3 Letter from the Editors

ESSAYS

5 How Digital Communities Cope: Cyber-vigilantism Following the Boston Marathon Bombings
   COLIN HILL

13 Ideology through Subliminal Propaganda: A Critique of Portrayals of Palestine and Palestinians in Israeli and Western Online News Media during Operation Protective Edge
   ELISABETH SIEGEL

30 Unity of Command or Unity of Effort? Humanitarian Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Reconstruction
   CHRISTINA BARTZOKIS

37 Globalization: Influences of Economic Dependence on American, Chinese, and African Diplomatic Practices
   DUSTIN VESEY

   RONA JI
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DEAR READER,

We are excited to present you with the 2017 Spring Issue of the Yale Review of International Studies. After our last issue presented pieces from across the US, this one returns to our roots within the Yale community. We received a range of incredible submissions for this issue, and we are grateful to everyone who gave us the opportunity to review their work. As normal, we aimed to select pieces which present intriguing, often overlooked perspectives on a broad range of issues. The pages of this issue include essays on social media activity in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings, on Israeli and Western media portrayals of Palestinians during the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, on the cooperation of civil and military organizations for humanitarian goals during post-conflict reconstruction efforts, on the influence of international economic dependence on American, Chinese and African diplomatic connections, and on refugees’ and asylum seekers’ access to the UK’s healthcare system. As always, we received more excellent papers than we are able to publish, and we hugely appreciate not only the authors whose work was selected but all of those who took the time to submit. We hope that everyone who submitted to this issue will continue to share their work with us in the future.

In addition to this issue, we have been hard at work on new projects. These include, among others, a Weekly Update which summarizes global news for all Yale International Relations Association (YIRA) members and the distribution of student work from YIRA-run international research trips. If you are interested in signing up for the Weekly Update, looking at our archives of previous issues’ papers or checking out any of our other new projects, please explore yis@yira.org!

Best,
The Editors
ESSAYS

How Digital Communities Cope
Ideology through Subliminal Propaganda
Humanitarian Civil-Military Cooperation
Influences of Economic Dependence
Refugees in the UK’s Healthcare System
On April 15th, 2013, two men and two pressure cooker bombs shook Boston to its core. One of Boston’s most treasured traditions, the Boston Marathon, had been marred by a terror attack that left the city at a standstill for four days. Following the disaster, however, online platforms were overwhelmed by the dynamic responses of global citizens. This globalized experience would not have been possible without the nearly universal accessibility of social media platforms; those who could not experience the paranoia of a deserted urban landscape or hear the gunfire through their locked windows could follow the events in near current time through live tweets and Reddit updates, receiving information in its most candid form, untouched by inevitable mass media biases. Social media platforms created rich environments for the gradual rebuilding of the Boston community through mediums such as crowd funding and symbolic memorializations in the form of #BostonStrong hashtags. Some utilized these platforms for online vigilantism which, many argue, harmed local families and fed paranoia. Mass media’s characterizations of social media ranged from crucial information sources to breeding grounds for toxic misinformation, a debate likewise evident in current scholarship. Scholars have widely discussed the “psychological effects of terrorism on the individual” and both the harmful and beneficial impacts of online “social amplification” through digitally mediated and communal reactions to the attack on Boston. These theorizations, however, neglect to consider the role of vigilantism as a virtual coping process, indicative of the current global, social, and interactive contexts of the digital age. The contributory potential of social media environments enable a form of simulated conclusivity which caters to the innate human drive for control; few scholars have examined how this impulse to impose control over a chaotic situation, like the bombings, define the rituals of digital vigilantes. I will argue that virtually-mediated vigilantism gives rise to a globalized yet disparate task force of ordinary citizens, seeking comfort in fantasies of control.

Established scholarship regarding digitally mediated social movements largely attends to the constructivity, or lack thereof, of social media usage in disaster contexts. Though few authors have written in depth about cyber-vigilantism, many authors have examined the emerging role of social media in citizen journalism. Perhaps the most compelling subset to emerge from scholarship on citizen journalism, cyber-vigilantism is the seemingly relentless pursuit of justice through amateur sleuthing on digital platforms. Current research debates both the benefits and drawbacks of broader citizen journalism on what is often called the “participatory web,” a dynamic environment characterized by “decentralized information/media sharing, portability, storage capacity, collaboration, and user-generated content.”

1 Several different hashtags were used as symbolic memorializations (e.g. #prayforboston), but #BostonStrong became the most prevalent and most enduring example.
2 “Mass media” refers to major television, online, and print organizations which are solely journalistic, such as CNN, New York Times, Boston Globe, etc.
5 “Citizen journalism” as used in this paper refers to the emerging trend in which ordinary bystanders capture and report on events through mediums such as photos, videos, live tweets, etc.
6 Martha McCaughey, Cyberactivism on the Participatory Web (New York: Routledge, 2014), 1.
criticize the uprising of citizen reportage, citing “misleading rumors, lapses in judgment and outright disinformation” as panic inducing and ultimately harmful.7 Others extol the benefits of “democratically fringed, participatory society where community-minded citizens do their part,” claiming that a breakdown of the barriers between professional and citizen journalists, between trained police forces and citizen vigilantes, promotes justice and healing during crisis situations.8 This democratizing trend underlies the paradigm shift from what I would call “lone-wolf” vigilantism to crowd sourced vigilantism, with “many members of the public...no longer simply news consumers but...news participators.”9 While scholars attend to the constructivity—or destructivity—of crowd sourced, digitally-mediated social media responses to disaster, I intend to diverge from this limiting conversation and instead explore what exactly drives people to engage so directly, and often anxiously, with crises through online platforms.

Experiences of disasters in the digital age are almost always mediated by the Internet, fostering a sense of detached and immaterial engagement with the crisis. Yet this engagement is simultaneously rendered proximal and viscerally immediate, regardless of location or affiliation. Scholarly theorizations regarding the dynamics of online vigilantism often neglect this globalized social condition. For those living in the Boston area, the four days following the bombings were characterized by a looming sense of crippling uncertainty and fear. As the Boston Police searched the city for the Tsarnaev brothers, twenty blocks of the city were shut down and residents were ordered to shelter in place. Although people living outside of Boston may not have been in physical danger, causing widespread panic and fear is a major goal of terrorist attacks, particularly in the digital age. Holman attends to the tendency of mass media to “[extend] the boundaries of local disasters, transmitting their impact far beyond

the directly exposed population and turning them into collective traumas.”10 Her theorization, however, neglects the power of social media platforms in making local concerns the subject of globalized trauma, the immediacy of the Internet amplifying ripples of anxiety which spread far from Boston. This spread is made evident by Twitter user @staygoldp0nyboy, whose profile indicates he lives over a thousand miles away in the Minneapolis area—he tweeted that “This Boston bombing shit is actually really fucking scary bc they legit don’t know who did this yet and we have the best intel in the world.”11 Endless tweets echo this sentiment, each one an individual contribution to a digitally mediated coping platform. This need for coping was catalyzed by amateur journalists, whose reportage “invited unruly, disruptive ways of seeing, its impulsive materiality threatening to disobey more conventionalised rules of inclusion and exclusion consistent with mainstream journalism’s preferred framings.”12 Such unconventional, unbiased reportage is abundant on video sharing sites like Youtube. One amateur video, filmed by a man standing very close to the bombs, captures a visceral and unsettling portrait of the event. After the first blast, the citizen videographer runs toward the carnage, with the camera shaking and unsettling. Viewers are confronted with the sounds of sirens and screams and the sights of destruction and panic. The unedited, unframed nature of this first-person footage engrosses its viewers in an exceedingly passive, and thus helpless, spectatorship.13 CNN’s coverage of the same event, however, is significantly less stirring, as it utilizes primarily aerial shots, which distances viewers from the victims of the attacks, obscuring their faces as part of an anonymous crowd. Also obfuscated are the sounds of the bombings—viewers hear only the narration of newscasters framing the horror of the situation, rather than experiencing the horror firsthand as in the amateur video.14 The carefully produced narratives of mass media platforms like CNN present filtered representations of crises, thus

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9 This term is common in rhetoric surrounding traditional vigilantes, referring to the archetype of a reclusive, isolated, radical extremist.
10 Michelle Katherine Larson Rose, “Public Engagement with the Criminal Justice System in the Age of Social Media,” Olati socio-legal series 4, no. 4: 774.
12 staygoldp0nyboy, “This Boston bombing shit is actually really fucking scary bc they legit don’t know who did this yet and we have the best intel in the world,” 16 April 2013, 7:23 AM. Tweet.
decreasing the intensity of emotional response—essentially telling viewers how they should feel. Although mass media is quite effective at rapidly disseminating information, it is not conducive to the virtually mediated proximity created by social media platforms.

The immaterial, yet simultaneously visceral, engagement enabled by social media platforms led to a sense of inconclusivity that transcended Boston to become a globalized social phenomenon. The trauma of the Boston Marathon bombings is in part defined by a disruptive instability around information gaps. The internet was immediately flooded by these absences, both literal and figurative—two explosions transformed familiar places into volatilized, chaotic environments and blew the city apart, leaving gaping absences in their wake, whether that absence took the form of a leg, a perpetrator, or a finish line. Such absences gave rise to tensions among an online global audience, an audience which as a result migrated “into the realm of the symbolic, the virtual, where the illusion of the mastery of absence” enabled them to cope with their trauma.16 Twitter user @UmmMaryam evokes this tension, tweeting that “the Boston bombing is so random, three blasts and there’s still no suspects.”17 This user elucidates an almost mathematical inequivalency which captures the unresolved nature of the bombings—there were “three blasts,” but “no suspects.” @UmmMaryam’s factual error18 of there being “three blasts” attests to the confusion immediately following19 the bombings; more importantly, however, the inequality she evokes captures the distressing information holes which pervade cyberspace. @UmmMaryam voices this globalized trauma with an interesting juxtaposition in her choice of language—she calls the bombing “random,” referring to the uncertainty regarding the suspects’ motives and location. As the bombers were eventually arraigned and more information was revealed, it became clear that the bombings were anything but random; in fact, they were a carefully calculated act of terrorism carried out in the name of religion. In the four days following the bombings, however, even the FBI did not seem to know this; these information holes thus set up a condition of global ontological instability. This instability was heightened by the wide array of photojournalism available online, much of which depicted the confusion surrounding the manhunt for the suspects. A widely circulated image shows a family being removed from their house so the police could search it (Picture 1).20 This family home, once a stable environment, was made unstable by the very information holes that prompted the manhunt. This photo represents a disquieting corporeal manifestation of the informational absences that evoked a global response. The attacks on Boston not only destabilized a treasured tradition and uprooted local families, but also troubled a vast global community, necessitating a complex and digitally mediated response. As the democratic nature of social media platforms breaks down the time-honored boundaries of professional journalism like verified sources and measured objectivity, users have become “both producers and users of content,”21 empowered to contribute to the “complex information-and-communication environment” embodied by social media.22 These contributions represent a crowd-sourced initiative to reconcile the specific qualities of the disaster, which engender collective trauma.

Perhaps the most traumatic aspect of the Boston bombings was the abrupt halting of the marathon and the subsequent unprecedented shutdown of a large part of the city; this state of stasis, in juxtaposition with information holes, gave rise to an ontological instability, which in turn mobilized a global community of online users. As soon as the bombs exploded, the marathon was stopped, thousands of runners held motionless before the finish line. Kevin Donovan captures the disappointment and stasis of these runners in a tweet that describes the situation as “incredible and heartbreaking”23 (Picture 2).24 This tweet includes a photo of the runners held static, the empty road and eager

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17 UmmMaryam, “the Boston bombing is so random, three blasts and there’s still no suspects.” 15 April 2013, 3:16 PM. Tweet.
18 There were actually only two blasts.
19 The tweet in question was sent at 3:16 PM, only 26 minutes after the bombs exploded.
20 Please see the online version of this paper at yris.yira.org to view pictures.
22 Although likely a coincidence, the word “heartbreak” holds special meaning for those familiar with the Boston Marathon—“Heartbreak Hill,” which these runners did not reach, is a very difficult portion of the course which often thwarts runners just miles before the finish line.
23 Please see the online version of this paper at yris.yira.org to view pictures.
spectators in front of them. These spectators lined up to watch runners pass by, but the imposed threat of stagnancy had robbed them of their role as active spectators, replacing their dynamic celebration of movement with the helpless passivity of an interrupted race. With runners no longer running and spectators no longer spectating, the breakdown of these categories gave rise to an unforeseen instability that was amplified by its dissemination through social media. This unnerving tension built over the next few days, reaching its peak during a daylong manhunt, which shut down a large part of the city. Although only those living in the twenty blocks that were shut down were tangibly affected by this motionless state, “the high speed and volume of communication enabled through social media platforms like Reddit, Twitter, and Facebook transform the scope and scale with which spatial meanings... may be circulated and revised.”

Amendola’s photograph, depicting the normally bustling Kenmore Square as a deserted urban landscape devoid of traffic and people, serves as an example of the kind of images that disseminated the trauma of stasis (Picture 3). The disturbing emptiness of this busy square is heightened by the high camera angle, a perspective that gives a sense of diminution, a harrowingly accurate portrayal of a city scared into hiding. This cowering depiction of Boston invites viewers to provide repair, disseminating a pervasive sense of collective helplessness. The CITGO sign, a landmark well-known among locals, even confronts viewers with a reminder of the Boston’s normal state of movement—the word “GO” contained in the sign itself serves as a reminder that things should be moving and changing, exacerbating the trauma of citywide stasis. The prolonged nature of the disaster in Boston led to an emergent sense of collective helplessness that, mediated by social media platforms, spanned the globe. In order to cope with the troubling passivity of distant, virtually mediated interactions with unresolved disaster, cyber-vigilantes pursue relevant content, deconstruct and synthesize it into something seemingly conclusive, and then disseminate it to a global audience.

The crisis conditions created by the Boston bombings engendered diverse global responses, which were driven by the cultural phenomenon wherein online users faced with mediated trauma anxiously fabricate a sense of control. What innate human quality governs this seemingly universal drive? As Jeffrey Douglas contends, humans derive pleasure from the illusion of control over that which is uncontrollable, the “fantasy of mastery or control over unwieldy reality.” Cyber-vigilantism represents an unprecedented collaboration between professional and citizen journalists as a way to reconcile information holes, the absences of information that underscored the chaotic threats of the Boston bombings. In the wake of tragedy, the democratic immediacy of social media platforms enables “organizations and publics [to] work together to fill [information holes] through creating and sharing information, often in real time.”

The Boston Globe actively engaged with citizen journalists as it transformed its homepage into a live blog where anybody, even nonsubscribers, could access and share salient information. On April 19th, the day of the city-wide lockdown, Boston Globe’s homepage commands a reader’s attention with an enormous, bold-lettered headline which warns, “RESIDENTS TOLD TO STAY INSIDE AS HUNT CONTINUES.” The webpage also includes important announcements such as the shutdown of public transit and newly-discovered information about the suspects, juxtaposed with a slideshow of stirring images depicting abandoned streets completely absent of motion, followed by SWAT teams searching houses in a frenzied yet organized imposition of order onto motion. This endless and dynamic live stream of the situation in Boston, through the progression from stillness (e.g. announcements about public transit shutdown and abandoned streets) to movement (e.g. SWAT teams going house to house), represents an attempt to fix the problem of stasis. Online users all over the world followed this poignant and unsettling live blog, becoming intimately invested in the wellbeing of Boston despite being physically removed from the crisis. On the subreddit /r/

25 Please see the online version of this paper at yris.yira.org to view pictures.
26 Interestingly enough, Citgo is a distributor of transportation fuels, another nuanced reminder of motion.
27 Douglas, “Gaming and the Death Drive in a Digital Age,” 93.
29 Boston Globe, April 19, 2013.
findbostonbombers,31 which is infamous for "groundlessly speculating on the identity of the attacker or attackers based on photos and videos from the scene,"32 moderators explicitly condemn the idea of crowdsourced citizen journalism, as evidenced by a rule on the sidebar which claims "r/FindBostonBombers is a discussion forum, not a journalistic media outlet. We do not strive, nor pretend, to release journalist-quality content for the sake of informing the public."33 This rule points to the internalized, even self-serving, drive for conclusivity—cyber-vigilantes are not interested in crafting a properly sourced, journalistic narrative; they are instead driven by a need to repair an ontological stability, a need for illusions of control. The digital inhabitants of both the Boston Globe blog and /r/findbostonbombers were subjected to a deep tension between their desire to provide material repair to a city in crisis and their inability to take control of the unfolding disaster in Boston through digital mediums. In order to resolve this tension, Internet users resorted to online vigilante activism, an accessible and immediate medium through which they could participate in a virtually-mediated simulation of conclusivity.

Enabled by its inherently participatory nature, cyber-vigilantism gives rise to a global community working collaboratively to impose a narrative structure upon the atemporality of a digitally mediated experience with disaster, effectively "solving" the problem of inconclusivity. A crisis is generally not considered to be finished until one can clearly say exactly what happened; thus ascribing a timeline to the Boston bombings allowed online users to finally achieve the conclusivity they so ardently sought by establishing a clear, temporal end to the crisis. Although the curated nature of mass media inevitably imposed narrative structures upon the Boston bombings, online users resisted these framings. One Twitter user predicted that "again this sick act carried out by EXTREMISTS in Boston will stigmatise (sic) innocent Muslims through mass media indoctrination #academictweet."34 Hanspal's choice of the word "indoctrination" evokes the vast social force of mass media framings and the drive to escape them. The stigmatization of the Islamic faith is but one imposed narrative which users opposed, with other tweets decrying the tendencies of mass media toward speculation and fear-mongering.35 36 These criticisms of mass media elucidate the online community's preference for the "gritty rawness of [citizen journalism]'s authenticity."37 This drive for unfiltered reality manifested most extensively through Reddit, where users compiled comprehensive live threads describing the details of the manhunt on April 19th. Nine separate threads, each one containing updates which are often mere minutes apart, combine to create a cohesive, temporally organized archive of the manhunt from beginning to end.38 This crowdsourced timeline rectifies the inherent atemporality of the Boston bombings, a troubling characteristic of the disaster which was rooted not only in the prolonged period in which it took place, but also the inability of monolithic news organizations to keep up with the rapidly changing situation at hand. Reddit commenter DisterDan, apparently perturbed by the lack of immediacy in mainstream news outlets, observed "CNN is like 40 minutes behind."39 Many users saw Reddit as a more accurate and timely source of information, with another user praising the way in which "Reddit and it’s (sic) community are performing more efficiently than any other news source I've found."40

30 Unfortunately, even Internet archives did not allow me to access the now private subreddit where the most controversial examples of cyber-vigilantism precipitated. Close readings of such posts would have made for much richer analysis, but I instead must rely on secondhand accounts when dealing with r/findbostonbombers.
32 oops777, /r/findbostonbombers, Reddit.
33 Sophie Hanspal, “Again this sick act carried out by EXTREMISTS in Boston will stigmatise innocent Muslims through mass media indoctrination #academictweet,” 15 April 2013, 4:34 PM. Tweet.
34 Darren J. Jones (MrThingamajigs), “Wow mass panic and chaos has really broken out in Boston ... The media are partly to blame for so many unconfirmed and false reports.” 15 April 2013, 2:31 PM. Tweet.
35 Sean Kitchen (RCPress_Sean), “Thoughts go out to the deceased in Boston. Don’t let the media mass fear monger us into believe it was an AI Qaeda attack. Shame on MSNBC” 15 April 2013, 1:17 PM. Tweet.
37 These updates are presented in chronological order with timestamps. For example, “EDIT 3:42 EST: Police are going house to house doing sweeps” (JpDeathBlade).
This user’s characterization of Redditors as a “community” illustrates the communal sense of purpose that emerged around the construction of temporal narratives, and the consequent simulation of conclusivity that formed around this community. Although the “beauty of super fast interconnection” fosters the creation of such productive collectives, the democratic process of a disaster’s mediation through social media can have overwhelming ramifications for online inhabitants. In the days following the bombings, countless sources, both journalistic and voyeuristic, professional and amateur, flooded the internet with a deluge of information. The inherently uncertain nature of the bombings resulted in narratives that were often conflicting and disorganized. Reddit, by compiling a detailed aggregation of information from police scanners, citizen journalists, and news organizations, lent a comforting sense of temporality to distressingly atemporal online representations. Time is, by definition, an immaterial construct, and thus time cannot be mastered in the way that one might be able to clean up debris or help the wounded. Yet the imposition of temporality became the most important of various illusions of control, with the assemblage of a timeline being the most tangible intangibility in the wake of disaster. This fabricated temporality stabilized the inherent chaos of the Boston bombings, thus imbuing incessantly atemporal digital mediations with the conclusivity so many global users sought to construct.

The Boston Marathon bombings are considered to be the “first atrocity to be covered in real-time for a mass audience on social media.” During the tense days following the bombings, Boston hosted an online population many times bigger than its physical population, with users all over the world becoming virtual citizens of Boston through their participation in a detached, yet proximal, drive for conclusivity. These virtual citizens, confronted with the ontological instabilities of absence and stasis, sought stability through social media platforms; because they could not provide material repair to Boston, these technologically-enabled users became self-appointed seekers of justice who might have resorted to the gallows in a previous era. Cyber-vigilantism, ironically, exacerbated the chaos it was meant to resolve, with misidentified suspects and inaccurate information blurring the line between truth and mere speculation. Understanding the modes by which online users interact with digitally mediated disaster will be invaluable in a society increasingly globalized by the interconnectivity of social media platforms. My research could be extended to discover not only how the global online communities respond to a diverse range of digitally mediated crises, such as natural disasters or prominent deaths, but also what would be an optimal digital design for post-disaster communication. How might digital mediation change the way we perceive, respond to, and memorialize crises, even outside of social media contexts?

41 Jesusthug, “This kind of news we are witnessing....” 19 April 2013, 6:09 PM, Online comment on JpDeathBlade. “Mods removed thread: Live updates of Boston Situation” Reddit: r/news. 19 April 2013.
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IDEOLOGY THROUGH SUBLIMINAL PROPAGANDA: A CRITIQUE OF PORTRAYALS OF PALESTINE AND PALESTINIANS IN ISRAELI AND WESTERN ONLINE NEWS MEDIA DURING OPERATION PROTECTIVE EDGE

INTRODUCTION
Rarely are there issues more contentious than the modern question of Palestine and Israel. One can find a plethora of media sources concerning Israel and Palestine, ranging in breadth and depth from history books to social media commentary, or from live broadcasts to stories passed down through family members. Online news media has become more and more of a force to be reckoned with, however, with its accessibility and its surge in popularity over the past ten years, according to the Pew Research Center. This paper aims to investigate the vehicles through which biases might arise in Western and Israeli news media coverage of Palestinians, with Operation Protective Edge used as the sample time period for news stories.

BRIEF HISTORY OF ZIONISM

Though there are different “stripes” of Zionism, as an umbrella term it indicates a belief in the creation of a Jewish homeland, specifically in nation-state form, and that all Jews constitute a cohesive nation of people. Zionism began in the nineteenth century, as anti-Semitism—a virulent presence throughout European history—surged, exacerbating Jewish people’s perceived need for a nation-state as a response to worldwide anti-Semitism. The Dreyfus Affair in 1894 exemplified this rising tide of anti-Semitism, especially in the mind of Theodor Herzl, one of the main theorists of modern Zionism. Herzl wrote Der Judenstaat (“The Jewish State”) after his experience covering the Dreyfus Affair, and in it he “talks mainly about the prospects of effectively turning the Land of Israel into a refuge.” This literary work put Herzl at the forefront of the secular Zionist movement, a specific form of Zionism arguing that Jews could not forgo their religious identities and integrate into secular society in the face of anti-Semitism, that Jews thus had to create a new, secular, and Jewish-ethnocratic state. After Herzl’s ideas gained momentum among Jewish people and other Westerners, the British government declared its support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine (after first considering Argentina and Uganda) as part of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 following World War I. 650,000 mostly Arab people were documented in Palestine in the 1880s and, after the Balfour Declaration, it can be extrapolated that similar if not larger populations of indigenous Arabs lived there. The influx of Zionists into Palestine caused a significant disruption to these indigenous peoples’ way of life and access to resources.

During and after World War II, more and more Jewish people began to emigrate to where Israel would later be founded, due to the Holocaust in Europe and the closed borders of other Western countries, including the United States, to Jewish refugees. After World War II in 1947, the United Nations passed resolution 181, splitting the land of

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3. Ibid.
Palestine and giving 55 percent of the land to Jewish immigrants in order to create the state of Israel. Violence between the immigrating Jews, the resident Palestinians, nearby Arab armies, and British military forces supporting the Jewish immigrants after the resolution led to the systematic expulsion of over 750,000 Arabs from Palestine, along with the destruction of 531 villages in what Israeli scholar Ilan Pappe terms an "ethnic cleansing" of the land by Westerners and Jewish settlers. The bulk of refugees, between 250,000 and 350,000 people, were expelled in April and May of 1948, and 4,244,776 acres of land were seized from Palestinian inhabitants after the creation of Israel in 1948. Thus, Zionism's creation of the state of Israel caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians; in the aftermath, many scholars of a multitude of backgrounds, such as Ilan Pappe and Edward Said, came to explicitly align Zionism with other European colonial enterprises of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The colonialist nature of the Zionist venture has been discussed most notably by Edward Said, a Palestinian-American scholar. He argued in his 1979 essay Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims that inherent to modern Zionism's thesis is an alignment with European imperialism and consequent colonialism. He writes:

There is an unmistakable coincidence between the experiences of Arab-Palestinians at the hands of Zionism and the experiences of those black, yellow, and brown people who were described as inferior and subhuman by nineteenth-century imperialists. For although it coincided with...virulent Western anti-Semitism, Zionism also coincided with the period of unparalleled European territorial acquisition in Africa and Asia. Said could not find the Zionist venture distinct from other imperialist ventures conducted within the same time frame, referring to other examples of colonialism occurring in Africa, Asia, and beyond. To him, a unifying factor of these subjugated peoples was their non-whiteness, synonymous with a lack of institutional power due to imported Western thought about racial and genetic superiority; white colonizers often saw the oppressed as inferior and ultimately dispensable in achieving a colonial goal. For instance, in Der Judenstaat, Herzl wrote that Israel would essentially be "an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism." Said found a sentiment in Herzl's as well as other Zionist authors' writings that echoed other common beliefs about the inferiority and dispensability of indigenous peoples in non-Western lands:

Zionism saw Palestine as the European imperialist did, as an empty territory paradoxically 'filled' with ignoble or perhaps even dispensable natives; it allied itself...with the imperial powers in carrying out its plans...and it did not think except in negative terms of 'the natives,' who were passively supposed to accept the plans made for their land.

Said was not the only individual who found a correlation between Zionism and other Western colonialist undertakings. In the 1973 book Israel: A Settler-Colonial State?, Maxime Rodinson also contextualizes the movement within the trends of Western colonialism and imperialism: "The advancement and then success of the Zionist movement thus definitely occurred within the framework of European expansion into the countries belonging to what later came to be called the Third World. [...] Wanting to create a purely Jewish, or predominantly Jewish, state in an Arab Palestine in the twentieth century could not help but lead to a colonial-type situation and to the development...of a racist state of mind." As discussed later in this paper, the founding of state defined as "Jewish" from the outset within a formerly Arab-majority land created a de facto ethnocracy that was then codified by law.

On the one hand, Zionism can be distinguished from other imperialist doctrines, mostly because Western Jews were not looking

12 Ibid., 138.
to create an empire akin to that of the French or the British, and a Jewish refugee from anti-Semitism elsewhere in the world cannot be individually referred to as a colonialist. Thus, what is referred to as settler-colonialism within Zionism is the mass displacement of and violence against indigenous Palestinians on a state-sponsored level, justified by the cause of creating a Jewish state. Additionally, the same racist sentiments that European settlers or colonists held towards indigenous Africans or Indians are encapsulated in many of Zionism’s founding thinkers’ beliefs, including those of Herzl, as indicated in his writings, and the founding of Israel occurred under the encouragement of then-current colonial powers like the U.S. and the British under the Balfour Declaration.  

ORIENTALISM AND ITS RELEVANCE TO CONSIDERATION OF ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

One can examine the Zionist movement within post-colonial and orientalist analysis, pioneered by writers Edward Said and Franz Fanon. "Orientalism" refers to attitudes of Westerners towards the Orient, or the East (as opposed to the Occident, or the West).  

According to Orientalist theory, the West uses various constructed binaries to emphasize its own perceived differences from the East in order to justify the subjugation and exploitation of “Oriental” lands, as well as violence against the people of those lands. 

According to Said, when confronted by the unknown—the Orient, for Westerners—Westerners are inclined to compartmentalize and binarize their intellectual prowess, their cultural experience, and moral capacity against those of the East, to the East’s detriment. These binarizations, even though they seem to be small-scale psychological categorizations, lead to a lack of empathy between the West and East. This will implicitly justify to the Westerner the colonization of the Easterner’s lands. 

Another scholar, Frantz Fanon, wrote The Wretched of the Earth. This book covers the psychological traumas of colonization in French Algeria, and his observations of the dynamic between the colonized and the colonizers are easily universalized to other instances of colonialism. In his work, Fanon proposed that Western binarizations of the Orient came from a place of anxiety on the part of the colonizers. Specifically, the ongoing worry belonging to the colonizers that the colonized want to “take their place,” or that their hold over the colonized land is illegitimate, leads the colonizers to create hostile representations in the media that they control. They turn “the colonized into a kind of quintessence of evil,” to justify to themselves and to others that what they are doing is just. The French colonizers of Algeria created an unmistakably Orientalist binary of the moral, righteous colonizer, as opposed to the unenlightened, uncivilized indigenous people devoid of Western morals. 

Arabs and Muslims are often caught in the crosshairs of Orientalist discourse. Their media representations are molded from “the web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, [and] dehumanizing ideology” that arises inevitably from Orientalist binaries that serve to negatively “otherize” the East from the West in order to justify colonial expansion and exploitation. In Fanon’s survey of psychological belief involved in justifying colonial expansion at the expense of the indigenous populace, he noted that conceptions of the colonized stemmed only from what the colonizers chose to disseminate, which tended to be images harmful to the colonized and beneficial to the aims of the colonizers. In the Israeli case, this phenomenon would include depictions of all Palestinians as terrorists or negative influences on society, thus justifying action that Israel might take against them.

Israel’s own legitimation relies upon the legitimation of the Zionist mission to create a Jewish state in a majority-Arab land. Nurit Peled-Elhanan, a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, wrote about the rhetorical legitimation of Zionism in schoolbooks, and described its necessity as due to the nature of Israeli citizenship: “This is because ethnicity and not citizenship is the main determinant for the allocation of rights, power and resources in

16 Middle East Research and Information Project, “Primer on Palestine,” Middle East Research and Information Project.  
18 Ibid., 5.  
19 Ibid., 12.  
21 Ibid., 6.  
22 Ibid., 27.  
23 Ibid., 14.
Israel. Jews who are citizens of other countries and Jewish settlers who live beyond the official border of the state have full citizenship rights while Arab citizens inside the state’s borders don’t, and Palestinians from the occupied West Bank are listed as ‘state-less.’” Because Jews, by 1948, had been spread throughout a global diaspora for up to a thousand years and had undergone various levels of assimilation within their local cultures or diasporic communities, “common language and common culture and history were hardly available to the modern Jewish-Israeli nation...they had to be manufactured by education, literature, and the media, for the purpose of building a collective homogenous memory and identity.” This phenomenon makes Israel unique from other existing ethnocracies, in its goal to unite Jews with a multitude of diasporic experiences setting them apart from one another. This reality of the Jewish experience drove Israeli state-builders to new efforts of bringing the worldwide Jewish population under one identity and one narrative—a “collective memory.”

Peled-Elhanan, as well as other scholars she cites within her work, describes this building of collective memory as at odds with the goals of history. The inherently contextual nature of memory depends on “a special group in a special place.” Collective memory can be created most effectively by distinguishing one’s own group from out-groups, and one of the methods of doing so is outright antagonism towards out-groups. Official accounts stemming from those involved in creating this collective memory must categorically reject out-groups’ accounts: “Official narratives draw sharp lines between stark opposites—black and white, good and evil, true children of the land and untrue children of the land...the ethnocratic public space is formulated around a set of cultural and religious symbols...practices which tend to reinforce the narratives of the dominant ethno-national group, while silencing, degrading, or ridiculing contesting cultures or perspectives.” The creation of this black and white picture, an “us versus them” mentality within Israel, allows for a “fast and simple” creation of common collective memory for all Israeli citizens. The in-group out-group distinctions inevitably cause Orientalist binaries to enter discourses concerning Israeli identity.

THESIS
In Peled-Elhanan’s inquiry into Israeli history and geography textbooks, she found three vehicles through which textbooks could craft Israel’s collective memory and delegitimize Palestinians: the erasure of Palestinians’ presence and history, the demonization of the Palestinians’ current existence, and justification of the means used to achieve an end after events such as massacres in Palestinian villages. In this paper, I study the coverage of Operation Protective Edge from the Israeli daily news site the Jerusalem Post (JP), the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) website, and the New York Times’ (NYT) website. This study aims not to verify facts presented in these news accounts, but rather to examine their discourse and rhetoric when recounting common events. I will also apply Peled-Elhanan’s three frameworks that she used to critically analyze the discourse of Israeli schoolbooks.

Carefully constructed narratives, communicated in Israel and throughout the West using mass media, further the ideologies of Israeli supremacy and of Palestinian inferiority through portrayals of Palestine and Palestinians grounded in Orientalism, as well as in colonialist policies conducive towards the erasure, dehumanization, demonization, and justification of violence against Palestinians. These strategies have continued being used in news media, evident in the coverage of the Israeli 2014 incursion into the Gaza Strip, “Operation Protective Edge,” by Western and Israeli news sources.

PREVIOUS STUDIES AND METHODOLOGIES
Zvi Bekerman and Michalinos Zembylas describe four possible steps for legitimation of a state and the crystallization of collective memory: “First, they justify the outbreak of the conflict...Second, the societal beliefs of collective memory of intractable conflict present a positive image of the in-group. Third, the societal beliefs of collective memory delegitimize the opponent. Fourth, the beliefs of collective memory present one’s own society as the victim of the opponent.” In this paper,

25 Ibid., 2.
26 Ibid., 4.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 5.
29 Ibid.
30 Zvi Bekerman and Michalinos Zembylas, “Fearful Symmetry:
I will extend these existing frameworks of critique to interrogate news coverage during Operation Protective Edge, and how through biased coverage they assist in continuing the collective memory of the Israeli state and furthering the “Zionist grand narrative.”

SUMMARY OF OPERATION PROTECTIVE EDGE

Operation Protective Edge was an Israeli military offensive upon the Gaza Strip that started on July 7, 2014 and lasted seven weeks, ending on August 26, 2014. A situation report conducted by the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs found that at least 2,131 Palestinians were killed, of whom at least 1,473 were civilians. More than 11,100 Palestinians were wounded, of whom 3,374 were children. During this same seven-week period, 71 Israelis were killed, four of whom were civilians. The operation left around 108,000 Gazans homeless, due to the destruction of 18,000 civilian housing units. Israeli military activity damaged the only power plant in Gaza, as well as the largest sewage treatment plant. 450,000 Gaza residents were unable to access municipal water systems. Throughout the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) 2014 military actions in Gaza, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ended on August 26, 2014.

JOURNALISM ERASURE

Part of crafting a collective memory for Israel’s people, erasure includes tactics of denying memories through outright omission and construing them as threatening.

Peled-Elhanan found that, in school books, a common aim appeared to be the creation of “a homogenous identity to all the Jewish ethnicities in Israel...while attempting to erase—both physically and spiritually—traces of a continuous Palestinian life on the land.” This assists a Zionist narrative seeking to make a direct link between biblical Judaea and modern-day Israel: “The cult of Jewish continuity...also includes obliterating all signs of Palestinian continuous existence on the land...means forgetting 2000 years of civilization on this land and seeing present Jewish life in Israel as a direct continuation of the biblical kingdom of Judea. The 2000 years of Jewish “absence” from the land...are literally bracketed in school books....” In the late 19th century, the phrase “A land without a people for a people without a land” was commonly used to gloss over the presence of indigenous Palestinians or render them “insignificant” to the goals of Zionism. Before and after the founding of Israel in Israeli history textbooks, “The Palestinian citizens of Israel...are practically absent from the texts, except as negative phenomena: a primitive lot which is a developmental burden or a security demographic threat.” Many geography textbooks do not mention the internationally recognized border of Israel, instead placing Israel’s borders as stretching over the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and Gaza and even into the Jordan Valley.

Erasure is useful for furthering a Zionist narrative by rejecting other out-groups’
historical explanations or causes of their actions by placing Palestinian actions outside of the existing historical context of the people’s traumas. For instance, referencing the Nakba, or disaster, of 1948—defined by most Palestinians and other sources as the expulsion of 750,000 Palestinians from Palestine in 1948—by name is banned in Israeli textbooks: “The ‘nakba law’ expresses the fear prevailing in Israel, of teaching Palestinian children their own narrative lest they be given cause to grieve and would indeed try to ‘redeem’ their lost cause.”

This paper will analyze the extent to which NYT, BBC, and JP propagate systems of erasure through investigating the sourcing of articles—whether or not Palestinians are as present as Israelis in discussing narratives that affect them—as well as the coverage of deaths and casualties during Operation Protective Edge to see whether or not the disproportionate tolls of Operation Protective Edge are apparent and easily accessed by readers of these news outlets.

DEHUMANIZATION

Dehumanization—used here as the deprivation of an actor of human qualities—can take many forms, most often through the invocation of stereotypes and other negative images. Often, the positive actions or actors within a certain group that do not fit the desired negative mold are omitted. Peled-Elhanan found some textbooks between 1994 to 2010 that even had “the most blatant comparisons of Palestinians with Nazis or the Devil.” When Palestinians are present at all within Israeli schoolbooks, they are usually “engaged in negative or problematic actions: terrorism, being refugees, working their fields with primitive tools, etc.” In general, demonization can be defined as “depicting people as the agents of actions which are held in low esteem or regarded as subservient, deviant, criminal or evil,” “showing people as homogenous groups and thereby denying them individual characteristics and differences,” and invoking “negative cultural connotations” and “negative racial stereotyping.”

The act of dehumanizing Palestinians is very much aligned with Orientalism. Demonization makes it easier for the in-group to cast out the narratives and histories of the out-group and maintain their own narratives’ dominance in media within the state and throughout the West.

Ross and Lester, in Images that Injure, defined a stereotype as something that imposes “a rigid mold on the subject,” and emphasized that it is “ultimately used to stigmatize.” Stereotypes undoubtedly contribute to demonization and dehumanization, usually because they invoke nonhuman imagery to communicate meaning: “A central, persistent and often systematic mechanism in achieving this construction of the Other...is the use of dehumanizing imagery: that consistent set of subhuman animal, insect, and disease images that circulates through media and popular culture to “mark” groups such as immigrants and racial or ethnic communities as less than human.” By comparing the out-group to a nonhuman or subhuman entity, thus “dehumanizing” them, one may find it easier to exhibit hostility towards the out-group. Peled-Elhanan noted the pervasive use of word choice surrounding Palestinians as “the Palestinian problem” or as a “demographic threat.”

Stereotypical images of Palestinians within Israeli schoolbooks often include depictions of “Palestinian refugees, farmers or masked terrorists, located in no-places, nameless and timeless.” The schoolbooks that Peled-Elhanan studied also cast wide generalizations of Arabs as primitive by virtue of blood: “These statements portray the ‘Arabs’—all millions of them—as possessing by nature or by heredity these ‘negative’ qualities...it symbolizes all Arabs, as they are seen in Israeli eyes.”

In this paper, to investigate the extent to which NYT, BBC, and JP contribute to the dehumanization of Palestinians, I will look at the instances of terminology such as “terrorism” and “terrorist,” as well as the quality of images chosen to represent Israel and Palestine in news coverage of Operation Protective Edge.

41 Ibid., 16.
42 Ibid., 69.
43 Ibid., 72.
44 Ibid., 71.
46 Peled-Elhanan, Palestine in Israeli School, 65.
47 Ross and Lester, Images That Injure: Pictorial, 53.
48 Peled-Elhanan, Palestine in Israeli School, 69.
49 Ibid.
JUSTIFICATION

Justification, or specifically the legitimation of certain measures taken as a means to a desired end no matter the cost, can be found in schoolbooks’ references to massacres throughout the history of the Israel and Palestine conflict. Even though a distinction is drawn between condoning the actions needed to bring about the end result and the endorsement of the result itself, Peled-Elhanan argues: “Its consequences are legitimated on the grounds of utility and effect.” Peled-Elhanan found that, in order to legitimate army orders or military operations that resulted in the massacre of hundreds or thousands of Palestinians, schoolbooks would report the massacres “in such a way that the negative act is counterbalanced or even rewarded by positive consequences such as victory or rescue, and the conflict between evil and good results in the victory of good, namely in positive consequences for Israel.” This legitimation a posteriori was present in Israeli history textbooks’ accounts of the Dier Yassin, Qibya, and Kaffer Kassem massacres, events in which upward of 700 Palestinian civilians altogether were killed by Jewish forces in 1948, 1953, and 1956 respectively. The textbooks also excluded important aspects of the narrative that would contribute to a well-rounded understanding of Israeli actions and their consequences; according to Peled-Elhanan, “The reports on massacres studied here omit the reasons for the killing, exclude both the immediate and the long-run consequences for the victims and any verbal or visual proof of their suffering, as well as details that may raise unnecessary questions regarding the legitimacy of Israel’s actions and goals.” In general, a media source can implicitly justify the action of one party against another by stating that the ends have justified the means, even if the potential ends were unknown when the means—in the above examples, namely the massacres of Palestinians and their expulsion from their residential villages—were first employed. Additionally, justification can also entail removing an action from the context in which it has occurred in order to make the action seem more or less acceptable, as well as leaving out any mention of consequences for the affected party.

To investigate the extent to which NYT, BBC, and JP promote this justification through their news coverage of Operation Protective Edge, I will look at the content of headlines and leads and compare how often a side takes on the role of aggressor versus the role of a respondent to aggression.

PAST NEWS MEDIA RESEARCH

Other researchers have interrogated the sources I plan on investigating for various related aspects of biased coverage, and their findings in general reflected my own.

THE JERUSALEM POST

Founded in 1932, The Jerusalem Post is a broadsheet newspaper that also maintains an online presence at jpost.com. The Jerusalem Post is an English and French-language Israeli daily news source that claims to be the most widely read Israeli news source and to have a readership of over seven million monthly visits, along with 22 million monthly page views.

A 1998 dissertation written by Hala Habal of Baylor University found that, during coverage of Syrian-Israeli relations during the 1990s, the Jerusalem Post had more attributions to Israeli and official Israeli sources as compared to attributions to Arab sources and official Arab sources. Additionally, in the dissertation “Settling the Dispute or Disputing the Settlements: Representations of the Disengagement Plan in the ‘Jerusalem Post’,” Reisa Klein argued that the newspaper “works discursively to privilege Zionist and state hegemonic ideologies.” Further, the Jerusalem Post reifies an Orientalist trope in which Palestinians are constructed as ‘Other’ and figured outside of the demos and public debate in its coverage of settlement disengagement plans in the early 2000s.

THE NYT

51 Ibid., 390.
52 Ibid., 390.
The NYT is one of the leading daily print and online news sources in American journalism. From 2012 to 2013, the NYT had an approximate average total circulation of 1,865,318 and a digital readership of 1,133,923.\textsuperscript{57} Richard Falk and Howard Friel investigated the NYT’s reporting on Israel and Palestine from 2000 to 2005 and concluded that “[F]rom 29 September 2000 to 31 December 2005 the Times published about fifty front page articles on Palestinian suicide bombings and other terrorist acts, in addition to twenty-five articles on Palestinian terrorism reported elsewhere in the front section . . . In contrast, there was much less emphasis in the Times on the far more numerous Israeli killings of Palestinians in the occupied territories during this same period.”\textsuperscript{58} In the same time period, four times as many Palestinians were killed, and seven times as many children.\textsuperscript{59}

In another study from the journal International Security, Jerome Slater compared the levels of nuance and criticism of coverage of Israel and Palestine within the NYT and the highly-respected Israeli newspaper Haaretz. Slater found that the NYT often “downplayed the devastating consequences of the occupation” by focusing typical news stories on “practical costs” to Israel: “its loss of international support, the impending ‘demographic problem’ (i.e., the concern that the Arabs will become a majority, forcing Israel to choose between being a Jewish or a democratic state), and the like.”\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, NYT’s stories often decontextualized Palestinian violence outside of the Israeli occupation, put forth a de-emphasis of the differences in scale and motivation for Israeli and Palestinian violence, and when critical of Israeli violence often also put forth semi-justifications for its actions.\textsuperscript{61} Furthermore, Mohamad Elmasry’s content analysis of the NYT side by side with the Chicago Tribune resulted in similar findings that the two sources “framed Israeli-Palestinian conflict violence in such a way as to legitimate Israeli killings by implicitly justifying Israeli violence and assigning more prominence to the Israeli perspective.”\textsuperscript{62}

America offers the largest amounts of the foreign aid it gives out to Israel, totaling up to over $100 billion since 1949, and Israel remains the United States’ closest ally in the Middle East. As a result, maintaining good PR relations with the United States government and populace is vital for Israel’s legitimation on the world stage. In Peace, Propaganda and the Promised Land, journalism professor Robert Jensen discusses specifically the “public relations front” that Israel must maintain, especially in the United States: “To ensure continued support for Israel’s occupation . . . you could say that in addition to the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel is also involved in an attempt to ideologically occupy the American media.”\textsuperscript{63} Jensen pointed to a quote from a speech given by Alon Pinkas, Council General for Israel in New York and the Co-coordinator for Israel’s PR efforts: “We are currently in a conflict with the Palestinians, and engaging in a successful PR campaign is part of winning the conflict.”

The claim that Israel has managed to do so entirely is ludicrous. However, there’s no questioning the clout of pro-Israel voices in American life. Because of America’s continuous foreign aid and military support to Israel, American news media’s coverage of Israeli military actions and the occupation is very much worth investigation.\textsuperscript{64} As a democracy, America’s foreign policy is determined, to some extent, directly and indirectly by the general populace, which is informed a great deal by American news outlets, such as the NYT.

BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

The British Broadcasting Corporation, founded in 1929, expanded its presence onto the internet in 1999. The public company is the largest and oldest broadcasting corporation in Britain, and also has a considerable international presence; in December 2012, its website bbc.co.uk reached 45.8 million unique users a week.\textsuperscript{65}

64 Slater, “Muting the Alarm,” 89.
65 Dominic Ponsford, “Report Which Reveals the Enormous Reach of BBC News Online May Alarm Regional Publishers.”
In the past, the BBC has come under fire from various critics, notably a JP correspondent to London who decried the news service for its “portrayal of Israel as a demonic, criminal state,” while other studies have been conducted that show the opposite to be true. Hanadi El Tuhani’s 2003 dissertation comparing BBC’s coverage of the second Palestinian intifada with the American news source CNN’s found that both news sources “indirectly assisted in maintaining the status quo, U.S. hegemony, by narrowing the news source list and focusing on the more sensationalistic aspects of the conflict. In so doing, they deflected attention away from important issues of historical and political significance that, if told, would offer a different and more illuminating interpretation of events.” The Glasgow University Media Group also carried out a separate three-year study of the BBC and other TV news coverage of Israel and Palestine in the early 2000s. In Bad News from Israel, the research “makes the scientifically based case that the main news and current affairs programmes...are failing to tell us the real story and the reasons behind it. They use a distorted lens. The result is that the Israelis have identity, existence, a story the viewer understands. The Palestinians are anonymous, alien, their personalities and their views buried under their burden of plight and the vernacular of ‘terror’.”

I intend to analyze the degree to which the above findings remain true in present-day coverage by measuring the extent of erasure, dehumanization, and justification of violence occurring in selected articles during Operation Protective Edge in the BBC, NYT, and JP.

**RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ARTICLES**

**ERASURE**

This paper analyzes 105, 119, and 124 respective BBC, NYT, and JP articles published during Operation Protective Edge and concerning Operation Protective Edge. For each article, the number of Palestinian, Israeli, and “neutral” sources were tallied. The articles were then organized by day of coverage, and the percentage of Palestinian sources out of the total number of sources consulted on each day of coverage were graphed.

The BBC used Palestinian sources the most out of the three news sources: Palestinian sources were used around 45 percent of the time, and most of the days of reporting fell close to or around the 50 percent line. The NYT had a similar total percentage of around 44 percent, while the JP only had around 26 percent of all sources cited or quoted coming from Palestinian voices. On the whole, however, the vast majority of all JP and NYT reporting on each day of Operation Protective Edge still have percentages that fall below the 50 percent line.

The significance of these statistics lies in the fact that Palestinians’ voices are less present in narratives about events that directly involve and concern them. Palestinians’ inability to advocate for themselves contributes to one-dimensional, overly simplistic, and usually negative portrayals of Palestinians within media, as Israeli assertions about the nature or actions of Palestinians, as well as Israelis’ own actions, often go unchallenged. The lack of Palestinians’ voices thus facilitates dehumanization or demonization and justification of aggression towards Palestinians, further illegitimating them and their struggle.

**DEHUMANIZATION OF PALESTINIANS: VOCABULARY CHOICES**

The vocabulary attributed to actors on Israeli and Palestinians sides were also examined. The first term (or set of terms) was the word or prefix “terror,” including derivative words (i.e. “terrorist,” “terrorism”). Attribution of these words to Palestinians or Palestinian infrastructure (e.g. “Three terrorist casualties” or “Terror targets” or “Using terror”) as well as to Israelis or Israeli infrastructure were calculated and compared.
JP used “terror” and related terms the most liberally, with around 225 instances of these derived words being attributed solely to Palestinians (“terrorist”) or Palestinian-sourced structures or actions (“terror attacks,” “terror targets” struck by the IDF). The NYT and the BBC also used these words to refer to Palestinian-affiliated subjects most of all, though in one article the NYT notably used “terror” to refer to an Israeli’s kidnapping and burning of a Palestinian teenager from the West Bank.69

When referring to Israeli acts of violence, the vast majority of all three news sources preferred to use other terminologies, namely “extremism” in the case of the kidnapping of Mohammed Abu Khdeir, as well as other more “military” terms related to Israeli operations in Gaza.70

When Israel leveled an eleven-story, inhabited apartment building in the Shejaia massacre with many civilian casualties,71 no “terror”-related epithets were attributed. However, as the data points out for Hamas’ less targeted and less impactful attacks (four Israeli civilians died over the course of the entire summer-long operation), if Palestinians were able to commit such acts with the accuracy and the same disproportionate toll on Israelis then “terror” would surely be one of the first words used to describe the perpetrators in news media. “Terror” as a word irrationalizes the perpetrators of the actions being described and removes them from the context of the rising and wholly disproportionate loss of Palestinian lives, as well as the indignities of living under continuous Israeli occupation and permanently remaining second- or third-class citizens of the land.

The next word usage looked at was the frequency and recipients of the terms “soldier” versus “militant.” Each of these terms was entirely applied to Israeli actors and Palestinian actors, respectively—no Israeli actor was ever referred to as a “militant,” and no Palestinian actor was ever referred to as a “soldier.” The dictionary defines militant as “combative and aggressive in support of a political or social cause, and typically favoring extreme, violent, or confrontational methods,” whereas a soldier is merely “a person who serves in an army.”

Overall, Peled-Elhanan similarly found that aggressive, “irrational” vocabulary was used when describing Palestinians’ actions or Palestinian individuals. In the case of textbooks, she asserts that “Israel ‘reacts to Arab hostility,’ performs ‘operations’ in their midst, and executes ‘punitive deterring actions’ against Palestinian terror, while the ‘Arabs’ murder Israelis, commit terror actions against Israel, take revenge and use what they call their suffering in anti-Israeli propaganda.”

JUSTIFICATION

In order to see the extent to which the aforementioned news outlets justified disproportionate Israeli military activity, I looked at leads and headlines. I studied the extent to which they posited one side as responding to the other side’s attacks and the other as the aggressor. In these graphs, each entry along the x-axis indicates that this group was shown to be the aggressor in the article.

As stated previously, the aim of this paper is not to verify that one “side” of the debate over who attacked first or who started what is more correct than the other—rather, I focus on the discrepancy between the three news sources over who the “aggressor” actually was. In the JP, Palestinians are disproportionately more likely to be portrayed as the aggressor in the headlines and ledes, whereas in the NYT or BBC, either both sides or neither of the sides were portrayed as such in both headlines and ledes. When a side was portrayed as the aggressor, the NYT was more likely to portray Palestinians in that position in their headlines, whereas the leads were so slightly leant on the other direction. The BBC, however, had the opposite inclinations, with Israelis overshadowing Palestinians as the aggressors slightly in headlines, and then more so in the stories’ leads.

Peled-Elhanan similarly found in textbooks that, especially in cases of disproportionate Israeli violence, context is used to legitimate Israeli aggression or military action. In one example of a textbook’s retelling of the Dier
Yassin massacre, or as the book refers to it, the Dier Yassin “affair” or “episode,” the textbook begins with “‘the dreadful, cruel, and bloodthirsty massacres by Arabs of [Jewish people]’ in order to counterbalance the negative impression created by the Dier Yassin episode...in this context, the Dier Yassin ‘affair’...is made to seem absolutely justified according to Israeli norms of deterrence and revenge.”

Even as the casualties of Operation Protective Edge continued to be stacked far higher on the Palestinian side, in the JP as a whole and in the NYT’s headlines, Palestinians were portrayed disproportionately as the aggressor, implicitly justifying the disproportionate Israeli response—even as other news outlets, even such as the BBC, do not frame events in such a manner.

IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THREE REPRESENTATIVE ARTICLES

On July 7 and 8, the JP, the NYT, and the BBC published news articles concerning the escalation of conflict between Israel and Hamas towards the beginning of Operation Protective Edge.

BBC Article

The BBC chooses Hamas rockets as its news peg for the article, chronicling the back and forth of rockets and airstrikes that followed, and then expanding the focus to discuss the deaths of three Israeli teens in the previous month and the death of a Palestinian teen following that.74 The article lists a report from Hamas that nine Palestinians, including a woman and two children, and five of its fighters were killed because of Israeli airstrikes and explosives, and a quote from Lt. Lerner of the IDF not taking responsibility for the deaths of the five fighters. The IDF itself is quoted justifying its airstrikes as hitting “terror sites,” and Hamas is quoted again describing airstrikes on its own fighters. The focus shifts to internal Israeli politics, including Lieberman and Netanyahu, as well as liberally quoting the visibly human Netanyahu on his condolences to the family of slain Palestinian teenager Khdeir. The article ends with Israeli authorities claiming to have arrested six suspects in Khdeir’s case, while also naming two Hamas operatives as responsible for killing three Israeli teenagers in the previous month, which Hamas denied.

In total, the BBC article uses ten Israeli sources compared to seven Palestinian sources. 398 words of the 550-word article are given to coverage of the Israeli side of events, while the remainder goes to Hamas sources. Israelis also see multiple facets of their society represented and quoted in this article, including the internal political front in the interplay between Lieberman and Netanyahu, as well as liberally quoting the visibly human Netanyahu on his condolences towards the Palestinian family affected by Israeli extremism. The Palestinian health ministry is quoted once, and all Hamas spokesmen remain unnamed. The only time a Palestinian civilian is quoted is at the very end of the article, when Khdeir’s family asserts their belief that Khdeir’s death was a revenge killing.

The article posits Israel as responding to Palestinian aggression, and only goes so far back as the deaths of three kidnapped Israeli teens in giving historical context for the aggression between Gaza and Israel.

The quality of images selected for this article showcases a variety of angles in which this story is covered, with civilian scenes of mourning, shots of the physical effects of Israeli airstrikes, and shots of the militaries of both sides. The video still of the airstrike on Gaza that starts the article bears a caption related to Gazan aggression rather than Israeli aggression, which would more accurately suit the photograph. Additional shots include a still from a video covering the mourning tent for Khdeir set up in Shufat, and a photograph of an emotional Palestinian funeral at the Bureij Refugee Camp. However, the dead Palestinians are unnamed and relegated to “militant” status by the photo caption. Another photograph immediately follows that image, showing armed Hamas fighters walking down the street, with the caption of “Militants in Gaza have stepped up rocket attacks on Israel in recent weeks,” as if to cast aside Palestinian mourning at once. The commonality of the usage of “militant” in both photos serves to implicitly link the two photos in readers’ consciousness, as if justifying the deaths of the two militants above because of a threatening-looking photo like the one below. A lone Israeli fighter is featured in the next image, sitting in a tank, with the caption of “The Israeli military has sent reinforcements to the frontier with Gaza.” The juxtaposition of this image with the above image of the line of Hamas fighters gives an inaccurate sense of scale of the conflict, in which Israeli forces hugely outnumber Gazan forces. The variety

74 Peled-Elhanan, Palestine in Israeli School, 187.
of these chosen photographs are undercut by
the biased quality of the caption-writing, which
countextualize the photographs in a pro-Israeli
way.

All in all, the number of Palestinian sources
is nearly but not quite equivalent to that of
Israeli sources used in this article, though
the number of words given to the Israeli
side of the article vastly outweighs words
given to the Palestinian side. Hamas and the
Palestinian people in general remain faceless
and nonhuman, only quoted when the article
refers to military activities. Additionally, the use
of photojournalism in this article furthers the
demonization of the Palestinian side, while the
ahistorical lack of context relegates Palestinians
to the position of “aggressor” with Israel only
“responding” to Hamas’ rockets.

NYT Article

The NYT article bears the headline “Israel
and Hamas Trade Attacks as Tension Rises” and
was published on July 8, 2014. The news peg of
this article is Hamas claiming responsibility for
rocket fire on over 40 targets with no injuries
or damage, which prompted Israel to conduct
more airstrikes and call up 40,000 reserve
soldiers. For historical context, the NYT starts a
little further back with the “collapse of American-
sponsored peace talks” and the attempts at a
Palestinian coalition government. Palestinians
are quoted referring to 23 dead from airstrikes,
and Israelis claimed two were wounded on
their side. There is some elaboration on the
background, which now only extends to the
killing and killing of the three Israeli
teenagers followed by the one Palestinian
teenager. Israeli military representatives are
quoted giving details about Hamas rocket
fire as well as the “150 targets” that the Israeli
military struck in response. Following that, the
article quotes authorities in Gaza on the death
count from the Israeli strikes, which killed
two teenagers targeting the civilian homes of
“Hamas members and officials.” A Health
ministry spokesman and President Abbas are
quoted against Israeli strikes, followed by many
different Israeli officials rationalizing Israeli
actions. Israeli civilians from Sderot are also
quoted alongside Gazan civilians, describing
day to day life. The article quoting a member
of the Khdeir family rejecting the government’s
condolences but accepting the 350 anti-
settlement Israelis that came to mourn at the
Khdeir home.

The narrative of Hamas as the primary
aggressor and Israel as a respondent is
reinforced continuously throughout the
article, beginning with the lead, “with Israel
carrying out extensive air attacks in response
to heavy rocket fire” and continuing with “…the
barrage of rockets…put pressure on the Israeli
government to respond with greater force.”
This statement implicitly and inaccurately
characterizes Hamas rockets as more
dangerous than they actually are, as they struck
mostly empty areas with barely any injuries
and no casualties.” With Israel’s state of the art
military, it is rather pressure from the political
and public sphere, such as the accusations
from Lieberman of Israel’s response not being
hardline enough toward Gaza, that heightened
Israeli military activity toward Gaza.

The headline for this article indicates
a “trade” of attacks, as if the scale and
proportionality on each side are equivalent.
The article dedicates 446 words out of the
total 1444 in the article to Palestinian sources
and events, whereas the remaining 998 go to
Israeli sources indirectly and directly quoted as
well as a narration of day-to-day events in Israel.
The article liberally describes the impact of
Hamas rockets on Israeli consciousness while
leaving out any mention of the effects of Israeli
airstrikes on the Gazan civilian population until
the last paragraphs.

The first image in the article is a shot
of Gaza City post-airstrike, though readers’
reactions to this image is tempered by the one-
sided sourcing of an Israeli official that claimed
that this strike fell on a military target. The next
photograph is a video still titled “‘Cutting the
Grass’ of Hamas’ Militancy,” a misleading title
due to the fact that it invokes “Hamas’ Militancy”
by providing a photograph of Gaza itself under
attack, reflecting Israel’s militancy as opposed
to Hamas’. Following that, a map that the NYT
compiled from statistics provided by both the
IDF and the Palestinian Center for Human
Rights

76 Steve Erlanger and Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Hamas Trade
Attacks as Tension Rises,” New York Times (New York City, NY),
com/2014/07/09/world/middleeast/israel-steps-up-offensive-
against-hamas-in-gaza.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias
%3Aw&_r=1.

77 Damien McElroy, “Can Hamas Rocket Attacks on Israel
Really Be Compared to the Blitz?” The Telegraph, July 24, 2014,
worldnews/middleeast/israel/10989250/Can-Hamas-rocket-attacks-
on-Israel-really-be-compared-to-the-Blitz.html.

23
shows locations where rockets from Hamas and airstrikes from Israel have landed; once again, this map fails to show the difference in scale and strength when comparing Hamas’ rockets and Israel’s disproportionate response, as well as the capacity given by the Iron Dome defense system and bomb shelters to protect Israel and Israelis from rockets, whereas Gazans have, as this article describes later, a five-minute warning before civilian homes are struck. An image of Palestinian civilians salvaging belongings from their destroyed home does indicate the scale of the devastation brought down upon Gazan citizens. An image of a lone Israeli tank and a video still of Gazans mourning the body of a dead fighter end the article’s photojournalism. In general, the quality of images in this article misrepresent the scale of Hamas attacks while downplaying the effects of Israeli airstrikes, painting an inaccurate picture of a level playing field between Hamas and Israel.

JP Article

The third and final article analyzed comes from the JP, published on July 7, 2014 with the headline “IAF strikes Gaza underground rocket launchers, terror tunnel amid heavy rocket fire.” The article opens with an account of Israeli airstrikes on “targets in the Gaza Strip” in response to “heavy rocket fire” on communities in the Negev region. The number of rockets and the places they “pounded” are then recounted, as well as the military targets that the IDF struck in response. Unnamed Palestinians are quoted as saying a boy was “moderately injured,” and then the IDF claims to have struck a tunnel aimed at “carrying out a terror attack against Israeli civilians.” The article gives more detail about the “targets in Gaza” that Israeli airstrikes have hit, and mentions nine “terrorists” killed. Though Hamas claims in the article that all were dead at the result of Israeli airstrikes, an IDF representative is quoted directly afterward arguing that they were mistakenly killed after triggering explosives in a tunnel. According to the source, five rocket launchers and a terrorist cell were targeted by the IDF in Gaza. Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri is quoted threatening Israel, and the article ends by mentioning a mortar shell coming from the Golan Heights, to which Israel responded with shooting.

The article quotes or mentions five Palestinian sources to seven Israeli sources, but the Israeli side is given weight in this article, as Palestinians have 105 words to 355 words given to Israeli-side events and sources. The language throughout this article posits Hamas as the primary and only aggressor, as well as constantly describing the targets struck by Israel as only military targets, even as this fact is not corroborated by Palestinian health authorities and other news organizations like the BBC and the NYT reporting on the ground. The context of the civilian death count resulting from Israeli airstrikes is also missing, while Hamas rockets are described in great detail, misleading readers about which side is militarily the most impactful. All in all, within the text of the article is a singular pro-Israeli viewpoint that demonizes and dehumanizes Gazans as aggressors in this situation in order to justify further military action.

The images in the article’s slideshow include an Israeli policeman removing a rocket, various shots of Israeli soldiers celebrating and walking, an Israeli tank, an Israeli launching a drone, more Israeli tanks, Israeli soldiers walking, a shot of Gaza City from afar with smoke rising from it, an Iron Dome rocket launcher, a tunnel from Gaza, and a soldier holding a rifle in a dark area. There are no images of Palestinian people, just Gaza City from afar, thus erasing human Palestinian presence in the narrative. Israeli soldiers are shown exhibiting a variety of emotions, including joy and determination, humanizing the Israeli soldiers on display and establishing empathy in the readers’ eyes towards Israeli soldiers. Israeli soldiers become familiar and human to the reader, while Palestinians either become absent entirely, relegated to an unimportant status in this story, or they become the menacing, faceless collective “Hamas.” The article overall posits a very one-sided recollection of events on July 7.

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

This survey of online news coverage of Operation Protective Edge found that news coverage from Western and Israeli sources fulfills Peled-Elhanan’s three-pronged
framework for describing the Palestinian people, using erasure, demonization, and justification.

The Israeli Jerusalem Post contained the most instances of each of these strategies in its writing, while the other surveyed publications followed behind. Of the three “prongs” of Peled-Elhanan’s framework for media analysis, “demonization” was the most clearly illustrated, with the disproportionate use of varying vocabularies upon actors of one side as opposed to another. The results from this study reinforce what Peled-Elhanan found in Israeli textbooks from the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Ultimately, the nature of media coverage of Palestinians reflects back on colonial anxieties as theorized by Franz Fanon and Edward Said. Zionism as a form of settler-colonialism required the gathering of a single community on the basis of ethnicity and religion from communities all around the world, which had spent thousands of years assimilating into local cultures through the diaspora. This new community thus lacked a common narrative and memory, which then had to be fabricated in order for it to become a cohesive people. With the inherent instability of a colonizers’ hold over the colonized, a collective memory had to be formed in a way that justified and legitimized the state of Israel as well as its actions against Palestinians. This formation of memory utilized the compartmentalization and binarization of Said’s theory of Orientalism in order to otherize Palestinians, as well as the tactics of demonization that the colonizers used upon the colonized. The legacy of these tactics has continued into the modern day, with Israeli aggression, military strategies, and expansion of settlements into occupied territories being offset by media representations of Palestinians that serve to legitimize the Israeli cause and a Zionist narrative of Israeli righteousness.

Problematic media representations of Palestinians compromise hope for diplomatic successes in lifting the occupation of the West Bank and the blockade on Gaza or in granting Palestinians true autonomy, as the representations permit Israel to impose its will with the help of the US as an ally unchecked by public opinion. As Palestinians grow frustrated with the status quo, they are bound to protest the occupation by many means, and Israel will once again respond with disproportionate force, thus perpetuating the cycle of military operation after military operation against the Palestinian people. Likewise, more equitable media representations of Palestinians would encourage people from the other side to see Palestinians in a three-dimensional light, as a people struggling for survival and autonomy and resisting settler-colonialism. These equitable portrayals could help in fostering empathic connections that Orientalist binaries and compartmentalizations tend to take away, and in turn assist in finding meaningful peace for this conflict.
INTRODUCTION
The inception of the Global War on Terror after the Sept. 11 attacks ushered in a new era of humanitarian civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were accompanied by a strategic shift in American military policy, which led to the prioritization of post-conflict reconstruction. The shift in the locus of conflict from actual combat to post-conflict competition for the loyalty of the population motivated the US military to convert humanitarian aid into a tool of military operations, employed to “win the hearts and minds” of locals. In an effort to gain control of humanitarian action in these new conflict theaters, the military attempted to integrate humanitarianism into the military chain of command. This “unity of command” model evolved over the course of the war in Afghanistan, shifting from an external, NGO-based structure to an internal structure for control of humanitarian action. In both forms, it had disastrous results for both the local population and for humanitarian civil-military relations during and after the war. As the US military moves forward from its engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is essential to assess the failures of the “unity of command” model and attempt to generate a replacement framework for humanitarian CIMIC.

UNITY OF COMMAND: THE MILITARY MODEL FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTION
As the prevalence of conventional, interstate warfare has waned, the US military has shifted to prepare for irregular security environments, counterinsurgency, and operations other than war. These new mission priorities have brought post-conflict reconstruction, and its accompanying humanitarian imperatives, to the forefront of military planning. The military’s new priorities were first articulated in Nov. 2005, when the Department of Defense (DoD) published Directive 3000.05, elevating stability operations to the status of “core US military missions” with “priority comparable to combat operations.” In other words, the post-conflict phase of military operations is now considered the “decisive phase” of engagement, perhaps even more vital to victory than actual combat. Such post-conflict reconstruction projects have historically been the purview of civilian institutions, like the United States Agency for International Development and the Department of State, international organizations, like the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Humanitarian aid, especially, has been delivered by NGOs independently of military operations or objectives. The US military’s undertaking of this role has shifted the balance of humanitarian aid delivery, and both US military and NGOs have struggled to adjust to the resultant overlap of military and humanitarian spheres.

The DoD has adjusted to its new focus by attempting to achieve “unity of command” by integrating NGOs and humanitarian action into the military chain of command (COC). Military doctrine places humanitarian CIMIC under the broad heading of Civil-Military Operations (CMO), which is defined as, “activities…that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions” and “coordinate the integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations.” Under this definition, the purpose of CMO, including CIMIC, is explicitly in support of the military and its goals. In other words,
humanitarian action is subordinated to military objectives, such as “winning the hearts and minds” or gaining mission acceptance from the population. The Bush administration’s rhetoric echoed the belief that NGOs and humanitarian aid are tools of the military: NGOs are often referred to as a “force multiplier” and a component of the military mission. The military has tried to integrate humanitarian aid into its own command structure via two mechanisms: attempting to subsume humanitarian NGOs into its command structure, and attempting to develop the internal capacity to deliver humanitarian aid itself.

When the military tries to use humanitarian aid or NGOs as part of “a commander’s range of tools for waging war,” it does so in defiance of fundamental humanitarian principles and norms. First and foremost, military action is definitionally excluded from the realm of humanitarian aid. Humanitarianism is based on the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. As a party to hostilities, the military cannot neutrally and impartially deliver aid to its adversaries; as a subordinate unit of the US government, it cannot be independent from American political and military goals. In the words of the ICRC, “Measures are humanitarian if they meet the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Aid measures that do not do this are not humanitarian, regardless of any well-meaning intentions and their effectiveness.” Therefore, the military cannot be considered a humanitarian actor.

Second, the military does not have the requisite skill set to carry out humanitarian action. The military’s hierarchical structure and specific training make soldiers hard-pressed to conduct long-term humanitarian projects that are tailored to local contexts. Structurally, the rigid COC makes it difficult for the military to respond to the nuances of localized requirements: orders sent down the COC stress universal, not local, models. Additionally, military personnel are trained to operate in “low context culture,” or environments in which they lack intelligence on their environment, thus relying on directives, specific orders, and a standard operation procedure (SOP) send down the COC. This form of training is inappropriate for the “high context” cultural and operational requirements of post-conflict reconstruction, where local communities place a high degree of significance on family or tribal status, age, gender, ethnicity, and social roles and expectations. Insensitivity to such factors can potentially derail the provision of aid by alienating locals from the planning and execution process. Reconstruction “requires a thorough intercultural understanding and an enduring commitment” that the US military fundamentally lacks, making it an ineffective provider of humanitarian aid.

Finally, the militarization of humanitarianism has translated into increased encroachment on humanitarian space. By undermining the perception of humanitarian neutrality in the local population, military humanitarianism jeopardizes the safety and effectiveness of actual humanitarian actors. The blurred lines of military and humanitarian action lead hostile forces to associate humanitarian workers with the occupying military. As such, militants are less likely to respect humanitarian neutrality, and more likely to target aid workers as a perceived extension of their military opponent.

No period in US military history has blurred the lines between military and humanitarian action more than the Global War on Terror, beginning with the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. During this period, all three of these obstacles to so-called military humanitarianism emerged during post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Although the US military implemented both models for unity of command, drawing NGOs into the military COC and developing humanitarian capabilities within the military, neither model was successful. The incompatibility between the military and humanitarian action derailed reconstruction in Afghanistan, and set a dangerous precedent for the future of humanitarian CIMIC.

**PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS: UNITY OF COMMAND FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN**

Military leaders stressed CIMIC from the outset of US operations in Afghanistan, and even invited humanitarian NGOs to participate in the Coalition Governing Council at US Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, FL. General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM Combatant Commander, set the tone for American military priorities in Afghanistan by describing a two-pillared model for military success: (1) “kill the bad guys,” and (2) “demonstrate to the Afghan people that they had the support of

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9  Ibid., 16.
10  Ibid., 14.
11  Ibid., 15.
the international community.” 13 Military leaders believed that they could accomplish the latter objective by harnessing the power of humanitarian aid to gain the trust of the Afghan public. To establish unity of command with humanitarian actors, the military initially tried to integrate NGOs into the military command structure via the Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF); following the failure of that endeavor, the military tried to carry out humanitarian action itself via Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Both tactics demonstrated the three primary flaws of the unity of command model for humanitarian civil-military coordination: the illegitimacy of the military as a humanitarian actor, the inability of the military to deliver humanitarian aid effectively, and the danger that the militarization of humanitarianism poses to humanitarians themselves.

CJCMOTF was established immediately after the collapse of the Taliban regime to spearhead the delivery of humanitarian aid and begin post-conflict reconstruction. Its eventual failure was emblematic of the flaws in the military’s unity of command model for humanitarian CIMIC. CJCMOTF had three primary functions in Afghanistan: to “win hearts and minds” and prevent the reemergence of hostilities, to “show the benign face of the Coalition” to the Afghan people, and to provide “access to relief and reconstruction resources for those local officials who supported the Afghan Interim Administration.” 14 The third function overtly violated core humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality by prescribing the use of humanitarian and reconstruction aid to reward local officials who supported the interim Afghan government. By displaying such blatant bias in the provision of aid, CJCMOTF’s fundamental political nature became apparent and was obviously unsuited to the label of humanitarianism.

The military initially invited NGOs, including the umbrella NGO InterAction, to attend CJCMOTF meetings at CENTCOM and contribute to the shape of military reconstruction efforts. Thus, all parties in the reconstruction effort and provision of humanitarian aid would be centralized under CENTCOM authority and direction, establishing unity of command. 15, 16 NGO representatives offered two predeployment recommendations for military action in support of humanitarian aims: providing security on the ground and repairing large-scale infrastructure that the Coalition had destroyed in battle. NGO representatives believed that these initiatives would allow NGO staff to maximize effective aid delivery, by establishing a safe humanitarian space for NGO operations and helping them transport supplies, but avoiding infringing on the NGOs’ principles by demanding too much involvement in traditional humanitarian projects. 17

CJCMOTF failed to implement both NGO recommendations, as did its operational units on the ground, the Coalition Humanitarian Cells (CHLCs). Their limited budget, which came from the DoD’s Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OCHDACA), was insufficient to repair major infrastructure, build police stations, or train or equip security forces. 18 Additionally, the CHLCs were confined to urban centers, preventing them from establishing security for NGOs operating in the provinces. The only projects that the CHLCs had both the funds and authorization to undertake were “quick-impact” reconstruction projects, such as drilling wells and building schools and clinics. The quick-impact projects duplicated NGO efforts in secure areas. NGO representatives who had initially hoped to establish a constructive relationship with the military were alienated by the military’s disregard for their input. 19 Additionally, the CHLCs introduced new threats to NGO staff, since CHLC personnel commonly wore civilian clothes and traveled in unmarked vehicles. Thus, the military’s humanitarian efforts put NGO workers’ lives in danger by enacting identical projects and appearing in civilian attire, thus curtailing humanitarian space in Afghanistan by creating the perception of overlap between humanitarian and military actors. As a result of these tensions, NGOs rejected invitations to attend weekly CJCMOTF meetings or participate in the reconstruction planning process from within the military COC. 20

Following the CJCMOTF failure, the military switched strategies and attempted to achieve unity of command by conducting humanitarian action independently from NGOs operating in the country. The first PRTs were established in Gardez in 2003, with the mission of “extending the influence of the central government outside the capital, providing a security umbrella for [NGOs] to operate... and

14 Ibid.
carrying out small-scale reconstruction projects based on concise needs assessments and local consultations.”

Despite commendation from the Bush administration during the war, the retrospective analysis of the PRTs’ performance is overwhelmingly negative: “Inconsistent mission statements, unclear roles and responsibilities, ad hoc preparation, and... limited resources have confused potential partners and prevented PRTs from having a greater effect on Afghanistan’s future.” Humanitarian NGOs criticized the PRTs for their ambiguous mandate, lack of constructive project implementation, and role in jeopardizing the safety of aid workers.

Like their predecessor, CJCMOTF, the PRTs were inextricably tied to American political objectives, invalidating them as humanitarian actors. They often used humanitarian aid as an incentive for local leaders to provide intelligence to US forces and cooperate with the US-backed interim Afghan government in Kabul. On May 12, 2004, the international NGO Medicins San Frontiers (MSF) issued a condemnation of the PRT practice of distributing leaflets in southern Afghanistan to inform the population that the delivery of aid was contingent on the provision of information on Taliban and al-Qaeda activities in the region. Most NGOs operating in Afghanistan at the time expressed the view that the instrumentalization of aid to manipulate the actions of the local population was contrary to every humanitarian value and “incompatible” with a cooperative relationship between NGOs and military forces.

The PRTs also remained focused on quick-impact projects, despite NGO criticism. Funding constraints from OHDACA continued to prevent the PRTs from establishing adequate security through consistent patrols and combat missions, and similarly impeded the reconstruction of large-scale infrastructure. Nevertheless, the quick-impact projects continued to infringe on and duplicate NGO operations. For example, in Kunduz, a PRT decided to take control of a hospital that had previously been part of the ICRC’s medical network. As a result, the ICRC withdrew from the hospital, ceding authority to Coalition forces. However, after the PRT’s deployment ended, their replacements decided that the program “no longer fitted in with its objectives or financing.” The new PRT dropped the hospital, necessitating renewed ICRC support. Similar blunders led Paul Barker and Paul O’Brien of CARE Intl. criticize the PRTs as “little more than a distraction from more serious discussions about country-wide security,” since they “have neither the resources nor the mandate to engage seriously in either reconstruction or security.”

Finally, the PRTs continued the trend of securitization of aid, as the military absorbed more and more aid work into its normal duties. This behavior put NGOs at risk by causing militants to devalue their neutrality and conflate civilian aid workers with military forces. Aid worker violence escalated rapidly in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the invasion. The shooting of five MSF aid workers in 2004 triggered that organization’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, citing intolerable security conditions. MSF cited military action for the deteriorating security situation and narrowing humanitarian space, saying, “in Afghanistan [these conditions] were due in large part to the US military forces’ assumption of the humanitarian mantle, traveling in unmarked vehicles in civilian clothes, carrying concealed weapons, and identifying themselves as humanitarians or ‘on a humanitarian mission.’” MSF did not return to Afghanistan until 2009.

Notably, there was wide variation in the performance of PRTs based on their national affiliation. The US PRT model received particularly scathing NGO criticism because of its focus on small-scale quick impact projects, tendency to operate out of uniform, use of aid conditionality, and failure to deliver aid impartially. The UK PRT model, on the other hand, had a security-centric orientation and a more precise “concept of operations,” according to a 2004 report by Save the Children UK. According to a statement from the UK-led PRT in Mazar e-Sharif, “Our concept of operations and development priorities are primarily concerned with: a. Government Institution Building and b. Security Sector Reform.” By emphasizing these efforts rather than school and clinic construction or food and water aid, the UK PRT model infringed less on traditional NGO/humanitarian areas of operation and avoided blurring the lines between military and humanitarian actors.

The failures of the unity of command models in Afghanistan caused extreme damage to humanitarian civil-military relations,
and led to animosity between the military and humanitarian NGOs. Many, including MSF, now promote a “traditionalist” approach to humanitarianism that emphasizes the distance between humanitarian actors and the dialogue on politics and peacebuilding. Representing the “most narrowly defined scope of humanitarian action,” this approach precludes any cooperation with military forces. The military has also become more hostile to NGOs, and has adopted a “with us or against us” rhetoric that reveals a fundamental lack of understanding of NGO principles. US Commander of Operation Enduring Freedom, Lt. General David Barno, criticized NGOs for trying to preserve neutrality in the theater: “They probably have to... realize that they are now operating in a different world.” The trend of increased estrangement is tragic, especially because cooperation is both critical and feasible. In the aftermath of Iraq and Afghanistan, the military has shown no signs of deviating from its focus on reconstruction and associated humanitarian components. NGOs will be forced to coexist with the military in complex emergencies around the world as US forces pursue stabilization and reconstruction objectives. If the two groups remain unable to cooperate, current trends in military efforts, such as duplication of NGO projects and infringements on humanitarian space, are likely to continue. Additionally, cooperation remains feasible: in the long-term, civilian humanitarian NGOs and military actors share the goal of helping societies scarred by conflict transition back to peace and stability. That goal can best be achieved through coordinated effort.

UNITY OF EFFORT: A MODEL FOR COOPERATION

The realities of the contemporary security environment demand that militaries and humanitarian NGOs cooperate in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The failures of that cooperation in Afghanistan, however, demonstrate that humanitarianism cannot be integrated into the military COC. Attempts at military domination of the humanitarian effort produced violations of humanitarian principles, ineffective humanitarian action, and a depleted humanitarian space. Instead of seeking to subordinate humanitarianism to military objectives, the military should construct a model of cooperation based on unity of effort. Unity of effort requires coordination and dialogue, but maintains independence, thus reestablishing the distinction between military and humanitarian action while allowing both actors to work towards their common

goal of reconstruction. The unity of effort model is based on three factors: preserving humanitarian space, acting in accordance with comparative advantage, and promoting better understanding between NGOs and the military. The military’s primary role in the humanitarian civil-military relationship should be safeguarding the humanitarian space. By prioritizing security, the military can create a protected bubble in an unstable post-conflict environment that can be filled with neutral assistance efforts conducted by NGOs. The military can also help NGOs reinforce that space through a variety of support tasks, including rebuilding infrastructure to enable supply transportation, restoring lines of communication and air traffic control, and facilitating logistics such as the transportation of NGO assets and relief supplies. While conducting these support tasks, the military must emphasize its distinct nature to avoid the “blurred lines” phenomenon observed in Afghanistan. Personnel should be in uniform at all times, military vehicles should be clearly identifiable, and military personnel must not identify themselves as humanitarian workers or as “engaged in a humanitarian mission.” By reestablishing the separation between humanitarians and military forces, the military will reduce the risk to civilian aid workers and arrest the securitization of aid.

In order to properly allocate tasks between the military and humanitarian NGOs, the two groups should examine their comparative advantages. The military should focus on tasks that benefit from its hierarchy and efficient structure, while simultaneously not threatening the humanitarian projects enacted by NGOs. These tasks include creating security and providing protection for the relief effort, rebuilding infrastructure, and security-related support tasks including the demobilization of fighters and demining operations. As the CIMIC experience in Afghanistan demonstrates, the military is often ill equipped for traditional humanitarian efforts, such as health, education, water, and food aid. As such, those tasks should be allocated to NGOs to conduct independently of military oversight. This separation of tasks should be consistently enforced and overridden only in the case of extreme emergency, such as a humanitarian crisis in the midst of a security situation that prohibits NGO operation.

Finally, the US military and NGOs should work towards a greater understanding of their respective cultures, values, and roles in post-conflict reconstruction. The military has

35 Rana, “Contemporary challenges,” 578.
historically struggled to grasp the importance of humanitarian principles, and must gain a greater respect for the fundamental tenants of humanitarian action in order to facilitate a functional working relationship and check the impulse to violate those principles. Respect will stem from a two-way dialogue between humanitarian actors and military personnel, channeled through horizontal relationships and low-level interfacing. These relationships can be encouraged by both the military and NGOs. Military training should include internships, staff exchanges, and joint conferences with representatives from the NGO community. The military should also institutionalize the position of Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD), a senior Foreign Service Officer with CIMIC experience who could advise the Combatant Commander on best practices. NGOs might consider emulating the ICRC’s Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces, a group of military and police specialists who conduct “dissemination” efforts and work to make the role and identity of the ICRC known to armed forces worldwide. By increasing mutual respect, the US military and humanitarian NGOs will be able to more effectively cooperate in complex security environments without the destruction of humanitarian space.

CONCLUSION
The disaster of humanitarian CIMIC in Afghanistan demonstrated the dysfunctionality of the unity of command model that the US military has pursued since the inception of the Global War on Terror. The model is crippled by the military’s illegitimacy as a humanitarian actor, its inability to effectively deliver humanitarian aid, and the damage that the militarization of aid does to the humanitarian space. Subsequent animosity on both sides of the relationship, with the “traditionalist” trend among NGOs on one hand and the military’s apparent disregard for humanitarian principles on the other, is equally destructive in the contemporary security environment. The rising importance of irregular warfare and post-conflict reconstruction demands that the military and NGOs work in concert toward their shared goal: a stable and peaceful society in the aftermath of war.

By abandoning the competition for superiority and control engendered in the unity of command model, and adopting a cooperative but independent dialogue-based model for relations, the military and humanitarian NGOs can rebuild the humanitarian space and prepare for future challenges. Under the unity of effort model, the US military and humanitarian NGOs can acknowledge that they share similar objectives and benefit from cooperation, as long as that cooperation is based on mutual respect, comparative advantage, and well-defined boundaries. In the context of ongoing wars in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere, a “reset” in humanitarian civil-military relationships is critical to post-conflict reconstruction. The US military and international NGOs should reexamine their relationships and set aside the collective hostility of the past 15 years of the Global War on Terror in order to open the door for more successful resolutions to current and ongoing crises.

37 Rana, “Contemporary challenges,” 583.
Trading is easier than ever before. The rate at which global populations have been growing is far greater than at any point in the past. Through the advent of more advanced communication and transportation technology, our world is in the process of integrating internationally. An interchange of cultures and ideas has sprouted from this globalization. Beyond more cultural awareness, however, our constantly changing environment has permanently transformed the ways in which countries maintain relationships as well as the potential for economic growth. In turn, these changes in international relationships have forever altered the focal points of diplomacy. When at one point the landscape of diplomacy between nations was greatly influenced by old Great Power alliances, or at another point by a mutual fear of nuclear destruction, the landscape of diplomacy today, especially concerning the world’s superpowers, is most influenced by economic interdependence.

The last century has seen the birth of a new type of governmental body: the supranational institution. The formation of supranational institutions is one way in which smaller powers have been economically affected by globalization. The European Union, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund all heavily influence the economic, and consequently political, growth of both developed and developing countries. A neofunctionalist’s analysis of these globalizing institutions’ efficacy concludes that, “through [economic] programs and policies, a pattern of upward convergence initiates in which the less developed nations in the institution will gradually be impacted by the policies,” resulting in their economic levels’ slow increase over time until, theoretically, they reach those of the institution’s more developed nations. Supranational institutions, however, are only one small example of globalization’s effects on the global economy and diplomacy. Evidently, such a neofunctionalist analysis only addresses the fates of small economic powers. I will focus on the effects of globalization and economic dependency on the largest powers.

The average person going about his life in Missouri likely does not think about power politics. When struggling with his personal day-to-day affairs, job opportunity and economic security are of a greater importance. In fact, when judging the efficacy of their government, Americans often base their presidential approval ratings on the effects a president’s leadership has had on unemployment rates and economic conditions. Therefore, when considering how to approach relationships with certain economically vital nations, appealing to the average person making up the American constituency is essential. Political scientists have studied this audience reaction in the past.

James Fearon, a political science professor at Stanford University, posits that in times of crises, a leader’s decision to escalate or back down endures audience costs based on perception of his foreign policy skill. The same conceptual response holds true for the consequences of economic collapse. In times of recession or market collapse, the public blames its federal government and subsequently questions the government’s economic policy strategy. For example, when the United States entered the Great Depression in 1929, although “his predecessors’ policies undoubtedly contributed to the crisis, which lasted over a decade, Hoover bore much of the blame in the minds of the American people.”

The United States’ economy did rebound. Now, decades later, it is the largest in the


world, yet it struggles to maintain that status. While many believe diplomatic relationships between countries have historically been most influenced by security, I will attempt to marshal evidence toward supporting a new hypothesis: **Hypothesis:** Trade and economic interdependency have replaced security as the biggest drivers affecting diplomatic relationships between great powers.

**CASE STUDY: UNITED STATES & CHINA**

For decades, the United States had no diplomatic relations with China. In the first half of the 20th century, the Middle Kingdom held no place of economic significance in the world. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, however, China quickly worked to improve its economic status. Deng set China on a path toward economic innovation, believing that the “only way to avoid a dead end is to deepen reform and opening both at home and with the world.”

Since then, China has morphed into the world’s largest exporter, becoming externally reliant on other countries to import its cheap products. The United States’ parallel need for those cheap products has thrust the two countries into a strong co-dependency built upon a fragile foundation. To be more specific, China “constitutes a $300 billion market for US firms if you combine both exports and sales in China by firms with US investment,” according to the Congressional Research Service. The total trade between China and the US reached half a trillion dollars in 2013, which represents a very significant chunk of both countries’ total economic output. The US’s relationship with China now, due to the economic interdependence previously summarized, is one of weakness. The US is forced to tolerate China and its slow but noticeable challenges to American global power because of China’s place in the global economy.

Daryl Press, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, proposes the existence of two theories of credibility: "past actions" theory and "current calculus" theory. The former, he argues, indicates that a nation’s decisions in maneuvering its diplomatic agenda depend on other nations’ records for either keeping or breaking commitments in the past. The "current calculus" theory instead posits that each new decision is made independent of past actions so only balance of power and current slated interests should be considered. China was the United States’ enemy when it was a rising power and when it was not vital to the United States’ economic interests. The United States did not tolerate Chinese territorial advancements in Korea during the Cold War in the way it is forced to tolerate, in some capacity, China’s advances in the South China Sea now. This is because, according to Press’s theory, current calculus theory holds that the economic advantages the United States will gain from continued diplomatic ties with China are too great to risk losing, which is a distinct possibility should the United States oppose China’s geopolitical decisions. Of course, worse relations between the two countries would be detrimental for China as well. Regardless, it seems the United States is unwilling to take the risk of making the first move against its antagonist. Despite the United States’ past actions of getting involved in other countries’ affairs, it exerts self-control regarding China in many other capacities.

In May of 2016 Chinese legislators passed a law granting police broad authority to begin supervising foreign nonprofit groups. It grants police the power to question NGO administrators, search residences and facilities, seize files and equipment, and have unrestricted access to organizations’ computers and bank accounts. The American government immediately condemned the law, citing human rights concerns. The Obama administration, however, reacted quickly and sternly to the law’s passage, warning that it would constrict contacts between individuals and groups in the US and China. Under this new level of Chinese police scrutiny, foreign individuals and organizations may just decide that it is too much trouble to carry out their activities in China, and simply move to another country instead. Obama, while concerned about human rights, cannot afford to see the mass exodus of American NGOs from China as it would be deleterious to preserving the economic relationship that provides the United States its economic benefits.

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7 Ibid.


9 Ibid.


States with its stability. Beyond impacting the US' diplomatic relations with China regarding NGOs, the US's economic dependence on China also influences its conduct of policy regarding Taiwan.

During the Cold War the United States supported ruthless dictators multiple times to prevent the spread of communism. It fought valiantly for democracy in the past, yet now it refuses to formally stand with Taiwan, a democratic quasi-nation governed by the People's Republic of China's former government. China insists on denying Taiwanese sovereignty. While the United States at one point may have opted to be the champion of democracy for Taiwan, it will not now. The "cultural and economic ties between the United States and Taiwan are important, but limited. America is ever less likely to intervene on Taiwan's behalf." Simultaneously, "China's economy is now so big and so central to global trade and capital flows that the consequences of any disruption would be just as serious for America as for China." It is indisputable that fully supporting Taiwan would result in an aforementioned disruption. China would be forced to respond since, as Thomas Schelling explained in his work Arms and Influence, it is committed to defending its stance of continued Taiwan control as it cannot afford to lose face by backing down. In fact, doing so would cast doubt on its willingness to defend other ownership claims in the future, such as those hotly contested in the South China Sea. The United States ensures no ambiguity by officially publishing on its Department of State website that "The United States does not support Taiwan independence." It did not even officially endorse Taiwan's most recent democratic presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-Wen, because doing so would have enraged China. In both actions and rhetoric, the United States compromises its democratic values in its treatment of Taiwan. Curiously though, despite the fact that the United States chooses not to recognize Taiwan as an (independent) country for the purpose of appeasing China, it provides Taiwan with defensive weaponry.

According to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the US may provide Taiwan with defensive weaponry "to enjoy a robust unofficial economic relationship." Taiwan is in fact the United States' 10th largest trading partner. The US attempts to toe the line between supporting and not supporting Taiwan to maximize its economic gains. It compromises democracy by delegitimizing Taiwanese sovereignty yet also compromises security with China by providing Taiwan with defensive weapons. Money is a primary driving factor behind the United States' diplomatic relationships with China and Taiwan. As the economic relationship between the United States and China drives their relative international diplomatic relationship, however, it also affects those nations economically displaced by the US's newfound Asian relationship, particularly countries from Europe.

The European Union is so desperate to shift the United States' priority and economic trade dependency back to Europe that it is supporting a trade law slapped with huge safety ramifications. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will provide more benefits in trade between the US and the EU, but at a cost. The bill "is about reaching behind the barriers and removing the standards and rules big business don't like dealing with, like labor standards, environmental standards, food safety standards." More specifically, the EU is passing for an end to port inspections of imports and exports, which could lead to food safety problems, among other risks of exposure to overseas contaminants. This bill will harmonize the regulations and standards between the EU and the US, though it will not do so in the public's favor. Since EU regulations are considerably stricter, instead of mandating heightened US regulations, it will deregulate the EU to American standards. Intimidated by the United States' pivot to Asia, the EU is willing to sacrifice the immediate welfare of its citizens for economic gains. The bill has been described has having "irreversible impacts on health, food, labour, product safety, environmental, social standards [and] privacy standards." If the bill is successful, it will not only prove the influence economic interdependence between the US and China has over their own populations, but also over the 28 countries that make up the European Union.

China already holds over $1.2 trillion of US debt in bills, notes, and bonds, which is over 8 percent of total US debt, according to the Department of the Treasury. If the United States does not build a better relationship and

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17 Ibid.
chooses to squabble over small issues with China, it will continue to rely on income from selling its treasuries to other countries. This will only continue as long as the US dollar remains the most valuable. If the United States doesn’t grow alongside China, the value of the dollar will continue to fall, as the currency of a country going further and further into debt will no longer be envied. Asymmetric rebalancing will become a very real danger if the US and China do not work together in coming years to converge to equal savings. This is contingent upon a growing trust. For these escalating reasons, the United States’ diplomatic decision-making will continue to be more heavily influenced by economic dependence moving forward.

CASE STUDY: CHINA AND AFRICA

Amid China’s intense period of economic growth, its energy consumption rates have grown by more than twice the global average for the last ten years. China and Africa do not share nearly the same level of interdependence as China and the United States do, yet China’s recent pivot to Africa is borne of necessity.

China is providing considerable loans to finance infrastructure projects in Africa, and African countries are choosing to work with China since Chinese loans do not possess the same political conditionality as those offered by international monetary institutions, like the IMF. The IMF’s limiting conditions “focus on politically contentious areas, such as public-sector wage cuts or private sector reform,” and China’s dearth of required natural resources to fuel its rapidly growing economy has spurred this new diplomatic relationship. China’s newfound interest in Africa is primarily driven by three key considerations.

Firstly, China needs resources, notably crude oil, to power its modern, growing economy and to support its expanding industrial base. The rapid growth of its manufacturing sector has also “created increased domestic demand for natural resources including oil and gas, precious metals, aluminum, copper and iron ore.” These are natural resources that Africa has in abundance.

Secondly, China views Africa’s population as a potential new consumer market for Chinese products. China’s growth relies heavily on its manufacturing sector. Just as the United States has played a vital consumer role in that interdependent relationship, China needs a new consumer to “satisfy its deep growth trajectory.”

Thirdly, new economic policies in African nations have liberalized previously monopolized industries, drawing Chinese interest.

China is providing financial services to facilitate African infrastructure projects in a neo-colonialist way in exchange for the continent’s natural resources. It is not interested in African culture, a security position, or a budding friendship. It is siphoning materials like oil, iron, copper, and zinc from the continent to fuel its own burgeoning economy. It is creating a new economic relationship of interdependency. About one-third of China’s energy imports may come from Sub-Saharan Africa, though the Asian superpower is not the only party becoming entrenched in its investments.

African countries’ combined loan money from China in 2014 constituted 13 percent of the total loan money the continent received that year, and the countries have become so eager to receive further aid from China that they have actually started creating wish lists. “Unfortunately,” says a partner at the global law firm Dentons whose clients include African governments as well as private investors, “these aren’t necessarily projects that are bankable, or are sufficiently thought through, in order to attract and develop the financing. I looked over the Ivory Coast’s so-called wish list last week or so, and it really is becoming quite substantive.”

Governments are hurriedly compiling potential projects that are, in the opinion of a Wharton scholar, unfeasible, in order to attract further Chinese investment.

Furthermore, China has started mandating a quota for African workers on these projects. Speaking from a strictly utilitarian sense, this is good for both the Chinese and the Africans. The Chinese can take advantage of cheaper labor than they would find domestically, while Africans have access to more jobs. It is dangerous, however, for Africans to become dependent on Chinese infrastructure development jobs, as China is not helping Africa’s development out of selflessness. Instead, it is doing so to pocket resources. When China no longer has a need for Africa’s resources, what will become

23 Ibid.
of the population dependent on these projects for work? The diplomatic relationships China is forging in Africa are constructed out of economic intent, and they have created an unbalanced interdependency that will only function for as long as China needs Africa’s resources. When a cheaper or more feasible siphon source gives the clarion call, China will have no more interest in the region.

CONCLUSION

Globalization has thrust countries all around the world into a rapidly spinning engine of interconnectedness. While this has led to more intercultural awareness and expanded global citizenry, it has also fueled the creation of many economically interdependent relationships. The demand for growth, and the level of growth made standard by modern superpowers has all but put leaders at the mercy of their economies. Constituencies demand economic progress, and the audience cost for a lack of progress is large, as posited by Fearon. This demand, in turn, often forces governments to make diplomatic decisions regarding relationships with other nations not out of amicable partnership or security, but out of the current calculus of economic necessity, as theorized by Press.

The United States and China sit at an interminable position defined by intractable economic problems. The United States cannot afford to lose any positive ground with China, and consequently lets its policy decisions in areas like NGO access and Taiwan be heavily influenced by what it believes to be China’s possible responses. China simultaneously is seeking new relationships in Africa, forcing the region to grow more and more dependent on its projects in order to maintain a reliable source of additional natural resources needed to fuel its own economy. As long as the world continues to become more interconnected, relationships will continue to be defined by economic interdependence, as policy decisions among two of the most powerful and influential countries in the world today have shown.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom (UK) houses one of the most developed public healthcare systems in the industrialized world. Its services are free at the point of need for more than 58 million UK permanent residents, a vast majority of the population, and all emergency services are free of charge. The NHS quite successfully provides primary services, such as visiting a general practitioner (GP) for cost-free checkups, but the complicated payment structure for more specialized services means that the system may not fully satisfy the health needs of all its residents. In particular, UK residents in lower income brackets cannot afford all necessary services. Barriers still remain with regards to accessing secondary and tertiary services, despite the mission of the NHS to reduce inequalities in healthcare access. Furthermore, residents who speak limited English may also find it hard to access clear explanations of NHS services beyond those services publicly funded for all permanent residents. The refugee and asylum seeker population in the UK are a special subset of underprivileged migrants, often more economically constrained than other immigrant groups. An investigation into the services available to this group of forced migrants thereby reveals the obstacles to access that exist in the NHS, including demographics, services available, information dissemination, as well as linguistic and cultural barriers.

FORCED MIGRANTS IN THE UK HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
Overall, the NHS system functions in a decentralized manner, with regional operations divided between NHS England, NHS Scotland, NHS Wales, and Health and Social Care in Northern Ireland. The basic services offered by GPs and the process of referral to specialists for more complicated cases are similar throughout all regions of the UK. However, depending on one’s region of residence, the local NHS branch may offer additional social care services such as mental illness support or rehabilitation. In particular, Northern Ireland and Scotland approach public healthcare using an “integrated” methodology, Wales has begun integrating its medical and social care systems in 2009, and England currently does not employ any type of mixed system. Even so, the aggregate effect of making social services available through NHS is small, as the combined population of Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland is around 10.1 million, while England’s population is around 53 million. Much of the population resides in the Southeast, and so the lack of social care provided by NHS England limits the services available to underprivileged groups such as refugees and asylum seekers. It is important to also note that a much smaller, but still significant, private sector functions alongside the NHS, accounting for 9.5 percent of the UK’s healthcare spending.

Although refugees and asylum seekers are not, by far, the largest segment of the UK’s population, they tend to be more vulnerable within the healthcare system due to linguistic

2 Chang et al., The UK Health Care System, 3.
4 Ibid.
5 Chang et al., The UK Health Care System, 2.
and cultural barriers. For the purposes of this paper, the terms “refugees,” “asylum seekers,” and general “forced migrants” will be used interchangeably despite the significant legal differences; these groups of migrants often share socio-economic status and experience the healthcare system similarly. From 1990 to 2000, around 330,000 asylum seekers entered the UK’s borders from thirty-five countries around the world, and most settled in London and greater Southeast England. Given such dispersion, the NHS in London and Southeast England may face additional pressure. This branch of the NHS also does not provide integrated social services. In areas of the UK that traditionally receive fewer asylum seekers, there may be fewer support systems to educate the new residents about their local healthcare providers and their NHS rights. Once forced migrants are granted asylum or receive refugee status, they are able to take advantage of all the legal protections granted to permanent residents and access basic NHS services at no cost. If trends continue and the Brexit vote does not drastically alter UK immigration policy, the UK will continue to see a steady immigration of this particular underprivileged sector. These changing international immigration and forced migration patterns are reflected in the NHS: that is, as the number of low-income, asylum seeker residents in the UK changes, so does the overall demand for inexpensive services as well as the cost borne by taxpayers.

Legislation has been passed in recent years to reduce the amount of cash benefits that an asylum seeker may claim up to only 70 percent of basic income support, and also forbids this group from working for the first six months of their residency in the UK. These limited financial prospects make it especially difficult for a transitioning family to spend money on services that may be seen as superfluous, such as those medical services intended to improve quality of life, but may not have life-and-death determinations. While the majority of refugees and asylum seekers face heightened risk for trauma due to the nature of fleeing regions of persecution and conflict, three countries in particular have seen significant increases in asylum applications to the UK in recent years. Time series datasets through 2016 have shown that the numbers of asylum seekers from Iraq, Bangladesh, and India have seen marked increases in recent years. A closer look at these countries reveals them to be regions surrounded by increased religious conflict. Therefore, it is within reason to believe that refugees from these regions may suffer from psychological stress in addition to any physical illnesses they may have acquired prior to entering the UK. In particular, refugee women are less likely than others to seek job training to work outside the home and more likely to suffer from domestic violence. Women in refugee populations may experience higher health risks, may be reluctant or unable to access care, and thus may need additional community support to access effective healthcare.

Indeed, research from the past several decades suggests that refugees tend to require more specialized health services. In one instance, a study conducted by the UK’s Home Office in 1999 on a sample of 4,000 Kosovo refugees airlifted into the UK noted that the vast majority of these new residents required long-term counseling for trauma. The specifics of the Home Office’s research are unavailable to the general public, as the details were presented via confidential recommendations to Parliament. Despite the fact that a later, unpublished study revealed that nearly half of the Kosovo refugees mentioned in the Home Office account felt that they were healthy, the question of asylum seeker and refugee care remains a difficult one. The dearth of further data makes it difficult to gauge whether the Kosovo refugees sampled in the above study replied that they did not need extensive medical attention because they truly held different understandings of “medical need,” or if they did not understand their healthcare rights and were afraid that their UK residential status would be revoked. Despite the difficulties of this research, most studies conducted by UK authorities have consistently found the forced migration population to be at higher risk for physical, mental, prenatal, and

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
social problems. Yet even these studies are thought to underestimate health risks because forced migrants tend to seek official healthcare less often due to financial and social reasons. Services that many Western doctors view as essential to a patient’s long-term health, such as regular psychologist appointments for trauma patients, other cultures can deem excessive or unnecessary. Ultimately, the NHS’ provision of more niche services and its cost structure for secondary and tertiary health services mean that forced migrants tend to face higher barriers to access than other UK populations.

NHS SERVICE AND PAYMENT TRENDS

Primary services are available to all permanent and temporary residents in the UK, although non-taxpayers may face higher costs for certain services than taxpayers. Treatment is not restricted by nationality and costs depend only on one’s term of stay in the UK. The NHS is generous in that even if a temporary resident in the UK cannot pay for emergency treatments or a hospital stay, healthcare providers are still legally obligated to perform lifesaving services. Some GP and dental practices can refuse to accept a temporary resident onto their list of NHS patients, but again, only if the patient’s case is not a medical emergency. Forced migrants do not often encounter these issues, since most are granted permanent residency status. Payment structures vary depending on the treatment sought and the patient’s immigration status. In cases where a patient receives lifesaving treatment but cannot continue paying until full convalescence, the UK government reserves the right to remove the patient back to his or her home country once their medical situation has stabilized. Non-residents who pay a “healthcare surcharge,” which varies depending on the length of one’s stay and country of origin, may see a reduced cost in NHS services during their stay when they apply for a UK visa. Although specific regulations differ slightly by sub-region, these broad trends in payment schemes are seen throughout NHS system.

Services offered by the NHS vary in terms of payment coverage, which can be confusing to new immigrants and short-term residents. In many cases, GP services are widely advertised, while other basic healthcare programs such as dental services can cost patients extra and are not as thoroughly explained to forced migrants. The NHS makes a much more concerted effort to spread the knowledge of how to access a GP’s services by providing pamphlets advertising the service in more than thirty languages. Yet the pamphlet, only four pages long, cannot thoroughly explain the NHS’ GP services. It may still be valuable to refugee populations because of the emergency contact information available: every asylum seeker granted residency in the UK is provided information with local contacts and directly assigned a GP before even arriving at a new area of residency. The extent to which the NHS streamlines the process of connecting refugees to GPs clearly highlights that the NHS has taken successful steps towards completing its mission to provide basic healthcare services to UK residents of all nationalities. Even so, the support that forced migrants receive in introducing them to primary care is still quite limited compared to the detailed English resources explaining the NHS’ workings available to English-speaking immigrant populations.

Secondary and tertiary treatments, such as visiting an ophthalmologist or undergoing long-term continued care for a disability, are judged on a case-by-case basis to determine both the level of emergency and the amount that the patient must pay. The specifics of payment and services included under a resident’s care package are difficult to track, which presents challenges especially for asylum seekers who speak and read limited English. For instance, “non-emergency dental visits,” which describe the majority of dental visits, are priced in bands of £19.70, £53.90, or £233.70, though pregnant women and children below eighteen years of age receive free dental services. The lowest

17 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
band covers basic diagnosis and polishing, with the occasional x-ray, while the highest band may include procedures such as crowns and denture setting. While basic dental services are priced within an acceptable range for most working adults, for many underprivileged families the cost may be seen as an excessive luxury. Although the NHS may evaluate that some patients may not necessarily need dental care as part of a free health service package, it is still a significant addition to improving quality of life. Hence, it is important that the NHS consider improving forced migrant access to at least basic dental services, even if normal dental care is not considered a life-saving procedure.

Moreover, all permanent residents in England are entitled to free maternity care, and refugees are exempt from all NHS charges when they seek medical care under these conditions. However, the general pamphlet on GPs distributed to asylum seekers only notifies them of basic contacts for medical needs, and does not specifically address the issues of maternity care. A GP may be able to guide a pregnant refugee woman if she happens to come in for an appointment during her pregnancy, but the healthcare system will not be able to provide adequate support for pregnant asylum seekers who do not go in for checkups at all. The NHS, then, fails to adequately support those forced migrant women who hope to start families in the UK. Without government-spearheaded programs, few avenues for learning about the intricacies of the healthcare system are available for refugees with limited English proficiency, as most regulations regarding more complicated medical treatments are written in English.

In terms of mental health care, NHS needs to take further steps to deliver high-quality services to all its residents, particularly refugees. For instance, data for England reveals that for every quarter from 2010-2016, British mental health services provided early intervention services only to an average of around 7,500 patients at risk for psychosis. Unfortunately the figures do not detail the age, gender, or income backgrounds of the patients receiving the intervention services. They do suggest that the use of mental health services is quite low; psychiatric services may be one of the more fringe services provided through the NHS. However, many refugees suffer from psychological issues such as severe depression, PTSD and anxiety, which may create a higher demand for services to deal with mental illness than in the general UK population. The free services provided by the GP may treat physical problems, for example by immunizing children, but may not adequately deal with mental ones such as the aftereffects of problems of prevalent domestic violence or long-term isolation. Forced migrants constrained by both difficulties in accessing information and by the fact that mental health services may be less developed in general. Overall, then, the healthcare system may not adequately provide for the needs of underprivileged populations.

TRENDS IN HEALTHCARE ACCESS AND SOCIETAL ATTITUDES

Despite the NHS’ dedication to providing universal basic healthcare, trends of unequal access prevail. In particular, Stephen Morris, Matthew Sutton, and Hugh Gravelle undertook a study using data from the Health Survey for England from 1998-2000 to test how socio-economic positions affected healthcare access. The study revealed that health consciousness in the UK increases with higher education levels and is not positively affected by income. In general, the data revealed that income did not have a marked effect on a patient’s propensity to visit their GP, while having higher education was correlated with a higher propensity to access healthcare. For instance, all income categories were associated with a negative propensity to consume healthcare services, with skilled non-manual workers experiencing a -0.006 marginal effect on number of GP consultations and unskilled manual workers accessed August 17, 2016. https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/mental-health-community-teams-activity/.


27 Burnett and Peel, “Asylum seekers and refugees in Britain,” 546-547.


29 Ibid., 1260.
-0.001. Consequently, residents with an A level education or equivalent saw a marginal improvement of 0.014 in terms of propensity to utilize GP services. In light of the NHS' mission, the fact that the data reveal propensity to access primary healthcare in the UK is not positively dependent on income underscores that the NHS is making significant steps towards reducing barriers to accessing basic healthcare and inequities between the rich and poor. These findings prove important in revealing that refugees and other underprivileged migrants more easily access healthcare in the UK than in those countries where healthcare is income-dependent. Even so, this does not discount other barriers to access. The education bar revealed by the Health Survey for England data suggests that a central factor in determining one's propensity to utilize healthcare effectively is one's ability to understand the importance of long-term healthcare. Asylum seekers are less likely than other groups of immigrants to have received a formal education or schooling in English. The result is that they may be less comfortable with seeking out more information regarding their health options beyond the bare minimum introduced to them through government advertising. These sentiments are echoed by research conducted by Maria Goddard and Peter Smith, which reveals that socio-economic status is associated negatively with one's propensity to undergo preventative screening for disease. In general, women and people of ethnic minority descent are less likely to seek out secondary or tertiary levels of medical care. These higher-level services tend to refer to those that require a specialist reference from a GP, such as cardiac surgery or plastic surgery, and are thereby more likely to incur additional fees, which may be unaffordable to many refugee families who may be living off of government subsidies for months after moving to the UK. Hence, the general patterns of healthcare seeking activity once again underscore that the NHS is less successful in providing specialist services than basic services, except when more complicated services are required in cases of emergency.

Yet, specialist services tend to improve the productivity of underprivileged residents than standard GP visits when conditions are more serious than a GP can handle. Consider, for instance, someone who may need a hip replacement—a non-fatal, non-emergency medical situation. As seen in the example of the band prices in dental treatments, the more specialized the treatment, the more expensive the individual copay. General trends in healthcare access in the UK suggest that a typical refugee family with limited funds may not be able to pay for the procedure, which requires surgery and recovery. Although the procedure could bring benefit by perhaps allowing one more adult to seek a full-time job outside the home, the family must forgo the surgery because the NHS does not provide a feasible financial avenue for them to undertake the procedure.

Furthermore, attitudes adopted by existing local communities may discourage asylum seekers from seeking more specialist forms of healthcare. Refugees and asylum seekers tend to face significant uncertainty in their residential situations. Although it is possible for approved asylum seekers to eventually gain legal, long-term residency status, the complicated paperwork of asylum procedures leaves some residing in the country illegally after failing to complete the necessary documents, which increases the potential of deportation. They are often subject to othering by local and international media, which frames their existence as irregular or charity cases. Then, communities become unwilling to share public resources with these migrants, as they are rarely seen to be contributing positively to the community. As the UK prevents refugees from working during the first six months of residence, the public resents refugees for using social service, including healthcare, without paying the taxes that support the system. Moreover, some refugees who have escaped conflict zones with collapsed medical services have higher risks of diseases such as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis. Therefore, public health services may see containing the diseases and dealing with the mental health issues brought by refugees

30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 1937.
as an excessive drain on a system built to serve lawful taxpayers. Due to the othering of refugees in public opinion, the UK government may be less likely to improve information dissemination regarding NHS services available to asylum seekers. Societal impressions of the forced migrant population also decreases the likelihood that the NHS’ copay for secondary and tertiary medical procedures will become more affordable. Moreover, the hostile environment does not encourage refugees with questions about their rights and privileges to seek more support. Medical access for asylum seekers is thus constrained by the biases that local communities may hold towards refugee groups.

Thus, the UK healthcare system is strained by the public image of the refugee community, the community’s heightened need for healthcare services, and the difficulty that asylum seekers may have in determining avenues to seek medical help. The public image of refugees creates a tense environment for healthcare providers, who feel pressure to reduce costs and not to “waste” taxpayer funds on forced migrants’ health problems. Moreover, the public has begun to display nationalist sentiments echoing those of the UK’s former Minister of State for Health, who infamously said that the “NHS is a national institution and not an international one.” These negative feelings create an oppressive atmosphere for asylum seekers hoping to access healthcare, and dissuade public institutions from implementing costly community support programs. As seen from the recent heated discussions of the Brexit vote, feelings of negativity and hatred towards low-income, foreign national residents reach far beyond healthcare alone, to UK politics as a whole. Given such a political climate, the pathway to improving the health of underprivileged migrants needs to combine improvements to information dissemination on services provided for free to NHS care recipients, reductions in the copay for specialist services, and improving community sympathy for refugees in order to decrease the “othering” of their communities.

PROBLEMS WITH ADAPTING: CASE STUDIES

In a 2006 study conducted in Glasgow, fifty-two asylum seekers from several countries, including Morocco, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Russia, were interviewed regarding their healthcare experiences. The intent of the study was to encourage refugees, through a series of focus group interactions and individual interviews, to overcome the general shyness of forced migrant populations to share their experiences with social services. The results reveal that while thirty-six of the participants felt comfortable with the way their Asylum Support Nurse registered them with their general practitioners (GPs), a small sample were frustrated. Some felt that they were assigned GPs far from their homes, which made appointments very inconvenient and inaccessible. Others felt confused that the UK’s medical system did not grant immediate appointments for illnesses that some refugees viewed as emergencies, such as stomach pain and flu symptoms, especially in children. This study highlights that, for refugees who are able to access GP services, NHS support is regarded positively, but some cultural differences exist in the understanding of illness. Indeed, in many situations, asylum seekers come from impoverished regions of the world, often without stable housing or medical facilities, where common illnesses can become life-threatening. Conversely, illnesses such as HIV and cancer, which would meet with more medical attention in developed countries, may not be diagnosed in the countries from which refugees flee. Many participants of the study also felt discouraged by the NHS because the waits for hospitalizations were sometimes as long as six months for health problems that greatly worried them, but that GPs thought were relatively unserious. The situation is complicated by the fact that interpreters for forced migrant populations remain in high demand without sufficient trained supply. Furthermore, dialects of languages that vary between countries, such as Sri Lankan Tamil and Indian Tamil, can present difficulties even when an interpreter is available. Lacking effective communication resources, the minute confusions that refugees may find it difficult to understand how the NHS prioritizes patient need.
cases, which can lead them to feel less valued than other permanent residents. Thus, the difference in understanding of what constitutes a “medical emergency” may mean that refugees are less inclined to continue regular health checkups once they find the system inconvenient and confusing.

The quality of care provided to refugees also deserves further questioning. NHS staff shortages in high-volume regions such as east London have led to situations in which underprivileged patients, including refugees, are signed on under a temporary patient registration, which only allows treatment for up to fourteen days.\textsuperscript{44} Then, especially in regions with high NHS patient volume, refugees and other underprivileged populations tend to be seen as less important than “normal” permanent residents. The situation with NHS staff shortages may not occur in regions with less traffic, but serves as an example of how forced migrants tend to be the first to be cut in a public service system.

Case studies of Somali refugees in the UK further highlight the limitations that forced migrants face, many of which divert resources away from a family's ability to access adequate healthcare. Two separate case studies of Somali refugees in East and South London drew connections between physical, mental, and healthcare needs. A 2001 study of Somali refugees led by Nasir Warfa drew connections between housing frustrations and mental health. The qualitative study intended to use the Somali refugee community to analyze how residential mobility affects forced migrants who already suffer from a variety of external stressors.\textsuperscript{45} In this study, it was noted that Somali refugees tend to replicate their ancestral nomadic habits in London by moving between several similar public housing properties many times within a few years before settling down permanently.\textsuperscript{46} Unlike typical nomadic movements, where there are few legal restrictions, this instance of house hopping led to increased frustration for the Somali community in London because families tended to cross Primary Care Trust boundaries. Such movement requires that each

refugee reregister with a new health service agency in every new location.\textsuperscript{47} The additional paperwork led to longer wait times and made it more difficult for the migrants to receive stable healthcare, which could exacerbate any existing mental or physical illnesses. These findings suggest yet another cultural disconnect that may affect forced migrants who move to the UK, now expected to navigate a foreign bureaucracy of property rights and residential identification. This presents another structural barrier to healthcare access, exacerbated if refugee families are not notified of the requisite transfer paperwork needed once a family moves to a new location.

In addition, in a 2005 study of 143 Somali refugees in urban settings further investigated the effects of shortages in other services on medical care. Most participants in the study kept in frequent contact with refugee services and had accessed GPs or psychiatrists at some point before the interviews, though they collectively shunned community mental health nurses and social workers.\textsuperscript{48} Many also did not have steady accommodation or food sources, stressing both their mental and physical health.\textsuperscript{49} On the one hand, it is clear that the refugees in fact welcome government services that are free or affordable. On the other, the refusal of any of the participants to make use of more “informal” services such as the community nurses and social workers suggests that the Somali refugees in particular prefer services that they feel are more legitimate. These findings highlight that official government programs explicating available NHS medical services or potential food and shelter subsidies are likely to be welcomed by refugee communities. The experience of Somali refugees also reinforces that a lack of suitable shelter and other physical amenities can put extra stress on a refugee’s mental and physical health, thereby straining the NHS even more. Government-sponsored programs could likely succeed in educating forced migrants about their options in order to increase access to healthcare and other social services.

The unequal treatment of forced migrants in the healthcare system is particularly apparent in childbirth and maternity care. A 2002-2003

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} Sally A. Hull and Kambiz Boomsma, “Primary care for refugees and asylum seekers: If the NHS stops free care for all groups, charities may offer the only safety net,” \textit{BMJ} 332 (2006): 62.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 505-508.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Warfa et al., “Post-migration geographical mobility,” 508.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 355-356.
\end{itemize}
study conducted by Lesley Briscoe and Tina Lavender from Liverpool and Manchester, respectively, interviewed four women about their childbirth experiences. Despite the small sample size, the study aimed to qualitatively describe a forced migrant’s experience with maternal care. The study revealed that the experience varies dramatically with her perception of “self” and a woman’s own autonomy over childbirth. In particular, one participant was pregnant as a result of rape in her home country of Rwanda. This experience had grave implications for her willingness to face the realities of childbirth and maternity care. This example sheds light on the difficulty of providing maternity and prenatal care for expecting refugee or asylum seeker mothers. It is not just sufficient that a service be affordable for expecting mothers: it must also be provided in a manner appropriate for cases of trauma.

Furthermore, as this paper has already discussed, language and cultural barriers can hinder communication. In one case, parents could not understand the correct way to prevent a baby’s death via cot-related sudden infant death syndrome, or understand the results of her own blood work. Although NHS maternity care is intended to serve to all permanent residents, the system does not adequately support the changing cultural composition of the UK population. Due to the dearth of qualified translators, gesticulation is often used as a form of communication within the birthing chamber, but many complicated situations cannot be sufficiently explained. For instance, in the case of one woman interviewed, her situation required a Caesarian section while her culture taught her to think that any type of surgery during childbirth would lead to the death of the mother. Understandably, her delivery was incredibly traumatizing and stressful. Cultural dissimilarities, different understandings of medicine, and language barriers make it difficult for underprivileged mothers to adequately prepare their families for the delivery and subsequent care. Research has revealed that postnatal depression can affect up to 42 percent of refugee women, compared to the normal range of 10-15 percent of new mothers, potentially due to experiences of sexual violence. NHS medical staff are not trained to converse with the expecting mothers about emotionally traumatizing experiences and are thus unable to provide sufficient support to new mothers with postnatal depression. These case studies reveal that NHS standard operating procedures do not provide adequate care for expecting refugee mothers, because they insufficiently prepare healthcare workers to deal with other cultures.

Furthermore, systematic failures by the state to provide refugees with support for health services that may be deemed more cosmetic enacts new barriers to healthcare access within the NHS. In terms of dental care, the 2006 Glasgow study detailed previously found that while most of the participants had visited a dentist, they had a much more difficult time finding information about dentists. As seen in previous studies, many asylum seekers interviewed in Glasgow did not receive centralized guidance on finding a dentist, and many dentists did not wish to treat refugees in their practice. Compared to GP needs, NHS dental services see significantly fewer patients with medical emergencies. Hence, it is understandable that local NHS divisions may choose to use fewer funds to provide special avenues for refugee populations to access a segment of healthcare that, seen from an administrative standpoint, could be potentially less essential to life. Even so, these minute differences in treatment reveal that asylum seekers face significant barriers to access in the NHS system. Unlike many other immigrant populations, asylum seekers may not speak or read good English, and thus may disproportionately rely on government provided resources to educate themselves about their healthcare rights. The lack of follow-up in healthcare services with lower priority can be crucial in determining whether a refugee may choose to use that service or not.

CONCLUSION

Despite the many successes of the UK public healthcare system, there are still elements that must be improved so that underprivileged populations can more equally access services. The NHS has made concerted

52  Ibid., 19.
53  Ibid., 20.
efforts to educate forced migrants about the free primary care system and has done well in providing free, lifesaving care in emergency situations. However, the quality of services can suffer in areas like London, where staff shortages are the norm, and, across the country, access to higher-end, more specialized services is almost completely determined by the patient’s ability to pay. For forced migrant populations in particular, the lack of translators and training for medical personnel on cultural sensitivity hinders access to quality care. This analysis brings to the fore the existing strengths and weaknesses of the NHS, as forced migrants are an extremely underprivileged subclass of those on the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum and are disproportionately affected by the inequalities in information access within the NHS. Increased training in cultural sensitivity and reduced costs of expensive treatments are necessary not only for the UK’s refugee community but also for the country’s growing population of economic migrants. As immigration brings more cheap labor from Eastern Europe into the UK, many low-wage economic migrants who receive permanent resident status will share many of the barriers to healthcare access faced by forced migrants. It is also especially important that the government consider the cost-efficiency of the healthcare system, given the economic turmoil brought on by the Brexit vote. In order for the NHS to successfully fulfill its mission of providing healthcare to UK residents, the system must be streamlined to improve access and improve equity for treatment access across all populations, no matter their income, education, or grasp of language.
WORKS CITED


