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Imperial Contradiction: Australian Foreign Policy and the British Response to the Rise of Japan, 1894-1904

By **Theodore Miller**

On Street-Side Sexism: Global Awareness for a Global Problem

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The Bodhisattva and Those Who Burned: On Self-Immolation and the Silence of the Dalai Lama

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Cuba as a Humanitarian Model in the 21st Century

By **Sophia Kecskes**

The Yale Review of International Studies

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GRAPHIC DESIGN

Loide Marwanga
Ria Roberts

CONTRIBUTORS

Sophia Kecskes
Anna Meixler
Mason Ji
Katherine Fang
Theodore Miller
Cody Kahoe
Nils Metter
Azeezat Adeleke

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Dear Reader:

As you return to campus from a hopefully restful holiday season, we are pleased to present you with the first 2015 issue of the *Yale Review of International Studies (YRIS)*. Like past years, this winter issue features only submissions from Yale, in an effort to continue broadcasting the voices of this talented student community.

While always committed to publishing academically rigorous scholarship, we'd be remiss if we failed to mention our ardent pursuit to represent Yale's intellectual diversity. Each production cycle, our editorial board pays immense attention to essays that display a certain *audacity*; that is, a willingness to push the boundaries of international studies, to chart unknown or underexplored academic territory. And this issue's authors do just that. Within these pages, you will find topics that include China's scientific revolution; self-immolation in Tibet; the Haitian diaspora; US-UK-Libyan clandestine diplomacy; neo-Ottomanism in Turkey; and Australia's 20th century foreign policy under British colonial rule.

Two comments written by members of the YRIS board provide this issue's editorial voice. The topics of global activism against street harassment and a Cuban humanitarian model are closely related with trends emerging in US media and policy, and we believe they serve as important points of discussion. As always, anyone interested in further understanding these subject areas should feel free to contact us.

In regards to this issue's cover, our design team has employed artful symbolism to best capture our journal's purpose and content; the intersecting moiré flags, paired with a striking black-and-white background, represent the boldness of distinct, yet sometimes overlapping, international perspectives. As you flip through this issue's pages, we kindly request

that you reflect on the strands that connect this selection of essays—no matter how hidden they may be.

To our authors, board of academic advisors, and the Yale International Relations Association, we offer our deepest thanks. It's a privilege and an honor to continue receiving such ardent support and advice. Next issue will feature the third edition of YRIS' Dean Gooderham Acheson Prize, so please do consider us as a platform for your best work. Enjoy reading!

Sincerely,
The Editors

Cuba as a Humanitarian Model in the 21st Century

SOPHIA KECSKES

A quick Google search of “Cuba Humanitarian Aid” generates countless pages of do-gooders soliciting donations for aid to Cuban citizens. The general perception of United States citizens remains that Cuba is suffering under a harsh dictator and needs our help for liberation. Yet, these individuals seem unaware of Cuba’s impressive development progress. For example, Cuba and the US have the exact same life expectancy: 79 years.¹ Cuba also has a 100 percent literacy rate,² likely thanks to the country dedicating ten percent of its annual national budget towards education (compared with just two percent in the US).³ Further, their health care system is one of the best in the world; there are 6.7 physicians per 1,000 people,⁴ preventive care is prioritized, every individual is visited at least once a year at home by a health care provider, and the infant mortality rate is lower than the US at 5 per 1,000 live births.⁵

In addition to their exceptionally effective domestic policies, Cuba also serves our global community as a top donor of humanitarian aid. Official Cuban reports claim that between 1961

and 2008, 270,743 Cubans served in a total of 154 countries.⁶ While some experts argue that these assistance endeavors were initially rooted in efforts to promote pro-Cuban sentiment internationally and advertise their socialist views, the role of Cuban assistance has now changed from its inception in the early 1960s. In the twenty-first century, Cuba engages with our international community in a productive and helpful manner, gaining allies along the way, but more importantly, acting in accordance with the principles of the nation’s founding ideology.

Cuba’s first major aid mission was in support of Algerian troops during their war of independence against France (which plagued the nation from 1954 to 1962).⁷ This mission, and another to Chile in 1960 that provided earthquake relief, first exemplified Cuba’s comparative advantage in supplying international aid. Due to the state’s extensive control, Cuba was able to quickly mobilize military and medical professionals, send these individuals into sub-optimal conditions, and request their prolonged deployment without significant domestic resistance.

Specifically, Cuba’s response to the 1986 Chernobyl disaster serves as an example supporting the hypothesis that Cuba acts for more than purely political reasons. While the international community had responded swiftly and effectively to the immediate crisis, a pervasive body of evidence suggested that the medical impacts of the nuclear explosion were likely to remain devastating for the long term. Responding to these claims, Cuba created the “Chernobyl Children” program. This large initiative promised to provide free, comprehensive medical care for all affected kids ages 5 to 15.⁸ For nearly 25 years, Cuban doctors have provided curative care for a total of 24,000 children.⁹ In accordance with typical Cuban health care norms, children at the Tarará Pediatric Hospital are treated with an integrative approach—they’re served by a wide variety of specialists, and receive access to cutting-edge Cuban medical treatments, such as a slew of new vaccines, biotechnology resources, and more.¹⁰

This integrative approach to disaster relief treatment has inspired others to change their practices. In 2003, the Ukrainian parliament voted to make the Chernobyl Children program an official government initiative, finally agreeing to allocate funds to its development. Further, the treatment center at Tarará Pediatric Hospital in Cuba has grown and now treats young disaster victims from all over the world. For example, earthquake victims from Armenia, those affected with Cesium 137 poisoning in Brazil, and traumatized evacuees following a volcanic eruption on the small island of Montserrat have all benefitted from the hospital’s free services.¹¹

In addition to welcoming international disaster victims to their domestic hospitals, Cuba also sends doctors and resources all over the world. For example, in the midst of last summer’s Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, Cuba sent six tons of medical supplies and drugs to affected Palestinians;¹² and in the aftermath of the 2010 Haitian earthquake, Cuban doctors were the first to arrive on the ground. Moreover, with 930 total health-care professionals involved, they comprised the largest contingent of aid workers for the disaster. With operating rooms open 18 hours a day and a donation of 400,000 tetanus vaccines for the wounded, Cuban aid saved countless lives.¹³ Yet, the media largely neglected to cover their efforts, according to an Al Jazeera report. Accordingly, the Western media has largely neglected to cover any “aid which comes from unexpected places,” such as Venezuela’s provision of free oil until the nation recovers, and a significant donation of \$70 million from Brazil.¹⁴

Considering that Cuba’s assistance during humanitarian emergencies is not particularly praised in the media, it’s unlikely that they engage in such initiatives solely for self-promotion. However, these actions do seem to promote pro-Cuban sentiment among other nations. For example, when in October 2014, the United Nations voted for the twenty-third consecutive year to urge the US to “end the economic commercial, and financial embargo against Cuba,” the only nations that opposed the resolution were the US and Israel. This year, support was especially strong as many countries praised Cuba for its exceptional response to the Ebola crisis in West Africa.¹⁵

1 “Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years),” *The World Bank*, 2014, accessed November 5, 2014, <<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LEW00.IN>>.
2 “Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above),” *The World Bank*, 2014, accessed November 5, 2014, <<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>>.
3 “Latin lessons: What can we learn from the world’s most ambitious literacy campaign?,” *The Independent*, November 7, 2010, accessed November 5, 2014, <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/latin-lessons-what-can-we-learn-from-the-worlds-most-ambitious-literacy-campaign-2124433.html>>.

4 “Physicians (per 1,000 people),” *The World Bank*, 2014, accessed November 5, 2014, <<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.PHYS.ZS>>.
5 Edward W. Campion, and Stephen Morrissey, “A Different Model—Medical Care in Cuba,” *New England Journal of Medicine* 358 (2013): 297-299.
6 Maria C. Werlau, “Cuba’s Health-Care Diplomacy: The Business of Humanitarianism,” *World Affairs Journal*, March/April 2013, accessed November 5, 2014, <<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/cuba%E2%80%99s-health-care-diplomacy-business-humanitarianism>>.
7 Werlau, “Cuba’s Health-Care Diplomacy.”

8 Conner Gorey, “Cuba Marks 15 Years Treating Chernobyl Victims,” *Medical Education Cooperation With Cuba* 7.5 (2005): 28-29.
9 “Chernobyl Victims Treated in Cuba,” *Reuters*, March 23, 2010, accessed November 8, 2014, <<http://www.reuters.com/news/picture/2010/03/24/chernobyl-victims-treated-in-cuba?articleId=USRTR2BZRV>>.
10 Gorey, “Cuba Marks 15 Years Treating Chernobyl Victims.”
11 *Ibid.*
12 “Cuba sends six-ton medical aid shipment to Gaza,” *Agence France-Presse*, September 11, 2014, accessed November 8, 2014, <<http://www.afp.com/en/node/2823836/>>.

13 Tom Fawthrop, “Cuba’s aid ignored by the media?” *AlJazeera*, February 16, 2010, accessed November 8, 2014, <<http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2010/01/201013195514870782.html>>.
14 *Ibid.*
15 Mirjam Donath and Louis Charbonneau, “For 23rd time, U.N. nations urge end to U.S. embargo on Cuba,” *Reuters*, October 28, 2014, accessed November 8, 2014, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/28/us-cuba-un-idUSKBN01H1RN20141028>>.

They're the only nation other than the US to send substantial human resources to the region.¹⁶ As Gail Reed, co-founder of Medical Education Cooperation with Cuba (MEDICC) explained: "This is something built into the psyche of Cuban doctors and nurses—the idea that 'I am a public servant . . . It's coming from a commitment to make health care a universally accepted right.'"¹⁷

Cuba's magnanimous outlook makes them a model for the world. In addition to the aforementioned efforts, the nation also founded the Latin American Medical School (ELAM), which offers scholarships to low income students from all over the world for medical school with the requirement that they return home after graduation to serve as health workers. So far 23,000 individuals from 83 countries have graduated (including some from the US), and there are an additional 10,000 students currently enrolled. This enterprise came from Cuban's belief that after providing disaster relief, leaving a nation behind with-out an adequate healthcare system was irresponsible.¹⁸

Examples such as the ELAM fill my heart with optimism; Cuba is an example of a nation that more of us should try to emulate. Despite their harsh economic prospects, and despite over 50 years of stigmatization, they still serve as one of the most responsible and globally minded countries. A deep commitment to collaboration is vital for our aggregate success in the twenty-first century; Cuba's humanitarian initiatives should shine as a ray of hope for a more synergistic world.

Sophia Kecskes ('17) is an Undeclared major in Pierson College.

¹⁶ Alexandra Sifferlin, "Why Cuba Is So Good at Fighting Ebola," *Time*, November 5, 2014, accessed November 8, 2014, <<http://time.com/3556670/ebola-cuba/>>.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

On Street-Side Sexism

Global Awareness for a Global Problem

ANNA MEIXLER

Global awareness has recently risen about the street harassment experienced by women worldwide. Though there is little consistency in street climates towards women, gendered harassment exists in cities considered both developed and developing. And while there are more urgent threats to women daily—from sexual violence to human trafficking to honor killings—it's also important to become aware of the daily, seemingly inconsequential language that normalizes gender inequality and violence.

Street harassment, defined as "any action or comment between strangers in public places that is disrespectful, unwelcome, threatening and or harassing, and is motivated by gender" may be hard to identify—people draw different lines as to when a compliment becomes a catcall, and when a catcall feels threatening. But it's pervasive. As *Ebony* magazine reported last year, by age 19, nearly 90 percent of American women have experienced some form of street harassment. Given that so many women, in America and abroad, are victims of gender-based violence and sexual assault, street harassment, which induces anger, fear, and shame, can evoke significant trauma.

Gendered street harassment is a world-wide phenomenon. In fact, a quick Google search will list cities that are less safe for female travelers just due to harassment. In Beirut, women are advised to "always ignore catcalls and advances," by Caroline Chalouhi,

the Coordinator of International Students at the American University of Beirut. Egypt and India are also cited as cities with particularly dangerous street environments for women. In India, "street harassment is an everyday reality for women," said Rubina Singh in *The New York Times*, the director of the Hollaback chapter in Chandigarh, an international organization that addresses street harassment. "Comments, staring, stalking, groping and much more are pretty much expected to be experienced by a woman traveling here," she said. Other cities deemed dangerous for women are those along the Mediterranean Coast, in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Eastern Europe.

To raise awareness about and energies against such harassment, author and activist Holly Kearn founded Anti-Street Harassment Week. This past spring marked the campaign's second year, and over 100 advocacy groups from 18 countries joined to address this global issue. Efforts ranged from Twitter campaigns to public art to radio shows to street theater. There were dozens of events held in New York, a city that publicly exhibited portraits by the artist and founder of "Stop Telling Women to Smile" Tatyana Fazlalizadeh. In Yemen, the Safe Streets Campaign distributed a collection of individual's experiences with street harassment, contacting human rights and women's groups, as well as journalists and politicians. In Germany, the group Pro Change handed out soccer-style "red cards" against

street harassment in subway stops, clubs, and pubs, sites where women were commonly made to feel unsafe.

These campaigns recognize that dangerous attitudes and actions towards women are normalized through public language. The Bureau of Justice Statistics state one in every six American women is sexually assaulted in her lifetime. Though men are also victims of sexual assault, according to the US Department of Justice, 91 percent of reported victims of rape and assault are female. The National Institute of Justice and the Bureau of Justice Statistics have also studied violence against collegiate women, and found that, “the percentage of completed or attempted rape victimization among women in higher educational institutions might climb to between one-fifth and one-quarter.” Such statistics highlight how gender politics manifest more subtly in public places, rendering compliments and catcalls assertions of power over women who are statistically more likely to be subject to violence. Language that can seem inconsequential in reality normalizes subjugation—words, like attacks, allow others to impose their will on women. Rape culture demands that women are sexually subservient to men, and by asserting one’s power to regard women as sexual objects publicly, cat-calling reinforces such a culture.

The study of street harassment has recently grown more nuanced. Researchers found that catcalling has reverberating psychological effects, and not only for its victims. A study at the University of Connecticut by Stephanie Chaudoirand and Diane Quinn found that the bystander effect for sexism is strong; when seeing another woman catcalled, women identify more with their gender as a group and displayed heightened negativity towards male bystanders in addition to the harasser himself. The researchers also write about psychological effects pertaining to fear and insecurities, stating, “the experience of street harassment is directly related to greater preoccupation with physical appearance and body shame, and is indirectly related

to heightened fears of rape for US undergraduate women.”

Street harassment, a manifestation of global sexism only recently acknowledged and explored, is indicative of far greater gendered violence. Such language stems from and normalizes rape culture, and affects the psychological health within and safety of our cities. Though political and journalistic discourse increasingly addresses the public manifestations of gender inequality and violence, there is surely more to be done. Efforts like Anti-Street Harassment Week are effective in quickly and powerfully raising awareness, as well as creating environments that welcome candid discourse. Hopefully more comprehensive policy and social reform lay on the horizon.

Anna Meixler ('16) is an American Studies major in Ezra Stiles College.

Science and Technology in Modern China

A Historical and Strategic Perspective on State Power

MASON JI

INTRODUCTION

“Carry out the policy of opening to the outside world and learn advanced science and technology from other countries. China cannot develop by closing its door, sticking to the beaten track and being self-complacent.”¹

On October 10, 1978, Deng Xiaoping articulated his vision for China’s development through these words. Deng instituted “Reform and Openness” (gaige kaifang) in the same year, a broad set of reforms that opened China up to the world and stood in stark contrast to a Maoist China characterized predominantly as a closed Communist society.

The focus of this paper is Deng Xiaoping and his 1978 reforms, the “Four Modernizations,” specifically the science and military defense components of this policy. I argue that the two components were intricately linked, and that Deng saw scientism as the foundation for bolstering state power. Though it is indisputable that Deng’s reforms were instrumental in bringing China out of Mao’s era, questions linger.

Just how “revolutionary” were the science and security components of Deng’s reforms? Were they completely distinct from events that occurred throughout Chinese history or were they a continuation of historical trends in a modern context? I argue the latter: China’s historical fascination with foreign technology as a means to bolster state power significantly influenced Deng. I first define scientism and provides context for scientism in China today before transitioning into an overview of Deng’s reforms. To evaluate the influences on Deng’s reforms, three parallels in Chinese history are employed. The first is Zhang Qian’s quest for steel production and mining techniques during the Han Dynasty, an example of China’s historical desire to integrate foreign technology into domestic practices to improve state power. The second is the fascination with Western technology during the Boxer Rebellion and the May 4th Movement, which sparked the growth of

1 Deng Xiaoping, “Excerpt from Talk in Federal Republic of Germany” (Speech, October 10, 1978), 1.

2 Martin Ryder, “Scientism,” University of Colorado, Denver, 2013, <http://carbon.ucdenver.edu/~mryder/scientism_este.html>.

3 Ibid.

4 Richard Baum, “Science and Culture in Contemporary China: The Roots of Retarded Modernization,” *Asian Survey* 22:12 (1982): 1166.

scientism in China. The third is the scientific fanaticism during the Maoist Era that laid the foundations for the development of science and technology under Deng. The paper ends by arguing that scientism remains an integral part of Chinese society today. Therefore, Deng’s reforms were a product of history, and should be viewed in a broader historical and cultural context.

SCIENTISM DEFINED AND SCIENTISM IN CHINA

Martin Ryder, technologist and professor at the University of Colorado Denver, defines scientism as a “philosophical position that exalts the methods of the natural sciences above all other modes of human inquiry.”² Scientism has been used to influence public policy and development in various parts of the world. The Western world, by embracing scientism, was able to industrialize in the mid-nineteenth century. An extreme example is Nazi Germany, which combined scientism and utopianism to form a regime efficient in suppressing opposition and building state power, but had an atrocious human rights record.³

Scientism in China manifests itself as a desire to use science to modernize in order to expand China’s global influence and prevent foreign encroachment of its territory. This desire for independence and self-determination is rooted in history as China’s central location has made it susceptible to invasion. Examples include Xiongnu during the Han Dynasty, Mongols during the Yuan Dynasty, Western imperialists during the end of the Qing Dynasty and Japan during World War Two. The fear of invasion has been etched into Chinese consciousness.

After World War Two, the desire for Chinese self-empowerment emerged in the near feverish pursuit of science. Scientism was the logical ideology for modern China to adopt—the historical desire for technology and fascination with the natural world made it easy for Chinese society to accept scientism as a means of modernization and self-preservation. Deng Xiaoping’s reforms were a continuation of a historical need for foreign technology, and must not be divorced from this context.

DENG XIAOPING REFORMS

In March 1978, Vice-Premier Fang Yi proclaimed that “the dark clouds [of the Cultural Revolution] have been dispelled and the way has been cleared. A bright future lies ahead of us.”⁴ Fang Yi was riding on a wave of enthusiasm ushered in by the promise of Deng’s rule. Indeed, Deng’s reforms transformed China and were responsible for the scientific and technological renaissance after the implementation of

“Reform and Openness.” As Richard Baum deftly puts it, the “austere and colorless collectivism of the Maoist Era was supplanted by an upscale entrepreneurial ethos labeled ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics.’”⁵ China today is a hybrid society as a result of the reforms, politically driven by deep-seated Communist ideologies and led by a technocratic body, but economically defined as predominantly a Capitalist system, albeit with the often referenced “Chinese characteristics.”⁶

Deng’s reforms were numerical: the “Four Modernizations” are reforms to agriculture, industry, science and military defense. Particularly, science and military defense shared a close relationship. The idea was to utilize scientific methods and foreign technology to “pull China up by its bootstraps” militarily, in turn providing political leverage and stability.⁷ Therefore science, in the context of Deng’s reforms, played a foundational role in national security and state power. Deng also realized the importance of education and maintained that the spirit of “[letting] one hundred schools contend” was essential to China’s scientific development.⁸ To achieve the goal of acquiring foreign technology through scientism, Deng sent Chinese students abroad to study Western scientific techniques, in hopes for them to come back and utilize that knowledge in their homeland.⁹ By opening China’s markets, he made it economically feasible to compete with foreign nations and attract students back to China. To some degree, the economic components of Deng’s reform aimed to support the larger political and security agenda of bringing foreign technology into China.¹⁰

However, the close relationship between science and security in Deng’s reforms was not unprecedented. Although Deng’s idea of mass importing foreign knowledge was revolutionary for China at the time, his focus on enhancing state power by importing foreign technology had historically been embraced by the Chinese. For instance, Zhang Qian’s search for iron mining techniques during the Han Dynasty is an example of this Deng-era phenomenon in ancient China. Both the start of scientism as a means to “save” and “enlighten” China at the turn of the twentieth century and later the nationalist embracement of scientism under Mao, used scientism as a vehicle to improve security and state power in China. Hence the history of linking science and security had a profound, even subconscious, influence on Deng as he was formulating “Reform and Openness.”

5 Richard Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 3.

6 Orville Schell and John Delury, *Wealth and Power* (New York: Random House, 2013), 401-404.

7 Song Zhiming, *Deng Xiaoping Theories* (Beijing: Remin University Press, Resource Center, ed. A3, 2006), 15-18.

8 Xiling et al., *Analysis of Deng Xiaoping’s Scientific Thought* (Shen Yang: Liao Ning People’s Press, 1992), 121-122.

9 Ibid, 104-106.

10 Ibid, 56.

11 David Sevillano-Lopez, and F. Javier Gonzalez, “Mining and Minerals Trade on the Silk Road to the Ancient Literary Sources: 2 BC to 10 AD Centuries,” in *History of Research in Mineral Resources*, eds. J. E. Ortiz, O. Puche, I. Rábano, and L.F. Mazadiego (Madrid: Institution of Geology and Minerals of Spain, 2011), 55.

12 Sima Qian, *Shi Ji (Records of the Grand Historian)*, trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 232.

13 Ibid, 234.

14 “History of Steel in Eastern Asia,” Macao Museum of Art, <<http://www.arscives.com/historysteel/>>.

15 Christopher Beckwith, *Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 9.

PARALLELS WITH THE SEARCH FOR IRON AND STEEL IN THE HAN DYNASTY

Zhang Qian and the Silk Road illustrate China’s historical fascination with foreign technology and desire to incorporate new technology into its own society to enhance state power. The term “Silk Road” is a blanket statement for all trade conducted primarily between the Han Dynasty and Roman Empire, but it is somewhat of a misnomer. The Silk Road was comprised of much more than Roman desire for Chinese silk; it was an advanced trading network that spanned thousands of miles, intricately connecting two great empires in arguably the first large-scale exchange of goods and ideas that transcended spatial boundaries.

An often glossed over component of the Silk Road are the strategic motivations behind the exchanges. China was arguably most engaged in Silk Road trading because of its pursuits of iron ore and steel. By the early Han Dynasty, though the Chinese were already able to make iron, the iron ore that could be harvested at the time were of poor quality, resulting in brittle iron.¹¹ Iron had become the essential component of Han weaponry, so acquiring better mining techniques to access better ore also became a military priority.

Zhang Qian was an imperial envoy of the Han Dynasty sent by Emperor Wu Di to establish connections with foreign powers. One of Zhang’s main missions in trading with foreigners was to acquire iron-mining techniques in order to enhance the Han influence.¹² In the process of discovering these iron-mining techniques, Zhang became exposed to steel production techniques.¹³ China had been experimenting with steel at the time, but had yet to produce enough to supplement iron in warfare. Evidence of steel swords during the Han Dynasty suggests that Chinese military had acquired the technology needed to get the furnaces hot enough to make enough steel for weapons.¹⁴ The technology for making steel was acquired over time through Silk Road trading established by Zhang Qian, which further bolstered the Han’s military power and influence.¹⁵

Though the events of the Han Dynasty were not explicitly associated with scientism, they underscore a desire for foreign technology to bolster state power that started early in Chinese history. This association between foreign technology and state power has become deeply rooted in the Chinese consciousness, and played a large role in influencing Deng’s policies. The 1978 reforms were driven by the same desire to acquire foreign technology via trade as seen in the Han dynasty.

PARALLELS WITH THE END OF THE QING DYNASTY

“China is the sick man of Asia.” This was the phrase used by Western imperialist powers to describe China through much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Indeed, China under the late Qing Dynasty fell far behind, its population suffering from the effects of the two Opium Wars and government corrupt. By the mid-nineteenth century, China was divided up by multiple Western powers, each competing to “enlighten” the “heathen and backwards” people of China.¹⁶

The end of the Qing Dynasty was a history lesson for China. Its humiliating defeat during the Opium Wars, the partition and occupation of China by foreign powers and the weakness of Qing Dynasty government convinced young Chinese intellectuals that there was a need to adopt superior foreign technology to repel invasion. Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao led the first wave of young intellectuals who tried to change China.¹⁷ Aided by the translations of Western texts by John Fryer of the Jiangnan Arsenal, they became exposed to Western methods such as engineering and calculus.¹⁸ This first wave of intellectuals would lay the foundations for scientism in China.

The desire to repel foreign forces in China culminated in the Boxer Rebellion, the iconic instance of Chinese outrage at Western occupation in China near the end of the Qing Dynasty. The failure of the Boxer Rebellion in 1901 resulted in the Eight-Nation Alliance of foreign powers to capture Beijing and plunder China’s capital of much of its treasures.¹⁹ Ultimately, the failure of the rebellion ignited a strong sense of nationalism in students, many of whom, including Hu Shi and Zhu Kezhen, set off to the United States to study Western methods at the most elite universities.²⁰ This group of students was responsible for guiding China on the path to scientism.

As Zuoyue Wang, a professor at California State Polytechnic University, Pomona puts it, if there was “one dream that united this group of Boxer students, it was a dream of saving China through science and technology.”²¹ Zhou Ren, one such Boxer student who majored in mechanical engineering at Cornell University, wanted to “sharpen the tools for a strong Chinese nation.”²² These students would later become the movers and shakers of early modern China. Their faith in science and technology brought about a renaissance in Chinese attitudes toward these fields—the May 4th Movement.²³

The May 4th Movement, a movement to modernize China’s education and society was started and continued by students like those who went abroad after the Boxer Rebellion. The focus on assimilating foreign technology has always been a priority for China, but it was with the May 4th Movement

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- 16 Adrian Arthur Bennett, *John Fryer: The Introduction of Western Science and Technology into Nineteenth-Century China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 13, 26.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 42-43.
- 18 Benjamin Elman, *A Cultural History of Modern Science in China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 119.
- 19 William Duiker, *Cultures in Collision: The Boxer Rebellion* (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978), 102-105.
- 20 Wang Zuoyue, “Saving China Through Science: The Science Society of China, Scientific Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China,” *Osiris* 17 (2002): 291-292.
- 21 *Ibid.*, 292.
- 22 *Ibid.*
- 23 Zhou Cezong, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 49.

24 *Ibid.*

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- 25 Fan Fa-ti, “Redrawing the Map: Science in Twentieth Century China,” *Isis* 98:3 (2007): 533.
- 26 Michael Burawoy, “Marxism as Science: Historical Challenges and Theoretical Growth,” *American Sociological Review* 55:6 (1990): 775-776.
- 27 Fan, 533.
- 25 Fan Fa-ti, “Redrawing the Map: Science in Twentieth Century China,” *Isis* 98:3 (2007): 533.
- 26 Michael Burawoy, “Marxism as Science: Historical Challenges and Theoretical Growth,” *American Sociological Review* 55:6 (1990): 775-776.
- 27 Fan, 533.
- 28 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1991), 2, 15.
- 29 Chi-Kwan Mark, *China and the World Since 1945: An International History* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 53-55.

that scientism, in its modern meaning and form, rose to prominence.²⁴ The end of the Qing Dynasty saw the start of a nationalist movement towards scientism as a means of state empowerment, one that would provide the basis for the expansion of such ideology under Mao, and then Deng.

PARALLELS WITH THE MAOIST ERA

Though China under Deng’s rule was drastically different from the Maoist era, scientism and the pursuit of foreign technology continued to prevail. “The same anxiety and [fear]” of falling behind technologically that characterized the Chinese mentality at the beginning of the twentieth century drove Mao to pursue science zealously.²⁵ However, some of his enthusiasm was also influenced by the very nature of Marxism itself. Marxism is a materialistic, non-religious ideology that includes the scientific method among its core tenets.²⁶ Marxism’s foundational “scientism” made it easily acceptable by the Chinese, and Marxism under Mao’s Communism reinforced China’s trend towards scientism that started in the early twentieth century. Therefore China’s history and Communism entered a reciprocal relationship under Mao that solidified scientism in China, laying the foundations for Deng’s reforms in 1978.

Mao amplified existing Chinese sentiments for Western technology on a much larger scale. Under Mao, a “mass science” program was instituted. This state-sponsored program attempted to engage each individual in the scientific development process, emphasizing the need to debunk the myth that science is only for the elite and the importance of “spirit over expertise.”²⁷ Of course, this mass science program had strategic purposes. Mao tried to increase scientific productivity to quickly achieve results, which would broadcast China’s capabilities to the rest of the world and provide leverage against world powers in international relations.

The most important example of the interaction between science and national security under Mao was the need to prove Chinese military capability to both the Soviet Union and the US—China did so by building the nuclear bomb. As Mao said, “either kill the tiger or get eaten by him, one or the other,” meaning, as he later clarified, that “so long as [the US] possessed nuclear bombs, China must have them too.”²⁸

Mao’s nuclear program was predominantly homegrown. Sure, China received Soviet aid for its nuclear program early on, but the Soviets were reluctant to divulge the most critical pieces of information to the Chinese. Worsening relations between the two countries led to the termination of Soviet aid in 1962, a Sino-Soviet split that surely Mao had predicted.²⁹ From then until when the bomb was detonated in 1964, the Chinese were left to themselves.

The mere fact that the Chinese were able to successfully detonate their first bomb made clear the importance Mao attached to becoming an effective nuclear power. Indeed, the bomb project faced extreme challenges in China, the largest being the Great Leap Forward. This movement caused massive famine in China between 1958 and 1961, and rural industrialization, which was officially the purpose of the entire project, “saw its development . . . aborted by the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward.”³⁰ Despite the economic disaster brought about by the Great Leap Forward, the nuclear bomb program continued and finished before schedule in 1964. In fact, even amidst economic deterioration, the amount of resources poured into the nuclear bomb project was astounding. China’s first bomb was uranium, which meant that it had an operating gaseous diffusion system for purifying uranium. To put into perspective, the French gaseous diffusion plant, which was just about to produce enough fissionable materials for a bomb in 1965, had cost about one billion dollars.³¹ The Chinese project, which resulted in a functional bomb, must have been of a similar magnitude. To invest so much into a nuclear project that may have failed, since China had to piece together important details of bomb creation, emphasizes the importance of the bomb to China’s national security agenda.

The successful completion of the bomb reveals not only Mao’s, but also the larger Chinese population’s desire to acquire a nuclear weapon. Building it required the Chinese to discover much of the construction details on their own, and many scientists had to work extremely hard and take many risks to finish the project. This fanaticism speaks not only to how important this scientific creation was to the leadership in terms of national security, but also to how widespread the idea of scientism was in the population.

The scientism underlying the development of the nuclear bomb under Mao was a continuation of the mentality that started to materialize at the end of the Qing Dynasty: the need to develop advanced technology to prove that China is capable and self-determinate. The success of the nuclear bomb in signaling China’s scientific competence and the advantages China gained on the international stage through “Big-Stick Diplomacy” no doubt had a profound impact on Deng as he was instituting his reforms. Deng realized that the Chinese population was already attached to scientism for developing China’s state power, so it was advantageous and logical to continue making scientism an integral part of Chinese society. The scientism component of Deng’s reform was thus historical—the precedence for scientism set by Mao influenced Deng to continue emphasizing science as a means of modernization.

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- 30 Dwight Perkins, “China’s Economic Policy and Performance,” in *The Cambridge History of China Vol. 15 The People’s Republic Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-1982*, eds. Roderick Macfarquhar and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54.
- 31 Morton Halperin, “China and the Bomb—Chinese Nuclear Strategy,” *The China Quarterly* 21 (1965): 74.

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- 32 Wang Zuoyue, “Science and the State in Modern China” *Isis* 98:3 (2007): 560-561.
- 33 Li, Jijin, “Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China,” (address at the US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, July 15, 1997).
- 34 William Tow, *Asia Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 19.
- 35 *Ibid.*
- 36 *Ibid.*, 21.
- 37 Tu Yuanji, “Renowned Scientist Qian Xuesen Views ‘Three Represents,’” *People’s Daily*, June 24, 2002, 4-7.
- 38 Hu Jintao, “Thoroughly Applying the Scientific Outlook on Development” (Excerpt from report to 17th National Congress of CPC, 2007), 1.

DENG’S LEGACY—SCIENTISM IN CHINA TODAY

Today, China remains fixated on playing “catch up” with the world in the scientific arena. The country still embraces the mentality that there is a need to assimilate foreign technology for security purposes. This obsession with scientism can be observed from the Chinese government’s continued encouragement of an education system that places utmost importance on scientific fields, a systematic delineation of study that was instituted under Mao and continues today.³²

General Li Jijun succinctly laid out China’s current idea of national security. “What China desires most is a peaceful and stable international environment in which it can focus on economic development and the improvement of its people’s life [sic].”³³ Li’s assessment of China’s goals is a classic example of the country’s political rhetoric. How will there be a “peaceful and stable international environment?” China must engineer one for itself. It does so by becoming powerful enough so that neighboring countries do not dare to invade it. Only when China becomes both a regional and a global power will the international environment be stable enough for its people’s lives to improve—no other nation will seek to challenge it. Hence, implied in Li Jijun’s seemingly passive message is the familiar mission to modernize for self-determination and self-preservation.

Thus, China’s survival is as much a national security problem as one of internal politics, because the country’s history fuels Chinese perceptions that “outside threats are responsible for China’s historical weakness and subjugation.”³⁴ China continues to require Western technology to generate what the Chinese term “comprehensive national power.”³⁵ “Comprehensive national power” envisions China as a developed country with sufficient wealth and technology so that it is “capable of challenging US strategic power in East Asia.”³⁶ The import of Western technology has propelled China to the ranks of world powers and having achieved success with Deng’s reforms, China has only redoubled its efforts of acquiring Western technology to achieve the international status it desires.

Deng’s legacy is thus very much alive today. Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” (*sange daibiao*) created in the immediate years after Deng expanded funding for scientific research, was an extension of Deng’s plan to economically incentivize the best researchers and scientists into China.³⁷ Hu Jintao extended the influence of scientism in China through the “Scientific Outlook on Development” (*kexue fazhan guan*) using the scientific method as the basis for political and social development in the future, broadening the scope and application of scientism in China.³⁸ More interesting, is Xi Jinping’s

“Chinese Dream” (zhongguo meng). Though the concept of the “Chinese Dream” remains somewhat nebulous, scientism is still needed in order to champion Xi’s vision of China’s “peaceful rise” while also “strengthening the military” under the increasing scrutiny of other powers.³⁹

Today, scientism plays a foundational and even more expansive role in China, not only in terms of national security and state power but also in terms of the very fabric of Chinese society. The emphasis on science has played well into China’s favor, it has allowed China to develop at astonishing rates and it is only logical to expect scientism to continue to have a strong presence. The challenge for China today is figuring out how to balance this culture of scientism with the forces of globalization.

GOING FORWARD: IMPLICATIONS OF SCIENTISM FOR CHINA AND THE WORLD

For China, scientism and the pursuit of foreign technology has become a part of national identity. History has ingrained in China a fear of “falling behind” and invasion, something that has currently become its greatest means of development. With growth come challenges. The wealth generated by development and the forces of globalization have created a rampant consumer culture, one that values efficient capital generation, even if it means making shortcuts and lowering standards. Though scientism is deeply entrenched in the Chinese conscience, the shortcutting and money laundering brought by the competing consumer culture threatens to slow Chinese growth. The question is whether or not the Chinese can succeed in maintaining their large scale support for high-level, high-quality scientific research for national security in a time and society where consumerism threatens to swing even the most steadfast to its side.

China’s scientism also has implications for the international community, particularly by creating problems for the US. American funding for scientific research is dwindling by the day but China’s investment has only increased. The magnification between the differences in scientific advancement has all sorts of ramifications for the US; not only does the competition for better military defense become fiercer, it also negatively impacts the US in terms of medical, engineering and industrial growth. The differences become apparent in the long run, tilting the international power balance in China’s favor. The US needs to make investing in technological innovation and research a priority, much like what China has been doing throughout history.

³⁹ Orville Schell and John Delury, *Wealth and Power* (New York: Random House, 2013), 405.

CONCLUSION

“Black cat, white cat, one that catches mice is a good cat.”

—DENG XIAOPING

Deng Xiaoping’s reforms were revolutionary in that they embraced Capitalist values after a period of fervent Communism under Mao—the difference could be described as clearly as night and day. Deng is credited to be the father of today’s China by pulling the nation out of close-minded Communism with his radical, open-door reforms in 1978. However, one of the essential components of the reforms—utilizing science to modernize China and provide it the means of self-determination—was not Deng’s radical idea; it was based on a history of desire for foreign technology. Zhang Qian’s quest for iron mining techniques during the Han Dynasty reflects a long Chinese history of seeking foreign technology. The lessons of the May 4th Movement paved the way for scientism in China, which was implemented on a national scale under Mao. In this view, Deng’s reforms continued the emphasis on scientism, but morphed the fanaticism of the Maoist era into something more sustainable and palatable for the future.

Nonetheless, Deng’s reforms have far reaching effects. As a result of his decision to import foreign technology to modernize China, China has rapidly developed and is now a major world economic and political power. Also because of Deng’s reforms, scientism plays an even broader role in Chinese society than ever before, seeping into its politics, its economics and its national identity. Scientism is what made China’s development possible and is what will continue to drive the rise of China; it is at the core of China’s success.

Mason Ji (’16) is a Global Affairs major in Morse College.

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The New Ottoman Citizen

Moderate Islamism and Kurdish Reforms in The Context of Neo-Ottoman Citizenship

CODY KAHOE

- 1 "Democrat or sultan?," *The Economist*, June 8, 2013, accessed December 1, 2013, <<http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21579004-recep-tayyip-erdogan-should-heed-turkeys-stret-protesters-not-dismiss-them-democrat-or-sultan>>.

The June 8, 2013 cover of *The Economist* featured the face of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, superimposed on the reclining, robed body of a 16th century Ottoman sultan, complete with prayer beads and a crown worthy of Suleiman the Magnificent.¹ It reads, "Democrat or Sultan?: Erdoğan and the Turkish Upheaval." Published during the midst of 2013's monumental Gezi Park protests, "Sultan" Erdoğan's image on this magazine cover betrays much more than the cleverness and humor of *The Economist's* graphic design team: it reveals a recent trend in Turkish politics and nationalism. Ninety years since the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the secular Turkish Republic, Turkey's leadership—headed by the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, or AKP) and Prime Minister Erdoğan—now approaches the question of Turkey's Ottoman past and national identity in new ways. As Turkey has grown into a substantial economic player on the global stage, courted the European Union, and received praise from the West for its success as a "Muslim democracy," Erdoğan's AKP has become a national powerhouse, but one conflict above all has presented a constant roadblock to international recognition of Turkey's transition into modern, post-Cold War liberalism: the fate of the millions of Kurds whose cultural expression has been repressed since the days of the Young Turks. This paper will explore how and why the AKP's embrace and exploration of a neo-Ottoman image of modern Turkish nationalism presents possible solutions to the "Kurdish problem" while simultaneously making the AKP's attempts at reconciliation more difficult. Here, the definition of the Turkish citizenry, the nation's historic and ardent attachment to secular Kemalism, and the politics of the European Union interact to produce a complex picture of the AKP's neo-Ottomanism and its effects on a Kurdish solution.

Before presenting the modern dynamic between the AKP, the Kurds, and the neo-Ottoman image, it is necessary to

explain the history of the Kurdish people in Turkey, the short life of Ottomanism in the nineteenth century, and the effects of the founding of the modern Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. While the origins of the Kurds remains a topic of contemporary scholarly debate, there is some consensus that, by the 7th century, the Kurdish people could be identified as “Western Iranians and the other Iranicised peoples established astride the mountain systems of the Zagros and the eastern extension of Taurus,” what is today the area at the intersection of the borders of western Iran, northern Iraq, northern Syria, and southeastern Turkey.² Given the region’s harsh and mountainous terrain, Kurds have been unable to foster the political unity of many of their neighboring ethnic groups.³ While Kurdish vernaculars all are believed to come from the same mother tongue of Median,⁴ the three Kurdish dialects show “marked differences in vocabulary, pronunciation, and grammar,” as different, according to some, as English and German.⁵ In addition to language, the strategic baiting of superpowers and tribal and clan loyalties have kept the Kurds from uniting for a common cause, even in national uprisings within a single state where Kurds live.⁶

Despite this lack of unity for most Kurds, a Kurdish nationalist movement began in the waning days of the Ottoman empire in the nineteenth century with the use of printing, the creation of the first Kurdish newspaper, *Kurdistan*, and the onset of other nationalist movements of other subject peoples, such as the Arabs or Armenians.⁷ The prospects of a nascent Kurdish nationalism were at their height with the creation of the League of Nations and Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points Program, which demanded that the subject nationalities of the Ottoman Empire, at the conclusion of World War I, “should be assured . . . an absolute, unmolested opportunity for autonomous development.” The Treaty of Sèvres, signed in August 1920, solidified this prospect by providing for the recognition, in concert with the Covenant of the League of Nations, of independent states not only for Arabs and Armenians but also for Kurds, dismantling Turkish Anatolia in the process.⁸ However, with the rise of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the founding of the Turkish Republic on the basis of a strong Turkish ethnic identity, this recognition was denied, with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne replacing the Treaty of Sèvres.

With the advent of Kemalism, which denied a sovereign Kurdistan and promoted an extreme form of secularism, known as laicism (in which the state controls religious expression), frustrated former-subject peoples were forced into a strictly Turkish conception of the state that repressed both religious observance and expressions of Kurdish culture, and rebelled in response. The first rebellion, in 1925, was “primarily

2 C. J. Edmonds, “Kurdish Nationalism,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 6:1 (1971): 87.

3 *Ibid.*, 88.

4 *Ibid.*

5 Graham E. Fuller, “The Fate of the Kurds,” *Foreign Affairs* 72:2 (1993): 110.

6 *Ibid.*

7 Edmonds, 89.

8 *Ibid.*, 90.

9 *Ibid.*, 91.

10 Mesut Yeğen, “The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 34:4 (1999): 555.

11 *Ibid.*

12 Thomas W. Smith, “Civic Nationalism and Ethnocultural Justice in Turkey,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 27:2 (2005): 441.

13 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Türk or Türkiyeli? The Reform of Turkey’s Minority Legislation and the Rediscovery of Ottomanism,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 43:3 (2007): 423.

14 Smith, “Civic Nationalism and Ethnocultural Justice in Turkey,” 440.

15 *Ibid.*, 442.

religious, a protest against the abolition of the Caliphate and the laicization of the State,” led by Shaykh Said of Palu, but the second, led by Ihsan Nuri in 1930, was structured by a committee named the *Khoybun* (being-oneself), created a provisional Kurdish capital at Mount Ararat, and appealed to the League of Nations for recognition.⁹ This history advances two points. First, Kurdish nationalism arguably constituted a response to repression from the early days of Kemalism and the founding of the Republic. Second the common repression faced by religious Muslims and Kurds during this period, as evidenced by the religiosity of early uprisings, led to the forging of a bond between these two groups both in their own eyes and in the eyes of oppressors. The advent of the AKP thus created a particular opportunity to address the “Kurdish problem” but also made both groups a perceived threat to the Kemalist center.

On its surface, discourse surrounding the Turkish state and “Turkishness” since the creation of the Republic generally “avoided recognizing the Kurdishness of the Kurdish question” even as the Turkish government dealt with the uprisings and movements the Kurdish question provoked.¹⁰ Turkish officials simply “assumed” there were no “Kurdish people” in Turkish territory¹¹ or explained away supposed differences with claims that Kurds were just “Mountain Turks,” descended from the same original Turkish tribes, who had forgotten their Turkishness and language,¹² with this discourse partially shaping present-day proposals for resolutions to the Kurdish question.

More than just avoidance, Turkey at the formation of the Republic, on the brink of dismantling by European powers, enforced an “intensive programme of national homogenization” to address an existential need for national unity, strength, and territorial security in the wake of the fall of the Ottomans.¹³ Unity, a solution to the post-World War I divisions embodied in Sèvres, also represented a break from the Ottoman past and an emulation of the modern nation-states of the West. The Republican People’s Party—Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or CHP—of Atatürk portrayed the new Turkish nation as a “social and political whole formed by citizens that are united by a common language, culture and objective.”¹⁴ Claiming that Turks were the fount of all civilizations, the “Turkish History Thesis” boosted Turkish pride in the wake of the humiliation of WWI and Sèvres, while the “Sun Theory of Language” asserted that all world languages descended from Turkish.¹⁵

In addition to the CHP’s emulation of the West in its European-inspired vision for the social and political structure of the Turkish nation-state, Turkish national discourse reacted against what it saw as the causes for the weaknesses of the late Ottoman social fabric, also tied to the to the scapegoated Kurds. Ottoman society in the late 19th century was comprised

of *millets*, semi-independent ethnic and religious legal communities within the empire, with the Empire thus a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and decentralized state, without an ethnic hierarchy.¹⁶ The relationship between the periphery and the center in the Ottoman Empire was one of “articulation” not of “exclusion,” in which ethnic and religious minorities received recognition from the center without the tyranny of majority groups while at the same time enjoying less than full autonomy. This social system lasted until the end of the 19th century when, to “resist the west,” “the Ottoman state had to be made more like the ‘west’ by means of its reformation and modernization along Western and European lines,” abandoning the “ethnic separatism” that was perceived as another element in the erosion of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷ These changes, carried into full swing with the creation of the Turkish Republic, a project truly in emulation of the West, “had the effect of repressing the periphery” through centralization.¹⁸

This history, the existential concerns of the early Republic and its emulations of the West, complicate understandings of the nature of the repression of the Kurds today. The Turks did not just deny the existence of Kurds. Rather, as illustrated by the vocabulary of nationalist speeches from the time, they associated Kurdish claims not with ethnic distinction but with veiled allusions to backwardness, resistance to modernity, and tribalism, all problems that threatened the sovereignty and unity of a fragile new Republic. The discourse surrounding the Turkish nation has signified “the transformation of a non-western, de-central, a-national and non-secular social formation (the Ottoman Empire) into a western, central, national and secular one (the Turkish Republic),”¹⁹ with resistance to that discourse on the part of Kurds thus interpreted as resistance to westernization, centralization, nationalism and secularism. When addressing Kurdish rebellions, Turkish official documents stressed the “Republican” nature of the army, characterized the violence as “banditry” under the command of “sheikhs and feudal landlords,” and promised “progress and prosperity” with Republican rule.²⁰ Since Kurdish rebellions occurred precisely in the context of the transition from Ottoman to Turkish Republican governments, the Kurds were reconstituted as people who clung to old ways, as rival groups, and as supporters of the Caliphate rather than as an ethnic group.²¹ In short, “whenever the Turkish state spoke on the Kurdish question, it automatically referred to the clash between the project of creating a western, national, central and secular state and the resistance of religion, periphery and tradition.”²²

These beliefs, held by the old Kemalist guard of the CHP, the court systems, and the military,²³ have long dominated Turkish politics and, specifically, the political establishment’s view of Kurdish resistance. With the rise of a moderate

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- 16 Yeğen, “The Kurdish Question,” 557.
 17 Ibid., 558.
 18 Ibid.
 19 Ibid., 559.
 20 Ibid., 560.
 21 Ibid., 561.
 22 Ibid., 568.
 23 Smith, “Civic Nationalism and Ethnocultural Justice in Turkey,” 451.

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- 24 Günes Murat Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 81.
 25 Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers*, 11, 22.
 26 Houston, Christopher. “Militant Laicists, Muslim Democrats, and Liberal Secularists: Contending Visions of Secularism in Turkey,” in *Muslim Secular Democracy: Voices from Within*, ed. Lily Zubaidah Rahim (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 261.
 27 Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, “The Prospects and Pitfalls of the Religious Nationalist Movement in Turkey: The Case of the Gülen Movement,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 46:2 (2010): 221-234.
 28 Didem Buhari-Gulmez, “Ümit Cizre, Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party,” *European Journal of Turkish Studies*. January 25, 2011. Accessed on November 28, 2013. <http://ejts.revues.org/4350>, 3.
 29 Tozun Bahçeli and Sid Noel, “The Justice and Development Party and the Kurdish question,” in *Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish issue*, eds. Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden (New York: Routledge, 2011), 104.
 30 Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, “The Prospects and Pitfalls,” 228.
 31 Seda Demiralp, “The Odd Tango of the Islamic Right and Kurdish Left in Turkey: A Peripheral Alliance to Redesign the Centre?” *Middle Eastern Studies* 48:2 (2012): 287, 288, 292.
 32 Seda Demiralp, “The Odd Tango,” 293.
 33 Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, “The Prospects and Pitfalls,” 228.
 34 Ibid., 291.
 35 Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers*, 23.

Islamist party in Erdoğan’s AKP, however, this prior definition of Ottoman state structure and the shameful connotations so long associated with it by Kemalists, is being challenged, prompting further changes in understandings of the relation between Kurdish culture and Turkish citizenship. The mainstream success of the AKP despite its moderate religiosity is a new trend in Turkish politics. The founders of the AKP, who politically matured during the 1970s and 80s and witnessed the judicial crackdowns and military coups that plagued their less moderate Islamist precursors, recognize the Kemalist establishment’s intense fear of radicals.²⁴ In response, the AKP has moderated along the lines of the median voter theorem, combining its openness to religious expression with liberalism and moderate values and profiting from astounding economic success during its time in power.²⁵ To avoid persecution, many Muslims in Turkey, including Erdoğan himself, have moved to support secularism and are now “consciously post-Islamist,” with Erdoğan at least publicly distancing himself from his days as a zealous member of the Islamist youth movement.²⁶ Like the Gülen movement, which has advanced a brand of Islam that embraces democracy and secularism, to counter Kemalist accusations of backwardness,²⁷ “the AKP de-emphasizes Islam in order to embrace democracy, human rights and rule of law, values which originated in the West but are increasingly perceived as universal.”²⁸ Illustrated in grand fashion by the huge portrait of Atatürk placed behind AKP speakers during addresses in 2001,²⁹ a self-identified loyalty to the nation, not to religion, comes first for both the Gülen supporters and the AKP.³⁰

As a moderate and popular Islamist party, the AKP shares historical connections with the Kurdish population, possibly enabling the AKP to more ably take on the Kurdish question. Since the creation of the Republic, both Islamists and Kurds have shared an opposition to the central state, have experienced repression at the hands of Turkish nationalism and the military, and have been alienated by the designation of the label “black Turks,” those citizens who “retain rural, religious, Tribal, or other elements of Anatolia.”³¹ Both groups have converted ridicule over these cultural elements into points of pride, with Erdoğan’s poor dancing skills and casual posture “his trademark in the eyes of his supporters.”³² Gülen’s concept of pluralism, additionally, in Islam is not unlike the pluralism many Kurds wish to see in Turkish society.³³ Another cause for the alliance between these two groups comes from the absence of a class-based political activism since the crackdowns of the 1970s and 1980s.³⁴

Given this shared ground, both groups stand to gain from changes to the constitution that would promote liberalism, whether in the expression of religion or with regard to the use of the Kurdish language.³⁵ In fact, uniting “the alienated

societal segments that protest the rigid policies of the state,” the AKP has jumped at the opportunity to add Kurds to its ranks of electoral support,³⁶ and Kurds rally behind Erdoğan and his party whenever they seem to be harassed by the military, applauding his shows of defiance.³⁷ Erdoğan has responded by acknowledging a new, more liberal citizenship structure in which “ethnic identities are subsidiary identities”: “our overall identity is the one which binds us together, and that is the bond of citizenship.”³⁸ This is the first glimpse at the articulation of the neo-Ottoman conception of the state, mutually beneficial to these two repressed groups, as adopted by Islamists and the AKP in the past decade.

From the previously mentioned beginnings of Ottomanism—as the *millet* system of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious state composed of semi-autonomous legal groups, none of which is repressed or subordinated to a central ethnic identity—the Ottomans have thus come to “use one single citizenship as a common political identity in order to achieve equality and unity among all Ottoman subjects and supersede differences of faith, ethnicity, and language,” in short, to foster a political affiliation with the territorial fatherland of the Empire.³⁹ Defined, Ottomanism was “the idea of a common homeland and common traits based on modern patriotic citizenship and universal law,”⁴⁰ the creation of an “Ottoman citizen.”⁴¹ The AKP has embraced this ideology in a way that, given its unique opportunities and ties with Kurdish groups described above, suggests the prospect for solutions to the Kurdish question.

In some ways, the AKP has invoked this neo-Ottomanism to legitimize its authority and religious backing, traditionally questioned by the Kemalist military and state structure. This adoption of neo-Ottoman identity functions as a form of “cultural memorization,” an activity occurring in the present, in which the past is continuously modified and redescribed even as it continues to shape the future.⁴² While Kemalists look to the 1930s as a golden age of history and progress in which the Turks were civilized in order to maintain power structures within their conception of citizenship, the AKP has emphasized neo-Ottomanism, looking instead to the pride from Ottoman days, from the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 to the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent.⁴³ In this way, the past is used to justify a liberal understanding of citizenship and society that includes diverse religious and ethnic identities. One author has described this conception of citizenship by contrasting the term “*Türk*,” the ethnic identifier currently used, with a new Turkish national identity based instead on citizenship in the Republic, “*Türkiyeli*,” or “from Turkey.”⁴⁴ This theme is reflected in Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statements, including those quoted above, and his trips to Diyarbakır and

36 Buhari-Gulmez, “Ümit Cizre,” 2.

37 Bahcheli and Noel, “The Justice and Development Party and the Kurdish question,” 133.

38 Ibid., 107.

39 Yılmaz Colak, “Ottomanism vs. Kemalism: Collective memory and cultural pluralism in 1990s Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 42:4 (2006): 589.

40 Ibid., 589.

41 Omer Taspinar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 40.

42 Colak, “Ottomanism,” 587.

43 Nora Fisher Onar, “Echoes of a Universalism Lost: Rival Representations of the Ottomans in Today’s Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 45:2 (2009): 233, 235.

44 Grigoriadis, “Türk or Türkiyeli?,” 424.

45 Onar, “Echoes of a Universalism Lost,” 236.

46 Colak, “Ottomanism,” 596.

47 Onar, “Echoes of a Universalism Lost,” 237.

48 Ibid., 236.

49 Ibid., 237.

50 Colak, “Ottomanism,” 588.

51 Onar, “Echoes of a Universalism Lost,” 237.

52 “Democrat or Sultan?”

53 Blacheli and Noel, “The Justice and Development Party and the Kurdish question,” 103.

other Kurdish regions have further connected his Kurdish support to neo-Ottoman projects.

Since the 1980s, neo-Ottomanism under the Islamists since the 1980s has taken two forms. The first, more confrontational toward Kemalists, is a neo-imperialist eulogization of Ottoman grandeur that “paints a picture of a glorious empire stretching from Central Asia to Europe” of which Turkey is now the rightful heir.⁴⁵ This form of neo-Ottomanism is found mostly in the conservative nationalist faction of the AKP and centered in Istanbul, a symbol of Ottoman hegemony in the region,⁴⁶ as seen in its new fusion of Ottoman and modern motifs in architecture and design, the AKP’s efforts to rebuild an Ottoman-style barracks/shopping center at Gezi Park (not coincidentally located at Taksim Square, a symbol of the Republic and Kemalism), and the building of grand projects like the new Marmara tunnel and a third Bosphorus bridge, named for Sultan Selim I, who was responsible for substantial expansion of the Empire in the sixteenth century.⁴⁷

The second form of neo-Ottomanism, more moderate, consistent with European values post-Cold War, and adopted more fully by the AKP, praises not imperial ambition but pluralism. Supporters of this form of neo-Ottomanism, leaders of the AKP who are the same pragmatists who saw the uselessness in uncompromising Islamism, “regularly mix Islamic and post-modern metaphors to claim that a pluralistic neo-Ottoman Turkey can serve as a beacon of tolerance for its region and the world.”⁴⁸ They aim to rekindle the multi-cultural, multi-religious, and multi-ethnic peace of the days before the Republic while maintaining modern secularism and democracy.⁴⁹ A strength of this aspect of neo-Ottomanism is that it is not “an anti-Western, counter-hegemonic movement that challenges the universal ideals of the West” but rather embraces these with a spirit of political and economic globalization combined with “localized common identity” of the Ottoman past.⁵⁰ This side of neo-Ottomanism too has been displayed in memories of Istanbul, from the works of Nobel Prize-winning author Orhan Pamuk to liberal Istanbulites who search their family histories for hints of Greek or Armenian ancestry in the pluralistic Ottoman period.⁵¹

This renewal of the Ottoman past by the AKP has led to a series of legal measures that have made Prime Minister Erdoğan and his party the biggest proponent of Kurdish rights in leadership of the country since the founding of the Republic.⁵² Previous Islamist parties like those of Necmettin Erbakan, acting without the moderation and Ottomanist historical view espoused by the AKP, treated the Kurdish question with relative ambivalence and subordinated Kurdish identity to Islamic identity. In contrast, Erdoğan, has emphasized civic identity,⁵³ leading some scholars to argue that,

outside the eastern part of Turkey where fighting with the PKK is still fresh in local memory, “the taboo surrounding all things Kurdish has lifted.”⁵⁴

Indeed, the AKP has done much to lift repressive policies, including a 2002 act that ended the ban on broadcasting in Kurdish and a 2004 act that started state-run TV and radio broadcasts in a widespread Kurdish dialect, Kurmanci.⁵⁵ In 2000, the Turkish penal code was amended to limit offenses against Kurds for ethnic expression. In 2001, the Ministry of Education began an effort to curb the use of pejorative words to describe Kurds, and the “Law of Foundations,” which appropriates *waqf*-like properties in the country, was expanded to include non-Muslim groups as well.⁵⁶ Most recently, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s most recent “Democracy Package,” in conjunction with a PKK ceasefire still in effect, went so far as to remove the phrase, “I am a Turk” from a public school oath of allegiance, to allow certain Kurdish letters that do not appear in Turkish to be taught in schools, and to permit political campaigns in languages other than Turkish.⁵⁷ In 2004, the Prime Minister’s “Working Group on Minority and Cultural Rights,” a big step forward by even acknowledging the existence of such minorities, resulted in a “catalytic impact” when it recommended “a civic, territorial national identity.” The Group explained that while, after the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey did not recognize cultural and ethnic minorities, they do in fact exist, as has become increasingly evident with the liberalization and media coverage that came end of the Cold War. Thus, the existence of these minorities should be “treated as an objective fact, rather than being subject to state definitions.”⁵⁸ If nothing else does, this Working Group report represents the neo-Ottoman influences of pluralism in action within the policy of the AKP.

Why, though, has this confluence of Islamist, Kurdish, and neo-Ottoman social movement arisen and succeeded at this time? For one, with the end of the Cold War and communism “international trends have now swung over to the ideals of free societies, support for more pluralistic political systems, greater sympathy for national self-determination [. . .] and greater attention to gross violations of human rights,”⁵⁹ bringing international pressure on Turkey to end the violence of raids against Kurds. In this context, the AKP has been able to frame its neo-Ottomanism not as an anti-hegemonic project meant to overthrow or rewrite the Kemalist past but rather as a natural part of the globalization of the West.⁶⁰ Turkish leaders have equated Ottomanism to American “melting pots,” allying the neo-Ottoman narrative with modernity and providing an example for Eastern Bloc nations that struggled to define their ethnic identities after the fall of the Soviet Union.⁶¹ Inside Turkey, political liberalization in the 1950s and economic liberalization in the 1980s, followed up with

54 Smith, “Civic Nationalism and Ethnocultural Justice in Turkey,” 469.

55 Ibid., 469.

56 Grigoriadis, “Türk or Türkiyeli?,” 425.

57 Göksel Bozkurt, “Turkish PM Erdoğan to unveil earnest ‘democracy package,’” *Hürriyet Daily News*, September 30, 2013, accessed December 8, 2013, <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-to-unveil-earnest-democracy-package.aspx?PageID=238&NID=55379&NewsCatID=338>>.

58 Grigoriadis, “Türk or Türkiyeli?,” 428.

59 Fuller, “The Fate of the Kurds,” 112.

60 Çolak, “Ottomanism,” 593.

61 Ibid., 592.

62 Onar, “Echoes of a Universalism Lost,” 233.

63 Fuller, “The Fate of the Kurds,” 114.

64 Smith, “Civic Nationalism and Ethnocultural Justice in Turkey,” 438.

65 Grigoriadis, “Türk or Türkiyeli?,” 429.

66 Ibid., 435.

67 Blacheli and Noel, “The Justice and Development Party and the Kurdish question,” 106.

68 Onar, “Echoes of a Universalism Lost,” 232.

69 Grigoriadis, “Türk or Türkiyeli?,” 431.

70 Smith, “Civic Nationalism and Ethnocultural Justice in Turkey,” 451.

71 Ibid., 453.

72 Ibid.

73 Welat Zeydanlioglu, “Repression or reform? An analysis of the AKP’s Kurdish language policy,” in *The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on violence, repression, and reconciliation*, eds. Cengiz Gunes and Welat Zeydanlioglu (New York: Routledge, 2014), 179, Erdem 57.

74 Gareth Jenkins, “The Democratization Package and Erdoğan’s Hall of Mirrors,” in *The Turkey Analyst* 6:18 (2013), <<http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/63-the-democratization-package-and-erdogans-hall-of-mirrors.html>>.

the economic success of the AKP in the 2000s, cracked the theretofore unblemished façade of the Kemalist narrative and made room for competing groups struggling to put forth a viable collective national counter-memory, one of which was neo-Ottomanism.⁶² The AKP’s economic achievement and subsequent popularity have also given the party freer reign to let democratic reforms and a new Turkish liberalism take shape.⁶³

Additionally, the prospect of EU membership has “encouraged a looser conception of citizenship,” and minorities, from Muslims to Kurds to Alevis, have united in support of such membership.⁶⁴ Thus, the Europe that Atatürk once called the “contemporary civilization,” which was, at the time, comprised of rational, scientific, progressive nation states (defined by ethnic and linguistic identities) and at odds with the lack of advancement in the Ottoman Empire, now represents a “multi-identity, multi-cultural, democratic, liberal and plural social model” at odds with the retrograde exclusion held on to by Kemalists.⁶⁵ This perspective makes it much more difficult for Kemalist hardliners in the CHP and military to ignore the Kurdish question or fault the AKP for pursuing it, as a solution is a “*sine qua non* condition for the success of Turkey’s application for EU accession.”⁶⁶ Indeed, when the AKP signed its first round of Kurdish reforms into law in 2001, party leader Abdullah Gül declared “this will shock the Europeans.”⁶⁷ Finally, one of the great barriers to liberalization and the Kurdish question, the existential threat to Turkish territorial sovereignty and unity (written in the memories of Kurds since Sèvres),⁶⁸ simply lacks the relevance it had before, and those who advance neo-Ottoman identities argue that a civic, *Türkiyeli* identity would rather unite the people of Turkey, “regardless of ethnic or religious identity.”⁶⁹

Of course, even with these unprecedented advantages, many roadblocks keep Kurds from enjoying equal citizenship and legal freedoms, even under the neo-Ottomanism model. The Courts are still in the hands of ardent Kemalists and the CHP.⁷⁰ The law regarding crimes committed against Atatürk, which forbids certain revisions of a strict Kemalist vision of society, is still enforced.⁷¹ Publications and web sites that too actively or explicitly promote Kurdish or leftist goals in political language, such as 2003’s *Özgür Politika* (Freedom Politics), are routinely shut down.⁷² Some critics, despite the AKP’s efforts, continue to call the crackdowns on the Kurdish language “linguistic genocide” and note that Erdoğan has had to change the name of his reforms from “Kurdish initiative” to “democracy initiative” because of lingering pressure against any substantially effective developments.⁷³ Others insist that the reforms, even though they are political statements, are superficial and advance minimal progress in reality.⁷⁴ In fact, and more interestingly, the neo-Ottomanism

approach to the Kurdish question arguably presents some of its own unique problems. While the AKP is purposefully much more moderate than its Islamist predecessors, the manner in which Muslims in Turkey flock to the party and label it a “pragmatic Muslim” party has prevented the stigma of religious backwardness from receding into history.⁷⁵ The connections between the Ottoman past, religiosity, and the Muslim identification of the AKP complicates efforts to promote neo-Ottoman liberalization, as such plans are scrutinized by the Kemalist judicial system as being retrogressive. The AKP, even with the support of half of the country, must tread lightly as it embarks on reforms, especially when these reforms invoke the Ottomans, considered backward still by many hard-liners, yet without its devout base, the AKP lacks the political capital to make bold moves in resolving the Kurdish question.⁷⁶ Public criticism, combined with a long history of military efforts to maintain Kemalist principles, is still a prominent force in slowing reforms. *The Economist* cover described at the beginning of this paper illustrates how the negative authoritarian and religious connotations of neo-Ottomanism can work against the implementation of reforms just as that system provides a framework for liberalization.

Ultimately, the history of identities and repression with regard to Kurds in Turkey is complicated and no easy solutions exist, but this examination of neo-Ottomanism provides useful insight. For one, Kemalists and the CHP, long the self-proclaimed champions of modernity and progress, are now in a position of seeming responsible for holding on to the retrogressive ethnic policies consistent with the Kemalism that held Turkey together in the 1930s. Neo-Ottomanism, what Turkish revolutionaries like Atatürk once saw as Ottoman backwardness, now in fact presents an opportunity to solve the “Kurdish problem” that was largely caused by the abandonment of the Ottoman system in the course of nation formation. Under a neo-Ottoman construct, the connotations of recognizing Kurdishness are modern and associated with liberalism rather than backward as they were under a Kemalist model. The AKP’s moderate approach can and has been applied to the Kurds, but in order for more than superficial reforms to take shape, both Kemalists and Islamists, on the left and on the right, and Turks and Kurds must be willing to look beyond the zero-sum game of the past. Finally moving beyond the legacies of the treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne, a semi-autonomous Kurdish zone in Iraq and the slow integration of Kurds into Turkish life have led many to recognize that room for compromise exists. As Mesut Yegen, a Kurdish academic at Istanbul’s Sehir University stated in *The Economist*, “not a single soldier or rebel has died since the beginning of

75 Omer Taspinar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 162.

76 Buhari-Gulmez, “Ümit Cizre, Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party,” 4.

77 “Inch by inch,” *The Economist*, September 12, 2013, accessed December 1, 2013, <<http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21586324-new-tensions-emerge-between-government-and-pkk-inch-inch>>.

this year, that is the biggest prize,”⁷⁷ highlighting a renewed, pragmatic willingness to work toward finding a solution under the neo-Ottoman liberal model.

Cody Kahoe ('15) is a Modern Middle Eastern Studies major in Calhoun College.

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The Importance of the Diaspora's Investment in Haiti

KATHERINE FANG

INTRODUCTION

Since 1990, the Haitian government has transformed—with laborious displays of violence—19 times.¹ The trend is part of a cycle of sustained political instability that has pervaded the nation's history since its inception and has prevented it from harnessing much of its potential human capital and natural resources. Given the instability and low standard of living in Haiti relative to other proximate countries, a critical mass of contemporary Haitians—disproportionately those who are educated—have chosen to exit Haiti in what has been termed the "Haitian diaspora," roughly beginning in the 1960s and enduring today.

The diaspora has created a community of expatriate Haitians abroad with singular and remarkable characteristics who represent a large portion of the potential human and working capital, which is now absent in Haiti. Their investment and interest would lend a significant amount of capacity and resources—whether monetary contributions from abroad or talents physically returned to within Haitian borders—to the development of the nation.

The cycle is dangerously self-perpetuating: political capriciousness leads to exodus, which causes a sapping of resources that can only further instability. This paper examines the historical roots of the Haitian diaspora, the push factors of which still persist today, and the 2010 earthquake's exacerbation of social and economic disparities in Haiti.

DEFINITION OF A DIASPORA

διασπείρω (pronounced "diaspeirō") is a Greek noun formed by adding the preposition δια, meaning "across" to the verb σπείρω, "to scatter."² The term was first employed to refer to the settling of citizens of an Ancient Greek city-state in a conquered land.³ In English, the capitalized Diaspora signifies the dispersal of colonies of Jews following the Babylonian exile from the Kingdom of Judah in the 6th century BC; the use of

- 1 Tatiana Wah, "Engaging the Haitian Diaspora," *Cairo Review of Global Affairs*. <<http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=333>>.

- 2 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, "Diaspora," *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 1940. <<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hop-per/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0057:entry=diaspora/>>.
- 3 Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Ian Skoggard, "Jewish Diaspora in the Ancient World, Africa, and Asia," in *Encyclopedia of Diasporas* (New York: Springer, 2005).

the term rose to prominence to describe the Jewish exile following the Hebrew Bible's translation into Greek.⁴

Since then, the term has undergone significant etymological expansion to encompass any general transplantation (voluntary or forced) of a group of people from a homeland that they or their ancestors have traditionally inhabited. In literature and social sciences, academics have used the term loosely to refer to any magnitude and type of dispersal of peoples. In 1991, American political scientist William Safran ascribed five other criteria outside the strict definition to qualify a people as members of a diaspora: 1) the retention of a collective awareness of the homeland; 2) the lack of complete assimilation to the host society; 3) the belief that the ancestral home is a destination of eventual return; 4) the collective feeling of responsibility to maintaining the homeland; and 5) the existence of an "ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity" in the diaspora population thriving in a host society.⁵ Safran asserts that this definition encompasses "the Armenian, Maghrebi, Turkish, Palestinian, Cuban, Greek, and perhaps Chinese diasporas at present [and the] Polish diaspora of the past."⁶ However, his qualifications are somewhat too narrow and exclude widely-accepted exoduses of peoples, such as the African diaspora, which was largely forced by the slave trade. For that diaspora, the third and fourth of Safran's conditions (the desire to return to the homeland and the feeling of responsibility to maintaining the ancestral land) may be mostly eroded. Therefore, in this paper, Safran's qualifications will be treated as *the ideal conditions of a theoretical, perfect diaspora* but will not be considered the exclusive terms under which a diaspora can flourish in actual practice.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE HAITIAN DIASPORA AND ITS PUSH FACTORS

There does not exist consensus to address the ambiguity of the term "diaspora" in academic circles; the nebulosity of the word pervades the discussion of the Haitian migration. According to the *Millennium—Journal of International Studies*, the Haitian perception of their diaspora is as follows:

When a Haitian refers to someone as "diaspora," he or she means one of two different things: either someone residing abroad or a returnee. It must be stressed that in the local parlance the returnees are also called diaspora. This simply means that the category diaspora is resilient because it outlives the conditions that once exclusively defined it.⁷

In other words, the prevailing Haitian sentiment is that there exists a divide—cultural, economic, or social—between returned diaspora members and Haitians who never left

4 Ibid.

5 William Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return," *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1:1 (1991): 83-99.

6 Ibid.

7 Michel S. Laguette, "State, Diaspora, and Transnational Politics: Haiti Reconceptualised," *Millennium—Journal of International Studies* (1999): 633-651.

8 Central Intelligence Agency, "Haiti," *The World Factbook*, 2014 (est.), <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html>>.

9 Wah.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

their country. In this paper, references to harnessing the power of the diaspora will include individuals of historical Haitian roots who have spent an extensive amount of time abroad and who have potential talent and resources that Haiti can use to further its development. This qualification encompasses not only returnee Haitians but also the second and third generations of the diaspora. These consist of the children and grandchildren of original migrants who may or may not have ever traveled to Haiti but who still possess a more than purely objective, outsider interest in Haiti. However, references to the Haitian diaspora in terms of hard statistics will include only those Haitians who have physically transplanted themselves abroad and still currently reside in another country. This distinction must be made because institutions that track rates of diasporic activities discount returnees and the second and third generations of the diaspora from their statistics.

Haiti's 2014 net migration statistic was -4.12 migrants per 1000 people in the population,⁸ meaning that the outflow of individuals exceeds inflow. The Haitian diaspora has established the largest ethnocommunal enclaves in primarily the Dominican Republic, Canada, and especially the United States, among other regions of the world.⁹ The receiving countries of the diaspora are significant because they share two common characteristics. Firstly, they were and are all more developed and politically stable than Haiti, thus representing safe havens for immigrating Haitians. Secondly, they are in close geographic proximity to Haiti that facilitates en masse transplantation of the diasporic community.

In this paper, unless otherwise specified, the use of the phrase "the diaspora" refers to the Haitian diaspora with the following parameters: there are three generally accepted waves of diasporic migration, the first being in the 1960s, the second in the 1980s, and the most recent in the 1990s.¹⁰ While different specific circumstances fostered environments in which migration was desirable, all waves of migration are tied together by the common push factor of political turmoil and instability in Haiti, which prompted diaspora members to believe their standards of living could be improved elsewhere.

This paper will also examine the Haitian diaspora through the lens of its dispersal to the US and its effects on US-Haitian relations. The US is an appropriate case study because it possesses the largest population of Haitian diaspora members (approximately one million members, or around 43 percent of all diasporic activity¹¹) and because the US, in many ways, spearheads current international efforts to engage and reconstruct the Republic of Haiti.

THE FIRST WAVE OF THE HAITIAN DIASPORA: 1960s

Between (nominal) Haitian independence in 1804 and the 1960s, there had been little classifiable Haitian migration other than the nation's participation in the exchange of laborers among other islands in the Caribbean.¹² Haiti's "brain drain" phenomenon—the movement of human capital away from the less developed Haiti to a more developed country (MDC)—was negligible before the 1960s, largely because of racial discrimination in MDCs.¹³ From 1900 to 1950, the US received fewer than 2,000 legal Haitian immigrants.¹⁴

In 1957, Francois Duvalier consolidated control over the Haitian government and instituted a dictatorial regime with the radical vision of promoting *noiriste* ideology; a "black power" movement that called for the replacement of the educated and professional class with a new black aristocracy.¹⁵ Through the violent channels of massacre and property destruction, the Duvalier regime targeted communists and the upper class.¹⁶ The private property and businesses these citizens abandoned as they fled or were killed were expropriated and nationalized.¹⁷

This persecution brought upper-middle class and educated Haitians in large numbers to the US, France (and, less significantly, other parts of Europe), and the French portions of Canada and Africa.¹⁸ The magnitude of the migration to French-speaking parts of the world can be attributed to French colonial rule of Haiti prior to its independence and the incorporation even in the contemporary Haitian republic of certain exported aspects of French culture.

The 1960s exodus marked the beginning of the "brain drain" phenomenon in Haiti. Not exclusively observable in Haiti, episodes of brain drain have occurred and persist in less developed countries, where migrating members consider the homeland to be unfit to nurture the living conditions or development of human talent that they desire. The distinction between "brain drain" and any sort of diaspora lies in the fact that while members of a diaspora are simply part of a large human movement, participants in the "brain drain" represent the sapping of human capital away from the homeland to a receiving country that is perceived to have a greater ability to employ the migrants' talents.

Duvalier, during the 1960s, actively encouraged certain forms of "brain drain" to Francophone Africa.¹⁹ During this decade, the parts of Africa that had been under French rule had just been newly liberated, and Duvalier's government promoted the emigration of Haitian professionals and technicians who were not seen as current political threats to these parts of the world.²⁰ In doing so, Duvalier intelligently gambled to decrease the risk of future political opposition from the skilled

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Michael Largey, *Vodou Nation: Haitian Art Music and Cultural Nationalism* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2006), 190-192.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Wah.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 "Jean-Claude Duvalier," *Encyclopedia Britannica* (2013), <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/174720/Jean-Claude-Duvalier>>.

25 Ibid.

26 Wah.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

class but also set in motion the depletion of human talents that would continue to haunt Haiti to this day.

Duvalier also tried to rid skilled Haitians by exporting them to the US. While racial tensions did not cease in the US in the 1960s, significant improvements in immigration and civil rights laws facilitated the Haitian diaspora to the US. While not all Haitian immigration to the US was legal during this time, US presidents in the period from the 1960s to the end of 1970s were primarily concerned with fighting a Cold War and its associated proxy wars. The implication of the Cold War for Haiti was that Washington, D.C. looked favorably on Duvalier in comparison to the neighboring, communist Cuba, which was under the rule of Fidel Castro. Therefore, the US made no efforts to stem legal or illegal Haitian immigration.²¹ The number of Haitian immigrants to the US consequently leapt from the mid-1950s statistic of 3,000 annually to 25,000 annually by 1970.²² Not until the 1980s did the US Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) tighten its campaign against those who did not hold valid immigration visas.²³

THE SECOND WAVE OF THE HAITIAN DIASPORA: 1980s

In 1971, Duvalier passed away and transferred power to his 19-year-old son, Jean-Claude Duvalier.²⁴ Under the younger Duvalier, standards of living continued to deteriorate for Haitian people, but human rights violations lessened in intensity.²⁵ A heavier influx of Haitians than the first wave of migration began arriving in the US in the 1980s, once again because of political instability. In fact, over 75 percent of the aggregate amount of Haitians currently residing in the US entered the country after 1980, with the largest recorded mass of legal Haitian immigrants within a timespan of one year occurring in 1980-1981, when 44,570 total Haitians arrived.²⁶ During the same time period, a record amount of Haitian refugees (25,000 in 1980 and 8,000 in 1981) also arrived in southern Florida via water.²⁷ The exodus by boat of Haitians to Florida was characteristic of the younger Duvalier's regime until its end in 1986. However, following 1981, the average amount of annual refugees who arrived in this manner stabilized at around 500.²⁸

THE THIRD WAVE OF THE HAITIAN DIASPORA: 1990s

Another burst of diasporic activity (both legal and illegal) to the US began at the start of the 1990s.²⁹ Between January and the end of August 1991, around 38,000 Haitians fled the country (although not exclusively to the US).³⁰ Once again,

political unrest was the impetus of the migration: the Haitian military had spent the year staging a coup d'état against the democratically-elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, which was realized on September 29, 1991.³¹ That same year, over 10,000 Haitians traveled by boat to US-administered Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to seek asylum.³² Approximately 30 percent were granted access to the US, and the US made active efforts to reunify these refugees with their families (as provisioned by US immigration law).³³ While military rule lasted until Aristide's return in 1994, refugees also sought safety in the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic.³⁴

In 1995, the US tightened requirements for reunifying Haitian families, and consequently, barriers to legal migration intensified.³⁵ The US Coast Guard launched a campaign to more actively detract illegal immigrants from south Florida.³⁶ Notwithstanding, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates that since 1990, Haitians have continued legal immigration at a steady 15,000 arrivals per year.³⁷ In addition, because of US bureaucratic inefficiency in handling the influx of Haitian immigrants, beginning in the 1990s, some of the official annual number for legal Haitian immigration into the US is accounted for by Haitians previously residing in the US whose legalization only recently occurred and who therefore count as "immigrants" in the year they achieved legal residency and not the year of their migration.³⁸

CURRENT DIASPORA STATISTICS FOLLOWING THE 2010 EARTHQUAKE

On January 12, 2010, a magnitude 7 earthquake hit Haiti approximately 15 miles from Port-au-Prince, the country's capital, most populous city, and center of economic activity.³⁹ Following the earthquake, the US granted temporary protected status (TPS) to approximately 200,000 Haitians who had already been residing in the US, but who did not have legal documentation.⁴⁰ The legal implication of this policy change was that these immigrants were now permitted to work legally within the US. Another consequence of the earthquake was that the segment of Haiti's population that was comprised of US citizens of Haitian descent who had returned to Haiti before the earthquake (mostly students and retirees) was now compelled to move back to the US.⁴¹ The American University of Cairo's *Cairo Review of Global Affairs* presents the following numerical data of Haitian immigration to the US:

The 1990 US Census reported 306,000 persons in the US who identified their primary ancestry as Haitian. By 2000, the recorded number nearly doubled, and had reached 548,000. In 2010, the US

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.

39 United States Geological Survey, "Magnitude 7.0—Haiti Region," *Earthquake Hazards Program*, last modified 2013, <<http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010rja6/>>.

40 Wah.
41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 "Haiti: Still waiting for recovery," *The Economist*, January 5, 2013, <<http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21569026-three-years-after-devastating-earthquake-republic-ngos-has-become-country>>.
48 Ibid.

Census reported 907,790 Haitians (foreign and native-born) in the United States.⁴²

Current statistics estimate that over one million people of Haitian descent now live in the US.⁴³ The number of ethnically Haitian persons in the US comprises, by a rough count, around 15 percent of the current population of Haiti.⁴⁴ (Organizations that have measured this statistic cite significant underrepresentation of Haitians in the US Census as the reason their count differs from that of the US government.⁴⁵) If up to 80 percent of university degree-holding Haitians and their progeny live outside of the national boundaries of Haiti, and if around 43 percent of diaspora members are in the US (the second greatest population of Haitian diaspora members thrives in the Dominican Republic),⁴⁶ then a sizable portion of any talent that could be useful to Haiti in reconstruction following the earthquake does not currently reside in the republic.

In the current time, political stability under President Michel Martelly (in office since 2011) has been established in Haiti to a greater extent than in decades previous. Here, "politically stability" is being loosely defined as the absence of any immediate threat of political turmoil, of forceful and violent ousting of the incumbent government, or of governmental violence against citizens, but should not be confused with infrastructural or social equality. Therefore, the immediately relevant source of current Haitian migration stems not from a threat of violence but from economic, environmental, and social factors, most profoundly embodied by the 40.6 percent official unemployment rate in the country, which significantly undercounts the nearly three-quarters of the population that is actually unemployed or is attempting to make headway in the informal sector.⁴⁷ Frantz Duval, editor of *Le Nouvelliste*, Haiti's leading newspaper, commented that the nation has "gone from being the Republic of NGOs to the Republic of Unemployment."⁴⁸ In the present day, the phenomenon of chain migration also greatly facilitates the movement of Haitians to the US; other migrants from LDCs tend to follow a first batch of migrants from their home country that has successfully obtained legal and socioeconomic status in a receiving country.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HAITIAN DIASPORA MEMBERS IN THE US

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF HAITIAN DIASPORA MEMBERS

In general, the members of the Haitian diaspora in North America hold higher educational degrees and more upper-level professional careers than their counterparts in parts

of the Caribbean.⁴⁹ The trend is a product of the amount of opportunities for education and professional development available to immigrants in the receiving country. For example, Haitians who have moved to the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic (DO), among other Caribbean islands, are constrained by the labor opportunities available—generally “agriculture, service, tourism, construction sectors, [and] petty commerce.”⁵⁰

Another determinant of socioeconomic status following a move to the receiving country is the degree of prior education before participation in the diaspora. Diasporic members who displace themselves to other Caribbean islands tend to have been involved in peasant labor and petty commerce before their move; their migration to neighboring islands—many of which have mass deportation programs for Haitians—is often illegal.⁵¹ However, there exists an increasing amount of skilled workers from Haiti (especially in primary and secondary sectors of production—agriculture, construction, and agro-processing) in the DO.⁵² The DO has also witnessed growing numbers of migrant Haitian university graduates and former Haitian political elites, all of whom had their legal immigration statuses thrown into political limbo in October 2013.⁵³

While this paper primarily focuses on the dynamic created between the US and Haiti as a result of the diaspora, a generalizable observation about the socioeconomic statuses of diaspora members in receiving societies can be observed in the DO Constitutional Court’s October 2013 decision to revoke the citizenship of any persons of foreign descent in the country—regardless of whether they were born in the DO—if their birthdate falls after 1929.⁵⁴ The United Nations estimates roughly 210,000 Haitian-descended, Dominican-born people—a large chunk of the 244,000 total people of foreign descent that the policy affects—will now be without Dominican citizenship.⁵⁵ While the implications of the policy are not clear given its newness, attorney Wade McMullen of the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice & Human Rights claims that now that the Dominican government has excluded this segment of the population from citizenship, these stateless persons will be compelled “to leave and effectively go to Haiti, where they are also not citizens.”⁵⁶ Meanwhile, Dominican Immigration Director Jose Ricardo Taveras, long-time dissident of the “Haitianization” of his country, insists that the court ruling endows the stateless persons for the first time with clearly delineated identities that will aid future navigation of any national legalization plan that the DO might implement.⁵⁷ In terms of this paper, the most important conclusion to be drawn from the DO’s revocation of citizenship is that the disparities in treatment of diaspora members across different receiving countries

49 Wah.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Jared McCallister, “A court ruling to deny citizenship to Dominican Republic-born Haitians will be challenged by demonstrators outside the Caribbean nation’s consulate in midtown this week,” *NY Daily News*, October 13, 2013, <<http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/haitians-protest-article-1.1483963>>.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

constrains the upward socioeconomic mobility of the migrant community.

Members of the Haitian diaspora who engage in entrepreneurship in the US tend to do so on a small-scale level, through micro-enterprises and informal economic activities of which there are no formal records. These businesses tend to cater to a market that is almost completely comprised of Haitians, both in Haiti and in the US.⁵⁸ These examples of enterprise exist mostly in the industries of “money transfers, travel agencies, and food preparation” and of “bakeries, shipping, restaurants, translation services, music shops, and small grocery stores.”⁵⁹

The *Cairo Review of Global Affairs* provides reasoning for the lackluster quality of Haitian diasporic businesses:

These businesses tend to have little potential for growth or to create any significant wealth since they cater to a limited market and very few employ more than the owner . . . The informality and small size of Haitian expatriate enterprises stem not only from their own lack of sophisticated entrepreneurial skills, but also from low production, low standards, and the low diversity of goods to be had from Haiti... The Haitian diaspora in the US and elsewhere is largely a community of wage earners, focusing more on climbing professional occupational ladders and increasing incomes from their jobs . . . In 2010, the US Census reports a mere 3.5 percent of Haitians remain in [the] category [of self-employed Haitians who are aged 16 or older].⁶⁰

There is a sharp contrast between Haitian diasporic members and members of the Lebanese, Iranian, and Chinese diasporas, who have engaged in trade activities on a multi-national level through establishing niches in large-scale manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, and distributing.⁶¹

COMMUNITY SENTIMENT AMONG HAITIAN DIASPORA MEMBERS

Social science posits that most immigrants cannot immediately assimilate into a receiving and foreign culture due to both cultural differences as well as discrimination on the part of the receiving country’s people. This effect is patently manifest in communities of Haitian diaspora members, to whom academics often refer as “migrants in isolation.”⁶² Notwithstanding, Haitian communities have largely managed to retain a strong sense of ethnic identity in the US. Haitian businesses cater specifically and almost exclusively to that ethnic group, and there exist hundreds of Haitian associations in the US whose agendas range on the spectrum from political activism to the promotion of arts, charitable causes, and professional development.⁶³ The significance of these organizations is they are created overwhelmingly to address issues in Haiti, the

ancestral home, rather than Haitian-American issues in the US. Although groups to promote Haitian-American interests in the US thrive as well, tragic disasters (the 2010 earthquake, cholera outbreaks, etc.) and poor conditions in Haiti tend to funnel diaspora efforts on charity to Haiti.⁶⁴

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIASPORA ON HAITI

The working capital and human capital drain on Haiti from diasporic migration is significant. The most acute per capita “brain drain” in the world occurs in Haiti.⁶⁵ 80 percent of university degree-holding Haitians have left the country.⁶⁶ Two million Haitians reside abroad (with approximately half that number in the US).⁶⁷

Reliance by Haitians on remittances from the diasporic movement stems from the damp employment prospects in the nation. By the harshest estimates in 2011, only ten percent of residents of Haiti were formally employed following the earthquake.⁶⁸ Aggregate annual remittances from diaspora members were as large as \$1.9 billion in 2010, which constituted around 30 percent of Haiti’s gross domestic product (GDP).⁶⁹ In perspective, money channeled into Haiti by other outside players and labeled as “official development assistance” (ODA) only made up ten percent of GDP, a third of diasporic contributions.⁷⁰ The economic impact of the Haitian diaspora is twofold: while it has undoubtedly drained funds away from nation, it also currently props up a large portion of the informal Haitian economy. However, aggregate statistics fail to show that not every individual diaspora member is the same; while some are regularly sending large remittances to the country, there are those who feel they have no ties to Haiti or for other reasons do not participate in unilateral transfers. To draw diasporic contributions to the country, there must be a base understanding that sentiments across the diaspora community range and therefore methods of attracting diasporic investment must vary.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE DIASPORA ON US-HAITIAN RELATIONS

In 2010, the US consumed nearly 80 percent of Haiti’s \$530 million export industry.⁷¹ The US is Haiti’s largest trading partner;⁷² therefore, there is mutual economic interest in preserving strong diplomatic relations. The Department of State’s official platform on “US Relations with Haiti” explicitly and optimistically states that members of the diaspora with legal status in the US could function as “a potentially powerful ally in the effort to strengthen US policy initiatives in Haiti,”⁷³ possibly because the US government assumes diaspora

64 Ibid.

65 Johanna Mendelson Forman, Hardin Lang, and Ashley Chandler, “The Role of the Haitian Diaspora in Building Haiti Back Better,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, 2011, <<http://csis.org/publication/role-haitian-diaspora-building-haiti-back-better>>.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 US Department of State, “US Relations With Haiti,” *Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs* (2013), <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982.htm>>.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Forman, Lang, and Chandler.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

members have cultural understanding of Haiti but have resided in the US long enough to be willing to promote an agenda that is bilaterally beneficial.

Such hope is tempered by trepidation at illegal immigrants from Haiti. The “flow of illegal migrants” from Haiti that the US Department of State perceives includes “100,000 undocumented Haitian migrants . . . intercepted at sea by the US Coast Guard in the past two decades.”⁷⁴ However, emphasis should be placed on the fact that the bulk of these interceptions were made during Bill Clinton’s 1991–1994 term, when illegitimate military rule (which had ousted Aristide from Haiti) existed in Haiti. During that time, more than 67,000 illegal migrants to the US were interdicted.⁷⁵ Currently, the US Department of State reports an average of “fewer than 1,500 [annual]” interdictions for such offenses. However, it warns that “the prospect remains . . . for the renewal of higher flows of illegal migrants, particularly under conditions of political unrest or further economic downturn.”⁷⁶

The week before President Martelly was sworn in as Haiti’s president in 2011, the Haitian legislature altered the country’s constitution to extend dual citizenship to Haitians abroad in an effort to compel Haitian-American diaspora members to become more vested in Haiti’s developmental trajectory.⁷⁷ While the instability of Haiti, which drives illegal diaspora migration, strains US-Haitian relations both developmentally and politically, the US recognizes legitimate migrants of the diaspora as powerful tools for furthering development of Haiti.

IMPORTANCE OF DIASPORA IN REBUILDING HAITI

Even prior to the 2010 earthquake, almost every development index consistently ranked Haiti near the bottom of its measurements.⁷⁸ The task ahead is difficult: Haiti must remedy both the deep-seated, structural inefficiencies that existed even before the earthquake and also address the devastation that the earthquake wreaked. The diaspora presents largely untapped human and capital resources for carrying out this twofold goal. This paper argues that the two types of development most capable of improving standards of living in Haiti are social and economic improvements, both of which the diaspora can contribute to significantly.

DIASPORIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Traditionally, Haiti’s niche in the global economy has been agriculture and manufacturing, primary and secondary sector activities.⁷⁹ While Haiti could theoretically attempt to supersede its historic formula for economic success—economists

widely accept that the tertiary and quaternary sectors are more lucrative, mostly because they deal with services and information in an increasingly technology-oriented world—other MDCs have largely captured the market in these sectors.⁸⁰ While 50.4 percent of the small segment of Haiti that is employed is actually occupied in providing services,⁸¹ competition with more formally-educated populations of MDCs may be too stiff for unskilled Haitians—especially if the goal is job creation for the many unskilled, unemployed persons in Haiti. This paper therefore argues that Haiti’s best bet for economic stimulation is to revitalize its lackluster agricultural and manufacturing sectors and also capitalize on a renewed, potentially lucrative tourism industry.

The potency of agricultural reinvigoration is large. Coca-Cola is partnering with TechnoServe to engage in foreign direct investment in Haiti by developing more efficient methods to grow crops (specifically mangos) for Odwalla’s beverage, “Mango Tango,” sold in foreign markets.⁸² The US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Clinton Bush Haiti Fund, among other organizations, are subsidizing the project.⁸³ While still in the works, estimates project that 25,000 farmers in Haiti will see a 100 percent increase in income as a result of the project’s job creation efforts between 2011 and 2016.⁸⁴ To succeed, the project needs strengthened infrastructure to export mangos, so Coca-Cola and its investors will also have to open new supply lines, thereby improving channels of transportation within the country for other types of economic activity.

The manufacturing of textiles and other goods is far from as robust as it used to be in Haiti. However, a hefty portion—19.4 percent⁸⁵—of the Haitian economy is propped up by the manufacturing industry. US legislation such as HOPE I and II and the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act give Haitian textiles duty-free access to American markets coupled with US foreign direct investment in the form of the Caracol Industrial Park outside of Caracol, Haiti, which currently employs 1,600 Haitians, and other smaller forms of investment in order to stimulate textile production.⁸⁶ Sae-A Trading, a South Korean firm that produces apparel for Gap, Target, Wal-Mart, and other clothing stores, is the largest employer in Caracol park.⁸⁷ A byproduct of this industrial park is that in order to function with efficacy, it, like with Coca-Cola, must strengthen national infrastructure, of which other portions of the economy can take advantage. Continued expansion of secondary sector activity via diasporic contributions can lower the unemployment rate in Haiti, increase GDP, and result in a multiplier effect and a more robust economy that attracts more capital into the country.

80 Ibid.
81 Central Intelligence Agency.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Central Intelligence Agency.
86 Forman, Lang, and Chandler.
87 Ibid.

88 Travis Ross, “Michel Martelly’s education plan in Haiti marked by mismanagement and inflated claims,” *Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti*, April 9, 2013, <<http://www.ijdh.org/2013/04/topics/education-topics/michel-martellys-education-plan-in-haiti-marked-by-mismanagement-and-inflated-claims/>>.
89 Forman, Lang, and Chandler.
90 Ross.
91 Jacqueline Charles and Nadege Green, “Martelly to Haitians in South Florida: ‘Haiti has changed a lot,’” *Miami Herald*, December 10, 2012, <<http://www.miami-herald.com/2012/12/10/3135560/haiti-chief-martelly-to-give.html>>.

The last underdeveloped portion of the Haitian economy is tourism. If the state can successfully sell Haiti as a country with rich cultural background and unique sightseeing destinations (which will involve actively funneling money—potentially from the diaspora—into preserving Haiti’s natural wonders), it could direct a large amount of foreign money to local Haitian businesses.

DIASPORIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Outside of economic improvements, the second target of the Haitian government, if it is serious about raising the standard of living of citizens, must be social improvements. A case study of positive social development that engages the diaspora (although not directly) is President Martelly’s taxing of international phone calls to and from Haiti at five cents per minute and of international money transfers at \$1.50 each, which he pushed through in 2011 (without legislative approval).⁸⁸ He had ambitiously declared the tax money would be used to finance state education programs, which the government—for lack of resources and efficiency—has largely until recently left up to NGOs.⁸⁹ Martelly announced in March 2013 that \$100 million had been collected to fund the education of 1,021,144 children (statistics on which his government has been vacillating greatly since the project’s inception and which the organization Haiti Grassroots Watch disputes to be 165,000 impacted children).⁹⁰ His own lack of accountability with the money notwithstanding, if Martelly can garner widespread support for the tax rather than sow resentment over it in the diaspora community—which appears to be the prevailing sentiment at the moment⁹¹—he can use the ongoing stream of taxed money to fund any number of social reform programs, including state-sponsored hospitals and other welfare programs. To do so, Martelly will have to convince the Haitian diaspora community that they have a stake in the country’s development and also prove to them that he is not in fact misappropriating the funds they contribute.

CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT ENGAGEMENT WITH THE HAITIAN DIASPORA

While Haiti’s proximity to the US and other international economic powerhouses and its retention of the structural skeleton of a multi-sector economy (from past activities) are optimistic signs that growth in the country is possible, issues hindering successful development include both intrinsic and already pervasive issues in the country as well as disconnects between the diaspora and the nation.

Firstly, the infrastructure of the country is weak. Channels of communication and transportation are not up-to-date, and therefore resources are either not shared or their distribution not coordinated efficiently enough, both spatially and across diverse portions of the economy. The problem is self-perpetuating: poor infrastructure leads to little economic development, which results in little motivation for investment in infrastructural improvements. In addition, economic activity is overwhelmingly concentrated in a few poles, including Port-au-Prince (with 2.1 million of the 10.1 million people in the country), Cap-Haïtien, and Les Cayes.⁹²

Haiti, without the monetary capital to invest in itself, is also largely dependent on foreign aid, which comes in the form of a plethora of NGOs and foreign government aid, which does not function as a cohesive unit and which is attached to myriad different agendas. Foreign aid, while undeniably necessary for the country, ushers into the country the problem of outside players' not understanding Haiti's cultural or environmental background well enough to necessarily decide the best course of action for the country. For example, in 1994, Bill Clinton's administration and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressured Haiti to liberalize trade.⁹³ Annual US domestic subsidies to its rice farmers figure around \$434 million (far higher than the \$353 million it contributes to Haitian aid),⁹⁴ allowing the US to export what local Haitians call "Miami Rice" to Haiti at a lower price than that at which local Haitian farmers can sell their product. In 1980, Haiti was self-sufficient in terms of rice production. However, as a result of US action, roughly 90 percent of Haiti's rice now comes from the US,⁹⁵ and 60 percent of its aggregate food from abroad.⁹⁶ These local farmers, no longer able to support themselves, were forced to migrate by the thousands to cities like Port-au-Prince, where they lived on the margins because of a plan Clinton now admits "may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but [has] not worked."⁹⁷

In addition, NGOs and foreign governments are often pressured by their donors and taxpayers respectively to turn out quick results. Haiti's issues are in most cases too deep-rooted to have quick fixes. Bill Clinton's Caracol Industrial Park, for example, while a staggering and concrete example of foreign direct investment doing good in Haiti, is 1) of dubious environmental sustainability, having eroded levies in a portion of Haiti's shores;⁹⁸ 2) not a comprehensive, overarching fix of all of Haiti so much as one example of how to stimulate its economy—in essence, for Haiti's economy to truly turn around, several iterations of industrial park construction would have to take place; and 3) less of the paragon of ideal

92 Central Intelligence Agency.

93 Mark Doyle, "US urged to stop Haiti rice subsidies," *BBC News*, October 4, 2010, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11472874>>.

94 Ibid.

95 Jim Guinn, "USA Rice Efforts Result in Rice Food-Aid for Haiti," *USA Rice Federation*, Jan. 10, 2010, <http://www.usarice.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=957:usa-rice-efforts-result-in-rice-food-aid-for-haiti-&catid=84:usarice-newsroom&Itemid=327>.

96 Doyle.

97 Ibid.

98 Tate Watkins, "How Haiti's Future Depends on American Markets," *The Atlantic*, May 8, 2013, <<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/how-haitis-future-depends-on-american-markets/275682/>>.

99 Ibid.

100 Forman, Lang, and Chandler.

101 Wah.

102 "Haiti—Open for Business," *Haiti Grassroots Watch*, November 29, 2011, <<http://haitigrassrootswatch.square-space.com/haiti-grassroots-watch-engli/2011/11/29/haiti-open-for-business.html>>.

employment for Haitians than a means for Haitians to eke out an existence—given the marginal wages of its workers and subpar working conditions.⁹⁹

Lastly, while the Haitian government is currently peaceful, any future instability could undermine present reconstruction efforts and deter international interest in providing aid.

DISCONNECT IN VESTING THE HAITIAN DIASPORA IN HAITI'S DEVELOPMENT

The diaspora and the Haitian government have historically had tense relations. Acute corruption in Haiti has discouraged diaspora members from channeling their talents into the country, which must ease its barriers to enterprise if it wishes to draw diasporic investment.¹⁰⁰ Currently, appeals to nationalism and "diaspora consciousness" have been regarded as enough to lure diasporic contributions to the ancestral home. Assumptions about the homogeneity of diaspora members (in terms of their affiliation with Haiti) ignore the nuances and multi-faceted quality of the diasporic individual's circumstances. Until Haiti and other outside players interested in Haiti's development can come to a comprehensive understanding of the diverse attributes of the diaspora community, they cannot maximize enlistment of diaspora members in Haiti's growth.

In addition, while the multitude of charitable organizations founded by Haitian-Americans to alleviate poor conditions in Haiti have the power to effect positive change in the Caribbean country, *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs* notes that:

The bulk of Haitian voluntary organizations in the US center around regional associations that are named for the specific region, town, or village in Haiti within which they conduct their charitable work. Haitian institutions in the US largely mirror those in Haiti in that they are weak or barely functioning, are plagued with capacity and financial resource deficiencies, are inappropriate due to parallel purposes, and are extremely informal.¹⁰¹

The criticism is significant because the dearth of coordinated efforts and lack of organization on the part of these NGOs erodes their efficacy not only in bettering Haiti but also in gaining support from the American and international public.

Prime Minister Daniel Gèrard Rouzier famously declared in 2011 that "Haiti is open for business."¹⁰² Delivering on such a statement is a tall order: expansive efforts to aggressively develop Port-au-Prince and a few other economic centers economically might be in the works, but those cities are only a few economic poles of Haiti (albeit the most populous ones). For all of Haiti to truly be open for business, Rouzier must

invest in development across the whole country. Diaspora engagement, while imperfectly employed at the moment, is one of his potential assets in doing so.

Katherine Fang ('17) is an Undeclared major in Trumbull College

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Imperial Contradiction:

Australian Foreign Policy and the British Response to the Rise of Japan, 1894-1904

THEODORE MILLER

INTRODUCTION: IMPERIAL CONTRADICTION

Can any nation depend for its defence upon a foreign policy entirely conducted by statesmen responsible to another nation?

—F.W. EGGLESTON

FW. Eggleston first asked the question above in a 1912 essay, and it would imprint itself on the minds of both Australian and British officials for decades.¹ Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, British imperial designs were in constant conflict with nationalist Australian notions of security. This divide was most lucidly showcased by war, such as in 1915, when the Gallipoli Campaign failed after heavy Australian losses, and during World War II, when Australian leaders were forced to turn to the United States for military assistance in the Pacific while London was focused on the battle for Europe. Differences in policy between the Dominion and the metropole were less pronounced in times of peace. Nevertheless, moments like the establishment of a separate Royal Australian Navy in 1911 and Billy Hughes' 1919 speech in New York, outlaying the need for an "Australian Monroe Doctrine for the Pacific," prove that these differences were never truly resolved, nor were they successfully repressed.²

The aim of this paper is to trace the imperial contradiction between Australian foreign policy and the British Empire's involvement in the Far East, specifically with regards to the rise of Japan. This paper will examine the earliest developments of this contradiction, beginning with the signing of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between Great Britain and Japan in 1894, and explicate their subsequent intensification by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. To accomplish this, this paper analyzes discussions between Australia's most outspoken political leaders and compares them to concurrent Foreign Office communications regarding the British handling of the fast-growing Japanese Empire. Through this analysis, this paper finds that the defensive

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- 1 Warren G Osmond, Frederick Eggleston: *An Intellectual in Australian Politics* (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 63.
 - 2 *The Mercury*, (Hobart, Australia, June 6, 1918), 4.

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- 3 John Hirst, "Empire, State, Nation," in *Australia's Empire*, eds. Deryck M. Schreuder and Stuart Ward (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008), 143-144.

policy of Australian leaders at the dawn of the twentieth century was a direct result of the nascent federation's heritage as a far-flung group of settler colonies, the foremost concern of which was the preservation of its white population through exclusionary immigration policies. Britain, on the other hand, being a mature global empire, had to maintain a policy of accommodation when dealing with other foreign powers. This policy was particularly necessary with regards to Japan, whose unexpected rise posed a uniquely complex situation for British officials to tackle, especially considering its proximity to the increasingly vociferous nation of Australia.

Therefore, it is precisely because the newly founded federation caused such a problem for British officials in their dealings over Pacific affairs that the Commonwealth of Australia serves as a lens through which historians can analyze one side of the imperial contradiction of British foreign policy in the early twentieth century. The simultaneous phenomena of Japan's rising power and Australia's budding nationalism and related aggression put a remarkably evident strain on the British imperial equation, as expressed through the dispatches of the top figures of its Foreign Office. Simultaneously, the predicament for Australia's most influential leaders lay in expressing its newfound independence on the international stage, when confronted with both the prospects of an Asian country dominating the Pacific and a seemingly ambivalent imperial government.

BACKGROUND: UNCOORDINATED EFFORT

To comprehend Australian foreign policy and defense policy before the scope of the main body of this paper, one has to first understand that there was no cohesive vision existed, at least not officially. Australia was a grouping of six remote colonies, the international affairs of which were completely under the purview of Britain's Foreign Office. The foreign policy of the island-continent as a whole may have been informed by prominent figures from the various colonies, but the ultimate decisions were always made in London. Furthermore, choices were made regarding one or more of the Australian colonies without respecting the preferences of the others, and sometimes without even informing them.

It is no wonder, then, that moves to federation and independence were born out of and furthered by foreign policy issues like immigration and defense. All of the Australian colonies except Western Australia were awarded self-government in 1852, when a "smooth transition" granted the colonies bicameral parliaments—including popular lower houses—and local ministers, all funded by British taxpayers and defended by the Royal Navy.³ The gold rush had begun a year earlier, and thousands of Chinese immigrants began to pour into work

camps in Victoria, Queensland and New South Wales. Victoria implemented the first restriction against the Chinese influx in 1854 when a Commission of Enquiry imposed regulations on Chinese workers, keeping them in their own, separated labor camps.⁴ The 1850s also saw the building of Australia's first permanent fortifications due to outbreak of the Crimean War and fears of a Russian invasion.⁵

The beginnings of disputes between Australian colonial leaders and British Foreign Office officials manifested in early interactions with the Chinese Empire and its migrant workers. In 1855, Victoria utilized the new British Passengers Act to limit Chinese immigration based on ship tonnage, and South Australia followed two years later. The British-signed 1860 Convention of Peking formally established the freedom of movement of Chinese workers coming into Australia, and the Foreign Office had to coerce the Australian colonies into accepting it—Victoria in 1865 and New South Wales in 1867.⁶ Political developments in Australia leading to the rise of the Labour Party in the 1870s only further entrenched the idea of the necessity for policies of exclusion. The 1878 Seamen Strike, supported by other trade unions, reform groups, and radical politicians, was explicitly initiated in response to the Australasian Steam Navigation Company's use of Chinese workers. In 1879, the Intercolonial Trade Union Congress of Australia and the Victorian Anti-Chinese League officially condemned immigration, and two years later the Victorian government introduced the Chinese Influx Restriction Bill, requiring all Chinese workers to obtain a special certificate to enter the colony.⁷

Meanwhile, British military considerations saw their first clashes with Australian interests, which resulted in some Australian leaders taking measures to maintain the security of the colonies. Stretched thin financially and logistically by tensions in Europe in the 1870s, British forces withdrew from the Pacific in great numbers, leaving Australian colonial governments feeling vulnerable. In July 1870, the Colonial Premiers met in Melbourne and decided to introduce permanently paid troops into their militias, as well as erect several fortifications to protect against coastal attacks.⁸

Australians began to see federation in the late 1880s and early 1890s as a means by which they could ensure the perpetuity of their defensive and exclusionary policies, which, under more direct British rule, had always been temporary and subject to English discretion. In 1883, the Premier of Queensland took control of New Guinea, a move that Lord Derby, the Colonial Secretary, rejected. In the same year, the upper half of the island was given to Germany; the formation of the Federal Council of Australasia was a direct result of this clash.⁹ Then, at the 1887 Colonial Conference held in London, the Australian Colonial Premiers disagreed with British officials over

4 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds. *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008), 17-20.

5 Stuart Ward, "Security: Defending Australia's Empire," in *Australia's Empire*, ed. Deryck M. Schreuder and Stuart Ward (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 232-233.

6 Lake and Reynolds, 20.

7 *Ibid.*, 30-36.

8 Ward, 235-239.

9 *Ibid.*, 239.

10 Lake and Reynolds, 37-43.

11 Ward, 240.

12 Lake and Reynolds, 137.

13 "Russo-Japanese War," *Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition*. (Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 2013. Web, Dec. 09 2013).

complaints made by Chinese Imperial Commissioners over Australian discrimination toward their subjects. The next year, Victoria completely ignored British law and began to prohibit the re-entry of Chinese workers, and after the Sydney Conference on Chinese Immigration, all six colonies acted in concert to enact restrictive policies.¹⁰ In 1891, the first Constitutional Convention, which was held in Sydney, resulted in plans to draft a constitution.¹¹ Decades of Australian efforts at coordinating for defense and against unwanted immigration were to be rewarded in writing both because of and despite British intervention.

PART I: 1894-1899, FEDERATION AND EXCLUSION

The most convincing piece of evidence that the Commonwealth of Australia's founding intended for the exclusion of unwanted immigrants is timing. The Australian states were officially federated on January 1, 1901, and its brand new Parliament passed the Immigration Restriction Act in December of the same year; as Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds argue, Australia was "inaugurated in an act of racial expulsion."¹² However, to Australian statesmen at the time of federation, the first priority was not exclusion, but, rather, obtaining from the British the independence that would allow them to carry out such exclusion in the future. British leaders, themselves, were in the midst of securing the foundations for favorable relations in the Pacific, both economic and political, and were willing to permit and encourage nationalist Australian manifestation to the extent that it would not interfere with imperial plans for the region. The conflict between the two governments before Australia's federation arose from the tension between the British desire for Australia to realize its dreams of full self-government and Australian fervor to maintain racial solidarity, a matter of security in itself for the aspiring Australian leaders.

1894 and the years that followed were pivotal for British imperial global strategy, as the empire sought to take economic advantage of the growing power and influence of Japan in order to enhance its own influence in the Far East. A year earlier, Russia had refused Japanese requests to withdraw its troops from Manchuria, so the Foreign Office looked to accommodate the trade interests of the Japanese to get them on the British side.¹³ In London, on July 7, British and Japanese officials signed the Treaty for Commerce and Navigation, "being equally desirous of maintaining the relations of good understanding . . . by extending and increasing the intercourse between their respective states . . . based upon principles of equity and mutual benefit." Most of the treaty details regulations regarding duties and taxation that one party was or was not allowed to inflict upon the other,

but the beginning of Article I stands out as particularly significant in relation to the issue of immigration into Australia:

“The subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel or reside in any part of the dominions and possessions of the other contracting party, and shall enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and property.”¹⁴

Although the treaty was in line with British doctrines of free trade and rights of movement, political conditions in an Australia fighting to achieve unity under the perceived threat of Asian immigration did not lend themselves to accepting the agreement. According to historian John Hirst, federal movement was revived as “a democratic crusade” in the mid-1890s after a few years of economic depression and internal tensions between colonies.¹⁵ Not by coincidence, after a number of decades marked by a drop in the Chinese population due to immigration restriction and persecution, the 1890s saw the first big upturn in Japanese immigration, as the rising country started to send workers to the Queensland pearleries. Australians, wealthy and poor alike, feared this new wave of immigration, a concern that opportunist politicians used to their advantage. Especially influential in inspiring fear in the hearts of Australians was Charles Pearson’s 1893 popular book *National Life and Character: A Forecast*, which predicted the rise of China as a world power and declared that, one day, Europeans would “wake up to find [them]selves elbowed and hustled, and perhaps even thrust aside by peoples whom [they] have looked down upon as servile, and thought of as bound always to minister to [their] needs.”¹⁶

The year 1896 exacerbated the split, as the Colonial Premiers one by one decided not to sign on to the agreement, a legal but undiplomatic move on their part.¹⁷ Each Australian state then enacted further legislation against Japanese immigration, explicitly due to the rise in Japanese navy capabilities and their military defeat of China the previous year. The only exception to this concerted effort in 1896 was Queensland, the economic beneficiary of the immigration influx, but the colonial government managed to strike a deal with British officials through which they still maintained rights to exclude Japanese workers.¹⁸

The political mood in Australia was, therefore, not receptive to the 1894 treaty, and Australians’ coordinated efforts to work against it fueled the final push towards federation in the late 1890s. In an 1896 paper titled “The Present Federal Crisis,” Alfred Deakin, a highly influential figure during federation and a future Australian Prime Minister, referred to the connection between British dealings with Japan and the need for federation, declaring that “the course of events abroad is . . . uncertain, and portends graver urgencies for immediate union.”¹⁹

14 “Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between Great Britain and Japan,” *The American Journal of International Law* 2:3 (1911): 187-199.

15 Hirst, 152.

16 Charles H. Pearson, *National Life and Character: A Forecast* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1913), 96.

17 Lake and Reynolds, 143-144.

18 E.L. Piessse. “Japan and Australia,” *Foreign Affairs* 4:3 (1926): 476-477.

19 Alfred Deakin. “The Present Federal Crisis,” *The Deakin Papers*, National Library of Australia. (1896), 11/174.

20 Hirst, 153.

21 Lake and Reynolds, 145-147.

22 Alfred Deakin. “On Federation,” *The Deakin Papers*. (1899), 11/207.

23 *The Critic, The Deakin Papers*. (June 4, 1898), 11/346.

24 Australasian Federation League of Victoria. “Songs of Union,” *The Deakin Papers*. (1899), 11/172.

25 *Encyclopaedia Britannica, Online Academic Edition*, s.v. “Russo-Japanese War,” last updated Nov. 27, 2014, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/514017/Russo-Japanese-War>>.

For the next two years, Australian leaders met and discussed forming a federation, a topic that also surfaced at the 1897 Colonial Conference, which Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain presided over in London. There, Chamberlain made British support for nation-building clear, and a referendum to adopt a federal constitution was sent to the six Australian colonies.²⁰ On the controversial subject of immigration, though, the nations compromised, as Chamberlain proposed an Australian immigration policy based on a literary test, as opposed to flat out exclusion, a measure which the Japanese begrudgingly accepted.²¹

The wave of federation through popular democracy and rule of the majority swept through the country in 1898 and 1899, as the colonies ratified the constitution and made final plans for official federation and nationhood. “A federal constitution . . . represents the highest development of the possibilities of self-government,” wrote Deakin of Australian prospects. The nature of the popular rapture, however, proved the racially exclusive underpinnings of the federal movement, as well as its xenophobic motivations. As federation drew nearer, the people of Australia grew more and more committed to the unity of the colonies’ white citizens, explicitly against foreign influence. In the same letter, Deakin also noted how a “united Australia . . . can only come with the consent of the Australia-born” and that the nation was “not to fall into the hands of foreigners.” Deakin continued the sentiment by saying:

“From the far east and the far west alike we behold menaces and antagonisms...Let us stand shoulder to shoulder in defence of the enlightened liberalism of the constitution.”²²

Local political groups and publications were even more open in expressing the racial component of Australian federation. The South Australian newspaper *The Critic* wrote in its June 4, 1898 issue that the new Australia would be “one people of one tongue.”²³ The Australasian Federation League of Victoria published the songs “Australians True,” which contained the lyric, “One race are we,” and “An Australian National Song,” which included the line, “One land, one flag, one brotherhood.”²⁴

Meanwhile, British officials moved in the opposite direction and looked to expand relations with Japan. Russia and China officially allied against the Pacific nation earlier in 1898, giving Russia the rights to lease Manchuria and the logistically important Port Arthur, an area Japan had been forced out of during the Sino-Japanese War.²⁵ Japan quickly urged Britain to obtain a lease for the Liaodong Peninsula, just south of Manchuria, in order to make sure that the Russians did not take it. According to Sir Ernest Satow, a renowned

British Japanologist and Minister-Plenipotentiary to Japan at the time, the Japanese position was that the “permanent occupation of such an important strategic point by a Western Power would imperil the peace of the Far East” and that the British should intervene to make sure that would not be the case.²⁶

Satow himself derived his knowledge of Japanese affairs from his passion for the country and love of its language—he married a Japanese woman and raised a family in Tokyo—but he was also very honest about the complications entailed in establishing solid relations with his home country.²⁷

In his frequent notes to the Marquess of Salisbury, the Prime Minister, Satow acknowledged that Japanese control of the area would be “detrimental to the peace of the Far East” and that the Japanese themselves did “not seem to appreciate the value of diplomacy.”²⁸ Still, Satow advocated “the concurrence and support of the British” toward Japanese endeavors “to check Russian progress,”²⁹ which the Marquess agreed would be “in the common interest.”³⁰

Even before official federation, though, Australian political leaders interfered with British diplomacy in the Pacific. The concession of Samoa to appease Germany, who also had aspirations for the Liaodong Peninsula territory, was “rendered impossible by the strong objections which the Australian Colonies would raise,” according to Salisbury.³¹ A year later, the Marquess stressed over the Samoa situation even more, saying it was “fraught with difficulty.”³² The Foreign Office was faced with the “strong and legitimate feeling which exist[ed] in the Australian Colonies against allowing the control of Samoa to pass into the hands of a foreign power” on one hand, and the imperial imperative to support British cooperation with Japan in the Pacific arena on the other.³³ Whose common interest the Prime Minister had been referring to remained uncertain.

PART II: 1900-1904, THE DEFENSE OF WHITE AUSTRALIA

In 1901, the Australian nation came into being, its White Australia policy was made secure, and the infant nation initiated plans to defend itself. The federating years made clear that nationhood, along with what it took to secure it, invoked notions of race and exclusion for Australians. However, what that meant for relations after federation with a British mother country focused on maintaining international ties with a Japan gearing up to go to war with Russia was still up for interpretation. The situation in the Pacific gave Britain cause to wholeheartedly back its new Asian ally. To the newly appointed Australian leadership, however, the rise of British-backed Japan and tensions in the Far East made the need to

- 26 “Satow to Marquess Salisbury,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Dec. 1, 1897), FO Japan 485.
- 27 N.J. Brailey, “Satow, Ernest Mason (1843-1929),” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
- 28 “Satow to Marquess Salisbury,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Mar. 26, 1898), FO Japan 496.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 “Marquess Salisbury to Satow,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Mar. 31, 1898), FO Japan 501.
- 31 “Salisbury to Viscount Gough,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Jul. 20, 1898), FO Germany 1466.
- 32 “Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Sept. 15, 1899), FO Pacific Islands 332.
- 33 “British Colonial Office to Foreign Office,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Jun. 24, 1899), FO Pacific Islands 326.

- 34 “Chamberlain to Governor of South Australia,” *The Deakin Papers*. (Apr. 5, 1900), 11/527-542.
- 35 “Lansdowne to MacDonald,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Mar. 16, 1901), FO Japan 538.
- 36 “Lansdowne to MacDonald,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Apr. 17, 1901), FO Japan 538.
- 37 “MacDonald to Lansdowne,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Nov. 1, 1901), FO Japan 563.
- 38 “Lansdowne to MacDonald,” (Apr. 17, 1901).
- 39 “Lansdowne to MacDonald,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Nov. 6, 1901), FO Japan 563.
- 40 Marquess of Lansdowne, “Memorandum,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Nov. 11, 1901) FO 92.
- 41 “MacDonald to Lansdowne,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Nov. 28, 1901), FO Japan 563.

establish a defensive force to protect the fledgling federation all the more urgent.

Discussions between Australian leaders and British officials over the defense of the soon-to-be Commonwealth unsurprisingly dominated the year preceding federation, as it proved to be the most controversial—indeed one of the only—issues involved in nation building. The specific article in dispute was Article 74, a piece of the document devoted to establishing in exactly which exceptional cases Australian policy could fall out of line with that of the Queen. In an early draft of the constitution, this line was defined by the term “public interest,” which Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain regarded as “so vague and indefinite as to have uncertainty in a matter where precision is of first importance.” According to the British, if Australia could independently make policy decisions that contradicted those formed in London, “a most important link of Empire would be impaired,” and it could “scarcely [have been] to the interest of Australia that the final decisions should not lie with the highest tribunal of Empire, beyond suspicion of local bias or predilection.”³⁴ During subsequent constitutional meetings, British officials brought up the Crown’s complaints, changed Article 74, and obtained Royal Assent, but the colony’s fervor to independently protect its interests remained.

As can be imagined, 1901 was a busy year for Australian leaders and British officials alike. The new British Foreign Secretary, the Marquess of Lansdowne, constantly expressed his desire to “act in concert with Japan” at ever-increasing odds with the Russian Empire.³⁵ “In the event of war,” Lansdowne wrote to Sir Claude MacDonald, the British representative in Japan, England “would remain neutral, but . . . [was] not likely to deprive [itself] of complete freedom of action.”³⁶ As the year went on, the need for a further “understanding or arrangement . . . with regards to affairs in the Far East”³⁷ became “highly necessary”³⁸ to both Britain and Japan in order that “neither of them should be overwhelmed by a combination of Foreign Powers.”³⁹ Thus, alliance negotiations had begun, as the British did “not wish to continue to act alone”⁴⁰ in the Pacific, and the Japanese sought to maintain “the status quo and general peace in the Far East.”⁴¹

Amid the commotion of federation in Australia, the passage of the Immigration Restriction Act in the same year proved Australia’s most marked departure from British imperial policy of working toward an alliance with Japan to date. The Act also revealed that the young nation was still bent on the exclusionary policies that so characterized its earlier colonial years. The nations agreed upon a policy of immigration restriction through a literacy dictation test, but its exact terms and expressed goals were not what Chamberlain had envisioned at the Colonial Conference

back in 1897. Australia's first Prime Minister Edmund Barton originally supported an English test, but British officials disapproved of the method due to the potential for it to alienate other Europeans.⁴² After the establishment of a rule that tested potential immigrants on knowledge of any European language, the bill may have been granted Royal Assent more smoothly had it not been for its implicit aim at Japanese immigrants working in Queensland and Britain's desire to form an alliance with Japan.⁴³

The maintenance of White Australia was not only effected at the exclusion of the Japanese. 1901 also saw the successful passage of the Pacific Island Labourers Act, which deported thousands of Queensland workers back to the islands their families had come from. When a group of the workers who were to be deported petitioned the Queensland government to let them stay, their efforts were immediately rebuked.⁴⁴ Deakin, a newly elected member of the first Australian Parliament, believed the petitioners' aims were to "thwart the wishes of a large majority of the people of Australia." The topic was apparently the "principal issue" in the Queensland federal elections, and allowing the Islanders to remain in Queensland would apparently "impair the principle of White Australia."⁴⁵

The debate over the exclusive act intensified as the British worried about the erosion of the integrity of imperial promises that they had made to Japan. Chamberlain echoed the sentiment that the act was "contrary to the spirit of the Treaty" and that "Inter-Empire free trade" was paramount to the British in his correspondence with Australian politicians during 1902 and 1903. In an official memorandum, Chamberlain wrote:

His Majesty's Government has shown every sympathy with the efforts of the people of Australia to deal with the problem of immigration, but they have always objected...to specific legislative discrimination in favour of, or against, race and colour, and that objection applies with even greater force to the present case, in which the question of the rights of the white population of Australia as against the influx of foreign immigrants...a matter which cannot affect the conditions of employment in Australia and in no way affects that purity of race which the people of Australia justly value.

He also warned the colonial government that their actions would cause "friction with foreign governments and serious results would be likely to ensue to Australian trade and credit." Chamberlain was attempting to reconcile the cosmopolitan attitude of the metropole with the defensive racism of its settler colony.⁴⁶

The latter won out, as Australians saw immigration restriction as not only crucial to the maintenance of the racial purity they so desired, but also to their independent voice

42 Lake and Reynolds, 137-138.

43 Piesse, 478.

44 Lake and Reynolds, 150-152.

45 "Alfred Deakin to Lord Tennyson," *The Deakin Papers*. (Sept. 23, 1902), 14/213-226.

46 Joseph Chamberlain. "Memorandum," *The Deakin Papers*. (Apr. 17, 1903), 14/869-877.

47 "Edmund Barton to Alfred Deakin," *The Deakin Papers*. (Jul. 19, 1902), 14/300-301.

48 Alfred Deakin. "Minute Paper," *The Deakin Papers*. (Jun. 16, 1902), 14/842-845.

49 Lake and Reynolds, 155-157.

50 "Alfred Deakin to Lord Tennyson," *The Deakin Papers*. (1903), 14/371-373.

51 Colonial Defence Committee. "Memorandum," *The Deakin Papers*. (Mar. 30, 1901), 14/527-533.

52 "Alfred Deakin to Edmund Barton," *The Deakin Papers*. (Jul. 29, 1902), 14/270.

within the British Empire. In July of 1902, Barton, after debating British officials on the issue, wrote to Deakin and said that the "Immigration Restriction Act . . . conflict[ed] in some degree with the [1894] Treaty" but that it might "be administered so as not to sensibly" do so.⁴⁷ Deakin confirmed Barton's sentiments when he wrote definitively that the "Act is not invalidated by conflict with the Treaty," and that "no violation" was committed with its passage.⁴⁸ Australian leaders took their first and soon-to-be second Prime Ministers' sentiments to heart that year as they enacted the Post and Telegraph Act, prohibiting Asians from working on ships carrying Australian mail, and the Commonwealth Franchise Act, enfranchising white women, while explicitly denying the same for any Asian resident.⁴⁹ In 1903, Deakin, by expressing a sentiment held by Australians for a half century, had the final say:

The object of the Act is to restrict the influx of undesirable immigrants, and especially of coloured races whose entrance in numbers would be a serious menace to the social and political institution of the Commonwealth, and might permanently impair the purity of race which its people value very highly.⁵⁰

White Australia was not to be denied, not even by the British. How best to protect it, however, had yet to be decided, and after the principle of White Australia was upheld through the passage of the Immigration Restriction Act and subsequent discussions, the following years in Australian politics were heavily devoted to establishing the defenses of the nation. Back in 1901, the London-based Colonial Defence Committee released their official recommendations for the new federation. First and foremost in their report was the statement:

The maintenance of British supremacy at sea is the first condition of the security of Australian territory and trade in war.

According to the British, Australian trade and freedom was "secured by the action of the Imperial Navy," and, therefore, Australian naval independence was secondary.⁵¹ An Australia unilaterally dependent upon the will of the Queen was not enough for Barton and Deakin. In 1902, they pushed the British to focus more efforts toward defending Australia, and imperial representatives repeatedly rejected the duo's appeals, leading Deakin to write that there was a "universal feeling" of "disappointment" on the part of Australians about the "attitudes of the British Government on all subjects," that the British government "neglect[ed] to make any advances towards trade preference," and that they "oppos[ed] military proposals approved by all [Australian] parties."⁵² Barton went so far as to suggest that, "before the conclusion of Treaties, views of Colonies affected should be obtained as far as might

be consistent with confidential negotiations with foreign governments.”⁵³ Not surprisingly, both sentiments fell on deaf British ears.

Of course, on the British side, the conversation was influenced by the mother country’s activity in the Pacific, specifically in regard to the alliance with Japan, made official on January 30, 1902, with the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. The alliance gave the Japanese rights to commercially expand in Korea—a territory sought by the Russian Empire—officially declared that British “naval forces should . . . act in concert with those of Japan,” and declared that the British Empire harbored “no intention of relaxing her efforts to maintain . . . available for concentration . . . a naval force superior to that of any third Power.”⁵⁴ The Marquess of Lansdowne thought of the deal as a reflection of “close and uninterrupted communication” and “mutual advantage” and thought that it was “to be invoked . . . in the defence of British interests.” Although the British may have maintained a policy of “strict neutrality” on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, their diplomatic allegiances, despite the cries of their own Australian subjects, lay firmly alongside Japan.⁵⁵

Knowledgeable of the alliance and ignoring British will, Australia went ahead with its plans to establish its own measures of defense. Sir John Forrest, the Australian Minister of Defence, made clear in a 1902 report that “the duty of the Commonwealth to adequately contribute to the defence of Australia and of its floating trade” was primarily that of Australians themselves. While Forrest was aware that “it is absolutely necessary to depend upon the Royal Navy for our Naval Defence,” he also believed that, “owing to the progress made by Foreign Powers in the construction and maintenance of powerful sea-going cruisers,” it was imperative that Australia develop its own force “independent of the Royal Navy.”⁵⁶ Less than a decade later, Australia was granted its own autonomous Navy. British imperial designs for the Pacific may have put their trust in the Japanese, but subsequent Australian defense build-up proved that concurrence on the part of Britain’s own colonial state was much harder to come by.

It is significant that though Sir John Forrest supported the establishment of Australian defense forces, he was not an advocate of any kind of Australian independence, as other passages of the same paper clearly state:

We must altogether get rid of the idea that we have different interests to those of the rest of the empire...Our aim and object should be to make the Royal Navy the Empire’s Navy.⁵⁷

53 “Edmund Barton to Alfred Deakin,” *The Deakin Papers* (Aug. 2, 1902), 14/308-309.

54 “Anglo-Japanese Agreement,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Jan. 30, 1902), 125.

55 “Lansdowne to MacDonald,” *Documents on British Foreign Policy Overseas*. (Jan. 30, 1902), FO Japan 563.

56 Sir John Forrest. “Observations,” *The Deakin Papers*. (Mar. 15, 1902), 14/549.

57 Ibid.

58 Piesse, 479.

59 Ward, 243.

60 Piesse, 479-480.

61 Lake and Reynolds, 193-195.

62 Piesse, 479-480.

63 Ibid., 480-488.

Forrest’s attitude reveals that early Australian leaders, like Alfred Deakin and Edmund Barton, were not fighting for freedom from British command but, rather, were struggling to reconcile their aspirations for the Empire with the protection of their Australian citizens, something they had hitherto achieved through exclusive immigration policies. Likewise, British imperial officials had to balance the concerns of their own colonial subjects while considering the global implications of their actions. It was during these few years just after the establishment of the Commonwealth that the imperial contradiction between Australian foreign policy and British relations in the Pacific reached its zenith.

CONCLUSION: IMPERIAL DIVIDE

Contradiction then turned into divide. E.L. Piesse, an Australian foreign policy analyst and former intelligence officer, wrote two decades later that “in no country did the success of Japan against Russia in 1905 produce a greater impression than in Australia.”⁵⁸ As British diplomats rewarded Japan for their victory with a new, stronger alliance, and as they began to withdraw ships from the Pacific in order to keep pace with a growingly belligerent Germany,⁵⁹ rumors of Japanese espionage sparked Australian questioning of the true interests of the Royal Navy and ignited moves for Australia to develop its own measures for defense.⁶⁰ At a 1907 Colonial Conference, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin noted the condescension and lack of concern of British officials for Australian protection.⁶¹ In 1908, he looked to the United States for a partner by inviting President Theodore Roosevelt’s naval fleet to tour the Pacific. A year later, compulsory military training for all Australian boys was introduced, and a year after that, the Royal Australian Navy set sail.⁶²

In 1911, however, and in direct contradiction with Australian action, the British renewed their alliance with Japan, an agreement to which Australia expressly would not adhere. In fact, Japanese actions on behalf of the British during World War I only served to further entrench Australia’s suspicion. In 1916, Australian leaders refused to lift tariffs enacted toward Japanese trade, even though Japan had promised that no unwanted Japanese immigration into Australia would ensue. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes was instrumental in getting rid of the racial equality clause that the Japanese so desired and that the British may have been willing to concede.⁶³ As the end of the twenties approached, Japan, having been explicitly excluded from the elite club of Western power, began to

militarize, and the wheels of war in the Pacific began to turn.

Of course, it must be remembered that the British imperial equation is so vast and so complex that no one component in its global web can fully represent its grander totality, and no one phase of its extensive history can describe the complete arc. In the case of the early Australian federation alone there is still much more work to be done. Newspapers and journals from the young nation must be studied to gather more data on Australian public opinion to gauge how it influenced the nation's leaders. On the British side, Japan was only one of a great number of powers it had to contend with in the East Asian arena. Closer study of its dealings with the likes of China, Germany, France, Russia, and other countries could begin to expose the bigger picture of Britain's affairs and motivations. What has been revealed already, however, is that although the imperial ties connecting Australia to its mother country remained and continue to this day, the very fabric that constituted them was changed forever during the decade surrounding the turn of the century, the decade the Australian nation was born.

Theodore Miller ('16) is a History major in Branford College.

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A Case for Clandestine Diplomacy

The Secret UK-US-Libyan Talks

NILS METTER

From the Cuban Missile Crisis to today's Israeli-Palestinian conflict, clandestine diplomacy has played an integral role in international relations—both past and present.¹ Academic research, however, has long overlooked the critical role intelligence actors play in conducting diplomacy. The current body of research in this field has focused largely on secret and clandestine diplomacy, leaving the covert negotiations between the US, Britain, and Libya in the late 1990s and early 2000s untouched. When these areas are considered, analyses focus on WMD proliferation or the usage of coercive diplomacy. However, as this paper will argue, literature on these events offers indispensable insights on the role clandestine diplomacy in shaping both the negotiation process and outcome.

Clandestine diplomacy is a special case of “secret diplomacy”² and should not be confused with “intelligence-driven diplomacy,” views intelligence as supplementary support for diplomats in the context of coercive bargaining.³ Clandestine diplomacy, on the other hand, relies substantially, if not exclusively, on intelligence actors in order to achieve a peaceful solution with an adversary.^{4,5} Whether such “clandestine diplomats” fall into the category of diplomatic actors is contested in diplomatic literature.⁶ I define non-accredited intelligence actors as diplomatic actors under certain circumstances, assuming a functional perspective. The basis for this definition is given by the functions of diplomatic missions as described by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations:⁷ representation, negotiation, information gathering, and pursuing national interests.⁸

Taking a primarily functional perspective is a defensible position in diplomatic scholarship.⁹ Yet clandestine diplomacy may expand these functions, as its essence “is that the participants can deny that they are engaging in talks or negotiations.”¹⁰ In the case of US-UK-Libya talks, intelligence assets were crucial because in addition to plausible deniability, the intelligence community was able to 1) circumvent domestic and bureaucratic inhibitors, 2) had an intrinsic advantage over

1 Clive Jones and Petersen Tore, eds., *Israel's Clandestine Diplomacies* (London: Oxford University Press, 2013); Len Scott, “Secret intelligence, covert action and clandestine diplomacy,” *Intelligence & National Security* 19:2 (2004): 322-341.

2 A widely accepted definition is that secret diplomacy entails the “total isolation and exclusion of the media and the public from negotiations and related policy-making”. See Eytan Gilboa, “Secret diplomacy in the television age,” *International Communication Gazette* 60:3 (1998): 213.

3 Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman, *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World* (London: Oxford University Press, 2012), 255.

4 Scott, *Secret Intelligence*, 330.

5 *Ibid.*, 336.

6 The debate about what constitutes being a diplomat goes along the following lines: 1) only those diplomats accredited by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations conduct strictly speaking diplomacy, 2) a broader base of state-affiliated actors ought to be included, or 3) the notion of state-centric diplomacy has to be revised completely in order to include a wider variety of actors. Kerr and Wiseman, *Diplomacy Globalizing World*, 4.

7 United Nations, *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities, Vienna, Austria: 1961.

8 Although explicitly named as another function of diplomacy in the Vienna Convention, it is widely accepted that “promoting friendly relations” is rather “political correctness than...reality”. G.R. Berridge and Alan James, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 66-67.

9 Other definitions of diplomacy focus on negotiation, communication, and omission of force. The Oxford Dictionary defines diplomacy as “the management of international relations by negotiation; the methods by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys.” See *Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 385-86. Another common definition sees diplomacy as the “process of dialogue and negotiations by which states in a system conduct their relations and pursue their purposes by means short of war.” See Adam Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States* (London; New York: Routledge, 1991), 11.

10 Scott, *Secret Intelligence*, 336; G.R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: theory and practice*, 4th ed., (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), 230-32.

11 Bruce W. Jentleson, and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,” *International Security* Vol. 30:3 (2006): 57-72.

12 Both the re-opening of the US interest section in Tripoli in February 2004 and the upgrade to a US liaison office in June of the same year can be cited as symbolic signs of improvement. *Ibid.*

13 Among these were Yussuf Dibri (head of the intelligence service), Abdul Salaam Jalloud (prime minister), and Musa Kusa (deputy foreign minister).

14 Gary Hart, “My secret talks with Libya, and why they went nowhere.” *Washington Post*, January 18, 2004.

15 *Ibid.*

the diplomatic apparatus in maintaining secrecy, and 3) was crucial for the negotiations due to the nature of the subject. A necessary precondition for successful clandestine diplomacy was given by well-functioning personal relationships between the leading figures on both sides and within each party.

OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND

Western-Libyan relations began to deteriorate as early as 1969 with the coup that brought Gaddafi to power. After the US ambassador in Tripoli was recalled in 1973 and the US Embassy closed in 1980, all official diplomatic relations between the US and Libya ceased. An age of US coercive diplomacy then began in Libya, as described by a three-phase model proposed by Jentleson and Whytock.¹¹ While the first phase (1981–1988) of US sanctions and military force failed, the multilateral and more sanctions-based phase from 1989–1998 yielded mixed results.¹² Only the third phase from 1999–2003, based on “secret direct negotiations,” brought success. This includes foremost Gaddafi’s public announcement on December 19th, 2003, that Libya would renounce state-sponsored terrorism, accept responsibility for the Pan Am 103 Lockerbie tragedy, and grant UN inspectors full access to its WMD programs with the commitment to abandon proliferation. As a result of these concessions, Libya’s diplomatic relations eased soon after.¹²

In order to understand the importance of clandestine diplomats in the success of these covert negotiations, one needs to grasp the context of the 1990s in which several attempts to find a diplomatic solution failed due to domestic obstacles. In February 1992, former US Senator Gary Hart was approached by a Libyan intelligence official in Athens, who then conveyed Libya’s interest in negotiations to the US State Department. Throughout the following year until March 1993, Hart convinced the Libyan officials¹³ to include all major disputed issues—a trial of the two Pan Am 103 suspects and “verifiable cessation of any support of terrorism and confirmed abandonment of weapons of mass destruction programs”¹⁴—in potential negotiations about the lifting of sanctions and normalization of diplomatic relations. Agreements on the logistical and legal details for the trial of the two suspects had also been reached through Hart’s intermediation. In fact, Libya even personally told Hart that “everything will be on the table.”¹⁵ However, in that time period the Bush administration denied offers to initiate official negotiations at least four times. The last refusal came with a statement that even in exchange for the Pan Am bombers, “there would be no discussions.”¹⁶

A similar backchannel with former Undersecretary of State William Rogers, established in January 1992, indicated Libya's readiness to talk even earlier.¹⁷ Jentleson and Whytock consider "formidable political pressure" from the families of the victims of the Lockerbie bombing as the main reason for American reluctance to engage in negotiations.¹⁸ Yet given Gaddafi's demonstrated willingness to acquiesce to the Lockerbie's demands as early as 1992, it is unlikely that this concern was the actual reason at that time. Rogers cites the loss of the Bush administration in the 1992 presidential election as its reason to lose interest in starting negotiations.¹⁹ In 1997, the environment for negotiations improved rapidly after British foreign secretary Robin Cook agreed to Gaddafi's proposal of trialing the two Lockerbie suspects in a third country—the Netherlands.²⁰ From May 1999 to early 2000, after the US-Libyan backchannels had been re-established, five meetings took place between the Libyan head of intelligence Musa Kusa and on the American Undersecretaries of State Martin Indyk and Edward Walker.²¹ Another halt in negotiations that lasted until December 11, 2001 was again due to a change in administration and fear of domestic outcry over negotiations with a terrorism-sponsoring dictator.²²

THE HYBRID VECTORS

Official US-Libyan diplomatic relations did not exist in the late 1990s and early 2000s, while those that existed were of a functionally unofficial nature. Aside from the problem of domestic sabotage, which I will later delineate in more detail, this environment especially challenged Western countries. After all, "meeting and negotiating with aggressive dictators can indeed imply acquiescence, approval, and, worse, surrender of both principles and interests."²³ Official talks "confer de facto recognition on the adversary."²⁴ But the West had an interest in finding a formal diplomatic solution. Diplomatic disengagement can lead to a "substantial loss of information and intelligence on the target state", which in turn causes a "reduction in communication capacity and a diminished ability to influence the target state."²⁵ Out of self-interest, the US and Britain had to engage in diplomacy if they wanted to remain rather proactive on the Libyan issue.

Under these circumstances, clandestine diplomats can function as "hybrid vectors", changing between the roles of officially accredited diplomats and unofficial intermediaries like personal envoys. In this way, they do not officially represent the state, but rather the particular administration they are serving.²⁶ Even without official recognition this role still grants clandestine diplomats substantial authority, rendering them preferable over unofficial or private envoys. Those are

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- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Barbara Slavin, "Libya's Rehabilitation in Works since Early '90s," *USA Today*, April 27, 2004, <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-04-26-libya_x.htm>.
- 18 Jentleson and Whytock, *Who "Won" Libya*, 65.
- 19 Slavin, *USA Today*, 2004.
- 20 George Joffe, Interview by Nils Metter, Personal Interview, Cambridge, UK, August 6, 2014.
- 21 Slavin, *USA Today*, 2004.
- 22 According to Indyk the "[t]hey were prepared to accept pretty much all the requirements we had" at that time of the "long laundry list of things we expected the Libyans to do to 'graduate' from U.S. sanctions." Ibid.
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- 23 Kerr and Wiseman, *Diplomacy Globalizing World*, 274.
- 24 Daniel Lieberfeld, "Secrecy and 'Two-Level Games' in the Oslo Accord: What the Primary Sources Tell Us," *International Negotiation* 13:1 (2008): 137.
- 25 Maller, Tara, "Diplomacy derailed: The consequences of diplomatic sanctions." *The Washington Quarterly* 33:3 (2010): 61.
- 26 Because "it is only through such official human agencies [diplomatic missions] that notional entities such as states can speak to each other." See Berridge and Alan James, *Dictionary of Diplomacy*, 66.

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- 27 Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, 226.
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- 28 Joffe, interview.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ibid.

often used for both bypassing the foreign office and enabling plausible deniability but come with the problem of establishing credentials.²⁷ The intelligence community can provide these as institutional representatives of the administration in place.

DOMESTIC FACILITATORS AND INHIBITORS

After diplomatic contacts were thoroughly cut by 1984, Libya's intelligence community became the only avenue by which to negotiate with the country's decision-making entity: Gaddafi.²⁸ It was access to Gaddafi that determined influence, not any formal position. In fact, the most important foreign policy circle around Gaddafi was found among the so-called "Men of the Tent", including Musa Kusa and Abdullah al-Senussi, leading figures in Gaddafi's intelligence apparatus. Gaddafi used members of his intelligence community numerous times as diplomatic actors to settle issues even before official diplomatic channels were cut by the West.²⁹ Agency was not equally dispersed in this circle, though. Most of the foreign policy community was counted among his "loyal executioners."³⁰

On the American side, three domestic factors had to be bypassed for negotiations to succeed: 1) the Lockerbie lobby, 2) Congress, and 3) hawks in the executive branch. As already discussed, the families of the Lockerbie victims posed a potential danger to successful talks. In their case, bypassing meant keeping them isolated from the process in order to prevent any leaks about on-going negotiations—at least until their demands were incorporated into a comprehensive agreement. As for, Congress and hawkish executive members, foremostly Undersecretary of State John Bolton, clandestine diplomats intrinsically better suited than diplomats.

Congress needed to be bypassed in the pre-negotiation stage because it was strongly opposed to lifting sanctions for a formalized agreement on Lockerbie, renouncing terrorism in general, and dropping of WMD programs. As Joffe aptly describes: "Congress mattered more than Bush," referring primarily to the role of the Lockerbie compensations in the talks.³¹ Arguably, Congress had far stronger connections with the State Department than the Lockerbie lobby, which incentivized the president to use actors capable of diplomatic functioning without proximity to the State Department: the intelligence community. Bolton was a tougher problem, since he was not only within important foreign policy circles, but was also someone who focused on eliminating proliferation threats as undersecretary. His agenda was set on regime change, pressing for Libya to be included in the official "axis of evil".³² This objective, however, was a driving force leading the US into a diplomatic deadlock with Libya until the late 1990s.³³

Combined efforts of British intermediation³⁴ and strong clandestine diplomacy headed by Sir Mark Allen, Saif al-Islam, and Musa Kusa³⁵ sustained negotiations despite powerful domestic inhibitors.

A CRUCIAL SECRECY

Aside from the ability to conduct diplomacy parallel to or instead of the diplomatic corps, clandestine diplomacy promises to be less prone to leakage or whistle blowing. Intelligence infrastructure and assets are designed to ensure secrecy, while the diplomatic service has a strong political component making it more prone to intrigues and mistakes. Robert Blackwill, former ambassador and senior official in the National Security Council, called it the “confidentiality factor”. Thus intelligence officials are significantly less likely to leak information compared with officials from the Department of State. Blackwill sees the reason for this in the lack of incentives for the intelligence community to “shoot down your policy.”³⁶ In the Libyan case, absolute secrecy was necessary beyond the need to bypass the Lockerbie lobby. Looking at Libya, both the US and UK participants understood that speed was essential “due to the ramifications”³⁷ press leaks could have. Secrecy could diminish a delegation’s incentive to grandstand for domestic audiences and also streamlined the negotiation process by removing layers of bureaucracy between negotiators and decision-makers.” Moreover, the domestic pressure on the Libyan regime, which included mostly internal politics and regional opposition mobilization, was also substantial, heightening Gaddafi’s need for negotiations.³⁸

By 2003, the delaying factor in the negotiations was primarily the question over the intensity with which Gaddafi would condemn Libya’s oppressive past. In the mid-to-late 1990s, Gaddafi assumed a leading role in African organizations, shifting away from his former Arab nationalism.³⁹ As became evident during the negotiations, this shift did not mean that he would be immediately willing to risk losing his face through abrupt policy shift and a public apology for and renunciation of terrorism. His reputation and stance in the Arab world was still of crucial importance to him.⁴⁰ But in order to come to the desired agreement with the West, a “strong [public] declaration was crucial,” said a British official.⁴¹ The necessity for a negotiated agreement was grounded in the ever-worsening economic and political situation in Libya. Significant GDP decreases, soaring inflation, and unemployment began to negatively impact the country’s political stability. In May 1998, Gaddafi even used the military to repress uprisings in Benghazi.⁴² The threat of domestic militant resistance against the regime also increased Gaddafi’s sense of urgency.⁴³

32 Patrick E. Tyler, and James Risen, “Secret diplomacy won Libyan pledge on arms.” *New York Times*, Dec. 21, 2003, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/21/world/secret-diplomacy-won-libyan-pledge-on-arms.html>>.

33 Jentleson and Whytock, *Who “Won” Libya*, 57-74.

34 An intervention of British officials “at the highest level” against Bolton took place. See Michael Hirsch, “Bolton’s British Problem,” *Newsweek*, May 2, 2005m <<http://www.newsweek.com/boltons-british-problem-118859>>. Also, the travel of British foreign minister Michael O’Brien to Libya in August 2002 is described as a “key development in the intensification of the WMD negotiations.” See Jentleson and Whytock, *Who “Won” Libya*, 73.

35 Joffe, interview.

36 Blackwill quoted in Jack Davis, “A Policymaker’s Perspective on Intelligence Analysis,” *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 38:5 (2005).

37 Lieberfeld, “Secrecy and ‘Two-Level Games’”, 136-42.

38 Nathan E. Busch, and Joseph F. Pilat, “Disarming Libya? A reassessment after the Arab Spring,” *International Affairs* 89:2 (2013): 451-475.

39 Gawdat Bahgat, “Nonproliferation Success,” *World Affairs* 168:1 (2005): 8.

40 Tyler and Risen, *New York Times*, 2003.

41 Ibid.

42 Jentleson and Whytock, *Who “Won” Libya*, 65-7.

43 Tyler and Risen, *New York Times*, 2003.

44 Joffe, interview.

45 An intelligence official recalled: “He knew what he wanted to do, and he had a message to pass back to both Washington and London. Our meetings were usually late at night, but in each case he had done his homework, and was quite generous with his time.” See Tyler and Risen, *New York Times*, 2003.

46 Tyler and Risen, *New York Times*, 2003.

47 These venues were chosen in typically diplomatic manner: Geneva used to be a hotspot for Libyan intelligence officials and place of British-Libyan meetings over the Lockerbie case; London is a place where Saif al-Islam was well connected; Tripoli was inevitable for Gaddafi’s personal involvement.

48 Judith Miller, ‘How Gadhafi lost his groove’, *Wall Street Journal*, May 16, 2006, <<http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB114773941211953610>>.

49 Joffé, George. “Libya: Who Blinked, and Why.” *Current history: A journal of contemporary world affairs* 673 (2004): 223.

50 Miller, “How Gadhafi lost his groove”, 2006.

51 Ibid.

52 Herman Nackaerts, “Towards More Effective Safeguards: Learning Hard Lessons,” Virginia, USA: Annual Meeting of Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), 2011.

53 Kerr and Wiseman, *Diplomacy Globalizing World*, 247.

Domestic and regional constituencies were highly influential, and ordinary citizens and intellectuals had begun to matter more than governmental authorities.⁴⁴ The secrecy guaranteed by clandestine diplomacy was thus able to start an open discussion of issues that, if publicized prematurely, would have provided propaganda material for opposition forces and rivals against Gaddafi. The stakes were too high for Gaddafi to trust normal diplomatic channels. During the end of the negotiations in 2003, even Gaddafi himself participated⁴⁵ and “drove his own subordinates to cooperate.”⁴⁶

NATURE OF THE SUBJECT: LIBYA’S WMD PROGRAM

A rather unique aspect of clandestine diplomacy is reflected in the relationship the intelligence community had to the subject of negotiation. It made involvement of intelligence vectors inevitable. In the course of “some half-dozen secret meetings” from March until October in London, Geneva, and Tripoli,⁴⁷ the lack of agreement over the dates for inspections of Libya’s nuclear WMD program—when the country had yet to even publicly acknowledge its facilities—led to a “diplomatic lull”.⁴⁸ Two intelligence successes finally turned the negotiations around. First, in early October 2003, American intelligence officials informed the Libyans that they intercepted a ship with cargo for Libya, which “contained thousands of centrifuge parts to enrich uranium.”⁴⁹ This discovery immediately changed Libyan attitudes to the point where senior CIA official Stephen Kappes was permitted to join an inspection tour of Libyan WMD facilities from October 19th to October 29 of 2003.⁵⁰ Following this success, in November 2003 US intelligence handed the Libyans a CD containing “a recording of a long discussion on February 28, 2002, about Libya’s nuclear weapons program, between Ma’atouq Mohamed Ma’atouq, the head of the nuclear program, and A.Q. Khan.”⁵¹ This evidence deprived Gaddafi of any plausible deniability for uranium enrichment efforts. Nackaerts even claims that the final decision to actually renounce the WMD program was causally related only to the final pieces of evidence.⁵² More generally one can claim that “certain strategies are particularly dependent on intelligence, such as those involving either surprise or the signaling of intent.”⁵³

PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS: PAST AND PRESENT

Research on secret diplomacy so far indicates that personal relationships have neither substantial impact on process nor outcome.⁵⁴ My analysis of the Libyan case, however, locates crucial importance of personal relationships at least in the

initiation of negotiations if not even to some degree throughout the negotiations. As already shown, Libyan interest in serious talks can be detected at least as early as 1992, with this intention even directly conveyed to the US.⁵⁵ What changed was Libya's ability to find the right "ears". In August and fall of 2002, Saif al-Islam established an "intelligence backchannel"⁵⁶ via emissaries like Mohammed Rashid, while British-Libyan discussions on unconventional weapons were taking place in Libya. British intelligence officials "reportedly assured Mr. Rashid that Tony Blair would raise Libya with Mr. Bush" at Camp David in September 2002.⁵⁷ Considering that Bush and Blair did indeed agree on a formula—abandonment of WMD programs in exchange for lifting sanctions—Saif al-Islam's personal relationships appeared to have bridged the gap that prevented an agreement before.

Initial meetings between primarily intelligence officials, in fact, were decided based upon previously established personal relationships.⁵⁸ Sir Mark Allen, an old school Arabist, was the "primary vector of the British approach" to Libya. He was first responsible for contacting Musa Kusa and subsequently for the rapprochement with Gaddafi, developing a "strong personal relationship" with the latter.⁵⁹ Importantly, Gaddafi also had deep confidence in Musa Kusa.⁶⁰ Given the stakes at play, mistrust in either negotiation team could have hampered the whole process significantly. Negotiations were able to progress quickly on the detail stage as long as the formula still had Gaddafi's support. Also, it is important to note that Musa Kusa, Libyan ambassador to Rome Abd al-Ati Obeidi, and ambassador to London Muhammad al-Zuai were the same group that negotiated the Lockerbie bombing agreement with the British.⁶¹ Official diplomats took part in the negotiation only to achieve a formal agreement and were basically the "sherpas who do the work."⁶²

CONCLUSION

Even though clandestine diplomacy is emerging as a fascinating field of study, regular diplomatic relations still remain "essential for the safe and regular conduct of diplomatic relations."⁶³ If clandestine diplomacy is chosen, this research functions as a major conceptual framework. However, several aspects are underexplored. First, the latitude clandestine diplomats enjoy should be explored more systematically. In the Libyan case my research supports the view that both sides had firm control over their diplomatic actors. It is unclear, however, how control over a state's actor affects process and outcome of clandestine diplomacy. Research on clandestine diplomacy during the Cuba Crisis and the North Ireland Conflict indicate that high independence if not even the loss

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- 54 Lieberfeld, *Secrecy and Two-Level Games*, 247.
- 55 Hart, *Washington Post*, 2004.
- 56 According to Joffe, he "was not an autonomous agent in Libya's acutely personalized system". See Jaffe, interview. This, however, might be true of any figure aside from Gaddafi himself.
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 Joffe, interview.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Bahgat, *Nonproliferation Success*, 4.
- 61 Ibid., 11.
- 62 Joffe, interview.

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- 64 Scott, *Secret Intelligence*, 232-37.
- 65 "NSA Intelligence Relationship with Germany—Bundesnachrichtendienst," *National Security Agency*, Jan. 17, 2013, <<http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34053.pdf>>.
- 66 Siobhan Gorman, "CIA Man Is Key to U.S. Relations With Karzai," *Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 24, 2010, <<http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704741904575409874267832044>>.

of ultimate control over the asset can lead to high-risk situations.⁶⁴ Second, in light of recent leaks of confidential NSA documents, it is imperative to explore how clandestine diplomats can act as "policy vectors" for domestic matters of allies. A NSA internal summary lists "[t]he German government modified its interpretation of the G-10 Privacy Law" in Germany as a "success story" of their liaison work with the Bundesnachrichtendienst.⁶⁵ In several instances, the paper alluded that NSA officials were directly involved in convincing officials of the German foreign intelligence service Bundesnachrichtendienst to press for policy change. Finally, it is important to analyze the interactions between clandestine diplomats and official diplomats. The case of "Spider", nickname for a CIA station chief in Kabul who became a "pivotal behind-the-scenes power broker", shows how clandestine diplomats can become rivals with accredited diplomats.⁶⁶ Thus, even if the Libya case can provide us with substantial insights into conceptual aspects of clandestine diplomacy, more focus on this field of study is necessary.

Nils Metter ('17) is a Political Science major in Ezra Stiles College.

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The Bodhisattva and Those Who Burned On Self-Immolation and the Silence of the Dalai Lama

AZEEZAT ADELEKE

- 1 "Situation in Meruma Tense after Latest Self Immolation Protest," *Phayul*, December 9, 2013, accessed April 20, 2014, <<http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=34324>>.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 International Campaign for Tibet, "Tibetan Father of Two Sets Fire to Himself in Ngaba," *Save Tibet.org*, December 3, 2013, accessed April 20, 2014, <<http://culanth.org/fieldsights/105-self-immolation-and-slander-woeser>>.
- 5 "Self-immolations by Tibetans - International Campaign for Tibet," *International Campaign for Tibet*, April 16, 2014, accessed April 17, 2014, <<http://www.savetibet.org/resources/fact-sheets/self-immolations-by-tibetans/>>.
- 6 Jaime Lutz, "Dalai Lama Says He Supports Gay Marriage," *ABC News*, March 8, 2014, accessed April 23, 2014, <<http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/03/dalai-lama-says-he-supports-gay-marriage/>>.
- 7 Tenzin Gyatso, "Disarmament for World Peace," *DalaiLama.com*, January 1, 2010, accessed April 22, 2014, <<http://www.dalailama.com/messages/world-peace/disarmament>>.

On December 4th of 2013, Kunchok Tseten made his final decision. Leaving behind his wife and two children, ages three and four, Tseten strode to the center of the Meruma township in Sichuan Province, China. Wearing cotton sheets held fast by metal wires, Tseten lit a match and set himself ablaze. As he burned, his thirty years of life coming to a violent end, he said some last words. He called for Tibetans to return to Tibet, and for the Dalai Lama to return as well.¹ He wished the Dalai Lama a long life and finally collapsed to the ground, hands still folded in prayer.²

With hardly a moment's pause, Chinese authorities swarmed in, intent on removing the body as quickly as possible. For an hour, the people of Meruma held them off, refusing to allow the evidence of Tseten's act of protest to be spirited away.³ When the authorities finally succeeded, Tseten was never seen again. His wife and other relatives were held in custody as the Chinese authorities tried to stop the news from spreading.⁴

This attempted cover-up is unsurprising given the onslaught of self-immolations that has struck Tibet and the Chinese provinces that surround it. Kunchok Tseten is one of 133 Tibetans who have set themselves on fire since 2009.⁵ These individuals have been monks and nuns, teenagers and adults, men and women. They have acted in front of crowds and in total solitude. What they share is a condemnation of the Chinese government and a plea for the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet.

For centuries, the Dalai Lamas have acted as moral centers of Tibetan life, exerting not just religious authority but immense political and social sway. The Fourteenth Dalai Lama is no exception; in some ways, his half-century of exile has magnified that authority, especially on the international stage. Yet, contrary to the Dalai Lama's usual willingness to issue moralizing statements (on everything from gay marriage⁶ to disarmament),⁷ he has been relatively silent on the surge of self-immolations. When he does speak, he takes care to avoid

absolute terms. Despite public pressure to call for an immediate end to the immolations, the Dalai Lama has not yet spoken out. Why? I argue that the Dalai Lama has not taken a clear stance because, while the immolators are calling for his return, the immolations are not directed at him. Instead, they serve two goals: sacrificing one's life for a higher cause and condemning the repression of the Chinese state. The Dalai Lama, for once, is not at the center of this drama.

In May of 2012, the Dalai Lama traveled to London to receive the £1,100,000 Templeton Prize, awarded annually to a living person who “has made an exceptional contribution to affirming life's spiritual dimension, whether through insight, discovery, or practical works.”⁸ In the question and answer period, an audience member posed the following question: “All over Tibetan areas, Tibetans have been setting fire to themselves in protest of Chinese rule. Can you tell us whether you think that they should stop this now or should they continue?”

The Dalai Lama responded, “I think that is quite a sensitive political issue. I think my answer should be zero.”

“You have no message for them? Your people?” the audience member asked, physically taken aback by his non-response.

The Dalai Lama continued to deflect the inquiry, pointing out that he had ceded all political authority. “No answer,” he concluded.⁹

A search for “self-immolation” on *DalaiLama.com* yields zero results.¹⁰ In a few cases, the Dalai Lama has been slightly more forthcoming about his opinion. In 2012, he told *The Hindu*, “The reality is that if I say something positive, then the Chinese immediately blame me. If I say something negative, then the family members of those people feel very sad.”¹¹

Some commentators, particularly those in the West, believe that the Dalai Lama's options are more black and white. Stephen Prothero, a professor of religion at Boston University, argued that one word from the Dalai Lama would end the immolations and his current silence means that “[the immolators'] blood is on his hands.”¹² “The bad karma the Dalai Lama is accruing here extends far beyond Tibet and these particular protesters,” Prothero wrote.

Yet, Prothero's argument misses essential context for self-immolation in the Buddhist tradition—which is unsurprising, given his expertise in American religion. Self-immolation has played an important role particularly in Chinese Buddhism, which held that those who set themselves aflame participated in auto-cremation, according to James Benn, Associate Professor of Buddhism and East Asian Religions at McMaster University in Ontario. Auto-cremation—self-sacrifice by

- 8 Templeton Foundation, “Templeton Prize—Purpose,” last modified November 6, 2014, <<http://www.templetonprize.org/purpose.html>>.
- 9 Richard Allen Greene, “Dalai Lama Ducks Question on Monk Self-immolations,” *CNN.com*, May 14, 2012, accessed April 23, 2014, <<http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/14/world/asia/uk-dalai-lama/>>.
- 10 “Search Results: Your Search Returned No Results,” *DalaiLama.com*, April 29, 2014, accessed April 29, 2014, <<http://dalailama.com/search/index/self-immolation>>.
- 11 Ananth Krishnan, “Dalai Lama Speaks of Dilemma on Spreading Self-immolations,” *TheHindu.com*, July 9, 2012, accessed April 17, 2014, <<http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3617428.ece>>.
- 12 Stephen Prothero, “My Take: Dalai Lama Should Condemn Tibetan Self-immolations,” *CNN Belief Blog*, July 12, 2012, accessed April 16, 2014, <<http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/12/my-take-dalai-lama-should-condemn-tibetan-self-immolations/>>.

- 13 James Benn, “Burning for the Buddha,” *Tricycle: The Buddhist Review* 23:2 (2013): 55-57.
- 14 Sallie B. King, “They Who Burned Themselves For Peace: Quaker And Buddhist Self-Immolators During The Vietnam War,” *Buddhist-Christian Studies* 20 (2000): 127-50.
- 15 Benn, “Burning for the Buddha,” 57.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 106.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 55.
- 18 “Standing Their Ground: Thousands Face Violent Eviction in China,” Amnesty International, January 1, 2012, accessed April 19, 2014, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/standing_their_ground_asa_17_001_2012_web_email.pdf>.
- 19 King, “They Who Burned Themselves for Peace,” 133.
- 20 *Ibid.*, 127-128.

starvation, burning off appendages, and even feeding oneself to wild animals—was seen as a “path to bodily awakening.”¹³ In the Lotus Sutra, the bodhisattva Medicine King burned his body in homage to the Buddha. The volumes of biographies of eminent monks praised those who immolated themselves with good intentions.¹⁴ Bodhisattvas who self-immolated were promised that after becoming buddhas, they would “be extremely large, live a long life, and possess a marvelously radiant body.”¹⁵

While as Prothero insinuates, killing is considered antithetical to the teachings of the Buddha, it was understood that the auto-cremators' intentions made their actions acceptable, even holy. The self-immolators “were understood to be acting not only for themselves but also for the good of others.”¹⁶

However, the Tibetan Buddhist plight in the twenty-first century is not perfectly analogous to that of medieval Chinese Buddhists. Benn noted that self-immolation was “relatively common” historically in Chinese Buddhism—so much so that “it was not considered a marginal or deviant act.”¹⁷ In contrast, immolations have been rare in recent history; there were just ten recorded self-immolations in China between 1963 and 2002.¹⁸ Furthermore, today's immolations are deviant by nature, conducted by people who feel irreversibly marginalized. The Tibetan and medieval Chinese Buddhist immolations are similar in this way and in their motivation: a belief that they act for the good of others. For the modern immolators, that good is the opportunity to draw international attention to the struggle for personal and religious freedom in Tibet.

It should be noted that Tibetan Buddhism has been shaped by influences outside of the Chinese tradition—especially those of India. There, immolation has a different history. Stories of people setting themselves on fire for religious purposes were placed in the realm of myth, considered “more or less imaginative hyperbole, not to be taken literally and certainly not to be imitated.”¹⁹ The twentieth century rarity of self-immolation (echoing Indian precedent) and its twenty-first century resurgence (echoing Chinese precedent) can perhaps serve as a metaphorical example of how Tibetan Buddhism has drawn from a mixture of East Asian traditions.

Buddhist self-immolation as a form of *political* protest has its own precedent, particularly as a condemnation of the conditions in war-era Vietnam. This era's first and most celebrated figure is Thich Quang Duc, a monk who self-immolated on June 11th, 1963. His act was in protest of Ngo Dinh Diem, the President of South Vietnam, and his repression of Buddhism.²⁰ Duc's story serves as a parallel to the Tibetan outcry for religious freedom. Four years later, a young Vietnamese woman named Nhat Chi Mai self-immolated outside of a nunnery

in protest of the war, following in Duc's footsteps.²¹ Mai and Duc's contemporaries embraced their deviant acts. When Duc lit the match, the other monks stood back. "Some press their hands together, palm to palm, as they witness a holy event, their faces expressing anguish and grief," Sally King, a professor of philosophy and religion at James Madison University, wrote.²² "Certainly no one is intervening; on the contrary, the circle of monks and nuns is a barrier against intervention." In a similar vein, Mai's family and friends viewed her act as a noble sacrifice. In the words of one of her colleagues, "Her sacrifice had indeed moved the hearts of many people and caused the peace movement to swell like waves in a storm."²³ Before she died, she wrote a letter to Lyndon B. Johnson's government stating, in part:

I offer my body as a torch
to dissipate the dark
to waken love among men
to give peace to Vietnam
the one who burns herself for peace.²⁴

Like the Chinese and Vietnamese self-immolators of the distant and recent past, the Tibetans are viewed with the type of reverence reserved for those who die heroically. Kevin Carrico, a Cornell University graduate student of anthropology, provided an apt example in translating content from a blog run by Woesser, a Tibetan writer and activist living in Beijing. A young Tibetan commenter wrote the following on the blog in response to the immolations:

I am recording the names, backgrounds, and achievements of each of these compatriots in my diary, as well as deep within my memory. I want to remember the names of these heroic sons and daughters of our nationality. I want to light a lamp and recite mantras for them, as an expression of my deepest reverence and respect.²⁵

How could the Dalai Lama condemn the immolators given this deeply emotional praise? The comment also demonstrates another point: The Dalai Lama is not necessarily the 'audience' for the immolations. The definition of immolation is "to offer in sacrifice."²⁶ Those for whom these sacrifices are made—fellow Tibetans living under repression—accept them, and in many cases, facilitate their success.

The Chinese state is the other "audience" of the self-immolations. Tibetan Buddhists are not alone in using immolation as a means of protesting against the state when official channels for expressing discontent are sealed off. Between 2009 and 2011, 41 Chinese men and women set fire

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 134
23 Ibid., 137
24 Ibid., 126
25 Kevin Carrico, "Self-Immolation and Slander," *Fieldsights - Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology Online*, April 8, 2012, accessed April 15, 2014, <<http://culanth.org/fieldsights/105-self-immolation-and-slander-woesser>>.
26 "immolate, adj.," *OED Online*, September 2014, Oxford University Press, accessed April 15, 2014, <<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91949?rskey=u0GOqx&result=1>>.

27 Amnesty International, "Standing Their Ground," 4.
28 Frank Langfitt, "Desperate Chinese Villagers Turn To Self-Immolation," *National Public Radio*, October 23, 2013, accessed April 22, 2014, <<http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/10/23/239270737/desperate-chinese-villagers-turn-to-self-immolation>>.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Langfitt, "Desperate Chinese Villagers Turn to Self-Immolation."
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Amnesty International, "Standing Their Ground," 4.
36 Chas Morrison, "Tibetan Self-Immolation as Protest Against Chinese State Repression," in *Conflict, Violence, Terrorism, and Their Prevention*, ed. J.M. Ramirez, C. Morrison, and A.J. Kendall (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 85.
37 Morrison, "Tibetan Self-Immolation," 95.
38 Amnesty International, "Standing Their Ground," 4.
39 Amnesty International, "Standing Their Ground," 4.

to themselves in protest of the government's policy of forced eviction as a tool for fostering urbanization. As Amnesty International noted in its 2012 report, "the problem of forced evictions represents the single most significant source of popular discontent in China."²⁷ The story of He Mengqing makes another compelling parallel to the Tibetan unrest. In 2013, Mengqing, a rice farmer, received an offer of \$33,000 from the government for his land, which would then be developed into factories and apartment buildings.²⁸ He believed that this offer was deeply unjust. After his demand for \$600,000 in compensation was rejected, government officials arrived at his home, prying open the locked door with a crowbar.²⁹ He then "poured gasoline over his head, opened a tank of cooking gas and lit himself on fire."³⁰ According to his sister-in-law, Mengqing believed that he "had run out of options."³¹

The same is true of the forty other Chinese men and women who were driven to fire as the solution to their problems. In May 2013, Zhou Lijun of Hunan Province self-immolated to protest the demolition of her home. As in the case of Kunchok Tseten, the Chinese authorities attempted to impose a media blackout. The city government in Chenzhou, Zhou's hometown, blocked the news and ensured that the gruesome photos did not circulate online.³² That same year, authorities told Zheng Guocun, owner of an animal feed store in Heilongjiang Province, that his shop would be demolished to make way for a new apartment block. After refusing a government compensation package for the store, which also doubled as his home, "hired thugs" arrived to force an eviction.³³ They beat him so badly that he was hospitalized. Two weeks later, he set himself aflame near city hall, literally banging his head against the building before collapsing to the ground.³⁴ Self-immolation is often political, but in this case, it was viscerally so.

Like the Tibetans, these Chinese targets of government evictions lacked legal protection and safeguards.³⁵ Both groups reacted to bureaucratic roadblocks using a dramatic tactic. The cases of the Tibetans and the Chinese differ, however, in how the government has responded to the immolations. Whereas the Tibetan self-immolators have been dismissed as mentally ill, emotionally vulnerable, epileptics, terrorists,³⁶ or foolish tools of the Dalai Lama,³⁷ the Chinese self-immolators have garnered more sympathy. When he was Premier, Wen Jiabao and other high level officials "publicly acknowledged the gravity of the situation" and pledged reform.³⁸ The state instituted guidelines outlawing violence in urban evictions and approved new recourses such as public hearings and opportunities to file complaints.³⁹ The Chinese state has not accommodated the Tibetans with such reform.

The Chinese dismissal of the Tibetan self-immolators demonstrates the state's disregard for their basic needs. Tibet faces a wide range of social and economic problems, including uneven development and high levels of illiteracy.⁴⁰ The Tibetans lag behind the Chinese in metrics like life expectancy, health outcomes, and education.⁴¹ In response to the government's chronic disregard for their wellbeing, the Tibetans continue to use self-immolation to gain the attention of the world. Morrison writes that the immolations are "acts of extreme violence that seek to delegitimize the state by subverting its monopoly on legitimate violence, demonstrating that the state neither cares for them in life, nor has the power to prevent or influence their death."⁴² The Chinese government has more incentive to address the grievances of the Chinese farmers because their attempts at de-legitimization pose a greater threat to stability. The general Chinese public sees the grievances of the Han majority as more credible and thus more deserving of a concerned response. This dynamic has developed because the Chinese state has worked tirelessly over the past fifty years to undermine the Tibetans, depicting them as fools and troublemakers. For example, during the spring 2008 uprising preceding the Beijing Olympics, the Chinese press accused the protesting Tibetans of "smashing, beating, looting, burning" and "rising up" against the Han.⁴³ This type of portrayal reduces the Tibetans to caricatures. Their grievances, then, are also minimized—a contributing factor to the Tibetans' marginalization. Following the 2008 protests, the state placed a renewed emphasis on patriotic education and surveillance of monasteries in Tibet, creating a feeling of ever-tightening control.⁴⁴ Members of the Chinese public are either ignorant of this state-sponsored marginalization, or simply choose to turn a blind eye.

Unlike the Chinese state, the Dalai Lama "has the power to prevent or influence [the immolators'] death[s]."⁴⁵ But since the 1959 invasion, he has also had a stake in undermining Chinese state oppression. Given that, how should he weigh the importance of saving Tibetan lives with the fact that immolations are the most visceral demonstrations of the state's indifference? At the risk of casting this 'simple Buddhist monk' as a Machiavellian figure, one could argue that the immolations further the Tibetan cause in ways that visits to the White House, five point treatises, college commencement speeches, and award ceremonies in London cannot.

This past May, two years after his non-response at the Templeton Prize Ceremony, someone asked the Dalai Lama a similar question on self-immolation while he was in Norway to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of his Nobel Prize. Were the Tibetans wrong to protest by lighting themselves aflame?

- 40 Tsering Shakya, "Self-Immolation: The Changing Language of Protest in Tibet," *Review D'Etudes Tibétaines* 25 (2012): 23.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 Morrison, "Tibetan Self-Immolation," 85.
- 43 Kevin Carrico, "Chinese State Media Representations," *Fieldsights - Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology Online*, April 8, 2012, accessed April 20, 2014, <<http://culanth.org/fieldsights/109-chinese-state-media-representations>>.
- 44 Shakya, "The Changing Language of Protest," 34.
- 45 Morrison, "Tibetan Self-Immolation," 85.

- 46 Rick Gladstone and Henrik Libell, "Dalai Lama Urges Outside Inquiry Into Spate of Self-Immolations Among Tibetans," *The New York Times*, May 9, 2014, accessed October 29, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/10/world/asia/dalai-lama-urges-outside-inquiry-into-spate-of-self-immolations-among-tibetans.html?_r=1>.
- 47 Gladstone and Libell, "Dalai Lama Urges Outside Inquiry."
- 48 Ching-Ching Ni, "China Steps up Criticism of Dalai Lama over Tibet," *Los Angeles Times*, March 20, 2008, accessed October 29, 2014, <<http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/20/world/fg-tibet20>>.

"If such a drastic action takes place with full anger, then negative," the Dalai Lama responded. "But more compassionate, more calm mind, then sometimes maybe less negative."⁴⁶ This is hardly a ringing endorsement of the self-immolations, but it is a stronger statement than, "I think my answer should be zero." Why the shift? Like the eminent monks before him, the Dalai Lama acknowledges that motivation is key to the self-immolation story. In emphasizing compassion, he links the twenty-first century self-immolators to those exalted by the Buddhist tradition. Additionally, and perhaps unintentionally, he links them to the Vietnamese protestors whose compassion came into sharp relief next to the horrors of war.

That being said, one could argue that the Dalai Lama's response is too timid. Given the discrimination, degradation, and decades of disappointment the Tibetans have experienced, isn't rage the most logical response? His people have seen the Chinese state take so much away from them—can they not keep their anger? Aside from the religion's basis in compassion, the Dalai Lama's discouragement of anger among Tibetans serves multiple purposes. Anger breeds unrest and unrest breeds instability. Too much Tibetan rage could provoke a violent response from the Chinese state and further degrade quality of life. Plus, compassionate and calm protestors are more likely to retain international support than angry and abrasive ones. Those in the West are accustomed to thinking of Tibet as Shangri-La and the Tibetans as a long-suffering yet graceful people. That image is useful, particularly as China's economic rise magnifies its political influence (note that senior officials in the Norwegian government did not bother to meet with the Dalai Lama out of respect for China,⁴⁷ which still portrays him as "a wolf in a monk's robe")⁴⁸ The Dalai Lama must use his, and the Tibetans', compassionate reputation as his main source of leverage over China.

Setting aside this speculation on his internal thought process, it should be noted that the Dalai Lama plays a minor role in the immolation story. Foremost are the actors themselves, who choose to make this ultimate sacrifice for their own reasons. Call them devout or desperate or defiant or some combination of the three, but they all have agency in making their final choice. When commentators like Stephen Prothero label the immolations as crimes or sources of bad karma, they play into the hands of the Chinese state in dismissing that agency, in reducing the Tibetans to caricatures. The same is true of commentators who label the immolators *solely* as victims. True, they are victims of repressive rule, but they are also independent actors crafting their own destiny. When Thich Quang Duc immolated himself back in 1963, the monks invited a reporter from *The New York Times* to come,

knowing that the attention of the international press would amplify their voices.⁴⁹ Immolation is not just tragedy; it is also strategy. Undoubtedly, the best-case scenario would be for the Tibetans to find freedom and happiness and live long lives in their homeland, but given the reality of the current situation, the Dalai Lama is hard pressed to condemn their choices. His silence cedes the spotlight to the immolators themselves, so their outcry can be heard clearly around the world.

Adeleke Azeezat ('17) is a Political Science major in Berkeley College.

49 Mark Lewis Taylor, "Review: Oriental Monk as Popular Icon: On the Power of U.S. Orientalism," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 79, no. 3 (2011): 735-46.

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