihilated one another. We have laid our own country waste. [. . .] The worst period of hatred, devastation and destruction happened not even a generation ago. It was done in the name of my people."[40]

Merkel's experiences behind the Iron Curtain ingrained in her not just an insistence for tolerance to be a hallmark of modern Europe; it also made her envision "Europe" beyond a Franco-German reconciliation project. Indeed, the only way she ever viewed Europe for the first 35 years of her life was as an outsider, an East German. In 1990, after reunification, she saw how the introduction of the West German *deutschemark* at a ratio of 1 for 2 East German equivalents devastated the economy, flooding the market with cheaply produced western products. After watching German farmers burn their produce in the fields and the impact of the EC-subsidized West German imports, Merkel saw a very different side of Europe from Kohl and his contemporaries. To her, Franco-German relations were not the center of Europe; Merkel was not from an area geo-

graphically close to France, and thus did not have the "barrier obsession" of Adenauer or Kohl.[41] What Europe was to her was a beacon of freedom, tolerance and the ability to maximize potential—in sum, all the things denied to her by the regime of the German Democratic Republic. Merkel hence was the German Chancellor that an expanded EU of 27 countries needed: someone who could appreciate the enormous change the downfall of Communism had brought to the eastern part of the continent.

This keen sense of freedom was perhaps Merkel's guide when she led the European response to the financial crisis that broke out in 2008. Even though France, Greece, and several international economists opposed her proposal for budget cuts in southern Europe, the heads of state for Eastern European and Baltic countries supported her. They too thought that after the debt cuts—such as the deal reducing Greece's debt from 160 percent of GDP to 120 percent—and the reductions to government spending, the southern Europeans would still have a higher standard of living than them. Merkel saw the crisis through East European eyes: she did not want to see the dismemberment of another system, and neither did the Poles and other central Europeans who supported her.[42] Merkel hence vigorously opposed the proposed "Eurobonds" that would pool sovereign bonds from across the EU and stem the flight of funds from discredited Greek, Italian and Portuguese government bonds. She refused to countenance the idea that the productivity of Germany and northern Europe should continue to fund the lifestyles of the southern countries.

In opposing these proposals, Merkel relied on her analytical, physicist approach to problem solving. She would become famous in Brussels for her bright, well-illustrated charts, which showed data such as the widely varying unit debts and labor productivity of different countries, and the stability of the Euro over the past ten years. And just as Thatcher "got [Britain's] money back," Merkel would seek to renegotiate offers from European allies that asked too much of Berlin's resources. Hence, the recommendations of Council president Van Rumpoy, highly favoring Eurobonds, were dismissed outright by Merkel.[43]

Merkel's vision for the future of the EU lied in something she termed as a "stability union", an idea built upon four pillars: a common financial policy, a common fiscal policy, a common economic policy, and greater democratic control and authority. Achieving the first two was straightforward; Europe standardized its financial regulatory responses to failed banks, and Merkel's "fiscal compact," agreed upon by the heads of state of Europe in 2012, set limitations on federal budgets across Europe. However, it was the third pillar that was revolutionary. How could member states be prevented

41 Ibid., 203.

42 Ibid., 228.

43 Ibid., 255.

44   Ibid., 253

45   Ibid., 255

46   "Germany rules out using reserves or SDRs to boost," *Reuters*, November 7, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/07/eurozone-germany-reserves-idUSL6E7M71R020111107>.

47   Ibid., 221.

from diverging from the common fiscal policy envisaged in the second pillar? In response to this issue, Merkel wished to empower a European authority that would enable economic policy across the union, and have appreciably wide-ranging powers. However, Merkel clarified she did not want the European Commission to have more powers. This led to her fourth pillar—the one on democratic accountability, which translated into greater powers for the European Parliament. This would mark a fundamental change in the operations of the EU.[44]

Merkel hence views the EU's function in two concurrent steps—the creation of a more democratic Brussels center, and the empowerment of nation-states to be meaningful stakeholders in strengthening the Union. In 2011, Europe experienced the rebirth of the nation-state, as countries in the north and south, east and west squabbled over conflicting economic policies and burdens in resolving the crisis. Merkel also believed that the Brussels elite had become arrogant in their belief that they were the real embodiment of the EU; many of them had cast national governments as retrograde provincial fiefs. Her "stability union," she thought, would provide a fine balancing act between a more democratic Brussels and a more constructive set of nation-states.[45] Merkel demonstrated the firmness of her conviction in a more democratic basis for European actions when she rejected a IMF proposal to raise money for bailouts; had it passed, the plan would have mortgaged the gold held by national banks. German law makes it *illegal* to go anywhere near the gold reserves in the country, so Merkel emerged as the strongest critic of the IMF plan. Withstanding criticism from economists and leaders from across the world—including President Obama—Merkel steadfastly refused to mortgage Germany's gold.[46] She would not let a common economic policy trump national laws and self-interests, as the crucial fourth pillar of her ideal "stability union", democratic accountability, was completely missing from this proposition.

Additionally, Merkel's experiences as "party-manager" in the CDU prepared her well for the diplomacy she would have to master during her response to the Eurozone crisis. Her relationship with Nicolas Sarkozy was the primary example of this. Merkel and Sarkozy could not have been more different—he was the sage voice of facts and reason, he the hyperactive bundle of French pizzazz and energy. In his first state visit to Berlin as President, Sarkozy refused to step out of his car and walk to the waiting Chancellor. Merkel stood her ground; the French President would eventually have to walk up to her.[47] This first meeting typified Merkel's firm handling of relationships with her French counterpart, whom she impressed in the next few months with her clear grasp on the emerging facts of the crisis. Merkel managed to convince

Sarkozy that cuts would have to be made in his government's budget. Even the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)—one of the centerpieces of the EU's attempt to provide credible infusions of liquidity into markets—was a result of the political relationship between these two radical leaders, a decision made after a sunset walk on the beach at Deauville.[48]

CONCLUSION

Thatcher and Merkel both belonged to backgrounds that made them unlikely and atypical choices for leaders, both of their patriarchal parties and their countries. Their common background in a religious setting with devout parents in-grained in them a ferocity of conviction: Thatcher's against the postwar "socialist" consensus, and Merkel's against the legitimacy of the East German state. Their convictions would lead them on quests for self-betterment through education; Thatcher would equip herself with a degree from the bastion of the upper class that she would later be accused of favoring, but to which she never had belonged. This would allow her to jumpstart a career in law and public life, and gain entry to the upper echelons of the Conservative Party. Merkel studied physics, a subject that enabled her to enjoy far greater freedoms and privileges than the ordinary GDR citizen; these travels and experiences would bolster her moral opposition to the regime, and allow her to be seen as a suitable pick for cabinets in reunified Germany.

Gender is a tricky subject for both these premiers, as each seemed to step in and out of their femininity at will. There is no denying that gender helped them initially in their careers—the Conservatives gave an untested Thatcher cabinet secretarial positions, and the CDU was impressed by the "triple-quota" Merkel filled (East German, Protestant and a woman). However, over time, their personalities as a whole became election issues, with gender just part of that personality. Hugo Young, writing in the *Guardian* before the 1987 election, wrote how the Prime Minister's personality was the main plank on which the national election was being fought: " ... although it may occasionally be right not to discuss the intellectual and moral weaknesses, the hypocrisy and the private character, of one politician or another, the only consequence of foreswearing an analysis of Mrs. Thatcher's personality would be grossly to misrepresent both the past and the future politics of the country."[49] 2013 would see the German elections revolve around the personality and politics of Chancellor Merkel. CDU posters showed the most famous German in the world in her typical pose, hands crossed in the form of a rhombus, a sign of stability and reassurance in a turbulent world.[50] In 1987, as in 2013, these approaches worked;

48 Steven Erlanger, "Europe's Odd Couple," *New York Times*, January 13, 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/magazine/16MerkelSarkozy-t.html?pagewanted=all>.

49 Hugo Young, and Ion Trewin, *The Hugo Young Papers: Thirty Years of British Politics—off the Record*, (London: Allen Lane, 2008).

50 "Angela Merkel: A safe pair of hands,"
The Economist, September 14, 2013,
<http://www.economist.com/news/
briefing/21586299-perceptions-
germanys-chancellor-who-likely-win-re-
election-september-22nd-are>.

51 Kornelius, 225.

both women were respectable premiers, and at the ballot box, their millions of constituents preferred them to their shaky, untested alternatives.

With Thatcher, and increasingly with Merkel, one aspect cannot be ignored: the divisiveness, polarization, and controversy that accompany the mention of their name. Thatcher's administration saw mass unemployment and riots, which even led to clashes between striking miners and the police. The Prime Minister who famously stated, "There is no such thing as society" truly did shake up British society during her rule. While some of her economic achievements were unquestionable successes, many are highly debatable; yet the fundamental reason that the Thatcher years continue to be divisive is the choice they presented between an American-style individualistic society and "traditional" British community living. Merkel has been able to be controversial on an even larger scale, as her policies now affect an entire continent (as she said, "European Union policy is domestic policy"). At Deauville, for instance, as she was debating the ESM with President Sarkozy, she suggested a punitive clause for member states that refused to honor its provisions, even proposing a loss of voting rights. This was rejected immediately at meetings of country representatives, who saw the withdrawal of any democratic rights immensely troubling. This gained her numerous unflattering sobriquets from across Europe, including the moniker of the "European Thatcher." When she visited Athens at the peak of the crisis, the entire central area of the city had to be cordoned off— it was almost as if the U.S. President were visiting Iran.[51]

The background that has guided the policies of these women has decided their personal triumphs and importance. Born on the fringes of political life, they both took the center by storm, and in having their policies, politics and, personalities validated by the electorate three times each, they ensured their spots among the great statesmen of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In safeguarding growth and warding off decline, they showed themselves to be true patriots. In their differing attitudes toward Europe, they showed the influence of these backgrounds and contributions toward the political life of their nations on their idea of a model of European integration and cooperation. In reaching the highest corridors of power in London, Berlin and Brussels, these outsiders became the insiders known today to people across the world. And yet these two leaders never lost the intuitions and experiences that their lives as outsiders taught them. With Thatcher having been given a funeral at Westminster Abbey and Merkel cruising along in what will be her last term as Chancellor, history is sure to record the lives of these outsiders in golden letters.

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The 'Modern Galahad' and the 'Apostle of *Kultur*'

Representations of the East African Campaign and the Imperial Gendering of British War Culture, 1914–1918

MATTHEW HERSHEY

1   See Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, *14–18: Understanding the Great War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000): 94–100; Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914* (New York: Vintage, 1987): 161; Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1962): 310–311. The collapse of the socialist Second International into its national components provides good illustration. See Marc Ferro, *The Great War: 1914–1918* (New York: Routledge, 1973): 38–43; James Joll, *The Second International, 1889–1914* (New York: Praeger, 1956).

2   Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14–18, 94–95. See also: J. M. Bourne, *Britain and the Great War, 1914–1918* (New York: Edward Arnold, 1989): 227; Jeffrey Verhey, *The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Benjamin Ziemann, *War Experiences in Rural Germany, 1914–1923* (New York: Berg, 2007): 15–28.

3   Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *14–18*, 97.

4   For an explication of the 'crusade' theme and war culture, see Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *14–18*, 92–174.

Although Kiboriani and Buigiri were called "Women's Camp," the [German military] man placed in charge of them was quite unfit to have the charge of ladies. His morals were bad. He was habitually rude to everybody, and frequently shouted at ladies in an insulting manner as if they were natives. If going away on a journey, he would order some of the ladies to pack his boxes for him.

He constantly flogged natives (soldiers, boys, and others) in the concentration camp, right in front of the ladies, which caused them much mental distress.

He nearly always gave his orders to both men and ladies through a native soldier, which gave them the opportunity to be insolent to us, and degraded us in their eyes.

— SWORN STATEMENT BY FORMER PRISONER JOHN H. BRIGGS (10 NOVEMBER 1916)

When the First World War broke out in the summer of 1914, a degree of genuine enthusiastic nationalism swept over Europe.[1] Throughout the belligerent nations, small handfuls of fervent urban crowds, while far from representing a majority view, essentially acted as a vanguard of an inchoate, but nonetheless capacious, emotional and psychological consensus of support for the war based on a perceived need to defend their respective nations.[2] In Great Britain, this consensus extended, broadly speaking, to the dominions as well, where a feeling of ethno-cultural unity and common cause with Britain overrode most other concerns.[3] But out of this vague feeling of national unity emerged something much more concrete, though still largely intangible: the meaning(s) of the struggle, just then in its infancy, which would ultimately endure through November 1918. During the early days of the war, a system of cultural interpretations solidified that defined the meaning of the war as a racial and religious "crusade" of civilization against barbarism, referred to by Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker as 'war culture.'[4] It was this war culture, which enabled the emotional and psychological mobilization of 1914 to persist through four years of war,

despite confirmation—early and often—of the true horror and destruction wrought by the conflict. In fact, Great Britain saw the single largest contingent of volunteers enlist in early September 1914, at precisely the moment when the war, in Adrien Gregory's words, "turned serious" and volunteers were overtly aware the war would not be a "picnic stroll."[5] Moreover, in Britain, even non-European campaigns in which the majority of the fighting and dying was disproportionately done by non-white troops were painted with the same war-cultural brush in representations published on the home front: a patriotically united, inherently moral, imperial Britain was at war, globally, with an innately barbaric, depraved and uncivilized German enemy.[6]

This concrete meaning of World War I as a civilizational crusade, however, did not emerge out of an ideational vacuum: it was built on pre-war definitions of the meaning of empire, what I have termed imperial culture—a cultural framework which gave (in this case the British) empire its deeper meaning(s) by defining British superiority through an imperial nationalism built on a combination of monarchism, militarism and Social Darwinism.[7] As Konrad Jarausch concisely states, prior to World War I "diffusion of imperialist sentiment infected wide circles with a powerful blend of nationalism, militarism and racism which would soon tear Europe itself apart."[8]

This was particularly true in British representations of the East African campaign, which offer unique and important insights into both war culture and imperial culture. Not only was the campaign the longest of the war, lasting from August 1914 until two weeks after the official armistice in 1918, but it was fought almost entirely by African askaris—essentially mercenaries—led by white officers on the German side, and principally by colonial and dominion troops also led by white officers on the British side.[9] In the British case, many of those white officers were not British at all, but colonials or from the dominions—particularly South Africa.[10] Further, casualties were suffered above all by the African porters who were employed and often coerced to keep the soldiers supplied, and not by the actual soldiers. David Killingray estimates that over 100,000 porters died in East Africa, principally from the disease and starvation that resulted from official neglect and incompetence.[11] By contrast, Hew Strachan puts total British losses at 3,443 killed in action and 6,558 dead from disease.[12] Officially, out of the 126,972 British troops who served in the course of the East African campaign, 11,189 died—a mortality rate of 9 percent—with total casualties reaching around 22,000.[13] Moreover, at least from a numerical standpoint, it was African and Indian soldiers that the Germans primarily faced in the campaign,[14] a fact also reflected in the mortality rates: according to Edward Paice, at least 41,000 Africans

5   Adrian Gregory, "British 'War Enthusiasm' in 1914: A Reassessment" in *Evidence, History, and the Great War: Historians and the Impact of 1914–18* ed. Gail Braybon (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003): 80. Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker make identical points: Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *14–18*, 98. See also: Ibid., 94–104; Bourne, *Britain and the Great War*, 227–229; Ferro, *The Great War*, 29–37.

6   Matthew Hershey, "Imperial Legitimation in a World at War: The British Empire, War Culture, and the East African Campaign, 1914–1918" (Master's Thesis, University of Chicago, 2014): 12-33.

7   John MacKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880–1960* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1984): 2–8, 253–256; Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914* (New York: Vintage, 1987): 70.

8   Konrad H. Jarausch, *Taming Modernity: European Experiences in the Twentieth Century* (Forthcoming): 92. Volker Berghahn makes a comparable point: Volker R. Berghahn, *Europe in the Era of Two World Wars: From Militarism and Genocide to Civil Society* (New York: Princeton University Press, 2006): 6. See also: Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005): 3.

9   The British also utilized East African askaris during the campaign; many askaris fought for both sides by the end of the war. Hew Strachan, *The First World War Volume I: To Arms* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 642.

10 There is a large body of military-historical literature about the war in Africa, particularly about the East African campaign. See: John Keegan, *The First World War* (New York: Vintage, 1998): 205–211; Strachan, *First World War*, 569–643; Ross Anderson, *The Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign, 1914–1918* (Stroud: Tempus Publishing Limited, 2004); Edward Paice, *Tip and Run: The Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007); Anne Samson, *World War I in Africa: The Forgotten Conflict Among the European Powers* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013); Anne Samson, *Britain, South Africa, and the East Africa Campaign, 1914–1918: The Union Comes of Age* (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006).

11 David Killingray, "The War in Africa" in *The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War*, ed.; Strachan, *First World War*, 642; Paice, *Tip and Run*, 392.

12 Strachan, *First World War*, 641.

13 Paice, *Tip and Run*, 392.

14   Strachan, *First World War,* 642.

15   Paice, *Tip and Run*, 392.

16   Hershey, "Imperial Legitimation," 12-33; Berghahn, *Europe in the Era of Two World Wars*; Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14–18, 102–104.

17   Hershey, "Imperial Legitimation," see especially 33–41.

18   See Berghahn, *Europe in the Era of Two World Wars*; Jarasuch, *Taming Modernity*, 69–92; Hull, *Absolute Destruction*. For an overview of the trend of studies of war and imperial cultures, see Hershey, "Imperial Legitimation," 4–6. In my earlier analysis of the war and imperial cultures relationship, gender entered marginally.

19   See Joan Wallach Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*, Revised Edition (New York: Colombia University Press, 1999): 28–50.

conscripted by the British in occupied German East Africa had died by the end of the campaign.[15] That figure is particularly striking given that the British campaign to take German East Africa did not commence until the beginning of 1916, and the territory was not fully occupied until early the following year.

These figures reflect that the very nature of the campaign necessitated that any person undertaking to represent it was forced to confront the underlying relationship between the two interpretive systems of war culture and imperial culture: war, race and empire converged in a single campaign in which the Africans themselves bore the brunt of the hardship. Somewhat ironically, but perhaps unsurprisingly, in these representations of the East African campaign, race became an *intra-European* marker of the divide between friend and enemy, civilization and barbarism, and good and evil during the First World War through a reconstruction of the pre-war imperialist racial hierarchy, as was the case throughout Europe and in representations of the war in Europe.[16]

Clearly then, this racialization of war culture—particularly in representations of the East African campaign—was distinctly imperial. It was a discourse that on the one hand used a modified form of imperial culture to demonstrate the absolute need for the united nation to defeat the racially barbaric enemy, while on the other it maintained the second-class status of non-Europeans through the more concrete continuation of the imperial racial lens. Even those non-whites fighting and dying in European armies were never represented as equals, despite the war-cultural rhetoric of racially-transcendent unity, while the defense of civilization was clearly represented as necessitating the enlargement of the empire.[17]

But the broader point here is that in order to gain a true understanding of war culture—and hence how the meaning of the Great War was perceived by those who lived it—it remains essential to fully explore its imperial roots. While recent studies have taken steps in this direction by analyzing how war culture was imperially racialized, what has remained unaddressed—and ultimately is equally important—is the fact that war culture was imperially *gendered* as well.[18] Hence, this paper examines British representations of the East African campaign, focusing specifically on the way gender functioned within these representations: What work did gender do within war culture? What does that work tell us about British understandings of the meaning(s) of World War I?

Joan Wallach Scott famously argues that *all* discourse is gendered,[19] and the contention here is similar, but more particular: traditional imperial conceptions of gender were mobilized as rhetorical weapons of war culture. They not only reinforced notions of German racial barbarity, but were integral to demarcating the lines between civilization and

barbarism more broadly, and thus to asserting and maintaining war-culture's polarized meaning of the conflict. At the same time, that war-cultural polarization bifurcated gender along national lines, making nationality—not gender per se—the core metric for assessing morality. Ann Laura Stoler argues that "[t]he very categories 'colonizer' and 'colonized' were secured through forms of sexual control that defined the domestic arrangements of Europeans and the cultural investments by which they identified themselves."[20] Similarly, in these representations sexual control (or lack thereof) and imperial gender norms were used to secure an additional categorical binary, and one which solidified the meaning of the First World War: 'ally' and 'enemy.'

WOMEN AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVILIZATION

Atrocity stories were the most integral aspect of convincing Britons at home of the racial malignancy of their German enemy,[21] and sexual crimes and crimes against women— whether real or imagined—had a long history of emotional potency as rhetorical weapons, particularly in colonial contexts; one's treatment of women was a, if not the, key marker of belonging to or separation from civilization dating back to the initial colonial conquests in the sixteenth century.[22] It is thus unsurprising that the German treatment of women functioned in this same way in representations of the East African campaign.

The most direct examples come from a September 1917 report to Parliament on the Germans' treatment of prisoners in German East Africa. The report consists of sworn statements by former prisoners who attest to the German's brutality, but focus especially on their malice towards women and non-whites, in addition to the prisoners being degraded in front of Africans. For example, according to the statement of Jas. Scott-Brown, an interned civilian, the female prisoners were "compelled to make underpants and socks for the Germans or their native soldiers, under threat of three days' confinement on bread and water," in addition to their normal duties which consisted of "sweeping out their rooms, washing their clothes, and periodical service in the kitchen, no native help being vouchsafed for them." Not only that, but during an oft-cited incident in the report, where roughly 100 prisoners were forced to stand inside a small, overcrowded shed for over a full day while they were overseen by intoxicated African guards who threatened to shoot anyone who left that shed, female prisoners suffered disproportionately: "[a]part from the physical pain and discomfort the women suffered at not being allowed to visit the lavatory when the necessity arose, they endured great mental distress at the threats and orders issued by the guard."[23]

[20] Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002): 42.

[21] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *14–18*, 100–104. See also: John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001): 175–261.

[22] See Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1995): 44–45. For the 16th century context see Louis Montrose, "The Work of Gender in the Discourse of Discovery," Representations 33 (Winter, 1991): 18.

[23] British Government, Reports on the Treatment by the Germans of British Prisoners and Natives in German East Africa (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1917): 14.

24 On this assumption, see Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge*, 62–67. Anna Davin also discussed these assumptions in regard to the cult of imperial motherhood: Anna Davin, "Imperialism and Motherhood" *History Workshop* No. 5 (Spring, 1978): 9–65.

25 The Government Committee on the Treatment by the Enemy of British Prisoners of War. *British Civilian Prisoners in German East Africa* (London: Alabaster, Passmore & Sons LTD, 1918): 16–19.

26 *Treatment by the Germans*, 30–31. Emphasis added.

27 For a summary of imperial fears of the 'Black Peril,' see Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge*, 58–61.

Thus, according to Scott-Brown, Germans not only subjected women to threats of violence and to forced labor in assistance of the German military, but they also disregarded what were considered appropriate provisions for white women living in the colonies. It is striking that Scott-Brown mentioned the dearth of 'native help' allotted for the women working in the kitchen, a clear indication of the continuation of the pre-war assumption of females' need for bourgeois surroundings and comforts in colonial settings.[24] It is also notable that the only female voice in any of the representations located during this study is an excerpt from the diary of a Miss. Dunforth, a missionary interned in the same camp as Scott-Brown, which was quoted in a second government report from 1918 (which summarized the testimonies found in the 1917 report) and recounts the incident in the shed. Her account is simply a more thorough version of Scott-Brown's testimony and contains the same lurid details. But it seems clear that this incident resonated strongly with Parliament, as it warranted not only inclusion in their 1918 summary report, but also prolonged, direct quotation from a female perspective on the episode: the quotation from her diary takes up three full pages in a report of only twenty-eight pages total length, and it seems fair to assume that any incident which took up ten percent of the report resounded to at least some extent.[25]

Similar accounts abound throughout the rest of the 1917 report. The statement of Augustine Beal Hellier recounts how at the Kiboriani prison camp "guards would enter our rooms (*even those of the ladies*) and compel the occupants to leave their beds in the afternoon," as well as several instances when "Dorrendorf [the German camp commandant] was grossly insolent to many of the ladies" by shouting at them, threatening them with "bread and water," and denying them 'native chairs' when they were forced to travel. He concluded his testimony by stating that "we did fear that the ladies might be assaulted by Dorrendorf, and Padre White and myself had formed a plan of action in such an event."[26] Hence, in addition to the numerous accounts of 'mentally distressing' threats to women and denials of 'necessary' comforts for their well-being in the colonies, in at least one instance there seems to have been a fear of a 'German Peril' led by the camp commandant, in a twist on and reconstruction of the widespread pre-war imperial fear of the 'Black Peril,' i.e. sexual assaults of white women by black men.[27]

Further, it was this atrocious behavior against those considered weak that assumed center-stage when reported directly to the public. An editorial in *The Manchester Guardian* from 25 September 1917 called the report "one of the most damning documents in the library of German dishonour" due to the "appalling evidence in these reports of malignance

displayed by some of the German officers in command of prisoners." One of the most incriminatory aspects was the treatment of women:

> The unspeakable conduct of one German officer towards the women prisoners seems to have provoked an inquiry from his superiors, but there passed without remonstrance from headquarters a sequence of brutalities which neither fear nor 'military necessity' nor anything except savagery can explain. One is driven to conclude that, whereas the best type of Englishman is to be found even in the minor branches of colonial administration, the German colonies attract mainly the worst Germans. The treatment of native prisoners was even worse.[28]

The editorial clearly represents Dorrendorf's conduct not as the exception, but as the rule: 'the worst Germans' were attracted to the colonies, and the threat of the 'German Peril' was unimpeded. The implication seems to be that it was at least tacitly condoned by the upper echelons of the German military and government. Hence, the editorial blames, at a minimum, the entire German military apparatus for the misbehavior of a single German officer, thus removing the incident and individual from their specific historical and personal contexts and reframing them as simply examples of group malfeasance. In this instance, a gendered discourse directly reinforced the notion of Germans as innately—i.e. racially—'savage,' whether they were actually perpetrating crimes against women or only tolerating those crimes.

But Germans' brutality towards women was represented in more indirect forms as well. In a collection of autobiographical vignettes of his experiences during the 1916 campaign, published in mid-1918 as *Sketches of the East African Campaign*, Captain Robert Dolbey, a surgeon in the Royal Army Medical Corps, accused the Germans of attempting to unleash the 'Black Peril' onto the colony:

> [T]here has been striking ill success on the part of the Germans in organising and inducing, in spite of their many attempts and the obvious danger to their own women and children, the native tribes to oppose our advance. Fortunately for us, and for the white women of the country, tribes will not easily combine, and are loath to leave their tribal territory.[29]

A racial lens is clearly employed: Dolbey did not feel the need to explain why black men were an 'obvious' threat to white women, likely because the trope (which is all it can be called, as there is little to no evidence of actual assaults) of the 'Black Peril' dated back to at least the 1890s.[30] Additionally, it is also clear that Africans are considered simple and uncivilized by what is implied to be their irrational attachment to their tribal territory, an illustration of their inferiority vis-à-vis the

28 "Prisoners in German East Africa." Editorial, *The Manchester Guardian,* 25 September 1917.

29 Robert V. Dolbey, *Sketches of the East Africa Campaign* (London: John Murray, 1918): 42.

30 Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge,* 58-61. See also Carina E. Ray, "Decrying White Peril: Interracial Sex and the Rise of Anticolonial Nationalism in the Gold Coast" The American Historical Review Vol. 119 No. 1 (February 2014): 85–86.

31 "The East African Campaign," Editorial, *The Manchester Guardian*, 15 December 1915.

British. More striking, however, is the fact that once again it was the alleged (in this case potential) mistreatment of *women* which demonstrated the true malevolence—not just inferiority—of the Germans, although this time via a German-organized 'Black Peril' as opposed to a direct 'German Peril.'

It is also worth pointing out that a *Manchester Guardian* editorial from 15 December 1915 made a comparable accusation, albeit in a subtler manner: "[German East Africa] had a force of some 7,000 whites at her disposal, and a native population of ten millions, whom she did not hesitate to arm with a recklessness that those who knew the native temper thought criminal."[31] The startling similarity of these accusations suggests that this specific indictment against the Germans may have had some degree of resonance on the home front, or at least was perceived to by Dolbey at the time he was composing his book. Regardless, treatment of women clearly remained a key measure of civilization—at least symbolically—for the British during the war, and thus their need for defense by British forces from either the 'German' or 'Black Peril' acted to further buttress the war-cultural meaning of the conflict. Moreover, it should be noted that Dolbey takes the accusation a step further in his assertion that the 'obvious' danger was to the Germans' *own* white women. Germans were thus represented as failing in their masculine duty to protect their white women, in addition to actively mistreating and threatening British women, a further indication of their distance from civilization.

APOSTLES OF KULTUR

But Dolbey's account is most striking in the way that he not only attacks German men as uncivilized and barbaric, but levels the same assertion towards German women, with arguably greater hostility and certainly more contempt. An anecdote entitled 'A Typical Frau' is perhaps the most illustrative in this regard:

> In the course of his work, [an Intelligence officer] seized the meat-canning factory near Arusha that a certain Frau ——, in the absence of her husband, was carrying on. The enemy used to shoot wildebeeste and preserve it by canning or drying it in the sun as 'biltong' for the use of German troops. My friend was forced to burn the factory, and then it became his duty to escort this very practical lady back to our lines ... . With tears she implored him to send her to her own people. *She would promise anything.* Cunningly she suggested great stores of information she might impart. But he cared not for her weeping, and ordered her to pack for the long journey to Arusha. Then tears failing her she sulked, and refused to eat or leave her tent. But this found him adamant. Finally she tried the woman's wiles which should surely be irresistible to this man. But he was unmoved by all her blandish-

ments. So surprised and indignant was he that he threatened to tell her husband of her behavior, when he should catch him. But here it appears he made a false estimate of the value of honour and dishonor among the Huns. '*A loyal German woman*,' she exclaimed, laughing, '*is allowed to use any means to further the interests of her Fatherland. My husband will only think more highly of me when he knows.*' So this modern Galahad of ours turned away and ordered the lady's tent to be struck and marched her off, taking care that he himself was far removed from her presence in the caravan. 'What fools you English are,' she flung back at him, as he handed her into the custody that would safely hold this dangerous apostle of *Kultur* till the end of the war.[32]

The first thing to note is that while his friend, the British Intelligence officer, was 'forced' to burn down the factory, no direct explanation is given as to why. The implication seems to be that it was being used to supply German soldiers with food, but conspicuously the specific factory mentioned is implicated only by sentence-proximity. Dolbey describes the hunting and canning of meat for troops in abstracted terms, never making clear whether the Frau's factory was part of this process. But most important is the highly gendered contrast between the completely un-ironic description of the British intelligence officer as a 'modern Galahad' and the Frau as an 'apostle of *Kultur*,' which is in many ways the most concise illustration of gender's principal work within British war culture. On the one hand, the 'modern Galahad' is meant to serve as an illustration and archetype of the reserved, rational, sexually pure, but nonetheless tough, British soldier—the First World War variant of what Mrinalini Sinha termed the 'Manly Englishman,' the epitome of military masculinity.[33] Multiple anecdotes throughout the book, beginning with the introduction, emphasize the restraint and "natural goodness" of the British soldiers, often directly contrasted with the immoral behavior of the Germans in the same situations.[34] On the other hand, German women—as apostles of German *Kultur*—are presented as inherently immoral, as they behave in in the exact opposite manner expected of 'civilized' women: the Frau would 'promise anything' and attempted to use the 'woman's wiles' which, far from being received with indignation (as was the case with the 'modern Galahad'), would be greeted by her husband with pride for militarizing her sexuality in the interest of assisting the German war effort.

In fact, driving home precisely this contrast seems to be the primary goal of Dolbey's book. He concluded his *Sketches* with a description of the British capture of the coastal city of Dar-es-Salaam, and an even more highly gendered war-cultural contrast:

Germans and their womenfolk crowd the streets; many of the former quite young and obvious deserters, the latter, thick of body and

32   Dolbey, *Sketches*, 179–180.

33   See Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity*.

34   Dolbey, *Sketches*, xviii–xix. Another example: Ibid., 35–36.

35 Ibid., 217.

36 For a discussion of fears of racial degeneration in Britain, see Davin, "Imperial Motherhood;" See Stoler's discussion of women, eugenics, and race: Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge*, 61–70. Scientists rallied to the national cause, as when a French doctor asserted German bodies smelled different than French ones: Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, *14–18*, 103–104.

37 The trope of the overly-sexualized exotic female has a history that goes back to the age of discovery. See Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Context* (New York: Routledge, 1998): 21–31; Jennifer Morgan, *Laboring women: Reproduction and Gender in New World Slavery* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004): 12–49.

thicker of ankle, walk the town unmolested. *Not one insult or injury has ever been offered to a German woman in this whole campaign.* But these 'victims of our bow and spear' are not a bit pleased. The calm indifference our men display towards them leaves them hurt and chagrined. Better far to receive any kind of attention than to be ignored by these indifferent soldiers. What a tribute to their charms that the latest Hun fashion, latest in Dar-es-Salaam, but the latest by three years in Paris or London, should provoke no glance of interest on Sunday mornings! One feels that they long to pose as martyrs, and that our quixotic chivalry cuts them to the quick.[35]

Here, the characteristics of the British 'modern Galahad' are spelled out more directly. The British soldiers show 'calm indifference' to the German women—since of course they never offered a *single* insult to any of them during the entire campaign—and act only with restraint, rationality, and a total lack of emotion. It is also striking that Dolbey refers to British soldiers' 'quixotic chivalry,' particularly given the romantic and gendered connotations of that noun. The implication is that not only had German women been treated with sexual indifference, but that British soldiers were inherently gallant, courteous and loyal men who treated their defeated enemy, particularly their women, honorably and graciously. This characterization is further driven home by the description of the German men left in the city as 'obvious deserters.' The young Germans were represented as blatant cowards in addition to being both vicious and callous—as he argued throughout the rest of his book—in direct contrast with the chivalric, male ideal embodied by the British.

Equally striking, and considerably more disturbing, is the way in which Dolbey fleshed out his description of German women. First, they are described as physically ugly, being 'thick of body and thicker of ankle,' and thus being unable to live up to the aesthetic expected of women. Moreover, this physical ugliness further buttressed the notion of the Germans' racial inferiority, their unsightliness being an indication of biological degeneracy and malignance.[36] This is further reinforced in Dobley's complaint about German women wearing fashions that are out of date two years into a world war, both of which amount to assertions of Germans' distance from civilization on a superficial but nonetheless easily recognizable level. But most striking of all is the way German women are characterized as not only overly sexual, but as actively courting rape by British soldiers: they did not just want sex, but wanted to feel 'martyred,' a step beyond even tradition imperial notions of native 'exotic' sexuality.[37] By the end of his book, Dolbey had moved past characterizing German female sexuality as militarily instrumental in those women's self-perception, as was the case in the 'Typical Frau' anecdote; it was now as immoral and uncivilized as possible,

both masochistic and irrational, and actively courting the gravest defilement which could befall a civilized woman. Indeed, the use of the term 'martyred' suggests that those same women *understood* the sex they were courting as defiling, but still desired it anyway. Moreover, as 'apostles of *Kultur*,' not only German women, but (once again) all of German society is implicated in those women's alleged sexual impropriety. Yet again, an imperially-gendered discourse was used to reinforce the notion of Germans' racial difference and immorality while simultaneously fortifying the idea of Britain's moral chivalry.

It should be noted that Dolbey held a low opinion of women generally. In describing jigger fleas (which would borrow into soldiers' feet, incapacitating them, and were thus a common medical issue Dolbey dealt with), he stated that "[t]rue to her sex, it is the female of the species that causes all the trouble; the male is comparatively harmless," a clear indication of his misogynistic worldview.[38] However, he does not describe English women with anything approaching the venom he reserved for the Germans; in fact, quite the opposite. His only specific discussion of British women came during a brief sketch about prisoners held by the Germans, which reads almost exactly like the two British government reports with their fear of both the 'German' and 'Black Perils:'

> Gentle nurses of the Universities' English Mission, missionary ladies who devoted a lifetime in the service of the Huns and the natives in German East, locked up behind barbed wire for two years, without privacy of any kind, constantly spied upon in their huts at night by the native guard, always in terror that the black man, now unrestrained, even encouraged by his German master, should do his worst. Can you wonder that they kept their poison tablets for ever [sic] in their pockets that they might have close at hand an end that was merciful indeed compared with what they would suffer at native hands?[39]

Ultimately, Dolbey's binary between the 'modern Galahad' and the 'apostle of *Kultur*' is more about *national* differences— i.e. the war-cultural division between ally and enemy—than it is about gender differences per se: imperial gender ideology was working in support of war culture.

MASCULINITY AND THE SPORT OF WAR

Not all representations were as extreme as Dobley's, although it is important to note that one can imply a degree of support for his views from the fact that his book underwent two printings within two months in mid-1918 (the first in June, the second in August) despite the fact that Britain had been suffering from a severe paper shortage since the start of the war.[40] But even in less Germanophobic works, imperial

38   Dolbey, *Sketches*, 165.

39   Ibid., 134–135.

40   Alan G.V. Simmonds, *Britain and World War One* (New York: Routledge, 2012): 265.

41 W. W. Whittall, *With Botha and Smuts in Africa* (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd, 1917): 184–185. Emphasis added.

42 Ibid., 143.

gendering played a major role in solidifying the British ideal of masculinity, and thus in shoring up the definition of the 'civilization' side of the war-cultural binary. One of the best illustrations comes from the 1917 war memoir of Lt. Commander Whittall, leader of an armored car unit during the South West African and East African campaigns, in his description of the African troops:

> In common with all who know him, I have a great respect and admiration for the native soldier; whether he be King's African Rifleman or German Askari, he is as good a fighting man as you would ask to have beside you in a tight corner, or *as worthy an enemy as the veriest fire-eater could desire as an opponent.* He is first and last a soldier. He comes of stock whose business has been fighting for many generations, and he is thus rich in warlike tradition. Full of courage, he is as faithful as a dog to his officers, if these know how to handle him and humour his prejudices . . . . He cannot shoot, as a rule, and when you are opposed to him the safest place is usually in the firing-line . . . . But if he is not much of a shot he is a magnificent bayonet fighter, as might be expected when it is remembered that he is almost born with a spear in his hand. Let him once get to close quarters with the 'white arm' and *he will give the best European troops as merry a scrimmage as they could want*—and it will not be more than even money on the result . . . . Like all native troops, he requires understanding and thinking for all the time, but once you have got his confidence he is yours to lead to the nethermost pit if needs be. If it be necessary to send him to absolutely certain death it will never occur to him that he ought not to go—he will assume, if he bothers to think about it at all, that it is all in the game, and that the *Bwana* knows best, anyway. In the bush he is worth any two white men.[41]

As was the case with Dobley's description of German attempts at unleashing the 'Black Peril,' one is first struck by Whittall's racialized lens. It should be noted, however, that Whittall's praise seems quite genuine, especially when read as part of his entire work. Throughout, he allotted praise and criticism wherever he thought it necessary, including to the Germans, and although his assessment was still in line with war culture—he contended, for instance, that "the German mind apparently is incapable of appreciating higher values"—by contrast with the rest of the representations he is quite moderate.[42] Thus it is all the more revealing that even his honest praise is laced with racial denigration. While highly lauded as fine soldiers to the point that he considered them twice as good as whites when it came to jungle warfare, Whittall nonetheless characterized all African soldiers as child-like and simple; they could not handle the mildly-complicated task of aiming a rifle properly, let alone any higher-level thinking. The comparison to a dog is in many

ways a synecdoche for his entire assessment: while African soldiers embody what Whittall considered the positive qualities of blind devotion, loyalty, courage, and ferocity, they are nonetheless little more than animals, and animals which one must have particular knowledge and patience to train.[43] Thus, it is clear that Africans—even those fighting and dying for the crown—were in no way considered part of the civilization they were defending.

Nonetheless, what is equally if not more striking is the nature of the positive characteristics ascribed to native soldiers—courage, loyalty to officers, willingness to sacrifice for their units, (suicidal) deference to military authority—all of which show a direct parallel with the pre-war imperialist masculine values inculcated in British public schools and through team sports in the late nineteenth century. What these institutions taught was, in Robert MacDonald's words, "[t]he metaphor of war as sport—and its corollary, sport as war: for men to value 'playing the game.'" What this meant was that one should "conduct the game in its 'true' spirit, that is, with vigour, good temper, dash; to play fairly, selflessly; to honour courage, and to lose cheerfully. 'To play the game' in war was, in effect, to behave as though the battlefield was an extension of the playing field, requiring the same attitudes and spirit."[43] And this ideal of 'playing the game' served a distinctly imperial purpose prior to the war. As John Tosh points out, British men were experiencing a dual anxiety in the latter years of the nineteenth century, as they felt that both their manhood and empire were under an increasing number of threats from feminists, colonial activists, and the working class. The solution to these anxieties was to implement changes in masculine education to better outfit British men for maintenance of the empire, service in which would then finish the process of making them true men.[44] 'Playing the game' was the behavioral and attitudinal embodiment of that new imperial masculinity.

This imperial-masculine valorization of 'war as sport' is clearly at the heart of Whittall's positive appraisal of native troops, as well as being implied in Dolbey's archetypal 'modern Galahad:' the Askaris can give the 'veriest fire-eater' a 'merry scrimmage,' as if bush fighting were simply a game of football or cricket. More importantly, the implication is that a true European man *wants* just such a 'scrimmage,' and thus it is this gamesman's quality of masculinity which was at the heart of their military success. Indeed, in Whittall's final analysis, this is exactly the case: "German East Africa had been rested from a resourceful enemy by a series of operations as brilliantly conceived and carried out as any in the annals of tropical war, consummated by the genius of a great soldier and the magnificent qualities of the troops."[46]

43   Ibid., 186.

44   Robert H. MacDonald, *The Language of Empire: Myths and Metaphors of Popular Imperialism, 1880–1918* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1994): 20. See also John Tosh, *Manliness and Masculinities in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Essay on gender, family and empire* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005): 196-198.

45   Tosh, *Manliness and Masculinities*, 208–209.

46   Whittall, *With Botha and Smuts*, 277–278.

47   The University of Chicago catalogues the publication date as 1919, but O'Neill's foreword is dated March, 1918—and judging by other books analyzed, and the fact that O'Neill covers until 1917, it is likely it was published in 1918. See H. C. O'Neill, *The War in Africa and the Far East* (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1919).

48   O'Neill, *War in Africa*, 114.

Whittall was not the only author to make such an assessment. H. C. O'Neill's military history of the extra-European theatres, *The War in Africa, 1914–1917, and in the Far East, 1914*, likely published in late 1918,[47] concludes with a similar assessment, stating that it was "the will to exact the persistent advance when the intellect has measured its necessity" that was the deciding factor in the campaign.[48] In both cases, it was Britain's willingness and ability to 'play the game' that allowed their imperial masculinity to triumph in the sport of war, while that same masculine conception provided the metaphors and language through which to address the new existential anxiety brought on by the global conflict. Thus, these sentiments embody the same masculine ideals as Dolbey's 'modern Galahad,' and similarly represent the British cause—along with its ultimate triumph—as both innately moral and righteous.

IMPERIAL GENDERING IN A WORLD AT WAR

Taken together, then, these works illustrate that British war culture as it appeared in representations of the East African campaign was imperially gendered. The treatment of women remained the standard by which civilization was measured, but 'proper' treatment was defined by the terms of the pre-war discourse of cultural imperialism: protecting white women from the 'Black Peril,' providing for their more effusive needs when living in the colonies, and respecting their privacy (and thus maintaining them in their 'proper' sphere) in all situations. By representing the Germans as failing to meet and more often directly subverting these 'civilized' standards, imperial gendering reinforced the notion of the Germans as uncivilized and brutal, and thus as an enemy that one had a moral duty to totally defeat. These war-cultural binary divisions between civilization and barbarity, ally and enemy, and British and German were then further buttressed by positive gendered notions without and within. By representing German women as 'apostles of *Kultur*,' the imperial racialization of the Germans and their demonization as the lowest race in the hierarchy was bolstered further, as their women were indicted as being just as uncivilized as their men through their flagrant flouting of 'civilized' norms, which those same men—it was asserted—condoned and encouraged: all Germans were implicated in the creation of these apostles. On the other hand, by discussing British military endeavors with the metaphor of 'war as sport,' the pre-war imperial definition of masculinity remained solidified, and the internal definition of British soldiers as 'modern Galahads' was strengthened, thus demonstrating the intrinsic morality of the British cause.

Between 1914 and 1918, the culture of the First World War meant that the binaries of 'colonizer' and 'colonized,' and

even of 'man' and 'woman,' took a back-seat to those of 'ally' and 'enemy,' 'British' and 'German.' What was most important for assessing the 'civilization'—and hence the morality—of a person and their conduct was not whether one was a man or woman, but whether one was a *German* man or a *German* woman: constructions of gender were bifurcated by war culture, while at the same time the imperially-gendered nature of that war culture ensured the continuing stability and emotional salience of the racialized meaning it applied to the war. Gender was another lens through which one could view the justice of one's cause and the injustice the enemy's, and thus it acted as an essential rhetorical weapon for the empire at war.

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Freedom for Authoritarianism

Patriotic Hackers and Chinese Nationalism

RYAN HANG

1 Nir Kshetri, *The Global Cybercrime Industry: Economic, Institutional and Strategic Perspectives,* Heidelberg: Springer, (2010): 154.

2 Thomas Holt and Bernadette Schell, *Corporate Hacking and Technology-Driven Crime,* (New York: Information Science Reference, 2011).

INTRODUCTION

In 2005, against the backdrop of increasing tensions between China and Japan, servers hosting the website of Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese Ministry of Defense, National Police, and other websites across Japan were shut down by cyber-attacks or defaced with Chinese Nationalist symbolism. Outside of Japan, computer systems supporting the White House, the State Department, and more than 100 other government websites were struck with server requests and virus-infected emails.[1] These attacks represent only a few incidents in an expansive history of Chinese hacker attacks. The hackers responsible for these recent large-scale cyber-attacks are a loosely organized confederation of Chinese citizens comprised of students, working professionals, criminals, and many other individuals from a variety of social backgrounds within China. They are known collectively as "Patriotic Hackers," forming their own independent community, culture, and hierarchies within Chinese cyberspace. More formally, Patriotic Hackers "refers to networks of citizens and expatriates engaging in cyber-attacks to defend their mother country or country of ethnic origin."[2]

THE PUZZLE: WHY DOES THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA SUPPORT PATRIOTIC HACKER ATTACKS?

3 Scott Henderson, "Beijing Rising Hacker Stars How Does Mother China React?" IO Sphere (2008): 25–30.

4 Alexander Klimburg, "Mobilising Cyber Power," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 53.1 (2011).

Even though Patriotic Hackers are not official agents of the Chinese government, China consistently supports and mobilizes Patriotic Hackers to launch attacks against foreign targets.[3] While the Chinese government has embraced the Internet as a tool of modernization, it has simultaneously understood the Internet to be an inherent threat to the stability of the Chinese Communist Party and has significantly invested in efforts to regulate Internet activity both within and outside of Chinese cyberspace.[4]

On the surface, there lies a contradiction between the Chinese government's support for some Patriotic Hacker attacks and the CCP's policies regarding Internet censorship

and regulation. First, Chinese Patriotic Hackers are a powerful threat to the Chinese government because they are a large politically active organization capable of subverting Chinese political stability. China's support for Patriotic Hacker attacks against foreign targets seems inconsistent with its aims to suppress and limit potential threats to the stability of the government because these cyber-attacks foster political passions which could spiral out of control and turn against the Chinese government's interests. Second, large-scale government support for Patriotic Hacker attacks is virtually non-existent, especially among Western countries like the United States.[5] Only a few instances of government sponsored Patriotic Hacking can be seen in Iran and Syria, with Russia and China being the only governments who sanction large-scale Patriotic Hacker attacks. Yet, if mobilizing Patriotic Hackers to attack other countries benefits governments, more countries should theoretically utilize Patriotic Hackers. Then, why does the People's Republic of China support Patriotic Hacker attacks?

METHODOLOGY

Chinese policy towards Patriotic Hackers is an especially difficult topic of research for several reasons. The exact motivations behind a country's behavior are abstract concepts that are difficult to quantify and analyze. Chinese media censorship makes resources on Chinese Patriotic Hackers difficult to access. Finally, these hackers form shadowy and continuously changing organizations that are increasingly difficult to study.

This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between the Chinese government and Patriotic Hackers by developing and testing a theory built upon empirical observations of the Chinese government and Patriotic Hackers. To explain why the Chinese government supports Patriotic Hacker attacks, this paper qualitatively examines the history of Patriotic Hacker organizations, the relationship between the Chinese government and Patriotic Hackers, and the nature of Patriotic Hacker attacks. When investigating the history of Patriotic Hackers, this paper draws upon historical research conducted by Scott Henderson, a retired U.S. Army Chinese linguist, in his independently published book *The Dark Visitor*. Henderson's research is conducted primarily through interviews with Patriotic Hackers and an analysis of Internet records preserved by hacker websites. There is little available literature on Patriotic Hackers; while *The Dark Visitor* is self-published by Henderson which makes his claims difficult to verify, *The Dark Visitor* is the one of the best resources available on the inner workings of these hacker groups because it is the only major publication to date dedicated

6   Cyber espionage is the act or practice of obtaining secrets without the permission of the holder of the information.

7   Scott Henderson, "The Dark Visitor: Inside the World of Chinese Hackers," (2007): 2.

to Chinese Patriotic Hackers. To illustrate the relationship between the Chinese government and Patriotic Hackers, this paper utilizes Chinese government media statements, interviews from Patriotic Hackers, and an examination of Chinese Internet policy. The nature of Patriotic Hacker attacks in their trigger, timing, means, target, and impact is explored through second hand strategic commentary and media coverage.

Additionally, this paper focuses on large-scale hacker attacks that are openly organized by Patriotic Hackers due to the ease of obtaining information on these types of cyber-attacks. Unlike other types of cyber-attacks that are designed to avoid detection, Patriotic Hackers utilize attack methods such as web defacements, which are easily observed and studied. This paper does not explore more covert operations committed by Chinese Patriotic Hackers such as cyber espionage because these attacks are not committed by these Patriotic Hacker organizations at-large and are virtually impossible to research.[6]

PURPOSE

The central purpose of this paper is to determine why the Chinese government supports Patriotic Hacker attacks. It concludes that the Chinese government supports Patriotic Hacker attacks to control these hacker organizations by fostering nationalist sentiments among Patriotic Hackers. The rise of the Internet has profoundly shaped the role of non-state actors within politics. Individuals are now far better situated to influence political outcomes, even within the international arena. While a single soldier was previously unlikely to significantly impact international affairs, a skilled hacker can now independently steal valuable state secrets and launch impressive cyber-attacks. In fact, international conflict no longer requires state sanction—multiple "hacker wars" have involved the citizens of states against each other without government direction.[7] Understanding why the Chinese government supports Patriotic Hacker attacks can also shed light onto how Internet access expands the power of individuals to affect political outcomes. Recognizing how governments will respond to the political consequences of the Internet allows future political interactions to be more effectively modeled and understood.

PATRIOT HACKERS: THE BACKGROUND

The United States' military might shapes much of China's relationship with cyber warfare. China perceives that it is at a significant conventional military disadvantage and develops its Cyber Warfare capabilities as a means to overcome this

deficit.[8] Since the 1990s, Chinese military doctrine has reflected the idea that "only countries that take the initiative in an information war or establish information superiority ahead of time will win" by consistently developing its cyber warfare capabilities.[9]

Currently, China possesses one of the world's best cyber warfare capabilities and has demonstrated that it is capable of compromising some of the United States' most heavily guarded secrets. Beginning in 2003, a group of Chinese hackers known as "Titan Rain" was able to steal information from government agencies such as the Defense Information Systems Agency, the US Army Aviation and Missile Command, and the US. Army Space and Strategic Defense Installation.[10] Chinese cyber-attacks also target more than government institutions. In 2010, Google announced that it was the victim of attacks originating from China, which targeted the code of Google's search engine and the personal emails of Chinese human rights activists.[11] These attacks illustrate only several incidents in an expansive history of Chinese cyber operations targeting governments, private companies, and individuals worldwide.

EARLY YEARS AND FORMATION

The history of Patriotic Hackers can be traced back to the birth of the Chinese Internet in 1994. As Chinese citizens went online, individuals naturally shifted their technical skills towards cracking software and registration codes.[12] The first Patriotic Hacker communities were established when individuals interested in "cracking," organized into online communities to share interests and develop expertise. In 1997, a Shanghai hacker known as "Goodwill" founded the first Patriotic Hacker organization known as the "Green Army" from this online community of early hackers.

In 1998, the first major Patriotic Hacker attack was triggered by anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia. In response to news of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia, Chinese Patriotic Hackers used Internet chat rooms to coordinate email bombs, DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks, and web defacement attacks on Indonesian websites. This first coordinated attack laid the foundation for current Patriotic Hacker organizations. Through their attacks on Indonesia, Patriotic Hacker groups "suddenly realized the power their group could wield and that this power was an independent voice from their government."[13] In the face of foreign threats, Patriotic Hackers remained loyal to the Chinese identity that they shared with their government. The political nature of Patriotic Hacker operations coined a new term among hackers: "The Red Hacker" (*Hongke* in Chinese pinyin). The Indonesian attacks "served as a catalyst to bring together existing independent hacker elements and fuse them under

8   Mangus Hjortdal, "China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence," *Journal of Strategic Security* 4:2 (2011): 2.

9   Ibid.

10   John Oakley, *Cyber Warfare: China's Strategy to Dominate in Cyber Space,* (S.l.: BiblioScholar, 2012), 30.

11   Ibid., 31.

12   Scott Henderson, *The Dark Visitor: Inside the World of Chinese Hackers,* (S.l.: s.n., 2007).

13   Ibid., 19.

14 Ibid., 48.

15 Ibid., 21.

16 Ibid., 19.

17 Ibid., 19.

the banner of nationalism," forming the concept of Red Hackers that collectively constitute the "Red Hacker Alliance."[14]

In this time period, the second large scale Patriotic Hacker attack was triggered in response to Taiwanese President Li Deng-Hui's advocacy that Taiwan was a separate nation from China. Patriotic Hackers attacked and defaced Taiwanese websites with messages such as "there is only one China in the world and the world only needs one China."[15] Taiwanese hackers retaliated by launching cyber-attacks against Chinese hacker organizations and websites. After the Taiwanese "hacker war," Patriotic Hacker attacks expanded across Asia. In 2000, a Patriotic Hacker organization named the "Ultra-Right-Wing Chinese Hackers Opposed to Japan Alliance" attacked Japanese websites in response to the perceived Japanese government denial of the Nanjing Massacre.[16] To facilitate attacks against Japan, the Patriotic Hackers created a website which provided links to hundreds of target Japanese websites, cyber-attack tools, and information on how to launch cyber-attacks.[17] These first three Patriotic Hacker attacks have defined the profile of Patriotic Hacker operations.

PRESENT DAY ORGANIZATION

18 Ibid., 50.

19 Ibid., 69.

20 Ibid., 60.

21 Ibid.

Currently, there are more than 250 Patriotic Hacker organizations that operate within China.[18] Modern Patriotic Hacker groups are organized around a collection of hacker websites, which provide organizational forums, access to attack tools, and even "trophy rooms" which display evidence of successful attacks.[19] The wide array of hacker organizations function as part of a larger whole, but are not regularly coordinated with each other. While Patriotic Hacker groups have large memberships, the number of active members fluctuates with current events.[20] Each individual website represents a vibrant community of regular hackers "capable of organizing a variety of activities damaging to the governmental and civilian organizations around the globe," but in certain political circumstances the number of hackers could swell to well over a million individuals.[21] While Patriotic Hackers in recent years are better organized in comparison to older of hacker groups, current Patriotic Hacker groups still suffer from fluctuating membership and a lax organizational structure. Thus, at their core, Patriotic Hacker organizations are not a monolithic army, but rather a loose confederation of individuals driven by overarching nationalist sentiments.

METHODS OF ATTACK

Patriotic Hackers utilize a variety of foreign and self-developed tools to achieve their objectives. Three common

attack methods utilized by Patriotic Hackers are Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, Web Defacements, and Malware Attacks. *Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS)*: This method seeks to make the attacked computer system "unavailable for normal use; usually this is achieved by exhausting the resources of the target or by disabling the target by exploiting a logic flaw in the system."[22] *Web Defacements:* This attack gains access to a web server and changes the content of the website.[23] *Malware Attacks:* This attack refers to the distribution of harmful computer software known as malware to targets. The malware distributed to a target is flexible and "could be configured to achieve many objectives, ranging from covert information collection to systematically corrupting all data in the system."[24]

THE ROLE OF PATRIOTIC HACKERS WITHIN CHINESE CYBER WARFARE

Chinese citizens share a unique relationship with their government in which "independence from government direction and control does not carry with it the idea of separation from the state."[25] While most Western countries view matters of national defense and foreign policy within the governmental domain, Chinese citizens are expected to actively support their government, which in some instances mandates that Chinese "citizens get involved with hacking or cyber attacking an enemy's systems."[26]

The Chinese government authorizes and encourages Patriotic Hackers to launch cyber-attacks against other countries, but does not organize these attacks. Instead, Patriotic Hackers independently organize attacks through websites, forums and chartrooms in response to events that provoke nationalist outrage. The government exercises significant influence over Patriotic Hacker groups and these hackers support the government on the basis of a shared Chinese identity. The government controls Patriotic Hacker groups through several venues. The Chinese government can encourage or halt Patriotic Hacker activity by communicating with hacker groups through public news media.[27] The government is also known to directly contact and communicate with Patriotic Hackers to recruit them for government operations.[28] Finally, the government can shape Patriotic Hacker groups through legal prosecution, although the government normally tolerates the activities of these hackers.[29]

22 Rain Ottis, "From Pitchforks to Laptops: Volunteers in Cyber Conflicts," (Tallinn, Estonia: Conference on Cyber Conflict Proceedings, 2010).

23 Ibid., 101.

24 Ibid., 102.

25 Henderson, *The Dark Visitor,* 102.

26 Timothy Thomas, "China's Electronic Long-Range Reconnaissance," *U.S Army Training and Doctrine Command,* Dec. 2008, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/chinas-electronic.pdf>, 58.

27 James Mulvenon, Scot Tanner, Michael S. Chase, David R. Frelinger, and David C. Gompert, "Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense," *Rand Corporation,* Apr. 5, 2006, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG340.html>.

28 Bryan Krekel, "Capability of the People's Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation," *Northrop Grumman Corporation,* Oct. 9, 2009. <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-030.pdf>, 51.

29 Mulvenon et al.,"Chinese Responses to US. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense," 93.

30 Liff (2012), Applegate (2011), and Ottis (2009).

31 Hjortdal (2011), Crossman (2012), and Mulvenon (2000).

32 Klimburg (2011) and Mackennon (2011).

33 Adam Liff, "Cyberwar: A New 'Absolute Weapon'? The Proliferation of Cyber-warfare Capabilities and Interstate War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 35:3 (2012): 401–428.

34 A former military officer and security researcher.

35 Scott Applegate, "Cybermilitias and Political Hackers—Use of Irregular Forces in Cyberwarfare," *IEEE Security and Privacy*, 9:5 (2011): 16–22.

36 Associate Professor of Cyber Security at Tallinn University.

37 Rain Ottis, "Theoretical Model for Creating a Nation-State Level Offensive Cyber Capability," (Lisbon: Academic Publishing Ltd., 2009).

38 Peter Singer and Allan Friedman, "Cybersecurity: What Everyone Needs to Know," Oxford: Oxford UP, (2014): 113.

39 Ibid.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS

The literature on Patriotic Hacking can be classified into three schools of thought: Plausible Deniability,[30] Strategic Logic,[31] and Political Co-option.[32]

THE LOGIC OF PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

The first approach argues that the Chinese government supports Patriotic Hacker attacks to maintain plausible deniability for government cyber operations. Plausible deniability within the context of this paper is a condition in which cyber attackers are able to reasonably avoid attribution to cyber-attacks. Chinese government is able to relinquish responsibility from its own cyber-attacks by utilizing Patriotic Hackers as a proxy.[33] Scott Applegate[34] similarly argues governments utilize cyber-militias to launch cyber-attacks because it is inherently difficult to attribute the source of these attacks.[35] Ambiguous international treaties and laws concerning the status of non-government hackers protect governments from the political and legal consequences of launching cyber-attacks, making cyber-militias even more advantageous. Rain Ottis[36] argues that non-government hackers are an extension of state power by highlighting the many avenues a government can use to influence non-government actors.[37]

CONCERNS WITH THE PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY ARGUMENT

The Chinese government's public encouragement of Patriotic Hacker attacks demonstrates that the Chinese government is not concerned with denying its responsibility for cyber-attacks. The Chinese government's relationship with Patriotic Hackers is well known and publicized. After an American EP-3 spy plane collided into a Chinese fighter jet and crash-landed on the Chinese island of Hainan, the Chinese government "encouraged computer-savvy citizens to deface American websites to express their displeasure."[38] Following the "hacker war" that erupted between Taiwan and China in 2001, Chinese state-sponsored media publicly "lauded the Patriotic Hackers and encouraged other hackers to join in during the next crisis with Taiwan."[39]

THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF PATRIOTIC HACKER ATTACKS

The second approach argues that the Chinese government supports non-government hacker attacks to enhance its

cyber warfare capabilities. More specifically, this body of literature suggests that the Chinese government bolsters its cyber warfare capabilities with non-government hackers to counterbalance the conventional military superiority of the United States. Mangus Hjortdal,[40] argues that China benefits from overt cyber-attacks because these attacks create a deterrent effect by signaling to other countries that China possesses significant cyber warfare capabilities.[41] Matthew Crosston[42] argues that the imbalanced conventional warfare relationship between China and the United States inspires China to utilize a "total nation" cyber warfare strategy to demonstrate its cyber warfare capabilities and deter potential threats.[43]

CONCERNS WITH THE STRATEGIC LOGIC ARGUMENT

It is unlikely that the Chinese government utilizes Patriotic Hackers to pursue strategic military objectives because Patriotic Hackers are difficult to control and could work against the government's strategic interests and damage China in international affairs. While the Chinese government generally condones the activities of Patriotic Hackers, the government has been forced to stop these hackers from harming government interests. In the midst of Chinese Patriotic Hacker attacks against the Taiwan, the Chinese media announced that Chinese hacker attacks against Taiwan were illegal, which "signaled to the hackers that the state had withdrawn its sanction of their activities and hacker activity quickly tapered off."[44] When some hackers, driven too far by nationalism, did not comply with directions to stop attacks, the Chinese government arrested these hackers.[45] Beyond individual attacks, the government has moved against large hacker organizations; in 2010 they shut down the Black Hawk Safety Net site, formerly home to over 170,000 Patriotic Hackers.[46]

Second, Patriotic Hacker attacks often have an adverse effect on Chinese Cyber operations. "Hacktivist attacks on a Chinese adversary may also risk shutting down lines of communication in use for intelligence collection or accidentally overwhelm channels the PLA is using as feedback loops to monitor the effectiveness of their network attacks."[47] During the 2001 US-China hacker war, Patriotic hackers "destroyed large volumes of data on the US Web servers they attacked," potentially hampering Chinese intelligence gathering operations.[48] Patriotic Hacker attacks are also organized publicly, which gives potential victims forewarning and time to effectively counter attacks. This strategic tradeoff indicates that Chinese government's use of Patriotic Hackers as a foreign policy tool is not primarily concerned with maximizing damage to targets.[49] Because Patriotic Hackers

40 A security researcher at the University of Copenhagen.

41 Hjortdal, "China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence," 2.

42 Professor of Political Science at Bellevue University.

43 Matthew Crosston, "Virtual Patriots and a New American Cyber Strategy," *Strategic Studies* 6:4 (2012): 100.

44 Mulvenon et al.,"Chinese Responses to US. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense," 93.

45 Singer and Friedman, "Cybersecurity: What Everyone Needs to Know," 113.

46 Ibid.

47 Krekel, "Capability of the People's Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation," 57.

48 Ibid., 4.

49 Ibid., 41.

blunt foreign policy instruments, which are difficult to control, it is likely that Chinese government supports these attacks in order to send a political signal rather than to bolster its military capabilities in sensitive strategic operations.

THE LOGIC OF CO-OPTION WITHIN PATRIOTIC HACKER ATTACKS

The third approach argues that government encouragement for Patriotic cyber-attacks against foreign targets are used to co-opt hackers in general across China under the banner of Nationalism. The Chinese government's support for non-government hacker attacks against foreign targets directs these hackers away from operating against the state. Alexander Klimburg[50] argues that the Chinese government deploys its netizens against foreign targets as a means to control them through integration into a national defense framework.[51] Rebecca Mackinnon[52] argues that China is establishing a system of "networked authoritarianism" which provides citizens an illusion of freedom that reinforces state power.[53]

This explanation is distinct from previous ones because it focuses upon the role that domestic politics plays in Patriotic Hacking. While most research on cyber warfare is focused within the realm of foreign policy, the mechanism by which the Chinese government co-opts hacker groups is unclear, the weaknesses of Patriotic Hackers as foreign policy tools indicates that the Chinese government supports Patriotic Hacker attacks for domestic reasons. Moving forward, this paper explores and develops the co-optation argument by arguing that the Chinese government supports Patriotic Hacker attacks to control Patriotic Hackers through generating Nationalism.

THE ARGUMENT: THE NATIONALIST LOGIC OF PATRIOTIC HACKING

Why does the People's Republic of China support Patriotic Hacker attacks? In contrast to previous explanations, this paper argues that China's motivation for supporting Patriotic Hacker attacks is centered upon domestic political control rather than foreign policy and military considerations.

A HISTORY OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

Nationalism within the context of this paper refers to Chinese-partisan sentiments "described as *aiguo* (patriotic) which in Chinese literally means, "loving the state and *aiguo zhuyi* (patriotism), which is to love and support China."[54] This form of nationalism stresses Chinese ethnic unity and loyalty to the communist state; it is a "firmly goal-fulfilling

50 A fellow at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs.

51 Klimburg, "Mobilising Cyber Power," 41–60.

52 A former CNN Journalist.

53 Rebecca MacKinnon, "China's Networked Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 22:2 (2011): 32-46.

54 Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism,* (Stanford University Press, 2004), 31.

and national-interest-driven doctrine, ideologically agnostic, having nothing, or very little, to do with either Marxism or liberalism.[55] But the concept of Chinese nationalism has constantly evolved throughout Chinese history. The earliest nationalist movements in China began as "an ethnic state-seeking movement led by the Han majority to overthrow the Qing Dynasty, under which China was ruled by the Manchu minority."[56]

Within China's political transition from the Qing Dynasty into a modern state, Chinese nationalism was championed by China's first modern political party, the *Guomingdang* (KMT) and evolved in the early twentieth century as a means to improve China though political and social reforms.[57] After significant political turbulence in the mid-20th century, which encompassed the Second World War and the Chinese Civil War, CCP seized control of China. Through the CCP, communist ideology spread throughout China and Chinese nationalism shed its ethnic context to adopt the "nation as a group of citizens who have the duty to support and defend the rights of their state."[58]

As political circumstances in China have evolved, so has the role of nationalism in Chinese politics. The death of Mao Zedong and market oriented economic reforms championed by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s fundamentally altered Chinese politics and collapsed Chinese communist ideology. Economic hardship, corruption, and political instability following Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms in the 1980s "greatly weakened mass support for the CCP and eroded its basis of legitimacy."[59] Chinese leaders turned to nationalism in response to the collapse of communist ideology to fill "an ideological vacuum left by the collapse of Marxist ideology and reinforce the stability of the CCP."[60] These leaders "wrapped themselves in the mantle of pragmatic nationalism, which they found remained the most reliable claim to the Chinese people's loyalty and the only important value shared by the regime and its critics."[61] The CCP maintained its legitimacy by promising national strength and focusing on high rates of economic growth. Through deploying nationalism, the CCP was able to ideologically tie China with itself and introduce the view that "the Communist state is the embodiment of the nation's will," and portraying the CCP as defenders of China against outside threats.[62] The CCP's success with deploying nationalism as a means to generate political stability has established nationalism as the basis for the support and legitimacy of the CCP.[63] Nationalism is a primary strategy utilized by the Chinese government to answer political threats; in the face of political crisis, the CCP has consistently "appealed to nationalism in the name of patriotism as a way to ensure the loyalty of a population stewing in domestic discontent."[64] Nationalism

55   Ibid.

56   Suisheng Zhao, "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" *The Washington Quarterly* 29:1 (2006): 131–144.

57   Ibid.

58   Ibid.

59   Ibid.

60   Ibid.

61   Ibid.

62   Ibid.

63   Kshetri, "The Global Cybercrime Industry: Economic, Institutional and Strategic Perspectives," 151.

64   Zhao, "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?", 131–144.

65   Ibid.

66   Ibid.

67   Peter H. Gries, "Nationalism and Chinese
      Foreign Policy," in *China Rising: Power
      and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy,*
      ed. by Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang,
      (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 2005).

68   Nigel Inkster, "China in Cyberspace,"
      Survival: Global Politics and Strategy
      52:4 (2010): 6.

operates through a couple of mechanisms to reinforce the stability of the Chinese government. Nationalism serves the Chinese government by bolstering "its legitimacy through invoking a deep sense of "Chineseness" among its citizens.[65] The government is able to resolve ideological fractures and consolidate the Chinese identity against external threats by fostering Nationalist sentiments. In the face of economic and political problems, nationalism "has become an effective instrument for enhancing the CCP's legitimacy by allowing for it to be defined on the claim that the regime provides political stability and economic prosperity."[66]

In the Internet age, "CCP is increasingly dependent upon its nationalist credentials to rule" and deploys nationalism to answer political threats from the Internet.[67] The Chinese government grants its citizens the freedom to express their political opinions and organize around issues that are favorable to the government. For example, the Chinese government sanctions and encourages anti-Japanese Internet activity. The government also mobilizes nationalist sentiments in media to divert its citizens away from expressing their discontent with the government and activities that the government views harmful to political stability of the CCP. In response to growing dissatisfaction with the Chinese government in the early 1990's, the CCP launched the "Chinese Patriotic Education Campaign." Through this nationalist initiative, the Chinese government permitted and encouraged "outbreaks of patriotic fervor" to draw attention away from the Tiananmen Square "Incident."[68] Nationalism through consistent deployment has become a political theme utilized by the Chinese government to reinforce political stability, boost national confidence, and transform past humiliation into a driving force for modernization.

NATIONALISM WITHIN PATRIOTIC HACKING

69   Desmond Ball, "China's Cyber Warfare
      Capabilities," *Security Challenges* 7:2
      (2011): 100.

The Chinese government's current response to Patriotic Hackers is consistent with the CCP's historical uses of nationalism to control political threats. The Chinese government is wary of political activity because it can expose Chinese netizens to government criticisms and serves as a venue to organize against the CCP. In response to this threat, the Chinese government deploys Internet censorship and restrictions, a major flashpoint between the Chinese government and its citizens. "It is clear that there are at least as many netizens concerned with breaching the Great Firewall as there are with attacking foreign networks."[69] Although Patriotic Hackers are driven by nationalist sentiments and generally support the Chinese government, they have the capacity to destabilize the CCP. Because Patriotic Hackers are not formally integrated into the Chinese government,

the CCP has no official control over these hackers. In some instances Patriotic Hackers, beyond circumventing Internet restrictions and breaking Chinese law, have even directly attacked the Chinese government by defacing government websites.[70] These hackers also have the capacity to undermine the Chinese government by working for Western computer security agencies.[71]

In response to this domestic threat, the Chinese government helps foster nationalist sentiments to control these hacker groups. While other violations of Internet regulations are harshly punished, Patriotic Hackers "appear to suffer no sanction for their brazen contravention of Chinese law"[72] and "nationalist Internet posts related to foreign policy or security are also usually tolerated by the government.[73] It is important to note that China's support for Patriotic Hacker attacks is distinct from its tolerance of hacker organizations. The government's tolerance for Patriotic Hackers signals that the government supports hacker activity through legal tolerance, which establishes the government as an ally of these hackers. However, the CCP goes beyond attempting to ally with hacker groups and is an active attempt to stoke nationalism among Patriotic Hackers. Through encouraging Patriotic Hacker attacks, the Chinese government actively attempts to stoke nationalism among Patriotic Hackers by allowing hackers to publicly express nationalist sentiments. The Chinese government shapes the loyalty of hacker organizations by rallying them against foreign threats under the banner of Nationalism.

THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S FRAMING OF PATRIOTIC HACKER ATTACKS

The Chinese government's motivation to foster nationalist sentiments and control Patriotic Hacker groups is evident in the way that the Chinese government frames its support for Patriotic Hacker attacks. First, the CCP supports Patriotic Hacker attacks within the context of fostering and expressing nationalist sentiments. During the Hainan EP-3 plane crash incident, the Chinese government "encouraged computer-savvy citizens to deface American websites to express their displeasure."[74] Expression and communication are key themes that the CCP emphasizes when supporting these attacks. Following the "hacker war" that erupted between Taiwan and China in 2001, Chinese government media "lauded the Patriotic Hackers and encouraged other hackers to join in during the next crisis with Taiwan."[75] However, there are limits to government support for Patriotic Hacker attacks. In the midst of a Patriotic Hacker war between Chinese and Taiwanese hackers, the Chinese government notified hacker through public media "that the state has withdrawn its

70   Ibid.

71   Stephen McDonnell, "Chinese Hacker Who Once Targeted the US Switches Sides to Help Defend Western Companies." *ABC News*, Jan. 22, 2013.

72   Mulvenon et al.,"Chinese Responses to US. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense," 93.

73   Ibid., 92.

74   Singer and Friedman, 113.

75   Ibid.

76   Mulvenon et al. 93.

77   Singer and Friedman, 113.

78   Henderson, "Beijing Rising Hacker Stars How Does Mother China React?" 25-30.

79   Kshetri, 151.

sanction of their activities and hacker activity quickly tapered off."[76] When some hackers, driven too far by nationalism, did not comply with directions to stop attacks, the Chinese government arrested them.[77] Second, it is important to note that China's intervention to stop some Patriotic Hacker attacks does not indicate that the government shies away from rallying nationalism through Patriotic Hacking. The Chinese government rarely intervenes to stop these hackers and supports an overwhelming majority of Patriotic Hacker attacks demonstrating that the CCP embraces the nationalist implications of these attacks. Third, the Chinese government publicly announces that its support for Patriotic Hacker attacks is intended to stoke Nationalist sentiments. When the Japanese government requested the Chinese government to shut down hacker websites, Chinese "police responded that they had no intention of doing so because it was a 'patriotic' website."[78] Through supporting Patriotic Hacker attacks, the Chinese government successfully instills the Chinese Internet with "nationalistic and patriotic longings" that reinforce the stability of the Chinese government and resolves the threat that Patriotic Hackers pose to the CCP.[79]

AN EXAMINATION OF PATRIOTIC HACKER ATTACKS

80   Oakley, 30.

81   In examining the nature of Patriotic Hacker Attacks, it is important to note that in this paper, Patriotic Hacker Attacks refers to large scale publicly organized attacks against foreign targets. While Patriotic Hackers may also engage in independent attacks and covert cyber operations, these attacks are motivated independently and are not the large-scale public attacks that this paper examines.

The nature of Patriotic Hacker attacks supported by the Chinese government is consistent with cyber-attacks primarily intended to foster nationalism. But large-scale Patriotic Hacker attacks are distinct from cyber-attacks normally attributed to the CCP, traditionally focus on covert espionage and monitoring operations, China has been regularly accused of selectively hacking into governments, private companies, and individuals alike to steal information ranging from weapons designs and search algorithms to embarrassing personal information.[80] In contrast, Patriotic Hacker attacks are designed to express outrage, convey nationalist messages, and release popular dissent. The trigger and timing, means, target, and impact of Patriotic Hacker attacks indicate that Patriotic Hackers serve nationalist rather than strategic ends.[81]

TIMING AND TRIGGER

Patriotic Hacker attacks are triggered in response to events that stir nationalist sentiments of Patriotic Hackers and are organized by Chinese hackers through online web posts and chat rooms. The table below summarizes the causes of Patriotic Hacker attacks most covered in the media.

TABLE I | THE CAUSES OF PATRIOTIC HACKER ATTACKS

DATE	PATRIOTIC HACKER ATTACK	CAUSE OF THE ATTACK
1998	Indonesian Riots	Chinese hackers attack Indonesian websites in response to anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia
1999	Taiwan "Two-States" Incidents	Attacks are launched against Taiwanese websites after Taiwan's president declares that Taiwan is separate from China
1999	Belgrade Bombing Incident	Hackers launch attacks against the United States after a Chinese Embassy is mistakenly bombed by the United States
2000	Nanjing Massacre Denial Incident	Attacks are launched against Japanese websites after Chinese hackers perceive that the Japanese government denied its responsibility for the Nanjing Massacre
2000	Taiwanese Election Incident	Chinese Hackers launch attacks against Taiwanese websites after pro-independence President Chen Shui-bian is elected
2001	Japanese Cyber Incidents	Patriotic Hackers launch attacks against Japanese websites in protest of a variety of issues including the perceived rude treatment of Chinese passengers on a Japan Airlines flight, a Mitsubishi vehicle brake failure which caused an accident, and accusations of textbook revisionism by the Japanese government
2001	Hainan Airplane Incident "Sino U.S. Hacker War"	Chinese Hackers and American Hackers wage a "hacker war" after an American EP-3 Spy plane collides with a Chinese fighter jet and crash lands on the Chinese island of Hainan
2004	Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Dispute	Chinese Hackers attack Japanese websites in response to earlier web defacements committed by Japanese Hackers
2005	Yasukuni War Memorial Incident	Japanese websites are attacked after Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi visits the Yasukuni War Memorial
2008	CNN Beijing Olympics Incident	Patriotic Hackers distribute materials on how to attack CNN after perceived unfair coverage of the 2008 Beijing Olympics
2010	Iranian Patriotic Hacker War	Chinese Hackers attack Iranian Hackers after the popular Chinese website site baidu.com is attacked by the "Iranian Cyber Army" [82]

82   Singer and Friedman, 113.

83   Nir Kshetri, "Pattern of Global Cyber war and Crime: A Conceptual Framework," *Journal of International Management* 11 (2005): 550.

84   Ibid.

85   Henderson, "The Dark Visitor: Inside the World of Chinese Hackers," 21.

86   Ibid. 38.

87   Kshetri, "The Global Cybercrime Industry: Economic, Institutional and Strategic Perspectives," 154.

88   Ibid.

89   Ibid.

Additionally, the timing of Patriotic Hacker attacks have been motivated by symbolism and planned to coincide with events significant to nationalist themes. For example, Patriotic Hackers publicly released plans to attack websites "until the anniversary of the bombing in Belgrade," despite the fact that publicly disclosing the timing of an attack would mitigate its effectiveness by providing the target forewarning and time to prepare.[83] Since Patriotic Hacker attacks are only executed within the context of nationalism, it is unlikely that they serve any other purpose for the CCP.

MEANS OF ATTACK

Patriotic Hacker attacks are planned openly to generate publicity, even at the cost of retaliation from hackers in other countries.[84] The attack methods utilized by Patriotic Hackers serve to maximize publicity, encourage public participation, and rally nationalist sentiments. The use of DDoS attacks and distributed malware attacks by Patriotic Hackers, by nature, require large-scale public participation to be effective. Additionally, Patriotic Hackers also deface websites with Chinese nationalist slogans and symbolism, often identifying themselves in attacks and opening themselves to retaliation.[85] Patriotic Hacker attacks serve to promote nationalism rather than to achieve strategic objectives because the means of these attacks emphasize publicity over strategic effect.

TARGETS FOR PATRIOT HACKERS

Patriotic Hackers are known to target highly visible and symbolic websites to maximize the profile and publicity of attacks.[86] In the 2001 "hacker war" between Chinese and American hackers, Chinese hackers targeted symbolically important websites, such as one's belonging to the White House and the Justice Department.[87] During tensions between China and Japan, Chinese hackers targeted the website of the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in addition to Japanese government websites. Patriotic Hackers additionally unfocusedly target a wide range of other websites that tangentially related to their nationalist-ire.[88] In the 2001 hacker war mentioned above, Patriotic Hackers targeted a websites associated with "Ohio's Bellaire School district sites to play the Chinese National Anthem and display the Chinese Flag," despite the fact that such an attack has little strategic utility.[89] The visibility and scope of Patriotic Hacker targets demonstrates that Patriotic Hacker attacks are primarily designed to rally and spread nationalist expression.

While the effects of Patriotic Hacker attacks are widespread, the lasting impacts of these attacks are small. The DDoS attacks and web defacements utilized by Patriotic hackers fail to achieve significant long-term damage. Attacks that achieve lasting damage such as those targeting power grids or nuclear centrifuges[90] require extensive expertise, precision, and covertness to execute. Because Patriotic Hacker groups are relatively unorganized and unwieldy, they are structurally unable to gather the focus, coordination, and secrecy required to successfully launch significantly damaging attacks.[91] The failure of Patriotic Hacker attacks to achieve any severe, long-term harm demonstrates that the Chinese government supports Patriotic Hacker attacks for their nationalist effect.

CONCLUSION

The Internet has strengthened the political power of individuals by enhancing their ability to organize and project their political opinions while weakening the power of authoritarian governments to directly repress their citizens. In analyzing Chinese Internet policies it is clear that even *more authoritarian* governments have decided that it is better to work with rather than against Patriotic Hackers. The support and freedom that independent hacker organizations receive, even under limited context, may signal that hacker organizations will inevitably become more powerful. While the Chinese government strives to develop stronger ties with hackers by providing support and direction, this assistance will also enhance their technical skills and elevate these hackers into a more prominent political role. Chinese attempts to deploy nationalism to influence hacker groups likely encourages more "netizens" to enter the political arena and express their voice within politics.

China's Internet is no longer politically sterile and has become infused with a unique political spirit that is "not tolerated in the real world of Chinese political life."[92] It is increasingly difficult for the Chinese government to encourage its netizens to become more politically active in support of the central government, while simultaneously steering hackers away from "undesirable" political pursuits. The increased political awareness of citizens forces the Chinese government to be even more responsible to them. In response to public Internet outrage, the Chinese government dropped murder charges against a female hotel employee who stabbed a senior government official to death in self-defense.[93] In the 2009, the Chinese government was forced to reverse its decision to install all future PCs with monitoring software

90 Referencing the Stuxnet attack on Iran's Nuclear Program.

91 Thomas Rid, *Cyber War Will Not Take Place*, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013).

92 Inkster, 59.

93 Ibid., 60.

94   Ibid., 62.

95   Ibid., 60.

after strong objections from China's netizens and computer manufacturers.[94]

Moving forward, the Chinese government should exercise caution in navigating its relationship with Patriotic Hackers. While the Chinese government currently benefits from Patriotic Hacking, there is no guarantee that nationalism and increased political participation from individuals will always benefit the Chinese government. The Chinese government has been accused of not being aggressive enough and the Anti-Japan protests in 2005 "began to morph into dissatisfaction with the Chinese government's perceived weakness in dealing with Tokyo.[95] An appropriate response to China's Patriotic Hackers requires an engagement with the relationship between the Chinese government and these hackers. The independence of Patriotic Hacker organizations from the Chinese government allows policy makers to directly shape Chinese politics from within through the use of targeted media and direct contact with hacker groups. China's support of Patriotic Hacker attacks makes at least one thing clear: even the most powerful authoritarian governments must work with its citizens in the age of the Internet. The support that Patriotic Hacker organizations receive from their governments will likely elevate the role that these hackers play in politics. The story of China's Patriotic Hackers represents only one instance of political change in the age of the digital era. Government officials no longer solely determine political decisions within consecrated halls of power. Small groups of individuals—or even a single individual—armed with computers and an Internet connection, now have a seat at the table of political change.

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How Do Levels of Consent Shape Different Forms of Human Trafficking In Southeast Asia?

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1   Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, 2000, P.L. No. 106-386, 106th Congress, 2nd Sess. (October 28, 2000).

2   Shelley Cavalieri, "Between Victim and Agent: A Third-Way Feminist Account of Trafficking for Sex Work." Indiana Law Journal 86:1409 (2010): 18-20.

3   United Nations, "Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime", United Nations Treaty Series vol. 2237 no. 39574, New York, Nov. 15, 2000. <http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng.pdf>.

Human trafficking is one of the most tragic features of present-day global migration, with an estimated 2 million people being trafficked annually.[1] Although combating human trafficking is a growing priority for many governments, information on the magnitude of the problem remains limited. The lack of consensus regarding the number of trafficked victims is largely attributed to the inability to isolate the jurisprudential and practical distinctions between who is, in fact, a victim of human trafficking or a smuggled migrant.[2] One might think that the effectiveness and legality of consent that distinguishes human trafficking from smuggled migrants rests on the presence or absence of coercion. Indeed, human trafficking legislation, to some degree, reflects this position. According to the UN, "Trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability . . . for the purpose of exploitation."[3] However, when these interferences to the individual's autonomy are absent, the individual is deemed a consenting participant and thus is branded a criminal. This essay critiques such a view and challenges existing approaches to identifying trafficked victims, in particular, for sex labor. This essay will argue that consent may be viable despite the absence of agreeable alternatives. In so doing, this essay questions whether individuals can be neatly placed into two categories— migrant smuggling and human trafficking—and instead points to different levels of consent within a continuous spectrum. As a result, these levels of consent will play a significant role when assessing each case of human trafficking.

This paper will use a comparative method on a range of real-life stories to demonstrate how a close reading of single events can yield a better understanding of the complex phenomenon of human trafficking. Since human trafficking is a transnational problem, regional approaches offer an appropriate variability across cultures. This paper will focus on Southeast Asia, where human trafficking is

ardently denounced, but still endemically entrenched across the region.[4] The reference to real experiences of women from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma and Laos, provides variability in terms of religious beliefs, ideology and socio-economic status. Firstly, this essay will evaluate the relevance of consent and coercion on measures to distinguish trafficked victims from smuggled migrants. The concept of agency helps to illustrate women's capacity to make choices about their own lives. Thenceforth, this essay suggests the "spectrum of consent" as a descriptive device to measure the nature of the women's consent. Finally, even though it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the impact of policy intervention, a few implications of anti-trafficking policy in Southeast Asia will be considered.

Sex worker rights advocates and feminist legal theorists have devoted attention to the conceptualizing of issues on sex work and trafficking.[5] The essence of their ideological divide lies on the relationship between trafficking in women and the crucial notion of consent. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Law, the legal definition of consent is "an act of reason and deliberation" and assumes the individual "possesses and exercises sufficient mental capacity."[6] Even though international policies are based on the legal notion of consent to differentiate between trafficking and migrant smuggling, the presence or absence of consent as a moral and acceptable contribution to the definition of trafficking victims is still highly contested. Supporters of the feminist theory perceive sex work as inherently exploitative and reject the idea of consent as a relevant indicator of trafficking.[7] On the other hand, the sex worker rights advocates place the voluntary nature of the individuals' actions at the center of their practical approach.[8]

Distinguished scholars, such as American sociologist Kathleen Barry and professor of criminal justice Ekaterina Osipova, argue that consent of the victim should be irrelevant to any proposed definition and scope of trafficking. They believe consent is inaccurate and oversimplified and would allow most traffickers to escape prosecution. Any legislation that allows traffickers to use consent as a defense would not protect most victims of trafficking. Not only do traffickers control the trafficking, but they can also control the evidence.[9] Many traffickers often require women to feign consent, for instance, they can make their victims pose smilingly for pornography. According to Dr. Osipova, "Some trafficking victims initially give their consent to be transported in search of legal employment. However, once force, fraud, or coercion are introduced, the individual is now referred to as 'trafficked,' having not agreed to exploitative circumstances."[10] For this situation, exploitation rather than coercion should be the operative concept in any definition of trafficking.

4   Jo Doezema, "Now You See Her, Now You Don't: Sex Workers At The UN Trafficking Protocol Negotiations," Social and Legal Studies 14:61 (2005): 62-63.

5   Jessica Christine Elliott, "The Role of Consent In The Trafficking of Women For Sexual Exploitation: Establishing Who The Victims Are, and How They Should be Treated," Ph.D diss, University of Birmingham College of Arts and Law, 2011, 19.

6   Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A. Martin, A Dictionary of Law, 7th ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 103.

7   Samuel Vincent Jones, "Human Trafficking Victim Identification: Should Consent Matter?" Indiana Law Review 45:2 (2012): 485.

8   Ibid., 490

9   Janice G. Raymond, "When It Comes to Human Trafficking, Consent Is Irrelevant," Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, Jul. 2009, 1-2.

10 Ekaterina Osipova, "Human Trafficking and Ways to Battle it During the World Economic Crisis," International Security: Police Academy in Szczytno 3:7 (2012): 4.

11   Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979), 46.

12   Ibid., 50.

13   Jones, 492.

14   Ibid., 493

15   Tooley's moral symmetry principle states that there is no moral difference between refraining from stopping an action and performing the action itself if motivations are the same.

16   United Nations, "Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons", 5.

17   Jones, 495.

18   Mahdavi Pardis, Gridlock Labor, Migration, and Human Trafficking in Dubai, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011), 17.

19   Ibid., 21

Dr. Barry claims, "No women can choose to do the work of prostitution."[11] The logic of her claim follows two arguments: first, sex work involves a level of self-harm to which no woman could ever consent; second, no other meaningful labor option exists, which renders choice impossible. The sum of Barry's propositions also supports a universalized approach to prostitution and trafficking.[12] Since sex work is inherently a form of violence against women, it does not matter how they entered the sex trade. This position asserts that all women involved in sex work are coerced; they are powerless victims.

Contrary to the gendered approach, which underestimates the role of voluntary undertakings and characterizes consent as irrelevant, the liberal approach measures the individual's moral culpability based on consent and his or her deliberate actions.[13] This approach argues that the trafficking of autonomous individuals is rarely something thrust upon them by a coercive agent, but is instead a consequence of their deliberate conduct.[14] Therefore, it creates, to some degree, moral symmetry[15] between the consenting agents. The consent or lack thereof, is subsequently significant as a basis for apportioning blame in the case of consent, and to weaken any claim to victim status. A UN report in 2000 stated that: "[it] is the non-consensual nature of trafficking that distinguishes it from other forms of migration."[16] In other words, each person is entitled to have a natural right to determine [for themselves] the direction of their lives without interference; individuals are not only entitled to the rewards produced by their decisions, but they are also responsible for any negative outcomes of their choices.[17] As a result, individuals' right to form and execute agreements without interference, supersedes any judgment of others who might disagree with the outcome of an actor's voluntary conduct.

In contrast to the polarized opinions regarding consent as the legitimate basis for human trafficking analysis, there is almost no controversy in the case of individuals who are innocent of their own trafficking and are referred to as "deserving victims" in the sex-work realm. Unlike smuggled migrants, human trafficking victims do not willingly violate the law; they have no reasonable alternative to obeying the commands of the trafficker.[18] While smuggled migrants are generally treated as business allies by their smugglers, trafficking victims are subjected to threats, forced isolation, and other forms of coercion, fraud, deception, or abuse in order to guarantee obedience.[19]

The testimony of Memey, a 28-year-old Indonesian woman who was trafficked and forcibly recruited into commercial sex work, better illustrates the case of many other non-consenting trafficked victims. Memey was born in Temanggung Central Java, Indonesia. When her husband died and left her with a

small child to feed, she saw no other option but to try finding a better paying job abroad. "A neighbor told me that there was an opportunity to work in Malaysia as a waitress," she explained.[20] Since she had worked in Singapore before, she thought this would be a similar, if not better, opportunity. However, criminal networks quickly took advantage of her situation and illegal status as soon as she arrived in Malaysia. Middlemen held her captive for four months. "We were watched closely, there was no opportunity to escape. Our passports were taken away, and we did not have access to a phone either,"[21] She described. When Memey finally escaped, she found that she was infected with HIV. She returned home but did not tell her family about the work she had been forced to do in Malaysia. What is undeniably revealed in the story of Memey is that her daily life was characterized by anxiety, fear, torture, poverty, and social isolation. In short, because of the lack of consent, coercive means, and forced exploitation involved in her case, Memey cannot be referred to as a migrant labor in Malaysia, but as a victim of human trafficking in Indonesia.

Memey's story portrays her as a victim of forced labor. However, her story is just one amongst countless other unique cases. There are others that, instead, confront the argument that sex work is inherently degrading and violent and recognize sex work as a form of labor. From an anthropological perspective, sex work is the performance of a service rather than the selling of the "self."[22] It is explained as an assertion of female sexual autonomy and subversion of patriarchy. With the story of the Angel Club Filipinas, Dr. Sealing Cheng provides an illustration of the recognition of migrant women as cultural and social actors in her book: On The Moon For Love. The purpose of her ethnography is to show how migrants Filipinas make their deployment to South Korea "their own," not as commoditized labor or sex objects, but as individuals motivated by their "capacity to aspire."[23] Moving away from the presumed framework of sexual victimhood, Cheng studies the Filipina migrant workers as "laboring and erotic subjects;" and their migration is understood as their voluntary pursuit of a better future.[24] A brief summary of their story is narrated below to demonstrate that women's victimhood in sex work is not a universal truth.

In August 1999, Winnie and six other Filipina entertainers ran away from the Angel Club in Dongducheon, the largest US military camp town (gijichon) in South Korea. Upon arriving at Dongducheon, Seoul police interrogated the club owner, Aunt Lee. After a night of negotiations between the Filipinas and the club owner, the Filipinas decided they wanted to retrieve their personal belongings from the Club. Rather than returning to the shelter assigned to them, they decided to make the trip back to Dongducheon with Aunt Lee.

20 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "'Put yourself in my shoes': a human trafficking victim speaks out," Nov. 28, 2012, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/November/put-yourself-in-my-in-my-shoes-a-human-trafficking-victim-speaks-out.html>.

21 Ibid.

22 Sealing Cheng, On the Move for Love: Migrant Entertainers and the U.S. Military in South Korea, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 23.

23 Ibid., 10.

24 Ibid., 27.

25   Cheng, 1-5.

26   Pardis, 68.

27   Jones, 492.

Sealing Cheng describes how she could not understand why they would want to leave with Aunt Lee; only when she met with the Filipinas a week later did she find out that they had all been eager to meet their American boyfriends that same night. In fact, for most of the rest of their stay in South Korea they were put up in motel rooms by their boyfriends. Two of them, over the next two years, married them. After a few days, the Filipinas were not eager to return home since they were looking forward to hanging out with their boyfriends and finding jobs in other clubs in the area.[25]

Cheng takes this experience to reveal the logic of these migrant women's actions, motivations and struggles. Her ethnography makes sense of their lives as migrant women in gijichon, where they are marginalized and stigmatized, yet hopeful and agentive. Similarly, anthropology professor Mahdavi Pardis uses the concept of agency to refer to the women's capacity, desire, and potential to make choices about their own lives. While this line of argument does not mean to minimize the abuse that some women indeed face, many women do in fact choose to migrate into sex work. The paradigm that portrays women like the Angel Club Filipinas as innocent, by assuming they are tricked or kidnapped into transnational sex work, denies their agency and courage. Nonetheless, these women should be seen as agents of change because they are making deliberate choices and seeking to improve their own circumstances.[26]

There is, however, little understanding that most women fall somewhere in between these two poles of non-consenting trafficked victims and willing migrants for sex work. In reality, most women fall within the "spectrum of consent," also referred to as the "human trafficking-smuggled migrant spectrum."[27] This spectrum is a descriptive device to clarify the range of considerations that might determine whether or not any decision—of the victim—might be said to be autonomous. One might ask if the prosecution has truly shown there was no consent. Even though in the current legal system there can be no spectrum of convictions, only guilty or not guilty, the following analysis treats consent and coercion as a continuum, as opposed to a dichotomous approach. There are many levels of consent, however, and the total complexities and levels of consent cannot be completely encapsulated in this essay. Therefore, with the following real world demonstrations, this essay will discuss two levels of consent: informed and uninformed. These two levels will be discussed in order to measure the women's capacity to make an intelligent and deliberate decision unaffected by fraud, pressure, or sometimes even by mistake.

Tolerance and agreement to the actual sex work may stem in some cases from religious beliefs and the absence of a strong social stigma.[28] A large number of Thailand's population is Buddhist. The Buddhist beliefs, especially in northern Thailand, contribute to community acceptance of prostitution and sex trafficking because it allows women to earn enough money to send to their families.[29] According to Siriporn Skrobanek, nearly 300 million dollars are transferred yearly between trafficked women engaged in prostitution and their families in Thailand.[30] Thai Buddhists hold that "each person's soul inhabits many physical bodies over time, with the quality of each life influenced by the soul's store of merit."[31] Merit can be earned by providing aid to one's parents, despite the nature of the work itself. Most villages believe that children owe a debt of merit (bun khun) to their parents for their having endured the hardships of childbearing.[32] The merit gained would bless the young women in their next life, negating the effects of having been a sex worker. In the journal Voice of Thai Women, Skrobanek tells the story of a twenty-year-old female sex worker, Nang, in Bangkok. When a European man tries to help Nang escape from the bar she works at, she expresses no plans to quit working there because the money she earns provides her with more than enough for the basic needs of her and her family. These reactions do not seem to be those of a forced or victimized woman, but rather the choice and informed decision of a sex worker to make money because her filial piety outweighs any stigma.

Like Nang, there are many other women in Thailand aware of the risks and reputation of the sex industry who still give their consent to migrate to Bangkok as sex workers, believing "that a good deed for one's mother is equivalent in merit to a good deed for ten others."[33] Some of them even describe that their sex work is a modern urban activity that young Thai women enjoy. In 2002 a former sex worker from Phayao village in her 30s stated, "I had a very good income, worked short hours, indoors, it wasn't hot, I could shop with my friends during the day, and my skin stayed white. I don't really think it was bad."[34] The assertion of the former sex worker illustrates how some young women understand prostitution as a tradition and as a normal job in the city. The social stigma and reputation as a sex worker is weaker than in other non-Buddhist countries.

However, not all educated and informed women give their consent because of their religious beliefs; others have no other alternative. Many women in Southeast Asia become prostitutes out of economic desperation and lack of other job opportunities. In August of 2009 a Women's Community Revitalization Project (WCRP) field reporter interviewed Ma Thit Thit, an eighteen-year-old woman from Burma working in Ye township. "Think about it, nobody

28   L. S. Dewaraja, The Position of Women in Buddhism, (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1981), 8.

29   Andréa Vilchez, "Human Sex Trafficking in Thailand," Aquinas Group, May 2011, <http://aquinasgroup1234.blogspot.com/2011/05/andrea-vilchez-since-early-1960s.html>.

30   Sakhro banēk Siriphǫn and Nataya Boonpakdee and Chutimā Čhanthathīrō, The Traffic in Women: Human Realities of the International Sex Trade, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 20.

31   Mensendiek, "Women, Migration and Prostitution in Thailand," International Social Work 40:2 (1997): 163.

32   Ibid., 164.

33   Ibid., 26.

34   Lisa Rende Taylor, "The Behavioral Ecology of Child Labor and Prostitution in Rural Northern Thailand," Current Anthropology 46:3 (2005): 4-6.

35   Lalit K. Jha, "Report: Why Burmese
      Women Become Sex Workers," The Offi-
      cial Website of Human Rights Foundation
      of Monland, Nov. 2009, <http://rehmon-
      nya.org/archives/1156>.

36   Maung Htin Aung, "Government and
      History of Myanmar," Encyclopædia
      Britannica, 2013.

37   Jha, "Report: Why Burmese Women Become
      Sex Workers," 2009.

38   Ibid.

39   United Nations, "Protocol to Prevent,
      Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
      Persons," 2.

enjoys working as a prostitute, but we have no money to survive,"[35] she said. Poverty disproportionately affects women, who consistently receive less pay than men for equal positions. Many women do not have the skills or education to find work outside of the house, yet daughters in Burma are often expected to provide for their parents. This vulnerable socio-economic status often leads women to enter the sex industry, but few of them tell their families how they earned the money. "My family doesn't know what I am doing here. I lied to them and told them I worked at a normal job," added Ma Thit Thit. As her experience reflects, a large number of sex workers in Burma are not tricked or forced into the trade; in fact, they are well aware of their situation. However, they do not become prostitutes out of their own volition but out of economic necessity to survive. Ma further explained, "Even though it is not a good job, I decided to work as a prostitute so that I could earn a higher income to send back to my family . . . We are poor and need the money."

Burma is one of the world's poorest countries and was ruled from 1988 until 2011 by a brutal military junta called the State Police and Development Council (SPDC).[36] The SPDC's political mismanagement and isolationist policies led to rising inflation and economic stagnation in the country. Moreover, in 1997 with the Asian financial crisis, Burma's already weak economy sank even further leading to more job cuts and rising unemployment.[37] Many women who leave their country (or their villages) are cognizant of the kind of work that awaits them, but still migrate for employment in the sex industry, feeling it is their only alternative. The choice to migrate remains a free and autonomous one since the women are capable of making informed decisions for their own lives. Nevertheless, Ma's experience demonstrates that she did not have the ability to maintain her autonomy. "Even though I know this is not a good job . . . we are poor and always face a shortage of money. Therefore, I must do it even though I don't want to," said Ma Thit Thit.[38] In the face of only unappealing options, a woman's choice to engage in sex work cannot be deemed a truly autonomous one, although it may be the best option from the available array of life choices. A strict definition of coercion cannot always capture the levels of softly coercive elements within the lives of women who seemingly voluntarily choose to migrate for sex work.

Similarly, a strict definition of consent or non-consent cannot fully reflect the cases in which the trafficker induces the victim through deception and fraud, rather than coercion or force. Any consent given to a specified act cannot be considered informed and legitimate when important information for the decision-making process is withheld from the consenting agent.[39] The following story will reflect the shared experiences of ordinary women who hope to cross the

border and find a lawful employment upon arrival, yet are instead subjected to illegal entry and forced to work as sex workers—a reality far from that which was promised.

Vahn[40] was sixteen years old when she was deceived into becoming a sex worker. She is from Champasak, a province in Laos. One day, a woman whom Vahn's family knew very well came to visit and told Vahn about a job opportunity as a housekeeper at the border between Thailand and Malaysia. "You will be well paid, earning 4,500 Baht [140 USD] a month, in a good environment and it will be easy work,"[41] the woman said. But this woman was a trafficker. In total there were four families who agreed to send four of their young daughters to the border, including Vahn, with the promise that they would be safe and well paid. When they arrived at their final destination they did not see a home but instead a karaoke bar/massage/beauty salon. The next day they received massage training, and then they were informed that they also had to provide sexual services. At first the girls refused, but then the trafficker told them they would have to pay back all the expenses that they had previously been told were covered. Since it was impossible for them to pay this amount, and they did not have the documentation to leave, they were forced to work as sex workers. As Vahn's story demonstrates, such deception can render a situation of facilitated migration one of human trafficking. Regardless of the original arrangement to accept the job, the presence of fraud means there was no valid agreement to sex work—the original consent has been nullified and no longer applicable.

All in all, one can determine that the ability to distinguish between victims of human trafficking and willing participants is informed by social notions about human dignity and moral culpability, and how each situates consent. While the liberal approach maintains the importance of consent and respect for human dignity and voluntary undertakings, the gendered approach, on the contrary, discounts the connection between human dignity and the exercise of personal autonomy. To be effective, however, it is also necessary to evaluate the sequence of choice that gave rise to the lack of agreeable alternatives.[42] Regardless of whether or not one is inclined to agree with the gendered or liberal approach, what appears undeniable is that each view is supported by an anti-trafficking construct. Hence, confusion and injustices regarding victim identification is likely to continue—and probably increase—so long as one tries to narrow down each case to either side of the line. The testimonies of different former sex workers around Southeast Asia demonstrate that in the real world, most women fall within the spectrum of consent or the grey area between a fully informed decision and a forced act of trafficking. Though placing consent and coercion within a continuum will make it more difficult to implement policy

40   Vahn is not her real name.

41   Rick Reece, "A Survivor of Human Trafficking," Village Focus International, 2013, 1.

42   Asian Development Bank, "Facilitating Safe Labor Migration in the Greater Mekong Sub-region," Issues, Challenges and Forward-Looking Interventions, 2013, 14.

43 Sivananthi Thanenthiran, and Sai
    Jyothirmai Racherla, "Reclaiming &
    Redefining Rights: Status of Sexual and
    Reproductive Health and Rights in Asia
    Pacific," Asian-Pacific Resource &
    Research Centre for Women (ARROW),
    2013, <http://www.arrow.org.my/
    publications/ICPD+15/
    Reclaiming&Redefining%20Rights.pdf>.

within the legal framework, treating consent and coercion as binaries ignores the complexities of a human trafficking victim's situation and regresses to a retrograde understanding of human trafficking.[43]

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"Ulei Română" During World War II and Beyond:

Development of the Romanian Oil Industry

JAMES GADEA

1   Ray Ward, Those Brave Crews: The Epic Raid to Destroy Hitler's Ploesti Oil Fields (Waverly, NY: Weldon Publications, 2003), 5-6.

2   Ilie Gadea was born on May 2, 1913 in what was the former empire of Austria-Hungary. He died June 28, 2009 at the age of 96. He also happened to be my great-grandfather, whom I am very thankful to have known.

3   Gadea, Dinu, Interview by James Gadea, Personal Interview, December 28, 2013.

4   Jay A. Stout, Fortress Ploesti: The Campaign to Destroy Hitler's Oil (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2003), xvi.

And elsewhere German columns raced
By light of burning Russian farms
Across the steppes of the Ukraine;
These deep incursions, Blitzkrieg paced,
Could win the war for German arms.
The Allies must a respite gain!
Thus was conceived an Air force blow

To shift the focus of the foe –
A strike at underbelly soft,
The oil supplies near Bucharest
On which depend each turning tread
Of tank, each truck, each plane aloft.
Then would those armies grind to rest,
With Blitzkrieg, for all purpose, dead!
—RAY WARD[1]

The clouds above were dark and hinted at the coming storm. As the wind blew ominously, a man perched on the foot of one of the many derricks peered into the night sky. He saw nothing. Turning his head to scan the horizon he heard a faint rumbling. The roar of the metal grasshoppers could be made out coming from where the sun was beginning to rise. With the sun's rays came an onslaught of loud alarms from the oil fields. An attack was imminent. Ilie,[2] the Romanian oil guard, knew the bombings would soon commence.[3]

The fields of Ploieşti where Ilie was posted would become the site of multiple air bombings by the Americans and Soviets. Along with the rest of the Romanian oil industry, Ploieşti's fields fueled the Nazi regime during World War II until their destruction. The history of the Romanian oil industry and its relation to World War II is an interesting topic that sheds light on the role resources can play in power structures and war. Romania, for many years, was one of the largest albeit most seldom recognized suppliers of oil to Europe.[4]

This analysis examines the history and development of the Romanian oil industry and how it affected the outcome

of World War II, the tactics of Germany and the Soviet Union in dealing with Romania's oil, and the Balkan political scene. It goes on to use a variety of lenses to evaluate alternatives that modern-day Romania can adopt to strengthen its extractive industries.

Current academic literature says little about how Romania used its dependence on the Axis powers to accomplish its foreign policy goals while dealing with its status as a "puppet state." Romania, under a 90-year prewar contract with Germany, went on to use its petroleum resources as leverage against Nazi Germany. The Romanian administration, though nominally allied with the Nazis, attempted to gain economic and political sovereignty via accomplished its ownership of the oil industries; yet with the damage to its fields and refineries at Ploieşti, Romania effectively lost its leverage against Germany and faced greater difficulties in the negotiation of favorable postwar deals.[5]

THE HISTORY OF ROMANIAN OIL

Bucharest, the capital of Romania, was known worldwide as the "first city illuminated with kerosene" in the 19th century.[6] On April 1, 1857, one thousand oil street lamps became active across the city in a huge display of its modernity, illuminating the cobblestone streets of what many called "the Paris of the Balkans".[7,8] Romania's display of its innovations did not end with Bucharest's illumination, instead continuing with the invention of the blowout protector[9] and a method of refining oil using sulfur dioxide.[10,11] Romania's connection to the oil industry began early and would continue to be nurtured throughout the nation's history.

MEDIEVAL AND PRE-INDUSTRIAL HISTORY

Archaeological explorations have uncovered Roman mugs with pieces of pitch from the 3rd century as well as bitumen[12] dating to the 5th and 6th centuries.[13] Records of Romanian oil date back as far as October 4, 1440, where a letter written by the sons of King Alexander the Good described a town "opposite from the black oil." A monk by the name of Bandini was particularly interested in the Romanian oil reserves, writing about them in 1646.[15] The first mentions of the extraction of black oil itself were made on November 22, 1517, in Wallachia.[16]

Early extraction of oil in Romania was done for "the lubrication of cart axels, the lighting of boyar[17] courts or the treatment of certain diseases in people or animals."[18] To extract the oil from the ground, the inhabitants of Romania would use oil mines, digs (the classic "hole-in-the-ground"

5   This is why post-WWII, the USSR was able to annex Moldova.

6   The Romanian Embassy in Kuwait, "The Romanian Oil Industry," N.D., <http://kuweit.mae.ro/sites/kuweit.mae.ro/files/romanian_oil_industry.pdf>.

7   Gadea, Erica, Interview by James Gadea, Personal Interview, December 28, 2013.

8   The Romanian Embassy in Kuwait, "The Romanian Oil Industry," N.D., <http://kuweit.mae.ro/sites/kuweit.mae.ro/files/romanian_oil_industry.pdf>.

9   A blowout protector is a device that stops oil derricks from exploding under extreme pressure.

10   Invented by the Romanian, Lazar Edeleanu.

11   The Romanian Embassy in Kuwait, "The Romanian Oil Industry," N.D., <http://kuweit.mae.ro/sites/kuweit.mae.ro/files/romanian_oil_industry.pdf>.

12   Bitumen is a type of asphalt, frequently used during the Byzantine era.

13   Radio Romania International, "The History of Romanian Oil Industry," Radio Romania International, last modified July 9, 2007, accessed May 10, 2014, <http://old.rri.ro/arh-art.shtml?lang=1&sec=9&art=3596>.

14   Gheorghe Buzatu, History of Romanian Oil Volume I (Bucharest: Mica Valahie House, 2006), 33.

15   Ibid., 34.

16   Ibid.

17   The boyars were a rich upper class in Romania who were essentially the serf lords of early Romania, taxing and receiving a portion of the agricultural production from their serfs' lands.

18   Gheorghe Buzatu, History of Romanian Oil Volume I (Bucharest: Mica Valahie House, 2006), 33.

19   Ibid, 35.

20   "The History of Romanian Oil Industry, " 2007.

21   "The Romanian Oil Industry," <http://kuweit.mae.ro/sites/kuweit.mae.ro/files/romanian_oil_industry.pdf>.

22   "150 Years of Oil in Romania!" History, <http://www.150deanidepetrol.ro/history.html>.

23   Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 24-25.

24   The 1861 oil well was drilled to a depth of 150m, an enormous amount for the time.

25   "150 Years of Oil in Romania!" History, <http://www.150deanidepetrol.ro/history.html>.

26   Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 132.

27   "The Romanian Oil Industry".

28   Yergin, 132.

29   Ralph W. Hidy and Muriel E. Hidy, Pioneering in Big Business, 1882-1911 (New York: Harper & Brothers,1951).

30   George Sweet Gibb, and Evelyn H. Knowlton, The Resurgent Years, 1911-1927 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956).

31   Ibid., 179-180.

32   Ibid.

33   Ibid.

34   Nicolae Titulescu, George G. Potra, and C. I. Turcu, Romania's Foreign Policy, 1937 (București: Encyclopaedic House, 1994).

approach), and derricks, which became particularly popular in the mid-1800s.[19] Gabriela Tanasescu, a recent director of the National Oil Museum in Ploieşti, explained, "crude oil exploitation simply meant collection from the shallow pits and ditches in the outcrops of the Sub-Carpathian area."[20]

In 1857, Romania moved on to become a global player in the oil business. It became the first country to officially record its petroleum production (275 tonnes for the year) and opened the first refinery using techniques similar to those of alcohol distillation.[22] Oil pumps were designed and built in Romania as well, by N. Choss in 1840 and M. Heimsohn in 1844,[22] improving access to deeper underground reserves.[23] In 1861,[24] Romania had built its first well, using rods and the auger type bit.[25] Austro-Hungarian banks began investing in Romania's oil industry in the 1890s and the industry thus began adopting more of the technological innovations as more capital became available.[26] The modern oil industry in Romania had been born.

20TH CENTURY

In 1907, the Romanian-American Company became the first to use a rotary bit in oil well drilling.[27] Coupled with foreign investment in the oil industry from Standard Oil, the Deutsche Bank, and Royal Dutch, Romania's output increased sevenfold from 1900 to 1910, turning Romania into a global oil producer.[28,29,30]

World War I, the beginning of modern mechanized war, caused global oil demand to skyrocket. In August 1916, Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary while fearing a Russian attack (bringing it into war with Germany as well)[31] Up to that point, Germany had been reliant on Romanian oil for its war efforts—in a postwar account, General Erich Ludendorff admitted that Germany "should not have been able to exist, much less to carry on the war, without Rumania's corn and oil."[32] Seeking to reduce its dependence, Germany mounted an unsuccessful attack on Romania a month later.[33] Romania, however, ultimately was not able to maintain total control over its resources. Nicolae Titulescu, Romanian diplomat and foreign minister, reflected on the situation:

> On May 7, 1918, the negotiations between Romania and the Central Powers end in the signature of a "treaty" of peace ("Bucharest Peace") . . . to accept the German monopoly over commerce with Romanian cereals, over timber exploitation and processing; German control on the Danube navigation; Romanian shipyards passed into the ownership of the German State; total German monopoly over the exploitation of oil for 90 years, etc.[34]

Titulescu stated afterwards that "friendship with Germany [was] imperative for us."[35] For Romania, the key result of the Bucharest Peace was that its relationship with Germany gained fundamental importance.

By 1928, the United States, Venezuela, Romania, and the Soviet Union's oil outputs led to a worldwide fall in oil prices and a decrease in profit margins for oil companies.[36] Before the beginning of World War II, Russia's crude oil production began to fall significantly from highs in the 1930s.[37] Though Russia was in need of foreign oil to accommodate for its drop in production, Romania in 1937 was the 7th largest producer in the world after Russia, the United States, Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, and the Dutch Indies (Indonesia).[38]

World War II significantly recalibrated existing interstate power relationships. On March 7, 1936, Germany seized the Rhine, to which Romania responded by increasing the price of oil shipments—a strategic move given that 37 percent of Germany's oil came from Romania.[39] The Romanian oil industry carried such importance to Germany that part of the motivation behind Hitler's Russian campaign was that it would ensure the safety of oil supplies in Ploieşti.[40] Romania began to use the fields as political leverage against Germany, attempting to gain more independence by threatening Germany.Nevertheless, Nazi control over Romania tightened over the course of the war, prompting American and Russian bombardments as the war progressed.

MODERN

The post-World War history of the Romanian oil industry is punctuated with further technological innovations and accomplishments. As Romania's oil industry recovered after the war, it reached peak oil production in 1976. In 1951, the first water injection operation on the industrial scale occurred at Sarmatian Boldesti oil field, giving oil companies even greater access to oil resources.[41]

Nicolae Ceausescu, the former dictator of Romania, invested billions of dollars in the 1970s in the construction of refineries capable of processing greater volumes of crude oil.[42] The ensuing decreases in domestic oil production meant that the refineries capable of processing 34 million tons of crude per year now only processed 7 million.[43] The old refineries built under Ceausescu now need renovation and a new source of oil.[44] Exploration has thus begun throughout Romania: attempts to reach oil in more remote locations have led to wells such as the 1984 Baicoi well, which reached depths of 7025 meters.[45]

35 Ibid.

36 Yergin, 261.

37 Robert E. Ebel, Communist Trade in Oil and Gas; an Evaluation of the Future Export Capability of the Soviet Bloc (New York: Praeger, 1970), 25.

38 "150 Years of Oil in Romania!" <http://www.150deanidepetrol.ro/facts-about-oil.html>.

39 Robert Goralski, and Russell W. Freeburg, Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat, (New York: Morrow, 1987), 23.

40 Yergin, 334.

41 "The Romanian Oil Industry". <http://kuweit.mae.ro/sites/kuweit.mae.ro/files/romanian_oil_industry.pdf>.

42 Colin Woodard, "Romanian Oil Industry Strives for a Comeback," The Christian Science Monitor, May 2, 1995, <http://www.csmonitor.com/1995/0502/02081.html/%28page%29/2>.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 "The Romanian Oil Industry".

46 David Painter, "International Oil and National Security," Daedalus 120 (1991): 184.

47 Robert Goralski, and Russell W. Freeburg, Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat, (New York: Morrow, 1987), 214-215.

48 Ibid.

49 Charles Hood, and Christine Mugnolo, Bombing Ploesti, August 1st, 1943 (Los Angeles: Red Hen, 2008).

50 Ibid.

51 Also in World War I, Romanians destroyed their own oil fields at the request of the Allied forces, so that Germany could not seize them.

52 Yergin, 334-335.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Goralski, 79.

56 Yergin, 334.

57 Goralski, 79.

ROMANIAN OIL AND WORLD WAR II

World War II revealed the true importance of oil in modern warfare. Fighting ships, seagoing freighters, tanks, airplanes, motorized troop transport, and submarines all depended on oil; without oil, there would be no mechanization.[46] Nazi offensive campaigns required especially large amounts of oil, making the resource integral to "blitzkrieg" tactics in the first half of the war.

Romanians themselves became accustomed to life with oil—they, too, wished to have oil for their own purposes. Yet the Nazis all but begged for oil. In October 1942, General Wilhelm Keitel wrote to Premier Ion Antonescu:

> ". . . I beg Your Excellency to increase to the maximum degree these deliveries of fuel to Italy which are exclusively reserved for supplying the fleet called upon to maintain important positions in the Mediterranean for the purpose of joint warfare."[47]

Antonescu replied and said that Romania could spare no more oil. Months later, Hitler "reproachfully" replied that North Africa was lost "due to lack of oil supplies."[48] In the end, the oil fields' slowing in production due to the war's extension to Romania played a pivotal role in the overall German defeat.

PLOIEȘTI OIL FIELD BOMBINGS

The city of Ploieşti was originally founded in 1500 as a small market town, but nearby oil fields later became the home to sprawling oil derricks and refineries.[49] Today, the city shows the remnants of the war, wrecks of airplanes dotting its vicinity.[50]

Ploieşti was home to the majority of the oil fields in Romania during World War II, and it hence became a major target for Allied bombings.[51] The city's fields themselves were Europe's largest individual source of petroleum outside the Soviet Union.[52] More importantly, 58 percent of Germany's total oil imports in 1940 came from the fields at Ploieşti.[53] Hitler saw the proximity of the Soviets as a "permanent threat" to the Ploieşti oil fields of Romania.[54] Germany valued the fields immensely, sending its own forces to protect the fields.[55] "The life of the Axis depends on those oilfields," Hitler told Mussolini.[56]

As a result, Hitler sent 50,000 Luftwaffe personnel and three squadrons of Messerschmitt Me-109 fighters to intercept bombers and minimize damage.[57] The Allied forces were not deterred: during Operation Tidal Wave, 162 American B-24

bombers on low-altitude sorties targeted the fields.[58] Oil historians Goralski and Freeburg also point out that "few people are aware of Russian strategic bombing of the Ploiești area in June 1941."[59] The Russians, hence, also wished to wipe out the oil fields. Under the combined force of American and Soviet bombings, the fields' production declined severely, as can be seen by the following graph.

58 Stout, 2003.

59 Goralski, 78-79.

60 "Cele Mai Recente știri," Petrom, <http://www.petrom.com/>.

THE FALL OF THE ROMANIAN OIL INDUSTRY

FIGURE 1. Romanian Oil Production and Peak (Petrom)

Created by Petrom,[60] Romania's national petroleum company, the preceding graph breaks down Romanian oil production over time. The results of World War II are evident as the oil industry receded, badly damaged by Allied bombings. Also visible is the ensuing Communist push to achieve a great deal of production in the years following the war via investment in new refineries. Current explorations suggest the potential for accessing reserves that may help Romania increase production to levels closer to those of 1976.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONFLICT

To understand how the Romanian oil industry affected the outcome and shape of World War II, understanding the drivers of the conflict is critical.[61] One such driver is oil itself. The resource curse in which plentiful natural resources have a paradoxically negative impact in a society seems to apply to much of Romania's history. Group dynamics begin to feed into the conflict:[62] in Romania, the war led to group polarization, with those advocating for selling oil to Nazi Germany experiencing backlash from an opposition strongly in favor of independence from both Germany and the USSR.

Romania's oil industry and its relationship to World War II is a narrative rich with characters. The actors present played

61 Alan Tidwell, "Conflict Analysis." Lecture, Washington, DC, Feb. 6, 2014.

62 Richard Ned Lebow, Dean G. Pruitt, and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement." Political Psychology 8.4 (1987): 685.

63 Leslie E. Grayson, National Oil Companies (Chichester: Wiley, 1981), 5.

64 Dietrich Eichholtz, War for Oil: The Nazi Quest for an Oil Empire (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012).

a role in the decision-making process on various levels and influenced how Romania ultimately came out of the war. On the international level, Nazi Germany, Romania, the Soviet Union, the Allies, and multinational oil companies (oil MNCs)[63] all fought for influence or to influence.[64] On the Romanian national level, oil industry workers, the Romanian army, and the governance of Ploieşti all played various roles in the conflict, with the Romanian army particularly involved as a result of their use as oil industry guards. At the local level, constituent groups include the village people in direct vicinity of oil wells or other extractive outposts, oil equipment merchants, and the community of petroleum engineers and mechanics in Romania.

At each level of analysis, different groups present often-divergent interests in the conflict and on Romania's relationship with oil. On one hand, Romania valued its independence from European powers more than it did revenues coming in from oil wells and refineries. Other countries, like Germany and the USSR, instead harbored interest in the petroleum itself. They in turn valued the Romanian oil industry for the energy it could supply to their campaigns. For the Allies, the Romanian oil industry was seen as an easy asset waiting to be seized by Germany; their interest was not in seizing the oil, but rather destroying it and incapacitating Germany.

On the national level, the Romanian army's interests were to protect the state, which in this case overlapped with the need to defend strategic oil assets. While the army faced critical challenges by simultaneously guarding the oil fields and defending the frontlines, city governances also needed oil for their own needs. On the highly local level, oil equipment merchants, petroleum engineers, and oil field workers were interested in the survival of the Romanian oil industry in order to retain employment.

The conflict has a variety of moving parts to be explored through international, national, and local lenses. This setup provides a more comprehensive approach to understanding the conflict and helps break it down into manageable levels.

INTERNATIONAL

65 "Înregistrare Senzaţională Cu Hitler: Fără Petrolul Din România Nu Aş Fi Atacat Niciodată URSS-ul | Historia," Historia. ro, <http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/ actualitate/articol/inregistrare-senzation-ala-hitler-petrolul-romania-nu-fi-atacat-nici>.

In a recently declassified recording with the then-Commander in Chief of the Finnish Armed Forces dated June of 1942, Hitler admitted, "if then Russia would occupy Romanian oil sources, well then Germany would [be] lost!"[65] The Allies saw the Romanian oil industry as the Achilles heel of the Nazi empire: if they could destroy them, the Nazis would be stopped dead in their tracks. In the mix of this international political reasoning were the oil multinational companies, who sought to

stay profitable wherever they operated. Expectedly, destroyed oil refineries or fields in Romania did not spell good news for the MNCs.

NATIONAL

Author Maurice Pearton, expert on the Romanian oil industry, notes that economic warfare became the basis of the Allied and Axis strategies in Romania: "The Allies had superior position 'on the ground' by reason of their established companies . . . [and] the State was becoming increasingly pro-German."[66] According to Pearton, the Romanian state sided with Germany due to its historical and demographic connections with Germany, trade relations, and previous treaties such as the Bucharest Peace.

The Romanian Army thus had to guard its oil fields from Allied attacks. The army served the national government's interests, which in this case seemed to be more about protecting the oil than protecting its borders.[67] While this might not make sense at first sight, upon closer examination, the Romanian administration had its own reasoning for this decision. In their eyes, the Romanian oil industry was the key to their independence. Fighting off attackers and joining campaigns would not ensure Romania's survival, but protecting its oil industry would at least preserve the one form of leverage Romania had against the great powers in Europe.

LOCAL

At the local level the conflict affected oil equipment merchants and petroleum engineers in the Romanian extractive sector.[68] These highly skilled laborers favored having a working oil industry in place in Romania. Though oil field workers themselves valued their jobs as well, their interests conflicted with those of local farmers and fishers.[69] Nearby towns often feared the detrimental environmental effects of oil drilling while also desiring a share of the profits.

THE MODERN ROMANIAN OIL INDUSTRY

Today, Romania seeks to increase its political and economic sovereignty by developing and reshaping its petroleum, natural gas, and shale gas industries to decrease its reliance on Russian gas.[70] Russia accounted for almost the entirety of Romania's total natural gas imports in 2011 (97 percent).[71]

Now an EU state, Romania has also been working on restructuring its oil and coal industries in order to make them more sustainable.[72] The EU seeks to "guarantee the increased provision of gas to European markets over coming

66 Maurice Pearton, Oil and the Romanian State, 1895-1948 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 244-245.

67 Refec, Cornel. Interview by James Gadea, Personal Interview, December 29, 2013.

68 Stephen Howarth and Joost Jonker, Powering the Hydrocarbon Revolution, 1939-1973 (London: Oxford University Press, 2007).

69 "The Dutch Disease" The Economist, November 26, 1977.

70 US Energy Information Administration, "Romania", Last modified August 2013, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=ro>.

71 Ibid.

72 International Energy Agency. Black Sea Energy Survey (Paris: IEA, 2000).

73   James Marriott, and Mika Minio-Paluello, The Oil Road (London: Verso, 2013), 109.

74   Goralski, 330.

75   Woodard, "Romanian Oil Industry Strives for a Comeback," 1995.

76   Ibid.

77   Ibid.

78   Central Intelligence Agency. "Field Listing : Crude Oil-Proved Reserves."Central Intelligence Agency. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2244.html>.

79   US Department of the Interior, US Geological Survey, Transylvanian Composite Total Petroleum System of the Transylvanian Basin Province, Romania, Eastern Europe, by M. J. Pawlewicz, US Geological Survey, Bulletin 2204-E, (Reston, VA, 2005), <http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2204/e/pdf/B2204E.pdf>.

80   "Tech Talk—The Potential for Future Production from Romania." The Oil Drum. 23 Jan. 2012. 10 May 2014. <http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8855>.

81   US Department of the Interior, US Geological Survey, Total Petroleum Systems of the Carpathian–Balkanian Basin Province of Romania and Bulgaria, US Geological Survey Bulletin 2204–F, (Reston, Virginia, 2007), <http://pubs.usgs.gov/bul/2204/f/pdf/B2204F_508.pdf>.

82   B.M. Popescu, "Romania's petroleum systems and their remaining potential," Petroleum Geoscience 1 (1995): 337–350.

83   Csaba Krézsek, "Petroleum Systems of Romania," AAPG European Region Newsletter, June 2011 <http://europe.aapg.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/AAPG_Newsletter-June-2011_final_fixed2.pdf>.

84   Tidwell, "Conflict Analysis," 2014.

decades", something Romania is attempting to follow with its national policies.[73] In spite of extensive importation, natural gas shortages have led to the Romanian joke, "Don't open the window. People on the street will catch a cold and die."[74]

The quest for energy independence has been driven by new explorations into potential fossil fuel deposits. The Shell Corporation, Amoco Corporation, and the U.K.'s Enterprise Oil have begun drilling test wells in Transylvania, the eastern Carpathians, and the Black Sea respectively.[75] The rights to drill and explore granted by the government also included the caveat that a certain "proportion of any production must be shared with the Romanian state." [76] Miron Bojinca, a Romanian Development Agency petroleum expert, notes that "[new discoveries] would be an enormous boost for the Romanian economy," yet "[it] will probably be several years before we know what's out there."[77]

Recent explorations have netted potentially new oil and gas reserves. According to the CIA, proven oil reserves in Romania are roughly 600 million bbl. (1 January 2013 est.).[78] Resource assessments for the Transylvanian Hybrid Total Petroleum System have estimated around 2.083 trillion cubic feet of gas potentially available for extraction.[79] An ExxonMobil-Petrom partnership estimates crude oil reserves in one of its exploration sites to be upward of 420 million barrels.[80] The fossil fuel resources in the Carpathian–Balkanian Basin Province have been estimated to be "2,076 billion cubic feet of gas, 1,013 million barrels of oil, and 116 million barrels of natural gas liquids."[81] Exploration efforts, in all, have been based on the idea of "[going] deeper while applying state-of-the-art exploration methods."[82,83]

IMPLICATIONS

What could modern-day Romania learn from its historical relationship with the oil industry? Now that new reserves may be available, how should the country proceed? Addressing the various international, national, and local issues with policy suggestions at each level may provide feasible answers.[84]

In terms of social concerns, creating Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) between corporate and local entities (particularly Romanian villages) would provide benefits to the local community while also ridding concerns over corruption. One option of a PPP would be the establishment of more modern schools (with modernized facilities) in rural Romanian villages, particularly for the Roma (Gypsy) population. Unlike in World War II, where there was little benefit brought to the local communities from the oil industry, PPPs could provide the local Romanian population with a variety of educational and social benefits.

When addressing political concerns at the national level, transparency becomes paramount. More outreach to local communities with information about mining and exploration is needed. Oil companies may need to make decision-making processes more democratic through more town-hall meetings and increased access to environmental, economic, and trade data. Such transparency did not exist during World War II, and would benefit Romania if present today, enabling more accountability for the multinational companies that will be extracting Romania's resources.

In regards to economic concerns, the creation of a Sovereign Wealth Fund would benefit the economic growth of Romania with sustainable income for its social services. Creating a government pension fund from part of Romania's profits out of the extractive industries sector would ensure that the Romanian extractive industries would have a sustainable and positive impact on the countries in which they operate.

As for concerns regarding international environmental concerns, an Environmental Task Force and stricter regulations regarding new techniques of oil extraction could be imposed. Independent teams sent on-site to monitor corporate compliance with strict environmental laws may ensure maximum accountability toward following companies' environmental promises. Stricter regulations over new extractive techniques, moreover, would help reduce regulatory loopholes companies may otherwise use to circumnavigate regulations.

In essence, Romania's oil industry is an intricate and multifaceted natural resource system, undergoing different roles in various conflicts throughout its history. Romania is an aspiring Eastern European state seeking to cement itself as an independent, pro-Western nation free from the sway of Russia. At the same time, it is seeking to gain economic autonomy by diversifying its natural resources and expanding its reserve of available resources. Historically, it has used its resources to solidify its independence from other countries, and there is no reason to believe that this cannot be the case today in the 21st century. Romania seeks to explore offshore, to expand oil drilling across its lands, and to have more access to more resources. So what will then happen? In the near future, Romania may succeed in acquiring the necessary connections and funding to explore for and extract these fossil fuels. As Romania advances into modernity, its best bet for a strong extractive industry is apparent: listen to the age-old adage and study the past.

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Tunisia Today

Historical Statebuilding Processes as Predictors of Post-Arab Spring Success

KATE MASSINGER

Tunisia's post-Arab Spring development has been punctuated by a series of promising successes. Last spring, the BBC couched the nation's recent passing of electoral law as "one of the last steps towards the country becoming a full democracy," three years after the May 2011 uprising that forced President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali into exile.[1] This electoral law includes date-setting procedures for presidential and legislative polling as well as stipulations regarding gender balancing in party lists; tellingly, it does not impose restrictions on officials that served in the Ben Ali regime.[2] Each of these legislative components seems to foreshadow what will eventually become a stable, institutionalized electoral process.

This initiative within Tunisia's interim parliament is the most recent link in a chain of what many regional scholars deem promising moves towards democracy. At the close of 2013, hope and warning coexisted. Democratic elections in the fall of 2011 had produced a secular state governed by a moderate Islamist party, and the nation seemed eager to both form a new constitution and include women in the process. However, success has been tempered by cautious realism; when democratically-elected Ennahda was pressured by secular groups to relinquish its power last September, political science truism was confirmed: "it seems to be difficult for a country to [institute] democracy [where there is] an authoritarian heritage."[3,4] And yet, after an arduous two-year drafting process accompanied by "high unemployment, protests, terrorist attacks, and political assassinations," in January 2014 the nation found itself with a compromise: a civil constitution that is separate from Islamic law and "dedicated to protecting citizens' rights, including protection from torture, the right to due process, and freedom of worship," as well as a "commitment . . . to protect women's rights."[5] Elections, too, are on the horizon; both presidential and primary votes are slated for late November 2014, and will mark "the country's final step towards full democracy."[6] Why is Tunisia earning rapid scholarly recognition as the best (if not the only) case of post-Arab Spring success?

[1] Tunisian assembly approves electoral law," BBC NEWS Africa, May 1 2014, Accessed May 7, 2014.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Basak Akar Yüksel, and Yilmaz Bingöl, "The Arab Spring in Tunisia: A Liberal Democratic Transition?" Electronic Journal of Social Sciences 12.4 (2013): 310-327, accessed May 7, 2014.

[4] Carlotta Gall, "Islamist Party in Tunisia to Step Down," The New York Times, September 28, 2013. Accessed May 7 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/world/africa/islamist-party-in-tunisia-to-step-down.html?_r=0>.

[5] Associated Press in Tunisia, "Tunisia signs new constitution," The Guardian, January 27, 2014, accessed May 7 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/tunisia-signs-new-constitution-progressive>.

[6] Tarek Amara, "Tunisia elections probably to be held in November: election chief," Reuters, May 3, 2014, accessed May 9, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/03/us-tunisia-election-idUSBRE

7   Kamal Eldin, Osman Salih, "The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings," Arab Studies Quarterly 35.2 (2013): 184-206, accessed May 7, 2014.

Among the nations which forced leaders out of power in 2011—Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen—it is relatively simple to identify similarities in causal characteristics: in terms of structural factors like state repression and stratified economic resources, as well as by the presence of spontaneous political demonstrations and the unifying power of social media.[7] Yet, an analysis that merely discusses the similarities between Arab Spring nations cannot explain their varied trajectories after the spring of 2011, nor can it comment on the distinct conditions in which they find themselves today.

To understand Tunisia's success—i.e. its stability and progression towards a democratic state—one must examine its political history: its legacy of French colonialism, its authoritarian state-building under highly personable leaders Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali, and its institutions—political, economic, and military. This paper will first provide a brief overview of historical state-building in Tunisia, from its colonial era to the events of the Arab Spring. Next, it will argue that five central factors rooted in historical state-building processes that are integral to an understanding of Tunisia's current political landscape and its relative success in forming a democratic state. These factors are as follows: 1) ethnic and religious homogeneity; 2) strong institutions produced by France's relatively light engagement during the colonial period and by the regimes of previous leaders Bourguiba and Ben Ali; 3) a military distinct from the state apparatus; 4) economic prosperity (a relatively high GDP); and 5) a history of moderate Islam in dialogue with a secular state, dialogue that has resulted in collective acceptance of democracy and the merits of electorally-gained power. The paper will conclude with an analysis of the present day challenges that may impede Tunisian democracy as well as the democratic advantages that the nation possesses.

THE HISTORY OF TUNISIAN STATEBUILDING: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

8   Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: stability and reform in the modern Maghreb (Oxon: Routledge, 2010).

Tunisia was a French protectorate from 1881 until its independence in 1956. France maintained control over Tunisia's foreign and defense policy, collected taxes, and protected it from other European powers, but ultimately Tunisians were allowed to maintain their courts, citizenship, schools, and guilds (coalitions of artists and merchants that preceded labor unions). The Tunisian government and army maintained authority over domestic matters but were subject to French advising and approval regarding major decisions.[8]

After a successful bid for independence in 1956, characterized by the nationalistic Neo-Destour party's strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, Tunisia adopted a single-party

regime presided over by Habib Bourguiba.[9] A prolonged period of regime opposition from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s culminated in November 1987, when Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali seized power from the ailing Bourguiba in a bloodless coup. Intentionally designed to avoid civil war between Bourguiba's secular government and mobilizing Islamist groups, this coup also served to quench labor unrest.[10]

Under Ben Ali, economic growth and liberalization were coupled with increased social inequality. Further, elections appeared meaningless amidst speculation that Ben Ali's relatives would eventually succeed to the presidency. Although the authoritarian regime had been sufficiently entrenched by means of false multipartyism and a system of privatized economic patronage, indignant citizens cited this same economic inequality, cronyism, and corruption as rallying points for discontent.

It took flagrant political demonstration to channel these frustrations into uprising. On December 17, 2011, fruit vendor Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire in a public square in Ben Arous to protest police harassment. Riots spread from rural towns to Tunis, with lawyers and other professionals, civil society groups, and trade unions increasingly supporting the rebellion. On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali fled his country for exile in Saudi Arabia, and a temporary government was instated under Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi.[11] Another wave of strikes and street battles served as the final impetus for complete political change, leading to Ghannouchi's resignation on February 27, 2011. Fortunately, this surrender was followed by a period of relative peace.[12]

It is the period following Ben Ali's ousting that this paper will address—a period with significant complications but also three years rife with promising democratic successes. These successes, relative to other nations involved in the Arab Spring, can be examined and understood by means of the uniquely Tunisian state-building that precedes them.

HOMOGENEITY AND NATIONALISM: A PEOPLE UNITED

Tunisia is a small country with an overwhelmingly homogenous population; of its 10 million inhabitants, 98 percent are Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslims.[13] Eva Bellin argues that when it comes to post-Arab Spring rebuilding, Tunisia is inherently "bless[ed] . . . in socio-cultural terms . . . national unity—or at least some sense of common solidarity—is an essential underpinning of democracy."[14] According to Lauth and Kneip, "the increasing heterogenisation of democratic societies seems to be the most apparent internal challenge to modern democracies," complicating the "political

9   Jonathan G., Farley, "Tunisia—forty years on from independence," Contemporary Review 270 (1997): 125, accessed May 9, 2014.

10   Alexander, Tunisia, 37-41.

11   Rex Breynen, Pete W. Moore, Bassel F. Salloukh, and Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Beyond the Arab Spring: Authoritarianism & Democratization in the Arab World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2012).

12   "The Second Republic, Or the Third Conflict Cycle?" Institut Arabe des Chefs d Entreprise, April 30, 2014, accessed May 10, 2014, <http://www.iace.tn/?p=3897&lang=en>.

13   Alexander, Tunisia, 1.

14   Eva Bellin, "A Modest Transformation: Political Change in the Arab World After the Arab Spring," in The Arab Spring: Will it Lead to Democratic Transitions?, ed. by Clement Henry & Jang Ji-Hyang (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 34-48.

15 Hans-Joachim Lauth, and Sascha Kneip, "Heterogeneity and Democracy Reconsidered," Comparative Sociology 11 (2012): 291-303, accessed May 8, 2014.

16 Bellin, "A Modest Transformation," 38.

17 Ibid.

18 Francis Fukuyama, State-building: governance and world order in the 21st century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

inclusion of heterogeneous groups into the political system, the equal application of political rights, and the equal granting of civil rights." Simply put, when ethnic, religious, or linguistic divisions of identity are largely nonexistent, democratization is easier. Although democratic systems can avoid problems of plurality through rights-based mechanisms, fledgling democracies are still institutionalizing such procedures.[15] For post-2011 Tunisia, natural homogeneity proves a significant advantage in creating stable electoral law and systems of representation; the "divisions over identity that might prove insurmountable to other democratic aspirants do not hobble Tunisia."[16] This homogeneity can be credited both to Tunisia's small size and to its history of territorial boundary drawing.

HISTORICAL STATE-BUILDING: NON-INTERVENTION ANINSTITUTIONALIZATION

Post-Arab Spring Tunisia remains a strong state with relatively professionalized and meritocratic institutions; it owes this foundational institutionalization to a history of statebuilding and nationalistic identity formation that enables its present-day progress towards democracy.[17] It is difficult to overstate the crucial nature of organizational, managerial, and political institutions in creating strong states. However, outside powers which attempt to install these institutions illegitimately and outside of cultural norms face "grave limitations . . . to the ability . . . to create demand . . . and therefore limitations on the ability to transfer existing knowledge about institutional construction and reform to developing countries."[18] Fortuitously, domestic institutionalization in Tunisia has been, from its colonial days, a largely organic process.

Differing from the prototypical story of European colonialism, the French presence in Tunisia did not result in weakened national institutions co-opted and controlled by outside bureaucrats. French interests in Tunisia were surface-level. While France did not want another European power to control its territory, it was uninterested in creating a settler colony like the one in Algeria, and Tunisia had few natural resources to exploit. Thus, while the French maintained "ultimate power" in Tunisia, controlling foreign and defense policy and approving loans through resident ministers, the Tunisian bey (monarch) still exercised broad authority within his nation. This resulted not only in domestically based institutions—educational systems, courts, and a national military—but also in the centralization that would eventually characterize the authoritarian state. Because Tunisia "avoided the profound disruption of its central governing institutions," its eventual independent government did "not have to create a whole new order atop the rubble

of the old one;" this pattern of enduring institutionalization in the face of new systems of governance would repeat itself decades later in the spring of 2011.[19]

These enduring institutions are largely due to the regimes of Tunisia's two authoritarian leaders, Habib Bourguiba (1959-1987) and Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali (1989-2011). In 1956, after leading the nationalistic Neo-Destour party in a successful bid for independence, Bourguiba instated a highly centralized authoritarian regime that would endure, with only one rotation of power, for over fifty years. Although unified by Bourguiba's own cult of personality, the regime still managed to successfully liberalize, secularize, and institutionalize multiple aspects of the Tunisian state. This "Bourguiba-driven program" included "a major effort in implementing a national educational system at all levels, specific steps to narrow the dramatic gap between the rich and poor parts of Tunisia . . . [and] the justly famous Personal Status Law of 1956 . . . [which] in general, instituted a social revolution in the direction of women's liberation."[20]

This tradition of effective state-building continued through the regime change; at the beginning of the 1990s, Tunisia's new leader Ben Ali was praised for his championship of pluralistic democracy through the establishment of municipal competitive, nonviolent elections, as well as the restoration of professional organizations. While contemporaneous scholar I. William Zartman noted flaws in the established institutions, explaining that democracy would not come to Tunisia until true competition for the presidency existed, there was still widespread trust in the promise of eventual democratic reform in Tunisia, as illustrated by steady patterns of constitutional reform, systematized election processes, and civic organization.[21]

Of course, Tunisia's state-building history has never guaranteed a completely seamless democratic transition. Both Bourguiba and Ben Ali consistently coopted, exploited, and destroyed valid institutions for individualistic political gain. Bourguiba's regime took control of its former union ally, the Tunisian General Labor Union, crippling the union's ability to represent workers. It also instated a sham constitution that merely provided arbitrary liberty protection according to "'the dispositions of the law.'"[22] Throughout his presidency, Ben Ali took drastic steps to dismantle non-Constitutional Democratic Rally (RDC) political parties, women's rights groups and other non-governmental organizations, the Islamic party Ennahda, and professional unions, weakening the nation's organizational landscape and incapacitating forums for political dissent through jailing and exiling.[23] And yet, while the institutions created and expanded by Tunisia's authoritarian leaders may not have been inherently ripe for democracy, they have proved adequately

19 Alexander, Tunisia, 20-34.

20 L. Carl Brown, "Bourguiba and Bourgui-bism Revisited: Reflections and Interpretation," Middle East Journal 55.1 (2001): 43-57, accessed May 8, 2014.

21 I. William Zartman, "The Conduct of Political Reform: The Path Toward Democracy," in Tunisia: The Political Economy of Reform, ed. by I. William Zartman, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1999), 9-28.

22 Anderson, Tunisia, 40-41.

23 Dafna Hochman Rand, Roots of the Arab Spring (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

24 Clement Henry, "Political Economies of Transition." in The Arab Spring: Will It Lead To Democratic Transitions?, ed. by Clement Henry & Jang Ji-Hyang, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 54-75.

25 Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East," Comparative Politics 44.2 (2012): 127-149, accessed May 9, 2014.

26 Breynen et al., Beyond the Arab Spring, 37.

27 Risa Brooks, "Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the Ben Ali Regime in January 2011," Journal of Strategic Studies 36.2 (2013): 205-220, accessed May 9, 2014.

28 Lisa Anderson, "'Early Adopters' and 'Neighborhood Effects,'" in The Arab Spring: Will it Lead to Democratic Transitions?, ed. by Clement Henry & Jang Ji-Hyang, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 28-32.

29 Hauge Wenche, "When Peace Prevails: The Management of Political Crises in Ecuador, Madagascar, Tunisia, and Venezuela," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 35.4 (2010): 469-493, accessed May 9, 2014.

robust (and in cases like the military, adequately distinct from the regime) to allow for democratic adaptation rather than chaos and collapse. Ben Ali's self-serving reforms had indeed begun to "undermin[e] the legitimacy of Tunisian institutions and the substantive meaning of rule of law;" however, when the president was removed, these institutions regained strength and were reformed. As Clement Henry writes, "[c]ut off the head and then the cancer, directly infecting some 113 individuals, is curable with further judicial surgery;" the state bureaucracy remained intact and workable after the removal of crony networks and entrenched systems of elite patronage.[24]

THE TUNISIAN MILITARY: AUTONOMY AND CHARACTER

The nature of a state's coercive military apparatus played a vital role in the revolution as well as in its aftermath. The military's institutional character, i.e. its willingness to use force against citizenry and its degree of loyalty to the existing regime, determined whether it would mobilize to protect a challenged state or align itself with demands of the citizenry.[25] To the benefit of the 2011 uprising and the democratic advances that followed, Tunisia's military has consistently maintained an autonomous nature, reluctant to engage in mass repression and eager to uphold its own central interest—reputation maintenance—among the populace.[26]

Tunisian military character is most effectively explained through its historical relationship to preexisting regimes. Both Bourguiba and Ben Ali strove to maintain distance from the military, marginalizing officers and limiting its access to funding. The Tunisian military found itself on the "periphery of politics," continuing a "long-standing historical role of acting as an apparatus of the state with limited responsibilities and without a daily role in the regular management of the regime."[27] Thus, the Tunisian military establishment, foreign to combat and superseded by the military intelligence and police forces, had few ties to the Ben Ali regime; in fact, it benefited from the regime's expulsion.[28]

Perhaps surprisingly, the Tunisian military's limited scope has persevered in the post-Arab Spring era, easing the state's democratic transition by refusing to instate military rule. Military doctrine remains focused on external enemies, and is reluctant to violently seize power against the populace.[29]

ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS

Tunisia entered the spring of 2011 with a robust GDP and decades of economic growth under its belt; "[of] the non-oil states its per capita income was second only to Lebanon's,"

and "[p]rudent economic management had generated the highest per capita wealth growth rate since 1987."[30] Ironically, this prosperity contributed both to Ben Ali's downfall and to the nation's subsequent ability to build a democracy on its institutional foundations.

Although neither economic success nor income inequality had substantially worsened in the years leading up to the Arab Spring, Tunisian dissatisfaction with corruption and cronyism at the highest levels of government was crippling.[31] Education's ubiquity had outpaced the Ben Ali regime's ability to claim legitimacy; high literacy rates produced greater Internet connectivity and access to social media outlets. Ultimately, this cocktail of infuriatingly stratified wealth, 50 percent unemployment among the highly educated, and dense social networking provided both the motives and methods for rebellion.[32]

It is not particularly significant that Tunisia's economic frustrations produced social uprising—this was to be expected—but instead, it is noteworthy that Tunisia's high GDP has aided its present progression towards democracy. Preexisting literature establishes a strong correlation between GDP per capita and the viability of electoral democracy; however, reasons for this trend remain unclear, delineated as a blend of higher literacy rates, greater economic flexibility that enables compromise, and a larger middle class. Regardless of exact causation, Eva Bellin, a scholar of Arab politics, argues that Tunisia's per capita GDP is positively affecting its shift towards democracy, stating that while "income level does not make enduring democracy a statistically 'sure thing' in Tunisia, it nonetheless puts this political ambition in the realm of reasonable possibility."[33] When Ben Ali's authoritarian regime toppled, Tunisia was able to retain its high GDP, consistent with democracy, while removing the elite patronage system that had caused deep popular dissatisfaction.

Today, the nation grapples with decisions regarding Tunisia's future economic policy; any new redistributive policies will require political debate and fiscal restructuring, and policymakers must be wary of the economic losses in investment and tourism caused by prolonged national instability.[34] In the fall of 2011, a roundtable of businessmen from the Tunisian-British Chamber of Commerce identified the employment of university graduates, microfinance, and start-up development as major goals for the nation in the years ahead.[35] In the fall of 2013, troubled by economic slump, Tunisia's donors—including the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European Union—urged an overhaul of restrictive and exploitative trade, business, banking, and investment laws still lingering from Ben Ali's regime.[36] Currently, Tunisia's labor force suffers from 17.2 percent unemployment, exceeding 40 percent among youth,

30 Henry, "Political Economies," 64.

31 Breynen et al, Beyond the Arab Spring, 36.

32 Henry, "Political Economies," 66.

33 Bellin, "A Modest Transformation," 38-39.

34 Breynen et al., Beyond the Arab Spring, 21.

35 "What future for Tunisia's economy?" Middle East 426 (2011): 48-51, accessed May 8, 2014.

36 John Thorne, "Why does democracy have a shot in Tunisia? Less money," Christian Science Monitor, September 26, 2013, accessed May 9, 2014, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0926/Why-does-democracy-have-a-shot-in-Tunisia-Less-money>.

37 "The Second Republic, or the Third Cycle Conflict?", 2014.

38 Ibid.

39 Richard Youngs, "From Transformation to Mediation: The Arab Spring Reframed," Carnegie Europe, March 20, 2014, accessed May 10, 2014, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/03/20/from-transformation-to-mediation-arab-spring-reframed/h4x4>.

40 "Transition in Tunisia: A success story?", 2014.

41 "The Second Republic, or the Third Cycle Conflict?".

42 Anderson, Tunisia, 57.

43 "The Second Republic, or the Third Cycle Conflict?".

and its bureaucracy is burdened with a deficit of almost $7.5 billion.[37] Even in the wake of promising reforms this winter, Tunisia might be "heading towards crisis if its economy continues to falter," especially if governmental priorities "shift from organizing elections to concentrating on economic reforms, which can in turn jeopardize the democratic transition;" clearly, all influential factors regarding Tunisia's potential for democratic success are inextricably interwoven.[38] In spite of this, Tunisia's relatively high GDP, fostered by a history of economic openness, has and will continue to smooth the nation's attempted democratic transition, even if it does not ensure success.

ISLAM AND THE STATE: EVERYTHING IN MODERATION

In the summer of 2013, Egypt's military staged a coup that resulted in the ousting of Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi. In contrast, the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda appointed a technocratic cabinet in an attempt to appease opposition forces;[39] in September 2013, Ennahda agreed to hand over power to a non-party government, conceding to the demands of street protesters enraged by recent secular political assassinations and the struggling economy. Of course, Ennahda's motives are not entirely egalitarian; its Minister of the Interior was allowed to keep his portfolio in the new government and, in next November's elections, the party will be able to use its peaceful relinquishment as proof that it values the voice of the nation over petty party politics. However, it remains remarkable that such controversial turnover could be followed by the compromise necessary to produce a constitution and electoral law. En masse, Tunisia's ability to manage the pluralistic requests of Islamist and secular groups has greatly aided its democratic transition.[40,41]

This successful compromise and interest brokerage is rooted in Tunisia's statebuilding history: in this case, a history of pluralistic collaboration. Under Ben Ali's regime, Ennahda remained extremely open to long-term cooperation with RCD and remained committed to operation as a legal party within an electoral framework, notwithstanding its ban from the political process.[42] This willingness continued after Arab Spring activity; in 2012, parties came together in in a successful nonviolent National Dialogue lauded on both local and international levels.[43]

Ennahda itself has managed to create a brand of moderate political Islam that emanates pragmatism and the potential for longevity even within a secular Arab state. Willing to shelve its more rigid views on women's status, sharia, and blasphemy, Ennahda has approached the political process enthusiastically,

hoping that democratically gaining power and influence will naturally imbue Tunisian society with Islamic values without the need for forceful or controversial reforms.[44]

Naturally, pluralism has not been an easy task for the fledgling Tunisian democracy. When Ennahda won more than 41 percent of the vote in October 2011, violent protests broke out in Sidi Bouzid, reflecting the secular nation's fear of Islamist power in its liberal Arab country. While Ennahda did agree to step down last September, one cannot avoid the frightening reality that a democratically-elected party was forced from office in the dangerous wake of possible civil war; discourse on nationalism, secularism, and democracy has clashed with Ennahda's pan-Islamism and theocratic ideology ever since it gained power.[45] However, as long as Tunisia—and more specifically, Ennahda—can continue to champion and sustain the "inclusive ethos of the country's transition" and of its past, continued pluralistic dialogue and bargaining will only increase its chances of successful democratic transition.[46]

CONCLUSION

Democracy is no surety for Tunisia. Political instability last summer produced Tunisians pessimistic about democracy, the economy, and their leaders.[47] An ethnically homogenous populace does not guarantee politically homogenous viewpoints, institutions produced in authoritarian regimes are not automatically compatible with democratic structures, and a high GDP does not prevent the continued stratification of wealth, the presence of corruption, or the weight of unemployment. Economic downturn and a widespread "identity conflict" about the nature of this new democracy will prove challenging in the months to come, particularly with an election on the horizon.[48] However, while neither Tunisia's homogeneity, history of strong statebuilding, military character, economic prosperity, or moderate political Islam can provide guarantees for a democratic future, these factors do provide two boons worth possessing: a foundation, and hope.

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44 Monica L. Marks, "Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda's Approach to Tunisia's Constitution," Brookings Doha Center Publications 30 (2014), accessed May 10, 2014.

45 "The Second Republic, or the Third Cycle Conflict?".

46 Youngs, "From Transformation to Mediation," 2014.

47 Thorne, "Why does democracy have a shot?", 2013.

48 "The Second Republic, or the Third Cycle Conflict?".

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