YRIS IS AN UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL DEDICATED TO PUBLISHING BOTH OPINION AND LONG-FORM SCHOLARSHIP ON CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL ISSUES. THEIR ORIGINS, THEIR PRESENT EFFECTS, AND THE FUTURE THEY WILL SHAPE.

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Dear Reader,

This year, we were again blown away by the enormous student interest in the Dean Gooderham Acheson Prize Issue. We received over sixty submissions covering an incredible academic range, and representing a Yale community of exceptional scholarship in international studies. As always, though we had to choose only a handful of papers to publish, we saw far more excellent pieces than we were able to recognize officially. To all students who submitted to this issue: thank you so much for the opportunity to review your work, and we sincerely hope that you will consider contributing to future issues.

We would like to give special thanks to Professor Charles Hill for dedicating his time to help us select the winners of the 2016 Acheson Prize. We also greatly appreciate our institutional sponsors, the International Security Studies program and the Yale International Relations Association, whose financial assistance was essential for publishing this issue. Finally, thank you to all of our readers. It was a privilege to read the pieces featured here, and we hope that you will enjoy them as well.

Sincerely,
The Editors
The following comment-length pieces were written by students who went on Yale International Relations Association trips to Turkey and Colombia during the 2015–2016 academic year. The pieces provide fascinating, firsthand insight on major international issues. They give us the opportunity to include writing based not only on strong academic analysis, but also on personal experience.
THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE:
Negotiations with the
FARC in Colombia

Haley Adams
Timothy Dwight College, ’16
The persistence of the conflict between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is fascinating. When we think about attempted revolutions and civil wars in Latin America we tend to think in historic terms, about people who have revolted and fought and since reconciled. While the FARC of 2016 is an undoubtedly perverted version of the original ideologically-driven rebel group, it is nonetheless shocking that this conflict has lasted for over half a century. Because of this persistence, any present-day discussion of FARC is both historic and political. This was my mindset upon arriving to Colombia: the country was sitting at a historic impasse, and that we were lucky enough to interview individuals who had insight into what the highly secretive peace process entailed. The peace negotiations would herald a new era of stability and peace, and so long as an agreement was reached, the negotiations would be a success.

For the most part, the academics and politicians that we interviewed confirmed this belief. The peace process (at least what we know of it) is not perfect, but it is better than the alternative of continued violence. I left all of these interviews feeling strongly that the peace negotiations were good for the country, and that Colombian citizens should vote to approve them. The marginal effort required to decimate the remaining members of the FARC was colossal; peace is clearly a better alternative.

I do think that Colombians will eventually approve whatever settlement is reached, but that doesn’t mean that they will be happy about it. What our research could not take into consideration was the role played by emotion and personal experience with the FARC in shaping Colombians’ perspectives of the negotiations. As a student with no personal connection to Colombia (a personal interest, but no historical or familial ties), it is inevitable that my opinion towards the FARC negotiations will lack a nuance that pervades most Colombian citizens’ opinions. Our discussions with academics and left-leaning politicians highlighted the benefits of the newest round of negotiations, but they often discounted the visceral, and mostly negative, reactions of the Colombian people to the FARC.

In my conversations with Colombians outside of a formal interview setting, few of them were as enthused as the academics. They worried about their country turning to the populism of Venezuela and other floundering Latin American states. They worried that the negotiations were a Trojan horse, a way of distracting the government forces while the FARC secretly built up their capacities. They worried that murderers would end up as elected officials, without facing anything resembling justice. For people who know victims of the FARC, this last worry is paramount, and this is understandable. But these concerns are not limited to one demographic: they are the worries of Colombians living in the US, working at prestigious think tanks or as doctors at Yale–New Haven.

In considering all of these conversations, I struggle to summarize my views towards the FARC negotiations. I do want the negotiations to succeed, and I want the Colombian electorate to approve them. But I also empathize with the frustrations and fears elicited by this process. To say that the negotiations are an outright success would be a gross oversimplification, even if this is true from a logistical standpoint. When considering the sentiments of the Colombian people, I wish there were a way to better reconcile my objective analysis and the harm that the FARC has caused people throughout the country.

On a separate note, I have to include a brief acknowledgment of my newfound love for the country of Colombia. Although I was only able to briefly explore Cartagena and Bogota, I was overwhelmed by the warmth, kindness, generosity of people that I met. That sounds trite, and a lot like what every New Englander says about people they interact with who aren’t from New England. But I cannot overstate the extent to which this was cliché was true in Colombia—there are a number of occasions that I was beneficiary of random acts of generosity. As I write this in New Haven on this bleak February day, there isn’t much I wouldn’t give to be enjoying an arepa in the Candelaria.
WHY THE OPEN DOORS?
How Turkey May Benefit from Accepting Syrian Refugees

Samantha Gardner
Jonathan Edwards College, '17
In recent weeks reports have emerged about thousands of Syrians waiting at the Turkish border, a passage now closed to refugees. On February 5, 2016, the United Nations reported an estimated 20,000 Syrians waiting at the Bab al-Salam border crossing and an additional 5,000-10,000 at other points. As of February 11, estimates had risen to 51,000 civilians. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmed Davutoğlu declared that they would be provided with food and shelter, but denied entrance to Turkey.

The highly criticized decision to close the border may have been motivated by a lack of capacity, a desire to prompt the international community to work towards resolving the conflict in Syria, or an intent to press the European Union to deliver the 3 billion euros it promised Turkey last November in exchange for stemming the tide of refugees to its territory. Davutoğlu announced in a London conference of donor countries to Syria that “[t]en thousand new refugees are waiting in front of the door of Kilis because of air bombardments and attacks against Aleppo” and “[t]hree hundred thousand people living in Aleppo are ready to move towards Turkey.”

While President Erdoğan said on February 11 that Turkey is preparing for the new wave of refugees, he accused the United Nations of pressuring Turkey to do more to assist Syrians instead of taking action to stop the violence that is driving refugees from their homes. Turkey’s closed borders and the condemnation it has received represent significant shifts from circumstances just one month ago, when I visited Turkey to study the treatment of refugees and the impact of the refugee crisis. Turkey's past actions do not excuse its decision to close the border, but the country deserves credit for admitting significantly more Syrian refugees than any other state. Turkey houses 2.3 million registered Syrian refugees and hundreds of thousands more unregistered Syrian refugees.

The numerous government officials, NGOs, academics, and journalists we interviewed all praised the Turkish government for how much it was trying to do for Syrian refugees. Against the backdrop of exclusionary European states, I began to wonder why Turkey opened its borders to so many Syrians. How was Turkey benefiting from spending $8 billion on another country’s civilians and accepting millions of refugees into its cities?

The first explanation I found is that Turkey miscalculated the duration and intensity of the Syrian Civil War when it announced its “Open Door” policy at the start of the conflict. Merve Ay, project coordinator of the Alliance of International Doctors, explained: “[t]he government was late to see that the conflict would be so long.”

Nearly every speaker we met pointed this problem out. It helps explain why only about 12% of Turkey’s Syrian refugees reside in its refugee camps, and an overwhelming majority resides in Turkish cities, but also could hint at why Turkey formed the policy in the first place. Having made this commendable commitment, Turkey would have received criticism for closing its borders, especially since it opposes the Assad regime. Furthermore, Cengiz Çandar, a prominent columnist and advisor to Turkey’s eighth President, pointed out to us that “Turkey’s longest border is with Syria and Syria’s longest border is with Turkey.” The border is largely flat and porous before the war, with families sometimes living on both sides, and is thus difficult to patrol.

However, many Turks who would balk at the view that they are just avoiding embarrassment credit the open border to Turkish compassion. Three different government officials proudly reported that Turkey’s actions are saving “human dignity.” Aziz Kocaoglu, the Mayor of Izmir, Turkey’s third largest city and a common departure port for refugees attempting to migrate to Europe, says “Turkey supports refugees not out of necessity, but out of human dignity.”

Ibrahim Kalin, Erdoğan’s Chief Advisor, told us that “[they] are carrying the major load here, as far as refugees are concerned.” Turkey’s actions have “probably saved tens of thousands of lives.” Kalin gives all credit for the policy to “the President himself: he really has forced this policy – [he] said ‘look, this is a humanitarian issue: we will take them in whether the rest of the world helps us or not.’”

While one government official said that his agency does not consider citizens’ opinions in forming refugee policy, Turkish citizens deserve some credit for the hospitable policies. As he pointed out, the government has “never been criticized [by the public] for providing financial assistance” to Syrian refugees. Moreover, that migration was not a topic in the November 2015 General Elections implies that the populace is generally sympathetic to the plight of refugees.

Çandar explains, “we are a nation of immigrants . . . we can never think of rejecting refugees because our psyche is one of immigrants.” A few speakers mentioned that Turks and Syrians
feel somewhat bound by their shared Ottoman kinship, one government official even claiming, “that is what brought the Syrians to Turkey.” Bahadir Dincer of Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu (USAK) Think Tank’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies explains that Turkey has been on migration routes since Ottoman times, and frequently offered refuge to people of different cultures and religions in times of conflict, including Jews, Kurds, Iranians, Bosnians, and people from the Caucasus and Balkans.

While Dincer clarifies that “many [of those emigrants] did not stay in Turkey because it lacked the capacity,” Turkey’s asylum policies challenge attempts to describe the country as historically open to refugees. While Turkey has ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the main international law on refugees, it is one of the only signatories that has not expanded its definition of refugees to include applicants from regions beyond Europe, which the law explicitly discusses. This fact means that to this day, only Europeans can apply for asylum status in Turkey.

Since the 1990s, Turkey’s refugee policy has been a “hot item with the E.U.,” says Ahmet İçduygu, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Migrations Research Program at Koç University. İçduygu explains that when Turkey began E.U. negotiations in 2005, “the second large paragraph of the fourteen-page document was on migration issues.” Accepting so many refugees—and retaining them—stands to improve EU’s judgment on Turkey’s human rights record. Dilara Yurtseven, Board Member of International Refugee Rights Association, believes “90% of the laws” Turkey recently established, which gives Syrians temporary protected status with rights to health care, education, and eventually employment, “are posturing to the EU.” “The temporary protection was modeled after their wishes,” she says.

Turkey’s handling of the Syrian refugee crisis has indeed attracted the EU’s attention, largely because it is depending on Turkey to stem the flow of refugees to Europe. Even though Kalin argues, “I don’t believe we needed the Syrian refugee crisis to jumpstart EU talks” and that “[t]hey would’ve happened in own right,” the crisis has rejuvenated negotiations. One government official says the EU “rediscovered” Turkey after the crisis, and negotiations have been proceeding in a “positive manner” since. Not only has the EU commended Turkey for taking care of refugees and, according to Professor İçduygu, stopped pressuring Turkey about its treatment of Kurds, but it also agreed in November 2015 to reopen accession talks and to give Turkey $3 billion euros to assist in supporting Syrian refugees, in exchange for Turkey preventing refugees from leaving Turkey for Europe.

Turkey’s acceptance of refugees has also benefitted its global image, and has given Turkey a valid claim to moral high ground. Kalin criticized other countries’ treatment of refugees “in numbers, as if it’s an auction. It is unbelievable and below human dignity.” Turkey reports to have spent as much as $9 billion on Syrian refugees, and to only have received $418 million in assistance. One government official remarked, “Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan have saved the grace of humanity.”

Of course, sheltering Syrian refugees can bring Turkey other benefits. Some believe it will lead to economic development. Kalin envisions this unique experience for Syrians to learn Turkish culture and language, and to make connections with Turkey will turn them into “voluntary ambassadors,” who can help promote Turkish business in the Arab world.

Many of these benefits, which hinge on Turkey’s reputation for accepting Syrians, may not be realized if the country closes its borders to Syrians. Turkey may have miscalculated how many refugees would come and how long they would stay not only in the beginning of the crisis, but also throughout the time it has had its open door policy. Eventually Turkey will face constraints in capacity, funding and public opinion, and will have to decide whether the benefits of an open door policy outweigh the country’s national constraints.
DISAGGREGATING THE COERCIVE APPARATUS:
The Competing Calculi of Parallel Security Institutions in Egypt and Tunisia

Arvin Anoop
Jonathan Edwards College, ’18
“Our revolution is your revolution,” yelled General Rachid Ammar to more than 1000 demonstrators in the Tunis public square, relieving the infamous coercive apparatus of its most infamous function of regime maintenance. Yet on the same day as newspapers broke the news about the army’s shifted loyalties, they noted the “marauding” and “violence” of the police, another element of the coercive apparatus. Similar events transpired in Egypt a month later. In 2011, the coercive apparatus so often associated with the “robustness of authoritarianism” imploded, pitting interior security forces under the Ministry of the Interior on one side and the military—particularly the army—on the other. This fracture seriously challenges the idea of bundling up Arab security sectors into “the coercive apparatus” and suggests a need to reevaluate their distinct identities. In particular, scholars generally agree that security institutions like Arab ones make decisions based on calculated, strategic interests.

In the Arab Spring, evidently, the interests of the interior forces and the military did not coincide. In the following pages, the paper first traces the historic power dynamic between the two most important wings of the security apparatus and then considers the key differences in interests that caused the split at the time of the protests. The ultimate claim is that age-old competition and hostility between the interior forces and the army made the army’s defection more probable. Given this background, when the time and opportunity for the defection decision came, key in-the-moment differences in interests and structure made the army’s defection easier and more sensible than that of the internal forces. In fewer words, a history of inter-organ competition followed by a unique instance of regime weakness persuades one party—in this case, the army—to defect.

### Literature Review

The fundamental principle behind this paper is to reject the impression of a homogenous security apparatus. In fact, coup-proofing literature establishes that Arab regimes deliberately and uniquely constructed parallel militaries to counterweight the regular armed forces, which they saw as sources of potential coups. In the past, coup-proofing has manifested in the form of dual militaries (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia), praetorianistic control over the armed forces (Yemen, Syria) or serious underdevelopment (Libya). In order to become the desired “army to watch the army,” these parallel forces had to become another military rather than a paramilitary force, reporting directly to the regime leader through some chain other than the regular defense ministry. After 9/11 Arab states, including Egypt and Tunisia, invested heavily in the “militarization” of the police under the Ministry of the Interior to become a suitable alternative to the armed forces. Given these trends, it is possible to see at least some similarity in the characters and aggressive capabilities of the two organs. If they had wanted, both could have acted in the same repressive manner in 2011 in Egypt and Tunisia—yet only one chose to do so, emphasizing a difference in strategic interests that surpassed any similarity in character.

There are also some lessons to be understood from works on civil-military relations. Historically, dictators such as Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, Bashar al-Assad, Habib Bourghiba and Ben Ali have sold themselves as civilian leaders. They asserted their “suzerainty” over the armed forces, marginalizing the latter politically. Some scholars have described this as “arguably extensive distancing of Tunisia and Egypt’s militaries from politics by their autocratic presidents.” By denying armies input into policy-making

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11 Quinlivan, 141.
Arv in Anoop

Disaggregating the Coercive Apparatus
called upon to participate actively in repressing political activity.16 The day-to-day policing and repression was left to the Interior Ministry and its police force – “uniformed or plainclothes.”17 In general, both coup-proofing and civil-military relations works underline the distrust (or cautious skepticism) that regimes like Egypt and Tunisia had for their militaries – as we shall see, this attitude influenced the decision-making of the army.

While coup-proofing allegedly protects against ousting attempts from within the coercive apparatus, it does not anticipate one like the Arab Spring and yet had a profound influence on the events that unfolded. Coup-proofing addresses from a different lens a problem affirmed by Eva Bellin, Zoltan Barany and Hicham Bou Nassif: “the coercive apparatus begs for disaggregation.”18 In order to unravel the calculus of defection and loyalty, we need to ask how divided the “guys with guns” really are.19 Bou Nassif points to two possible disaggregations:20 a horizontal one differentiating the military from the security establishment and a vertical one separating the elite officers from the rank-and-file. Due to space reasons, this paper focuses primarily on the horizontal breakdown of the apparatus but acknowledges the rich insights that a vertical analysis might offer.

Case Selection

Egypt and Tunisia serve as the primary pro-cases while China is considered as a counter-case at the end. The cases were chosen with three ideas in mind. Firstly, the coercive machineries in all three are more clearly defined and divided between the Interior Ministry’s police and the army. Due to the opaque nature of security organs, information can be difficult to obtain; cases like Libya, with its many local militias, Saudi Arabia, with its royal divisions, and Bahrain, with its outsourced mercenaries, defy consistent analysis. Secondly, all countries followed a similar trajectory whereby the military was called in when the dictator realized that either the Interior Ministry had failed21 to “stem the uprising” or had been overwhelmed by it. This enables a consideration of the military’s direct response to the security sector’s ‘call for help’ and its valuation of its vested interests relative to the security regime’s interests. Finally, the homogeneity of both countries’ populations means that sectarian divides do not skew the decision-making calculus. This paper aims to keep the lack of sectarianism constant across cases because sectarian reasons add a whole new dimension to the decision-making calculus. Consider the case of Bahrain, in which various security wings remained on the same side and fulfilled different repression functions.22 It has often been argued that defection did not occur because of the Sunni army’s loyalty to the Sunni royal family.23 This paper’s aim is to infer why two distinct wings of the same coercive apparatus made different defection decisions under similar conditions, not why two different militaries in two different countries made different calls. Hence, by substantially varying the conditions under which security forces chose to repress, sectarian cases disable comparison with cases like Egypt and Tunisia.

The Relationship between the Military and Internal Security Agencies

First, we will consider the clash of interests between the army and the Interior Ministry to illustrate how a legacy of distrust split the military and internal organizations. The split pitted the two organs on opposite sides; the regime chose to join the internal agencies, which meant that the split with the internal agencies also meant a split with the regime by proxy. In some cases, the regime deliberately orchestrated the rift e.g. with resource distribution. In other cases, however, the regime retroactively chose to side with the internal agencies e.g. inter-organ political crises. Ultimately, this past progressively widened the Ministry-military gulf – it made the

18 Bellin, 130.
19 Barany, 29.
military’s defection more probable than that of the police (etc.) and set the scene for the defection when the moment of pressure struck (this is considered in the next section).

**Competition for resources**

In both Egypt and Tunisia, the two bodies have continually fought for limited state financial resources. In Tunisia, the “security establishment… had long viewed the military as its competitor for state financial resources,”24 especially because of the oscillation and uncertainty of the regime in budget allocation. Despite Bourghiba’s lack of enthusiasm for the armed forces, he allocated more funds to the military than to the police during his presidency.25 As the table on the next page demonstrates, the division of money between the Interior Ministry and the military has fluctuated substantially. Generally, both organs have experienced increases and decreases together but the Ministry’s budget has increased at a much faster rate and absorbed decreases more resiliently (except the anomalous year of 1996-7). It could be argued that this allocation was not anomalous since the Tunisian military was smaller and tasked with limited roles like disaster relief and border patrolling.26 However, regardless of justification, the military felt disillusioned with the lack of resources, considering itself “disadvantaged vis-à-vis the civilian bureaucracy”27 as early as 1980; the disadvantage seems to have worsened during Ben Ali’s reign.

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</table>

Source: See the December issues of al-Ra’i’al-Rasm for the figures pertaining to the budget.

[Table 1] Distribution of defense budget under Ben Ali28

The Tunisian military felt it had not received sufficient material to carry out its mandate29 and needed more basic comfort and amenities like sleeping bags for its troops.30 This competition was a robust influence on the army’s calculus particularly because the military—beyond the dissatisfaction of dealing with lack of material and basic necessities—saw the competing “civilian bureaucracy,” “the several oligarchs allied with the presidential couple” and “police organizations” as “ostentatiously corrupt.”31

Like its counterpart, the Egyptian armed force faced “intense competition over resources and institutional turf battles.”32 Scholars have further argued that it was during Mubarak’s tenure that Egypt decisively evolved from a military to a police state.33 More specifically, armed forces’ “contempt for the Interior Ministry and its associated police and security agencies deepened during

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24 Nassif, 70.
25 Nassif, 79.
28 Nassif, 75.
30 Nassif, 73.
31 Nassif, 74.
32 Sayigh, Yezid. 2012. Above the state: The officers’ republic in Egypt.
33 Kandil, Kindle Locations 4492-4493.
the last decade of Mubarak’s rule.” Analysis of defense budgets in Egypt reveals similar patterns to those in Tunisia as the following graphs illustrate.

**[Figure 1] Trends in defense budget spending in Egypt**

In the last decade (2005-12), the Interior Ministry’s budget increased tremendously while the military’s budget staggered after initial increases even if it was always higher in absolute terms. The fact that the military’s budget was generally high is not surprising, given the greater size and responsibilities of the EAF compared to Tunisian forces. But the patterns here underscore an increasing political preference for a stronger interior ministry relative to the army. On the other hand, the Interior Ministry was largely assimilated into the “widening circle” of economic activities associated with Gamal Mubarak and the neoliberal policies he promoted. And this is exactly why this economic competition had noticeable bearing on the military’s calculus—by the late 1990s, Gamal Mubarak, the man expected to succeed Hosni Mubarak, and his circle of “businessmen” and “police and security forces… [they] relied extensively on “began to threaten the military’s stake in the economy.”

**A History of distrust and political friction**

There is more to the story than just economics. In a way, the nature of coup-proofing and police militarization made collision between internal security and the army almost inevitable because of the paranoid and skeptical way in which one kept a check on the other. In Tunisia, an epochal example of this is the Barakat Al-Sahil affair. In May 1991, the minister of the interior ‘Abd Allah Qallal revealed that the police had uncovered a coup plot. This was soon accompanied by a humiliating confession by Army Captain Ahmad ‘Amara, who confirmed that a conspiracy to impose “Sharia Law and Iranian-style theocracy” had been manufactured at Barakat al-Sahil, a hamlet near the coastal town of Hammamet. This national spectacle is a perfect example of controversial coup-proofing in action—a heavily militarized police monitoring the activities of an apolitical military and punishing it to keep the regime safe. One hundred and thirteen officers, 82 noncommissioned officers and 49 soldiers (all from the army, navy and air force) were detained in relation to the alleged coup. Several of these officers held senior positions: 21 were Majors, 45 were Captains and 37 were Lieutenants. Moreover, there is compelling evidence that they were tortured into confessing at the Ministry of Interior rather than the Ministry of Defense, the body normally responsible for their disciplining. Nassif effectively summarizes the polarizing implications of this event: “Through the Barakat al-Sahil affair, the rcd machinery and the security establishment humiliated the officer corps and, by extension, the entire armed forces.” The affair convinced Ben Ali that the “true pillars of the regime” were “the party and the security establishment” and bolstered the security establishment, which not only moved closer to the regime but also became more confident about future meddling in the army’s affairs. In fact, the affair

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34 Sayigh, Above the State, 22.

explains the anomalous 9.7%-5.9% budget split in 1992. To put things in perspective, the affair exemplifies the unavoidable tensions that fester in parallel security systems. Events like these obviously heightened the army’s animosity towards the police apparatus but also made them view the regime, the party and the police as an aggregate hostile group.

In Egypt, the specific incidents have been quite different but the outcomes are similar. Under Mubarak, the Interior Ministry became “a terrifying bureaucratic empire” with about 34 departments. By 2002, the Ministry represented 21 percent of state employment and had 25 officers for every 1000 citizens, a ratio greater than the Soviet Union’s. At the time of the 2011 uprising, the Ministry was estimated to have 1.5-1.7 million personnel on its payroll, including up to 850,000 policemen and 300,000-400,000 informers. At the same time, most recent figures put the entire military at just 450,000. The numbers themselves speak to the high potential of inter-institutional crises. These crises have been primarily tied to the deliberate apoliticization and weakening of the military by the regime in favor of the Interior Ministry. The Officers’ Republic in Egypt often describes the apparent penetration of the military “deep into the state apparatus” but this did not imbue the military with an “exceptional political role.” One crucial event here was the shaming of Abu Ghazala, a particularly popular general with both the public and the army. Ghazala had served in the 1948 and 1956 wars, often “attacked the police’s popular general with both the public and the army. Ghazala had crucial event here was the shaming of Abu Ghazala, a particularly

39 Kandil, Kindle Locations 4376-4379.
42 Sayigh, Yezid. “Reconstructing the Police State in Egypt.” Carnegie Middle East Center.
43 Kandil, Kindle Location 3981.
44 Kandil, Kindle Location 3954.
45 Sayigh, Agencies of Coercion, 10.

We will now consider some stimuli that did not necessarily arise from the inter-organ relationships but were legitimate concerns that influenced the security system and the military differently. It has already been established that the agency-army tussle over the years disenchanted the military and actually wooed and benefited the security forces. However, each organ also had independent relationships, which produced independent strategic interests. Among these, the crucial ones were internal cohesion in relation to the masses and post-revolt survival in relation to the regime. As we shall see, compared to the military, internal cohesion made defection more necessary while regime dependence made defection more practically viable for the military.

Internal cohesion and subordinate loyalty

Several authors have advanced the idea that Arab militaries, especially in Tunisia and Egypt were particularly concerned about “internal cohesion” and loyalty of their rank-and-file. Before we move to the main argument, it is important to establish that internal cohesion should logically also be a concern for the Ministry. In fact, common arguments like empathy with the protesting masses or political grievances against the regime could apply to riot police as much as soldiers in tanks. In Tunisia, police officers worked more than 12 hours a day, earning less than the wages of bus driver.
In Egypt too, they were “ill-fed, poorly lodged, sleep-deprived and donned wretched uniforms.” The subordinates evidently did not share the economic privileges of the higher ranks, like the common soldier. Moreover, at least Egypt had already faced a historic mutiny from the Central Security Forces in 1986 for similar socioeconomic grievances against the regime. Since the rank-and-file composed the vast majority of the apparatus and did the dirty work, it was their thinking, not the elite officers’ that mattered—spontaneous defection at the bottom would put the entire structure in disarray.

The main argument here concerns the top leadership of each of the organs. Each organ’s leadership factored subordinate loyalty when deciding whether to defect or repress and discovered different conclusions. Two differences made internal cohesion a far more pressing factor for the army and both differences can be understood in terms of the organ’s interactions with the popular masses.

Firstly, the army and the police varied vastly in terms of public support and popularity. Whether before or after the revolution, in both Tunisia and Egypt, more than 70% of the public viewed the military favorably whereas only about 40% viewed the police/general security the same way. The army is arguably the most popular institution in both countries. A defected soldier would be received with open arms and enthusiasm. At the same time, it is well established that years of police brutality and Interior Ministry humiliation was a huge driving force behind the Arab Spring. All this suggests that if the police/security agencies defected, it is unlikely that the general public would have embraced them. In ways, defection was a zero-sum game—the losses involved in sticking with the Ministry relative to the risks of defection (losing the already meager economic livelihood and potential rejection and outrage) were less.

Secondly, cruelty against hordes of unarmed civilians was not new to the Interior Ministry and its forces. In Tunisia, security forces resorted to “increasingly brutal tactics and indiscriminate
uses of force.” In Egypt, too, police brutality was never limited to the regime’s political opponents. Amnesty International has validated these claims: “Egyptian police routinely... arresting ordinary citizens... [used] cruel methods to interrogate prisoner[s].”53 Kandil best summarizes this situation’s relevance: “police torture transcended the boundaries of frequent practices to become standard behavior... automatically applied without effort or reflection... violence had become second nature.”54 The highly “results driven” security establishment also mistreated and abused fellow officers, establishing clear penalties if results were not achieved.55,56 On the other hand, cases of military crackdown against civilians are few and far between. “The armed forces, by contrast, stayed out of the business of squelching domestic dissent.” It is possible that several desensitized police officers treated the Arab Spring repression as usual business while others considering defections were deterred by the consequences if they did. In the armies, such mistreatment and penalties were not common and pro-revolution sympathies seemed to exist in the higher echelons from “day one.”57

To summarize, the army elites—already frustrated by a legacy of disagreement with the regime and Ministry structure—also realized that their subordinates could feasibly defect because of the culture of dealing with the public. Violent crackdown had few precedents, and public admiration meant defection could seem attractive. On the other hand, the Ministry felt the opposite about its own subordinates who only stood to lose if they defected and were seemingly desensitized to the brutality.

**Dependence on the regime and self-sufficiency**

In addition, militaries and security agencies considered the extent of their own dependence on the regime and their ability to exist and prevail without it. This dependence could be assessed in a political and economic sense. On one hand, the Interior Ministry was inextricably tied to the regime. A major structural reason for this was the “high degree of centralization,”58 whereby the security sector received all its resources from the central or national government. Thus, the Ministry quite obviously saw the regime that was “filling its coffers” as its “employer and raison d’être.”59 Politically, the people associated the Ministry with the dirty work of the regime.60 On the other hand, the economic dependence holds true for the army to a large extent in both Tunisia and Egypt as well. But both militaries had worked around this—as long as the armies had alternative resources, they could absorb the risks and losses associated with the regime’s downfall, an outcome that was favorable in other aforementioned ways. In Tunisia, the Army and its senior leaders “did not depend on Ben Ali for resources or access to power, which lessened their investment in sustaining him office.”61 This is not to suggest that the Tunisian military could survive without the central government’s budget allocation. Instead, this suggests that the army was not the beneficiary of any special resources or privileges due to their association with the regime. Their allotted budget was guaranteed under the constitution and owing to the needs of national security and border control. Moreover, partly due to army’s popularity, General Ammar saw potential to be “de facto the key power broker in the country.” Tunisian military personnel subsequently “participated in the arrest of key officials” and defended the interim government from “threats posed by Ben Ali loyalists.”62 By taking charge against the security services and getting involved in political spearheading, the Tunisian military could also solve the problem of economic competition with the Ministry that was mentioned earlier. To clarify, the anticipated political clout for the Tunisian army was sizably lesser than the Egyptian army’s but it had a role to play—in fact, the Tunisian army preferred to play politics only to a certain extent and then return to the barracks.

Egypt is an odd case where the army’s dependence on the regime was matched by staggering independence. Regardless of its tendrils in the state, the Egyptian army was an avid proponent of self-sufficiency (al-iktifa’a al-thati)63 and expanding the meaning...
of national security to mean economic and social welfare. The Egyptian military’s economic empire can be dated to the time of Abu Ghazallah. The army continued to invest in agriculture, food production and land reclamation, producing “everything from flat screen televisions and pasta to refrigerators and cars... in over 35 factories.” By one estimate, the military commands up to 40% of the Egyptian economy. While Mubarak had facilitated and allowed the acquisition of these lucrative businesses and even though Gamal’s rise threatened this economic military empire, the military’s economic establishment as it stood in 2011 was fairly independent and resilient. And of course, the Egyptian military, unlike the Tunisian one, receives $1.3 billion from the US, covering about 80% of its military procurement, a substantial expense. Moreover, in political terms, just like the Tunisian military, as the most trusted public institution, the Egyptian forces expected a forthcoming role as the arbiter of the revolution—they would direct their own economic fate. Conversely, the entrenchment of the Interior Ministry and police is reinforced by the immediate aftermath of the revolts. The police felt an “initial sense of shock and retreat” and the “sector [initially] fell into the shadows.”

In summary, the Egypt and Tunisia’s armies are different in terms of self-sufficiency (Egypt was clearly more but Tunisia was self-sufficient in a different way) but were self-sufficient nonetheless or had the political foresight to become so, at the time of the revolutions.

On the Brink: Timeliness of the Defection

An important concern here is why the defector defected when it did but not before. Indeed, a major theme in this paper is time. In the past, the military always kept its historic forced subordination in relation to the Ministry when making decisions—the Interior forces saw the relationship as favorable. More centrally, in terms of the present, the circumstances of the Arab Spring brought those factors from the past to a climax. Here, it is useful to acknowledge that the Arab Spring was unprecedented in its magnitude and anomalous in its impact. Although the military had been disillusioned for a while, defection was only seriously considered because of a favorable set of circumstances that the protests generated. At the point of defection, the interior security forces were at their weakest, the probability of regime collapse was highest and subsequent risks associated with defection were lowest.

Kandil describes the military’s timely arrival on the streets of Egypt as “an army that had been subdued by the its two other ruling partners rolled confidently into the streets.” At this point, the regime and the police had completely placed their bets on the army to save the day e.g. “the police cautiously deployed its forces but stayed away from hot spots, preferring to let the military handle the situation.” The military, however, acted with intelligent, political foresight. The Tunisian army, for example, “deployed to the cities... and stood by while security forces used extreme tactics... including live ammunition” and “tried to calm... by interposing themselves between the protesters and police.” By capitalizing on the unique ‘breaking point’ of the regime, the army “enhance[ed] its social position” and “avoid[ed] the disdain Tunisians heaped on the police...” Hence, the strategic timing and circumstances added fuel to the grievances the military had accumulated and emboldened it to defect.

The Counter-Case: China, Tiananmen Square and Lack of Defection

One useful counter-case where defection did not occur is that of the People’s Liberation Army during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Although China is not part of the Middle East, it provides a worthwhile comparison in two ways. For one, the broad authoritarian model of China and several Middle East countries—particularly Egypt and Tunisia—is similar. In fact, it has been compellingly...
claimed that many Middle Eastern states adopted China’s “authoritarian capitalism,” economic reforms without political liberalization. More importantly, the Tiananmen protests were a singularly unexpected and serious threat to the Communist regime. They therefore created a similar set of conditions as the Arab Spring, temporally and politically, for the Chinese PLA and People’s Armed Police (PAP). Briefly, the events unfolded in this order. Throng occupied Tiananmen Square in April 1989 in response to Hu Yaobang’s death. Initially, the PAP mobilized to control the crowd and disperse protesters, but they were quickly overwhelmed and constrained. By mid-May, the PLA moved in, following declaration of martial law. Yet in the final turn of events, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, the PLA and PAP remained on the same side.

The explanatory differences are several. For one, the Chinese military and internal security forces did not have a history of strained ties. They never particularly competed for resources—between 1983 and 1989, just before the protests, the PAP was primarily “looking for funding sources to supplement woefully inadequate state allocations” whereas the army was well-endowed. Moreover, there were no coup-proofing tensions in China since the forces were not as parallel. The PAP was constructed as an independent institution in 1982, and before that, it was always a wing of the PLA. Even in 1982, the PAP was accountable to the Central Military Commission rather than an Interior Ministry, which ensured smoother alignment of interests. We can also consider the independent institutional relationships with the public. In the public’s case, the two organs were not viewed too differently because, unlike in the Middle East, both organs worked cooperatively and quite often to quell protest. China did not have one Interior Ministry that had bloodied hands and a remote, inactive and prestigious army, so a split like Egypt’s or Tunisia’s could not happen between the PLA and PAP. It is worth mentioning that the temporal importance and pressure of the protests were similar in Tiananmen and the Egypt/Tunisia Arab Spring. Tiananmen too presented a rare moment for the military to consider defection, but because factors like the historical split and convincing in-the-moment strategic interests did not match up, both forces remained loyal and on the same side of history.

Conclusion and Looking Ahead

On a final note, it is evident that the coercive apparatus in the two countries where the Arab Spring caused perhaps the most rupture was not only internally heterogeneous in structure but also in strategic interests and decision-making calculi. Defection also does not always occur when the factors mentioned in this paper are present—historical periods and high-pressure ‘breaking points’ matter. As a disclaimer, it is important to acknowledge that decision-making is not always possible to unravel and justify, especially when closed institutions like the military and Interior Ministry in a closed region like the Middle East are involved. To add insights to the currently lacking literature on defection and coercive apparatus disaggregation, the paper suggests the following areas for research:

1. Further horizontal disaggregation of the security apparatus into the army, navy, air force, thugs, police and spies; Disaggregation analysis in countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Yemen, analyzing esoteric institutions like the Republican Guard and keeping in mind the ethnic and sectarian influences on calculi;

2. More vertical analysis and differentiation between the high-, medium- and low-rank officers and their varying interests and needs;

3. Deeper look into the Interior Ministry to chart out the extent of and reasons behind any defections; On balance, further research and some of this paper’s structure will help untangle the interesting dance that a country’s coercive organs engage in: “Sometimes they are in conflict (no matter how muted), and at other times they are in alliance, but their aim is always to further their interests.”

77 Cheung, 526.
78 Cheung, 526.
80 Kandil, Kindle Location 64.


Cheung, Tai Ming. 1996. Guarding china’s domestic front line: The people’s armed police and china’s stability. The China Quarterly 146, (146): 533-547


Honorable Mention

GROUND TRUTH:
A Comparison of SOF Operations and Strategic Objectives in Afghanistan

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In October 2015 the U.S.-Afghan conflict, the longest-running war in U.S. history, entered its fifteenth year with little progress to show in terms of both security and development. A Taliban force that numbered roughly 45,000 in 2001 is now estimated to exceed 60,000, despite having incurred 20,000-35,000 casualties.\(^1\) A *World Affairs Journal* article reports that more than 100 billion USD in foreign aid “has not brought the United States or Afghanistan a single sustainable institution or program,”\(^2\) and of the sixteen experienced Special Operations Forces (SOF) members interviewed for this research project, only six (38 percent) believed that the conflict is winnable under our current approach.

Yet while many agree that the conflict has not gone well for the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), there is no accepted consensus as to why. In this paper I argue that two key ISAF failures have been inability to adhere to ISAF’s own counterinsurgency doctrine as described in *Field Manual 3-24: Insurgencies and Counterinsurgesies* and a failure to adjust strategic-level policies and objectives to the reality of what is feasible at the tactical and operational levels—the “ground truth.”

Using 16 interviews of former and active Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Intelligence Community personnel, I conducted a qualitative analysis of three major SOF mission areas in the Afghan conflict: village-scale clearance operations, High Value Target (HVT) operations, and Village Stability Operations (VSO). I did this to understand whether practices at the tactical and operational levels support strategic-level objectives, and conversely, to determine whether those objectives incorporate the ground truth. Analysis reveals that while all three of the SOF mission areas were highly effective at the tactical level, two of the three mission areas were ineffective at the strategic level.

This paper proceeds as follows: First, I define U.S.-ISAF’s strategic objectives for Afghanistan and discuss ISAF counterinsurgency practices as described in *Field Manual 3-24: Insurgencies and Counterinsurgesies* (FM 3-24). These will provide clearly defined benchmarks through which to evaluate whether SOF actions at the tactical/operational level have been strategically effective in terms of both execution and outcome. Second, I describe the research methodology used. Third, I discuss observations from the interviews, organized by mission area. Finally, I discuss findings and their potential implications for policy and research.

**Defining ISAF Strategy and Strategic Objectives**

In order to determine the effectiveness of practices at the tactical and operational levels in contributing towards strategic aims in Afghanistan, it is necessary to first define what the U.S. objectives for the region are. According to a Council on Foreign Relations report on U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, “The basic long-term U.S. aspirations for Pakistan and Afghanistan are uncontroversial and easy to list: stability, prosperity, and good governance.”\(^3\) We should add to this that the overarching reason for pursuing these aims is to deny international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda a sanctuary from which to operate.\(^4\)

Responding to a growing Taliban insurgency following the collapse of the Taliban regime, precipitated by U.S. and Northern Alliance forces in 2001, the combined U.S.-NATO International Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) have employed a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. FM 3-24 outlines the core doctrine used by ISAF. The manual defines an insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.” Conversely, counterinsurgency is defined as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”\(^5\) Because FM 3-24 establishes the core doctrine under which ISAF operates in Afghanistan, it is the obvious benchmark with which to evaluate actions on the ground. However, the manual readily acknowledges that the complexities and dynamic nature of insurgency environments are such that a

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clearly defined “one-size-fits-all” strategy is neither provided nor desired and, “as such, the objectives of a counterinsurgency must be contextual to that insurgency.”6 This creates an obvious methodological problem: how to evaluate tactical and operational effectiveness in an environment where “best” practices remain open to interpretation.

In order to clarify this ambiguity, I evaluate counterinsurgency practices on two main parameters. First, I evaluate whether practices contribute to the stated goals of stability, prosperity, and good governance. Second, I evaluate how execution at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels conforms to FM 3-24, specifically chapters one and nine. Chapter one outlines ten “strategic principles” which are “provided for the practitioner and planner as a foundation for how they think about planning and executing counterinsurgency operations,”7 these principles provide broad yet still clearly defined concepts with which we can assess execution. Chapter nine outlines the “Direct Method” of counterinsurgency that has been employed in Afghanistan, which is structured around a “Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition” framework. This framework functions as a means of organizing and implementing resources at all three levels—tactical, operational, and strategic—to defeat an insurgency, and forms the conceptual foundation upon which ISAF strategy operates.

The framework has five broadly defined phases: Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transition. Shaping operations involve “identifying which areas in an operational environment exhibit conditions that counterinsurgents can impact to change the capability differential between insurgents and counterinsurgents.” This phase primarily involves a short-duration insertion of forces into an insurgent-controlled area (often village or district size) to assess and prepare that area for future counterinsurgency operations. These forces do so by engaging the population and understanding the human terrain of the battlespace to identify enemy networks and resources, to learn how they influence the battlespace, and to strategize on how to isolate and defeat them.8

The purpose of the Clear phase is to “to eliminate the insurgency’s combatants to enable the host nation to develop the capability to address the insurgency’s root cause and eliminate the conditions that allow it to exist.” Though the Clear phase is distinct from the Hold phase, FM 3-24 is clear that “Counterinsurgents do not execute tasks associated with the clear component unless they have developed the capability to execute tasks in the hold” and is explicit that the counterinsurgent should not clear an area that it cannot hold: “Until those conditions exist, the counterinsurgent may choose to continue to prepare or shape the environment for future shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework operations.”9 The primary objectives of the Hold phase are to safeguard the population, to reduce enemy strength, and set conditions for the host nation to take over responsibility for security.

The Build phase is meant to commence once host-nation forces are able to provide for security. Its main objective “comprises carrying out programs designed to remove the conditions that allow the insurgency to exist, specifically addressing the root causes, tying inhabitants to host-nation security institutions, governing and rule of law, and strengthening the host nation’s ability to provide legitimate and effective governance.”10 Finally, the Transition phase is designed to effectively turn over responsibility for security and development to the host nation, with the goal “to create the conditions necessary for the host nation to counter an insurgency independently.”11

It is important to note that the phases of the Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition framework are not executed discreetly but on a continuum in which actions in one phase may be ongoing simultaneously with actions in another phase. Furthermore, different geographic Areas of Operation (AO) may be at different points along the continuum at the same time. This paper seeks to evaluate whether ISAF actions taken at all levels have been logical and consistent with the Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition framework in
terms of their timing and execution for a given area, and whether those actions had a positive strategic-level impact consistent with the policy objective of “stability, prosperity, and good governance.”

Research Methodology

The research methodology for this paper involved the collection of micro-level qualitative data in the form of sixteen interviews conducted with current and former SOF and Intelligence Community members with significant Afghan theater field experience. Interviews were conducted by phone or email during October and November 2015, with phone interviews that were typically between 60 and 90 minutes. I posed a base set of 20 questions (Appendix A) during each interview, though conversations evolved dynamically in order to allow interviewees to articulate their views. Interviews were conducted with guaranteed anonymity in order to facilitate candid discussion without fear of repercussions, as many candidates are currently serving in the military or Intelligence Community. I requested that information related to classified practices be omitted.

The interview candidate pool was built from personal professional networks, but I chose interviewees who I thought would capture as diverse a range of experiences as possible. Interviewees were military and civilian, officer and enlisted, American and NATO ally, and between 24 and 41 years of age. Participants have between 5 and 23 years of work experience, and between 6 and 23 months of Afghan field experience. Deployments took place between 2006 and 2014, encompassing 20 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. An effort was made to obtain as broad a sampling as possible in terms of background and theater experience, but because SOF units are specifically trained for irregular warfare, they are often given considerable autonomy within their Area of Operations, and are generally provided with greater resources than conventional forces. Because SOF units practices should most closely approach what would be considered “best practices”, they represent a reasonable benchmark with which to evaluate the strategic effectiveness of counterinsurgency practices.

Observations

Direct Action (DA)

Direct Action operations cover a broad spectrum of actions encompassing “Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions.” In Afghanistan, SOF Direct Action operations generally comprise two broad mission areas: multi-day village-scale clearance operations, and precision raids to capture individual High Value Targets (HVT). Both mission types are conducted in conjunction with an Afghan National Army (ANA) or Afghan National Police (ANP) partner force.

15 Ibid.
Of the six interviewees who participated in village-scale clearance operations, none (zero percent) felt that it was effective at contributing towards strategic goals. They cited two main reasons for this. The first main reason cited was a failure of the counterinsurgents to hold the cleared territory. All participants strongly agreed that ISAF and ANA forces took on great risk in clearing a village, which often resulted in firefight and improvised explosive device attacks, only to leave shortly after the clearance without holding the ground that was taken. As one interviewee remarked, “I found myself clearing the same villages that I had cleared during shaping ops on a deployment two years earlier, sometimes even clearing the same buildings.” All participants in this mission area believed that the risk was generally not worth the reward for these operations, that the rate of enemy kill or capture was low, and that the Taliban who often fled at the beginning of the clearance operation quickly returned once the counterinsurgents left. As one particularly experienced interviewee remarked, “At most clearance ops resulted in us destroying an enemy weapons cache or killing a fire team to squad size element [5-10 insurgents], but it was readily apparent to almost everyone that what we were doing wasn’t going to affect the overall outcome of the war. This isn’t the type of war where you can kill your way to victory.”

The second main reason cited was the hostility that clearance operations generated in the population, particularly because of the ANA partner force’s aggressive and corrupt behavior. While some participants believed that their partner forces’ treatment of civilians was acceptable, most agreed that their excessively aggressive behavior resulted in a negative strategic impact on the population. Afghan forces were observed engaging in activities such as beating villagers, stealing valuables, and attempted executions of prisoners. Most interviewees also agreed that their partner force behaved more aggressively when they were operating in a village of a different tribe or ethnicity. One interviewee noted that, “even if you could discount the negative impact of the [Afghan partner force], the repetitive nature of clearances ops likely resulted in a strategic loss given the hostility that they caused with the population.”

In contrast, six out of the seven interviewees (86 percent) of interviewees who participated in the High Value Target (HVT) mission area felt that it was strategically effective. Most reported that although night raids were viewed as odious by the population, and Afghan partner forces still sometimes behaved corruptly and overly aggressive, removing critical Taliban leadership from the insurgent network had positive strategic-level effects that outweighed their negative effects on the population. This is attributed to the minimal impact of HVT operations on the broader population due to their small scale and precise nature. Positive strategic effects were characterized by an observed devolution in enemy practices and a reduced overall fighting effectiveness in successfully targeted networks. One person related that, “HVT targeting enabled us to remove critical nodes in the Taliban network that resulted in an observable degradation in enemy effectiveness by removing their most experienced members.”

Based on an assessment of the data, village clearance operations appear inconsistent with ISAF counterinsurgency strategy in both execution (FM 3-24 criteria) and contribution towards the strategic objectives of stability, prosperity, and good governance. The hostility created by the repeated nature of clearance operations, often exacerbated by overly aggressive partner forces, is inconsistent with FM 3-24’s first Strategic Principle that fostering legitimacy in the host government is the primary objective. It also violates the eighth Strategic Principle of using the lowest level of force required for the mission. Furthermore, clearance operations are inconsistent with chapter nine’s Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition framework, which clearly states that Clear operations are not to be undertaken without the ability to transition into the Hold phase.

In summary, two important themes emerge. First, village-scale clearance does not appear to produce a net positive contribution towards the strategic goal of a stable Afghan state because of an ISAF failure to hold cleared territory and the hostility that repetitive clearance operations caused in the population. Second, HVT operations do appear to demonstrate a positive strategic effect by degrading enemy capacity, allowing for increased
regional stability through tactics that do not significantly disenfranchise the larger population.

Village Stability Operations (vso)

Village Stability Operations, introduced to SOF strategy in 2010, involve embedding SOF teams in villages with the dual purpose of marginalizing the insurgency and building stability in their Area of Operations. This is to be accomplished by managing security and development at the village-district level. Security is managed through the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program, and development is managed by working jointly with the population to assess needs, administer aid, and source development projects. According to a recent Joint Special Operations University report, “Village Stability Operations (vso) and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) have been key instruments of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, constituting the principal contribution of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to population-centric counterinsurgency.”

Of the interviewees who participated in the vso mission area, three out of ten (30 percent) felt that it was effective in contributing towards strategic goals. They cite three main reasons for this. First, all participants strongly agreed that aid projects were extremely ineffective at winning popular support. As one interviewee remarked, “the villagers we were working with had lived in the region for hundreds of years without a well, and they were just fine. We built them a well, and somehow we expected them to love us for it.” Another interviewee remarked that, “After we pulled out of the region, the ALP disassembled the police station we had built them so they could sell the scrap wood. None of the public projects meant anything to them.” Finally, another interviewee observed that, “Our inability to understand the human terrain was a detriment to us. We falsely assumed that our Western material values would translate, like democracy and McDonalds. It was possible to win the support of local actors in the short term, but not in the grander strategic sense. The appeal for material things were an appeal to people’s individual greed, and not a greater desire to build a successful society.”

The second reason cited for vso failure was that the ALP is an ineffective fighting force against the Taliban. All agreed that the ALP performed poorly in combat, and most agreed that it lacked adequate arms and resources to reliably protect the population from the insurgents. Despite frequent requests by SOF teams on the ground for more manpower and equipment, they were often ordered to withdraw prematurely. One interviewee related that, “We (U.S. SOF) would get into all-day gunfights where the Taliban would attack us relentlessly with PKM [light machine guns] and RPG [rocket propelled grenades] in spite of having constant Close Air Support. In one firefight we killed more than 50 Taliban. The ALP were only given AK-47’s, and we knew the ALP couldn’t stand up to the Taliban with what they had, but no one [in upper leadership] wanted to listen, and when we left our [area of operations] they all got slaughtered.”

The third main reason cited for vso failure involved the population's short-term and long-term survival calculus. All vso participants agreed that demonstrating power and control over territory was the only effective strategy for obtaining collaboration with the population. Interviewees observed that villagers began to offer support only once their team had established tactical dominance to a degree that made the local population feel safe from reprisal. As one interviewee observed, “Only once we destroyed the local Taliban could we count on the population for support within our area of control. They would often volunteer information to us, like [improvised explosive device] locations, even if no reward was involved. But outside of our [area of control] we couldn’t count on anything.” However, nearly all participants also agreed that while public collaboration was possible in the short term, the population ultimately believed that once ISAF forces withdrew, the Taliban would immediately return. One interviewee remarked that, “At the end of the day, they knew were going to leave and they knew the ALP wasn’t going to keep them safe. They cooperated with us at the time for survival, but we never had them on our team.”

Finally, nearly all interviewees agreed that they were ordered to withdraw from their vso sites before their Areas of Operation were

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sufficiently prepared for turnover.

Based on an assessment of the data, Village Stability Operations appear inconsistent with ISAF counterinsurgency strategy in both execution (FM 3-24 criteria) and contribution towards the strategic objectives of stability, prosperity, and good governance. The inability of VSO to transition areas that were capable of unilaterally providing security for the population is inconsistent with FM 3-24 chapter nine’s Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition framework, which clearly states that transition should not commence in an area until host nation forces can provide for its own security. This failure is also in violation of FM 3-24’s fifth Strategic Principle which states that the counterinsurgent should be prepared for a long term commitment. However, it is crucial to note that the decision to withdraw prematurely was a strategic-level failure, made in spite of objections by SOF teams on the ground.

While the ALP’s knowledge of the local area was a distinct advantage in regards to intelligence and insurgent identification, the inability of the ALP to provide for local security (given their inadequate numbers and equipment) is inconsistent with the broader strategic goals of stability, prosperity and good governance, as is the inability of aid and development projects to generate support for government legitimacy. Overall, I assess that Village Stability Operations do not appear to have created a positive strategic impact. My assessment is consistent with a Joint Special Operations University report which notes that, “VSO and ALP have not been strategically decisive because they have been too small a size to have sweeping effects on security and governance, owing to top-level policy decisions.”

**Findings**

Because of this paper’s small sample size and narrow scope, findings can only suggest future research. However, if the conclusions hold up to further scrutiny, then the potential implications of these findings for strategic-level policy and research could be significant. For clarity, conclusions drawn from the data are roughly organized by the three relevant actors: Afghan Civilians, Afghan Security Forces, and US/ISAF.

**Afghan Civilians**

One of the most remarkable trends to emerge from the data is the ineffectiveness of foreign aid and development projects in garnering support from the Afghan people. This finding is consistent with the scholarly work of Lyall, Blair, and Imai, who found that “Economic assistance appears to hold little sway over attitudes, whether in the form of quick, 30-day Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) initiatives or more deliberate National Solidarity Program (NSP) community grants.” In light of these observations, and the overall impotence of billions in aid in advancing strategic goals over the past fifteen years, a reassessment of the role and application of foreign aid in counterinsurgency could be warranted.

Equally remarkable is the universal observation that overwhelming tactical dominance has a strongly positive effect in gaining collaboration from the population. This finding is consistent with Kalyvas’ argument in The Logic of Violence in Civil War, that collaboration maps to territorial control regardless of preferences. This view is bolstered by the finding that short-term collaboration was possible despite widespread popular belief that the Taliban would ultimately be victorious after ISAF withdrawal. However, interviews seem to suggest that the minimum threshold of control that enables collaboration is quite high. VSO participants agreed that collaboration could not be expected from a population if insurgent reprisal was still a credible threat. This point was stated well by an interviewee who recalled, “We would go to villages that we didn’t have a strong presence in, to hand out supplies and [provide medical aid] for the purpose of building rapport with the locals, but...
they refused our help. We later found out it was because as soon as we would leave the Taliban would come in and give beatings to anyone who had accepted our support. They were very successful in keeping us isolated from villages we didn’t control.” The finding that an exceptional degree of territorial control is required in Afghanistan to facilitate collaboration would seem to require a redefinition of the “Hold” phase in FM 3-24. These findings may also warrant a candid reappraisal of the manpower and resource commitments necessary to meet the threshold for collaboration. As Kalyvas observes, “Once a civil war is on, the military requirements for the establishment and preservation of control over the entire territory of a country are staggering.”25

Afghan Security Forces

Some important themes emerged from the data about Afghan military and police forces. First, nearly all interviewees reported that both Afghan military and police demonstrated increased aggression and indifference towards the population when they were operating in a region that was not local to them. In contrast, forces native to the area in which they were working typically treated the local population within culturally normative bounds. Most interviewees attributed the normative police behavior to the degree of accountability that comes from living within the community in which they work.

Second, every interviewee I spoke to agreed that ethnicity and tribal culture played an integral role in the relationship between Afghan security forces and the local population. All interviewees observed that Afghan military and police demonstrated increased aggression and indifference towards the civilian populations that were not of the same ethnicity. When Pashtun forces were in provinces that were predominantly Pashtun, a similar dynamic was observed but along tribal cleavages. In addition, ethnicity also appeared to play a role in public perception of Afghan forces. In provinces that were not homogenously Pashtun, interviewees found that the Pashtun villages were far more likely to show hostility towards ISAF and Afghan forces, and to provide aid to the Taliban. While interviewees attributed this observation to the fact that the Taliban is a largely Pashtun organization, it is possible that the observed hostility was a response to previous aggression by Afghan forces. Overall, the observed importance of ethnicity in shaping the dynamics of Afghan security force relations with the population is consistent with the work of Lyall, Shiraito, and Imai on co-ethnic bias.26

Second, Afghan Local Police (ALP) forces were typically recruited from two sources: directly from the village (often former Arbakai militiamen under the control of village elders), or by co-opting a local warlord and his militia. Interestingly, the source of ALP did not appear to play a significant factor in determining how ALP treated the local population. When ALP were sourced by the local warlord (who became the de facto ALP commander) some isolated instances of intimidation and extrajudicial killings were reported that were attributed to the warlord’s maintaining control of the region. However, overall the ALP were reported to have treated the local population in a manner consistent with cultural norms, regardless of their source. This appears inconsistent with Mike Martin’s observations in An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, who argues that co-opting warlords and their militias undermines Afghan government legitimacy because the militias maltreat the local population.27

Third, all interviewees agreed that the greatest strategic benefit that Afghan forces provided was their cultural understanding and superior ability to identify insurgents. This capability was greatly enhanced if Afghan forces were of the same ethnicity as local people, but more so when forces were local to the area in which they were operating. One interviewee remarked, “When our ANA guys started operating unilaterally they would often bring back more HVIs and better intelligence than we could get ourselves. Their language skills and nuanced understanding of the culture

25 Ibid., 139.
gave them in edge that we didn’t have.” Another interviewee assessed that, “The alp had two advantages that we didn’t. First, they could sometimes change the public’s mind when Westerners could not. Second, their ability to gather actionable local intelligence was excellent. Some of our alp were former ana Special Forces, and would leave at night to do ops and show up the following morning with Taliban bodies, weapons, and explosives.”

These findings have potentially significant consequences for research and foreign policy. First, the pervasive effects of ethnic and tribal dynamics on Afghan military-civilian relations need to be accounted for in strategic-level planning. That all interviewees stressed the importance of tribe and ethnicity is consistent with the findings of Jason Lyall, who argues in “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents?” that ethnicity matters in civil-military relations. Second, the observation that forces who are co-ethnic to the population are better able to solve the identification problem is again strongly consistent with Lyall, Shiraito, and Imai’s conclusion that co-ethnic bias exists in wartime informing. Third, most interviewees agree that Afghan security forces have often had a far greater negative impact in undermining the legitimacy of Afghan government than have isaf, a fact that must be accounted for in strategic planning if perceptions of government legitimacy is an objective. Fourth, police forces were generally found to be adequate for their function of local policing, but were generally ineffective in resisting battle-hardened Taliban given their low levels of manpower, training, and resources. Most agreed that the vso program had the potential to be successful if isaf forces had been replaced with Afghan military personnel as a means of supporting the Afghan police. This strategic-level failure appears to be a consequence of the isaf drawdown, as vso conceptualizers originally “viewed local security forces as a supplement to strong national army and police forces, not as a substitute for them.”

Overall, I observe three broad dynamics shaping Afghan civil-security force relations that strategic policy makers need to account for: police vs military capabilities, local vs non-local, and group identity characteristics (e.g. tribe, ethnicity). Co-ethnic and especially local forces are better able to counter the identification problem, while non-local and non-coethnics are more prone to act with excessive aggression and undermine the legitimacy of government in the eyes of the population. Meanwhile, police forces are adequate to maintain local order but are unsuitable as a substitute for Afghan military forces. While assessing ideal divisions of labor and force composition are beyond the scope of this paper, the dynamics discussed have substantial strategic impact in terms of security and legitimacy.

U.S. – ISAF

Some important themes emerged from the interviews about U.S.-isaf practices, which are grouped into their respective domains of tactical/operational and strategic. In the tactical/operational domain, the first major finding observed is that two of the three core mission areas assessed failed to contribute strategically and were not executed in accordance with fm 3-24’s strategic doctrine. Village-level clearance operations had an overall negative strategic impact in regards to building legitimacy and support for the Afghan government. This is because of their typically hostile public reception, repetitive nature, and limited strategic effect on the enemy. These findings align with both Martin’s and Kalyvas’ observation that “search-and-clear” operations have historically been counterproductive.

In contrast, short duration raids targeting individual High Value Targets were observed to have a positive strategic impact by degrading Taliban command and control networks and causing an observable devolution in tactics and methods, at least in the short term. This finding of strategic effectiveness appears inconsistent with Martin’s criticism of Special Forces raids, which states that, “a super-decentralized, patronage-based organization is not vul-

31 Martin, Mike. An Intimate War. 244.
nerable to any type of decapitation strategy.” Also absent from the findings was Martin’s claim that local actors were able to manipulate Special Forces into targeting their enemies. Interviewees expressed confidence in the intelligence behind HVT targeting, a fact that likely indicates ISAF has become wise to the practice of local actors exploiting the informant system to their advantage in the time since Martin left military service in 2010.

Village Stability Operations were assessed to be strategically ineffective because SOF teams were ordered to transfer control to local forces that were inadequately manned, equipped, and prepared to counter Taliban forces, an assessment consistent with a 2012 RAND Corporation working paper assessing the VSO mission in Afghanistan. In addition, the VSO mission was not executed in accordance with FM 3-24’s Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition framework, as it transferred responsibility of local security and governance to forces ill-prepared to fulfill either requirement.

The second main theme to emerge at the tactical/operational level is that ISAF’s Afghan partner forces often did more to undermine strategic efforts at creating legitimacy than did Western forces. This brings up the obvious question of whether ISAF was able to control partner force professional behavior. Interestingly, most interviewees agreed that the most effective method of controlling partner force behavior was by controlling their access to money and other resources. In instances where ISAF had direct control over the pay and resources of their partner force, they were able to exert a much higher level of control and enforce normative behavior with regards to the local population. In contrast, salary through the Afghan government was often unreliable due to corruption, and Afghan forces would frequently turn to low-level predatory criminal behavior against the population in order to survive when pay was not forthcoming. This has two major implications. Strategic planners need to consider how sourcing salary and resources affects the level of control of the partner force, and how corruption and regularity of pay also impacts partner force behavior, both of which have broader strategic-level implications in regards to perception of government legitimacy.

Strategic-level findings can be subdivided into organizational constraints and strategic rigidity. Interviewees agreed on a wide variety of U.S.-ISAF organizational constraints that have contributed towards the current state of the conflict, which include: poorly defined objectives and metrics of success; inadequate understanding of counterinsurgency doctrine; prohibitive rules of engagement, imposed as a blanket attempt to minimize civilian casualties, which were frequently exploited by the enemy; an onerous bureaucratic system that hindered ground forces’ ability to respond to an agile insurgency; a careerism-driven risk aversion by strategic-level leadership that constrained ground forces; and an inability to comprehend the human terrain, a deficit exacerbated by short deployment. Taken collectively, these practices are inconsistent with FM 3-24’s second Strategic Principle which states that the counterinsurgent must understand the environment, and the eighth Strategic Principle which states that power and authority should be pushed down to the lowest levels.

Nearly all interviewees’ most emphatically cited reasons for strategic failure were reserved for strategic rigidity: an unwillingness or inability to acknowledge realities on the ground and respond accordingly. The failure of upper leadership to respond to the “ground truth” being presented to them from below was observed in all three SOF mission areas assessed. As one VSO participant related:

“The population had zero faith in the success of the ALP or the government…They knew that once we left the Taliban were going to move in and wipe them out. Our team knew what the ALP were going to be up against and were pleading with [higher leadership] to get them more weapons, manpower, and an ANA contingent, but [higher leadership] wouldn’t listen.”

Similarly, a participant in village-level clearance operations stated, “the point had been brought up to [higher leadership] that

large scale clearance ops were high-risk/low-reward and probably created more Taliban than they eliminated, but this didn’t seem to matter to them.” Finally, a participant in the HVT operations observed that strategic-level leadership, “was only concerned with the total numbers of raids and HVT captures, despite the reported negative impact on the population. They should have been looking at overall effects on the insurgent network as a better metric of effectiveness.” These findings demonstrate an overall inability to comprehend the ground truth and adjust strategy and goals accordingly, which appears distinctly inconsistent with FM 3-24’s seventh strategic principle of “learn and adapt.”

Conclusions

Using qualitative data, I have undertaken an analysis of practices at all levels of three SOF mission areas in the Afghan conflict: village-scale clearance operations, HVT operations, and VSO, comparing their execution to FM 3-24 counterinsurgency doctrine, and their outcomes to broader U.S. strategic objectives for Afghanistan. What emerges is a distinct dissonance between tactical/operational practices on the ground, and broader strategic goals and principles. I assessed that village-scale clearance operations resulted in an overall negative strategic impact because of a failure to hold cleared ground, and because of the hostility which often repetitive operations incited in the population. In contrast, precision raids against High Value Targets resulted in an overall positive strategic impact demonstrated by an observable degradation in enemy effectiveness. Village Stability Operations were assessed to be strategically ineffective overall, largely because local forces were ultimately underprepared and underequipped to provide security to the population, and because aid and development projects had a negligible impact on perceptions of government legitimacy.

Next I examined findings with potential research and policy implications. I observed that territorial control had a strong collaborative effect on the population, though the threshold of control required to enable collaboration is quite high. This carries strategic-level policy implications in regards to the time, manpower, and resources required to achieve voluntary collaboration from a population, though one should consider that this threshold is likely to be variable for different groups and cultures. I observed the pervasive effects of tribal, ethnic, and local vs non-local dynamics in shaping relations between Afghan civilian and security forces, which carry strategic-level policy implications for government legitimacy. Similarly observed were the different capabilities and limitations of police and military forces with regards to the identification problem and combat effectiveness, where proper division of labor carries strategic-level security implications.

Lastly, and to the point of this paper, I observed significant dissonance between the tactical/operational and strategic levels of U.S.-ISAF and its execution of counterinsurgency doctrine as defined by FM 3-24. I observed a variety of strategic-level constraints that hindered ground forces from prosecuting the conflict effectively, and were inconsistent with FM 3-24’s counterinsurgency doctrine. More importantly, I observed a failure at the strategic level to comprehend the ground truth and to adjust objectives accordingly. This resulted in unnecessary failures which have contributed to the current state of the conflict.

An appreciation of ground truth could have diverted resources from ineffective development projects towards establishing a level of territorial control adequate to facilitate collaboration. As Emile Simpson explains in War From the Ground Up:

“If a village is broadly supportive of the Afghan government, but is being intimidated by a particular group of alien insurgents, it matters not how many leaflets one gives them, or schools one builds; they will still be intimidated and will not subscribe to the Afghan government narrative. If the insurgents who intimidate them are killed or captured, change can come about.”

36 Ibid., 1-21.

vso participants agreed that had operations been extended until Afghan military forces were able to support the ALP, the vso mission would have been far more successful. Similarly, village-scale clearance participants agreed that clearance operations should not have been undertaken unless a holding force was able to establish itself there, and that a vso team would have been ideal for that purpose. Finally, participants in HVT operations agreed that their missions could have been more successful if they were able to tap into the local intelligence provided by ALP forces. In short, acknowledging the ground truth could have greatly improved SOF integration between mission areas and improved overall effectiveness.

The results of this paper are only suggestive given its small sample size. However, if the findings stand up to more in-depth scrutiny, we will have gained two key insights into SOF operations that may also apply to U.S.-ISAF forces as a whole: that there has been a failure to operate in accordance with written counterinsurgency doctrine, and a strategic-level failure to acknowledge the ground truth and to adjust policy and objectives accordingly. Simpson summarizes the problem in *War From the Ground Up*: “If the soldier on the ground can see that policy is unrealistic, but is unable to challenge it because he is at the end of a one-way flow of policy, policy cannot be adjusted in light of practical possibility.”

Special Operations Forces are the most highly trained, skilled, and experienced counterinsurgents in ISAF, making SOF practices a sensible benchmark from which to gauge strategic effectiveness. As one interviewee stated, “I would encourage any and all policy makers to take advice from those who are in direct contact with the population. We must be careful not to make decisions in a vacuum far removed from the culture. Additionally, for anything to work we need to be very cautious of bias and groupthink to ensure it does not degrade the reality of the situation.” It has been my aim with this paper to share these interviewees’ wealth of experience, not only to inspire future research but also to open up a much needed strategic dialogue within the military.

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38 Ibid., 121.
Third Prize

REPATIRATING MACHU PICCHU:
On the Yale Peruvian Expedition and the Imperialism of Archaeology

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One of the most astounding displays of national unity in Peru occurred in early 2007, when Machu Picchu, the fifteenth-century archeological site that is the undisputed cornerstone of Peruvian pride, was nominated to become one of the New Seven Wonders of the World. The candidature was met with nationalistic fervency: the Ministry of Commerce and Tourism put in motion a frantic publicity campaign, the media featured the contest in headlines on a weekly basis, and schools gave students time to vote during class. It was common for Peruvians to ask each other whether they had voted already, and negative answers were most likely met with pressing advice and a sense of patriotic displeasure.

To the joy of Peruvians nationwide, who celebrated by taking to the streets, the world also recognized the importance of the Inca citadel in July of the same year. Machu Picchu’s earning of the title further proved how it has always been and will always be Peru’s most famous landmark, the stoutest example of the Inca legacy left upon popular imagination.

Visitors seem to be aware of this importance, making the road to Machu Picchu a heavily travelled one. Up to 2500 tourists make their way up to the citadel every day, and the total would be much greater if it were not for restrictions imposed by Cusco’s Regional Directive of Culture, in response to UNESCO concerns for the conservation of the ruins.1 There are a number of ways to get to Machu Picchu from nearby Cusco, and although adventurous hikers might embark on the weeklong Inca trail and brave the surrounding mountains, the large majority of travelers choose to take the train to the town of Aguas Calientes, and then drive up a winding road into the citadel. The train and the road share a striking similarity: they are both named after an American man, Hiram Bingham III.

The name is a monument to times when the road to Machu Picchu was less travelled. Although at the beginning of the 20th century the presence of the citadel was well-known to locals (a number of peasant families actually lived within the ruins) and to a limited number of Cuzco intellectuals,2 American explorer, politician and academic Hiram Bingham is largely and justifiably credited with bringing Machu Picchu to the public eye. His scientific discovery of the ruins took place in 1911, in what was the first of three Peruvian Expeditions funded by the National Geographic Society and by Yale University, where Bingham had earned a B.A and was a lecturer in South American history.3 He would return in 1912 and 1915 to conduct further anthropological, geographic and archeological studies in the Peruvian Andes, and in his last expedition, he would not return to New Haven empty-handed. Under an eighteen-month loan from the Peruvian government, Bingham exported seventy-four boxes containing more than forty-six thousand artifacts found at Machu Picchu—ceramics, bone remains, jewelry and statues—to be kept and studied at the Yale Peabody Museum of Natural History.

Almost a century later, as Peru fought to crown Machu Picchu a New Wonder of the World, the artifacts still had not been returned. Amidst an ebullient wave of nationalistic pride, 2007 would see the Peruvian government embark on a second patriotic mission: to denounce Yale’s continued possession of the artifacts and repatriate them back to their home country.

The Peruvian Expedition and the government’s quest to recover the Machu Picchu collection, however, are not two separate and exclusive events, but part of a long process of 20th century nation building that would forever shape Peru’s self-constructed vision of itself and its relation to the United States. In the 95 years between the artifacts’ discovery and Machu Picchu’s nomination, Peru underwent a continuous construction of nationalistic values. Examining how these came to influence its relationship with Yale University is the main aim of this paper. Through close observation of newspaper portrayal of the conflict, and of the Peruvian government’s legal response to archaeological discovery as embodied in its civil codes, the essay will attempt to track both the crystallization of nationalism and the creation of anti-American sentiments.

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3 “Finding Aid to the Yale Peruvian Expedition Papers,” Yale University Manuscripts and Archives (MS 664), 4.
in Peru, exploring the role of national pride, scientific hegemony and class conflict in the country’s defense of Machu Picchu against the imperialism of archaeology.

### Bingham Under Scrutiny

On the 7th of May of 1914, newspaper kiosks in Lima offered, for 20 centavos of a Sol, the latest issue of *The West Coast Leader*. Its front spread confirmed the rumors that had been blazing through the scientific and social circles of Lima’s country clubs, hotels, dance salons and budding universities: after two years of absence, Hiram Bingham and his Yale Expedition were finally returning to the Andes. They would continue what *The West Coast Leader* avowed was a glorious mission “to read one of the oldest sagas of mankind, scribbled with shards of pottery and granite blocks, across the valleys of a mile-high range of mountains.”4 The time had come for the discoverer to go back to Machu Picchu.

These were prosperous times for Americans in Peru, proved by the existence of *The West Coast Leader*. Published entirely in English, the independent weekly targeted the “English-speaking people of the west coast of South America, and the travelling public.”5 It was aimed at employees of the growing number of American corporations investing in Peru, most prominently the Cerro de Pasco Mining Company, the International Petroleum Company and United Fruit. For the first time since the establishment of the Peruvian republic, Americans were overcoming the British, who had been the long-time owners of the major commercial houses and railway lines, in their corporate investment in the country.6

This opening of the Peruvian economy to foreign capital was the result of a twenty-year rule of the country by Lima elites—what celebrated Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre named the Aristocratic Republic. The period was characterized by the ongoing rule of the Partido Civil (a party almost exclusively composed of wealthy landowners and businessmen), by the creation of an economic dependency on British, American and German investment, and by the granting of a large number of concessions to foreign corporations for the extraction of Peru’s booming raw products: minerals, rubber, guano, oil, cotton and sugar.7 It does not come off as a surprise that a number of the articles in *The West Coast Leader* discussed foreign intervention in Peru’s military, economic and social circles.

The pages of *The West Coast Leader*, however, show that corporate concerns were not the sole area of interest for Americans living in Peru. A three-page spread on the pre-Columbian mud city of Chan Chan, and the long article detailing “the magnificent scientific and exploration work”8 of the Yale Peruvian Expedition are evidence of the role that historical, archaeological and cultural findings were playing on the expansion of U.S influences in Peru.

The allure of Peruvian history did not only concern individual readers of *The West Coast Leader*, but also the Pan-Americanist objectives of elite universities in the United States. At the turn of the century, educational institutions such as Yale, Harvard and Stanford were competing for prestige as they sought to transform from undergraduate colleges into complex research universities.9 The result was a wave of university-funded expeditions to Latin America: the Titicaca Lake, Argentinian Patagonia and Amazon basin. In the case of Peru, such expeditions were fully supported by the governing elites’ established economic ties with and admiration of the United States. The Peruvian government, as evidenced by correspondence between Peruvian ministers and members of the expedition, would go as far as “recommend all authorities in the republic to give every amenity and assurance to the (Hiram Bingham) commission.”10 This took the form of tax and tariff annulments, free transport and telegraphing services, military support, and the long-sought-after permission to export archeological artifacts. The connection between the objectives of the expedition and the support of the aristocratic government is clearly demonstrated

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4 “Yale Peruvian Expedition: Return to Peru,” *The West Coast Leader*, May 7, 1914, 3.
5 Ibid, 1.
7 Ibid, 116.
8 “Yale Peruvian Expedition: Return to Peru,” 3.
9 Salvatore, *Local Versus Imperial Knowledge*, 68.
10 Government Director Ministro de Ramo to Elwood C. Erde, 7 May 1914, Box 2, Folder 22, Yale Peruvian Expedition Papers (ms 664), Yale University Library.
in the signing by President Augusto B. Leguía—a wealthy sugar baron—of the final executive order that allowed the expatriation of the Machu Picchu collection.11 Leguía’s eldest son was one of the few international undergraduates at Yale University.12

Yet, in spite of the government’s support of the expedition and of The West Coast Leaders’ glorification of Bingham, the excavation and expatriation of the artifacts would not escape some major criticism. It would predominantly come from the popular classes: the rising bourgeoisie and the intellectual left, sectors of the population that had been institutionally scorned by the racial exclusivity of the Aristocratic Republic. The heart of these complaints was crystallized in the pages of another Peruvian newspaper: El Sol.

At only 5 centavos the issue, El Sol was one of the most popular cheap publications in Cusco. In its home city, it was the newspaper of the working class, with lower-income intellectuals and blue-collar workers figuring prominently amongst its readership. Throughout the course of the 20th century and into modern times, El Sol would be associated with popular socialism, a movement that, at the time of Bingham’s expedition, was gaining in strength amongst the lower-income classes that felt repressed and excluded by the aristocratic government. Less than a decade after the exportation of the Machu Picchu artifacts, José Carlos Mariátegui, one of the most influential political thinkers of the continent and the founder of Peruvian Marxism, chose El Sol as a platform of denunciation.13

Due to its association with the rising middle class, it does not come off as a surprise that El Sol waged a furious battle against Hiram Bingham and his expedition. Starting in May of 1915, as the commission’s officials prepared to expatriate the artifacts, El Sol would run a long series of articles confirming what it called the “grave rumors” surrounding the archaeological excavations in Machu Picchu. Written in the grammatically flawed Spanish characteristic of low-tier publications, the articles described the finding and exportation, via a well-known mountain pass, of a “great treasure.” El Sol blamed the Yale Peruvian Expedition of “mocking our (Peruvian) customs agencies” to export the objects and of creating a “Yankee Zone” around the excavation site, where no individuals other than commission members were allowed. The entire expedition was portrayed as “gravely compromising the interests of Cuzco and the country in general.”14

Although the claims might seem inflammatory, there are three remarkable concepts present in the accusatory articles of El Sol that should be pointed out: their aggressiveness, their inaccuracy, and their nationalism.

El Sol’s aggressiveness is evidenced by its determined attacks on the expedition. The newspaper defended its biting claims in a number of articles, including the vicious front-page headline: “The Criminal Excavation in Machu Picchu: The members of the Yale commission are stealing our treasures.”15 It did not stop in laying its accusations on paper, but also challenged the government authorities to “break their usual silence”16 and prosecute Bingham. The articles are littered with similar suggestions of strong anti-American sentiment. In response to the media hostility, Bingham wrote an extensive letter of response, which was published in late June by El Sol itself.

Bingham’s letter is evidence for the blundering mistakes of El Sol. It pointed out a number of inaccuracies present in the articles’ claims, such as that the commission was not exporting “more than 500 boxes” but only 74. It argued that the expedition had explicit and written permission from the government, in the form of a contract and multiple permits, to conduct its studies, refuting El Sol’s accusations of archeological illegality. Stating that the existence of secrecy and American exclusivity around the excavations was utterly false, Bingham invited the journalists of El Sol to visit the archeological sites and open the artifact boxes. Bingham also defended the scientific value of the expedition, which he believed would benefit the entire country by kindling foreign interests in the area, and vowed that he would “never…commit acts contrary to

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12 Salvatore, Local Versus Imperial Knowledge, 76.
14 Clipping of El Sol, 2 June 1915, Box 32, Folder 51, Yale Peruvian Expedition Papers.
15 Clipping of El Sol, 16 June 1915, Box 34, Folder 51, Yale Peruvian Expedition Papers.
16 Ibid.
the laws and sentiments of Peru.”17

Finally, El Sol’s articles are banners of nationalism. Although some of its accusations might have been erroneous, El Sol did not build its case upon factual accuracy, but upon a firm nationalistic sentiment that was growing in popularity amongst its readership. In its articles, El Sol portrayed itself as a bastion of nationalistic righteousness that had “promised to always look after the interests of Cusco…and the conservation of its enormous and grand historical treasures.” El Sol even went as far as to justify its accusations under excuses of “patriotic enthusiasm,” denouncing that the actions of the commission “must not be tolerated by the people.”18

The wave of criticism towards the Yale Peruvian Expedition delivered by El Sol was an indicator of a new kind of nationalistic sentiment that was rapidly gaining in popularity in early 20th century Peru, a movement known as indigenismo. Like its name suggests, this particular branch of patriotism was based on the uplifting of native culture and history, which had long been institutionally and socially criticized. The indigenistas begrudged their country’s dependency on foreign intervention, and were associated with the beginning of anti-American sentiments. In the context of the Peruvian Expedition, indigenismo served as the defense mechanism of the intellectual left, which, consisting largely of amateur archaeologists and historians, did not have access to the financial and educational resources available to members of the Bingham expedition. Their resentment at the taking of their historical heritage by Americans was translated into El Sol’s defamatory campaign, explaining the articles’ lack of factual accuracy and overreliance on the rallying effect of national pride.

The polarizing influence of the expedition can be better observed by comparing El Sol’s articles to the coverage of the same events by one of Peru’s oldest publications: the daily newspaper El Comercio. Long associated with the interests of the majorly right-wing high class, El Comercio continues to be run, even now, as a family business. It is owned by the Miroquesada Garland family, established members of Peru’s wealthy coastal elites. At four Soles the monthly subscription, and 30 centavos the issue in 1912,19 El Comercio was amongst Peru’s most expensive and comprehensive newspapers.

In response to the media conflict, El Comercio published a retaliatory article that brushed off the accusations of El Sol as “unfounded denouncements.” The article defended the lawfulness of Bingham’s expedition, even describing the explorer as “distinguished and wise.” El Comercio argued that denying such foreign expeditions permission to conduct studies and export artifacts would not only go against “national utility,” but also against “an even higher universal mission in benefit of human science, a mission towards which all civilized peoples should be obliged to cooperate.”20 In another article, El Comercio would be the first entity to utilize an argument that would be frequently repeated a century later, as the Peruvian government tried to repatriate the artifacts, that these had little historical value. The Lima newspaper stated that it found no “archeological remains of importance” upon inspecting Bingham’s boxes, and that these would serve no purpose other than “be a foundation for the exceedingly important studies undertaken by the Yale commission.”21

Almost a year before the artifacts boarded a ship at Lima’s port of El Callao and set off on their way to New Haven, their expatriation already had a strong polarizing effect on Peruvian society. As shown by the respective coverage of El Comercio and El Sol, whilst Lima elites had paved the way for the artifacts to leave the country, mestizo nationalism in Cusco had catalyzed around the lightning rod of Bingham’s archeological finds, leading to what might easily be one of Peru’s first cases of American-initiated class conflict. Yet, as the country’s nationalistic sentiments solidified during the course of the following century, the expatriation would have a second pioneering effect: it would set off one of the first legal battles over cultural ownership fought between the two American continents. To understand the conflict, one must

17 Clipping of El Sol, 22 June 1915, Box 34, Folder 51, Yale Peruvian Expedition Papers.
18 Clipping of El Sol, 16 June 1915.
20 Clipping of El Comercio, 1915, Box 54, Folder 51, Yale Peruvian Expedition Papers.
21 Clipping of El Comercio, 3 July 1915, Box 54, Folder 51, Yale Peruvian Expedition Papers.
follow the legislative and political trail it left on Peruvian 20th century history, and examine the writing of Peru’s civil codes.

Machu Picchu on the Stand

Yale University Manuscripts and Archives currently houses the totality of the Peruvian Expedition papers. It is a fascinating collection of explorer paraphernalia, including glass slides, photographs, journals, accounting records, maps, and correspondence. Hiram Bingham himself donated most of the material to Yale in 1936. The hand of the discoverer has left its mark throughout the collection in the form of diary entries, personal letters and even a folder in which Bingham kept careful track of media criticism of the expedition, containing a large number of clippings from El Sol’s defamatory campaign. Yet the expedition’s archives are not only about discovery, triumph and glory; many of its folders contain legal records dating to a decade before and after Bingham’s first visit to Peru. These translated copies of executive orders, contracts and civil codes are the first indication of the legal battle that would develop at the turn of the 21st century, of the role that Hiram Bingham and his expedition, long thought to be Indiana Jones-esque examples of triumphant discovery, would play in the formation of Peru’s legal frameworks on archaeology. The records foretell how the expatriation of the Machu Picchu collection served as a fundamental disruption that catalyzed important discussions about Peruvian nationalism and the role of the government in protecting its archeological heritage.

Yet in order to understand the impact of the Yale Expedition on nationalist responses to law implementation, it is important to go back almost ninety years before Hiram Bingham and his commission first set their feet in Peru. The first piece of Peruvian legislation considering archeological remains was passed in 1822, an executive order signed by President José Bernardo Torre Tagle. The order gave a nationalistic reason behind its specification that archeological remains were the property of the state, stating that these “belong to the glory that is derived from the nation.” It prohibited the “exportation…and extraction” of archeological remains, arguing that doing so would “deprive us (Peruvians) of the joy of having what is ours.” This very first surge of nationalistic protection of archeological findings is easily explained by the historical context of Torre Tagle’s administration. He was only the second president of Peru, taking office barely a year after the country’s declaration of independence from Spanish rule. Hence, the executive order was most likely referring to the exportation of historical treasures to Spain. Torre Tagle most likely did not even suspect that his legislation would be replicated many years later, as Peru sought to protect its relics from a second imperial hegemon.

Only three decades later, however, the Peruvian government reversed its decision to claim ownership of historical artifacts. In 1852, Congress promulgated the first civil code in Peruvian history, under the presidency of José Rufino Echenique. Although it was pioneering legislation, the civil code of 1852 also tackled the issue of archeological exploration. In article 522, the code specified that any “treasure or buried object” found within public land was the property of the discoverer.

The civil code of 1852 was still in force during the three Yale Peruvian Expeditions. In fact, its articles concerning archeological property had been reestablished by the 1903 Código de Aguas, a piece of government legislation regarding hydrological property distribution of Peru’s main rivers and water channels. This meant that, in 1915, the artifacts found in Machu Picchu would have been the property of Hiram Bingham, their discoverer, with the Peruvian state having no claim over their possession.

Yet, the Peruvian government covered this loophole in what was the first example of the Yale Peruvian Expedition’s direct influence on the country’s legislation. On the 10th of August of 1911, President Augusto B. Leguía signed Executive Decree 2612, which modified enforced norms to announce that “all articles found

22 “Finding Aid to the Yale Peruvian Expedition Papers,” Yale University Manuscripts and Archives, 6.
23 “Decreto Supremo No. 89,” 2 April 1822, in Alfredo Bullard, Informe Legal de Precedentes sobre el Proyecto de Acuerdo entre el Gobierno del Perú y la Universidad de Yale, Lima: 13 November 2007, 8.
25 Código de Aguas del Perú, 1902. (Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2010), articles 56, 57 and 58, 32.
belong to the government, which may give duplicates to those who ask for permission (to excavate).” The order further established that exportation of artifacts was “absolutely forbidden,” under danger of being fined up to two hundred Peruvian pounds of gold. Considering that the Yale Peruvian Expedition papers contain drafts of contracts between Yale and the Peruvian government dated as soon as 1908, where the university showed interest in exporting a large amount of artifacts, it is most likely that Executive Decree 2612 was passed specifically so that Leguía’s government could lay claim to all object discovered by Bingham. Although the Leguía administration would be very complacent towards Hiram Bingham’s commission, the decree was one of the first attempts of the Peruvian government to protect its archeological heritage, permitting the state to gain the upper hand in legal matters and run negotiations with the American commission under its own terms.

The trail of the Machu Picchu collection’s impact on Peruvian legislation, however, grows blurry after its departure from Peruvian territory in 1916. There are little to no recorded attempts by the government to repatriate the artifacts throughout the course of the 20th century, in spite of it being a vital time period for Peruvian nation building. There does, however, seem to be an explanation behind this silencing. Only a few years after the 74 boxes left the port of El Callao on their way to New Haven, the Aristocratic Republic would fall. The following decades of Peruvian history would be troubled ones, marked by the resurgence of military dictatorships, economic crises, unbelievable levels of debt, crippling hyperinflation, coup d’états and peasant revolts. They terminated in one of Peru’s bloodiest conflicts, the civil war between Shining Path, a Maoist insurgency group, and the Peruvian government. During this wave of internal conflict, nationalism became highly concerned with Peru’s economic performance, and anti-American sentiments grew around the role of American corporations in Peru’s markets. This most likely distracted the government from engaging with Yale over legal issues regarding the return of the collection.

In spite of this period of oblivion following the expatriation of the artifacts, the 20th century continued to display a clear correlation between the nationalistic tendencies of Peru’s governments and their stances on archeological law. The first civil code to establish the ownership of the state over any discovered archeological artifacts was implemented in 1936 under the administration of Oscar Benavides. In its article 822, the code specified that not only were archeological remains property of the nation, but also that they would be governed by “their own special law.” This is unsurprising given that the Benavides’ government, the second in a series of military dictatorships, predictably held a stronger sense of national identity surrounding Peru’s cultural heritage. Yet, internal political turmoil, the effect of Great Depression in Peru’s economy, and the war with Colombia over territorial delimitation hindered any attempt by the military dictatorships to repatriate the artifacts.

A decade later, the Good Neighbor Policy helped reduce some of the anti-American sentiment in Peru. This seems to have made local intellectuals more tolerant of American academics; Hiram Bingham was able to return to Peru in 1948 and inaugurate the highway that, even now, bears his name. Upon arrival, the same Cuzco crowds that had accused him of cultural thievery celebrated him as a hero. Following the example of their government, they seemed to have forgotten the expatriation of the Machu Picchu collection.

The final civil code of the century, established in 1984, once again stated that archeological remains, even those found within private land, were the property of the state. But the historical events that were to follow its implementation would once more prevent the government from pursuing the recovery of the Machu Picchu collection, not only due to the rise of the Shining Path and the implosion of armed conflict throughout the country, but also because Peru fought, and lost, its first lawsuit over archeological property with the United States, the controversial Government of Peru v. Johnson.

26 Translated copy of Augusto B. Leguía’s Executive Decree 2612, 19 August 1911, Box 2, Folder 23, Yale Peruvian Expedition Papers.
27 Ibid.
28 Draft of contract between Yale University and the Republic of Peru, 1908, Box 2, Folder 23, Yale Peruvian Expedition Papers.
31 Salvatore, Local Versus Imperial Knowledge, 77.
In 1989, Peru would sue Benjamin Bishop Johnson, a private collector, for his possession of number of artifacts looted from the pre-Columbian site of Sipán. The case fell under the jurisdiction of California’s District Court, which ruled that the Peruvian state had failed to prove that the objects were found in and exported from Peru and to verify when they were discovered, and hence had no way of demonstrating that these had been exported before Peru’s civil codes claimed ownership of archeological remains. The ruling was a harsh blow to Peru’s objectives of cultural recovery, one that would affect its decision not to immediately sue Yale over the Machu Picchu collection in American court. It would take the emergence of a new kind of fiercely nationalistic government for Peru to finally put Machu Picchu on the stand.

**Neo-populism Strikes Back**

In July of 2001, Peru saw a groundbreaking moment in its electoral history. After an ardent populist campaign, Alejandro Toledo became the first person of indigenous descent to assume the Peruvian presidency. In his first speech to CNN after the victory, he made two promises: to make Peru a multicultural society, accepted of its complex historical legacy, and to contribute to Peru’s booming economy through the strengthening of the tourism market. In Toledo’s mission to establish a strong national identity, Machu Picchu, as the ultimate icon of Peruvian pride, would play a special role. The return of nationalism had to be accompanied by the return of the artifacts to Peru.

Toledo’s government would be followed by two more populist administrations, those of Alan García and Ollanta Humala. Once again proving the connection between nationalist stances and archeological protectionism, the ten years spanning the return of neo-populism saw Peru embark on an aggressive campaign of cultural repatriation. The Ministry of Culture opened forty lawsuits, aiming to bring back approximately fifty thousand artifacts. Of the forty lawsuits, twelve were fought with entities in the United States. Forty-six thousand of the fifty thousand artifacts were in the possession of Yale University.

Negotiations to return the artifacts started near the end of 2001, with Yale initially hesitant to acknowledge the Peruvian government’s claim of ownership over the objects. The university employed a number of arguments to strengthen its case, citing the doctrine of estoppel to argue that the state’s disinterest in the artifacts for nearly a century confirmed that Peru had no claim to the collection. Richard Burger, anthropology professor and curator at the Yale Peabody Museum of Natural History, reasoned that the events surrounding the expatriation were unclear, and that even though “all sorts of speculations” were being made, it was difficult to know whether the Peruvian government could lay claim to the artifacts. Yale also defended its possession of the collection on the grounds that Peru did not have the resources needed to properly conserve the artifacts. University spokesman Tom Conroy stated that “preserving, restoring and researching the collection over many decades has cost Yale money…resources had to be secured and grants had to be found… it has not been a profitable exhibition,” and Professor Burger displayed worries over Peru’s “long history of problems in terms of security of its collections.”

Yet, its status as a world-renowned academic institution did not help to strengthen Yale’s claims. The general public seemed to perceive the initial reluctance to return the artifacts as a paternalistic abuse of power on the university’s part. Even the National Geographic Society turned its back on Yale, with its president, Terry García, stating that “National Geographic was there, we know what was said, the objects were lent and should be returned.” As negotiations over the collection took place, Yale was undergoing a period of internationalization similar to the one that had prompted it to export the artifacts in the first place. This change was evidenced by the opening of Yale-NUS, collaboration...
between Yale and the National University of Singapore, in 2011, by the initiation of a number of international conferences and by the growing percentage of accepted international undergraduates receiving financial aid. Richard Levin, Yale’s president at the time, contextualized these changes against the background of the Machu Picchu collection, stating that Yale sought to “demonstrate leadership in the (international) area, in a way that balances the legitimate interests of Peru against the worldwide interest in the reservation and conservation of these important historical artifacts.”

It would be these international pressures, as well as a letter from Yale alumni asking the university to return the artifacts, that finally prompted Yale to strike a deal with Peru and vow to repatriate the collection in 2007. In spite of this, conflicts concerning the amount of objects declared still lead Peru to sue Yale under the District of Columbia court in 2008.

Back in Peru, however, the pressures prompting the government to repatriate the collection were not international, but strongly nationalistic. Anthropologist Eliane Karp, President Toledo’s wife, would be one of the most aggressive defenders of Peru’s right to repatriate the collection, an unsurprising occurrence given her reputation as one of the most fervent nationalists of Peru’s political circles. In an op-ed published in the Miami Herald, and during her official visit to the United States in 2007, Karp launched a series of attacks on Yale, stating the national importance of Machu Picchu, and claiming that failing to repatriate its artifacts went against the idea that “there is no more colonialism in the 21st century.” Karp’s nationalistic tendencies directly influenced the government’s decision to reject any deals with the university in which complete ownership of the collection was not granted to the Peruvian state, including an offer to build a Yale-funded, state-of-the-art museum outside Machu Picchu to house the collection, and which would arguably have proved beneficial to both the conservation of the artifacts and their access to the general public.

Eliane Karp was a hugely controversial and largely criticized figure, but her aggressive opinions on the Yale-Peru scandal raised few eyebrows in Peru, where anti-American sentiments abounded in connection to Yale’s stance on the artifacts. Headlines denouncing the paternalistic attitudes of the university were common in a variety of newspapers, including El Comercio, showing how even amongst Peruvian elites, the nationalizing effect of the issue was strong. Demonized by the Peruvian media and criticized within international circles, Yale would finally repatriate the artifacts, starting in 2011. Yale and the Peruvian government had struck a final deal: the collection, now fully the property of the Republic of Peru, would be exhibited at La Casa Concha, a small museum owned by Cusco’s San Antonio de Abad University, with Yale maintaining the right to continue its research of the collection.

The first shipment of artifacts was welcomed by the Peruvian president in an official ceremony on the steps of the Governmental Palace. The last shipment arrived in Cuzco and was exhibited a year later, as Peru celebrated the hundredth anniversary of Machu Picchu’s scientific discovery by Hiram Bingham. Massive queues lined up to see the collection, which received thirty thousand visitors in the first few days. Both the flags of Peru and Yale were hoisted outside the museum, but an air of nationalistic victory, of the triumph of Peru over imperialist America, would linger over the entire episode.

As of 2014, the Machu Picchu collection remains housed at La Casa Concha Museum. Although the institution was officially named the Yale International Center for the Study of Machu Picchu and Inca Culture, the term has not stuck; locals, tour guides and tourists all refer to it by its old Spanish name. Compared with the collections housed at Cusco’s museums of Pre-Columbian and religious art, the exhibit at La Casa Concha is measly, mostly because its scientific value exceeds its artistic one. Of the collection’s forty-six thousand pieces, only about two hundred and fifty were deemed worthy of museum showcase. Not surprisingly, the
number of visitors has dwindled enormously since the exhibition’s opening days, and only a few tourists are seen walking amongst the glass cases. Yale’s flag has been removed from the museum entrance. The fifteen minutes of fame of the Machu Picchu collection seem to be over.

Visiting La Casa Concha, no one would suspect the polarizing hold that the collection once had over Peru’s people. It was a hold that lasted close to a century, growing from a small domestic complaint into an international lawsuit, hoisting a flag of shared indigenous history around which a rising intellectual class would gather, changing a country’s legislation, all in the name of nationalism.

The importance of the Machu Picchu collection within the wider context of U.S imperialist history in Peru is evidenced by the fact that the Peruvian government, and the Peruvian public in general, displayed aggressive interests to repatriate a collection that had little historical worth when compared to Peru’s dazzling assortment of historical relics. Instead, the fervor seems to have been born out of anti-American resentment, out of a need to define Peru’s national identity by having it challenge the scientific hegemony of one of the greatest academic institutions in the United States. The Peruvian media and the Peruvian state catalyzed nationalism around the Machu Picchu collection by portraying it as a hostage of American imperialism that needed to be rescued, an act which left Peruvian pride hanging in the balance. But Peru came out victorious, the artifacts returned home, and now, they are again forgotten.

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FROM PAN-ARABISM TO PAN-AFRICANISM:
Sonic Solidarities In Francophone North Africa, 1930–Present

Sergio Infante
Calhoun College, '18
Soit que l’on considère le Maroc du point de vue social, comme membre de la grande famille musulmane, soit que, par sa nature géographique, on l’intègre dans l’Afrique septentrionale, ce pays n’en occupe pas moins une place toute particulière.

—From a French primer to Moroccan music (1925)1

Spain: An Overture

This paper will trace a shift in North African musical culture from the pan-Arab to the pan-African. It will open with a brief discussion of Andalusian music (al-‘ala), the music of Islamic Spain, and its relationship to Europe and the Hispanophone world. Then, the paper will turn to an extended discussion of Gnawa—a musical style brought to the Maghreb by West African slaves trafficked across the Sahara. This section will analyze the role of the desert as both a divider and a connector between formerly colonized peoples and places. It will also trace the political life of pan-Arabism, from the death of Nasser to its modern iteration in Islamic fundamentalism. Finally, the paper will close with some reflections on similar geographies in Zanzibar and elsewhere, giving special attention to the role of music in the creation of a cartographic discourse.

This paper’s sonic approach to space is not as esoteric as it might at first seem. As political scientist Hisham D. Aidi explains, music has produced “a moral geography” in the Maghreb, one that is “anchored in North Africa but [that also] extend[s] east, south, and west.”2 Although this understanding of the landscape rejects the essential features of formal, European cartography—in particular, an indexical relationship to the earth and crisp, defined borders—it does reveal a number of relationships that would be otherwise occluded. More specifically, the discursive and participatory nature of music gets at one facet that most top-down cartography cannot: how ordinary people discuss the land. How, in other words, do both individuals and collectives talk about geography? What is disputed between them? What genealogies and histories do they inscribe onto their landscape?

Sound is also a useful medium to dissect the fragmented and kaleidoscopic experience of postcolonialism in North Africa. As Achille Mbembe notes, colonial ruptures tended to produce a “deconstruction of images,” one that thrust the visual objects of empire into flux between colonial and post-colonial resonances. In order to parse these artifacts, Mbembe contends, one must treat them “not as [static forms of art] but as a compositional process[es] that [are] theatrical and marked by polyphonic dissonances.”3 The emphasis on context and staging is key. Yet, because of the prominence of image vis-à-vis our other senses, the visual dimension of a performance can often be alienated from the tactile and the aural. As per Timothy Barringer:

The so-called “linguistic turn,” and its less ubiquitous successor, the “visual turn,” have seen historians and anthropologists take a renewed, critical interest in the structure and fabric of texts and images. To reincorporate questions of sensory experience, however—to include hearing and smell alongside sight, and to reposition the enquiry to take account of the response of the perceiving individual—requires a rethinking of cultural history in general, and the cultural history of empire in particular.4

Most musical performances intertwine and layer together various sensations in a way that is hard to capture with a simple vinyl track or a digital recording. This essay has attempted to get at the multifaceted experience of the geography that it discusses, drawing on film, image, recording and text. Much work still remains to be done before a complete integration of smell and taste can even be considered, however.

When considered solely from a visual perspective, Islamic lands can be rather difficult to circumscribe in cartographic terms. “There is no [official] theology of the land,” Hartford Seminary theologian Mahmoud Ayoub explains, “[and t]he Islamic view is that the whole earth belongs to God, and all of God’s broad earth

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1 Alexis Chottin, Tableau de la musique marocaine (Paris, FR: Librarie Orientaliste Geuthner, 1938), 1.
is a *masjid*, a mosque. The system of land classifications that is usually mentioned in discussions of Islam and geography—that of *dar al-Islam*—is a later addition, as Manoucher Parvin and Maurie Sommer note:

Dar al-Islam [lit. The Land of Islam]...is not a term used in the Quran, but is a classical legal doctrine, treated in the shari’a...that relates to the Qur’anic injunction imposing the Muslim obligation of jihad, the conversion, subjection, or elimination of the non-Muslim. Moreover, this system has “a personal rather than [a] territorial cast,” and is more closely related to the individual believer than the terrain he or she occupies. By contrast, the musical geographies discussed in this paper record both personal migrations and collective perceptions of the land. The sonic medium is also a useful one with which to chronicle the complicated genealogical histories of diasporas and their traditions. After all, the patchwork and pastiche of overlapped identities is more often engrained in the popular troubadours of ordinary folk than the legalistic pronouncements of the élite.

The first Arabic-speakers arrived in the Iberian Peninsula in 711, with invading Muslim armies from the south. In Córdoba, a backwater once controlled by the Visigoths, these conquerors established a grand capital for their caliphate. And, as the story goes, “in some cases met with rather rough fates.” Confronted by this hostility, most recent arrivals chose to acquiesce to the dominant culture and take root in the soil rather than preserve a distinct identity. But their music remained.

With the Reconquista of Spain by Christian monarchs, a veritable exodus of religious minorities began to flow out of the Iberian Peninsula. This forcible exile of Jews and Muslims transposed the Spanish landscape onto North Africa. Often, the pattern of resettlement was indexical as refugees plotted their cities, point by point, onto the new terrain. As per Aidi:

According to local lore, refugees from Cordoba brought their music to Tlemcen in western Algeria, refugees from Seville brought theirs to Tunis, and those from Valencia and Granada brought theirs to Fez and Tetuan. This overtly “Cartesian” mentality persists even today, among a clan of Andalusian-identified Moroccans in Rabat. Most elsewhere, however, the exiles of the Umayyad Caliphate integrated themselves into the societies that they arrived into. Today, music remains the primary vestige of this migration, and the principal medium through which most Arabs experience the culture of al-Andalus.

In Algeria and Tunisia, the largest waves of migrants came later, in the early 17th century, when the *moriscos* (Christian converts of Arab descent) were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula. “By the time of the expulsion orders of 1609 and 1610,” recounts Reynolds, the migrants had few connections to the Maghreb and “in some cases met with rather rough fates.” Confronted by this hostility, most recent arrivals chose to acquiesce to the dominant culture and take root in the soil rather than preserve a distinct identity. But their music remained.

“W hen we were evicted from Spain,” quips the Algerian musician, Maurice El Medioni, “we had this same music tucked away *dans nos bagages.*” This sense of cultural continuity is impressive, especially given that in Algeria, French cultural policy...[suppressed] Andalusian heritage, seeing it as unhelpful evidence of the land’s civilizational pedigree, preferring to promote and catalogue traditions of local Amazigh communities and local Sufi orders—and as a
way to distance the country from the Middle East.\textsuperscript{17} Was it actually the “same music” (cette même musique), however? El Medioni’s claim is somewhat dubious, given that the majority of Andalusian music played today in cafés and street corners today “cannot be traced [back] to medieval Iberia.”\textsuperscript{18} However, the various styles of North African al-‘ala do share several characteristics that distinguish them from other kinds of music. In particular, this is a style that rejects hybridization with the various Maghrebi “regional musics marked by strong African features.”\textsuperscript{19} In effect, it is the product of an imaginative culture whose geographic and sonic frontiers are primarily “Iberian and Middle Eastern” in scope.\textsuperscript{20}

Although this was a diasporic music, grafted onto the skin of the Maghreb, Arab musicians quickly adopted it as their own. During the colonial period, however, the French government attempted to drive a wedge between the music and its composers. In part, this rested on the re-naming of these melodies in official discourse and decrees. As per Jonathan Shannon:

A number of Moroccan authors have suggested that the term Andalusian only came to be applied to [al-‘ala] music during the colonial period. According to one author, as a way of diminishing its Arab nature and to diminish the possibility that the Arabs could have created something of great civilization import.\textsuperscript{21}

Upon gaining independence, hence, many states saw this music as central to their rehabilitation as a civilized, self-governing people. For Algerian nationalists, as Aidi explains, Andalusi music bespoke a history that was suppressed by colonial rule; it embodied a tradition and identity and could inspire a nationalist consciousness: by anchoring Algerian national identity retroactively in Muslim Spain, the music could point toward an independent future.\textsuperscript{22}

But what did it mean to link the country’s post-independence identity to a bygone past? What did this sonic geography look like? The visual culture of Andalusian nationalism is difficult to parse, in part, because of the fact that “these are very closely related regions, and...the strait of Gibraltar [is only] an eight mile stretch of water.”\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, the Spanish colony in Río de Oro and the various outcropped colonies of the Spanish in the region “have meant that the role of Spain in the Moroccan and Algerian musical imagination is particularly complex, and is as real as it is imagined.”\textsuperscript{24}

In Andalusian music, however, this affinity for Spain is clearly defined as a yearning for the past, one demarcated by the three semi-spatial sentiments that recur in Andalusian songs—exile (el ghobra), separation (el faraq), and nostalgia (el wahash).\textsuperscript{25} Curiously, however, the new nationalist music did not just evoke the West with its distant history of convivencia: it also evoked the East and, in particular, the Islamic heartlands in Arabia and the Levant. This was in accordance with the tenets of pan-Arabism, as articulated and put forth primarily by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt.\textsuperscript{26} As per the guiding light of post-independence Egyptian music, Umm Kulthum:

Music must represent our Eastern spirit. It is impossible to present to listeners of foreign tastes; they won’t accept it. Those who study European music learn it as one would learn a foreign language. Of course it is useful, but it would be foolish to expect that this European language become ours.\textsuperscript{27}

The connections between a classical repertoire and pan-Arabism are less pronounced in the Maghreb. However, in Syria, where Andalusi music also took hold, the genre has been converted into a major symbol of pan-Arab solidarity.\textsuperscript{28} Consider, for instance, the description of an Arab music festival from the digital daily, Sylvia-Online:

Two Syrian cities (Damascus and Aleppo) will [host] four Andalusi nights in which ancient music and songs from the days of the Moors in Spain will be presented...The Syrian-Moroccan-Spanish connection of this cultural festival is evident: the Umayyad Dynasty based in Damascus estab-

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. 1, 169.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. 14, 236.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. 1, 266.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid. 1, 256.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid. 21.
\textsuperscript{26} Avraham Sela, “‘Abd al-Nasser’s Regional Politics: A Reassessment,” in Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt, ed. Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2004), 187.
\textsuperscript{27} Umm Kulthum: A Voice like Egypt, directed by Michal Goldman (1996; San Bruno, CA: YouTube, 2013), Web.
lished the Umayyad rule in Andalusia, and Aleppo, capital of the north, became the bearer of the artistic traditions of this glorious past. Morocco became the refuge to the thousands of Spanish Muslims (Moors) who fled the Spanish inquisition after the Spanish re-conquest of Andalusia. Thus, musical traditions of Andalusia were preserved throughout centuries. Three [ensembles] from Aleppo, Morocco and Spain will perform in this festival, using period instruments and authentic styles.29

For pan-Arabists, the Andalusi past is not seated in a Christianized, re-conquered Córdoba. The Syria-Morocco-Spain connection evokes instead the power of the Damascene Umayyads, who ruled from the Islamic heartland in the Levant. In the Maghreb, where the nexuses with Spain are far stronger, Andalusi music is less associated with the East. Nevertheless, it is still an emblem of a culture and a time to which all Arabic speakers have access.

Even in Spain, the imaginative connection to al-Andalus is alive and kicking. In her survey of Spanish musical production over the entrepisos period (1874–1936), Laura Sanz García has traced the “commercialization of cuadros de costumbre and salon music that continued to identify Spain with Andalusia and Al-Andalus.”30 This production ceased temporarily from 1936 to 1975, when the Franco regime began to promote a simplistic, Christian narrative of Spanish history. 31 But recently, there has been an intense interest in Spain's Moorish past. This has produced a new crop of Andalusian artists and bands: Cálamus,32 Radio Tarifa,33 Diego El Cigala,34 Alabína,35 and many more.

Although traditional música andalusí has rarely made it onto South American shores, the dissemination of this music in Europe has made a couple of Hispano-Arab crossover compositions possible.36 This was concomitant with a novel understanding of geography. In Brazil, for instance, [Islam] came to be seen as a form of resistance to globalization, to empire. And many people decided to convert—especially people who historically vote left—Trotskyites, socialists—they saw Islam as a new Third Worldism.37

On the Maghrebi side, the arrival of Puerto Rican soldiers on North Africa shores in 1942 increased the sense of affinity between Latin American rhythms and Andalusian tunes. Maurice El Medioni, for instance, notes that he first learned to play Latinx music (what he calls “Descarga Oriental”) from a couple of puertorriqueños who were stationed in his town.38

For the many Jewish players of Andalusian music, by contrast, the postwar period was one of intense hardship and defeat. After all, countless Sephardim were exiled from their homes with the rise of nationalist governments in Algeria and Morocco.39 Mustapha Tahmi, an Algerian musician who has recently been reunited with his former band (see Figure 2), recalls that all of his former friends scattered one after the other, “like doves at the sound of gunfire.”40 Andalusí music could make the frontiers of their exile seem more permeable, transposing the original sense of yearning for Islamic Spain onto a newer nostalgia for the Maghreb. Certain Judeo-Arabic musicians also used their music and their professions to literally collapse the distances, returning to their homelands for concerts and recitals. Ahmed Bernaoui, another Algerian musician, would say of that time that “[t]he guitar was our passport,” permitting access to spaces not accessible to other Jewish émigrés.41

The majority of Jews exiled from Algeria moved to metropolitan France, where, because of the Crémieux Decree, they were considered white.42 There, they adapted the traditional Andalusí style to a mode that would speak to their particular sense of displacement. As per Aidi:

Perhaps prior to 1962 there wasn’t anything distinctive about the Jewish contributions to this music, but the genre that emerged in France explicitly tried to deal with the contradictions of being a Jew of Arab heritage in a West that

29 Cited in Ibid. 28, 317.
31 Ibid. 9.
32 Cálamus, “Btâyhî,” from The Splendour of Al-Andalus © 1994 by MA Recordings, MP3 Audio File.
35 Alabína, “Yo te Quiero, Tu Me Quieres,” from Alabína © 1997 by Astor Place Records, MP3 Audio File.
36 Ibid. 1, XXV.
38 Ibid. 1, 270.
39 Ibid. 1, 285.
perceives the Jew as the antonym of the Arab.  

Back in North Africa, Andalusian music would continue to be the official soundtrack to pan-Arab solidarity and nationalism. Jewish contributions to its development, however, would be expunged from the official record. In the context of escalating Israeli-Palestinian tensions in the Middle East, Judeo-Arabic Andalusian music has become a symbol of alterity—of the possibility of convivencia between Jews and Muslims. Salim Halali, in particular, has become an emblem for the Andalusian musical tradition, especially since the release of Les hommes libres (2011), a film that recounts his experience as a Jew in Nazi France. His words echo a broader sense of statelessness among Judeo-Arabic musicians: “My heart knows no horizons or frontiers,” Salim would later say. “[Just play] a guitar and my soul changes…My homeland is love.”

The popularity of Andalusian music as both a symbol of civilized, European ties and pan-Arab solidarity ultimately set the stage for the rise of the Gnawa in the sixties and seventies. With the appearance of this latter music on the Maghrebi musical scene, the North African ties with the Islamic heartlands of the East would be reconfigured, and the imagined solidarities extended to the Hispanophone world instead move downwards, to Mother Africa.

Gnawa Music & Maghrebian Pan-Africanism

Gnawa (or Gnaoua) refers to a Maghrebi people that claim to be the descendants of enslaved West Africans trafficked across the Sahara (see Figure 3). At the same time, the word denotes a distinct Sufi order, closely associated with this people. Although most of the members of the order “have no clear ancestral connection to Sahelian Africa,” the best-loved and revered members of the brotherhood are indeed of sub-Saharan African descent. And while Gnawa rituals and practices are Islamic in name, most contain a heavy dose of animist traditions. As per Chouki El Hamel:

[Gnawa rites] combin[e] Islamic belief with pre-Islamic African traditions, whether local or sub-Saharan West African. Gnawa ‘spirit possession’ practices were not fundamentally outside of standard…Islamic Sufi practices, because, firstly, the notion of ‘a spirit world’ is accepted in Islam…and, secondly, [because] most Sufi orders sought a form of spirit possession through study and meditation.

The principal sacrament of the Gnawa order is called the lila. It is an all-night ritual, punctuated and driven by a sequence of musical suites, each intended to call down a different spirit, who then possesses the dancers and invites the spectators to join him or her in religious ecstasy. In this ceremony, devotees will praise God and the Prophet Muhammad, but also call on “different [non-Muslim] saints and invo[ke] the spirits of Bambara, Hausa and Fulani, an allusion to [their] ancestors from West Africa.”

The Gnawa first attained global exposure in the fifties, in part because of their association with major American musical figures—Claude McKay, Pharoah Sanders, Don Cherry, Ornette Coleman, and the like. Of late, however, more people have been drawn to the melodies of this obscure Sufi order because of its circulation in underground music circles. In particular, because of the “various blends of Gnawa jazz, Gnawa reggae, and Gnawa rock” that already saturate the European and North African music scenes and have begun to make their way into the States. The Gnawa’s newfound “global status,” however, has not come without controversy. By and large, this has taken the form of heated debates about the music’s origin:

Publicity on Gnawa music generally focus[es] on its African roots and downplay[s] the fact that lilas—the healing/trance rituals which are the main occasion for Gnawa music, consistently invoke Allah, the prophet Muhammad, his companions and family, and prominent Muslim saints, as well as the spirits (mulûk) of West African origin.

This attempt to present Gnawa music as universalistic and “tribal”...
is grounded in the logic of the U.S. market. When devoid of its cosmopolitan Islamic basis, after all, this music can be advertised as yet another New Age product—the newest kumbaya straight from the mouths of the dispossessed. For American listeners, moreover, “any percussive local sound [in Gnawa music] is seen as…an ‘African retention,’” and thus similar to the traces of African music found in jazz and reggae. The geographic implications of this phenomenon are manifold:

North Africa in this context is seen not as part of Africa, but as an extension of the African diaspora; if light-skinned Berbers perform Gnawa music, they are “appropriating” black music just as whites did in the U.S. And more broadly, the Sahara is seen as a divide akin to the Atlantic Ocean, separating Africa from her diasporas. Randy Weston, the jazz maestro who first popularized the Gnawa in the West, echoes these sentiments in his recent memoir, entitled African Rhythms. For him, the resonances between the trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic experience are both spiritual and musical. The comparison rests on the nature of a single spirit—Sidi Musa—whose color is blue like the Atlantic and whose namesake, Moses, parted the waters to lead an enslaved people out of Egypt. It is not clear whether the Gnawa practitioners in North Africa understand their relationship to the diaspora in those same terms.

The treatment of the Sahara as a divisive ocean is not a recent phenomenon, however. It is at least as old as the name given to the climactic zone directly beneath the Sahara—the Sahel—which in the original Arabic (sahil) means coast. This metaphor of exodus-over-water, moreover, remains a prominent trope in traditional Gnawa ceremonies, where devotees chant about the displacement and disorientation that their ancestors suffered. “The experience of slavery, of being uprooted” is, as Tim Abdellah Fuson contends, a central part of the initial suites in a Gnawa ceremony.

This vision of dislocation is specific to the Maghreb. Elsewhere, because of the domestic nature of slavery in Islamic lands, “former slaves tended not to huddle in distinct communities, but rather meld into the larger society.” Only in Morocco and Algeria, then, did freed slaves find vibrant enclaves in which to preserve their cultures. The continuous flow of human chattel to Morocco trickled to a stop at the end of the 19th century, but even today one can find “proud Black Africans” in Rabat who “openly acknowledge their status as former slaves.”

The colonial experience compounded the sense of distance between North Africans and their sub-Saharan brethren, as between Francophone colonies more broadly. The Malian author, Amadou Hampaté Bâ, discusses this subject in his magnum opus, The Fortunes of Wangrin:

[The degree of moral uprightness of an individual was judged, on the one hand, on the basis of how much he had contributed toward French penetration and, on the other, by the geographical position of his country of origin. Accordingly, Europeans were the most moral men, followed by the people of Martinique and Guadeloupe, the black Senegalese…and, at the very end of the line, the rest of the [West African] population.]

In this regime of distance, Algerians and other Maghrebis were the favored children of the metropole. It did not help that, by dint of their skin color, a number of them could pass as white. As Achille Mbembe notes, this racial-spatial mentality bled into the ethical pronouncements of the colonial state:

The physical distances that separated the races were largely understood to consecrate moral ones…[Ultimately,] race came to be inscribed…‘in such a way as to make the spatial pattern both a reflection of and an active moment in the reproduction of the moral order.’

The evocation of a Gnawa past can hence be seen as a rapprochement between two lands that were torn asunder by a dominant imperial power. For darker-skinned North Africans, this music promises to undo the sins of racialization. For disillusioned urban...
youth, by contrast, it is a central piece in the jigsaw puzzle of decolonization. The aim for both, nevertheless, is to transform the Sahara from a chasm “[into] a bridge…between civilizations.”

This particular interpretation first gained currency in the sixties and seventies, with the rise of a Casablancais Gnawa collective called Nass El Ghiwane (see Figure 4). “It was a time of great pan-Arabism and revolutionary politics,” Deborah Kapchan recounts, “and Moroccans were interested in a stable, progressive state.” By the advent of the first pan-African congress in Algiers in 1969, however, it was commonly accepted that “[an] essential energy from Africa [was needed in order] to revitalize Morocco.”

Although incubated in the realm of avant-garde political theater, Nass El Ghiwane ultimately became famous for their Gnawa-inspired music and their trenchant criticisms of the nationalist government. Their meteoric rise was in part conditioned by the politics of the fifties, when Andalusian-inflected pan-Arabism was the norm. As per Aidi:

> After independence, the cultural and political elite of Morocco rarely celebrated Gnawa music, seeing it as lowbrow, a little embarrassing—nowhere near as urbane as the country’s stately Andalusian repertoire (‘ala), held up by the intelligentsia and government as testament to Islamic Spain’s refinement.

The fact that the French imperial administration had supported the Gnawa Brotherhood, a politically disengaged order, against the nationalist movement only increased the acrimony between the two. Thus, when the various promises of the post-independence government failed to materialize, public support for the Gnawa increased.

Transes (1981), a documentary by Ahmed El Maâouni, captures the anti-government rhetoric of Nass El Ghiwane’s members on film. One conversation between Omar Sayed and Larbi Batma is particularly telling:

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S: First of all, let’s consider the lyrics.
You say that the tyrant sleeps.
B: Of course he sleeps! He’s unworried, unaware that his victim’s heart is still awake.
S: What bothers me is that he sleeps at all.
He shouldn’t be able to.

This exchange between Sayed and Batma is reflective of a broader cultural ferment: a populist politics that was wary of dictatorship, Cold War alarmism, and top-down governance. The history of this discontent can be traced to the fall of institutionalized pan-Arabism, with the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and the rise of Saudi Arabian Islamism after the Yom Kippur War:

While the [pan-Arab] left was in solidarity with the socialist bloc [well into the late sixties], its frustration with the inadequate support given to Egypt and the Arabs, as compared to the West’s support for Israel, pushed it into an almost wholesale flight into radical nationalism…Islamic fundamentalism has been the main political beneficiary of this trend, harvesting the anti-Westernism [originally] sown by the left.

Riyadh, in particular, has profited from this movement to the right. Awash in oil revenues after the successful embargo during the Yom Kippur War, this state has remade itself into a massive “empire of charity and good works.” In order to reinforce this newfound prominence, Saudi Arabian administrators have begun to promote their own brand of Islam: Salafism.

More often than not, Salafis evince “disdain for political participation and the nation-state, [and embrace instead] a transnational community that transcends the state and identifies with the East.” In this last respect, Salafi Islam is a clear successor to the official pan-Arabism of the Nasser era. After all, despite the fact that the institutional capital is now Mecca and not Cairo, its “borderless, transnational outlook” continues to privilege the heartland of Islamic civilization over its peripheries. The fever-pitch

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63 Ibid. 1, 301-302.
64 Ibid. 60.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid. 1, 122.
67 Ibid. 1, 63.
68 Ibid. 1, 50.
malaise expressed in most of Nass El Ghiwane’s music speaks to Maghrebi unease with these distant, Eastern ties. Although known to their fellow North Africans as les Rolling Stones d’Afrique, the band seems to have been troubled by Western incursions and hegemony as well.73

The tensions over Gnawa music would only deepen with the escalation of American diplomatic efforts on North African shores. After the end of the Cold War—when jazz had been the principal medium used to woo urban youth away from Communism—the focus of American cultural diplomacy turned to Sufi music. This genre has proven useful to the Western powers, whose prominence in the Middle East is dependent on their regulation of Saudi and Salafi prominence. While the differences between Sufis and Salafis are manifold, the most important one to U.S. interests abroad is that the Sufis are, “unlike the Salafis and Wahhabis, [respectful of] local and national loyalties.”74 This has an added bonus for the United States, whose Muslim population has ballooned in recent years. If Sufism is useful overseas for its opposition to trans-national Salafism, domestically it is handy because it ensures Muslim-American devotion to the federal government.75

The problem for U.S. administrators, however, is that American Muslim youth “believe that Sufism is just ‘too white’!”76 And not without reason: Sufism is the Islam that most white converts have been drawn to since the 19th century.77 In their efforts to control what is overheard and understood by this new generation, politicians and strategists in Washington, D.C. must thus confront the specter of race. In the future, it is possible that the American government will turn to a black Sufi order, like the Gnawa, in order to entice their Muslim youth away from extremism.78

In Europe, where “Sufism is generally seen as [a faith] compatible with liberalism...Sufi practice has [also] been encouraged,”79 European administrators consider Gnawa culture, in particular, one of the most malleable and useful: “[after all, it’s African, Arab, Muslim, Berber, [and] Mediterranean,” all at the same time.80 When infused with reggae or jazz, this Maghrebi genre is palatable to youth in clubs and dance halls. More importantly, it sends a message of support to the key constituencies on the periphery of Saudi influence—black Muslims in Africa and elsewhere.

Even North African governments have turned to the rhythmic grooves of the Gnawa in order to counter the rise of Saudi-style Salafism. As per Aidi:

The objectives of the new [Moroccan] policy were varied: to encourage cultural tourism and economic growth in different corners of the kingdom and to promote the country’s self-image as a crossroads of civilizations, but also to activate various genres of Sufi music and Berber culture against the growing Islamist movement and the increased influence of Saudi Salafism and Iranian Shiism.81

The valorization of this “offbeat” music is part of the search for a new Islamic left. Although the postcolonial “Arab left [had originally been] almost indistinguishable from the pan-Arabists,” the death of Nasser in 1970 had driven the two apart.82 The fallout from the end of the Cold War only increased this separation, and further alienated the North African states from their co-religionists in the East. Economic transformations in the Maghreb have contributed to the separation of this region from both sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.83 (New pan-Maghrebi projects, such as the Union du Maghreb Arabe, or Arab Maghrebi Union, and the Tunisian-based television channel, Nessma TV, speak to this regional isolationism.) In the political realm, however, pan-Africanism remains North Africa’s strongest riposte to the fervent Islamism of faraway Riyadh.

Even still, the ghosts of the trans-Saharan slave trade continue to haunt the Gnawa melodies. And the exile of countless Sephardic Jews from North Africa only compounds this problem. As Hisham D. Aidi notes:

[Politicians opposed to black-Muslim solidarity and] pro-Is-
lamic pan-Africanism...[often] respond by reproducing “trans-Saharan slavery” into public discourse...[W]hen black-Jewish relations are good, the Sahara is depicted as an oceanlike divide; when that relationship is tense, the Sahara is a “civilizational bridge.”

The idea that Gnawa music belongs to an African diaspora also stems from the fact that Gnawa musicians have often paired it with jazz and reggae—two genres that are diasporic in nature. Ironically, the very artists who make these crossovers are often the strongest opponents of the diasporic view. The *m'rastas* (Maghrebi Rastafarians), in particular, are militant about their “history and geography, denouncing all political actors and ideologies—politicians, Islamists, Arab nationalists—who deny North Africa’s ethnic diversity and its historic links to sub-Saharan Africa.”

In all fairness, a politicized geography is not exclusive to the reggae-fusion artists. Even the more classical, quietist Gnawa musicians are rather brusque when asked to split hairs between pan-Africanism and diasporic Africanism. For Malika Zarra, a Franco-Moroccan chanteuse, Gnawa music is not an appropriation, but rather “a conversation, a dialogue between different parts of African music.”

Hassan Hakmoun, a NYC-based Gnawa ma’alem, echoes these sentiments. He responds to those who claim that his music is diasporic with a simple, sarcastic rejoinder: “excuse me, but Morocco is in Africa.”

The Afro-centric reggae artists, however, do more than just situate the Maghreb within a broader continental context: more often than not, they employ the sonic geographies of Gnawa as tools with which to reshape the world around them. Darga, a Jamaican-style sound system from Casablanca, uses pan-Africanism as a call to arms against racism within the Arab world. In “Qissat Ifriqya” (Story of Africa), this message is set to the tune of a dissonant jazz pastiche:

They divided us for centuries and decreed that we were different races They forgot that we had always lived together Weren’t we all once colonized?

Another Gnawa collective, Djmawi Africa, gives their pan-Africanism a distinct geopolitical edge. In an interview with *La Presse*, Ahmed Ghouli, the lead vocalist of this Algiers-based band, explains the philosophy behind this approach:

[Gnawa music] is special because of the fact that it extols the African origins of Algeria...We believe that Algerians must turn away from East or West—so why not explore our Africanism? Even if our feet touch to the Mediterranean, don’t our hearts touch to Africa?

Ghouli’s comments resonate quite closely with those of Amazigh Kateb, the lead vocalist of Gnawa Diffusion. His was one of the earliest reggae-inflected bands to attain worldwide recognition, with potent melodies that are now over fifteen years old but still no worse for wear. As per Kateb:

We Algerians, we’re African...but we have forgotten it, we are wedged between two models of superiority—the West and the Orient. If we keep looking east or west, we lose our balance. Algeria needs to look south and within—only the Gnawa, this country’s African tradition, can offer a solid base of identity.

The solidarities espoused by these bands do not just extend southwards, however. On tracks like “Bab El Oued Kingston,” for instance, Gnawa Diffusion extends the ties of friendship across the Atlantic, to the capital city of Jamaica. Thus, “Amazigh maps the Caribbean onto the southern Mediterranean,” Aidi writes, “melding Rastafarianism with North African culture.”

The members of Djmawi Africa position themselves similarly within the world. In an interview on Nessma TV, the band’s electric guitarist, Abdelaziz El Ksouri, explains the political solidarities that underlie their music: “We are all part of this magnificent continent [i.e. Africa].” El Ksouri explains, “but [our band also]
privileges other South-South ties as well.” With the impulse from Third-Worldism and Ethiopianism, these reggae-inspired singer-songwriters have reinvigorated the Gnawa culture and given it an innovative political slant. In the final analysis, however, their argument is hard to parse: is it solidarity with Africa? With the Global South? With the darker-skinned peoples of this world?

These contradictions can perhaps be resolved by a discussion of the differences between Gnawa music and the melodies of the black trans-Atlantic diaspora. There are two crucial distinctions that one can make. As per Chouki El Hamel:

[First, that] the internal African diaspora in Morocco has primarily a musical significance and [second, that] it lacks the desire to return to the original homeland. [Gnawa culture] is constructed positively around the right to belong to the culture of Islam, unlike the construction of the African-[American…] double consciousness. Black consciousness in Morocco exists as part of a larger Arab collective identity…[Therefore,] it does not constitute a contradiction with itself.

Gnawa culture is, in other words, embedded in the Maghreb in a way that shields it from full exclusion and separation. In this sense, the concept of an “inferior insider” put forth by the late historian John Boswell is useful. Although Gnawa music can be used to explain the “liminal position [of Maghrebs] on the edges of Islam and Europe,” it does not perforce speak to the marginalization of black North Africans within North Africa. After all, black Moroccans and Algerians are considered indigenous to this land, insiders with deep attachment to this landscape. (Women in North Africa occupy this same position to an extent, as indispensable but subordinate members of society; black Americans, by contrast, have been the object of various attacks at removal, the most famous being the American colony in Liberia.) To address race-based issues, hence, Gnawa musicians must call on other tunes and traditions—reggae, rock, jazz, etc.—that better articulate a history of exoticization and Otherness.

There is yet another sense in which Gnawa culture can be thought of as diasporic: in its spread to the United States and Europe, where the music has blossomed despite a climate of intense Islamophobia and paranoia vis-à-vis the Middle East. In this, its newest iteration, the words of the Gnawa seem to have transformed once more, to echo the nostalgia of these migrants for their former homes: “When I hear the song ‘Dawini, ana gharib wa birani’ [Heal me, O Lord, I am a stranger in a strange land],” explains Samir Langus, a Moroccan-American, “I tear up, I think of home.” The amorphous, overlapped diasporas of the Gnawa help these migrants understand their place in new and unfamiliar homes—help them assume hyphenated identities and navigate a jumble of nationality, race, and religion that only grows more and more complex with each successive transplantation.

As the Moroccan author, Mohamed Choukri, has put it, there is perhaps no “more suitable medium to [bridge] our cultures than music, this universal language that all people understand, that requires no translation…Feelings can form stronger bonds than just pure rational thoughts.”

Zanzibar: A Coda

Afro-Algerian.

Is the term redundant? Is it divisive? Does it hold the Maghreb hostage to the tenets of American-style racial politics? Or can it be a useful motor for social change? All of these are questions that dark- and light-skinned North Africans will have to answer if they are to resolve the racial tensions that confront them both at home and abroad. A possible solution to some of these issues can be found in Zanzibar, an island with a long history of trade with the Arabian Peninsula.

This island’s location at a crossroads in the Indian Ocean “has bequeathed it a [unique] treasure chest of Afro-Arab culture.” Zanzibar’s eponymous capital, in particular, was a

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94 Ibid. 241.
96 Ibid. 143.
97 Ibid. 49.
98 Mohamed Choukri, liner notes to Mountain to Mohamed, Houssaine Kili, © 2001 by Tropical Music Records. PDF.
99 Ibid. 59.
prolific center of art and literature, whose products, by and large aspired to Middle Eastern models. The local word for this sophisticated culture invoked an Arab racial identity to connote its cosmopolitan style: “ustaarabu [lit. to be like an Arab] equates civilization with Arabisation and thus locates the ideal social origin in the Arab world.” Here, too, the name given to the people of this place was geographic in bent: the term Swahili derives from the same Arabic term (s. sahil, pl. sawahil) for coast that was used to name the Sahel. This time, of course, the name is a reference to the coastal traders whose craftiness and savvy brought the island prosperity in the first place.

For most of the 19th century, Zanzibar’s music tended to follow Middle Eastern schemata. Both the sultans and British colonial authorities encouraged production in this style, and Zanzibari musicians and composers were more than willing to oblige. But during the 20th century, this dynamic changed. After World War I, with the transition from German to British control on the mainland, thousands of people were dislocated from their homes. Many of them were emancipated slaves whom the German colonial government had denied entry into the cities. Those who migrated to Zanzibar brought with them practices and beliefs that were more closely related the continental interior than the coast. Most notably, these migrants introduced a form of music-performance called ngoma—whose style and sensibility was “heavily influenced by Congolese dance band music.” In the early 20th century, this continental (i.e. “African”) music melded with the Arab-inflected music indigenous to the region in order to form a distinct, syncretic style: the taarab.

Remarkably little research has been done on this music. And there is even less on Siti Binti Saad (see Figure 5), the slave-turned-songster who popularized the taarab genre in post-Independence Tanzania and whose musical prowess earned her the title “mother of the nation.” All of the elements that make the story of the Gnawa controversial are here, however: the conflict that stems from colonial patronage, the displacement due to slavery, the shift from “Arab” to “African” music, the paradoxes of a “diaporic” sound that is also “indigenous,” and so on. Moreover, the transformations in Zanzibar took place in the twenties and thirties—well before Nasserite pan-Arabism, the Cold War, and the exportation of an American-style racial politics to the Third World.

This is useful in a comparative sense, as it helps to gauge the influence of American and Soviet (or Salafi) incursions on these faraway regions. However, the Zanzibari case study merits consideration not just for its relation to the Gnawa, but rather for what it can tell us about the relationship of Arabism to Africanism more broadly. Despite numerous waves of migration from mainland Tanganyika, the island remains 99 percent Muslim. Nevertheless, modern-day Zanzibaris continue to encounter the various paradoxes associated with life in the Islamic borderlands. Both by race and geography, Zanzibar appears to be firmly located in Africa. But what does one make of the island’s Arab past? More importantly, how does one read the geography that an ustaarabu identity seems to imply?

These questions are significant not just for Zanzibaris and Maghrebis, but also for their co-religionists in Mauretania, Somalia, Mali, the Sudan, and elsewhere (see Figure 6). In order to answer them, we must renew our study of spaces that can be connective as well as divisive—oceans, deserts, rivers, forests, and the like. And, as I have argued throughout this paper, such study cannot be complete without an analysis of musical geography and the sonic solidarities that it invokes.

100 Elke Stockreiter, Islamic Law, Gender and Social Change in Post-Abolition Zanzibar (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 222.
105 Ibid. 103.
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Aaron Mccants
WRESTLING WITH ROOTLESSNESS, INDIVIDUAL AND POLITICAL: Tracking Refugees from Crisis Toward a New Language and New Politics

Hannah Carrese
Pierson College, ’16
Under the most diverse conditions and disparate circumstances, we watch the development of the same phenomena: homelessness on an unprecedented scale, rootlessness to an unprecedented depth.

—Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951)

Rakin is looking for human rights. He fled Afghanistan six years ago in search of the guarantees he views as acknowledgements of his human dignity. But his route to Rome laid bare the gap between the idea of the European Union as a paragon of human rights and the lives of the refugees, men and women like Rakin, that it harbors. Rakin protests: “I believe that human rights are just in the titles of newspapers. Where are your human rights here? These I can’t see.”

The reality of human rights seems to fade as Rakin and I speak in a cramped basement room within the Joel Nafuma Refugee Center (JNRC) in central Rome. The indignities that have trailed him from Kabul to Rome seem more painful in light of the principles of universal equality espoused by the EU. Rakin’s story is a reminder of the frailties of human rights, and of the failures of the states that are ostensibly committed to defending them.

When he came to Italy in 2013, Rakin joined thousands of other asylum seekers who slept outside of train stations, liminal spaces appropriate for these people trapped between states. Rakin was homeless for five months, in Milan and then in Rome, before he was at last allocated a place in a refugee shelter run by a government contractor. This building, which I saw only from a distance, looks like a school but functions more like a detention center. Rakin lives here, on the outskirts of Rome, with 400 other refugees, eight or ten men sleeping in a room together. The shelter managers, eager to siphon off federal money, offer the men nothing more than weak tea and a biscuit for breakfast. Rakin says that this, the only food the refugees are given at the shelter, is a ration on which “even a child could not live.” To secure another meal, he comes to the JNRC, which does not house refugees overnight but instead serves lunch to around 300 refugees each day. Getting there requires a two-hour journey by bus. Rakin is still traveling, that is, in search of good treatment.

The Italian government recognizes Rakin as a refugee. But this is a fraught term. It first entered international law through the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In 1967, the Convention’s parameters were broadened by the addition of a Protocol on the same subject. Italy now joins 145 other countries, including the United States, in acceding to the Protocol, which forms the foundation of most current law on refugees. The document holds a refugee to be a person who has been rendered rootless with political cause. He must have fled the bounds of his home state “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”

This definition is meant to be narrow: parties to the Protocol are obliged to provide significant financial and social support to any person within their borders who meets the criteria for categorization as a refugee. But, in practice, this term is obtuse and difficult to apply. Because of this opaque terminology, progress toward earning the label “refugee” was tortuous for Rakin, as it is for many displaced people. Rakin’s kidnapping and the deaths of his father, brother, and two sisters at the hands of an Afghan crime syndicate indicate the contours of his well-founded fear: these were his grounds for leaving Afghanistan. In trekking to Europe, first to Norway and then to Italy, he became an asylum seeker, a man looking for protections of his life and rights in a foreign state.

Now that he has been granted asylum in Italy, he is entitled to the perhaps dishonorable badge of a refugee. With this appellation, he becomes one of 19.5 million refugees worldwide. He joins 59.5 million forcibly displaced people—an expansive group which encompasses the internally displaced along with asylum seekers and refugees—scattered throughout the globe. This statistic is now larger than at any other time since the close of World War II.
Numbers, last tallied at the end of 2014, are only rising.

Why this mass movement? The Office of the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) proclaims ours to be a unique era of “spiraling crises.” New surges of violence in Syria, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen, and Iraq have added to the human misery and migration born of fostering conflicts in, among other states, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Eritrea, and Mali. The spiral the UNHCR invokes describes two aspects of this situation. The first emerges from the plural nature of our refugee crises, which are not localized in any one region of the world. This distinguishes them from all other refugee upsurges since World War II. In the 1950s, for example, a given refugee was likely fleeing turmoil in Europe: in recognition of this fact, the 1951 Convention applied solely to Europeans. In the 1970s, this refugee was probably escaping Vietnam. In the 1990s, he hailed from the Balkans, usually Bosnia or Kosovo.

Now Europe is awash with significant refugee populations from more than a dozen countries. Among Rakin’s close friends at the JNRC are men from Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Iraq, Sudan, Senegal, and Pakistan. We should not even expect displacement and migration to slow in the near future—this forms the second strand of the spiral. The number of Syrians in Europe more than doubled in 2015, even though only ten percent of the 10.9 million displaced Syrians have found their way to European borders. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that in November 2015 more than 500,000 African men were waiting in Libya, anxious to board boats bound for Italy. The rising price of passage to Europe indicates the demand: smugglers who once charged $3,000 to ferry an asylum seeker from Turkey to Austria now ask for $12,000. Traffickers in Libya, sensing the potential of this market, have begun to offer discounts to passengers who recruit other asylum seekers to make the perilous journey with them.

The burgeoning number of refugees seeking succor far from home is an indicator of a disordered world. It has exposed a fundamental rift between humanitarian principles and political solutions to conflict. The headlines Rakin sees as false harbingers of human rights continually evince surprise about what journalists term a “tide of refugees” lapping over Europe, but the supposedly unexpected crisis created by this mass migration is really the product of a failure of international political order that is two decades in the making. Piero Rijtano, the director of the JNRC, is astute when he observes that “refugees are a result of a policy. It’s not something that happens suddenly. We talk ‘emergency,’ but really it is not: this is the result of the international politics of the last twenty years.”

Still, politicians in America and Europe remain myopic in regard to the political roots of this mass migration. Those who are apprehensive about refugees treat them as a security threat. They contend that the migration crisis is best resolved through a tightening of border controls and an intensification of military intervention in the Middle East. Those who are amenable to refugees see displacement as a humanitarian issue. It demands, they believe, the organized dispersal of refugees among willing states and increased allocation of funds to aid organizations like the UNHCR.

A politically incorrect analogy illustrates the insufficiencies and insensitivities of these approaches. This analogy comes in the inflammatory but instructive gloss on the crisis offered by presidential candidate Ben Carson upon his return from a tour of Jordanian refugee camps this fall. Campaigning again in the United States, Carson compared the danger of terrorists lurking among refugee populations to that of rabid dogs running with sane dogs. Politicians who situate refugees as a security problem hold that refugees, like dogs who may be mad, should be quarantined: we should treat them in their own home rather than allowing them into ours. But quarantine is alienating even when it affects a small

11 Piero Rijtano in discussion with the author, July 2015.
population—the psychological and political effects would be dire if these restrictions, however feasible, were extended to millions of people in the Middle East and North Africa. Politicians who understand refugees to be a humanitarian problem agree with this assessment, arguing that the preponderance of refugees, like most dogs, are not menacing: they can be appeased by kind treatment as a dog might be satisfied by a bone. This belief is misguided, as well. It ignores the political roots and the real dangers of the disease in an attempt to palliate its symptoms.

A refugee crisis cannot be quelled by air strikes alone, especially if they are tied to stringent immigration policies in the West. Renewed bombing by Russian and American forces during the past few months has prompted another wave of Syrians to flee for Turkey and, eventually, Europe. New technologies facilitating the transport of ideas and bodies are ripe for use amid the disorder created by ill-considered military action: this is evident in the chaos produced in Libya in part by Western intervention in 2011. It is no accident that thousands of refugees have departed for Europe from this northern African failed state in the past three years.

Neither should displacement be classified as a problem that is simply humanitarian—the very definition of a refugee proclaims his political nature. UNHCR officials with whom I spoke this summer, all humanitarians to the core, are convinced that no amount of humanitarian aid will suffice in subduing the refugee crises if the West refuses to politically engage with the conflicts that produce refugees. Udo Janz, the director of the UNHCR’s New York office, recommends that humanitarian action be seen as a “band-aid” meant to minister to the overt symptoms of a conflict until a more comprehensive resolution can be found. William Spindler, a UNHCR spokesperson who specializes in Europe and Africa, makes clear that “humanitarian action is not the solution to these problems. It can alleviate suffering, but at the end the solution has to be political.”

Spindler adds this warning: “the international community has lost the political ability to solve conflicts.” Can we recover this skill? Which strategies can we employ to cope with our age of spiraling crises? We must begin with the admission Spindler voices at the beginning of our conversation: these crises can be said to be critical only in the sense that “the absence of proper response has made them crises.” Two faulty assumptions underpin the improper policies that Europe and the United States have formulated in response, or perhaps in non-response, to these “refugee crises.” These faults are strategic and methodological. Strategically, we have forgotten that a solution to mass displacement requires political action in which security concerns are seen as inextricable from humanitarian predicaments. We must shake off the notion that military engagement precludes humanitarian measures and that these two actions leave little room for diplomacy. Methodologically, we have neglected the origins of politics in speech and narrative, and we have ignored the crucial role stories occupy in the lives of refugees and of citizens rooted in a particular state. We must not rely exclusively on data in making policy: we should instead incorporate stories into our crafting of strategy.

This essay is written in hopes that these flaws can be rectified, and that we can formulate a new grand strategy on refugees that better engages the states and rights, the political structures and humanitarian obligations that compose our world order. Tracing the stories of refugees, we can develop a better understanding of the role of states in defending human rights in the face of an increasingly disordered and un-bordered world.

Refugees are not dogs, rabid or otherwise—they are unmistakably people. We must not be deaf to pleas like the one Rakin voices when he says “I have only one hope, which is not to be a refugee forever. I want to be like other humans again.” But Rakin’s acknowledgement that refugees exist apart suggests that refugees are people as well as political indicators. They are humans whose movements disclose existing disorder. We would do well not to disregard the rot they reveal.

Stories Toward a New Grand Strategy

Telling stories about refugees seems, on first glance, a case of fiddling while Rome, and the world, very nearly burn. Europe has

15 William Spindler in discussion with the author, August 2015.
absorbed more than 2,500 refugees each day this year—tens of thousands of them have settled in Rome. The population of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has burgeoned to a full quarter of that state’s population. The UNHCR website broadcasts the ominous fact that today one in every 122 people worldwide is a displaced person. What use are anecdotes set against the raw reality of these statistics? Stories seem the province of journalists or philanthropists more than grand strategists.

But politics and strategy have long been steeped in narrative. The first political historian, Herodotus, constructs his History around stories with this caveat: “I must tell what is said, but I am not at all bound to believe it.” Aristotle, one of Herodotus’ early critics, might note that it is essential to know “what is said” because “man is the only animal whom nature has endowed with the gift of speech.” Indeed, it is this ability to speak that prompts Aristotle to label man the “political animal.”

Aristotle also cautions that “one should not seek precision in all arguments alike.” Instead, “it belongs to an educated person to seek out precision in each genus to the extent that the nature of the matter allows.” The precision politics allows, and grand strategy requires, seems to be the kind of skeptical storytelling that Herodotus practices. Skepticism allows space for the development of strategies that can alter reality: we do not have to believe everything that stories tell us about the way the world should operate. But the details that stories supply allow us to develop a textured, truer understanding of our circumstances as they are.

Refugees are eager to add their narratives to this endeavor. Indeed, they must: through the extensive interviews they attend with refugee organizations and state governments, their tales become their tickets to asylum. I will tell four here. Three are gleaned from conversations in which I engaged at the JNRC. The last comes from research conducted in Bosnia. They form rough pairs, the former dealing with human rights, the latter interested in states. They are linked in that each is representative of a route to Italy. All of these paths are mapped onto a world formed by an international system in which sovereign states commit to a shared international structure. But the stories of these refugees are made relevant by a new order superimposed upon the international state system—that of human rights. Refugees speak from the gap between these two world orders. They confront the West, which gave rise to both orders, with this rift, and they urge us to repair it.

Rakin offers his account first. It finds him traveling by plane from Kabul to Oslo, then being shepherded by car from Norway to Italy. Though not often written about, this is a route well-trodden by wealthier Afghans and Syrians. Rakin’s journey reminds us that principles and practicalities demand that we renew our commitment to human rights for refugees in the West.

Adama speaks second. He traces his path from northern Mali to Libya, then by boat to Malta and by air to Rome. This route has seen a surge in popularity since the 2011 collapse of the Libyan government. Adama’s circumstances call us to better define a refugee, so that the principles we espouse can be properly applied to our current refugee crises, and to the inevitable “emergencies” that will face us in coming decades.

The United States is now, as Rakin and Adama indicate, the leader of a liberal world order. This is an amorphous phrase, but it is useful in that it forces us to confront the rapid disintegration of the world order and borders we have been instrumental in establishing. That refugees are now pressing deep into Europe is the most troubling sign of this chaos: collectively, European states are the most promising and the best proven of our international partners, and the very ideas upon which Europe was founded are in many ways our own, the products of our labor to reconstruct Europe after World War II.

In light of these facts and these ties, we must elect one of two strategic paths related to refugees and the world disorder they reveal. The first would find us gradually abandoning the international state system that has governed our world and gripped our political imaginations for 400 years, since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. We would accept, or be forced to adopt, an alternate conception of world order. We could find ourselves moving toward the vision Russia and China espouse of a neo-imperial world in which great powers carve out discrete spheres of
influence. We hope not to succumb to a system approximating the Islamic State’s violent division of the globe along ideological fault lines. We might espouse something akin to the European Union’s ideal of a post-national federation of states committed to collective justice and open borders.

Of these options, the European model once seemed the only framework that was not pernicious. President Obama, speaking during a visit to Britain last year, was unequivocal in proclaiming that the European Union had “made the world safer and more prosperous.” But Europe is crumbling under the strain of refugees, these pesky human devices inadvertently designed to expose problems of political order. Britain is threatening to exit the Union. Nationalist parties have claimed electoral victory from Hungary to France. This cannot be the world order the US imagines. The alternative, then, would find the US reaffirming its dedication to leading a liberal world order and better articulating its tenets. It would also find the US committed to a modified international state system, one more relevant to a globalized world. Rakin and Adama, I think, would encourage us to tread this route. It is a path less harrowing than, although it is built upon, the paths these rootless people took to Rome.

**Rakin’s Roman Rights**

Rakin had a home and rights in Afghanistan. His father was an engineer, his mother was a teacher—his was, he insists, an educated family with a “comfortable life.” But this comfort became a curse. In a pattern common to traffickers and kidnappers from Eritrea to Colombia, his family’s relative wealth attracted the attention of a criminal organization that kidnaps members of well-to-do families and demands exorbitant ransom payments in return for their safe release. Rakin fell victim to one of these schemes when he was 24. He was held for three months in a house on the outskirts of Kabul. His torture was broadcast on videos mailed to his family or was conducted while they listened over the phone. Rakin later learned that his father had humbled himself by pleading for money from distant cousins, from neighbors, even from the government to secure the $30,000 the kidnappers demanded in ransom.

Aware that these efforts would likely fail, Rakin devised his own escape plan. At night, he managed to slip between the bars of the grate that covered a small window in the second story room where he was captive. He dislocated his hip and shoulder to fit through the metal grid and then fell headfirst toward the ground. By some quirk of fate or gravity, he landed on his feet and ran as best he could. Rakin paused to compose himself before offering this comment: “I think it was God who helped me. But you know if you are in death danger you can do anything for rescuing yourself.”

Having done just this, Rakin limped toward the nearest road, and begged the driver of a passing car to take him directly to a police station. He found little reprieve with officers of the law: he was immediately asked if he could lead the authorities to the house where he had been held. “Yes,” he proffered, with the diagonal inclination of his head that is peculiar to southwest Asia. He now rues this assent. When the police reached the house, a firefight erupted. Three of Rakin’s kidnappers died.

Rakin was known to be the snitch whose disclosures had led to these killings. His family was now targeted for execution. The overwhelmed Afghan police force offered scant support: desperate to ensure their own safety, Rakin and his family moved four times over the next few months. His mother, succumbing to the stress of their situation, suffered a stroke and was moved to a hospital. Rakin made a ritual of spending the night in her drab room a few nights each week.

As he prepared for one of these nocturnal visits, Rakin’s younger sister, then six years old, asked that she be allowed to join. Rakin asked her to wait, promising that he would bring her to the hospital in the morning. But when he woke, a neighbor was on the phone. His father, his brother, and his two sisters had been gunned down in his absence. He is silent for a moment. “And I could have saved my sister if I brought her with me. And always I think about this.”

Making his way west seemed the only feasible option. Rakin chose his destination carefully. He knew, even in Afghanistan, that
“the situation of refugees here in Rome was bad.” His sights, then, were set on northern Europe, where countries have committed more resources toward refugees in part because there are fewer refugees pushing at their borders. Rakin left his mother in the care of a friend and boarded an airplane bound for Oslo. He lived under a temporary asylum permit in Norway for two years, working odd jobs and sharing an apartment with an Afghan friend named Tawfiq who also now frequents the jnrc.

Both Rakin and Tawfiq—who, because he lost his left leg to a bomb in Afghanistan, Rakin calls “that boy with no leg”—evoke nostalgia when they mention Norway. “If I was accepted there,” Rakin offers, “I would be one of the luckiest. You will find a good life there, as a refugee.” But the 2011 mass murder committed by Anders Behring Breivik, a right-wing activist, precipitated a shift in conditions for refugees. Under a new center-right coalition, Rakin’s appeal for permanent asylum was denied. Both he and Tawfiq were ordered to leave the country. Reluctant to move south, though, Rakin tarried in Norway for two more years. He retained an acute sense of the law, remarking to me that he and Tawfiq were “kind of criminals, because we were illegal: they told us to go and we didn’t respect this.”

Norwegian police, adhering to what was until a few years ago a norm in northern Europe, did not force him from the country until 2013, when they raided the flat Rakin shared with four other refugees. Worried that he would be sent back to Afghanistan, Rakin partnered with Tawfiq and an Iranian asylum seeker in hiring a German smuggler to transport them to Milan. Each passenger paid $3,500 to join this international caravan. They drove at night and browsed markets in various European cities—Copenhagen, Hamburg, Innsbruck—by day. The smuggler was unsentimental. Money, Rakin, says, “is the only thing they want. They don’t care to help anyone.” But Rakin had, I suppose, entered an unsentimental world, in which he moved, from Kabul to Oslo to Milan and eventually by train to Rome, simply to survive.

Rights and States in the European Union

Rakin’s is a typical route to Rome. Piero estimates that half of the rotating population of 500 or 600 refugees who gather at the JNRC for meals, language and literacy classes, and to socialize came to Italy from other European countries. Refugees gravitate to Rome because it is Italy’s most multicultural city, but their life here is still trying. Unemployment is so high in the country that some Italians have left to seek refuge and opportunity in other European nations or in the United States. Conditions are especially difficult for male refugees: women and children are given special benefits under Italy’s refugee law, while men are left to fend for themselves.

Existing in an underclass perched below the dignity and rights accorded to full citizens, these rootless people have little hope of finding work and establishing lives in Italy. They come because it is easier to secure refugee status here—where just under half of asylum applications are accepted—than anywhere else in Europe. The same Norwegian government that denied Rakin’s asylum claim, for example, has just deported 4,000 of the Afghan and Syrian asylum seekers that have arrived in a steady stream from Russia since October. It is also now paying refugees to voluntarily exit Norway and has printed advertisements in Afghan newspapers warning of a harsh environment awaiting refugees in Scandinavia.

All EU nations recognize, in their acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1967 Refugee Protocol, the right to asylum as a basic provision of human rights. The term “refugee rights,” though, has drastically different meanings throughout Europe: rights that were meant to be universal are in reality dependent upon the state that defends these rights. Two Europes have emerged under the stress of mass migration. Northern European nations, distanced from common routes to Europe by geographic fortune, are better able to select the refugees they will offer asylum. The vast majority of the refugees chosen are those who have fled Syria and Eritrea, countries recognized by the UNHCR and the EU as those where violence is particularly heinous. Granted asylum, these people are afforded what Rakin terms “good social help,” which includes a stipend for food and shelter as...
well as language and job training.

The opposite is true of southern European countries like Greece and Italy—and now Hungary. Burdened with the majority of migrants and displaced people arriving by land and by sea, these states have begun to allow vast numbers of asylum seekers entry into their countries. A relaxed standard for asylum, though, means that there is precious little in the way of a social safety net for refugees. Rakin is forceful in reiterating his claim that human rights are invisible in this Europe: “prisoners in my country had better food than refugees here. People are coming to my country talking about mujahideen not respecting human rights. Fine. But where are your human rights here in Europe?” Refugees have little desire to stay in countries like Italy, and border police have warmed to their desire to migrate north. Estimates suggest that thirty percent of the refugees that streamed into Italy this summer passed through without being stopped and identified.24

This is partly a result of institutional dysfunction. Piero chuckles as he explains that “because we are in Italy, there are no checks, no controls,” and certainly no system equipped to handle the sheer volume of refugees now entering the country. But Italy’s laxity also stems from a longstanding resentment of the other Europe. A 1992 New York Times articles quotes the Italian Immigration Minister avowing “we refuse to accept a de facto attitude that only the countries bordering the ex-Yugoslavia should take care of the refugee problem.”25 Add “North Africa” to this statement about ex-Yugoslavia, and you would have an idea of the current situation in Europe. Spindler, the UNHCR spokesperson, summarizes the problem bluntly: “nobody wants to take responsibility for migrants.”

It has become a game in Europe, he says, for countries to make conditions “the most difficult possible for refugees, so you have this moving population rotating around Europe.” The UNHCR, the agency best equipped to track refugees who have joined this carousel, believes that many of the same people who were in Lesbos in February of this year made their way to Calais by August and are in Germany this December.

Two staples of EU law, the 2013 Dublin III Regulation and the Schengen Zone, prompt and facilitate this movement. Dublin stipulates that refugees must submit their initial application for asylum in the EU country to which they first arrived. This, of course, puts great burden on countries located near the southern and eastern fringes of Europe. But Dublin runs counter to the open borders established by Schengen, through which refugees are able to move with few controls. That this is a security risk became evident in the horror of the November 13 Paris attacks, which were planned in Belgium and facilitated by the nearly 200 border crossings between France and Belgium.26

Sealing these openings, as some politicians have advised, is infeasible: there are too many crossings for border police to man each. And this also runs counter to the principles of shared space central to the EU project. Dublin, although it is existing EU law rather than a reaction to new threats, is subject to the same objections. Even under agreements to allocate quotas of refugees to states around Europe, EU countries have not equally shared the burden of refugees. This disparity between humanitarian ideals and political reality has disillusioned Europeans who have begun to pledge their support to nationalist parties. And it has dangerously deflated the expectations refugees have of Europe.

Victor, a Senegalese refugee at the JNRC, captures this disappointment. Refugees hear about human rights regimes in Europe, he says, and they know that Western governments are prodding the countries from which refugees come to meet human rights standards. But when refugees arrive, they realize that “human rights don’t exist in reality—they’re only a theory, a language. So, they’ll live here for nine years, be treated badly, and decide to go back. Or, they’ll be denied asylum, and the same thing will happen.”27 The gap between human rights in the two Europes leads, according to

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24 Piero Rijitano in discussion with the author, July 2015.
Victor and affirmed by the stories of the Paris attackers, to alienation and violence.

Civic and Human Rights

From Princip’s Bridge in Sarajevo—the site of its own clarifying act of violence—it seems that these problems of states and rights which dog 21st century policymakers were also the defining problems of the 20th century. Its first decades saw global war stemming from a well-placed bullet fired by Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip at Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Responding to this outbreak in nationalist fervor—and to a much older recognition of the right of peoples to self-determine, of nations to become states—Woodrow Wilson noted in his Fourteen Points speech that “national aspirations must be respected; people may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase; it is an imperative principle of action.” Wilson’s faith in human rights was matched only by his belief in the rights of citizens. With the formation of the League of Nations, human rights were inextricable from civic rights.

Can human rights stand apart from civic rights? Rakin supplies a definition of human rights predicated on opportunity: “We need respect, we need at least equality, to have the same right that an Italian boy has to make good on so many opportunities in his life. That is human rights.” In Europe, though, human rights have always been attached to civic rights; European governments have long assumed that an Afghan and an Italian boy will in practice be afforded different protections. Hannah Arendt notes that Wilson’s binding of human to civic rights has deep origins. Since “the French Revolution combined the declaration of the Rights of Man with the demand for national sovereignty,” universal human rights had been curiously identified with particular national rights. The practical consequences of this contradiction were clear: “from then on human rights were protected and enforced only as national rights.”

The refugee crises that followed World Wars I and II were simply expressions of this preexisting identity between human and civic rights. Nations began to bar certain groups—Jews, Gypsies, and a slew of other minorities—from any role in civic life. The shift could be justified in part because these people stripped of citizenship were meant to be able to depend upon their broader human rights. But because human rights had for so long been identified with civic rights, “the rights of man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable…whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state.” Claims of human rights allowed governments to deny civic rights—but these human rights claims had no real force.

This troubling if often unnoticeable collapse of human into civic rights persists today: German Chancellor Angela Merkel observed in a July speech addressed to newly arrived refugees that “universal citizen’s rights have so far been closely connected with Europe and its history.” Merkel’s emphasis on citizen’s, or civic, instead of human rights is almost ironic in the case of refugees. Under the meaning of the 1967 Protocol, these are by definition people who do not hold the rights of citizens.

Arendt insists that because human rights are ephemeral even in the West, where they were born, “human dignity needs a new guarantee” stronger than that of human rights. This “can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities.” The full details of this new guarantee do not emerge in Arendt’s work. But she is unequivocal in castigating the false idealism of our current system, in which human rights are encrusted in an ineffective superstructure upon the state system. This seems a result of her methodology, which is concerned with diagnosing problems rather than prescribing solutions. Comprehension of our current political architecture, she remarks in a Herodotean vein, entails “the unpremeditated,
attentive facing up to, and then resisting of, reality—whatever it may be.”

Victor, who is the jnrc’s electronic expert and its most notorious loudmouth, expounds on human rights in a manner Arendt would recognize as he toys with a computer. He muses about the way in which he teaches fellow refugees, and some Italian clients, to repair electronics. “You can know the equations,” he says, “but unless you actually practice the techniques, you can’t do it. Things have to work in reality to work.” This might well be a motto for the grand strategist, who is interested not only in the theory of things but also in their practical ability to work in reality—in the connection between ends, ways, and means. And this is where we fall woefully short: we are unable to establish in practice the principles of human and refugee rights that we expound in theory.

Adama’s Definitions

Better practice begins with a better definition of a refugee. The 1967 Protocol has become unwieldy and unclear sixty years after its initial formulation. This is not because the language is inelegant, but rather because our situation has shifted. Herodotus’ successor, Thucydides, would recognize this phenomenon, in which unexpected events and inept strategies have caused “words [to]…change their usual meanings.” Is it possible, we wonder, to distinguish migrants fleeing desperate poverty or natural disaster from those escaping political turmoil? Should we distinguish between refugees on the basis of religion? Ethnicity? Piero suggests that the “right to be a political refugee” as stipulated under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol “makes a picture of a world that right now is totally different.”

Adama speaks from his experience of this different world. He spent his childhood and early adult life in Kidal, a town in the desert region of northern Mali. His father was a government official born and raised in southern Mali but posted in the north. As

Adama was leaving secondary school, members of the nomadic Tuareg people began to fight for what they understand to be the national liberation of Azawad, the region that covers an extensive acreage in northern Mali. Adama gives this unrest a simple moniker: the “Tuareg Problem.” He is unspecific about the events that precipitated his departure from Mali, simply labeling them “the incidents.” But three years ago, his family met and decided that Adama should leave Mali for Italy as the family’s emissary to Europe. They would join him in Rome if they could.

A drive through the Algerian desert to Libya marked the beginning of Adama’s sojourn. From a small port near the Libyan city of Misrata, which was heavily bombarded by Western powers in 2011, Adama boarded a fishing boat bound for Malta. After ten days at sea, he reached the Maltese coast and prepared to board a plane that would take him to Rome’s Fiumicino Airport. False documents prepared by the smugglers who had ushered him from Libya to Malta allowed him to enter Italy. He had no contacts in the country, but Italy’s liberal policies in the shadow of the Dublin Regulation made it the best place for him to claim asylum.

Maliens make up the largest subset of refugees at the jnrc in the summer of 2015—they have supplanted Rakin’s cohort of Afghan refugees to assume this position. All of these Malians are dogged by the assumption that they are not really political refugees, that they fled desperate poverty rather than degrading violence. Adama is conscious of the assumption and of the distinction. His role as a “peacemaker” at the jnrc means that he interacts with nearly every refugee who enters its basement quarters, but he distinguishes his predicament from those of other Malian refugees, particularly those who fled from Bamako, Mali’s southern capital. Another Adama exemplifies this condition: he left Mali in 2005, secured asylum papers in Italy, and has taken full advantage of Schengen by leaving Rome to work in Barcelona. He is at the jnrc for only a few days, while his asylum permit is being renewed. But our Adama did not flee poverty. He had “a good job, a wonderful

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37 Adama N. in discussion with the author, July 2015.
family, good connections” in Kidal. War made him a refugee. And he is “waiting, everyday waiting” for new opportunities in Europe.

The gradations between economic and political refugees are amorphous. Piero supplies a working definition when he notes that an economic refugee “chooses to immigrate somewhere—it is his decision to make his life better. So he will arrive prepared, where a political refugee will run away just to save his life.” Spindler augments this distinction with the practical reality that in Europe as in the United States asylum is a right reserved for political refugees. But, in this practical vein, the existential facts that confront an economic refugee seem no different from those that face a political refugee. Poverty, too, can kill people. Piero, casting himself as a hypothetical economic refugee, observes, “If I go back to a place that is desperately poor, I will be condemned to death too.”

Rakin and Adama, both of whom understand themselves to be political refugees, are sympathetic to this case. They tell me that there are two kinds of economic refugees. The first is dirt poor, a refugee who is truly “life-seeking.”38 The second is an “opportun-ity-seeking” migrant, one who claims refugee status “but it is not true, because to be a refugee your life should be in danger.” How is this danger to be determined? A gendarme stationed outside of Milan’s central train station offers an answer based on chronology and nationality: Senegalese migrants, many of whom hawk bracelets and baseball caps to tourists visiting Milan’s Duomo, came to Italy three years ago. Syrians—who, because they flee persecution by their own government, seem to epitomize the political refugee—first came to Italy in discernible quantities three months before we spoke, in April of 2015.

In practice, these are the ruthless calculations made by governments and by aid agencies. But Rakin and Adama provide interesting theoretical cases. Do their stories exhibit the qualities expected of a political refugee? That they remain in Italy means that their chances of gaining asylum in European countries with more stringent protocols on refugees are slim. Rakin exited Afghanistan because his government had no power to remove him or his family from the clutches of organized crime. But it is not clear that he was persecuted because of his “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” To fit this mold, Adama’s case must be understood in light of the conflict in his home that verges on civil war, and it must be assumed that he could not have made a life in southern Mali, that his only hope lay in the voyage to Europe. These are uncharitable and simplistic calculations, but they illustrate the difficulties of defining a refugee.

Refugees of Futures Past

This linguistic problem portends further political problems. Migrants, especially in the Asia-Pacific, have begun to claim that their displacement stems from pernicious effects of climate change. In September, after a protracted legal contestation, New Zealand deported a man from the island of Kiribati who claimed that he was a “climate refugee.”39 Scientists have suggested that “climate-related events, including the expanding desert in the Sahel region of Africa, have spurred conflict, from Nigeria to Darfur.”40 Asylum seekers who originate from these regions are still recognized as political refugees by the US and the EU, but the 1967 definition of a refugee is not flexible enough to encompass migrants fleeing environmental change. These refugees loom: a longstanding treaty between the US and the Marshall Islands could find the US obliged in the next decades to welcome refugees from this sinking island nation.41

Piero sums up his thought on these quibbles over the vagaries that separate political from economic from environmental refugees by proclaiming that “the UN and everyone have to be a little more detailed on what it really means.” His task comes in assimilating the refugees who are recognized in Italy, although the JNRC, unlike other refugee organizations working in Rome, does not demand that migrants show their asylum papers before they are

served meals. To justify the refusal of asylum, Piero believes, the terms of that refusal must be clear. Because he is not satisfied with existing language on refugees, he welcomes all migrants.

On my last day at the jnrc, Adama, Rakin, and I temporarily abandon our preoccupations with these theoretical questions, and we excuse ourselves from the work of cooking for a crowded room of refugees. We instead welcome ourselves to the table. Fahad, an Afghan refugee who joins Adama as a “peacekeeper” at the jnrc, is unchallenged in his role as chef. I dice onions on his command, assure him that there will be enough food, and ask Rakin to test his linguistic capabilities. Rakin, Adama, and Fahad each speak five languages, although English is the only tongue they share. This is because Rakin refuses to learn Italian, an act of defiance directed at the country and the culture that he feels has scorned him.

I tend to my chopping, and I join my well-educated refugee friends in trading stories about soccer and geopolitics, but I remain fascinated by the medium Rakin has chosen to express his discontent. His spurning of Italian means that he will never have full civic rights in Italy: Aristotle reminds that it is through language shared in the public sphere that we manage to “set forth the expedient and the inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and unjust.” He will rely on the human rights he acknowledges to be flimsy.

Piero diagnoses this reluctance in comparing the situation of refugees to sufferers of the strappado, a medieval form of torture in which the victim is suspended with his hands bound behind his back. When he is released from this height, the weight of his body rips his shoulders from their sockets. Refugees, too, are wrenched from their homes against their will. Many are still traumatized: they are not prepared, Piero says, “to mix their culture with another.”

Niccolo Machiavelli, himself a refugee from Florence, was a famous victim of the strappado. Machiavelli’s most poignant mention of refugees comes in a passage from the Discourses on Livy, in which he speaks of refugees in a barren land who, “without any prince to govern them, began to live under such laws as seemed to them best suited to maintain their new state.” Machiavelli’s ideal refugees are those who found new orders, just as he did in the realm of philosophy. But contemporary refugees are not afforded this luxury. They are asked to conform to the norms of the society in which they are granted asylum, and their stories become means of survival that must fit within the confines of the internationally approved definition of a “refugee.”

Edward Gibbon, who taught himself Italian to read Machiavelli, reserved high praise for the imperator cum princeps Augustus, who “was sensible that mankind is governed by names.” Our condition has not changed. If we mean to refuse refugees entry, we must be sure that we can identify a refugee and then abide by this definition. New migratory populations may require us to develop new categories of refugees. But renewed attention to the 1967 Protocol will allow us to justifiably turn back non-refugees, and to better welcome those who are really rootless.

Rights and States in the Balkans

As he made his way to Rome, Fahad passed through a region where the international community has successfully intervened to quell conflict, to bring law. Indeed, conflict in the Balkans, in which Fahad lived for three months, marks the last instance in which the international community was forced to deal substantially with the clash between states and rights, political and humanitarian concerns. It is to this period, and the policies that succeeded it, that Piero refers when he notes that our refugee crises have been building for two decades. Examination of the Dayton Accords that brought peace to Bosnia after genocide swept the fledgling state allow us a more comprehensive sense of the history that anchors current refugees.

I arrived in Srebrenica the day after the memorial service, on July 11, commemorating the 20th anniversary of the genocide orchestrated by members of the Yugoslav National Army and Serb
militias that killed more than 8,000—numbers vary—Bosniak men and boys in this region of the Drina River Valley. Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright had appeared at the memorial ceremony, as had, controversially, Serb Prime Minister Alexander Vujíc. The cemetery at Potocari, to which victims’ remains have been moved from mass graves around Srebrenica, was peppered by 60 fresh graves containing newly unearthed bones. These were marked by green plastic headstones and geraniums rather than by the small white marble obelisks engraved with fleurs-de-lis that denote older graves.

Posters at the rudimentary museum held in the former battery factory where the to-be-massacred fled proclaimed that a “new life for Srebrenica” was emerging from the fresh earth of this death. This was hard to see as we walked through the town of Srebrenica itself, about a mile from the cemetery: the place was ghost-like. Life, though, was precisely what Zekeriah, a lawyer for the municipality of Srebrenica, intends to make here. He moved to Srebrenica in 2008 with his two daughters, a migrant of a different sort from Fahad, returning to the scene of displacement to remember and to rebuild. The work is hard: he says, softly, that “we have a problem with genocide here.” This is because “genocide changes all structures.”

This disorder, this structure-shifting, is still evident in Srebrenica. Buildings remain pockmarked by bullets or caved in by shells. Land-mine removal teams in ambulance-like vans prowled the roads outside of Srebrenica. Srebrenica, and Bosnia as a country, remains divided between Serb and Bosniak populations. 60 percent of the town’s residents are Serb, and its political offices are, like those at the federal level, divided equally between Serb and Bosniak representatives. Zekeriah says that this arrangement is tenable for 363 days each year. Divisions grow bitter only when Bosniaks celebrate their independence and on the anniversary of the massacre for which Srebrenica is infamous.

Jasmina Hadziah-Metovic, a curator at the stirring Sarajevo Wrestling with Rootlessness, Individual and Political: Tracking Refugees from Crisis Toward a New Language and New Politics museum designed to commemorate Srebrenica, is less sanguine. Bosniaks are still waiting for judgments to be rendered by the International Court Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the most heinous Serbian war criminals. The trial of Ratko Mladić, the Bosnian Serb officer who orchestrated the genocide at Srebrenica, began only last year. Corruption is rampant in Bosnia, and economic woes have precipitated the emergence of new fissures between Serbs and Bosniaks. “Bad things are to come,” Jasmina predicts. This is not pessimism so much as sober prophecy. Most Serbs are still unwilling to acknowledge that the Yugoslav War consisted in a genocide of Bosniaks. And politics shifts quickly: after all, Jasmina was “raised thinking these boundaries of Europe in the 20th century were permanent, but now, with Kosovo, with Crimea it seems that nothing is permanent.”

Adi’s Intervention

The same impermanence troubles Adi Hadzibabic, a law student in Sarajevo. He sips coffee and explains that his parents speak of a “beautiful life” under Tito. He speaks in relative terms: his family lived the full ugliness of the Yugoslav War. A grenade fell on their house weeks after they fled to Italy for three months in 1993. The family left Adi’s father behind when they left for another period because he, like all other Bosnian men, was conscripted. And after they returned to their Sarajevo home, Adi and his mother were nearly killed during the final sensational act of violence in the War, the shelling of the Markale Market in central Sarajevo.

Of course, Adi explains, “human rights were limited under Tito.” This was especially true of free speech, which was practically nonexistent. But where these “soft” rights were unavailable at least the “hard” rights to life, food and water, shelter were protected: “at least under Tito there was no genocide.” Piero, at the INRC says much the same. Tito, he notes, “held Yugoslavia together for forty years.” He invokes Tito to compare him with Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya. “I
never liked Gaddafi,” Piero avows, “but he held Libya together.”

Ours is a world predicated on the existence of states, many of them comprised of ethnic groups, languages, religions so diverse that they cannot be properly said to be nation-states, by which a single people organizes politically. Instead, they are multi-national multiethnic states. Recognition of this reality was the organizing principle of the international state system that emerged from our reading of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. But Westphalia presupposed monarchy – the document is rife with allusions to princes. Strong heads of state, often no better than the Renaissance equivalents of Tito or Gaddafi, were meant to bind the populations of their states together so that the state presented a united front. Citizenship was a determining factor: individuals had limited rights beyond the confines of their states.

Pre-Enlightenment philosophers and political leaders had always presumed, as Aristotle would, that human beings were inextricable from community, that to reduce them to a solitary existence as individuals would be abnormal. But the ideas of human rights that emerged just over a century after the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia presumed that humans stood on their own. They were endowed with rights independent of their status in community.

Koestler, recognizing the moment of this philosophical shift as pertains to refugees, includes a passage from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens in his Scum of the Earth. It proclaims “the representatives of the people of France…considering that ignorance, neglect, or contempt of human rights are the sole causes of public misfortunes…have resolved to set forth…these natural, imprescriptible and inalienable rights.”

This declaration of purpose immediately follows a section titled “Apocalypse.” The irony is clear: the setting forth of human rights did little to prevent Koestler’s apocalyptic.

Practically, human rights are still defended by states. Jasmina says of the US-led NATO intervention in Bosnia that “it was so easy to stop the war – a couple of NATO airstrikes and in many places the Serbs laid down their arms.” The human rights architecture overlaid on the international state system is dependent upon individual states to guarantee human rights. Absent this action, the gap between humanitarian and political action grows, drawing refugees and other victims into its maw.

The European Union fascinates and irritates because it is a post-national state ostensibly able to forgo the rule of a single strong man and because it is fervent in proclaiming the universality of its governmental system. This is nothing new: the Westphalian system originated from Europe through the same bold declarations. But the EU is reluctant to pair its principles with practical action. Its member states are captivated by the elegance of humanitarian principles and occasionally interested in orchestrating air strikes but are unwilling to engage the political work that would root its humanitarian values and security concerns in solid action. It epitomizes the thought untethered to action that Victor mentioned while fiddling with his computer and that Arendt implicates in Europe’s movement toward totalitarianism. Piero damns the Union by comparison when he says: “I think the UN is like the EU. It governs nothing.”

Refugees and World Order

Which strategies should we glean from this lack of governance, this “United Nothing”? How should we understand the disorder exposed by refugees? Many of the actions that we must take, to defend our principles and our citizens, cut deeply against the grain of popular opinion. So, grand strategy requires, as it ultimately must, a new kind of leadership–statesmanship, really–attuned to broad problems of human community rather than to petty interests and cheap sound bites. But this statecraft does not have to exist solely in the world of principled theory. Arguments that we should treat refugees well in the West, that we should define the parameters of a refugee so that we can turn some asylum seekers back, and that we should intervene in the conflicts that produce refugees are predicated on security concerns as well. Action to aid refugees is the province of enlightened self-interest in our own political good.

Rights, as Arendt indicates, have always been defined and

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defended by states. Indeed, human rights are most in danger when they are held by states to be universal, so inalienable that they need not be assiduously protected. The United States, jaded by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and shying from the title of “world’s policeman,” has done little in the past decade to actively protect human rights. For Europe, this unwillingness to intervene politically in humanitarian crises has been longer in the making: it dates, as Piero suggests, to NATO intervention in Bosnia during the 1990s. The Milan gendarme with whom I spoke this summer reiterated this connection between violence in the Balkans and the current refugee crisis. When I asked whether the influx of refugees was a problem he responded in the affirmative but added, unprompted, “it is always like this, with the Syrians now and with the Bosnians then.”

Solutions to the refugee crisis in the Balkans required American-led NATO intervention. Bosniaks agree that this came too late, after the deaths of around 80,000 Bosniaks. Ten percent of this number came from deaths during three days in the fields surrounding Srebrenica. Conspiracy theories abound regarding the delay, and some of them, however horrible, are at least plausible. Jasmina wonders whether the UN bargained with the Serb army to give up the Bosniaks ostensibly protected by UN peacekeeping troops in a “safe zone.” UN officials knew it would be easier to reach a ceasefire, she suggests, if the country could be cleanly divided between Serbs and Bosniaks. The Bosniaks living in the eastern part of the country were problematic in relation to this plan. If they were somehow eliminated, the conflict might end. And Adi notes that in many ways this plan has come to pass. Forty-nine percent of the land in Bosnia and Herzegovina is occupied by Serbs, who Bosniaks see as the perpetrators of the genocide that ravaged their population twenty years ago. They “cleaned” the land, Adi says, so that they could occupy it even after peace was achieved.

Even after NATO and US troops entered the Balkans, soldiers were frustrated by the slow-moving nature of the operation. An American intelligence officer with whom I spoke said that during his tour in Bosnia, beginning in December of 1995, American soldiers were hamstrung by one overriding rule: “don’t get yourself killed.”49 The death of eighteen American soldiers in Somalia a few years before lurked in the minds of American politicians, and they stipulated that the troops that they sent to the Balkans should be careful not to put themselves in potentially life-threatening situations. On a larger scale, because casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan dwarfed those in Somalia, we are still coping with the ramifications of ill-considered military action tied at least in part to humanitarian aims.

If we have learned the lessons of Somalia, of Iraq and of Afghanistan, we have largely forgotten the lessons of Bosnia. The country remains economically depressed, but it is rebuilding from the war. To commemorate the anniversary of Srebrenica, thousands of Bosniaks congregated in squares across town to watch the live broadcast of a “Concert for Peace” being played at the National Theater in central Sarajevo by the orchestra of La Scala, the Roman opera house. Adi and I attended together. The symbolism was poignant: here was a refugee who had fled to Rome listening to its best musicians in the home from which he took refuge in Italy. Adi had found the “durable solution” the UNHCR takes as its goal for refugees: the point at which they are no longer refugees, no longer rootless. The international community once knew how to help a nation emerge from humanitarian crisis. We knew that treating the flight of Bosniaks into Europe—the last refugee crisis before the current migrations—meant intervention in the Balkans as well as care for refugees in the West. It is this connection between the humanitarian and political spheres that we must remember again if we are to have any hope of resolving our “spiraling crises.”

Rootlessness—whether individual or communal, political or linguistic—is dangerous. Humanitarian measures should be rooted in political action, in diplomacy and in military intervention as “the

49 Joe Derdziński in discussion with the author, June 2015.
continuation of politics by other means.” 50 Human rights must be anchored in the work of states willing to defend these principles. Language—especially political language—is impoverished and perilous when it is not tied to the phenomena it describes. State interests, in protecting their borders and their citizens, must have foundations in some principle. These are simple statements that become more complex as they meet political reality, but if we work toward them—as we should, and as we must—the number of refugees, the very embodiment of this intellectual and geographic rootlessness, will decrease. And the route of these refugees toward rootedness will not be as long.

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