

THE YALE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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YRIS IS AN UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL DEDICATED TO PUBLISHING BOTH OPINION AND LONG-FORM SCHOLARSHIP ON CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL ISSUES: THEIR ORIGINS, THEIR PRESENT EFFECTS, AND THE FUTURE THEY WILL SHAPE.

ESSAYS

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Matthew Taylor King

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DEAR READER,

In this issue of The Yale Review of International Studies, we are proud to continue providing the premier platform for outstanding undergraduate scholarship on international affairs. This is the fifth year of our Intercollegiate Issue, and we have been humbled again by the incredible range of submissions we received from students from around the globe. In this issue we have continued our commitment to include pieces tackling profound, difficult and often under-appreciated subjects. This year's papers include a comparative study on the development of colonial political institutions in Gabon and Botswana and their legacies; an exploration of the relationship between social Darwinism and Ninhonjinron; a Foucauldian analysis of governmentality conceptualizing contemporary development policy as a biopolitical technique of security; scholarship on water securitization in India; and an account of the religious and ideological components of jihadism. Our contributors come from the United States Military Academy, Duke University, Boston University, Queen Mary University of London, and Georgetown University. As always, we received far more excellent work than we could publish, and we hugely appreciate not only this issue's authors but all of those students who gave us the honor of reviewing their work.

We are also grateful to those within the Yale community who support YRIS, especially the Yale International Relations Association, Yale's International Security Studies program and our faculty advisors. You all made this publication possible, and for that we are deeply appreciative.

To the readers, we hope you enjoy this edition of The Review! If you are an undergraduate student, we encourage you to visit our website and consider submitting your own work on international affairs. For any questions, please email yris@yira.org.

All our best,
The Editors

ESSAYS

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TREASURE NOT FOUND IN THE GROUND:
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND RESOURCE WEALTH IN BOTSWANA AND GABON

ABSTRACT

Both Gabon and Botswana gained their independence in the 1960s and shortly afterward had to come to grips with the complex task of managing resource rents: oil in Gabon and diamonds in Botswana. Over the past forty years, clear management patterns have manifested: in Gabon, widespread corruption predominates and a staggering kleptocracy has emerged, fueled by the petroleum sector, while Botswana sports Africa's lowest levels of corruption and responsibly plows resource revenues back into education, health care, and infrastructure development. A novel performance index developed specifically for this paper lays bare Botswana and Gabon's divergent paths of resource management. What accounts for these differences? This paper contends that it was the political institutions that developed during the colonial era—political institutions of indigenous and colonial origin—that ultimately shaped how Gabon and Botswana responded to the windfall of resource wealth in the early postcolonial years. Under French tutelage, Gabon developed hierarchical, extractive political institutions. In Botswana, Britain's hands-off approach allowed inclusive political institutions to evolve. Paradoxically, the French "civilizing mission" ended up hobbling Gabon's institutional development, while the British policy of "salutary neglect" allowed the Tswana tribes to develop their indigenous institutions.

INTRODUCTION

On October 20, 2008, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation awarded its $5 million prize to Festus Mogae, the outgoing President of Botswana. The Ibrahim Prize is awarded to democratically elected leaders on the African continent who abide by constitutional limits while in office, promote good governance, and step down after their allotted time in office has ended. At the announcement of the award for President Mogae, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who chaired the selection committee, lauded Mogae's response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Botswana and cheered his management of the southern African country's diamond wealth. "Botswana demonstrates how a country with natural resources can promote sustainable development with good governance," noted Annan, adding that Mogae's accomplishment was all the more remarkable "in a continent where too often mineral wealth has become a curse."[1]

Less than a year later, longtime Gabonese President Omar Bongo lay dying in a Spanish hospital, too ill to remain in Gabon for treatment and too controversial to convalesce in France, the old colonial *métropole*, where the ailing dictator was under investigation for corruption. In power from 1967 until his death in 2009, Omar Bongo was, among other things, a gardener. Under Bongo's care, a hardy vine of corruption and clientelism crept outward from Libreville, the Gabonese capital where Bongo co-opted rivals with oil earnings, snaking its tendrils as far afield as Abidjan and Paris.[2] In an ironic reversal of the neocolonial narrative, Bongo exerted considerable influence over French domestic politics, compromising French politicians as notable as Jacques Chirac with illicit campaign contributions.[3] Meanwhile, the Bongo family plucked the fruits of the vine. Recent investigations have begun to illuminate the extent of its harvest: more than

1 "Festus Mogae Wins the Largest Prize in the World," *Mo Ibrahim Foundation*. October 20, 2000, 1.
2 "L'ère Bongo," *Le Monde*, June 9, 2009.
3 "Mort de Bongo: 'On ne va pas pleurer sur une crapule,'" *Libération*, June 9, 2009.

$100 million in luxury vehicles and Parisian real estate, almost certainly a small fraction of the family's *biens mal acquis*, or ill-gotten goods.[4] Bongo's death on June 8, 2009 signaled continuity, not change, in Gabonese governance. In October of that year, a headline in the French daily *Libération* heralded the next stage in Gabonese history: "Ali Inherits the Throne of 'Papa' Bongo."[5]

Botswana and Gabon are both small, resource-rich African countries. Botswana was a sparsely populated hinterland of the British Empire in Southern Africa. Gabon was hardly the jewel of France's colonial empire. Both countries held multiparty elections after gaining independence in the 1960s. Both experienced resource booms in the 1970s—petroleum in Gabon, diamonds in Botswana—that sustained growth for decades, lifting Botswana and Gabon above their peers to rank among the richest economies in sub-Saharan Africa on a per capita basis. The similarities end there. Botswana regularly outperforms Gabon in key measures of institutional performance, including corruption perceptions, credit worthiness, education, and infrastructure. Both countries bear the mixed blessing of resource wealth. Only one has managed the windfall wisely.

Why was it that in June 2009, a septuagenarian Gabonese president could not even have the luxury of dying in France because he had so badly mismanaged resource wealth, while a few months prior, a former President of Botswana was receiving a prize for managing it so well? Surely the answer has something to do with political leadership. According to this line of thinking, Botswana was lucky enough to enjoy a succession of "good leaders" and Gabon was cursed with "bad leaders" from the Bongo family. But this explanation raises more questions than it answers. How do good leaders emerge and what forces hold them accountable? Why do bad leaders behave so wickedly and why is it so difficult to remove them?

My answer to those questions depends on an understanding of the political institutions that developed in each country, rather than analysis of the leaders themselves. To classify political institutions, I borrow a typology developed by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in *Why Nations Fail*: "inclusive" and "extractive" political institutions. According to Acemoglu and Robinson, inclusive political institutions "distribute power broadly in a society and subject it to constraints," while extractive political institutions "concentrate power in the hands of a narrow elite and place few constraints on the exercise of this power."[6]

This paper is divided into three main sections, each of which treats a discrete component of the argument. The first section elaborates on the independent variable: political institutions. I argue that the critical institutional differences between Botswana and Gabon developed during the colonial era. Inclusive political institutions emerged in Botswana under the hands-off British policy of *salutary neglect*, while the heavy-handed French *civilizing mission* meant that Gabon was saddled with extractive political institutions from the start. In the second section, I contend that when diamonds were discovered in Botswana and oil in Gabon shortly after independence, each country could only respond to the new resource rents with its existing political institutions. In the third section, I treat the dependent variable: management of resource wealth. To measure how well Botswana and Gabon have managed the windfall of resource wealth, I provide a novel Performance Index that combines six measures of institutional performance: corruption, credit worthiness, infrastructure, education, health, and poverty. The conclusion discusses contemporary politics in Botswana and Gabon and the potential for feedback loops between political institutions and management of resource wealth.[7]

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Botswana

Botswana's history of inclusive political institutions begins with the *kgotla*, a pre-colonial institution unique to the Tswana people. An early political history of Botswana provides three meanings of kgotla:

1. A meeting place for the ward or mo*rafe* [group];
2. A meeting for the discussion of group matters of any importance;
3. A court for settling disputes within the

4 "Ces palais qui se vendent plus de 100 millions d'euros à Paris," *La Tribune*, April 13, 2011.

5 "Ali hérite du trône de 'Papa' Bongo," *Libération*, October 17, 2009.

6 Daron Acemoglu and A. James Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (New York: Crown Business, 2012), 80-81.

7 Despite the similarities in size and resource endowment between these two countries, to my knowledge this paper represents the first comparative study of political institutions and management of natural resource wealth in Botswana and Gabon.

group according to customary law.[8]

At the *kgotla*, a section of the archetypical Tswana village demarcated by tall wooden polls arrayed in a semicircle, the *kgosi* (chief) would convene a meeting for the purpose of making a decision, relaying news, or settling a dispute. What is so remarkable about the *kgotla*, according to Acemoglu and Robinson, is that it "encouraged political participation and constrained chiefs."[9] In the eight Tswana states, the *kgosi* had to persuade, winning support by way of discussion and consensus-building. A Tswana saying about the *kgosi* reflects this legacy: *kgosi ke kgosi ka morafe* ("The king is king by the grace of the people.").[10] This concept is popular sovereignty by another name.

After decades of trade and missionary involvement with the British, as well as intermittent clashes with Boers migrating from South Africa, the Tswana feared for their future security. In response, the British declared the Protectorate of Bechuanaland in 1885, encompassing the territory of the eight Tswana states. Meanwhile, Cecil Rhodes was building a business empire in Southern Africa, passing on a road through Bechuanaland to what would become the colonies of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Worried that Rhodes might one day seize their territory and subordinate their people, three Tswana *diKgosi*—Khama III of the Bangwato, Sebele I of Bakwena, and Bathoeng I of Bangwaketse—steamed to Britain to lobby the Colonial Office for extended protectorate status to shield the eight Tswana states from the depredations of Rhodes and the British South Africa Company. With the aid of a missionary who translated their words, the three *diKgosi* wrote to Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, "There is no Government that we can trust as we trust that of the Great Queen. . . . We fear the Company because we think they will take our land and sell it to others."[11] Knowing that they might have to compromise to secure a deal, they offered a counter-proposal to avoid immediate annexation by Rhodes' company:

> *Let us continue to live under the Government for 10 years, till we can get to know the Company better. If they are good in their government of the Makalaka and Matabele we shall get to know it, and our people will trust them, and when you agree that we shall pass under the rule of the Chartered Company we pray that you will put strong*

Chart 1: Causal Chain for Institutional Development

	Botswana	Gabon
Pre colonial	• Eight Tswana states • *Kgotla* system • *Kgosi ke kgosi ka morafe* (The king is king by the grace of the people)	• Only one truly centralized kingdom the Orungu • Clan system • Many different ethnic groups • Limited historical research
Colonial	• British approach *salutary neglect* • Taxes collected by *kgosi* and transferred to British administration • Economic institutions A few marginal British mining companies • *Kgotla* system maintained and expanded chiefs rarely removed by British administrators • Inclusive political institutions African Advisory Council Joint Advisory Council Legislative Council	• French approach *civilizing mission* • Taxes head tax and forced labor collected by French appointed officials • Economic institutions concessionary companies • Hierarchical political institutions three tiered indigenous administration appointed by French • Inclusive institutions Territorial Assembly introduced with 1956 *loi cadre* municipal assemblies
Post-colonial	• Limited ties with old colonial power some British development aid but no military involvement • 1966 Constitution created limited government with unicameral legislature and advisory body the House of Chiefs • *Kgotla* structures were built in the new capital Gaborone (continuity)	• Strong ties with old colonial power French infantry bases in Libreville and Port Gentil • 1961 introduction of presidential model • 1967 single party regime • 1968 1990 Politburo model rubberstamp legislature
Contemporary	• Stable representative democracy • Single party rule in a multi party system 2014 general elections were best ever showing for opposition	• Autocracy ruled by Ali Bongo • 2016 Presidential Election marred by blatant vote rigging and political violence in major cities

Table 1: Comparing Institutional Development in Botswana and Gabon

8 F. Morton and J. Ramsay, eds., The Birth of Botswana: A History of the Bechuanaland Protectorate from 1910 to 1966 (Gaborone: Longman Botswana, 1987), 199.

9 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 407.

10 Ibid, 408.

11 Colonial Office of Great Britain, "Correspondence Relative to the Visit To This Country of the Chiefs Khama, Sebele, and Bathoen, and the Future of the Bechuanaland Protectorate," In Miscellaneous Pamphlets on Southern Africa: Volume 2, 13-14. London: Harrison and Sons, circa 1900.

words in the agreement to help us and protect us. Do not let them take away the land, which is the life of your children. Do not let them bring liquor into our country to kill our people speedily. Do not let them deprive us of our right to hunt the game that is in our country, and do not let them deprive us of our right to do justice among our own people. We know them better than you do, and can act more justly towards them than you can, though we know that you wish to be just.[12]

The Tswana chiefs secured what they had requested. Critically, they also asked to maintain the right to act as middlemen between their people and the colonial authorities, thus preventing foreign tax collectors from visiting their villages. Between the chiefs' proactive diplomacy, dedication to preserving their inclusive political institutions, and farsighted emphasis on fiscal independence, they helped ensure that Botswana would avoid many of the deleterious effects of colonialism. Meanwhile, the British established a limited colonial administration with a headquarters *outside* of Bechuanaland proper, in Mafeking—a South African city. Fewer than 100 British colonial administrators were responsible for governing the protectorate.[13] In essence, they ran Bechuanaland as a night watchman state, leaving governance mostly to the Tswana chiefs. One early history of Botswana reports of the British administrators, "They succeeded in governing this large country because their aims were limited to three: controlling disorder, collecting revenue, and introducing small-scale improvement projects."[14]

While missionaries did establish a handful of schools and hospitals in the territory, the economic and social development of Bechuanaland was never the goal of the British colonial administration. Instead, much as the British had done in the eastern American colonies from 1607 to 1763, the British governed Bechuanaland under a policy of *salutary neglect*. Unless Tswana chiefs stirred up a great deal of trouble or failed to collect enough taxes, the British administration would not interfere with Bechuanaland's evolving institutions. Under colonial rule, the kgotla actually spread to non-Tswana tribes living in the area:

The kgotla system, which had been introduced by Botswana overlords before the nineteenth century, was in the twentieth century demanded by each group in the territory as its best guarantee of equal treatment within the larger community. Even people who historically had no kgotla system realized its value in protecting their interests against attack from others. The kgotla served its members in other ways. It afforded men the opportunity to be present when important decisions were made (women fought for and won the same privilege before colonial rule had ended); it supported the practice of law in accordance with local traditions and changing circumstances; it gave each group its choice of representatives on councils governing at higher levels; and it gave all ward members legal status equal to members of other wards.[15]

That non-Tswana tribes adopted the *kgotla* system speaks not only to the quality of the *kgotla* as a political institution, but also to its efficacy in helping minority groups to defend their interests against the British and later the central government of Botswana.

In 1919, the British set up the Native Advisory Council, later known as the African Advisory Council, which once a year brought the Tswana chiefs, tribal chiefs, and the occasional "person of standing" to meet with the Resident Commissioner. Transcripts from these meetings reveal spirited debates.[16] The British also established the European Advisory Council in 1920 to represent the interests of the 1700 European settlers who lived in the Protectorate at that time.[17] In 1951, a Joint Advisory Council was established, composed of eight representatives each from the European and African Advisory Councils.[18] In 1960, the Protectorate adopted a new constitution that turned the Joint Advisory Council into the Legislative Council—now containing *elected* members—another step in making Botswana's political institutions more inclusive. From 1960 to 1965, new political parties formed and contested elections for the Legislative Council. It was the electoral success of one of these political parties, the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP), that led to Bechuanaland's independence under a new constitution in 1966.

Fortunately for Botswana, on the eve of

12 Ibid.
13 *Birth of Botswana*, 2.
14 Ibid.
15 *Birth of Botswana*, 9.
16 *Botswana: A Short Political History*, 127-128.
17 Ibid 128.
18 Ibid 151.

independence, the country's political elite had many years of experience with inclusive political institutions. No doubt the people of Botswana, thanks to the intense discussion and consensus-building built into the *kgotla* system, also benefited from what Robert Putnam calls "social capital," or the accumulated value of social connections.[19] The British had allowed the *kgotla* system to endure and even spread. Thanks to their light footprint policy of *salutary neglect*, the British had also depended on the Tswana states to shoulder much of the governance of the territory themselves. Where the British did interfere with indigenous governance—and this was the exception, not the rule—the consequences were negative and lasting, as James Robinson and Q. Neil Parsons argue:

> *We may also note that the two local Tswana states that remained the least democratic and the least guided by legal-rational ideas in the later twentieth century, the Kwena and the Tawana, were the two tribal reserves in which the British had interposed and replaced clever dissident chiefs in 1906 and 1931 by more pliant individuals of their choice. Subsequent chiefs were dependent on colonial sponsorship rather than popular legitimacy, and tended to concentrate on feathering their own nests rather than developing their tribal states.*[20]

As we shall see in the case of Gabon, it matters a great deal whether indigenous leaders in the colonial era had to worry more about maintaining bottom-up support from the people they were supposed to represent or were more concerned with conceding to top-down pressure from colonial administrators.

Gabon

Like Botswana, Gabon did not exist as a discrete polity before the colonial era. Densely forested and sparsely populated—even before the slave trade further depopulated the area—little governance existed above the village level in pre-colonial Gabon. One exception was the Orungu Kingdom, which grew wealthy and powerful for about a century from the 1760s to the 1870s by selling thousands of slaves to Portuguese traders. Unlike the Tswana, Orungu centralization was short-lived, and they did not possess similarly inclusive political institutions. The Orungu numbered only around 5000, and their chiefs "could even be described as despots, for they no longer submitted to either advice or control from the traditional council of clans."[21] The building blocks of inclusive political order would not be found among the Orungu.

Another factor makes it difficult to assess pre-colonial institutions: Gabon's contemporary political system stifles historical scholarship. As one review of the historical vocation in Gabon explains, "It is fair to say that in the past the Bongo regime had been extremely suspicious of intellectuals and in order to control them a two-pronged strategy was developed: punish those who dared to dissent and reward those who were willing to participate in the government. . . . [W]hether crushed in opposition or seduced by the ruling power, the consequences for sustained research on Gabonese history by Gabonese scholars remain the same: it simply does not happen."[22] The scholarship on pre-colonial Gabon from scholars at Omar Bongo University is unreliable, and only a handful of scholars elsewhere study Gabon.

Centralized political institutions did not develop in Gabon until the colonial era. Gabon was assembled piecemeal by French explorers and conquerors, beginning in 1839, when the French secured the first of many treaties with indigenous peoples. Over the next four decades, the French would cajole and subdue Gabon's many ethnic groups: the Mpongwe, Fang, Okanda, Mba, Echira, Bakalai, Badouma, and Batéké. Shortly after Gabon's recognition as an official colony in 1886, Gabon came face to face with the first of many extractive institutions: concessionary companies. The French colonial government borrowed this institutional form from the nearby Congo Free State, where Leopold II of Belgium's depredations had just begun. While these concessionary companies were technically economic institutions, for Gabonese colonial subjects, the companies often represented the first form of colonial governance they had encountered. After all, one company received a concession over roughly half the country and employed a private militia to keep it orderly—and the Gabonese experience with the concessions was far from pleas-

19 Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

20 James A. Robinson and Q. Neil Parsons, "State Formation and Governance in Botswana," 119.

21 David E. Gardinier, *Historical Dictionary of Gabon*, 251.

22 Christopher Gray, "Who Does Historical Research in Gabon? Obstacles to the Development of a Scholarly Tradition," *History in Africa*, 21 (1994): 416-417.

ant.[23] As the concessionary companies stripped Gabon's forests of okoumé wood and floated the lightweight logs up the Ogooué River to Port-Gentil for export, they also pressed thousands of colonial subjects into forced labor. Reports of concessionary brutality prompted Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, the legendary explorer and former commissioner-general of the French Congo,[24] to emerge from retirement and investigate. Brazza's report was never published, but it found widespread abuses and "resulted in the mitigation of some of the worst abuses and scaling down of many of the concessions."[25]

The year 1910 brought with it the restructuring of French colonial administration in Central Africa. Gabon, Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, and Chad were now part of French Equatorial Africa (AEF), which introduced a uniform governance system to more directly administer the territories. Because the French did not, as a rule, believe that indigenous people were capable of self-government, they sought to cultivate an African elite who could act as the intermediary between the parochial masses and the French administrative elite. Under the AEF, the French established a extractive, hierarchical system of colonial administration, consisting of the tiers: (1) the *chef de village*, who was empowered to collect the head tax from his village; (2) the *chef de terre*, who oversaw "a group of villages united by tradition . . . or administrative convenience" and distributed the *prestation* (forced labor) among the villages; and (3) the *chef de province*, who was often but not always a chief from a leading family of the province.[26] A fascinating and prescient passage from a 1942 British Royal Navy report suggests how this colonial arrangement was different from that at work in Botswana:

> *In almost all British colonies . . . chiefs of all degrees are appointed by their people and installed by native customary law, government retaining only a right of approval, and not that in all cases. Similarly, they can be deposed by their people in accordance with the same customary law, though [colonial] government has put an end to the cruder means of dismissal. Resting thus on old tradition, they both carry weight with their people and can represent their opinions in dealings with government, but on the other hand may prove to be more independent of government control, and more heedless of its wishes, than chiefs in French Equatorial Africa and Cameroons, who owe their appointment and their continuance in office solely to government [emphasis added]. Which system is most beneficial to the country in the long run is not argued here . . .*[27]

To prepare colonial subjects for service in the colonial administration, the French adopted a hands-on colonial model that required much more investment than the British *salutary neglect of* Botswana or the earlier concessionary company glut in Gabon: the *civilizing mission* (*mission civilizatrice*). French colonists built schools and hospitals. Extraordinarily talented students could even go on to study in Dakar or Paris. In one famous example of the French enthusiasm for uplifting Africa, the great humanitarian Dr. Albert Schweitzer sailed up the Ogooué in 1913 to found a hospital at Lambaréné. He would die there in 1965 after more than 50 years of treating sleeping sickness and other tropical maladies. And while Europeans like Schweitzer might enjoy powerful roles in colonial Gabon, for ambitious, civically-minded Gabonese, there was one way to contribute: assimilate, acquire an education, and serve in the colonial bureaucracy.

The career of Georges Aleka Damas serves as a case study of public service under extractive and limited inclusive political institutions in Gabon. From 1948 to 1954, Damas advised the governor of Gabon and served in his council of administration. When elective institutions opened up in 1956 under the *Loi cadre* (political framework) reforms, rather than run for a seat in the new Territorial Assembly (a colony-wide representative assemply), Damas contested and won a local government position on the municipal commission of Libreville. After Gabonese independence, he served as president of the national legislature. But when multiparty democracy gave way to a single-party regime in 1968, Damas continued to serve, this time as treasurer-general for the ruling Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG). He even composed the national anthem, *La Concorde*.[28] But what Damas's career best illustrates is the

23 James F. Barnes, *Gabon: Beyond the Colonial Legacy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 24-25.

24 Berenson, Edward. *Heroes of Empire*. Chapter on Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza, 2011.

25 Gardinier, *Historical Dictionary*, 72-73.

26 Naval Intelligence Division of Great Britain, *French Equatorial Africa & Cameroons* (1942), 282-283.

27 Ibid 281.

28 Gardinier, *Historical Dictionary*, 93-94.

arc of political institutions in Gabon: from extractive institutions established under French rule, to more pluralistic institutions at the end of colonialism and the beginning of independence, and back again to extractive institutions under the Bongo regime. The inclusive institutions did not have time to stitch themselves in Gabon's political fabric.

RESOURCE WINDFALL

At the critical juncture when Botswana began exporting diamonds and Gabon started producing oil, each country's post-colonial political institutions had more or less stabilized. Gabon was stuck with extractive political institutions that concentrated power in the hands of a single ruler, Omar Bongo, while Botswana was blessed with inclusive political institutions that made its first president, Seretse Khama, a limited executive in a country where power was broadly diffused among the citizenry. The development of political institutions under colonial rule influenced the form of early post-colonial institutions, which in turn shaped how each country responded to its resource bounty. Before we assess how each country responded to its resource windfall, it is important to provide a brief overview of diamond mining in Botswana and oil production in Gabon.

Botswana

Far more significant than the discoveries of copper and nickel deposits during the colonial era, Botswana's great mineral discovery came in 1967–*months* after independence–when De Beers discovered a large pipe of diamonds at Orapa. In 1969, De Beers established a joint venture, Debswana, with the government of Botswana, which owned a 15 percent stake in the company. By 1971, the diamond mine was open at Orapa and Botswana had begun to export diamonds. Later that decade, the government upped its stake in Debswana to 50 percent, ensuring that a significant portion of government revenue would stem from diamonds. Debswana has monopolized diamond production in the country ever since, opening three new mines, including the world's richest at Jwaneng. As of 2014, the mining industry stood at 26.5 percent of Botswana's GDP, up from 21.5 percent in 2010, a sign that the government's attempts to diversify the economy away from mineral exports still have not been successful.[29]

Gabon

In the 1970s, Gabon's export-oriented economy shifted from *okoumé* wood to petroleum products. Oil companies had been exploring in Gabon since the 1930s, but the first significant discovery came at Ozouri, close to Port Gentil along the Atlantic Coast, in 1957. After 1967, production shifted offshore, and 1974 saw the discovery of oil at Gamba-Ovinga, a massive offshore site. Gabon's entry into the world oil market possessed providential timing; thanks to the OPEC oil embargo, the price of Gabonese oil surged 300 percent in the two years from 1972 to 1974.[30] Gabon was an OPEC member from 1975 to 1995–Omar Bongo reportedly converted to Islam to win favors from Arab oil producers–and the country officially rejoined the oil cartel in July 2016.[31] In 2014, Gabonese oil production accounted for 35.7 percent of GDP, a sign that the country's economy is still heavily dependent on export of a single commodity.[32]



Chart 2: Causal Chain for Institutional Development and Management of Resource Wealth

29 African Development Bank (AfDB), *African Economic Outlook* 2016. Paris: OECD. http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/statistics.

30 Barnes, *Colonial Legacy*, 78-80.

31 "Gabon Facts and Figures." OPEC. Accessed December 1, 2016. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/3520.htm.

32 AfDB, *African Economic Outlook 2016*.

	Measures	Botswana	Gabon
Government Finances	Corruption	63	34
	Credit Worthiness	73	40
Finances Average		68	37

	Measures	Botswana	Gabon
Government Services	Infrastructure	50	44
	Health and Primary Education	67	69
	Higher Education and Training	59	43
	Poverty Alleviation	83	94
Services Average		65	63

		Botswana	Gabon
Performance Index	50% finances, 50% services	66	50

		Botswana	Gabon
Alternative Weighting	33% finances 67% services	66	54
	Excluding health and primary education, 50% finances 50% services	66	49
	Double weighting poverty alleviation 33% finances 67% services	68	58

Table 2: Evaluating Management of Resource Wealth (Performance Index)

MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCE WEALTH

In this section, we examine how Botswana and Gabon performed in the Performance Index, which is intended to approximate our dependent variable, management of resource wealth. I created the Performance Index specifically to compare how Botswana and Gabon have managed resource rents. Two assumptions are important to note for the index. First, the index scores range from 0 to 100, with higher scores reflecting better performance: lower corruption; higher credit ratings; more advanced infrastructure, education, and health systems; and lower poverty rates. Second, it is also assumed that each of those dimensions reflects something or at least stands in for something that can be influenced by government action. We will examine and compare Botswana and Gabon's performance in each category of the index, then briefly discuss alternative methods of weighting the Performance Index.

Government Finances

i. Corruption

For a measure of corruption, the index relies on Transparency International's 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The CPI is the most commonly used measure of corruption, an activity that is notoriously difficult, if not outright impossible, to actually measure. Transparency International relies on survey data to collect perceptions of corruption in different countries and translates survey responses into a scaled score from 0 (most corrupt) to 100 (least corrupt).[33] Botswana scores a 63, superior to Italy and Spain. Gabon comes in at 34, about the same as Mexico and Belarus. Botswana clearly outperforms Gabon on this measure of institutional performance—a key indicator of the professionalism of the civil service and the efficiency and integrity of government spending.

ii. Credit Worthiness

The three major credit ratings agencies—Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody's, and Fitch Group—provide assessments of the risk of government debt. As a general rule, countries with lower risks of default, lower deficits, more constant revenue streams, restrained spending activity, and professional budgetary procedures tend to have better credit ratings. One website, Trading Economics, provides a translation of alphanumeric ratings from the Big Three ratings agencies into a scaled score from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). In November 2016, Botswana scored a 73, while Gabon earned a 40.[34] [35] Despite having comparable debt-to-GDP ratios, Botswana clearly outperforms Gabon in the dimension of creditworthiness, a measure that reflects investors' confidence in Botswana to pay its debts. A sound credit rating also means that Botswana can borrow relatively cheaply to finance spending projects such as infrastructure.

33 "Table of Results: Corruption Perceptions Index 2015," Transparency International, Accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table.

34 "Botswana Credit Rating." Trading Economics. Accessed November 6, 2016. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/botswana/rating.

35 "Gabon Credit Rating." Trading Economics. Accessed November 6, 2016. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/gabon/rating.

Government Services

i. Infrastructure

The World Economic Forum (WEF) issues an annual Global Competitiveness Report providing useful measures with which one may compare countries across many different dimensions of economic competitiveness. The infrastructure rating draws on nine different input measures—such as quality of roads and quality of electricity supply—to form a scaled score from 1 (least competitive) to 7 (most competitive). Botswana scored a 3.5, edging Gabon's 3.1 score.[36] I divide these scores by 7 and multiply them by 100 to fit them on a 0 to 100 scale.

One infrastructure project epitomizes Gabon's profligacy in the use of resource wealth: the Transgabonais railroad, one of the only railways in the region not built during the colonial period. It runs from Libreville to Franceville, where Bongo family land happens to abut uranium and manganese deposits, and also to Bélinga, home to significant iron ore deposits. Gabon's multi-billion dollar investment in the Transgabonais is a typical vanity project, as the railroad still requires state subsidies and runs only at half capacity.[37] Even if the Transgabonais were profitable and well-utilized, it would represent a flawed development strategy: diversifying away from oil to produce metal exports. Mineral ores, like petroleum, are subject to dramatic price swings. In pursuing this grand project, Gabon has sadly neglected the fundamentals of infrastructure. As one journalistic account puts it,

> *The theft of billions of dollars of oil money has stalled the country's development. Nearly 50 years after independence, Gabon has fewer miles of paved road than it has of oil pipelines. . . Even within Libreville - which can seem deceptively well-off if you keep to the seaboard, with its hotels, casinos and patisseries - the lack of infrastructure is glaringly obvious. Many houses are connected by tiny footpaths filled with rubbish and tangles of hosepipes that serve as the mains water supply.*[38]

"IN PURSUING THIS GRAND PROJECT, GABON HAS SADLY NEGLECTED THE FUNDAMENTALS OF INFRASTRUCTURE."

ii. Health and Primary Education

The Competitiveness Report's rankings on Health and Education represent perhaps the least helpful of the WEF data. Botswana scores a 4.7 in this category and it is a comparable 4.8 for Gabon. Because Botswana suffers from high rates of HIV/AIDS and Gabon grapples with endemic malaria, these countries will have relatively low health scores even if they invest significant amounts in their health systems. With regard to nutrition, Gabon significantly outperforms Botswana, reflecting a higher caloric intake and a far lower prevalence of malnourishment—some 5 percent in Gabon versus 24 percent in Botswana.[39] When life expectancy is adjusted to reflect a hypothetical no-AIDS scenario, however, Botswana scores almost three years higher than Gabon. And, in an indication of how far Botswana has come since independence, the country now has one doctor for every 2500 people, a tenfold increase since 1970, when patients in rural Botswana also had to rely on a pilot-doctor to fly out for house calls.[40]

On the education front, the WEF data are helpful, but they could also stand to be supplemented by AfDB data. Botswana's 97.9 percent youth literacy rate exceeds Gabon's 89.1 percent rate by nearly nine points. The Botswana-Gabon literacy gap is even greater among the young than the old, suggesting that, as Gabon's education system stagnates, the educational disparity between the two countries is widening rather than shrinking. Education spending figures reveal the extent of Gabon's stagnation: Botswana spent an average of 9.5 percent of GDP on education from 2000 to 2013, while Gabon only spent an average of 3.8 percent

36 Schwab, Klaus. "The Global Competitiveness Report, 2016-2017." World Economic Forum. Accessed November 6, 2016. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2016-2017/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2016-2017_FINAL.pdf.

37 "Gabon's Transgabonais Railway Unsustainable and Underutilized." *Mining Review Africa*. March 30, 2015. https://www.miningreview.com/news/gabons-transgabonais-railway-unsustainable-underutilised/.

38 Xan Rice, "Papa Bongo's 40 Years in Power," *The Guardian*, May 4, 2008. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/05/1.

39 AfDB, *African Economic Outlook 2016*.

40 *Botswana: A Short Political History*, 180.



Chart 3: Botswana's Virtuous Circle



Chart 4: Gabon's Vicious Circle

over that same period. Botswana's heavy investment in education and high literacy rates are especially impressive compared to the country's educational situation at independence:

> *The state of education at independence was hardly promising. Only 2,416 people in the country had passed their JC [Junior Certificate Examination, the test administered at the end of 10th grade], while no more than thirty-five people held university degrees. Some fear that, modest as Botswana's education system was, the new Government would not be able to maintain it. At the time, the country only had five qualified Batswana secondary school teachers.*[41]

iii. Higher Education and Training

Botswana outperforms Gabon considerably in WEF's measure of Higher Education and Training, which captures secondary and tertiary educational enrollment as well as the quality of non-traditional training services. As commodity-based economies transition from resource dependence to an industrial or services-based economy, higher education is essential. Both Botswana and Gabon have invested to some extent in universities, and I have already chronicled the limitations on academic freedom at Omar Bongo University. It is worth nothing as well that at least one University of Botswana professor has also raised concerns about political intimidation.[42] Nevertheless, based on the data, it appears that Botswana is significantly outperforming Gabon in this crucial dimension of how the government has invested the gains from resource wealth.

iv. Poverty Alleviation

Another useful investment governments can make in the wake of resource wealth booms is in reducing poverty. Poverty and its associated effects—malnutrition, disease, lack of access to transportation—hinder the development of human potential. Based on the most recent World Bank poverty data I could glean, I created an index of poverty rates for the 49 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. In a ranking of countries by the percentage living below the $1.90/day (2011 dollars) World Bank poverty line, I found that Gabon outperformed Botswana, ranking in the 94th percentile of sub-Saharan African countries compared to Botswana's place in the 83rd percentile.[43] Only 7.97 percent of Gabon's population lives under the global poverty line, while some 18.24 percent of Botswana's population does. This finding is consistent with the AfDB nutrition data discussed earlier in the health section. Clearly, Gabon is outperforming Botswana in terms of poverty reduction. The extent of poverty reduction due to concerted government policy, rather than Gabon's somewhat higher per capita income, remains to be seen.

Alternative Weighting

As the baseline measure for the dependent variable, management of natural resource wealth, I compiled a Performance Index deriving 50 percent of its score from government finances measures and 50 percent from government services measures. Botswana outperforms Gabon 66 to 50 on the Performance

41 *Birth of Botswana*, 191.

42 Kenneth Good, *Diamonds, Dispossession & Democracy in Botswana* (Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer, 2008).

43 King, Matthew. "World Bank Poverty Data." Microsoft Excel file on Google Drive. December 10, 2016. https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B_flYiBrPt5IVnFmb0VjdWVudGc.

Index, as Table 2 illustrates. I also considered alternative methods for weighting the scores for natural resource management. One method reduces the share for government finances to 33 percent and increases the share for government services to 67 percent. The underlying logic behind this weighting is that it may not matter if the government uses a little corruption to grease the wheels of social progress, as long as the government invests efficiently in core services. I also tried double-weighting poverty alleviation because the ultimate goal of development plans is to lift populations out of poverty. And, finally, I reverted to the 50-50 weighting and removed from consideration the health and primary education data because of the concerns expressed earlier in this section. In each of these alternative weighting scenarios, Botswana maintained a significant lead over Gabon. Based on the Performance Index and the above discussion, I conclude that Botswana outperforms Gabon in its management of resource wealth.

CONCLUSION

Once resource rents enter a society, the neat causal chain between political institutions and the management of resource wealth may become somewhat more complicated. In countries with inclusive political institutions characterized by high levels of accountability and professionalism, such as Norway and Botswana, revenue from resource rents can initiate a virtuous circle in which well-managed resources reinforce inclusive political institutions.[44] Efficiently administered and amply funded public services like education and infrastructure tend to be popular, creating electoral incentives for governments to continue reinvesting resource wealth in sectors supporting broad-based growth. Under the framework of Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast in *Violence and Social Orders*, this virtuous circle allows countries to fortify an *open access order* characterized by impersonal relations, meritocracy, the rule of law, and strong taboos against corruption.[45] Meanwhile, when a country with extractive political institutions encounters a resource boom, the revenues allow rulers to siphon more funds off for themselves, appoint relatives and loyalists to key positions, engage in grandiose building projects, co-opt rivals with bribes, and strengthen patron-client networks. At the same time, this vicious circle leads to increasing discontent with the corruption and a higher likelihood of social upheaval—characteristics of North, Wallis, and Weingast's *natural state*.[46] Therefore, poor management of resource wealth has a way of polarizing society into ethnically- or politically connected "haves" and deeply resentful "have-nots." This is neither a recipe for sustained economic growth nor enduring political stability.

Recent events underscore the importance of political institutions in Gabon and Botswana. In October 2014, Ian Khama, son of Seretse Khama, was reelected as Botswana's president, but the ruling BDP earned its lowest-ever vote total, signaling that the first truly competitive multiparty era in Botswana's history may soon arrive. [47]Gabon's presidential elections in August 2016 were clearly rigged, but the country's highest court rubber-stamped the results, allowing Ali Bongo to remain in power.[48] Riots ensued in Gabon's largest cities. Even if Bongo's challenger, Jean Ping, had won the election, it would have hardly been a victory for inclusive institutions in Gabon. Ping has two children with Pascaline Bongo, Ali's sister, who is rumored to loathe her brother. It is unlikely that he would break the patronage system that has paid the Bongo family so handsomely. From government to so-called "opposition," politics in Gabon remains a family business.

While the Khama dynasty has done well for itself in Botswana's politics, Botswana's term-limited president, Ian Khama, is almost certain to retire in 2018. Another democratically elected leader will take the helm and grapple with the challenge of diversifying Botswana's economy as diamond exports diminish. Khama's successor would be wise to understand that the country's greatest treasure is not its subsoil, but its people. The institutions the people of Botswana have shaped and improved

44 James A. Robinson with Ragnar Torvik and Thierry Verdier, "Political Foundations of the Resource Curse." *Journal of Development Economics* 79 (2006), 447-468.

45 Douglass C. North with John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

46 Ibid.

47 "Botswana's President's Party Secures Election Victory." *Reuters*. October 25, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-botswana-election-idUSKCN0IF01B20141026.

48 "Constitutional Court in Gabon Upholds Ali Bongo Ondimba's Disputed Election." *The New York Times*. September 23, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/24/world/africa/gabon-ali-bongo-ondimba.html?_r=0.

over generations are worth more than diamonds. And, if Botswana's institutions continue to deliver good governance and broad-based prosperity even after the country's mines are exhausted, Botswana will show the world that institutions, not diamonds, are forever.

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JAPANESE NIHONJINRON AND 1890'S AMERICAN SOCIAL DARWINISM:

LOOKING TO THE PAST FOR A SOLUTION TO JAPAN'S VICIOUS CYCLE OF HOMOGENEITY

With the advances of both the natural and social sciences, nativism and anti-immigration sentiments based on social Darwinism have largely fallen out of the mainstream culture in the United States. One would expect that Japan, a country known for its technological advances and innovation, would have also, like America, moved past using social Darwinian ideas to justify anti-immigration sentiments and policies. Yet, the post-World War II ideas of nihonjinron, a discipline dedicated to the study "of national identity and the exceptionality of the Japanese people," that promotes the "idea that Japanese people are inherently, essentially, and genetically distinct" still lingers and has, in fact, been ingrained into multiple facets of Japanese society.[1] Because Japanese exceptionalism and nihonjinron ideas "are still commonly accepted by Japanese people, including politicians and some academics," it has allowed some nativists to argue for apartheid in Japan if immigration were allowed and to justify Japan's anti-immigration laws on preserving the purity of the Japanese character without widespread societal objections.[2] By analyzing the historical cases of anti-immigration movements in the United States circa 1890 and modern day Japan, this paper attributes Japan's inability to overcome nihonjinron ideals to its low percentage of foreign-born inhabitants, enabling a self-perpetuating vicious cycle wherein foreigners are banned on the basis of stereotypes and misconceptions that are perpetuated by the lack of foreigners to correct these misconceptions.

While the pseudo-scientific arguments used to reinforce Japanese and American exceptionalism are termed differently—nihonjinron in Japan and social Darwinism in the United States—the underlying sentiments are the same; nativists in both countries believed that their respective populations are so far superior and advanced than other peoples that intermingling with the other so-called lesser races would dilute their greatness by contaminating their race with undesirable traits. Social Darwinism theorizes that all the races of mankind are in competition with each other and that only the fittest race can survive. Herbert Spencer's extrapolation of the Darwinian concept of survival of the fittest into human interactions empowered nativists espousing American exceptionalism. Before the advent of social Darwinism, nativists argued that Americans were exceptional because of their republican values.[3] After social Darwinism's inception, nativists could further argue that Americans were racially superior as well, grounding their

1 Alanna Schubach, "The case for a more multicultural Japan," AlJazeera America, November 12, 2014, accessed November 11, 2016, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/11/multiculturalismjapanantikoreanprotests.html; Sean Richey, "The Impact of Anti-Assimilationist Beliefs on Attitudes toward Immigration," International Studies Quarterly 54, (2010): 199.

2 Richey, 199; Kyla Ryan, "Japan's Immigration Reluctance," The Diplomat, September 15, 2015, accessed November 13, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/japans-immigration-reluctance/.

3 Michael W. Hughey, "Americanism and Its Discontents: Protestantism, Nativism, and Political Heresy in America," International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 5, no. 4 (1992): 539.

exceptionalism in biological concepts.[4] Some of these nativists claimed that only the most successful Anglo-Saxons from Europe managed to reach America and, thus, America was the nation that fostered the most successful Anglo-Saxons, which the nativists already considered to be the most advanced race in the world.[5] Josiah Strong, an American Protestant clergyman controversial for his advocacy of using Christianity to uplift the savage races of the world, documents the different immigrant races in his widely-read book Our Country and concludes that almost every other race is inferior to American Anglo-Saxons.[6] He contended that they are better looking, stronger, and more physically fit and have taller statures, more energy, and a stronger conviction of morals. These ideas of social Darwinian American exceptionalism were pervasive, such that they were even discussed in the upper echelons of academia, managing to stay relevant for decades. Writing thirty years after Strong's publication—a testament to the endurance of social Darwinian American exceptionalism—Edward A. Ross, a prominent American eugenist who taught at Cornell and Stanford, was one such academic who subscribed to ideas of social Darwinian American exceptionalism. Ross documented the purportedly deleterious effects of immigration in The Old World in the New, writing that Americans would lose their focus and composure if they were to "absorb excitable mercurial blood from southern Europe."[7] The idea of racial superiority and using science to justify the exclusion of other races, though, was not only limited to America at the turn of the century.

In Japan, the same sentiments of the exceptionalism and nationalistic sense of self were manifested in the form of nihonjinron, perpetuated in contemporary Japanese society through politicians and the media.[8] Nihonjinron, literally translated as Japanese people theory, is a field of study that emerged after Japan's failed attempts at imperialism in the 20th century.[9] Japan's failure to create a pan-Asian empire forced Japanese academia and policymakers to reinvent the concept of Japanese identity—from an ethno-racial hybrid to a homogenous national self-image.[10] This field of study analyzes Japanese uniqueness and the reasons for their supposed superiority over other races. In the United States, social Darwinism and American exceptionalism allowed nativists to dehumanize and criminalize immigrants, portraying them as "'unassimilable aliens,' 'unwelcome invasions,' 'undesirable,' 'diseased,' [and] 'illegal.'"[11] In Japan, politicians utilize the same rhetoric against immigrant workers. The more vitriolic of these arguments come from Ishihara Shintaro, conservative former governor of Tokyo, who has publicly disparaged immigrants on several occasions. Shintaro is known for espousing nihonjinron-esque arguments, generalizing that "'Sangokujin [third world people] and foreigners'" repeat serious crimes.[12] He even posits:

> *Why don't you [Japanese citizens] go to Roppongi? It's now a foreign neighborhood. Africans— I don't mean African-Americans— who don't speak English are there doing who knows what. This is leading to new forms of crime. We should be letting in people who are intelligent.*[13]

The onus of spreading and perpetuating stereotypes of foreigners is not just on the politicians; Japanese media also has a role in promoting Japanese uniqueness against the backdrop of immigrants.[14] Michael Prieler, an associate professor in South Korea specializing on media representations of race and ethnic-

4 ativists started adopting social Darwinian ideas into American exceptionalism to bolster their anti-immigration arguments between the late 19th and early 20th century, where an estimated 22 million immigrants entered the United States between 1890 and 1930. Rachel Schneider, "The Gilded Age and the Progressive Era (1890-1900)" (Video Lecture, Writing and Research Seminar from Boston University, Boston, MA, October 24, 2016).

5 Josiah Strong and Austin Phelps, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis (New York: The American Home Missionary Society, 1885), 172.

6 Strong, 287-96.

7 Edward Alsworth Ross, The Old World in the New: The significance of past and present immigration to the American people (New York: The Century Co., 1914), 296.

8 Richey, 199; Michael Prieler, "Othering, racial hierarchies and identity construction in Japanese television and advertising," International Journal of Cultural Studies 13, no. 5 (2010): 511.

9 Hwaji Shin, "Colonial legacy of ethno-racial inequality in Japan," Theory and Society 39, no. 3 (2010): 328.

10 Schubach, "The case for a more multicultural Japan"; Shin, 328.

11 Erika Lee, At America's Gate: Chinese Immigration During the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 22.

12 Jack Eisenberg, "From Neo-Enlightenment to Nihonjinron: The Politics of Anti-Multiculturalism in Japan and the Netherlands," Macalester International 22, (2009): 92.

13 Ibid., 93.

14 Debito Arudou, "Tackle embedded racism before it chokes Japan," The Japan Times, November 1, 2015, accessed November 11, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2015/11/01/issues/tackle-embedded-racism-chokes-japan/#.WCNCT3c-JE4; Prieler, 511.

ity, in his study "Othering, racial hierarchies, and identity construction in Japanese television advertising," empirically documents that foreigners "are often stereotyped in ways that differentiate them from Japanese," thereby "contributing … to the long-standing discourse of Japanese exceptionalism (nihonjinron)."[15] Japanese actions inspired by nihonjinron—stereotyping of immigrants as well as dehumanizing and criminalizing them— is reminiscent of 1890s and early 20th century America and the rhetoric of social Darwinian American exceptionalism, where nativists popularized sweeping generalizations of other races.

More telling of the pervasiveness of nihonjinron ideals are the Japanese citizens' reactions, or lack thereof, to these nativist sentiments. When Ayako Sono, a prolific conservative columnist, published her column advocating for an apartheid in Japan, the article only provoked a lukewarm response from the Japanese people and was generally met with indifference.[16] Sono wrote that "all races can do business, research, and socialize with each other, but they should live separately." In her article, Sono goes on to elaborate that if Japan were to increase foreign immigration, it should pursue racial segregation, unapologetically asserting that "Whites, Asians, and blacks should live separately."[17] While the international community saw the piece problematic and controversial, with the South African ambassador to Japan issuing a letter of protest, domestic Japanese media "scarcely mentioned the story."[18] The lack of widespread public outrage over Sono's nihonjinron statements is indicative of how entrenched such ideals are in Japanese society. The relatively few objections to her article suggests that a majority of Japanese still implicitly believe in and accept nihonjinron, that the Japanese race is unique and should not risk contamination by outsiders.

Despite the fact that both social Darwinism and nihonjinron have been discredited in academia, the tenets of nihonjinron still pervade Japanese society; in the United States, it has become uncommon to base American exceptionalism on Darwinian concepts like the nativists had in the 1890s.[19] The reason Japan still retains concepts of Japanese uniqueness and superiority is because of its homogenous population, wherein the foreign-born immigrants comprised of around 1.2 percent of the population in 2014 compared to America's 14.77 percent in 1890.[20] The homogenous population in Japan allows for a vicious cycle to be perpetuated (see Figure 1). The ideas of nihonjinron beget the vicious cycle by creating an in-and-out group dynamic, where the Japanese people see themselves as a unique group of people and everyone else as "agents capable of contaminating a pure ethnic Japanese identity."[21] Japanese exceptionalism, disseminated and ingrained in society through the media and political rhetoric, contributes to the misconceptions of foreigners and immigrant workers, feeding into xenophobic sentiments. These xenophobic sentiments, in turn, allow for the enactment of restrictive immigration legislation, as the Japanese people see these laws as a way of protecting their country from degradation and a form of self-preservation. The Japanese government's stance on immigration "was and remains that of limiting the stay of migrants and assuring their return to their home countries after two or three years."[22] These restrictive immigration laws thwart the flow of immigrants and foreign populations into the country to correct the misconceptions generated from nihonjinron, further perpetuating said misconceptions. The reason social Darwinian American exceptionalism has failed to carry over into popular discourse in the 21st century is because the United States had a robust population of immigrants to challenge misconceptions, which prevented the formation of the vicious cycle.

In the 1890s, America shared all but one of the links of the vicious cycle of homogeneity—the lack of foreign-born residents, which effectively prevented the formation of the vicious cycle and allowed the country to cast social Darwinian American exceptionalism out of the mainstream and into the fringe discussions of immigration. As previously noted, both Japan and America had ideas of exceptionalism. Nativists were convinced that American Anglo-Saxons differed from every other race

15 Prieler, 511.
16 Ryan, "Japan's Immigration Reluctance."
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Richey, 199.

20 U.S. Census Bureau, Nativity of the Population and Place of Birth of the Native Population 1850 to 1990, https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab01.html, accessed November 15, 2016; Schubach, "The case for a more multicultural Japan."
21 Eisenberg, 94.
22 Malissa B. Eaddy, "An Analysis of Japan's Immigration Policy on Migrant Workers and Their Families." Master's thesis, Seton Hall University, 2016.

including the original European Anglo-Saxons. This generated, as nihonjinron did in Japan, misconceptions of foreigners and people of other races. The Dictionary of Races, produced as a result of the U.S. Congress' attempt at utilizing science to craft immigration legislation, is a collection of sweeping generalizations of different races and is one such example of the misconceptions born out of the nativists' beliefs of social Darwinian American exceptionalism.[23] These misconceptions generated xenophobic sentiments, as the nativists were wary of the effects of assimilation and what that might mean for the purity of the American people.[24] Fears of contamination led to anti-immigration laws such as the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) and the Geary Act (1892). However, unlike Japan, the lack of foreigners link was not present in 1890s America and, thus, disrupted the formation of the vicious cycle.

By the 1890s, foreign-born residents already comprised 14.77 percent of America's population.[25] The immigrant groups in America were able to disrupt the vicious cycle by correcting misconceptions that had arisen from social Darwinism and American exceptionalism and by participating in the political process. Prior to being elected president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson had openly championed anti-immigration rhetoric based on social Darwinism, writing in his book A History of the American People that the Southern and Eastern European immigrants had "neither skill nor energy nor any initiative of quick intelligence."[26] However, when Wilson met with delegations of immigrants on multiple occasions during his campaign for presidency in 1912, he was forced to make commitments to "the offended groups during the campaign [that] were a matter of honor with him…. That honor and commitment was decisive in his vetoes of the restrictive immigration bills in 1915, 1917, and 1921."[27] By actively participating in the political process and lobbying against restrictive immigration measures, the immigrant groups contributed to the shattering of the vicious cycle and prompted a closer investigation of the social Darwinian claims of American exceptionalism. The decline of social Darwinism is evident when scholars emerged questioning the validity of extrapolating biological phenomena observed among animals (which was where Charles Darwin documented the phenomenon of survival of the fittest) to human interactions and the social sciences.[28] Now, in the 21st century, mainstream nativists no longer use social Darwinism to justify anti-immigration legislation. A majority of American nativists now base their anti-immigration sentiments not in racial differences and the idea of American Anglo-Saxon superiority, but rather on religious affiliation and perceived threat from certain religious groups. Because America had a large number of foreign-born residents in the country, these residents had the opportunity to band together to participate in the political process, correct misconceptions of ethnic groups, and advocate against restrictive immigration legislation– ultimately purging social Darwinian American exceptionalism from popular discourse. Conversely, Japan, owing to its low percentage of foreign-born residents, still clings to its perceived uniqueness, unwilling to let immigrants stay too long for fear of societal disruptions resulting from the immigrants' alleged inability to assimilate.[29]

The historical cases of social Darwinian American exceptionalism in 1890s United States and nihonjinron in modern day Japan exhibit striking similarities in the rhetoric used by nativists in championing their own respective population's racial superiority. What is troubling is that American nativists made these arguments over 100 years ago. America has been able to move past using pseudo-science and racial superiority as justification for nativist and anti-immigration arguments and legislation in the mainstream. In Japan, though, nihonjinron is still being disseminated and perpetuated by politicians and the media and remains entrenched in their society. This paper contends

23 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Immigration, Dictionary of Races or Peoples, report prepared by Daniel Folkmar and Elnora C. Folkmar, 61st Cong., 3d sess., 1911, S. Doc. 662, Government Printing Office.

24 Ross, 285.

25 U.S. Census Bureau, Nativity of the Population and Place of Birth of the Native Population 1850 to 1990.

26 Woodrow Wilson, A History of the American People (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1902), 98-99 quoted in Don Wolfensberger, "Woodrow Wilson, Congress and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in America An Introductory Essay" (paper presented at the Congress Project Seminar "Congress and the Immigration Dilemma: Is a Solution in Sight," Washington, D.C., March 12, 2007), 3.

27 Ibid., 12-3.

28 Franz Boas, a German immigrant and anthropology professor at Columbia University, argued in the 1940s that "culture more than nature determined the shape of humanity and society." Thomas C. Leonard, "Origins of the myth of social Darwinism: The ambiguous legacy of Richard Hofstadter's Social Darwinism in American Thought," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 71, (2009): 39.

29 Strong, 172.

that Japan's low-percentage of foreign-born immigrants is the reason why a self-perpetuating cycle of homogeneity has formed in Japanese society. By looking to America's past, this paper concludes that having a high number of foreign-born immigrants in a society is critical in breaking the vicious cycle, as they help correct the misconceptions born out of ideas of racial superiority. With a rapidly aging population, Japan can either actively pursue immigration policies that will boost the foreign-born population in the country, terminate the vicious cycle, and replenish their greying population with young immigrant workers, or they can maintain the status quo of letting immigrants stay for only a couple of years and expect their population to dwindle to around half of its current size in 2100, with the vicious cycle perpetuated ad infinitum.[30] If the latter were to happen, Japan—already in its third decade of economic stagnation with its gross domestic product per capita having shrunk for the past 20 years—can expect to see a multitude of problems including: a lack of young workers to pay into the top-heavy pension schemes (it is estimated that around 36 percent of Japan's population will be aged 65 and up) and food insecurity that threatens the extinction of "an estimated 896 Japanese cities, towns, and villages."[31] Allowing for more immigration in Japan is not just for the sake of creating a multicultural society; it is so that the Japanese can abandon embarrassing, antiquated racist sentiments of nihonjinron; it is so that they can address their demographic crisis; it is so that they can avoid enduring further economic drawbacks associated with a disproportionate aging population.

30 Colin Moreshead, "Japan: Abe Misses Chance on Immigration Debate," The Diplomat, March 6, 2015, accessed November 17, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/japan-abe-misses-chance-on-immigration-debate/; Yoshida, "Japan's immigration policy widens as population decline forces need for foreign workers."

31 It is estimated that by 2030, around 75 percent of the farmers in Japan will be aged 65 and up. Arudou, "Tackle embedded racism before it chokes Japan."

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BIOPOLITICS IN THE BORDERLANDS:
THE SECURITIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL LIBERAL WORLD ORDER

ABSTRACT

Following the end of the Cold War, the discourses and practices of international development and security have become increasingly intertwined. This paper explains why, and with what consequences, international development has become securitized in the post-Cold War era. The merging of security and development reflects the attempted operationalization of a global liberal governmentality, and the consequent security-development nexus has largely failed to promote peace and development in the Global South. Rather, it has served to undermine calls for social progress while institutionalizing a status quo characterized by severe global inequalities and violent conflict among impoverished peoples across the globe.

The processes by which development has been securitized are both discursive and institutional, and are illuminated by utilizing insights from the field of critical security studies. However, in order to explain why a wide variety of actors have sought to securitize development and why such moves have been successful, it is necessary to move beyond these insights to uncover the conditions of possibility and rationality behind the merging of security and development. This paper utilizes a Foucauldian analysis of governmentality to explain the merger and to conceptualize contemporary development policy as a biopolitical technique of security. It subsequently employs this framework in a case study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, allowing for the empirical substantiation of its central claim, namely that the contemporary security-development nexus achieves neither security nor development. These findings represent a serious challenge to the dominant framing of development as a security issue, suggesting the desirability of reconceptualizing development in desecuritized terms.

"[T]HE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS ACHIEVES NEITHER SECURITY NOR DEVELOPMENT."

INTRODUCTION

> *God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? … Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?*
> *– Friedrich Nietzsche (1974: 181 §125)*

We live in an age of uncertainty. God has long since died, and in his absence the meaning of existence and political action has been sought in the secular '-isms' of the modern era. Nationalism, having resulted in the destructive World Wars of the early twentieth century, thereafter gave way to the Cold War standoff between liberal capitalism in the West and communism in the East. This standoff heavily influenced Western approaches to global politics, providing a relatively unambiguous framework for comprehending international security and identifying threats thereto. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus the bipolar world order, however, the security agendas of prominent Western actors such as the US, UK and EU lost their clarity and fixity. In this "new world order" (Bush: 1991), the sudden absence of a potential large-scale interstate military confrontation

allowed for intensified global connectivity. As capital, people, and information became increasingly mobile, so too did security threats become conceptualized as transnational and diffuse. No longer could instability, conflict, and disease in the developing world be dismissed as local issues beyond the scope of the Western security agenda. In this context of radical uncertainty stemming from the perceived diffusion and intensification of global threats, combined with the lack of an overarching meaning for political action, Western international development policy became defined as a security issue, that is, securitized.

This paper examines why, and with what consequences, there has been a merging of security and development in the post-Cold War era. It argues that contemporary development and humanitarian aid policies reflect the operationalization of a global liberal governmentality. Beyond its structural characteristics, globalization allows for a reconceptualization of the globe, and the populations which inhabit it, as governable according to a liberal rationality of government. With no recourse to a fundamental source of values and meaning to inform political action, liberal governance takes as its object the promotion of life itself (Rabinow, 1991: 17). In this regime of global liberal governance, development aid constitutes a "technique of security" which takes the "population as both the object and subject of these mechanisms of security" and thus seeks to promote species life by way of monitoring, regulation, and correctional intervention at the level of the population (Foucault, 2007: 11). This liberal governmentality informs the securitization of development, which in turn legitimizes and depoliticizes the attempt at transforming and governing faraway populations by representing development as a matter of urgency and necessity, and development policy as a mere technical issue to be tackled by experts of the field, devoid of any need for political deliberation or contestation. Sustained criticisms against contemporary development policies and continued instability in places such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) suggest that the social, political, and ethical outcomes of the merging of security and development are highly questionable. This project therefore constitutes a *critical inquiry* into the liberal governmentality, highlighting the consequences of combining contemporary security and development policy.

Part I reviews existing literature on the post-Cold War security agenda, in order to argue that rather than being based solely on objective realities, or arising directly from structural transformations, security threats are always socially constructed. Insights from the field of critical security studies provide a framework for critically examining the securitization of development. A review of primary sources, including policy papers and security strategies, supported by secondary academic literature on the topic, demonstrates the merging of security and development in the post-Cold War era.

Having highlighted the processes by which development has become securitized in Part I, Part II discusses the imperatives and facilitating conditions driving the merging of security and development. As approaches within critical security studies are better equipped to illuminate the "how" rather than the "why" of securitization, a Foucauldian framework of liberal governmentality is drawn on to conceptualize contemporary development policy as a biopolitical technique of security. Development practice is one of the concrete outcomes of the operationalization of this liberal governmentality through globalization, to be understood as the new predominant grid of intelligibility informing and influencing security strategies in the US, UK and EU.

Part 3 then presents a case study of Western developmental interventions in the DRC in the post-Cold War era, to demonstrate how development practice on the ground reflects a liberal governmentality. A critical examination of the sustained failure of development policies and continued instability in the DRC highlights the very serious shortcomings of securitized development practice. Although a single case study was chosen due to limitations of space, the findings of this paper should not be dismissed as lacking in wider relevance. As "in the study of human affairs, there appears to exist only context-dependent knowledge," a single case study can "clarify the deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences" despite the lack of a comparative dimension to the analysis (Flyvberg, 2006: 221, 226). Indeed, "one should not wish to divest existence of its *rich ambiguity*" by way of overzealous quantification and generalization (Nietzsche, 1974: 335 §373 – original emphasis). The DRC represents an extreme case due to the persistence of instability despite extensive international stabilization and development efforts since the mid-1990s, allowing for a particularly fruitful ex-

amination of why dominant approaches to development in the DRC have remained largely unchanged despite their serious shortcomings. As Foucault asserted in his interrogation of the continued operation of the prison system despite its perennial failure, "perhaps one should reverse the problem and ask oneself what is served by the failure of the prison; what is the use of these different phenomena that are continually being criticized" (1991a: 272). This paper undertakes to ask these questions with regards to the securitization of development.

SECURITY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

> *The concept of peace is easy to grasp; that of international security is more complex, for a pattern of contradictions has arisen here as well … progress also brings new risks for stability.*
>
> *– Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992: 202)*

With the sudden collapse of the Cold War military standoff between East and West, the globe became void of the overarching intellectual framework previously informing the theory and practice of international security. Although the absence of a bipolar world order now seemed to give way to an increasingly interconnected and collaborative global society, the globalized nature of security threats also caused concerns. Indeed, the apparent paradox of globalization has been a simultaneous proliferation of both opportunities to realize global prosperity, and, on the other hand, uncertainty and risks now beyond the control of any single nation state (Beck, 2009: 160).

This section reviews the literature regarding the transformation of the security agenda in the post-Cold War era. Following an overview of mainstream literature and policy statements which point to the ambiguity of threats in a global era, it argues that the concepts of "security" and "threat" must be problematized in order to uncover how certain issues become included on the security agenda over others. Insights from the discipline of critical security studies illuminate the socially constructed nature of security, highlighting the discursive and institutional processes of securitization. This framework is subsequently applied in an examination of policy statements and institutional developments, supported by other secondary academic accounts, to demonstrate the securitization of development in the post-Cold War era.

New World Order, New Global Threats?

The dismantling of a bipolar world order coincided with rapid technological advancements, together acting as the structural drivers of the spatial, temporal, and cognitive transformations commonly grouped together under the heading of "globalization." Although perceived as promising a new age of global peace and prosperity (Friedman, 2000), increased interconnectedness also resulted in increased interdependence. In other words, as globalization intensified transnational flows of capital, populations, and information, Western security actors conceptualized global threats and risks as being beyond the control of any single nation state, and it thus became recognized by the Commission on Global Governance that "there is no alternative to working together and using collective power to create a better world" (1995: 2).

In this context, traditional analytical frameworks regarding international security – focusing on identifying and minimizing the threat of large-scale interstate warfare, and allowing for relatively autonomous national security assessments by each independent state – became increasingly outdated. Of course, more traditional security frameworks continued to assert some influence (e.g. Barnett, 2004). The traditional calculus of military threat identification in an age of globalization gave rise to policy prescriptions advocating the establishment of a transnational security apparatus, which could be used to tackle the threats posed by the "non-integrating gap" composed of illiberal states disconnected from the liberal world system (Barnett, 2006: 151). Despite the continuity of state-centric security paradigms, however, the security agenda was to undergo a veritable transformation as well.

Not only had the nature of warfare arguably shifted away from interstate military violence towards more complex network wars including both state and non-state actors (Kaldor, 2012), but new schools of thought within the field of international security studies began to broaden its remit considerably. Beyond the military sector, security experts now argued that international security studies should include assessments of political, economic, social, and environmental threats as well (e.g. Buzan, 1991). From this perspective, however, threats to security were still perceived as objective realities emanating from the structural transformations

of globalization, despite these threats now constituting "challenges to statehood itself, rather than challenges from interstate rivalry" (Mabee, 2009: 3).

The problem was therefore to efficiently identify and eliminate security threats, ostensibly defined by some objective criteria, as reflected in high-level policy statements such as the European Security Strategy of the European Union (EU), which asserts that "[i]n an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand" (EU, 2003: 6). Not only was the geographical scope of security threats conceptualized to encompass the world at large, but they were also seen as increasingly diffuse and perpetual. In other words, the maximization of national security now required action on a global scale and became increasingly open-ended, due to the impossibility of tackling all threats for good, as indeed the proliferation of global threats constituted the unavoidable "dark side" of globalization (Collins, 2012: 315). The *National Security Strategy* of the United Kingdom simultaneously described the contemporary era as both "an age of unparalleled opportunity" as well as "an age of uncertainty," in which "openness brings great opportunities, but also vulnerabilities … we are continually facing new and unforeseen threats to our security" (Cabinet Office, 2010: 3-4). President George W. Bush reflected this characterization of security threats as perennial in a globalized world in his address to the United States just nine days after the terror attacks of September 11th, 2001:

> *This war will not be like the war in Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion … Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen … Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. (Bush, 2001)*

Of course, the global 'war on terror' continues to inform US national security strategy today (White House, 2015: 9-10).

In addition to these conceptual transformations regarding national security, in the post-Cold War era, the nation state was no longer to be the sole referent object of international security, which now aimed to maximize "human security" as well. Influential actors such as the United Nations Commission on Human Security argued for a further expansion of the security agenda to include "human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential" (cited in Chandler, 2007: 367). The new security agenda, then, was not simply concerned with military threats and national security, but rather with "the pursuit of freedom from threat" very broadly defined (Buzan, 1991: 18). In this context, public and private actors now deliberately sought to include particular issues on the security agenda, due to the ability of security discourse to galvanize the newfound "compulsion to intervene" in a "world of emergencies" (Calhoun, 2004: 374, 379).

However, broadening the international security agenda to include non-military threats and a focus on non-state referent objects also raises pertinent questions regarding the criteria by which threats are identified. If almost anything, anywhere in the world, might now constitute a threat to an individual, a nation state, or the world at large, on what basis are some issues included on the security agenda while others are not? Furthermore, how exactly is a particular issue securitized, and what are the consequences of such a framing?

Problematizing Security

With the expansion of the security agenda, a major problem for security studies became "deciding where to stop, since the concept of security otherwise becomes a synonym for everything that is politically good or desirable" (Wæver, 1995: 47). In order for the concept of security, as well as the discipline of security studies, to retain their coherence and distinctiveness from other concepts and disciplines, security has become conceptualized as a particular "problematique, a specific *field of practice*" (Ibid.: 50 – original emphasis). In other words, rather than referring to some "objective, or purely material conditions" by which certain issues are or become threatening, the "security status" of any object is always intersubjectively constructed, and to treat any issue as belonging to the security agenda implies the subsequent operationalization of a particular framework for action in order to minimize the threat (Balzacq et al., 2014: 3-4). Illuminating the process by which issues become securitized is then the object of critical security studies. Furthermore, the discipline acquires a more overtly political and normative dimension, as "the crucial question

is no longer 'more or less security?' but whether or not an issue should be treated as a security issue" (Abrahamsen, 2005: 57).

The Copenhagen School of critical security studies made pioneering work in this regard, seeing the process of securitization as primarily discursive (Buzan et al., 1998). In this view, securitization constitutes a "speech act" through which an issue is discursively framed in the language of security and threats, and therefore "security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act" (Wæver, 1995: 55 – original emphasis). The language of security represents issues as existential threats to a referent object, often the nation state. This language of urgency seeks to elevate issues beyond the realm of everyday political deliberation by legitimizing emergency action to ameliorate the situation. Of course, not all issues discursively framed in the language of threat or crisis are successfully securitized, as indeed security is an *inter*subjective construct, and must be accepted by the intended audience. The success of a securitization therefore depends on the perceived legitimacy of the securitizing actor as well as the referent object, and each actor's capacity to effectively securitize issues will always be shaped by power relations between competing securitizing actors, and between the securitizing actor and the intended audience. This approach powerfully demonstrates the purposive character of security by rendering securitization as "a *decision* to rupture a situation with certain calculable consequences for others" (Huysmans, 2011: 373 – emphasis added).

While the approach of the Copenhagen School provides an informative theoretical framework from which to conceptualize the process of securitization, its focus on the discursive remains problematic. Concentrating only on existential framings by high-level political actors used to legitimize action beyond the realm of everyday politics, the Copenhagen School overlooks more diffuse and mundane processes by which issues are moved onto the security agenda. The Paris School of critical security studies has sought to address these shortcomings by stressing that not all securitizations depend on political spectacle or call for exceptional measures. Long-term legal and technological developments, as well as struggles between professional agencies, also incrementally shape the ways in which security is conceptualized and operationalized (Huysmans, 2006: 63). Successfully claiming "expertise" in the field of security allows particular practitioners or agencies to produce relatively unchallenged knowledge claims concerning the security status of particular issues, and therefore to "*construct* problems in a way that enables them to use their traditional 'solutions'" (Bigo, 2001: 121-122 – original emphasis). Rather than having to frame issues in existential terms in order to legitimize exceptional measures, security professionals shape the security agenda by determining the very boundaries of the field itself, often more aptly described as a long-term, incremental "management of unease" rather than a politics of exceptionalism and emergency (Bigo, 2002: 75).

Despite these critiques and further insights, however, the Paris School does not seek to completely undermine the Copenhagen School nor entirely reject its theses on the importance of discourse and exceptionalism in the process of securitization. Rather, the diffuse and mundane incremental developments shaping the professional field of security often provide the basis for successful discursive securitizations. For instance, international migration became very visibly securitized in the highly contentious political debates surrounding the "migrant crisis" in Europe beginning in 2015 (Sherwell & Squires, 2015). However, the success of discursive securitizing moves, which closely conformed to Copenhagen School predictions of a language of existential threat used to legitimize emergency action such as closing internal borders of the EU, in fact largely depended on diffuse institutional, bureaucratic, and technological developments shaped by security professionals from the early 1990s onwards (Huysmans, 2006: 68-72).

Normative dilemmas arise from the inherent characteristics of the discourse and practice of security. Based on the identification and elimination of threats to a referent object, securitizing a particular issue often involves representing particular groups or populations as dangerous. This representation serves to construct the image of a coherent "enemy" against which otherwise unacceptable actions, such as violence and exclusion, can be legitimately taken (Bigo, 2002: 81). Such representations rely on generalizations potentially based on ethically dubious identificatory characteristics such as ethnicity to construct the enemy as a coherent group, and the imagery of existential threat can be subsequently used to avert the

need for political debate as to how and why exactly particular individuals or groups are categorized as dangerous (Huysmans, 2006: 48). Parallel to constructing a coherent image of an enemy, securitization reifies a particular conception of political community by determining its limits and concealing the multitude of interest groups and cultural practices therein. Security concerns becoming central to political action limits the spaces for contestation and democratic deliberation within the political community, along with the possibilities for constructive engagement with those deemed "dangerous" (Huysmans, 2004). Indeed, when "the concept of 'fear' and 'enemy' constitute the 'energetic principle' of politics, a democratic political system is impossible, whether the fear is produced from within or without" (Neumann, 1953: 935). Furthermore, as security involves the operationalization of a particular framework for thought and action by security experts, successful securitizations may prove self-perpetuating. Once issues are moved onto the security agenda, they are open to evaluation and intervention primarily by security experts, who are inherently inclined to approach issues from a security perspective. In a cyclical manner, "people see the world as a threatening place, and, because they do, the world turns out, indeed, to be a threatening place" (Coelho, 2006: 125). In other words, desecuritizing issues that have successfully been securitized can be extremely difficult.

These combined insights into the socially constructed character of security, and both the discursive and institutional processes of securitization, provide a framework for examining the post-Cold War securitization of development. They suggest the need to analyze both high-level policy discourse and institutional transformations in the fields of security and development. The potential normative dilemmas of the securitization of development arise from the generalization, depoliticization, and exclusion which characterize the discourse and practice of security.

The Dangers of Underdevelopment

In addition to their conceptualization of the global nature of threats, outlined above, Western security strategies' inclusion of poverty and instability within the developing world on the security agenda signals an important transformation. In line with the Copenhagen School perspective on securitization, the security strategies of the EU and other entities now describe underdevelopment as dangerous, ostensibly giving rise to "key threats," including organized crime, terrorism, international conflict, and migratory movements (EU, 2003: 2-4). Security and development are thus intimately interlinked, as Western governments "acknowledge that without development and poverty reduction there will be no sustainable peace and security, and that without peace and security there can be no sustainable development" (EU, 2014: 25). The UK national security strategy also asserts that because underdevelopment gives rise to instability, it is necessary to "tackle the causes of instability overseas in order to prevent risks from manifesting themselves in the UK," and therefore the strategy recognizes the importance of "development professionals … involved in deploying our world-class development programme to help improve security" (Cabinet Office, 2010: 9-10). Thus, the provision of development aid is based on "the security-development nexus" (Hoebeke et al., 2007: 3), and donor security concerns have often trumped recipients' humanitarian needs as a determinant of foreign aid provision of both the US and the EU, particularly after the 9/11 terror attacks (Brown, 2005: 188). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopting Resolution 1308 warning of the risks of a global HIV/AIDS epidemic (UNSC, 2000) indicates the extent to which high-level policy discourse has accepted perceptions of underdevelopment as a security threat. The UNSC thereby signaled that "security is no longer confined to defending sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law" but now also includes tackling underdevelopment, seen as a source of instability and disease across the globe (Elbe, 2005: 406).

In addition to such discursive developments, institutional developments also attest to the securitization of development, confirming Paris School predictions regarding the role of professionals in shaping the security agenda. The fields of security and development "are now increasingly overlapping in terms of the actors and agencies engaged and the policy prescriptions advocated" (Chandler, 2007: 362). National governments and security agencies have promoted the convergence of these fields by stressing the importance of development professionals for Western security strategies, and by strengthening interdepartmental coordination and collaboration, as is the case with the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and Ministry of Defence (MOD) coming together to implement the UK National Security Strategy (FCO, 2015). National development departments and intergovernmental agencies have also adopted the language of security and stressed their own roles in tackling security threats. For instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Strategic Plan 2014-2017* highlights the proliferation of global risks and asserts the potential of its operations to minimize them (UNDP, 2013: 3-4). Similarly, DFID appeals to UK national security concerns to justify its attempts to "reduce poverty in fragile states [and] deliver world class humanitarian assistance" (DFID, 2012: 2).

Importantly, however, these institutional developments are not limited to governmental departments and agencies. Indeed, a crucial aspect of the securitization of development in the post-Cold War era has been the inclusion of a wide array of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within the security-development nexus. Prolific NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières, Oxfam, Save the Children, and many others have had to "[learn] to work with military establishments in new ways" due to their perceived "security responsibilities" given the role of development practice in addressing the threats of underdevelopment (Duffield, 2002: 1062). Certainly, state actors have partially driven the inclusion of non-state actors in the operationalization of securitized development policies, as reflected in the near doubling of direct governmental funding to developmental NGOs between 1989 and 2005 (Williams & Young, 2012: 10). However, NGOs themselves have also eagerly embraced their new position within public-private networks of aid provision, in which they speak the language of security and become increasingly involved with military actors, as such expertise now constitutes a central source of their legitimacy. Given the increasing interlinkages and overlaps between military and development actors, both public and private, the political neutrality of NGOs has been compromised, and "from the perspective of many local populations, they have become indistinguishable from occupying forces or the allies of intrusive governments" (Duffield, 2006: 31).

Insights from the Copenhagen and Paris Schools have provided the analytical tools to demonstrate the merging of security and development via an examination of both discursive and institutional developments in the post-Cold War era. However, they cannot provide an account of the rationality informing attempts by both public and private actors to securitize development, or explain why these attempts have been largely successful. Although these analytical frameworks recognize the role of "facilitating conditions" in determining the success of securitizing moves, this concept ultimately remains underdeveloped (McDonald, 2008: 571-572). Furthermore, while it is possible to conceptualize securitizing moves by particular agencies and actors in terms of economic incentives, or as attempts to gain legitimacy provided by "expert" status in the security-development nexus, such explanations raise the question of why these incentives have proliferated in the post-Cold War era. It therefore becomes imperative to examine the changes in the underlying grid of intelligibility informing political thought and action following the end of the Cold War, in order to explain why narratives of global threat and the securitization of international development have been so widely accepted.

GLOBAL LIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY

> *It has been said that arguing against globalization is like arguing against the law of gravity.*
>
> *– Kofi Annan (2000)*

Following the triumph of Western liberal capitalism over the communist East, "globalization" soon became the buzzword of the turn of the century. Policymakers and scholars of politics attempted to grasp the political realities of the post-Cold War era, in which the acceleration of technological developments seemed to have resulted in an unforeseen level of global interconnectedness and transnational circulation. However, the proliferation of competing accounts of the nature of contemporary global politics soon undermined the conceptual coherence of the term "globalization," which "encompasses all kinds of things; it's used very widely and vaguely" (Hardt, 2004).

This section dispels such ambiguity and conceptual incoherence. Following a critical examination of popular accounts of globalization, and the limitations thereof, this section puts forth an alternative account of globalization as constituting a new grid of intelligibility for political thought and action. It argues that globalization allows for the operationalization of a liberal rationality of government on a trans-

national scale by rendering the globe and its populations in their entirety as governable. In the absence of serious alternatives to the liberal capitalist form of government (Fukuyama, 2006), 'global governance' has been viewed as possible, and indeed desirable. Drawing on the analytics of governmentality developed by Michel Foucault (1991b), this section demonstrates how – rather than resulting in coercive global domination – attempts to govern the globe are informed by a liberal governmentality, characterized by the conduct of conduct – "*conduire des conduites*" (Foucault, 1994: 237). Within this regime of global liberal governance, international development constitutes a "technology of security" which operates on the populations of the underdeveloped world (Duffield, 2007: 15). This framework captures the dynamics which allowed for the merging of security and development policy, and the rationality underpinning the concrete operationalization thereof.

Making Sense of Globalization

The profound structural transformation brought about by the collapse of bipolarity coincided with technological developments in production, transport, and communication. Intensified transnational flows of goods and services, populations, and information challenged the traditional theoretical frameworks of International Relations, as their insistence on the individual state as the central unit of analysis in international politics (e.g. Waltz, 1979) seemed increasingly atavistic in a globalized era.

The irrelevance of traditional analytical frameworks was not, of course, universally accepted. Although some hardline realist commentators insisted on the unchanged status of the state and its power vis-à-vis non-state actors (Waltz, 1999), most traditionalist analyses recognized at least some measure of change within the world system, while maintaining that these changes did not undermine their theoretical frameworks as such. In response to assertions of declining state power in the context of a proliferation of influential non-state actors on the international scene and the increasing porosity of interstate borders (Rosenau, 1995), realists extended their frameworks for analyzing political power. For instance, some theorists included notions of "soft power" and credibility to explain non-coercive influence in global politics (Keohane & Nye, 1998: 86), and some also recognized the role of context-specific social dynamics in shaping the successful translation of power resources into desired outcomes (Baldwin, 1979). Despite this added level of sophistication, however, realist analyses of power "remain fundamentally state-centered and faithful in the primacy of realist states' interests," and are therefore "of limited help as soon as it comes to accounting for situations in which actors that lack material bargaining capabilities can be successful" (Holzscheiter, 2005: 729). The realist focus on states and material power conceptualized in zero-sum terms appears problematic in the context of non-state actors enjoying significant successes in shaping the international political agenda despite very limited material resources, as was the case with e.g. the 1997 Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines and the 1986 UN Convention against Torture.

A Marxist political economy perspective informed an alternative, yet similarly traditionalist, popular framework for understanding globalization. These analyses stressed the neoliberal capitalist logic of globalization, which, from this perspective, represented a "spatio-temporal fix" to the problem of capital overaccumulation (Harvey, 2005). Globalization, then, was the result of attempts to both deepen existing exploitative capitalist relations within the West, and extend the geographical reach of the capitalist world system (Moore, 2001). This perspective moves beyond the state-centrism of realist frameworks by stressing the complementary role of non-state actors such as multinational corporations in spreading global capitalism and reorganizing production on a global scale. However, Marxist accounts of globalization fall short both empirically and theoretically. Contrary to predictions of the geographical spread of exploitative capitalist relations across the globe, in fact:

> *the South has been increasingly isolated and excluded by the dominant networks of the conventional global informational economy. Many traditional primary products are no longer required or are too low-priced for commercial exploitation, investment is risky, the available workforce lacks appropriate skills and education, markets are extremely narrow, telecommunications inadequate, politics unpredictable, governments ineffective, and so on. (Duffield, 2001: 5)*

Furthermore, in their conceptualization of globalization as a concrete manifestation of "imperial and class-based control," material power

and economic imperatives seem to constitute central explanatory categories in themselves, and Marxist accounts thus fail to theorize "how this control is effected" (Ferguson, 2014: 13 – original emphasis).

In an attempt to rectify the aforementioned shortcomings, scholars of "global governance" put forth an account of globalization which is "able to move beyond state-centric analyses to include a focus on the processes of governance, to highlight the power of nonstate actors, and to identify and theorize about the changing forms and institutionalization of political authority" (Sending & Neumann, 2006: 651-652). These accounts shifted focus away from states and relations of production toward the myriad actors involved in global governance and the extent to which these actors were able to gain authority in a particular issue-area. Explanatory power was thus located in measures of institutionalization, delegation between public and private actors, modalities of interaction between actors and governance frameworks, and the extent of control over decision-making processes (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002). Although these accounts correctly recognize the importance of non-state actors in contemporary governance arrangements, they remain wedded to a zero-sum conception of power, thus confining these analyses to debates over whether or not a relocation of power, authority, or legitimacy has resulted in the "eclipse of the state" (Evans, 1997). Furthermore, these debates overlook the fact that states often encourage or directly support the incorporation of non-state actors in governance arrangements. While such perspectives on global governance are therefore better equipped than traditionalist frameworks to examine the multifaceted outcomes of governance arrangements in a globalized world, they "fail in exploring both the power at work in the actual practices through which governance takes place, as well as the more specific content or logic of the relations between state and non-state actors" (Sending & Neumann, 2006: 654).

Grasping the logic of governance arrangements involving state and non-state actors on a global scale thus requires a genealogy of globalization in order to uncover how "the global [emerged] as a way of knowing and acting on and in the world" (Larner & Walters, 2004: 502). Notwithstanding the structural and technological developments characterizing the post-Cold War era, globalization, as an epistemological system, constitutes a regime of knowledge – "*régime du savoir*" – through which "knowledge circulates and functions" (Foucault, 1982: 781). In other words, discourse on globalization constitutes the dominant narrative through which to understand the world and act upon it. As is the case with all discourse, globalization as an interpretive grid is itself a manifestation of relations of power, where power is understood in productive terms:

> *What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. (Foucault, 1991c: 61 – emphasis added)*

Conceptualizing globalization as the dominant grid of intelligibility informing political thought and action highlights its contingency as the product of power relations and allows for a critical interrogation of the particular forms of knowledge and expertise it legitimizes, in this case the narrative of global threats which justifies the securitization of development.

Discourse on globalization proliferated in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War in the context of Western liberal triumphalism and represents a liberal reconceptualization of global politics in the absence of the threat of communism in the East (Abrahamsen, 2000: 15). Globalization arises from historically specific configurations of power characterized by the dominance of the Western liberal capitalist political model, and therefore seeks to render the globe governable according to a liberal rationality of government, or "governmentality." An "analytics of governmentality" is required to grasp the liberal rationale that characterizes attempts at global governance, and which informs the merging of security and development (Dean, 2010). This framework will also avoid the pitfalls of a zero-sum conception of power common in popular conceptualizations of globalization and global governance, by allowing for an examination of how liberal power is often operationalized productively through the freedom of its subjects rather than merely coercively or restrictively. Furthermore, rather than accepting accounts of economic clout or material interest as sufficient explanatory cate-

gories as such, an analytics of governmentality allows for an interrogation of the concrete manifestations a liberal governmentality as reflected in dominant regimes of knowledge, the creation of particular subjectivities, the techniques and mechanisms through which government operates, and the formation of particular fields of visibility of what is to be governed (Deleuze, 1991), all of which contribute to the merging of security and development in the post-Cold War era.

Foucault, Governmentality, and Biopolitics

In his analyses of the operationalization of political power in modern liberal societies, Foucault sought to "criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked" (cited in Rabinow, 1991: 6). He had previously examined the historical development of sovereign power, based on the right of the sovereign "to take life or let live" (Foucault, 2004: 241) and disciplinary power, which "compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes… [in other words] *normalizes*" in order to transform individuals into productive members of society by maximizing their "docility and utility" (Foucault, 1991a: 183, 218 – original emphasis). In modern liberal societies, however, political power no longer operates simply on the level of the individual, nor in a solely coercive or restrictive manner. Indeed, the new liberal form of power "presents itself as a critique of excessive disciplinary power" (Dean, 2010: 133). However, while liberalism operates through the freedom and rights of the individual, it simultaneously "contains the possibility of *illiberal* practices and rationalities of government," as a liberal form of rule "constantly produces a division between those populations who are capable of exercising such capacities and those who are not… For the still to be improved populations, or those permanently unimprovable, liberalism necessarily produces forms of despotic rule" (Ibid.: 257 – original emphasis). Given the depoliticizing effects of the language of freedom and rights, which shifts responsibility onto individuals who are supposedly free to shape their own destinies, uncovering "on what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices are based" becomes imperative (Foucault, 2002: 456).

With the development of fields of knowledge regarding the state and its resources – in a word, its "statistics" – it became possible to take the population as a whole as the object of government. Having exposed that while individual fates are inherently unknowable, certain phenomena can be probabilistically quantified at the level of the population, the new liberal power seeks to monitor, regulate, and intervene in the biological processes affecting the population as a whole. These include mortality rates, morbidity, reproduction rates, and aleatory elements such as accidents. Foucault refers to this newfound focus on the population and its biological processes as the object of government, in order to promote species life, as "biopolitics" (Foucault, 2008). Contrary to disciplinary power, which operates through coercive and isolating practices, biopolitics seeks to maximize species life by enabling, rather than restricting or limiting, the circulation of capital, people, and information (Elden, 2007: 30). The problem of government is thus no longer to maximize capacity for direct control, but rather to find a balance between governing too little and governing too much, as either extreme may cause phenomena such as theft, disease, or economic productivity to move beyond "socially and economically acceptable limits and [the] average that will be considered as optimal for a given social functioning" (Foucault, 2007: 5).

Given the biopolitical imperative to maximize species life by refraining from governing too much for the aforementioned reasons, political power thus becomes operationalized through the freedom of the subject in an attempt to promote self-regulation of the population through the conduct of conduct. In other words, rather than operating in a directly coercive manner, a liberal governmentality seeks to "structure the possible field of action of others" while allowing political subjects the freedom to act within this constrained field of agency (Foucault, 1982: 790). The freedom of the subject is therefore "not in opposition to modern government, but is rather an essential technique, or product, of power" (Death, 2010: 238). In order to produce self-governing populations that are able to responsibly exercise their freedom within the limits prescribed by liberal democratic norms, the conduct of conduct operates via dominant regimes of knowledge, regulatory mechanisms, norms, and value systems "that not only constrain actors, but also constitute

them" (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1459).

It is from this perspective that globalization, and the transformations of political power on a transnational scale, may be understood. Globalization allows for conceptualizing the remit of liberal governance as inclusive of the world and its populations in their entirety (Elden, 2005). This discursive structure expands the biopolitical rationale to encompass transnational circulation and population dynamics and therefore similarly expands the distinction between responsible liberal subjects and illiberal populations onto a global scale, in order to "govern all illiberal life on the basis that the species as a whole would be less endangered" (Evans, 2010: 418). The proliferation of influential non-state actors on the international arena, rather than representing a zero-sum loss of state power in favor of NGOs, reflects the operationalization of a liberal governmentality in which non-state actors, constituting "civil society," shape and enact the conduct of conduct at a distance. Although some critics aptly recognize that techniques of liberal governmentality often fail in the context of the limited infrastructure, a weak economic base, and insufficient regulatory capacities of the state (Joseph, 2010), this argument does not necessarily undermine the utility of using the governmentality approach as an analytical framework to uncover the underlying rationality which informs these failed attempts at liberal governance in the developing world (Death, 2013). Rather than suggesting the successful and comprehensive incorporation of the developing world into a system of global liberal governance, this account of globalization as the expansion of a liberal will to govern uncovers the rationale informing the securitization of development, according to which development policy now constitutes a biopolitical technique of security in an attempt to govern the underdeveloped populations of the Global South. Certainly, securitized development policies have not always resulted in successful biopolitical governance, as indeed the attempted operationalization of a liberal governmentality via development policies has often produced questionable results in practice and raises difficult normative questions regarding the political and ethical dimensions of international inequality and underdevelopment.

International Development as Biopower

An analytics of governmentality allows us to critically interrogate the liberal rationality of government which has been globalized in the post-Cold War era, within which international development practice constitutes a relation of "biopower." Aimed at the pacification and normalization of unstable regions across the globe, biopower operates on the populations of the developing world by "taking control of life and the biological processes of man-as-species […] ensuring they are not disciplined, but regularized" (Foucault, 2004: 246-247). Conceptualizing development policy as a biopolitical technique of security requires one to critically interrogate the regimes of knowledge, particular subjectivities, and the techniques and mechanisms that both constitute the global liberal governmentality and reflect its concrete operationalization (Deleuze, 1988).

Having examined the role of globalization as a new dominant grid of intelligibility, it becomes possible to interrogate a more particular post-Cold War "development discourse" within that broader regime of knowledge, which in turn has contributed to the reconceptualization of development as a technique of security. Within the dominant interpretive grid of globalization, development discourse has served to construct the Global South as a "particular kind of object of knowledge, and [has created] a structure of knowledge around that object, [on the basis of which] interventions are then organized" (Ferguson, 2014: xiv-xv). In order to render it knowable and actionable, the Global South is defined within development discourse in negative terms of "fear, absences, and hierarchies" (Abrahamsen, 2000: 17). In all of these aspects, the developing world is represented in contradistinction to the West: instability in the underdeveloped Global South poses a security threat to the stable West thereby generating "fear"; technical progress and economic prosperity found in the West is contrasted with their "absence" in the developing world; and, in teleological fashion, a "hierarchy" between the civilized Global North and the anachronistic Global South is thereby constructed. In other words, development discourse establishes a "formative contrast between *borderland* traits of barbarity, excess and irrationality, and *metropolitan* characteristics of civility, restraint and rationality" (Duffield, 2002: 1052 – original emphasis).

This distinction between the stable Western "metropolis" and the chaotic "borderlands" of the developing world, is, in effect, a distinc-

tion between those political subjects who are able to govern themselves and those who are not. This distinction legitimizes Western interventions within the Global South, aimed at the wholesale transformation of the populations of the "borderlands" into self-regulatory and stable entities, and thus reflects the liberal "*will to govern* the borderlands" (Ibid.: 1053 – original emphasis). Furthermore, conceptualizing underdevelopment and instability in the Global South in terms of societal breakdown and as the absence of technical knowledge required for economic management depoliticizes development as a matter of technical intervention by development professionals (Escobar, 1984: 388). Such representations of the Global South as a zone of chaos that threatens to spill over into the developed West and that can yet be pacified via technical interventions by experts, comprise the conditions of possibility for the securitization of development in the post-Cold War era, described in the previous section. The concrete aims of securitized development policies in the post-Cold War era reflect the biopolitical imperative of liberal governmentality, which constitutes the underlying rationality of this reconceptualization of development. The merging of security and development in an age of global liberal governance, then, has given rise to a "biopolitics in the borderlands." Of course, development policies are not simply imposed by Western actors onto passive populations, as local actors often shape the outcome of international development efforts as well (Bayart, 2009). Indeed, a central aspect of liberal governmentality is its engagement with local actors to utilize their agency in developmental interventions (Constantinou & Opondo, 2016). However, the agency of local actors does not undermine the utility of the governmentality framework in uncovering the underlying rationale of Western securitized development policy and practice.

The biopolitical imperative of the liberal governmentality, that is, the goal of maximizing species life, arises from the lack of an overarching meaning of existence and political action in the postmodern and post-ideological phase of liberal politics. With the proverbial "death of God" as well as the demise of political projects put forth by the antagonistic nationalisms of the early twentieth century, and thereafter the ideological standoff of the Cold War, liberalism has "no goal, no answer to the question: why?" (Nietzsche, 2017: 15 §2). With no recourse to an overarching meaning of existence and political action, and no promise of a utopian future, in the era of global liberalism "[p]olitical actions no longer find their legitimacy in a vision of the future, but have been reduced to managing the ordinary present" (Laïdi, 1998: 7). In this context, the reconceptualization of the global security agenda has, as described in Part 1 of this paper, resulted in the perpetual management of insecurity in a world of inherently unknowable risks. Due to its reconceptualization as a biopolitical technique of security, the contemporary nature of international development policy and practice concretely mirrors the inability of liberal governance to aim at nothing more than the maximization of species life.

"CONCEPTUALIZING UNDERDEVELOPMENT... IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN TERMS OF...THE ABSENCE OF TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE... DEPOLITICIZES DEVELOPMENT."

As detailed above, within the regime of biopolitics, techniques of security seek to produce self-governing populations by way of monitoring and regulation, as well as targeted interventions when required, in order to maximize species life by optimizing circulation while eliminating its dangerous elements. Thus, the security-development nexus now aims at stimulating the self-governance of the developing world, by promoting "sustainable development" and the "resilience" of underdeveloped populations in the Global South (Chandler, 2014; Curtis, 2001: 6-7), so that they may "bounce back better" in the case of conflict or disaster, without need for further external intervention (DFID, 2011: 9). Instances of instability arising from natural disasters and

violent conflict have, in fact, been reconceptualized as "windows of opportunity" allowing for Western developmental actors to "enable transformational change" in order to build "resilience" (Oxfam, 2013: 11). Of course, as Foucault argued in his examination of governmentality (1991b: 102), rather than replacing earlier forms of sovereign and disciplinary power entirely, the regime of global liberal governance retains its capacity for coercive disciplinary action as well. This coercive capacity becomes momentarily visible in instances of "humanitarian intervention" discursively conceptualized as a "responsibility to protect" (ICISS, 2001), which not only justifies *reactive* violent intervention to pacify "dangerous" populations of the Global South, but also entails a *preventative* responsibility, in effect constituting a disciplinary technique "which relies upon a series of permanent coercions in order to train individuals to be docile" (Shinko, 2006: 175).

This combination of biopolitical development efforts with occasional disciplinary interventions has characterized securitized development policies and practices since the end of the Cold War. International development efforts, then, aim at the pacification and normalization of Global South by intervening at the level of the population in order to maximize species life and eliminate the dangers of underdevelopment which threaten to spread to the West. This reconceptualization of development as a biopolitical technique of security is significant in that it entails a shift of responsibility for development and well-being onto the underdeveloped populations themselves. Stressing the importance of "sustainable development," "resilience," and "local ownership" localizes and depoliticizes the underlying causes of global inequality (Ferguson, 2006: 51). Similarly, the language of 'emergency' and 'disasters' in the developing world not only legitimizes biopolitical or disciplinary interventions as necessary corrective actions, but also "naturalizes what are in fact products of human action" (Calhoun, 2004: 376). In other words, the role of the West in producing and reproducing global inequalities is obscured, thereby delegitimizing calls for redistribution or social progress. With the merging of security and development, "social progress is no longer on the agenda; in its place is the management of poverty and the institutionalization of the *status quo*" (Chandler, 2007: 373). In addition to these normative dilemmas, moreover, the outcomes of securitized development programs have frequently failed to produce even their own intended outcomes such as strengthened capacity of local populations for self-sustenance via "sustainable development," and the cessation of violent combat in the Global South. Rather, the contemporary security-development nexus has often served to normalize violence and conflict in the developing world. Indeed, it seems the merging of security and development in the post-Cold War era has produced a situation where, on a global scale, "the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule" (Benjamin, 1992 [1940]: 248). To concretely demonstrate the biopolitical character of the security-development nexus, as well as its normative and empirical shortcomings, this study now turns to the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

CASE STUDY: THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Take up the White Man's burden –
The savage wars of peace –
Fill full the mouth of famine
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch Sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all your hopes to naught.
– Rudyard Kipling (1940 [1899]: 323)

Given its considerable size, economic resources, geostrategically crucial location at the center of the African continent, and long history of violence with particularly intensified conflict following the end of Mobutu Sese Seko's 32-year reign, the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) involves multiple crucial concerns of the contemporary security-development nexus. Perceptions of the DRC's untapped economic potential, combined with concerns over underdevelopment giving rise to threats such as transnational terrorism (Piazza, 2008), regardless of a lack of evidence thereof (UNSC, 2015: 4), have galvanized extensive, and heavily securitized, Western developmental interventions in the post-Cold War era. Despite widespread recognition of the sustained shortcomings of these interventions, even with regards to their own stated goals of reducing violent conflict and promoting sustainable development, dominant approaches to development in the DRC have undergone little transformation in the past two decades.

The DRC allows for the empirical substanti-

ation of the claims made above, regarding the merging of security and development in the post-Cold War era. Western policy discourse and institutional developments surrounding intervention in the DRC confirm the securitization of development, and the concrete operationalization of securitized development policies reflects their biopolitical nature. The application of an analytics of governmentality, outlined in the previous section, illuminates the underlying rationality informing attempts at a 'biopolitics in the borderlands' and explains the continuities of development policies despite widely recognized shortcomings. Furthermore, applying this Foucauldian framework to the case of the DRC provides a critique of securitized development policies in an age of global liberal governance more broadly, by highlighting their limits and therefore the problems inherent to the reconceptualization of development policy as a biopolitical technique of security. The liberal rationality of government itself undermines any real attempt at problematizing or challenging global inequalities and therefore precludes the proper appreciation of the political nature of underdevelopment, which remains crucial to the attainment of social progress and the termination of violent conflict in the DRC.

"THE LIBERAL RATIONALITY OF GOVERNMENT ITSELF...THEREFORE PRECLUDES THE PROPER APPRECIATION OF THE POLITICAL NATURE OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT."

Historical Background: "The Heart of Darkness"

Following its independence from Belgium in 1960, a period of instability and constitutional crises ensued in the DRC, due to factional infighting, tensions between Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu, and secessionist struggles in the Katanga and South Kasai provinces (Van Reybrouck, 2014: 282). This phase of intensified instability ultimately culminated in a military coup led by Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, later Mobutu Sese Seko, in 1965, inaugurating a period of personalistic authoritarian rule lasting until 1997, when he was ousted by the foreign-backed Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (*Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre*, AFDL), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila in the context of the First Congo War (1996-1997) (Reyntjens, 1999). During the post-Mobutu period, Western involvement in the DRC has expanded significantly, and therefore this time period constitutes the focus of this case study.

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 is often characterized as the beginning of the post-Cold War era of violent conflict in the DRC. Vast inflows of immigrants fleeing the Rwandan Civil War destabilized ethnic relations in the North and South Kivu provinces, which thereafter also provided refuge for Rwandan Hutu militia forces fleeing prosecution by the Tutsi-dominated postwar government. Instability in the Kivu provinces added to existing national and international contempt towards Mobutu, resulting in full-scale war between his government forces and the AFDL, which was internationally backed by the governments of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola. The overthrow of Mobutu and the accession of Kabila to power hardly inaugurated an era of peace in the DRC. Although initially welcomed on the back of the unpopularity of the Mobutu regime, Kabila soon faced severe allegations of foreign dependence and control, particularly with regards to the sustained Rwandan military presence in the eastern provinces, and extensive linkages between Kabila's regime and that of Rwanda's de facto leader, Paul Kagame (Reyntjens, 1999: 245). Kabila's attempts to absolve himself of such allegations culminated in his expulsion of Rwandan and Ugandan military actors from the country, quickly resulting in the Second Congo War (1998-2003), between Kabila's government forces backed by the governments of Zimbabwe, Angola, Chad, Namibia and Sudan, and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*, RCD)

backed by the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi (Autesserre, 2010: 48).

Its significant regional impact stretching across the African continent has resulted in the Second Congo War being alternatively referred to as The Great African War, in addition to its generating extensive Western interest and involvement in an attempt to bring the war to an end. As Kabila's forces brought rebel advances to a halt in mid-1999, a peace process was initiated with the involvement of an extensive array of international actors, including the US, UK, EU, UN, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and multiple African nations (Autesserre, 2010: 49). These negotiations resulted in the Lusaka ceasefire agreement of July 1999, and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force, MONUC (United Nations Mission in the Congo – *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo*). Despite the ceasefire and the arrival of MONUC forces in early 2001, however, violent conflict continued to rage on between 1999 and 2003, with the eastern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, Katanga and Ituri most severely affected. Nevertheless, the assassination of President Kabila in 2001 eliminated the main obstacle to the signing of a peace agreement. With the accession of his son Joseph Kabila to the presidency, the Inter-Congolese Dialogues were initiated in April 2002, culminating in their Final Act of April 2003, which instituted a Transitional Government to carry out a plan to peacefully reunify the Congo and arrange democratic general elections, which took place in 2006 (Reyntjens, 2007: 311-315).

The DRC was thereafter described as having entered a "post-conflict phase," reflecting perceptions of the imminence of peace, and MONUC was soon renamed to MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC – *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo*), "with the 'S' in stabilization indicating that a return to 'normalcy' was envisaged down the line, even if this was not reflected by what was happening on the ground" (De Vries, 2015: 12). In fact, the "post-conflict phase" has seen some of the highest instances of violence and insecurity, particularly in the eastern provinces and among the most socioeconomically disadvantaged strata of the population (Hoffman et al., 2016). Moreover, levels of human development have seen little improvement, with extremely high child mortality (Kandala et al., 2014), severe restrictions on civil and political rights (UNSC, 2016), and little improvement in the country's Human Development Index (HDI), in which the DRC currently ranks 176th of 188 countries (UNDP, 2015).

"THE COMPLEXITY OF LOCAL POLITICAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS HAVE BEEN OBSCURED BY 'NAIVE LIBERALISM.'"

These issues have persisted despite extensive humanitarian and developmental interventions by Western actors over the past two decades. Furthermore, the character of these interventions has demonstrated remarkable continuity, even in the face of a recognition of their failures by the intervening actors themselves (UNSC, 2016; DFID, 2014). In order to explain the failures of these interventions, as well as this continuity in spite of their shortcomings, one must critically interrogate their underlying rationality.

Operationalizing a Liberal Governmentality in the DRC

The case of the DRC concretely substantiates the claims of the two previous sections, namely of the rationale behind the securitization of international development. The general reconceptualization of security in a globalized era, and the proliferation of development discourse as outlined above, contributed to representations of the DRC as a "borderlands" zone of chaos and therefore inherently violent (Autesserre, 2010: 42). This representation legitimized Western intervention given the threats of instability in the underdeveloped world (DFID, 2012; MSF, 2016), in turn giving rise to an astounding quantitative increase in funding for peacekeeping missions and development aid by both state and non-state actors since the mid-1990s onwards (Quick, 2015: 14, 19). Such discourse depoliticized and technicized the nature of development in the DRC, by representing ongoing violence as inherent to the Congolese, thereby preventing

evidence of sustained conflict from undermining the "post-conflict" label of the DRC, as violence became seen as "normal" rather than representing a reversion to war (Autesserre, 2010: 79). Furthermore, this view allowed for conceptualizing violence as arising not from socioeconomic discontent or legitimate political concerns, but rather a lack of governance capacity or technical expertise (USAID, 2014: 2; DFID, 2014: 5). Therefore, both the complexity of local political and ethnic conflicts, as well as the role of the West in producing and reproducing global inequalities contributing to the sustained underdevelopment of the DRC, have been obscured by what some critical commentators have characterized as "naïve liberalism" (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2014: 11).

The nature of Western interventions, to which the dominant understandings of underdevelopment in the DRC gave rise, reflects the liberal rationale underpinning the reconceptualization of the globe as a governable entity, in which international development therefore constitutes a biopolitical technique of security. True to the biopolitical imperatives of a liberal governmentality, these interventions aim to optimize species life by promoting the self-reliance and self-governance of local populations (DFID, 2012; USAID, 2014). The achievement of these goals is seen as a technical problem, to be solved by strengthening local governance capacity and technical expertise through the actions of governmental development agencies and NGOs (Bonard et al., 2010: 6), while humanitarian organizations focus on the provision of basic needs until local actors have become self-reliant (ICRC, 2009). The main indicators of developmental success, then, are those which point to increased self-sufficiency and strengthened governance capacity of the central state, with a particular focus on elections (DFID, 2014: 7; UNSC, 2016: 17). Furthermore, the focus on self-sufficiency, arising from a liberal governmentality operating through the conduct of conduct, has resulted in extensive efforts at "empowering" local populations by promoting local ownership and participation in developmental projects (Oxfam, 2013: 8; Constantinou & Opondo, 2016: 308), and the establishment of public-private partnerships in the provision of public goods on a local level, such as education (Titeca & De Herdt, 2011).

Of course, these interventions have produced some noteworthy achievements. The value of the international peace achieved by Inter-Congolese Dialogues cannot be discounted, and the arrangement of democratic elections in 2006 constituted an important step towards a more open political system with stronger links of accountability between the governors and the governed (Autesserre, 2012: 203-204). Furthermore, MONUSCO has cooperated with national and local security actors to address some of the shortcomings of existing documentation and alert systems in security governance (Hoffman et al., 2016: 9), and community-level engagement has improved social relations between ethnic groups (Vinck & Pham, 2014: 34). Nevertheless, while such developments are indeed positive, they are extremely limited when considered in proportion to the extent of Western developmental interventions in the DRC, and overall levels of conflict and insecurity remain high while levels of human development and well-being have seen little improvement over the past two decades, as highlighted in the previous section. The persistence of these issues underscores the fundamental drawbacks of biopolitical interventions informed by a liberal governmentality.

The Limits of Biopolitics

Focusing on the promotion of depoliticized and technical interventions aimed at the production of self-governing populations in the Global South overlooks in effect the role of complex local and global political and social dynamics in the production and reproduction of inequality, underdevelopment, and violent conflict. Treating violent conflict and the persistence of underdevelopment in the DRC as a technical issue arising from a "governance crisis" or from limited participation by the local population (DFID, 2014: 5-6), entails a shift of responsibility onto the Congolese population. No longer is underdevelopment in the DRC even partially explained with reference to international inequality and the structural weakness of the African continent in global economic relations, or the failures of Western interventions with reference to their misguided goals or poor implementation. Rather, it is the "sloth and heathen folly" of the local populations, to borrow Rudyard Kipling's phrase from the epigraph to this section, which precludes the establishment of liberal democratic government and the attainment of peace and human development.

The need to critically reflect upon the developmental agenda is therefore averted, accounting for its remarkable continuity in spite

of repeated recognitions of its failures. Focus remains on strengthening the governance capacity of the central state despite widespread evidence and local perceptions of state actors actually contributing to local violence and insecurity (Marriage, 2010: 373). Similarly, explanations of the economic imperatives of mineral extraction driving conflict remain influential (Jackson, 2002), even as only 8 percent of violent conflict can be attributed to contestation over access to mineral resources, and in spite of evidence showing that attempts to curb illicit mineral mining have resulted in the further undermining of rural livelihoods (Autesserre, 2012: 211). These simplistic narratives depoliticize and technicize the complex issue of underdevelopment in the DRC, as humanitarian actors quite explicitly claim to "not aim to address root causes [of emergencies]" despite the inherently political character of the conflicts in which they have become involved (MSF, 2016: 2). In addition to the failures of Western developmental interventions according to their own criteria of success, moreover, a global biopolitics is morally dubious even with regards to the values of the Western liberal societies which seek to promote it.

Promoting the "resilience" of the Congolese population simultaneously undermines any serious effort at social progress. The pacification of the underdeveloped world, and thus the elimination of the supposed security threat to which instability therein gives rise, can be achieved by promoting self-sufficiency understood as "sustainable development." On the other hand, concrete social progress would inevitably give rise to political contestation and potential antagonism, as it would require at least some measure of redistribution on a global scale (Ferguson, 2014: 64-65). The fundamental problem with Western biopolitical interventions in the "borderlands," then, is that, contrary to liberal values of the equality and freedom of each individual to choose their social destiny, contemporary securitized development policies in fact both rely on and reinforce a differentiation between the value of life in the West and in the Global South. This differential valuation of life is materialized in the field, where, for example, any risk to Western nationals often results in the immediate suspension of the provision of aid, regardless of the effects of such action on the local populations (Fassin, 2007; ICRC, 2016). In order to secure the sustained freedom and social security of Western populations, the populations of the Global South are condemned to mere existence as such, without any grounds for contesting the global disparities between their quality of life and that found in the West. The contemporary security-development nexus does not aim to allow the Congolese population to achieve their fullest potential. It promotes neither global equality and freedom from material constraints, nor the freedom of the individual to choose their social destiny rather than passively accepting one that is predetermined. Contemporary securitized development policies constitute an effort to manage the potential dangers of underdevelopment, instead of seeking to rectify its underlying causes. The depoliticization and technicization inherent in the biopolitical imperative of a global liberal governmentality naturalizes and legitimizes global inequalities, and has resulted in the normalization of violence in the DRC. Ultimately, attempts at a "biopolitics in the borderlands" have not only failed to promote peace and prosperity among the Congolese people, but have also undermined the humanitarian commitment to the universal and equal value of human lives as such.

CONCLUSION

> *'And that,' put in the Director sententiously, 'that is the secret of happiness and virtue – liking what you've got to do. All conditioning aims at that: making people like their unescapable social destiny … Besides, we have our stability to think of. We don't want to change. Every change is a menace to stability.'*
>
> *– Aldous Huxley (2007 [1932]: 12, 198)*

The tragic irony of the merging of security and development, then, is that in its purported quest of securing the West while providing a "better life" for those in need (Oxfam, 2013: 14), in fact the security-development nexus achieves neither security nor development. Contemporary narratives of global risk give rise to an ever-proliferating array of perceived security threats, based as they are on the biopolitical attempt to make knowable and actionable species life itself. As "species life, however, is not a datum … [but] an undecidable," this endeavor can never reach its goal, and will thus only serve to promote deeper insecurity, in a cyclical manner (Dillon, 2004: 82). Simultaneously, visions of empowerment and egalitarian development in the Global South are undermined by the very attempt to achieve

such goals via biopolitical interventions, which privilege pacification and stability over any real attempt at social progress, and consequently focus their efforts on the symptoms rather than the ultimate causes of underdevelopment and suffering experienced among impoverished and marginalized peoples across the globe.

This paper has demonstrated the post-Cold War securitization of development, with reference to both discursive and institutional developments which conform to expectations in the field of critical security studies regarding successful processes of securitization. The merging of security and development reflects the dominance of globalization as a new grid of intelligibility through which to know and act upon the world, which in turn has allowed for an attempt at operationalizing a liberal governmentality on a global scale. Within this regime of global liberal governance, securitized development policies constitute a biopolitical technique of security, aimed at promoting self-governance among the peoples of the underdeveloped world via monitoring, regulation, and intervention at the level of the population. These development policies have fallen short with regards to their own criteria of success, namely pacification of the Global South and its economic development. Their shortcomings are exemplified in the continuity of instability in the DRC, and in its lack of progress with regards to indicators of economic growth, as well as human development and well-being. Furthermore, this paper critiqued the goals and practices of the security-development nexus on a normative basis, by demonstrating the way in which they undermine commitments to social progress, and serve to institutionalize a status quo marked by severe global inequalities and violent conflict in places such as the DRC.

These findings present a serious challenge to the commonly accepted framing of international development as a security issue, suggesting that an alternative conceptualization of development is required. While there may be multiple avenues for pursuing this reconceptualization, for instance by framing development as an issue of economic redistribution or human rights rather than international security, any such attempts must retain a critical reflexivity regarding their underlying rationale and frames of intelligibility if the humanitarian ideals regarding the universally equal value of human life, and the commitment to do no harm, are to be upheld.

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WATER SECURITIZATION RECONSIDERED:
INTRASTATE WATER DISPUTES IN INDIA

INTRODUCTION

"Water wars" have dominated headlines in local and international media, moving the securitization of water from the political realm to the public imaginary. As a result, it has become increasingly important to think critically about water security. In a broad sense, water becomes securitized through two related mechanisms: a structural/institutional one and a linguistic one. Structural mechanisms are concrete infrastructures to protect the resource, which are justified by the institutional mechanisms that put them into practice.[1] Linguistic mechanisms are the rhetorical tools used to portray urgency and justify securitizing practices. The linguistic mechanisms of securitization often precede the structural and institutional ones, since governments are often required to justify securitizing practices to avoid social unrest and maintain political power. Previous scholarly work has already established that language has a decisive role in shaping the understanding of environmental issues (see Dryzek 1997; Hajer and Versteeg 2005), which will ultimately impact the response to them. Therefore, the linguistic mechanisms of water securitization have a crucial role in determining the policy responses to water crises.

This paper will explore the following question: How does discourse as a rhetorical and linguistic process—specifically the Environmental Security discourse utilized to justify securitizing practices—impact the decision-making process? How does this affect water cooperation across state boundaries? Are the failures of traditional cooperation related to water securitization in its various forms? This paper will challenge water securitization by analyzing the sociopolitical context of securitizing practices. It will focus specifically on the "water war" narrative, given that local and international media are increasingly covering "inevitable water wars" across the globe, without putting them in the correct sociopolitical context. Governments often utilize this same discourse to justify actions and practices, embedding it in discriminatory, nationalistic, and/or authoritative narratives. Additionally, this discourse benefits governments by de-politicizing the issue and shifting responsibilities elsewhere. Thus, the "water war" narrative, and the water securitization framework that accompanies it, offer an incomplete understanding of the socio-political context of water issues. As a result, this paper seeks to construct an alternative multi-dimensional framework to analyze water disputes, by drawing from constructivist and Environmental Justice theories, which may offer a more holistic view of water disputes and a better understanding of cooperation. Both frameworks will be applied to analyze a water dispute: the Cauvery basin dispute between the states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu in India. The media has, historically and currently, featured this dispute as a potential "water war." Politicians constantly blame the other state for the dwindling water supplies and the drought for the fall of agricultural production, while overlooking decades of resource mismanagement.

The first part of this paper will place water securitization in context by discussing its philosophical foundation, its history, the different definitions of "water security/securitization," important related concepts, and the existing critiques of the theory. The second part of this paper will introduce the new analytical framework. The third part will apply both frameworks to the case study. The paper will conclude by briefly outlining general characteristics of effective transboundary basin cooperation by drawing conclusions from the case study.

1 Itay Fischhendler, "The securitization of water discourse: theoretical foundations, research gaps and objectives of the special issue," *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 15.3 (2015).

WATER SECURITIZATION

Water security is encompassed within the overarching concept of Environmental Security. This concept emerged in the 1970s and it was mostly associated with resource depletion, exceeding the Earth's "carrying capacity" and Malthusianism. However, the concept only began to gain ground in the 1990s, with Thomas Homer-Dixon—and the Neo-Malthusian movement—at the forefront. Environmental Security was related to conflict over scarce resources, and the Middle East and Africa were soon regarded as potential hotspots for future "water wars."[2] Critics condemned this approach for its state-centrism, which ultimately proved to be a counterproductive perspective since the State often perpetuates insecurity. Additionally, traditionalists also criticized this approach (see Walt, 1991) for broadening the concept of security too much, voiding it of any meaning.[3] Nonetheless, expanding the concept of security was necessary in the face of emerging threats to states, individuals and the world as a whole.[4]

The Copenhagen School (CS) went further by expanding the concept of threat beyond the military realm, and by broadening the concept of security "by arguing that issues can be considered matters of security even if they are not threatening states beyond the confines of military and trade affairs."[5] According to proponents of the CS, securitization is a speech act, which identifies an existential threat to a referent object and justifies the use of extraordinary force (see Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998). An innovation of the CS was the introduction of an "audience" that must acknowledge and receive an issue as securitized before securitization is considered successful. Thus, "securitization in this way reflects the values and interests of a political community."[6] Nevertheless, the CS has some significant theoretical shortcomings: it ignores the different policy implications that result from different framings of climate change (for example, a national security framing will yield a much different policy response than a human security one); it is unclear as to what constitutes a relevant audience; it excludes visual representations and security practices by solely focusing on speech acts; and fixes the meaning of security to an existential threat.[7]

Environmental securitization eventually evolved to include human security, which "amounts to the human well-being; not only protection from harm and injury, but access to water, food, shelter, health, employment, and other basic requisites that are due every person on earth."[8] The human security perspective overcame the failures of the CS by acknowledging and addressing the root causes of environmental problems and insecurity: the sovereign state.[9] Another contribution of this theory is the realization that economic, political, and cultural processes shape people's access to water and their resilience to climate change.[10] However, critics of human security deem it as wishful thinking and point out the potential unintended consequences of its implementation. For example, human security—dressed up as the "responsibility to protect"—has in the past been used to legitimize military intervention in sovereign states.[11] Furthermore, human security concerns in the global South are often redefined in terms of national security of the global North and are only relevant "to the extent that they are strategically relevant for Northern homeland security."[12] Therefore, human security is just as violent, short-term-oriented, and undemocratic as other security approaches.

The human security perspective has also failed to address the interrelationship between wealth and environmental threats. The literature places most of the causes and threats in the global South while requiring "actors from outside, who inform, protect, and establish economic growth and good governance."[13] Therefore, the "central paradox" of human security is that "although structures and norms that produce human insecurity are challenged, the remaining and enforcing effects of the traditional

2 Hough, "Securitization of Global Environmental Policy," 22-3.
3 Ibid., 23.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Maria Julia Trombetta, "Rethinking the securitization of the environment: old beliefs, new insights," *in Securitization theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve*, edited by Thierry Balzacq (Milton Park, Abingdon,Oxon, New York: Routledge, 2011): 138.
7 Angela Oels, "From 'Securitization' of Climate Change to 'Climatization' of the Security Field: Comparing Three Theoretical Perspectives," *Hexagon Series on Human* Environmental Security *and Peace* 8 (2012): 194.
8 Norman Myers (1996:31) in Hough, "Securitization of Global Environmental Policy," 21.
9 Oels, "From 'Securitization' of Climate Change to 'Climatization' of the Security Field" 194.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 197.
12 Ibid., 185.
13 Judith N. Hardt, "Critical Deconstruction of Environmental Security and Human Security Concepts in the Anthropocene," *Hexagon Series on Human* Environmental Security *and Peace* 8 (2012): 217.

power structures on the vulnerable may achieve the opposite effects to the emancipatory aims" further disempowering the vulnerable."[14] Moreover, this approach falls within neoliberal governmentality, "which regards those governed responsible for their own fate," and often materializes in the form of development aid, which is highly variable and may leave "many of the most vulnerable … unprepared and unable to cope."[15] Development aid has become a business in itself and it can paradoxically perpetuate human risk in order to profit from it.[16] Moreover, the evidence so far reveals that human security has not facilitated substantial action on climate change: "Environmental Security is not about the environment, it is about security; as a concept, it is at its most meaningless and malign…one cannot expect that an appeal to a human centered security will provide different outcomes…from the appeals to Environmental Security."[17] In conclusion, while human security has made crucial contributions to the debate, it still offers an incomplete understanding of environmental issues.

Despite the substantial academic debate on water security, the term has become void of meaning: authors define it how they specifically use it or would like it to be used.[18] The definition of water security differs in each discipline: from a legal perspective water security is "associated with allocation rules and that seek to secure entitlements to desired quantities of water;" while from an agricultural perspective the main determinant of water security is the "protection from flood and drought risk."[19] Perhaps this demonstrates that the linguistic mechanism of securitization precedes the instrumental/structural one. Thus, how actors frame water issues greatly impacts the response to the perceived threat. In practice, the term water security is interchangeable with water scarcity or used as a synonym for other water problems, such as water pollution, and drought.[20] The scales and methodologies to measure water security also range among various disciplines and the level of analysis varies from household, to population, to society. Nevertheless, none of these can truly account for the social and political nuances that shape water access and distribution, arguably the two determining factors of water security. Since no universal definition of water security exists and its implementation depends on how it is framed, "stronger actors with greater influence have a better chance of convincing audiences about the importance and acuteness of their securitized issue."[21] For the purposes of this paper, water security will be defined in its broadest sense to highlight how discourse is truly what defines practices and policy responses. Securitization is first and foremost a linguistic and rhetorical tool.

As previously mentioned, the securitization process contains a structural/institutional mechanism (for example, military personnel protecting water infrastructure or the exclusion of civil-society from decision-making processes),[22] and a preceding linguistic one, which includes the framings and narratives to justify securitizing practices. Science often justifies these discourses, given the technical and managerial nature of water securitization: "in the case of the environment the relevance of th[e] scientific agenda is evident in the attempts to legitimize different competing claims with the authority of science."[23] There are two main issues with the over-reliance on scientific authority in the context of water. First, while scientific knowledge and data are crucial for establishing effective water management and water governance regimes, they paint an incomplete picture of the sociopolitical context of water. Water is a resource with economic, political, social, cultural, and even religious dimensions. Besides economic benefits (agricultural production, hydropower, etc.) water is also linked to political goals (for example, self-sufficiency), social life (livelihoods, health, sanitation, etc.), and cultural and religious value (for example, the Ganges in India). Thus, scientific data can only go so far in analyzing water issues since it leads to a de-contextualized approach that is ultimately counterproductive for the achievement of a just and equitable solution.

Secondly, authority–including scientific

14 Hard, "Critical Deconstruction of Environmental Security and Human Security," 217.

15 Oels, "From 'Securitization' of Climate Change to 'Climatization' of the Security Field" 200.

16 Maria Julia Trombetta, "Environmental Security and climate change: analysing the discourse," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21.4 (2008): 590.

17 Trombetta, "Rethinking the securitization of the environment," 139-140.

18 Mark Giordano, "Water Security," forthcoming.

19 Christina Cook and Karen Bakker, "Water security: Debating an emerging paradigm." *Global Environmental Change* 22 (2012): 95-96.

20 Mark Giordano, "Water Security," forthcoming.

21 Fischhendler, "The securitization of water discourse."

22 Ibid.

23 Trombetta, "Rethinking the securitization of the environment," 141.

authority—is a contested concept, particularly in the context of the era of "post-truth politics," when facts and evidence are disregarded over bold rhetorical, often inaccurate, statements. Moreover, authors can easily manipulate (or omit) data to fit within a hypothesis and often leads researchers to confuse correlation with causation. An example of the latter is the scarcity-conflict thesis: while a vast array of quantitative studies show an overlap between scarce resources and armed conflict, jumping to the conclusion of scarcity being the sole trigger of conflict grossly oversimplifies what drives a country to armed conflict. In the case of Syria, many isolate the drought as the main trigger for the uprising. However, the first protests occurred in the governorate of Dara'a, where rainfall levels exceeded the average in 2009 and 2010.[24] Claiming the drought as the main culprit of the Syrian revolution, rather than the government's failure to respond to the humanitarian crisis ravaging the nation, oversimplifies and de-politicizes the issue and "diverts attention away from the core problem: the long-term mismanagement of natural resources."[25] Consequently, science-backed securitization cannot adequately respond to the issues it seeks to address because it de-contextualizes a resource which functions within social, political, economic, cultural and religious realms.

The media has been particularly pervasive in spreading the water securitization discourse, in particular the "water wars" narrative. Besides the fact that it is hard to find a case of a true water war, this narrative perpetuates the idea that humankind is at the mercy of a capricious nature, and allows government to shift responsibility elsewhere. If we push this rather fatalistic image to its logical extreme, then why bother with global coordinated climate change action if humankind is always going to be subject to the unpredictable forces of nature? This narrative seeks to create a sense of urgency through fear and anxiety, which are not necessarily motivators for action. Moreover, "the main causes of contemporary conflict are societal, not natural (in the broadest sense of the term, i.e., including man-made). Conflicts are borne out of human choices and mistakes."[26] It is hard to claim that climate is the essential factor explaining collective violence in the Anthropocene—the current historical epoch where human activity changes the Earth and its processes more than natural forces.[27] Employing this narrative transforms governments into passive actors and victims of nature. This is particularly problematic when governments are at the root cause of unrest and conflict, such as the Darfur case: "framing climate change as a factor in the genocide in Darfur helps push to the background the political and economic motivations for the fighting—and unwittingly could let the criminal regime of Khartoum off the hook."[28] The more nuanced version of the "water war" narrative—climate change as a "threat multiplier"—is equally as problematic since it " underlines the complexity of predicting the future impact of climate change, not only on the environment but also on social and political unrest or conflict."[29] Regardless of these significant issues, government officials continue to employ the water war narrative and utilize it to justify the securitization of water: the threat of a war warrants the use of securitizing practices.

The underlying logic of water security is the need for insecurity to address human concerns and eco-political issues.[30] This allows decisions to be made on the basis of impulse, urgency, anxiety, and willingness to sacrifice, which will produce countless unintended consequences for the environment. Security becomes reactive rather than preventive, requires a "decisionist" attitude,[31] justifies the use of force by creating a sense of urgency, and diminishes the space for discourse by taking issues outside the realm of "normal politics."[32] Securitization also implies a zero-sum rationality that greatly reduces the space for cooperation. Given these shortcomings, one cannot help but question if water security, or the broader Environmental Security, is even useful in the context of water management (or environmental governance). In fact, "to claim that climate change may have an impact on security is to state the obvious,"[33] and while reframing water in security language has brought new actors into the water arena and broadened awareness of water problems it has, arguably, not fundamentally changed how wa-

24 Francesca DeChâtel, "The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution," *Middle Eastern Studies* 50.4 (2014): 524-5.
25 Ibid., 522.
26 Bruno Tertrais, "The Climate Wars Myth," *The Washington Quarterly* 34.3 (2011): 25.
27 Ibid., 17.
28 Fischhendler, "The securitization of water discourse."
29 DeChâtel, "The Role of Drought," 524.
30 Hough, "Securitization of Global Environmental Policy," 26.
31 Trombetta, "Environmental Security and climate change," 588.
32 Hough, "Securitization of Global Environmental Policy," 26.
33 Tertrais, "The Climate Wars Myth," 17.

ter issues are approached. Oels argues that, if anything, the securitization of the environment has led to the "climatization" of security: the introduction of "new practices from the field of climate policy … into the security field."[34] In particular, water securitization has often tainted cooperation over transboundary basins, yielding inequitable and unjust cooperative regimes because of its de-contextualized nature. A new theoretical and analytical framework, that overcomes the issues of water securitization, may shed some light on how to ensure effective cooperation over transboundary basins.

A NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

First, a new analytical framework must move beyond what Selby and Hoffman (2014) call "scarcity framings." They identify certain paradoxes of these framings relevant to the water war narrative. First, non-renewable resources (such as oil) are associated to conflict through abundance, while the most renewable of resources (water) through scarcity.[35] Second, scarcity and abundance are relative—"scarcity somewhere implies abundance somewhere else"—and these framings are sustained by state-centric political imaginaries and securitization discourses.[36] Third, it is not resource quantity but the economic and the political values associated to it that drive conflict: conflict can happen without any changes in resource supply.[37] Thus, these framings become geographically deterministic and shift focus away from the sociopolitical context of water disputes. Lastly, these framings ignore how global dynamics can drive conflict: under-development and state failure, while characteristics of developing states and societies, are often the result of their positioning and insertion into a highly uneven and hierarchical world economy.[38] Accordingly, the new proposed framework will not focus on water quantity but on water access, distribution, and management.

Water securitization de-contextualizes water and this is often what leads to ineffective policies responding to ensuing crises. Therefore, this framework will attempt to place water issues in their sociopolitical context by looking at both local and global dynamics that may impact water access or distribution by drawing from Environmental Justice theory. Patterns of environmental deterioration follow patterns of inequality. Additionally, environmental degradation does not only occur through the direct impact of policies from local central government but also through indirect forms of global oppression. The latter is particularly important in post-colonial societies and for the global South, where neoliberal policies, development, and insertion into the global market have transformed agriculture and peasant societies through the



Fig. 2: Annual Rainfall in India. Source: Maps of India

34 Oels, "From 'Securitization' of Climate Change to 'Climatization' of the Security Field" 185.

35 Jan Selby and Clemens Hoffman, "Beyond scarcity: Rethinking water, climate change and conflict in the Sudans," *Global Environmental Change* 29 (2014): 361.

36 Selby and Hoffman, "Beyond scarcity," 361.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., 362-3.

commodification of land and labor. Additionally, while most of the consequences of global environmental change are borne by the global South, most of the causes emanate from the global North. Environmental Justice theory has allowed for a re-orientation of focus from the oppressed to the oppressor: "small farmers might be degrading their environment because they had no choice … peasants worked harder and longer, often degrading their land, in order to ensure social reproduction in the face of price squeezes."[39] Taking this into consideration, this framework will encourage against imposing lifestyle changes on the most vulnerable, and point to the patterns of the North that have led to widespread human and biosphere insecurity.

Another helpful tool this framework will utilize is discourse analysis. By looking at the discourse employed in the context of water disputes, the power asymmetries and the context of human vulnerabilities become clearer. Moreover, the aforementioned "patterns of exploitation and appropriation" are actually legitimized through discourses, in particular "discourses of climate crisis" (including the water wars narrative).[40] The dominant discourse will represent the views and the interests of the powerful and will determine the outcome: "discourses … ultimately determine the willingness of policymakers and the public to act on pressing issues."[41] Therefore, this framework, by focusing on discourses rather than practices, will be able to analyze the sociopolitical nuances of water disputes, and thus propose responses that are adequate, efficient, and just.

Fig. 3: The Cauvery River Basin

THE CAUVERY BASIN WATER DISPUTE

Given India's vast physical and demographic size and the diversity of human and climatic conditions, water issues vary dramatically across the country.[42] Spatial and temporal variability define India's hydrologic regime. As observed in Figure 2, within India rainfall patterns vary widely: the Thar Desert, in the West, is one of the driest places on Earth, while Cherrapunji in the North-Eastern state of Meghalaya is the wettest place on Earth.[43] Additionally, most of the rain falls within the four-month period from July to October, and within that it mainly falls on just fifty days[44] As a result, most basins in India, including the Cauvery basin, oscillate between episodes of severe flooding and drought. Given the country's federal system, the responsibility for India's water resources is shared between the central government (through the Central Water Commission of India) and the individual states (through regional inter-state river boards), with the national government retaining overall management authority if a basin is shared.[45] If a dispute between two states over a river basin arises, the central government intervenes through a tribunal process to encourage cooperation.[46]

The Cauvery basin (refer to Figure 3) originates in Karnataka and flows through Tamil Nadu and Puducherry before flowing into the

39 Michael J. Watts, "A political ecology of Environmental Security," *in Environmental Security: Approaches and Issues*, edited by Rita Floyd and Richard A. Matthew (Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013): 87-8.

40 Selby and Hoffman, "Beyond scarcity," 9.

41 Fischhendler, "The securitization of water discourse."

42 Meredith Giordano, Mark Giordano and Aaron Wolf,"The geography of water conflict and cooperation: internal pressures and international manifestations," *The Geographical Journal* 168.4 (2002): 297.

43 "Annual average rainfall of India," India Water Portal, accessed May 5th, http://www.indiawaterportal.org/articles/map-annual-average-rainfall-india.

44 Giordano, Giordano Wolf, "The geography of water conflict and cooperation," 297.

45 Ibid., 298.

46 Ibid.

Bay of Bengal.[47] The dispute between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka dates back to the 19th century and lies mainly in two agreements between the Madras Presidency (which comprised Karnataka) and the Kingdom of Mysore (which comprised Tamil Nadu).[48] The 1892 agreement defines the terms under which the Kingdom of Mysore was to construct the Krishnarajasagar dam in the Cauvery River and to expand the irrigation system in both States;[49] the 1924 agreement relates to the irrigation development of the Cauvery River.[50] Both agreements are based upon the principle of "no significant harm" to the downstream state. The dispute between the states worsened when the government of Karnataka began constructing self-funded dams across the tributaries of the Cauvery in 1967-68 without the appropriate approvals from Tamil Nadu or the Central Water Commission of India.[51] Tamil Nadu deemed the construction of these dams in direct violation of the 1892 agreement, and formally requested for adjudication and later filed a suit in the Supreme Court in 1970.[52]

Unsuccessful negotiations continued between the two states and in 1972 the Cauvery Fact Finding Committee compiled a report that led to draft proposals by the Government of India, eventually rejected by both states.[53] Informal and formal negotiations between the two states continued and in 1990 the government of India created the Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal (CWDT) to mediate the dispute.[54] Unrest and protests erupted when the monsoon was unfavorable in the period of 1995-96 and later in 2002. The CWDT reached a final verdict in 2007, which established the following: Tamil Nadu would receive 419 TMC (one thousand million cubic feet), Karnataka 270 TMC, Kerala 30 TMC, and Puducherry 7 TMC.[55] This requires Karnataka to release 192 TMC to Tamil Nadu according to a monthly schedule.[56] Both Tamil Nadu and Karnataka challenged the decision of the CWDT, and the issue was brought to the Supreme Court, which heard the case on January 4th, 2017. Tensions continue to rise in both states, with widespread protests and civil unrest ensuing in both.

Water securitization discourse has infiltrated the narrative of this dispute. The national management of water resources in India as a whole falls in line with water securitization: one central "decisionist" authority holds the overall authority of water resources. Moreover, in defining the state of the water crisis and in the CWDT's 2007 Final Order, the actors rely on "scarcity framings" and scientific data. The latter, while it shows there is an issue, it does not paint the full picture and often puts the burden of the blame on the most vulnerable: the farmers that are over pumping groundwater. In both cases, the actors focus on quantity rather than how the resources are actually distributed. This has allowed governments to shift responsibility to a capricious nature (ignoring decades of mismanagement) and attract funds: Tamil Nadu received this year a sizeable loan from the central government for desilting and



Fig. 4: Proportion of indebted farmer households. Source: The Hindu.

47 "Cauvery River Water Disputes," Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation – Government of India, accessed May 5th, 2017, http://wrmin.nic.in/forms/list.aspx?lid=378.
48 Ibid.
49 Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal (CWDT), "The Report of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal with the Decision," *Volume I: Background of the Dispute and Framing of Issues* (New Delhi: 2007): 6.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 7-8.
52 Ibid., 10-11.
53 Ibid.
54 "Cauvery River Water Disputes."
55 Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal (CWDT), Final Order (2007): 2.
56 Ibid., 4.

restoring water bodies.[57] Additionally, since the Final Order dictates absolute values, rather than percentages, it is expected that conflict will emerge in years of stress. Another key shortcoming of the Final Order is its ambiguous language: it offhandedly mentions a reconsideration of the water allocations in years of stress, but without specific directives on how to put into effect these mechanisms.

The most pervasive form of securitization that exists in this context is human security and its discourse, precisely because it attracts development aid. In an article by *The Wire*, the author depicts the tragic story of Sivagangai—a young man that struggles every day in finding water and has found himself digging deeper and deeper to find water. The story is very much in line with the human security discourse.[58] The media has also covered other socioeconomic impacts on rural livelihoods, in particular focusing on farmer's suicides[59] However, while the media has dedicated a lot of coverage to the drought and its victims within this human security framework, it has failed to place them in the context of years of resource mismanagement and ineffective policy prescriptions (such as demonetization and energy subsidies). Additionally, the human security of the farmers and those most affected by the drought, only becomes relevant when it threatens the urban center's security: focus on the socioeconomic impact of the drought only received media coverage when protests and civil unrest occurred in the large cities, while ignoring the suffering of rural India, which began well before the protests in the cities erupted.

All the CWDT documents and media articles depicting the suffering of the most vulnerable, fail to paint a full picture and to place the water dispute in its sociopolitical context. By applying the alternative framework, it allows us to move beyond these scarcity framings and actually look at the distribution of water resources. In fact, in India overall "scarcity has emerged as a 'meta-narrative' … [and] tends to be naturalized and its anthropogenic dimensions are whitewashed."[60] Thus, it is necessary to examine how the biophysical aspects of scarcity are lived and experienced differently by different people and to isolate the global and local factors driving the drought. The focus on access and distribution would reveal an underlying pattern: the most vulnerable are coincidentally the most discriminated against on ethnic grounds, the most marginalized, and the most rural—and forgotten—communities of India.

The first factor driving the water crisis is the fact that India's agricultural sector expanded by relying on groundwater extraction, facilitated by energy subsidies that essentially made pumping groundwater free for small farmers—the majority of farmers in India. The Green Revolution soon turned into the "Blue Revolution" or the "Pump Revolution" because these new high yielding crops also required more water to produce their yields. India's insertion into the global economy drastically changed rural livelihoods. The value of produce from the global South greatly diminished, forcing farmers to choose non-food and water-intensive cash crops (such as sugarcane and cotton) and to grow crops in both the dry and wet season to earn a decent livelihood. This ultimately forced small farmers to seek loans and become indebted, broadening the urban-rural divide, and to over extract groundwater so that crop yields would be enough to provide for their household. In fact, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka are among the top five Indian states with the highest proportions of indebted farmer households (refer to Figure 4), and many have pointed out farmer debt as the main driver of farmer suicides, not the drought *per se*.

The situation has worsened with the slowdown of agricultural growth and the ensuing agrarian crisis in both Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. By placing the Cauvery water dispute in this context, one cannot demand lifestyle changes from farmers, even if they are pumping groundwater at unsustainable rates. The true culprits of the crisis are: perverse energy subsidies, the introduction of high yielding (and water-intensive) crops into the market, farmer's diminished livelihoods (and the fact that no alternative livelihoods have been provided), and farmer debt. Another factor worsening human vulnerability in the region was demonetization: on November 8th, India's prime minister announced that all 500 and 1,000 rupee notes (which represent 86 percent of the cash in circulation in India) would become invalid the

57 Sandhya Ravishankar, "Tamil Nadu dry spell: Crop losses push farmers to the brink of despair," *The India Times*, January 15, 2017.

58 Aparna Karthikeyan, "Digging for Water in Tamil Nadu," *The Wire*, May 28, 2017.

59 Abhishek Waghmare, "Tamil Nadu declares drought as 144 farmers die amid worst North East monsoon in 140 years," *First Post*, January 10, 2017.

60 Lyla Mehta,"Whose scarcity? Whose property? The case of water in Western India," *Land Use Policy* 24.4 (2007): 654

next day.[61] The objective was to end the black market, but this policy ended up hurting the poorest in the most rural areas since they often had no access to banks to exchange the bank notes, and from day-to-night saw all of their life savings become worthless. Those that did have access to banks, saw limits on withdrawals: "we [the farmers] were [not] allowed to take our own money from the cooperative banks and from the nationalized banks and the Rs 2,000 given per day was nothing but peanuts to meet our farming requirements."[62] It also created a fertile ground for moneylenders to take advantage of the distress of helpless farmers, worsening the vicious cycle of debt and farmer suicides. Additionally, demonetization was not paralleled by the creation of an alternative legal economy to replace the illegal market on which thousands of rural Indians relied on.

Simultaneously, both states are experiencing a deepening political crisis: widespread corruption, nepotism, and nascent loyalist movements. The Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu is facing corruption charges, which have left government officials unsure from whom they should take instructions.[63] One can draw many parallels between DeChâtel's (2014) image of Syria and the current state of drought in India. Similarly to Syria, India's water sector operates in two realities:

> On the one hand there is the official narrative, a facade, which portrays [India] as a naturally water-scarce country actively working to 'modernize' its water sector, and on the other there is the reality on the ground of an inefficient, corrupt and rigid water management system that has enabled large-scale overexploitation of water and land resources and engendered growing poverty and disenfranchisement among rural communities. The official narrative does not correspond to the reality of a deeply dysfunctional water sector, which is incapable of reform or change as long as basic issues such as inaccuracy and incompleteness of data, lack of human resources, opaque financial governance and lack of accountability are not comprehensively addressed. This situation is not helped by the sector's arcane institutional framework. The system is trapped in a colossal bureaucratic structure.[64]

"AN INEFFICIENT, CORRUPT, AND RIGID WATER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HAS ENGENDERED GROWING POVERTY AND DISENFRANCHISEMENT AMONG RURAL COMMUNITIES."

In conclusion, the core problem of the Cauvery water dispute is the long-term mismanagement of natural resources and the government's inability to respond to the agrarian and humanitarian crisis: none of these are addressed by the Final Order, precisely because water securitization has de-contextualized the dispute. Finally, another factor, essential for the context of the dispute, is the ethnic marginalization and widespread racism against Southern Indians, as well as ethnic-based violence in India more generally.

CONCLUSION

There is a clear disconnect between the CWDT, the media, and the government and the reality on the ground. Water is embedded in all the aforementioned issues and thus, the de-politicized view offered by water securitization is rather problematic since it does not address the true underlying causes of the dispute. Unless both the state and central government address these deep-rooted problems, no effective and equitable cooperation can be reached between the two states. Therefore, water securitization—in all its variants—is pervasive because

61 R. Ramasubramanian, "How Demonetisation Has Accelerated Tamil Nadu's Deepening Agrarian Crisis," *The Wire*, January 15, 2017.

62 Ibid.

63 R. Ramasubramanian, "Tamil Nadu's Deepening Political Crisis Threatens Fate of Litigants, Government in Courts," *The Wire*, February 11, 2017.

64 DeChâtel, "The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising," 529-30.

of how it impacts, as a rhetorical tool, cooperative agreements, both formal and informal.

Certain generalizable traits for effective cooperation can be extrapolated from the case study. First, the need for allocation regimes that are based on percentages, rather than absolute quantities in order to avoid unrest in years of stress.[65] This allows cooperative regimes to move beyond "scarcity framings." Second, agreements must first place scientific data, human vulnerabilities, water access and distribution in their sociopolitical context by looking at patterns of injustice (both local and global) and at discourses. As a result, this will place policy prescriptions and lifestyle changes on the perpetrators of injustice rather than on the most vulnerable. To facilitate the incorporation of situated knowledge in cooperative agreements, the decentralization of water management is imperative. By placing water governance on local entities, not only does it empower those affected by the water crisis directly, but it also fights against the decisionist (and slow-acting) attitude inherent of water securitization. Additionally, this will facilitate the implementation of evaluation, re-negotiation and enforcing mechanisms, which should also be clearly stated and delineated in written agreements. Lastly, expanding the negotiation to include allocation of benefits, rather than just the resource itself, allows parties to move beyond zero-sum games and create resilient cooperative regimes—in the case of the Cauvery dispute, there is no discussion whatsoever on anything but water allocation.[66] By incorporating these traits into cooperative regimes (formal and informal), it may yield more equitable and just agreements that move beyond the issues of water securitization, and offer a more holistic view of water disputes and their sociopolitical impacts.

65 Mark Giordano, Meredith A. Giordano & Aaron T. Wolf, "International Resource Conflict and Mitigation," *Journal of Peace Research* 42.1 (2005): 58.

66 Ibid., 58.

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MEGAN BRYN
WEST POINT

UNDERSTANDING THE NARRATIVE:

THE CRUCIAL FIRST STEP TOWARD THE REDUCTION AND PREVENTION OF RADICAL JIHADISM

INTRODUCTION

Despite the unilateral and coalitional responses of the U.S., other states, and the broader international community, terrorist movements associated with violent jihad have gained traction and resilience over the last thirty years. The devastating and symbolic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 turned the attention of the U.S. and the world to the rising threat of violent extremism in the name of Islam, and led U.S. President George W. Bush to declare that the U.S. would become one of the major leaders in the "Global War on Terrorism." This "War on Terror" has been primarily understood in terms of political violence, but military action and "hard force" have proved insufficient in responding to this phenomenon.

Dina Al Raffie, in September 2012, offered a sober assessment of U.S. efforts in this counterterrorism campaign:

> *Perhaps the biggest mistake in [this war] was the belief that the destruction of Al-Qaeda's training camps would lead to the demise of the group, its affiliated movements and the Salafi Jihadist ideology to which the organization is understood by many to belong. Few paused to consider if Osama bin Laden and his cohorts were perhaps only the tip of a substantially larger iceberg. Now, eleven years down the line, two wars and 1.283 trillion dollars later, politicians and scholars alike are still devoting time into furthering our understanding of groups like Al-Qaeda and their associated Salafi Jihadist movement. More importantly, much focus has been given to the ideology that underlies the phenomenon of Salafi Jihadism in an effort to understand why it continues to inspire local initiatives and individuals to act on its behalf.*[1]

In the last decade, as she explained, governmental and military officials leading the counterterrorism campaign have slowly begun to recognize the need for "soft" efforts in the communication arena, whether it be an enhanced focus on the propaganda mechanisms or the narratives themselves.[2]

Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of Al-Qaeda, proudly described one of the organization's achievements as "a clear thought and ideology […] relying on strong evidence from the Qu'ran, the prophet's tradition, and the respected scholars. This provided it with a solid base on which it hoisted its banner, which everyday attracts new advocates, God willing."[3] Al-Qaeda has proven to be an extremely resilient organization in the face of much international pressure. It is diffuse, decentralized, and worn down in some areas today, yet Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula share the same goals as Osama Bin Laden called for after the "War on Terror" began following September 11th – the establishment of a transnational pan-Islamic identity and the restoration of the Caliphate in order to unite, protect, and enable the Muslim community to actualize its full potential.[4] Groups with similar ideologies [like the

1 Dina Al Raffie, (2012). Whose Hearts and Minds? Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Salafi Jihadism. *Journal of Terrorism Research*. 3(2). DOI: http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.304

2 Alex P. Schmid, 'Al-Qaeda's "Single Narrative" and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State of Knowledge," International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (2014): 1.

3 Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS)-NESD-2002-0108.

4 Heather S. Gregg, "Defining and Distinguishing Secular and Religious Terrorism," Vol 8. No. 2, 2014.

Islamic State] may slight Al-Qaeda today, and it may face increasing challenges in leading its adherents and affiliates. However, Al-Qaeda believes that the U.S. is retreating in the Middle East, and failures of the Arab spring have added greater purpose and "ideological momentum." In spite of the international coalition's efforts to reduce the threat of terrorism, the Salafi-jihadist view of the world (a willingness to restore an "originalist" form of Islam through violence) that Al-Qaeda promotes and fights for has maintained its appeal and even gained ground over time.[5] This dynamic demonstrates that the world must approach the challenges of religious terrorism with a longer-term perspective to understand the conditions that allow for these groups to rise and endure. Key to understanding these conditions is an understanding of one of the common threads that run through the generations of this wave of religious terrorism associated with violent jihad: a compelling narrative.

Violent extremism creates unique problem sets that cannot be addressed with mere military force; countering this threat both at home and abroad requires deliberate and well-informed engagement with the war of ideas and the narratives each group uses. It is therefore imperative that scholars and policy-makers alike understand how religious leaders communicate to recruit, radicalize, mobilize, and legitimize their terrorist strategies and tactics. The most effective narratives are embedded and grounded in cultural meaning, identities, stories, history, and religious scripture. Each of these elements stands as a support structure for the narratives and the organizations themselves. We need to understand how Salafi Jihadists build bridges between mainstream Islam and their ideology through the weaving together of religion, history, culture, and other features in an attempt to justify the propagation of violence.[6]

Research Question

The broad question I seek to answer is: what are the components of the religious and ideological narrative Al-Qaeda has sought to use in attracting followers and mobilizing its support base toward violence? Many authors have articulated various narratives that exist within Al-Qaeda propaganda. Though progress has been made on this subject in the last decade, there is a need for synthesis of the existing knowledge and further exploration of the steps that can be made moving forward to counter these methods of radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization. The multitude of sources provides many ideas, but the current literature lacks a framework that captures the many dimensions, intricacies, nuances, and full sequential, cumulative logic of the narrative. It has become a very complicated landscape but the existing models are too simplified – a theoretical framework that fuses the most significant ideas together but appreciates the complexities will add value in fighting this war of ideas because it will enable us to better understand the foundational themes, underlying assumptions, arguments, strands of logic, rhetorical modes of persuasion, and smaller pieces of this patchwork that form the entire narrative. Only by understanding each piece of the puzzle can we respond effectively. Hence, this paper will survey the literature on the narratives used by Al-Qaeda to synthesize existing ideas and construct a new, more comprehensive conceptual framework.

Methodological Approach

I will use an exploratory approach to examine this ideological component of Al-Qaeda's appeal and persuasion. This method of exploration offers great utility because it has the potential for a level of critical, honest, open-minded, and reflective engagement that is unmatched by conclusive or confirmatory research, which is driven from its start by a biased motivation to prove or validate hypotheses and "advance arguments that make exclusive truth claims."[7] Exploratory research starts from an "original set of models, explanations, and questions, then becomes an act of gradual, structured, and theory-led heuristic expansion."[8] Rather than striving to prove an exclusive claim about reality or identify a

5 "The Unquenchable Fire," *The Economist* (28 Sept. 2013). Available online at http://www.economist.com/news/keep-bouncing-back-unquenchablefire. See also, Engel, Richard. *And Then All Hell Broke Loose* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016): 36.

6 Dina Al Raffie, (2012). Whose Hearts and Minds? Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Salafi Jihadism. *Journal of Terrorism Research*. 3(2). DOI:http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.304

7 Bernd, Reiter, "The Epistemology and Methodology of Exploratory Social Science Research: Crossing Popper with Marcuse," (2013). *Government and International Affairs Faculty Publications*, Paper 99. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gia_facpub/99

8 Ibid., 7.

final solution, this type of study aims to provide "more or less plausible and hence fruitful ways to examine and explain reality that can be shared, if successful and plausible, after a critical evaluation."[9] As a result, conflicting explanations have the space to coexist, and each may hold its own strengths and limitations, and may explore or explain the topic with varying levels of depth.[10] Oftentimes exploratory research serves as a foundation upon which the scholar can complete future research.[11] My methodological process is therefore to build a framework to improve our ability to analyze, understand, and counter the narratives historically employed by Al-Qaeda and other violent extremist groups such as the Islamic State.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Synthesized Conception of the term "Narrative," and its Variations

Before examining the scholarship on the ideological trends of terrorism associated with the Islamic religion, it is important to discuss and clarify a few definitions. First and foremost, I will summarize and bring together various ideas about narratives themselves. Generally speaking, the term narrative can be thought of as the "story or recruitment pitch of violent extremists."[12] However, in my exploration of Al-Qaeda's narrative themes, I will employ a more nuanced definition that includes different forms of narratives.

My understanding of narratives most heavily draws from Steven Corman's definitions. First, Corman recognizes that the academic and practical realms lack consensus on the distinctions between concepts like story, narrative, and discourse. He then clarifies the definitions of each. A story, he offers, is "a sequence of events, involving actors and actions, grounded in desire (often stemming from conflict) and leading to an actual or projected resolution of that desire, [while] a narrative is a system of stories that share themes, forms, and archetypes." When stories are sequentially and deliberately tied together in this ensemble, it "creates a unified whole that [holds greater meaning] than the sum of its parts."[13] Corman then delineates several different forms of narratives, the first being "master narratives, [which] are so deeply engrained [and well-known] that they [and the themes, memories, and values they are associated with] can be invoked by words and phrases without actually telling the stories that comprise them."[14] These include common stories and experiences that take on a trans-historical and even transnational nature when recounted for rhetorical or ideological purposes.[15] Master narratives can be combined to form an inclusive rhetorical vision, which "contains a stock of values, morals, story forms, and archetypical actors that can be used in narrative action." Alluding to them can generate powerful emotional responses. Local and personal narratives are the last two kinds. Local narratives, which can emerge out of master narratives, refer to "[more specific] events in particular times and places," and personal narratives allow individuals to determine what their role is, has been, and should be, by fitting themselves into the context of a local narrative.[16]

Before moving onto the more specific case of Al-Qaeda, it is crucial to consider why narratives are important. In exploring this question, I will bring together ideas and explanations from numerous scholars and practitioners, creating a logical path through which we can better understand the impact narratives have on our societies, cultures, perceptions, worldview, decision-making calculus, and even rationality. Michael Vlahos asserts that in war, narratives serve as the foundation of all strategy, upon which all else – policy, rhetoric, and action – is built […] War narratives "can illuminate the inner nature of the war itself."[17] Juxtaposing this upon the radical extremists' concept of jihad, or holy war, it becomes clear that the narrative supports and sustains the strategy while providing insight into the perceived nature of the struggle as a whole. As military theorist George Dimitriu asserts, narratives are a resource through which a "shared sense is achieved, representing a past, present and

9 Ibid., 4.

10 "Exploratory Research," *Research Methodology*, accessed April 7, 2017, http://research-methodology.net/research-methodology/research-design/exploratory-research/.

11 Ibid.

12 Sara Zeiger, "Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in South East Asia," *Hedayah*, 2016.

13 https://info.publicintellige Steven R. Corman, "Understanding the Role of Narrative in Extremist Strategic Communication," in "Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies," July 2015. 35.

14 Ibid., 36.

15 Dina Al Raffie, (2012). Whose Hearts and Minds? Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Salafi Jihadism. *Journal of Terrorism Research*. 3(2). DOI:http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.304

16 Ibid., 37.

17 Michael Vlahos. "The Long War: A Self-defeating Prophecy," *Asia Times*, 9 September 2006.

future, an obstacle and a desired end-point."[18] Furthermore, narratives are "both products of, and contributors to the nature of existent cultures."[19] The interweaving of narratives constructs "social realities" by defining subjects, identities, and establishing their relational positions within a system of signification."[20] Although the phenomenon of narratives is not dangerous in and of itself, these constructed "realities" and templates become much more disturbing when they are employed as tools for political actors to mobilize support for and acceptance of violent extremism because they "present an alternate form of rationality."[21] Narrative rationality spurs action because of its salient link to desires, emotions, values, and its impact on how we interpret, conceptualize, and explain events within the world. Oftentimes, it trumps logical reasoning.[22] It is clear that the power of narratives, if harnessed with the intent to radicalize, draw support, and inspire violent actions, can have a significant impact on both individuals and groups.

Survey of the Literature on Al Qaeda's Narrative

One of the most comprehensive analyses of Al-Qaeda's narrative, completed by Alex Schmid, brings together much of the academic knowledge on Al-Qaeda's ideological narrative that existed by the year 2014, and provides a survey of the counter-narrative efforts of the U.S. and UK. He "[consults] the ideological writings and propaganda statements of Al-Qaeda, as contained in, for instance, the documentary collections edited by Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli or the ones of Raymond Ibrahim, Bruce Lawrence and Robert Marlin."[23] Ibrahim, when examining the writings of Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al Zawahiri, observed that "most of their [extremist products] fit neatly into two genres – religious exegesis, meant to motivate and instruct Muslims, and propagandist speeches, aimed at demoralizing the West and inciting Muslims to action." Both are characterized by the claims that "the West is oppressive and unjust toward Islam, that the West supports ruthless and dictatorial regimes in the Islamic world," and other grievances.[24] The messaging within these writings and speeches intensifies real or imagined grievances, and as Briggs describes, is a "mix of historical and political facts with half-truths, lies and conspiracy theories. These messages often convey simplistic argumentation which promotes thought-processes that include black-and-white thinking, de-sensitization, dehumanization, distancing of the other, victimization and calls to activism and militancy."[25]

Schmid emphasizes that Al-Qaeda's "chief message" is meant to cement the idea that "the West is at war with Islam," and through its rhetoric has constructed a narrative of humiliation and oppression coupled with an opportunity to achieve redemption and glory by demonstrating "faith and sacrifice" through jihad. It is only by "following the course proposed by Al-Qaeda, the self-appointed defender [and vanguard] of Islam, which it claims is under systematic attack from "Zionist Christian Crusaders," that justice and dignity can be restored, and Western influence can be eradicated in the Muslim world.[26]

Schmid lays out three structural components of the narrative: basic grievance, a vision of the good society, and a path from the grievance to the realization of the vision. In addition, he highlights important ideas within the narrative that are not necessarily sanctioned by conventional interpretations of the faith: that suicide/martyrdom (shahid) operations are legitimate, civilian and military targets are both valid in the fight against its near and far enemies, the excommunication of Muslims is proper protocol for failures to abide by Sharia law or accept the beliefs and practices deemed right by jihadists, the pursuit of jihad (in the sense of holy war) is an individual obligation for every true Muslim, a clash of civilizations between the Muslim and non-Muslim

18 G. Dimitriu, *Strategic Narratives, Counternarratives and Public Support for War: The Dutch government's explanation of the Uruzgan mission and its influence on the Dutch Public* (Leiden University: Master Thesis, Campus The Hague, 2 February 2013), p. 13.

19 Dina Al Raffie, (2012). Whose Hearts and Minds? Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Salafi Jihadism. *Journal of Terrorism Research*. 3(2). DOI:http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.304

20 Richard Jackson, "Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse," *Government and Opposition* 42, (2007), 396

21 Ibid., 37.

22 Ibid.

23 Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (Eds.), Al-Qaida Texte des Terrors (München: Piper, 2006);

24 Raymond Ibrahim, *The al Qaeda Reader* (2007), pp. xii, 2 and 5-6.

25 R. Briggs, S. Feve Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism (2013), 9.

26 Alex P. Schmid, 'Al-Qaeda's "Single Narrative" and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State of Knowledge," International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (2014): 6.

world will occur until Sharia rule is established universally, and that the establishment of a government ruled by Sharia is a stepping stone to a Sharia based world government.[27]

Lastly, Schmid covers six ways in which the narrative "prepares the path for vulnerable young Muslims toward terrorism": identifying the problem as an injustice rather than a mere misfortune, constructing a moral justification for violence, blaming the victims, dehumanizing the victims, displacing responsibility (ordered by God or other authorities) or diffusing responsibility (placing accountability on the group rather than the individual), and misconstruing or minimizing harmful effects (through euphemisms or by contrasting one's own atrocities with those of the enemy.[28]

Another scholar, David Betz, contributed a basic model of the narrative, breaking it into four sequential ideas: Islam is under general unjust attack by Western crusaders led by the U.S.; jihadis are defending against this attack; the actions they take in defense of Islam are proportionately just and religiously sanctified; and, therefore it is the duty of good Muslims to support these actions.[29]

Tom Quiggin provides a list of the most relevant and influential works by Al-Qaeda and its sympathizers, and bases his analysis of the group's ideology on this literature and its statements. His main takeaways include a three-part structure of a set-up (that aligns well with Betz' model), climax, and resolution in the narrative which forms the rationale behind joining the organization, and eight themes that resonate within Al-Qaeda's jihadist discourse. The structure includes (1) political grievances (oppression, poverty, exploitation) in its claim that Muslims are under attack, (2) the notion that Al-Qaeda's mission is to be the heroic vanguard and agent of the oppressed and only the organization and its followers are fighting the opponents of Islam, and (3) the claim that if you are not supporting Al-Qaeda, you are supporting the oppressors (a call to action).[30] The eight concepts within the narrative are: jihad (struggle through war), bayat (pledge of obedience to the leader of a group as one would give to Mohammed), daru Islam (an Islamic state), the Ummah (collective Muslim community), takfir (accusing others of being infidels or non-believers), shaheed or istisyhad (martyrdom and migration to Allah to be rewarded after a suicide act), Al-Wala' Wal Bara' (us versus them, friends versus enemies), hijrah (migration – surrendering worldly inclinations for the sake of heavenly goals and Allah).[31]

Although Schmid, Betz, and Quiggin's narrative structures are easy to understand, there is room to fill in the gaps, elucidate the complex set of assumptions, logics, appeals, and justifications behind each component, and build upon their ideas with a more nuanced framework.

Richard Engel draws out a powerful account of an "arc of history" that Osama Bin Laden relied upon in much of his rhetoric, and that "every Muslim schoolchild is taught" and grows to resent: "Islam's golden era of the Arab caliphate, the Crusades, the Mongol devastation, the rise of the Ottomans, World War I, the carving up of the Middle East by Europe, and the poverty, weakness, and wars in the Muslim world of the last century."[32] Though Engel acknowledges that only a small percentage of Muslims agree with terrorist tactics, millions understand this world vision.[33] Bin Laden's account of history places blame for every problem and time of adversity Muslims faced or currently face on the West. This narrative sees nation-building and policing efforts as a subversive attempt to "reinforce a foreign system under the banner of democracy" in such a way that it makes the region weak, Israel strong and secure, and favors secular, pro-American autocracies.[34] Bin Laden's solution for changing the trajectory was to attack the U.S., the "modern crusader," wear and bring it down, enact change in the world order by doing so, and enable the Islamic caliphate to rise again through this Salafi-jihadi movement.[35]

27 Alex P. Schmid, "The Importance of Countering al Qaeda's 'Single Narrative'," in E.J.A.M. Kessels (Ed.), *Countering Violent Extremist Narratives* (The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2010): 47.

28 Alex P. Schmid, 'Al-Qaeda's "Single Narrative" and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State of Knowledge," International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (2014): 8.

29 David Betz. 2008. "The virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2008, p. 520.

30 Tom Quiggin, "Understanding Al-Qaeda's Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work," *Terrorism Research Initiative* Vol 3, no 2 (2009).

31 Ibid.

32 Richard, Engel. *And Then All Hell Broke Loose* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016): 33.

33 Ibid., 37.

34 Ibid., 34.

35 Ibid.

Similarly, Bruce Hoffman touches upon this need for "far-reaching changes in the world order," describing the choices Al-Qaeda saw itself facing: "either to accept it with submission, which means letting Islam die, or to destroy it, so that we can construct the world as Islam requires."[36] When distinguishing between secular and religious terrorists, Hoffman asserts that the militancy justified with religion is even more unrestricted than that of secular terrorist groups who are susceptible to political, moral, and practical imperatives. First, "for the religious terrorist, violence is a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. Terrorism assumes a transcendental dimension;" thus, religious terrorists are virtually unimpeded.[37] For instance, the structural differences in audiences 'leads to a sanctioning of almost limitless violence against a virtually open-ended category of targets […] and explains the rhetoric common to holy terror manifestos describing persons outside the terrorists' religious community in denigrating and dehumanizing terms, such as "infidels," "nonbelievers," "children of Satan," and "mud people." The deliberate use of such adjectives to condone and justify terrorism is significant in that it further erodes the constraints on violence.'[38]

Heather Gregg, in her discussion of the definition of religious terrorism, points out that "non-religious factors may cause groups to use terrorism for religiously salient goals. For example, groups may use terrorism with the aim of overthrowing governments that they believe are not upholding the tenets of a particular religion and installing a religious government in its place. The cause of the terrorist act is something outside of the faith, but the goal is uniquely religious."[39] This idea may have salience with the way Al-Qaeda constructs its narrative appeals and frames its ultimate objective.

Moving deeper into how religion drives the narrative, in her article about Salafi Jihadism, Dina Raffie provides an assessment of how religion is used as a pretext for violence. She stresses that the groups often redefine and re-contextualize religious terms and concepts to align with jihadist narratives.[40] Similarly, Quintan Wiktorowicz characterizes the religious dimension of the narrative as a "dichotomous struggle for God's sovereignty on earth [which] eliminates the middle ground and sets the stage for a millennial, eschatological battle between good and evil."[41]

Finally, three of the stories or concepts most heavily used within Islamist Extremism's strategic communication provide insight into the major themes and underlying beliefs: Al-Nakbah (this invokes themes of the catastrophe in the loss of Palestine to Israel then deliverance because champions from the ummah step forth to restore the community), Crusaders (this is the common colonization story of Christian invasions of the Middle East in the 10th through 12th centuries, followed by subjugation and humiliation of the community until they're repelled), and the Pharaoh (this is a label to "apostate leaders" in Muslim countries whom extremists consider to be corrupt and dictatorial, encouraging the audience to resist the tyrant and take on the role of God's agent).[42] The main conclusions of each of these are that the struggle requires a champion to reconcile the injustice, and that all in the Muslim community should join and contribute. These stories represent calls to action, and have the potential to inform my understanding of the deep cultural values, beliefs, and worldviews that drive behavior.

SYNTHESIZED, MORE NUANCED & INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK

The wide array of sources provides many ideas, but the current literature lacks a framework that captures and embraces the complexities, dimensions, nuances, and full sequential, cumulative logic of the narrative. Each of the scholarly works offer a few components that are important, or a structure to the narrative. Although simplification helps provide order to complex phenomena, oversimplifying the dynamic and intricate processes characteriz-

36 Bruce Hoffman, "Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1995), pp. 274.

37 Ibid., 272.

38 Ibid., 273.

39 Heather S. Gregg, "Defining and Distinguishing Secular and Religious Terrorism," Vol 8. No. 2, 2014.

40 Dina Al Raffie, (2012). Whose Hearts and Minds? Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Salafi Jihadism. *Journal of Terrorism Research*. 3(2). DOI:http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.304

41 Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "A Genealogy of Radical Islam." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 2 (2005): 81.

42 Steven R. Corman, "Understanding the Role of Narrative in Extremist Strategic Communication," in "Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies," July 2015. https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf. 27.

ing Al-Qaeda's narrative may be limiting our ability to understand and counter the terrorist activity. Taking this existing literature and each of the overlapping, diverging, and unique contributions into account, I have created a fused framework that maps out the relationships between the broad themes, ideas, claims, and beliefs nested within Al-Qaeda's narrative. I offer a nuanced and detailed thematic framework that captures how commonly experienced emotions, grievances, thoughts, beliefs, and values can be intensified, radicalized, and mobilized to build a willingness to commit acts of violence. Counter-narrative efforts must first and foremost be based upon a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the narratives themselves; in order to question, identify hypocrisy, and dismantle the validity of the narrative and its assumptions, one must first understand the full spectrum of and relationships between the ideas it propagates. I propose ten major themes, messages, or functions that create a cumulative effect when intertwined to form Al-Qaeda's compelling narrative.

1) Grievances as Unjustly Imposed

The first broad narrative theme is the idea of grievance. Within this context, Al-Qaeda invokes a story of victimization, and recounts a history of humiliation through invasion, oppression, exploitation, discrimination, marginalization, and other forms of mistreatment. Osama Bin Laden placed emphasis on what he described as the "puppets" of the U.S. and the unjust influence and involvement of the U.S. and West in the Middle East, and grounded much of the narrative in the underlying premise that the main problems Muslims face and have faced throughout history "were caused by the American occupiers."[43] This deflects responsibility for "war" from the terrorists to the 'oppressors'. The notion of grievance is thus multifaceted, and spurs thought processes and belief systems that lead to alienation of the Muslims who have grown to resent Western influence, and blames the necessity of jihad on the West.

2) The Perceived Need to Defend Islam in the Face of an Existential Crisis

By painting grievances as imposed by the West rather than just misfortunes, and by framing Western actions as part of a larger attempt to strengthen themselves at the expense of the Islamic world, the "local stories" are translated into broader national and transnational narratives of collective and unjust suffering that must be reconciled. This second message Al-Qaeda broadcasts is that this continued historical struggle is evidence that Islam is under siege. Al-Qaeda therefore depicts its 'defensive war' as the justified and provoked response to an existential crisis. As Engel describes, Osama Bin Laden argued that the secret intent behind Western presence, policing, and stability efforts was to "keep Muslims locked in a nation-state system that thwarted the rightful destiny of Islam."[44] As a result, Al-Qaeda classifies its acts of violence as resistance to the aggression from an enemy bent on weakening Islam. The implications of this framing is that the narrative encourages Muslims to believe that Al-Qaeda, in employing a strategy of terrorism and engaging in violent, indiscriminate tactics, is responding proportionately to decades and even centuries of 'injustice'. Al-Qaeda's mission is to thus rectify the world order so that it is conducive to Islam's survival and prosperity.[45] By framing the narrative in this way, it can then be perceived as a "struggle to uphold Islam, not terror."[46]

3) Seeing the World in Black and White

Third, Al-Qaeda has crafted an interpretation of the battleground and enemy that is extremely polarized. The reduction of the complex and dynamic relationships between actors in the international arena into simple, clichéd dichotomies dividing humanity into good versus evil, friend and foe, and us versus them is epitomized by the term al-Wala wa'l-Bara, meaning those one has "to love, support, help, follow, defend […], and those one has to despise, desert, denounce."[47] This

43 "The New Powder Keg in the Middle East: Mujahid Usamah Bin Ladin Talks Exclusively to 'Nida'ul Islam''. Nida'ul Islam 15 (Oct.-Nov. 1996), http:==www.fas.org=irp=world= para=docs=LADIN.htm.

44 Engel, Richard. *And Then All Hell Broke Loose* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016): 34.

45 Bruce Hoffman, "Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1995), pp. 274.

46 Ramakrishna, Kumar. "Deligitimizing the Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia." *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (December 2005), pp. 343-369.

47 Alex P. Schmid, 'Al-Qaeda's "Single Narrative" and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State of Knowledge," International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (2014): 1.

polarization defines the struggle itself as a grand, divine war against the corrupt and impure enemies of Al-Qaeda using the notion of takfir: labeling "infidels" or apostates like the US, Israel, and other Jews, Christians, polytheists, pagans, and secular leaders.[48] The degradation and dehumanization of 'enemies' makes it easier for Al-Qaeda to present these groups as almost unworthy of living, and distance themselves further from their targets. By portraying the West as Christian and Zionist crusaders, the organization builds the narrative around these 'predators' to further differentiate between what is good and evil.

AL-QAEDA INVOKES A HISTORY OF HUMILIATION THROUGH INVASION, OPPRESSION, EXPLOITATION, DISCRIMINATION, [AND] MARGINALIZATION.

4) An Irreconcilable Eschatological Conflict between these Forces of Darkness and Light

The problem the narrative helps to create is also underlined by a sense of irreconcilability. It essentially renders any possibility of a middle ground, compromise, or peaceful coexistence null; the conflict itself becomes a zero sum game. Instead, Al-Qaeda calls upon Muslims to help obliterate these dark forces of Western influence so that it can ultimately lead the establishment of a Sharia state after eradicating its largest threat. Therefore, not only does Al-Qaeda circulate the theme of unjustly imposed grievance and create the perception of an existential struggle against evil, but it also interprets the conflict as eschatological, rooting it in highly connotative and subjective interpretations of the past, present, and future. This system of interpreted historical events, emotionally-charged memories, powerful stories, and perceptual themes elevates the decision to join as a moral imperative.

5) Al-Qaeda as the Only Way: The Divinely Appointed Agent of the Oppressed

The fifth narrative theme is the premise that Al-Qaeda is the vanguard that embraces and calls upon Muslims of all nations and ethnicities around the world. It claims to be both an agent of the oppressed, and an agent of Allah. Al-Qaeda, under Osama Bin Laden, was especially concerned with its brand and made efforts to ensure its affiliates were sanctioned and following its protocols to remain true to this identity and control its message. Al-Qaeda often invokes the idea of bayat in the context of followership, which highlights that followers and operatives should show the same level of obedience to Al-Qaeda as they should show to Allah. It has often been presented as a theological imperative, or duty incumbent upon all Muslims to demonstrate piety and devotion to the faith through Al-Qaeda membership. A highly important nuance to consider is that Al-Qaeda frames adherence as the only rightful path, stressing that if one is not supporting the organization, they are instead supporting the oppressors and defying Allah. In this way, the narrative seeks to persuade Muslims that the only way to rectify and achieve redemption for the injustices, lessen their grievances, protect their religion to ensure its survival in the face of dark and powerful adversaries, and show true obedience to Allah is to join Al-Qaeda.

6) Exploiting the Idea of Transcendence to Dismiss the Laws of the World as Illegitimate

Al-Qaeda has sought to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize in pursuit of its political agenda by religious-based justification of violent means. First, Al-Qaeda's narrative exploits the transcendent nature of religion itself by weaving an argument together that invalidates the laws and rules of society and the international system. The organization sees the values, institutions, and conflict resolution mechanisms currently in place as illegitimate, and furthermore draws upon the idea of the cosmic world being more important than the physical to justify why it ought to not be constrained by

48 Ibid.

secular rules.[49]

7) Enticing Potential Followers with Promises of Immediate Heavenly Rewards and Glorifying 'Champions' of the Islamic Community

The seventh theme is a powerful message about the morality of violence. The narrative highlights the value of force because of the expediency of those tactics in the attainment of individual heavenly reward and in the fulfillment of Al-Qaeda's vision of the ideal world. Another primary element within this theme of glorification of violence is the "social-heroic" idea, which venerates violent acts of terrorism and their perpetrators. Acts of terrorism themselves are regarded as noble, sacramental acts of devotion. The idea of "personal responsibility to protect fellow Muslims from harm,"[50] the idealization of martyrdom and celebration of former fighters as saviors or "champions of Islam" within the Al-Qaeda community, and the promise of immediate heavenly rewards and deliverance upon death fall within this religious-ideological concept. This piece of the narrative encourages and incentivizes fellow Muslims to exhibit a willingness to sacrifice for the cause.

8) Appealing to the Faith and Using Claims of Protecting the Religion as a Shield Against Challengers and 'Debunkers'

When Al-Qaeda fits its efforts and mission in the context of the religion, it bolsters its legitimacy and draws upon elements of the faith that mainstream Muslims can relate to. Al-Qaeda relies upon an "eclectic patchwork of cherry-picked elements from sources considered sacred, [including the Qur'an and the Hadith among other classical theological concepts]," and has built appeal and justification into its narrative by incorporating Salafist and jihadist Islamism in the religious tradition.[51] Doing so also allows the narrative to retain a sense of impenetrability or "invulnerability" because any attack on it or attempt to "debunk" the fallacies can be framed as an attack on Islam itself, which reinforces aforementioned themes.[52]

9) Transforming and Mobilizing a Religious Constituency to Create Political Change Through Force

On the whole, Al-Qaeda's primary audience is the worldwide Muslim population, and its narrative is carefully and deliberately crafted to ultimately transform its initial religious constituency into a politically motivated group that can serve as an agent of coercive change. As shown above, Al-Qaeda's narrative appeals to deep-seated grievances, fears, pride in the religion, moral drives, a belief in obedience, a desire to be a hero and contribute, and lastly a strong sense of piety and devotion. The religious and ideological narrative seeks to intensify these feelings, thoughts, values, and beliefs to ultimately mobilize the individuals to commit acts of violence. The thought processes triggered by each thematic aspect of the narrative are intended to first politicize then radicalize those who are susceptible to the messages such that they are willing to train and use force in accordance with Al-Qaeda's global mission.

10) The Narrative's Impact on Al-Qaeda's Strategic Flexibility and Long-Term Resilience

Finally, Al-Qaeda's narrative plays a significant role in its overall strategy and resilience. First, the narrative allows the organization to build legitimacy and credibility regardless of whether it succeeds or fails in the shorter-term. For instance, the terrorist attacks of September 11th served Al-Qaeda as "propaganda of the deed."[53] Consistent with the understanding that its primary audience is the Muslim community, this was intended to have a great impact on the confidence of Al-Qaeda's potential supporters who might begin to see the U.S. as vulnerable, and trust Al-Qaeda more as a powerful, capable organization worthy of supporting. Even if it would cause a greater security dilemma for Al-Qaeda, it seems the second objective was to provoke the U.S. to act in such a way that would further anger, alienate, and drive Muslims into the welcoming arms of Al-Qaeda.[54] Both goals could further strengthen the narrative. Therefore this parallels insur-

49 Bruce Hoffman, "Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1995), 272.
50 Ibid., 9.
51 Alex P. Schmid, 'Al-Qaeda's "Single Narrative" and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State of Knowledge," International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (2014): 4.
52 Ibid.
53 Mark Sedgwick, "Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2004): 800.
54 Ibid.

gency warfare: the military defeat of the group in a certain location like its stronghold, safe-haven, or primary training ground may temporarily disrupt and dismantle the body of the organization, but it may actually contribute to its longer-term political or strategic success by providing more empirical evidence that can be woven into an already compelling, multi-generational narrative. Al-Qaeda constantly seeks new and promising markets for the circulation of its message, ways to socialize new generations of followers, and ways to link world events to its narrative. The adaptable narrative protects the organization by maintaining a reservoir of collective memories about successes, and framing any military failures, Western, or U.S.-led efforts to destroy it as further confirmation of the requirement of violence in this great "war on Islam."

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Assessing the state of the literature on Al-Qaeda's ideological and religious narrative, there are a variety of sources that offer useful theories to describe the structure or logic of Al-Qaeda's overarching message. However, the current literature lacks a framework that is thorough enough to encapsulate the nuances, and full sequential, cumulative logic of the narrative. I have therefore created a synthesized framework that maps out the themes and the details nested within: commonly experienced emotions, grievances, thoughts, beliefs, and values that can be intensified, radicalized, and mobilized to build a willingness to commit or at the very least grow complicit in the proliferation of acts of violence. I have proposed ten major themes, messages, or functions that hold a cumulative effect in Al-Qaeda's narrative. Though parsimonious theories hold value in the way they strive to deconstruct complex realities, oversimplification when it comes to understanding the narratives of violent extremists potentially disables efforts to counter and respond to those narratives; my framework provides a thorough delineation of the stories, themes, appeals, and logics within the ensemble.

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND FURTHER RESEARCH

As many scholars, policy-makers, and practitioners have noted, kinetic force is not sufficient in countering terrorism. There are several dimensions to the threat, and the more recent rise of the Islamic State illustrates that this phenomenon of radical jihadism is recurrent and multigenerational. This renders the ideological domain even more important, because the propaganda rhetoric and narratives religious terrorist organizations rely on draw from decades and centuries of history, as well as current events, to paint a picture of the world and their religious constituency's existing and rightful place in the order. The Islamic State has invested heavily in this arena, and has constructed powerful propaganda mechanisms that use the latest social media platforms to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize homegrown terrorists, supporters in the Middle East, and foreign fighters. Though it is a sobering and unsettling realization, the threat of radical jihadism is not one that can be fully eradicated or defeated, but must be instead conceptualized as a "chronic disease like cancer," and thus managed and contained.[55] There is a need to pinpoint effective ways to act more preventatively and proactively rather than just reacting to attacks themselves including (but not limited to) "identify[ing] at-risk segments of the population, interdicting those who have become radicalized before," building cooperation between the public and private sectors to adapt to the ever-evolving nature of the war of ideas in the context of the rapid pace of technological innovation, strengthening multilateral relationships to synchronize and coordinate but also delegating and allocating resources and mission sets, tactfully leveraging partnerships with the Muslim community at home and abroad to engage in credible counter-radicalization and counter-narrative efforts that help reveal hypocrisies, fallacies, and inconsistencies with the mainstream interpretations of the world religion of Islam, empowering preemptive education programs, community groups, and political action communities, and bridging the relationship gap to lessen the supposed need to posture oneself to defend its religion in light of a perceived existential crisis.[56] Understanding the narrative first will enable us to continue to problem-solve and address the root causes of this type of violence.

Building upon these implications, there are a few more suggestions from this exploratory research in the counter-narrative chal-

55 Price, Bryan C. "15 Years after 9-11: the State of the Fight Against Islamic Terrorism," Prepared testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, 2016. http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20160921/105337/HHRG-114-AS00-Wstate-PriceB-20160921.pdf.

56 Ibid., 13. See also Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press, 2006. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/hoff12698.

lenge. First, it is imperative that we strive for greater understanding, especially by increasing the transparency of our intentions in and with various regions and states. We need to strive to acknowledge the political, economic, and social grievances many Muslims face around the world to demonstrate greater empathy, support, and sensitivity to the cultural, societal, and historical contexts in which we operate and involve ourselves. We need to engage in diplomacy and work to truly show that we are not at war with Islam in our own country and beyond. These ways should be incorporated into our strategic vision, and will address the first four components of the narrative in my framework. Moving forward, we need to aid the broader Muslim community in highlighting that the legal and moral codes of the modern world are indeed legitimate and necessary for collective security and prosperity, and to expose the hypocrisies of Al-Qaeda's reading of jihad. Finally, Muslim leaders in both the U.S. and international arena must highlight inconsistencies between Al-Qaeda's methods, tactics, and premises and the foundational texts of the faith. All in all, as Hoffman concludes, we need a broader solution range and greater awareness of the various domains in which this national and international security challenge manifests itself, as well as a true investment in the longer-term battle against radical extremist ideologies that arise at home and abroad.

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