A STORY OF GENDER STEREOTYPING
BY GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES

Contradiction and Ambivalence: Mexico’s Cold War and the United States
Jorge Familiar Avalos, Yale University

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Dear Reader,

The Yale Review of International Studies’ editorial board is pleased to bring you the second issue of this semester, the Winter Issue. We are featuring the stellar academic work of five new voices, students at Yale and elsewhere in North America. We pride ourselves on the breadth of our global coverage in every issue; Winter 2018 is no exception, with topics ranging from the Oslo Accords to Korean Identity, and from Nonstate Actors’ Fundraising to the tragic story of Claudina Velasquez in Guatemala.

This semester, we achieved record staff growth as we welcomed a new cohort of writers and editors. As a result, we have been able to deepen our regular coverage of world issues and on-campus events through our online site as well. We are grateful to our staff’s hard work in bringing the Winter 2018 issue to life and for continuing to create new content that we bring to you throughout the year.

As always, we could not do this without you, reader. Your support to YRIS is invaluable, and your readership and your engagement with scholarship on international affairs truly motivate us. We are also grateful to YIRA Secretary Henry Suckow-Ziemer and YIRA Executive Director Mbella Beseka for launching the first ever YRIS reading group events this semester, creating more fruitful opportunities for scholarly debate and discussion centered around essays published through the Review.

If you like what you read, look out for an opportunity to join our staff at the start of the Spring semester!

Best Wishes,

Elisabeth Siegel, Jake Mezey, and Qusay Omran
YRIS Executive Board 2018-2019
Essays

JORGE FAMILIAR-AVALOS
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With the Allies’ victory in 1945, the United States cemented itself as a global superpower. The U.S. was the only major belligerent to escape the conflict largely unscathed. Its economy was thriving, and it was the only nation in the world to have developed and used atomic weapons. But just when it seemed that the United States would successfully set about crafting a new world order through the establishment of multilateral organizations like the United Nations, a new threat emerged. The Soviet Union, an American ally during World War II, developed a chokehold on Eastern Europe immediately after the war, propping up repressive communist satellite regimes to create what Winston Churchill dubbed the “Iron Curtain” in 1946. The U.S.S.R.’s totalitarian communism and America’s democratic capitalism were deemed irreconcilably different by the leaders of both nations, and the Cold War was born as “the superpowers engaged in a global struggle for nothing less than ‘the soul of mankind,’” each advancing their own agendas for the betterment of all.” Soon, both nations possessed nuclear weapons, meaning that a military conflict between them would have the potential to exterminate the human race. Thankfully, the Cold War did not play out as a conventional war. Rather, it was a geopolitical rivalry that manifested itself through military alliances, clandestine operations, and proxy wars as both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. sought to spread their respective ideologies throughout the world. Caught between the competing American capitalist and Soviet communist camps was the so-called Third World, made up of nations that refused to align themselves

either way in a bid to remain neutral. Despite its proximity to the United States, Mexico was one such nation.

Mexico neglected to join America’s bloc not because of ideological sympathy toward the Soviet communists, but because of its own sense of nationalist self-preservation. While the United States justified aggressive interventionist policies, most infamously in Vietnam, as a reaction to communism’s despicable threat, Mexico “viewed the Cold War not as a principled crusade, but as an example of aggression by imperialist states whose financial and military power allowed them to dominate less developed nations.”

In many ways, Mexico’s Cold War experience was shaped by the Mexican Revolution. The government’s decisions, first to stand with Fidel Castro’s leftist regime in Cuba and later to support insurgent movements in Central America, were founded on a tradition of defending national sovereignty and self-determination dating back to the Revolution. Furthermore, certain sections of Mexico’s population, namely college students, unionists, and peasants, commiserated with Marxism, yearning for a Revolution they felt had gone unfulfilled. This sentiment was only exacerbated by the Mexican state’s authoritarian streaks, as the Mexican government found itself forced to choose between opposing the United States or its own citizenry.

The Soviet Union and Cuba

Mexico was one of the few countries to enjoy virtually uninterrupted diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union from the 1920s until its dissolution in 1991. This relationship was diplomatically and economically modest, with neither Mexico nor the U.S.S.R ever seriously considering a formal alliance with the other. Its climax arguably came during the late 1950s, as Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev mandated an expansion of the Soviet Union’s influence in the Third World at the same time as Mexican president Adolfo López Mateos looked to decrease Mexico’s commercial dependence on the United States.

In November of 1959, the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Anastas Mikoyan, visited Mexico and opened an exhibit on life in the U.S.S.R. that was visited by over one million Mexicans in less than a month. The Soviet Ambassador raved of the visit’s success and negotiations over a trade agreement were rumored, but nothing ever materialized. The United States quietly accepted such mild engagement, with the only cause for concern being allegations of espionage operations based in the U.S.S.R.’s Mexico City embassy.

Fidel Castro’s capture of Havana and deposition of U.S.-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista on January 1, 1959, proved far more consequential to Mexico’s relationship with the United States. The Cuban Revolution had begun on July 26, 1953, when Castro and a group of his fellow insurgents unsuccessfully tried to seize a government barracks. Castro was arrested and jailed until 1955, when he was released and fled to Mexico City to reorganize his rebellion. He returned to Cuba and completed his revolutionary mission. In just a few years, Castro’s crew of students and professionals became an organized movement capable of toppling a government. Once in power, Castro set about implementing a variety of radical reforms, including the nationalization of foreign property and the redistribution of land.

The Cuban Revolution shocked the United States because of its proximity. Although it had not been an explicitly Marxist movement, the radical views it brought to power presented a clear affront to the United States. As it became clear that Castro’s radicalism would not

3 Ibid, p. 2
6 n.p.
7 Ibid, p. 39
"Mateos was paradoxically caught between disavowing communism and praising the Cuban Revolution to affirm his commitment to Mexico’s own revolutionary ideals."

fade with time, President Dwight Eisenhower decided to take action. On January 4, 1961, the U.S. cut diplomatic ties with Cuba, marking the first major reversal of the World War II-era Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin America.9

Tensions continued to escalate in the following months under new U.S. president John F. Kennedy, and on April 16, 1961, the United States launched the Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba. About 1,500 Cuban exiles, armed, trained, and financed by the American government, landed on Cuba’s southern coast, but were soundly defeated. When news of the invasion reached Mexico, former president and populist icon Lázaro Cárdenas tried to fly to Cuba as a show of solidarity toward Castro’s regime; it took a moratorium on all Mexican travel there by López Mateos to stop him.10

Elected and inaugurated in 1958, López Mateos had been in office for less than a year at the time of the Cuban Revolution’s conclusion. He entered the presidency promising to accelerate reform, and by the time he left office in 1964 had redistributed about 30 million acres of land, more than any Mexican president since Cárdenas’ administration of the 1930s.11 Following the Bay of Pigs debacle, however, his presidency was dominated by questions over Mexico’s relationship with Cuba. With Mexico’s general population expressing sympathy for Castro at Cárdenas’ urging, López Mateos was paradoxically caught between disavowing communism and praising the Cuban Revolution to affirm his commitment to Mexico’s own revolutionary ideals.12 To this effect, López Mateos firmly condemned America’s attempt to invade Cuba and invited Cuban president Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado on an official state visit.13

While López Mateos was certainly not interested in an alliance with Castro, he was willing to foster a relationship built on mutual nonintervention between Mexico and Cuba. In just a few years since the Cuban Revolution, Cuba had built a reputation for itself as an ‘exporter’ of revolution by encouraging subversives around the world and especially in Latin America. Implicit in Mexico’s decision to oppose American intervention in Cuba was an understanding that, in return, Cuba would not export revolution to Mexico.14

On December 2, 1961, Castro declared himself a communist, further isolating Cuba and increasing international scrutiny on López Mateos.15 With several Latin American countries joining the United States in cutting ties with Cuba, the Organization of American States (OAS) convened in January 1962 to vote on whether or not to expel Cuba. Despite

9 Teichert, Pedro C. M. “Latin America and the Socio-Economic Impact of the Cuban Revolution.” *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1962, pp. 105–120. JSTOR, JSTOR.
12 Sloan, p. 5
13 Ibid, pp. 1-12
15 Ibid, pp. 704-707
the fact that Mexico’s representative branded Cuba’s Marxism as “incompatible with the inter-American system” during the meeting, Mexico ultimately abstained from votes on expelling Cuba and on imposing economic sanctions and an arms embargo on the Cubans. Although Mexico was not alone in abstaining, all three motions were approved anyways.

Mexico’s decision to neglect the United States’ wishes at the OAS in January 1962 had an immediate impact on their bilateral relationship. Kennedy postponed an official state visit to Mexico until June, and there were rumors that American foreign aid to Mexico would be cut off. Pedro Teichert, writing later that year, argued that Mexico’s refusal to side with the Americans was proof of “Latin American determination to change the traditional setup in spite of U.S. opposition,” and that the continued antagonism of Cuba would push the rest of Latin America to pursue greater autonomy from the U.S.

In failing to endorse Cuba’s expulsion from the OAS, Mexico stayed faithful to the principle of mutual nonintervention that defined the two nations’ relationship. In fact, this tenet was based on a longstanding Mexican political tradition—the Carranza Doctrine. The Carranza Doctrine was the product of a 1918 proclamation by then-President Venustiano Carranza calling for mutual respect for national sovereignty through nonintervention. Before and during the Mexican Revolution, Mexico was the subject of repeated foreign interventions, most notably at the hands of the United States. Thus, post-Revolutionary Mexico championed nonintervention as a defensive reaction to its proximity to the United States. As one scholar put it, there is “only one credible threat to Mexico’s international security: the United States.” Given this, Mexico’s decision to stand by Cuba on the international stage is hardly surprising. Mexico was not defending Cuba for Cuba’s sake; in reality, Mexico was defending its own right to self-determination.

The indisputable climax of tensions between the United States and Cuba was the Cuban Missile Crisis of late 1962. After the discovery of Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba by American reconnaissance planes on October 15, the world held its breath for almost two weeks, the threat of nuclear war more real than ever before. While López Mateos refused Kennedy’s request for assistance in blockading Cuba, he did release a statement calling for the missiles’ removal. In the end, cooler heads prevailed, and the situation was resolved on October 24 with the removal of the missiles after Kennedy promised Khrushchev that the U.S. would never again invade Cuba and that he...

"Mexico’s decision to stand by Cuba on the international stage is hardly surprising.... In reality, Mexico was defending its own right to self-determination."

16 Ibid, p. 124
17 Fenn, Peggy. “México, La No Intervención y La Autodeterminación En El Caso De Cuba.” Foro Internacional, vol. 4, no. 13 (1963), pp. 1–19. JSTOR, JSTOR.
18 Ibid, p. 111
19 Ibid, pp. 1-19
20 Ibid, p. 35
21 Ibid, p. 39
would be removing U.S. missiles from Turkey.22

Later, the United States resumed its attack on Cuba at the OAS. In July 1964, the OAS voted on a U.S.-sponsored resolution to mandate that member states cut all diplomatic ties with Cuba. While Mexico was not the only nation to vote against the resolution, it was the only OAS member to refuse to comply after it passed. Mexico became the only Latin American country with diplomatic relations with Cuba, cementing its autonomy from the United States on matters related to Cuba and exonerating itself from any future OAS-backed interventions in Cuba. Unsurprisingly, Castro lavished praise on Mexico, saying:

Mexico [is for us] an example of how relations between Cuba and the rest of the Latin American countries can be with only one condition: that our sovereignty is respected, that there is no interference in our domestic affairs, that no mercenary expeditions are organized, that no sabotage campaigns are organized.23

Once again, Mexico had acted not in Cuba's interest for Cuba's sake, but for its own sake, upholding the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention and appealing to a populace agitated over perceived mistreatment of Cuba by the United States.

By 1964, it was clear that Mexico could not be swayed in its defense of nonintervention and Cuba. These constant confrontations “convinced Mexico that the OAS had become a U.S. tool to undermine governments that Mexico deemed reformist but that the United States perceived as communist threats,” leaving Mexico reluctant to participate in OAS policy-making for the remainder of the Cold War.24 In light of this, the United States was forced to adapt to Mexico’s position. Because Mexico could not be convinced to abandon Cuba, the U.S. was determined to find a way to benefit from the situation. Ultimately, a compromise was reached, as López Mateos agreed to involve the United States in his pursuit of “contradictory overt and covert foreign policies” with Cuba.25

In reality, López Mateos had pursued such contradictory policies since the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961. Although he publicly supported Cuba, declassified intelligence records show that he privately spied on Cárdenas, the student groups that formed as a result of his agitation, and on the Cubans themselves through the Mexican embassy in Havana.26 Details remain murky about how or when exactly this came to be, but it is widely accepted that he eventually acceded to U.S. involvement in espionage efforts in Havana. On September 3, 1969, Cuba’s ambassador to Mexico famously sent a diplomatic note to Mexico’s foreign ministry accusing Humberto Carrillo Colón, a Mexican national and press attaché at the Havana embassy, of being a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative. While the evidence behind this allegation never surfaced, Carrillo Colón was recalled from the embassy almost immediately.27

The United States tolerated Mexico’s continued relations with Cuba once it found a way to benefit from them, but Cuba found itself with even less of a choice. While Castro privately distrusted the Mexicans in much the same way they distrusted him, he was forced to limit the extent of any response, as covert actions in Mexico would surely provoke an aggressive American reaction if discovered.28 Furthermore, Cuba’s relationship with Mexico remained commercially and symbolically significant to the island nation, and a loss of diplomatic relations would come at a great economic and political cost for the Castro regime.29 Thus, Cuba’s only real option for retaliation was to spread leftist propaganda in Mexico and hope to inflame the ideological strife that swept the country in the midst of the Cold War.30

23 Ibid, p. 126
24 Ibid, p. 58
25 Ibid, p. 6
26 Ibid, pp. 1-12
27 Ibid, pp. 133-136
28 Ibid, pp. 1-12
29 Ibid, pp. 39-40
30 Ibid, pp. 1-12
Leftist Dissent in Mexico

The Cuban Revolution inspired a heated debate over the legacy of the Mexican Revolution in Mexico. While leftist protestors maintained that its ideals had gone unfulfilled and looked to Cuba as a model to be followed, the Mexican government sought to quell the protests and assure the public that it stood for the values of the Revolution. As Renata Keller puts it, “Castro and his fellow Cuban revolutionaries had unwittingly exposed a contradiction coded deep in the DNA of Mexican politics: the tension between the country’s revolutionary past and its conservative present.”

This ideological tension gave way to a very real struggle, as leftist protestors and guerrillas clashed with clandestine and brutal government forces.

In the 1960s, Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was roughly halfway through its uninterrupted 71-year rule over the country. Founded in 1929, the PRI maintained power until 2000 by rigging presidential elections, deceiving the public, and silently crushing the opposition. In 1990, Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa famously declared that “the perfect dictatorship is not communism, nor is it the Soviet Union, nor is it Fidel Castro: it is Mexico.”

The party’s name, laying claim to ‘institutionalized revolution,’ is an oxymoron, exemplifying its paradoxical claim to radical rhetoric and liberal ideals despite its conservative and strict style of governance.

The PRI was not used to serious opposition, but this is exactly what it encountered in the wake of the Cuban Revolution. The Cuban Revolution had grown out of a tiny group of radical protestors; with the rise of leftist student movements and the latent presence of communism in Mexico’s unions, the country’s ruling elite felt they had a real cause for concern. Starting with López Mateos’ Cuba policy, the government employed a foreign policy aimed at appeasing Mexico’s dissenters, but as the protestors grew increasingly radical, the government’s response became distinctly authoritarian.

The bulk of Mexico’s Cold War-era protest movement was made up of middle-class college students who commiserated with certain Second World nations antagonized by the United States, namely Cuba, the People’s Republic of China, and Vietnam. This was not necessarily motivated by ideology. Though the protestors were certainly left-leaning and radical, they were not necessarily communists. Rather, their solidarity was inspired by the sense that, like the aforementioned nations, Mexico was subject to American imperialism, ruled by a government that failed to truly represent its people. Protesters’ chants eulogized Castro, Mao Zedong, and Ho Chi Minh, and annual demonstrations on July 26 in commemoration of the Cuban Revolution became commonplace.

The suppression of Mexico’s radical leftists began under López Mateos, who in 1959 ordered the removal of communist union leaders and university rectors and in 1960 authorized the imprisonment of famous muralist David A. Siqueiros for his role in organizing a student demonstration. However, it was under his successor, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, that the situation truly escalated. Despite being extremely conservative, Díaz Ordaz maintained the public relationship with Cuba fostered by his predecessor. Domestic policy was what changed, and as Díaz Ordaz abandoned the agricultural reform championed by López Mateos, the student movements he detested grew stronger and louder.

Protests attended by as many as 500,000 people gathered to denounce Díaz Ordaz for his increasing willingness to incarcerate leftists. The most significant of them all was staged by just over 15,000 people ten days before the inauguration of the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City. Díaz Ordaz wanted the Olympics to display Mexico’s economic progress and social stability, but on October 2, protestors gathered at the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in Mexico City’s Tlatelolco section to chant “no queremos olím...
piadas, queremos revolución”—we do not want the Olympics, we want revolution.38 Hoping to quietly end such protests, which he feared would hurt Mexico’s image internationally, Díaz Ordaz authorized the creation of a plainclothes police force, which infiltrated the crowd at Tlatelolco while government snipers occupied rooftops around the plaza.

In the evening, the government forces opened fire, although it remains unclear exactly what caused them to do so. Over 1,300 protestors were arrested, and although official government records that were classified until 2001 claimed that only 38 people were killed in the Tlatelolco Massacre, tallies based on eyewitness accounts estimate the number to be closer to 400. This hurt Mexico’s image more than any previous student demonstration had, and tens of thousands of tourists canceled their reservations in the week before the Games. More significantly, this marked the beginning of Mexico’s Dirty War, as the government would, for the next decade or so, sponsor a militaristic counterinsurgency meant to silence leftist agitators once and for all. Both the media and the general population blamed Díaz Ordaz for the violence, and he defended himself by baselessly alleging that the police acted to defend themselves after foreign communists among the protestors shot first.39

Luis Echeverría, elected to succeed Díaz Ordaz in 1970, embodied Mexico’s contradictory Cold War policies. His foreign policy was designed to curry favor from Mexico’s generally liberal and anti-American population, as he “repeatedly called for Third World countries to maintain their economic independence from the United States.”40 Looking to emphasize Mexico’s neutrality in the Cold War, he became the first Mexican president to visit the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. On the domestic front however, he embraced the use of violence of against Mexico’s radicals. During his presidency, right-wing paramilitary groups such as Los Halcones flourished and targeted leftists—on June 10, 1971, Los Halcones killed about 120 people in the Corpus Christi Massacre.41

At the same time, leftist groups themselves became increasingly violent, and guerrilla groups emerged. One group in particular, the Revolutionary Armed Movement (MAR),42 became particularly notorious after a series of bank rob-

"...He became the first Mexican president to visit the USSR and the PRC. On the domestic front however, he embraced the use of violence of against Mexico’s radicals."

41 Latin American Newsletters, n.p.
42 Movimiento Armado Revolucionario
permitted the formation of new political parties and legalized Mexico’s Communist Party. However, this came as a bid to increase his legitimacy after winning the 1976 presidential election unopposed and not as a well-intentioned reform. Furthermore, the reform did nothing to reverse the Dirty War, as the government’s efforts had “wiped out the extreme left by the mid-1970s.”

In the early 1980s, the last leftist guerrilla groups were defeated and disbanded.

It took decades and further democratization for the Mexican government to support any real investigation of the Dirty War. Ernesto Zedillo, elected in 1994 and last in the PRI’s uninterrupted presidential line, implemented a series of reforms to free Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute from government manipulation and revise campaign finance laws. These reforms successfully strengthened Mexico’s democracy, as the 1997 congressional elections were, at that point, “the most competitive ever held,” resulting in the PRI losing its congressional majorities. On October 2, 1998, Zedillo ordered an investigation into the Tlatelolco Massacre. Unfortunately, this yielded no real results as records remained secret.

In 2000, Vicente Fox of the center-right National Action Party (PAN) was elected president of Mexico, putting an end to the PRI’s electoral dominance. In November 2001, he created the Special Prosecutor’s office and ordered it to investigate political violence during the Cold War; this move proved more fruitful and yielded thousands of declassified documents.

A report released by the Fox administration documented the disappearance of 275 individuals and the torture of 523, and it was used to indict several former government officials, including Echeverría, on human rights abuse and genocide charges. Of course, these efforts did not expose each and every of the thousands of disappearances and killings of Mexico’s Dirty War, and many of those who carried out these despicable acts will have done so with impunity.

But what role, if any, did the United States play in the political violence that occurred in Mexico during the Cold War? Immediately after World War II, cooperation between Mexico and the United States on security dramatically increased. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) helped organize Mexico’s Federal Security Directorate, while the CIA established contacts at every level of the Mexican government. Thus, the United States had considerable knowledge of Mexico’s security concerns during the Cold War, but refrained from intervening in any substantive way because “U.S. leaders knew that their Mexican counterparts shared their

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45 Ibid., p. 236
46 Ibid., p. 64
48 Partido Acción Nacional
50 Ibid., pp. 41-43
anti-communist orientation and trusted them to manage their own affairs.” There was an implicit agreement between the two countries, holding that Mexico would be allowed to pursue a foreign policy that presented a public challenge to the United States, but that on the domestic side, Mexico would align itself with the United States by fervently opposing homegrown communism. Beyond this, there is some concrete evidence of direct U.S. involvement in Mexico. For example, the paramilitary group Los Halcones was trained and obtained its weapons in the United States, which the Mexican government went to great lengths to conceal in the aftermath of the Corpus Christi Massacre. In 2003, the American government declassified documents pertaining to Mexico’s security preparations for the 1968 Olympic Games. Specifically, these documents revealed that the United States supplied the Mexican government with radios, weapons, and ammunition both before and after the Tlatelolco Massacre and that the CIA had been monitoring Mexico’s student protests movements for months before the Massacre but had been told by unnamed high-ranking Mexican officials that the situation was under control. Further declassifications in 2006 revealed the existence of LITEMPO, a secret network of high-level Mexican informants managed by the CIA’s Mexico Chief of Station, Winston Scott. Among these informants were Díaz Ordaz and Echeverría, both of whom were also personal friends of Scott’s. LITEMPO was in operation from 1960 to 1969, and was described in one internal document as “a productive and effective relationship between CIA and select top officials in Mexico.” In another memo, John Whitten, chief of the clandestine services Mexico desk, complained about the fees paid to the program’s informants, although it remains unclear how much the CIA paid Mexico’s former presidents. Their involvement clearly influenced the CIA’s response to the Tlatelolco Massacre, as the agency’s internal accounts of the incident regurgitate key aspects of the government’s account, including the presence of violent foreign communists. Clearly, Díaz Ordaz and Echeverría had a much closer relationship with the CIA than was previously known.

The United States ensured its participation in the Dirty War was covert, and as such, its full extent remains unclear. It cannot be denied that the main driver behind Mexico’s Dirty War was the PRI’s desire to defend its power at any cost in the face of new leftist opposition, but it must also be acknowledged that the horrors that resulted were in line with America’s Cold War-era policy goals.

Central America

Facing unprecedented opposition at home, the Mexico’s PRI government needed to prove its loyalty to the values of the Mexican Revolution if it hoped to preserve its legitimacy. Cooperating with the United States became a political liability for the Mexican government, and it faced no choice but to challenge American action abroad that the Mexican population generally perceived as imperialist. Early on in the Cold War, it did this by refusing to cut ties with Cuba, but by the late 1970s, the focus of Mexico’s foreign policy became Central America. Most significantly, Mexico opposed American policy relating to a leftist insurgency in Nicaragua and a civil war in El Salvador.

In Nicaragua, the Sandinista National Liberation Front had begun its insurgency in July 1961 seeking to overthrow the right-wing government and pursue social and agricultural reforms. Under López Portillo, Mexico financially supported the Sandinistas mid-insurgency...
at the same time as the United States backed Nicaragua's dictator, Anastasio Somoza, in an apparent suspension of mutual nonintervention.\textsuperscript{58} Mexico cut diplomatic ties with Somoza's government on May 20, 1979. That July, he was deposed and the Sandinistas formed a Nicaraguan government of their own.\textsuperscript{59}

Ronald Reagan's victory in the American presidential election of 1980 stoked tensions with Mexico over Central America. Within the first few years of his presidency, the American government began to provide material support to the rightist Contra counterinsurgency in Nicaragua as well as to El Salvador's conservative government.\textsuperscript{60}

Mexico simultaneously aided leftist insurgents in El Salvador and called for peace negotiations at the United Nations in August of 1981. By February of 1982 it was clear that this strategy had failed to accomplish much, and López Portillo approached the Reagan administration with a plan to facilitate negotiations in El Salvador in exchange for an end to U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. Reagan stalled on a response, hoping that Salvadoran elections later that spring would help validate the ruling party. El Salvador's far right emerged victorious, but this failed to stop the violence.\textsuperscript{61}

Miguel de la Madrid succeeded López Portillo as Mexican president in 1982. Although he supported reforms that began to liberalize Mexico's economy and believed that closer economic relations with the United States were needed to boost Mexico's development, he refused to back down in Nicaragua and continued Mexico's political and economic support of the Sandinista government.\textsuperscript{62} In 1983, Mexico formed the Contadora Group, along with Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela, as an alternative to the OAS in the search for a peaceful solution to the ongoing Nicaraguan crisis.\textsuperscript{63}

Ultimately, the United States and Mexico did not have to find common ground in the cases of either Nicaragua or El Salvador. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas allowed free elections for the first time in 1987, and lost power through this new medium in 1990.\textsuperscript{64} Meanwhile, U.N. arbitration of peace negotiations for the Salvadoran civil war began in late 1989, and resulted in a peace agreement in 1992.\textsuperscript{65} The Soviet Union officially dissolved on December 26, 1991, ending the Cold War and making Castro's Cuba an international pariah.\textsuperscript{66}

These changes "removed some obstacles to U.S.-Mexican collaboration, among others their differences over policies toward Central America and their assessments of the Soviet Union.”\textsuperscript{67} It was actually before the Cold War's formal conclusion, in September of 1990, that Carlos Salinas, the Mexican president elected in 1988, declared that "trade integration with the United States had become a necessity," foreshadowing the groundbreaking cooperation between the two countries that defined the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{68}

The Cold War was an extremely uncomfortable period for U.S.-Mexico relations. The Cuban Revolution triggered an existential crisis in Mexican politics over the Mexican Revolution's legacy, which in turn pushed the Mexican government to both oppose the United States on the international stage and use violence against its own citizens. For all intents and purposes, real collaboration between the two nations was a political impossibility during this period, and the Cold War's conclusion brought with it a tremendous opportunity to change the bilateral relationship for the better.
About the Author:
Jorge Familiar Avalos is a first-year student at Yale University, where he is studying economics. Born in Mexico City, he resides in Potomac, Maryland, on the outskirts of Washington, D.C. Because of his ties to both countries, the U.S.-Mexico relationship is one of his main academic interests. He is on staff with the Yale Review of International Studies, and he also writes an online column on Mexican politics for The Politic.

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I won’t allow the authorities to let my daughter become just another [Guatemalan] murder statistic.” These are the words of Claudina Velasquez’s father right before the Inter-American Court case, Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala, in 2015. Claudina’s murder in 2005, which stands out as one of the few investigated in Guatemala and brought to an international court, illuminates a particularly severe problem with the methods employed by the National Civil Police (PNC) to investigate gender-based violence.

At the time of Claudina’s death, PNC officials had very few resources to help them carry out extensive investigations of murders of women in Guatemala that had risen by over 20% more than the increase in the number of men murdered between 2002 and 2004. Yet Claudina’s case revealed that officers did not make use of even the limited resources they did have to investigate female killings. I argue that the failure by the police to investigate thoroughly the disappearance and femicide of Claudina Velasquez was tied, in large part, to particular gender-based stereotypes of women at play that reflected a lack of care for women in general. In order to remedy this ongoing issue, the government must institute courses taught by instructors that train police officers to avoid forming gender-based stereotypes, rather than encourage them to do so, and that emphasize the importance of women’s lives by exposing officers to the reality that a victim could be one of their family members. By implementing these
recommendations, police might learn to reduce, rather than contribute to the spread of, gender-based violence.

In the years between 2000 and 2005, as violence against women increased in Guatemala, the PNC continually demonstrated a lack of will to investigate such crimes. The number of women killed had increased by over 63% from 2002 to 2005, and many of the crimes were categorized as femicides, meaning the victims were murdered because they were women. According to the Guatemala Human Rights Commission, families reporting crimes against females repeatedly encountered police who possessed gender bias against women. In a report, “Guatemala: No Protection, No Justice: Killings of Women,” Amnesty International revealed that family members of a female victim often had to prove to police that she was “respectable or that she had not been involved in any crime before the authorities would take their complaint seriously.” In some cases, even after this “innocence” was proven, officers’ investigations were influenced by the stereotype and “perception that women are to blame for their own deaths.” For this reason, police often demonstrated a lack of will to carry out investigations and thus made several mistakes while doing so. If a woman was reported missing, police often “placed the burden of proving her disappearance was not voluntary on the family.” Or, when a woman's body was found, it often took police hours to arrive at the scene, if they arrived at all, and they handled evidence without care or consideration. In this way, the view that women were at fault for any violence inflicted on them particularly hampered police investigations and thus perpetrators often did not meet legal consequences, entrenching impunity within Guatemalan society.

Within this context occurred the femicide of Claudina Isabel Velásquez Paiz, a 19-year-old law student. After attending school at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala City on April 12th, 2005, Claudina called her parents at 10 p.m. to inform them that she would be attending a party with her boyfriend, Pedro Moreno, until 12 a.m. During this party, she spoke with her parents and brother multiple times, yet after a final phone call at 11:45, Claudina's family members did not hear from her again. The Velasquez family called the National Civil Police who came to their home and informed the family that they would patrol the area of concern, yet could not file a missing person's report because 24 hours had to pass before doing so. Claudina's family decided to launch their own search with the aid of friends until 5 a.m., when they headed to the local police station to again inform officials that Claudina was missing. In a similar fashion, police told the family that it was too early to formally report Claudina's disappearance and it was not until 8:30 a.m. that officials finally did so. By this time, it was far

"The view that women were at fault for any violence inflicted on them hampered police investigations, thus... entrenching impunity within Guatemalan society."


7 Jones, 2009
too late. When an anonymous caller informed police that a woman’s body had been found, officials went to locate it and noticed that the victim had been shot in the forehead and sexually violated; upon confirmation by the family, it was clear that the woman was Claudina. Police only began investigating after her body was found, for prior to locating Claudina, they took no action aside from filing the missing person’s report on the morning of August 13.8

After 13 years, Claudina’s case has yet to be resolved by Guatemalan authorities. This lack of resolution led the Velasquez family to take their case9 to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights after exhausting all domestic remedies. The Commission then referred the case to the Inter-American Court and so arose the court case of Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala in 2015.

Analysis of the Inter-American Court’s commentary, along with petitions presented to the Inter-American Commission, further highlights the failure of the National Civil Police in Guatemala City to investigate Claudina’s disappearance. The Court determined that based on the information provided by Claudina’s parents to the police, officers were fully aware of the real and imminent risk that Claudina Velasquez could be sexually assaulted or killed.10 Indeed, the petitioners,11 including the Guatemalan Institute of Comparative Studies in Criminal Sciences and Claudina’s father, Jorge Velásquez, noted how police were informed that the mother of Claudina’s boyfriend “heard screams” when “she called Claudina’s cell phone.”12 According to the Court, in a context of increased violence against women, the State had the duty of strict due diligence when reports of missing women were made.13 However, police failed to fulfill their role in this positive obligation of the State that was especially crucial in a society with high rates of femicide, as they did not carry out an extensive search for Claudina immediately after she disappeared. Not only this, but police also did not gather a description of Claudina that could help identify her, did not visit any places where she might have been likely to be, and did not question anyone for information about her location.14 Though the PNC are known to have received an “inadequate governmental allocation of resources” which severely impacted the way they handled all cases of violence,15 their inaction in Claudina’s particular case is indicative of another causal factor that ran deep within the police’s mindset.

Indeed, supplementary details of the case make clear that the PNC’s investigative inactivity was majorly tied to gender stereotypes that officers possessed. For example, police “suggested that Claudina had run off with her boyfriend”16 when her parents reported her missing as a justification for why they did not feel the urge to order a search for her. These actions demonstrated the PNC’s belief in the stereotype of women as dependent individuals who leave behind their lives to follow a man. Additionally, it was later noted by the Inter-American Court that because Claudina’s disappearance had occurred at night when she was attending a party, police officers assumed she was likely a gang member or a prostitute and thus her disappearance did not deserve their attention in the form of a thorough search,17 which in itself reflects a problematic discrimination. PNC officials had jumped to the conclusion that Claudina was involved in promiscuous and illegal matters solely because she had been spending time in the company of friends at a social gathering in the way that many
women do. This assumption suggests that police do not consider partying is a socially acceptable act for women to partake in, and thus renders women inferior and subordinate to men who can enjoy partying without being stereotyped in a society where machismo is prominent.18

The lack of will to investigate Claudina’s disappearance remained throughout the examination of the crime scene and the gathering of information. In Guatemala, officers are expected by law to head to the scene of the crime and to secure it before searching for possible bullets, the victim’s personal belongings, or interviewing any possible witnesses present.19 Yet when Claudina’s body was discovered by police, they carried out very little analysis of the crime scene. Indeed, the PNC inspection was not conducted with the necessary rigor, as important details were missing about the state in which the body was found, and the condition of the clothing.”20 Though Claudina’s body was located near a house that also functioned as an informal restaurant, the PNC did not search this establishment for any possible blood stains or suspicious footprints. As for evidence that was seemingly taken into account, police made note of a package found next to Claudina that they assumed was a condom wrapper, yet ended up being part of a soup container. Additionally, though there were many people at the crime scene, there is no evidence that police attempted to collect official statements from witnesses who claimed to have seen someone in a white taxi drop Claudina’s body off. The PNC also failed to gather testimonies in the days following the discovery of Claudina’s body, failed to even question relatives until a month had passed since the murder,21 and failed to take the primary suspect who provided a voluntary statement “into custody even though…there was sufficient basis for issuing an arrest warrant.”22

These observations reveal an incredible lack of concern and motivation on the part of the PNC to solve the case it was presented with, which to date has still not occurred. The details also illuminate how police did the absolute minimum when tasked with the crucial job of determining who violated Claudina’s right to life.

Were the insufficient investigative techniques of the PNC tied to a lack of basic police training? In Guatemala at the beginning of the 21st century, most police officers were only required to receive three months of instruction that consisted of a lack of substantive lessons on how to simply gather evidence.23 Consideration of this fact may suggest that police did not thoroughly look into Claudina’s death because they did not know how to. Though this type of insubstantial training may certainly explain a number of the PNC’s problematic investigative decisions, it does not fully describe the issue.

Indeed, a major reason why PNC officials felt that they could conduct an investigation of the crime scene and of those involved in the crime in an incomprehensive way was because of prevailing gender stereotypes of women. According to Helen Mack, a human rights activist in Guatemala, the PNC’s tactics reflected “not only…organizational failures, but also … deeper and more complex [issues that were] rooted in culture”.24 Indeed, as cited in the Court’s commentary, when the PNC investigator from the Women’s Unit of the Criminal Investigation Service, Carolina Hernandez, went to visit the Velasquez family three days after Claudina’s death, she was asked why the crime scene and subsequent investigation had been treated and carried out so poorly. To this she responded without any consideration for the victim’s family and claimed that police once again assumed Claudina was a woman of ‘easy virtue,’ a prostitute or

18 Machismo culture imposes rigid gender roles on societal members and consists of the idea that men are superior to women, and that men are always stronger, tougher, and more independent (Newman).
20 Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 2015, 74,(Translated by author).
21 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
"To this, she responded without any consideration for the victim’s family and claimed that police once again assumed Claudina was a woman of ‘easy virtue,’ a prostitute or female gang member."

female gang member. Hernandez explained that this label was formed not only because of the aforementioned time when Claudina disappeared, but also because of the fact that the victim had been wearing a choker around her neck, a ring in her belly button, flip flops, and had red polish on her nails. These details were enough for officials to consider her death not worthy of investigation. In this way, the PNC imposed the stereotype of a prostitute or female gang member on Claudina based on the way she looked and dressed, which was seemingly not in accordance with the “ideal view of women.” Because Claudina’s accessories were reflective of chic young female fashion trends at the time, police were stereotyping against many women in Guatemalan society. This practice imposes a limit on women’s freedom of expression since it suggests that the clothing they choose to wear can earn them a certain disreputable identity if it is not in accordance with the PNC’s view of conservative female fashion. Additionally, continually using the excuse that Claudina was likely someone who sold her body for sex or who was involved with dangerous drug lords highlighted the PNC’s prevailing view that in general, women are killed because they place themselves in dangerous situations and are thus at fault. In this way, Claudina and other female victims are discredited in that their version of the story is hardly ever considered in attempts to achieve justice for them.

As shown, when dealing with the disappearance and murder of Claudina, the PNC made several decisions with prejudiced views of women in mind which led to the conclusion of the Inter-American Court in 2015. The Court explained that, though the State failed to formally make note of this in Claudina’s case reports, her murder was clearly an act of gender-based violence given the signs of possible rape, the wounds on her body, and the context of violence against women in Guatemala. The Court concluded that stereotypes emphasized by various agents throughout the treatment of Claudina Velasquez’s death constituted a form of discrimination and violence against women. In this way, the State had violated Claudina’s right to equality before the law and further entrenched impunity within Guatemalan society.

For this reason, the Court recommended that the State incorporate within the National...
"The Court recommended that the State incorporate within the curriculum a permanent education program on the need to eradicate gender stereotypes, in light of the international standards on these matters."

Education System curriculum a permanent education program on the need to eradicate gender stereotypes, in light of the international standards on these matters. Additionally, it recommended that Guatemala implement ongoing programs and courses for public officials of the National Civil Police regarding acts of murder of women. In particular, a specific combination of both of these recommendations—training for the PNC on how to avoid gender-stereotypes that influence the way it handles women’s disappearances and murders, as well as a permanent program to help eliminate female stereotypes in Guatemalan society—is arguably necessary to help potentially prevent deaths like Claudina’s or to help make arrests surrounding murders that resemble hers.

Are such recommendations currently being implemented in Guatemalan society? Since 2015, Guatemala has taken positive steps to meet the Courts’ concerns, yet has not addressed crucial deficiencies in the police system. According to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s or CEDAW’s review of the eighth and ninth periodic reports of Guatemala in 2016, the nation is making attempts to “ensure that women’s issues are a part of the public agenda, including stereotypes which stand in the way of women being truly able to enjoy their rights.” Yet training to help eliminate these stereotypes is predominantly provided only to those within the judicial system. According to the Advocates for Human Rights in 2017, there remains “widespread impunity for...perpetrators due to the failure of the government to adequately investigate” gender-based violence. Although the “police are the most easily accessible sector for most Guatemalan women,” officials do not “always perform their duty under the law.”

Thus, the National Civil Police remains in need of fundamental change. Closer examination of the police training system reveals necessary potential reforms that should be made to eliminate gender stereotyping amongst officers and to encourage more thorough investigations of female disappearances and murders. The International Crisis Group reports that police academy instructors are often “the least motivated and qualified...older officers waiting out retirement.” This finding reveals that recruits are being trained by the very elders who likely inculcated gender stereotypes and biases within them as they grew up. To help end this ongoing cycle, Guatemala must replace current police...
academy instructors with trained individuals who can learn to begin tearing down commonly held views of female victims. Police officers must not only be trained to deeply examine evidence pertaining to female disappearances and murders, but also specifically how to do so without allowing prejudice and gender stereotypes to influence their degree of involvement in a case. Furthermore, in order to make the police care more about female victims of violence and to end the practice of simply attributing stereotypes to women and dismissing their cases, training courses should emphasize to officers that the victim of a murder could easily be one of their family members. This strategy is crucial, for it appears that strongly held machismo views are extraordinarily weakened when the female victim is a relative.

What is more, following through with these recommendations is crucial for Guatemalan authorities because according to CEDAW's General Recommendation on Violence Against Women, “traditional attitudes by which women are regarded...as having stereotyped roles...contribute to the propagation and the depiction...of women as sexual objects...[which] contributes to gender-based violence.”40 Thus, when police are blinded by their stereotypical views of females, they encourage the spread of violence against women. This consequence reveals why it is all the more necessary for Guatemala to immediately begin the process of implementing the aforementioned police training reforms.

Though Claudina's death has not been brought to justice, the lack of thorough investigation of her disappearance and murder have been profoundly illustrative of the close connection between gender stereotypes that reflect indifference towards women and a failure to look into gender-based violence. Despite agreeing with several of the Inter-American Court and numerous NGO recommendations, Guatemala has yet to implement ongoing programs that train the PNC on how to avoid its biases against women. In a society where machismo pervades, change may be difficult to envision. Yet as around 15 women per week are either killed or disappear in Guatemala, it becomes clear how stereotyping that leads to indifference cannot continue. Based on the universal and fundamental principle of human rights for all, it is crucial for foreign NGOs to dedicate even more attention, in addition to their work within Guatemalan society, to helping eradicate the gender stereotypes that prevail amongst police. In particular, women's NGO members must continually show Guatemalan officers of all genders how evading gender stereotypes and dedicating attention to all cases of violence against women should be the standard rather than the exception. Though at first these attempts will likely face opposition and indifference out of the belief that foreigners are imposing their cultural views on Guatemalans, ongoing and permanent efforts can bring about greater tolerance in the future. Difficult as it is to acknowledge, without implementing some kind of change, Guatemalan women will continue to disappear and die in the way that Claudina did.

40 CEDAW, 2017
41 UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 2012

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The Oslo Peace Process
The Collapse of Coherence in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The Oslo Peace Process was the first direct, bilateral set of negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. Distinct from the multilateral Arab-Israeli track at the Madrid Conference, it represented a historic break-through between principal players. With the 1993 Declaration of Principles, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) officially recognized Israel's right to exist. Meanwhile, Israel recognized the PLO's right to self-government as an autonomous Palestinian people. While Oslo left many final-status issues such as the return of refugees, borders, settlements, and the status of Jerusalem undetermined, the exchange of land for peace, beginning with the 1994 withdrawal of troops from Gaza and Jericho, was promising. In theory, it would resolve the frustrating contest over territory ongoing since the expansion of Israel's borders in the 1967 Six Day War, while committing both sides to resolving outstanding issues through non-violent means. Despite this early promise, historians recount the Oslo Accords with an overwhelming sense of failure and defeat. Ultimately, rejectionists from both sides managed to undo the delicate trade-off of land for peace. The peace process was hijacked and used as a springboard for terrorism and fear.

Analysis of Oslo's failure typically begins with an analysis of its limited capacity to endure throughout the 1990s. Indeed, Oslo stretched beyond the 1993 Declaration of Principles, to the 1995 agreement at Taba, or Oslo II, the 1998 Wye River Memorandum, and finally the 1999 Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum. Oslo's experimentation with the incremental building of trust, its gradualism, was fatal as it "provide[d] opportunities for destroying, as much as constructing confidence." Leaders were forced back to Camp David in 2000 for an entirely new peace process.

2 Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 317.
as the momentum behind the interim agreement disintegrated. In fact, many argue that Oslo died as early as November, 1995, when Prime Minister and chief negotiator Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by right-wing activist Yigal Amir in Tel-Aviv. This notion that individuals hold instrumental value in history has been essential to contemporary reflections on Oslo. For instance, historian Avi Shlaim insists it was not the fall of Rabin, but the subsequent rise of Likud Leader Benjamin Netanyahu, which is to blame for the failure of the accords. He notes that Netanyahu was a vocal opponent of the peace process as a young Member of the Knesset in the opposition and later as Prime Minister. From 1996 to 2000, the period for which Oslo II had promised significant withdrawal from the West Bank, Prime Minister Netanyahu oversaw the building of a record number of settlements.

This paper rejects this individual-centered historiography. It must be noted that this approach was used by the signatories of the Oslo Accords themselves, who couched the process as a “peace of the brave.” Relying on the personal qualities of leaders, whether brave, or extremely fallible, to explain the strategic developments which occurred while they held office is a shallow approach which neglects the broader geo-political and national realities of the moment. In particular, the argument that an anemic leadership kept Oslo from surviving the turbulent resistance of the 1990s, ignores the compatibility of Oslo’s terms with the fractious reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is this mismatch which arguably gave rise to resistance in the first place. Further, the neat paradigm of two coherent adversaries promulgated by the Oslo Accords contradicted the internal battles gripping both the Israelis and Palestinians at the time. It was Oslo’s masking of the vital re-negotiations of sense and significance at the heart of Israeli and Palestinian society, which led to a debilitating distrust and stalling negotiations. It was not only the spoilers who explicitly intended to disrupt the peace process, but a poorly tailored peace process which was to blame. This can be evidenced by the fact that genuine non-violent resistance to Oslo emanated from the moderate core of both Palestine and Israel. It was not exclusively the product of those at the fringes of radical society. Prospect theory in international relations, which seeks to explain deviations in rational decision-making, says that peace agreements must be “sold” by the elite to the general public. Oslo was “sold” as a peace between two peoples rather than a peace between delegations of statesmen, which is precisely why the failure to understand and incorporate the national aspirations of these peoples into the terms of the agreement, also led to its failure overall.

Rather than fixating on the markers of its failure in the 1990s, this paper will explore the decision-making process which determined Oslo’s contents in the late 1980s. After this brief historical overview, it will proceed with a discussion of the internal disagreements facing both Israelis and Palestinians at the time. These clashes widened the gap between the official bi-lateral objectives of Oslo, and the vastly more complicated reality of each of the groups that was a party to it. First, the conflict over Israeli

"Further, the neat paradigm of two coherent adversaries promulgated by the Oslo Accords contradicted the internal battles gripping both the Israelis and Palestinians at the time."

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3 Ibid., 319.
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
ideology and identity, and the emergence of the “new historians” and other Zionist revisionists who questioned the Israeli project in the rare reprise of peace which followed the tumult of the Lebanon War. Second, the contest over political representation in the Palestinian Territories. By recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate political representative of the Palestinian people, Oslo manufactured an undemocratic consent about who ought to govern, and it enflamed existing tensions.

**Historical Overview**

The 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles was inspired by an earlier peace plan by David Shultz of the Reagan administration, devised during the early days of the first intifada, the Palestinian uprising which began in 1987. The intifada led to renewed international attention and regional peace initiatives. Between February and June 1988, Shultz mimicked Henry Kissinger's technique of “shuttle diplomacy” to promote his plan by travelling three times to the Middle East in five months. With the recent blunder of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon in mind, Shultz pursued a cautious U.S. Middle East policy which envisioned international diplomacy as a means to facilitate bi-lateral meetings to establish peaceful working relations and a government in the Palestinian territories. The goal was to keep the American mediators at a comfortable distance from the chaos of the Middle East. Ultimately, the plan was frustrated by the oncoming victory of George H. W Bush in the 1989 Presidential elections and the continued isolation of the PLO, which was in the early days of the intifada still reluctant to accept non-violent resistance.

This changed in November 1988, when in a speech to the General Assembly, Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO, finally met U.S. demands to renounce terrorism, and accept United Nations resolutions 242 and 338 which called for Arab-Israeli peace and mutual recognition. Arafat’s declaration re-invigorated hopes of a bi-lateral Shultz style plan, and it seemed truly genuine. Earlier in the year, Arafat had been denied entry to the United States to speak in New York. The Reagan administration proclaimed that Arafat “knows of, condones and lends support to acts of terrorism.”

10 Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 326.
13 Ibid.
led to the fall of Israel’s national unity government. The failure of the plan, combined with sharp U.S.-Israeli exchanges over Israeli settlement-building in the Occupied Territories, strained relations between Bush and Shamir.

Yet again, the ambitious land-for-peace style deal was put on hold in favor of a traditional multi-lateral track. The United States proceeded with the October 30, 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. Co-chaired by President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, the conference was attended by Israeli, Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese delegations. It was the first time all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict gathered to hold direct negotiations. Importantly, the Palestinian team was part of a joint Jordanian delegation which expressly excluded the PLO. Exiled in Tunis since their expulsion from Southern Lebanon in 1982, the PLO was not considered the prevailing voice of the Palestinians. Furthermore, Madrid was curated by America’s NATO Gulf War coalition which had just succeeded in driving Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. The PLO was a vocal supporter of Hussein and the Ba’ath Party in Iraq, and was therefore unwelcome.

Shimon Peres, Israel’s Foreign Affairs Minister described multi-lateral negotiations according to the “the bicycle principle ... when one pedal moves the other moves by itself.”

The problem with Madrid was that the bicycle pedal was stuck. Israel and the U.S. focused on the Syria track to resolve missile threats in the Golan Heights but Hafez Al-Assad of the Syrian Ba’ath party was an incredibly difficult negotiator. Al-Assad was unwilling to make compromises. As the squabbles of the Arab world slowed Madrid down to a halt, Yossi Bellin and Shimon Peres began to think of an alternative strategy, back to the original essence of the Shamir and the Shultz plans.

The stalemate in the Madrid talks ultimately led to the opening of the Oslo back channel and secret talks, held over an eight month period in 1993 in Oslo, Norway. Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister Johan Joergen Holst and Social Scientist Terge Rod Larsen played hosts and were able to provide an easy and honest connection between Israel and the PLO. The reason for the ease of the secret negotiations and the frankness of talks between the three partners was that a back-channel had actually started as early as 1979, when Yasser Arafat requested a direct line to the Israeli government through the Norwegian government. Arafat’s request came after the revelation that the Norwegians were selling oil to the Israelis during the international shortage which followed the collapse of the Iranian monarchy and the Islamic Revolution. Norway was situated as a peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon around PLO operatives, and this commercial decision compromised Norwegian impartiality. Norway, the PLO and Israel negotiated this back-channel to make up for it. Peres and Rabin were also inclined to give greater attention to Oslo with the growing threat of Hamas and Islamic jihad in occupied territories. This allowed the West to perceive Arafat as less of a frightening figure and it refocused them on his recent declarations of peace in New York. Furthermore, by June 1990, according to Benny Morris, “the Intifada seemed to have lost direction. A symptom of the PLO’s frustration was the great increase in the killing of suspected collaborators.” Between 1988 and 1992, intra-Palestinian violence and the execution of suspected collaborators claimed the lives of nearly 1,000 people. An assessment by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Director of Military Intelligence of the time stated that Arafat’s dire situation made him “the most convenient interlocutor for Israel at that particular juncture.”

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22 Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 314.
24 Ibid., 59.
25 Ibid., 60.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 63.
30 Ibid., 613.
Oslo's primary significance was the promotion of a formula of land for peace and the mutual recognition of both sides. Land for peace is a legal interpretation of UN Resolution 242. It affirms that peace should include the application of two principles: withdrawal of Israeli forces (giving up land) and termination of all claims or states of belligerency (making peace). In addition, Oslo essentially provided the constitution for a de facto government in the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian Authority would be self-governing in terms of raising taxes and spending revenues on portfolios like health, police, and social welfare. Palestinian jurisdiction for the interim agreement was split into Area A, where it maintained full control; Area B where Palestinian civilian control was combined with Israeli security control; and finally Area C with full Israeli security and civil control. After a five-year interim period, the hope was that negotiators would move on to a permanent settlement which addressed the tricky details including Areas B and C.

This proved very difficult. While there was one high-level committee for figures like Abbas and Peres, a “nuts and bolts” committee met at the Red Sea resort of Taba regularly. Negotiations on the transfer of security authority to a growing Palestinian police force were particularly challenging. Underlying the “labyrinth,” negotiations at Taba in 1995 was a basic conceptual divide. The Israeli representatives wanted a gradual and strictly limited transfer of power to Palestinian police to maintain overall responsibility for security, while Palestinians wanted an early and complete transfer of power to...lay the foundations for an independent state. Furthermore, seeds of mistrust on security matters were sown by disruptive resistance and violence from both sides. Hamas set out to embarrass Arafat and delegitimize non-violent resistance. The day before the Declaration of Principles was signed, Hamas killed three Israeli soldiers in Gaza. The day afterwards, a suicide bomber self-exploded in a police station. Between 1993 and 1996 a total of 300 Israelis were killed in such attacks. The Israeli consciousness was particularly wounded by the 1994 Dizengoff bus attack which killed 13. Many pondered the fact that the No.5 bus targeted by Hamas, ran to a prosperous area of north Tel Aviv which was home to many supporters of the Labor Government. Palestinian terrorism was becoming more severe, uncontrollable

34 Ibid.
36 Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 318.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 322.
and chaotic. This escalation made the essential cause of violence, calls to justice against the occupation, more difficult to sympathize with, even for left-wing Israelis.

Likewise, the 1994 Hebron massacre killing 29 Palestinian worshippers in the Mosque of Ibrahim during the holy month of Ramadan by Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli settler and member of the far-right Kach movement, hardened the Palestinians. UN Resolution 904 condemned the incident and expressed shock and grave concern about how a lack of security control for the Palestinian people would influence the peace process.39 The Israeli Knesset consequently banned the Kach party from politics.

The Hebron attack, similarly to the Dizengoff attack, irreparably damaged trust. Dizengoff confirmed Israelis’ fears about negotiating with “terrorists.” Even though PLO and Hamas commands were separate, Israeli media painted all “Palestinians” as one. Meanwhile, the Hebron attack by a settler on a Mosque, spoke to the broader challenges posed by increasing numbers of settlements to the survival of the Oslo accords. By-pass roads violently cut through land; and walls erected to separate communities claimed additional land.40 Settlements did not contravene the terms of the Oslo interim agreement, but many Palestinians argued that the interim arrangement had enabled them. The settlements were a symbol of the occupation, a source of daily friction, and a “constant reminder of the danger to the territorial contiguity of their future state.”41

As the Oslo interim agreement inched closer to a final-status negotiation, the violence and tension between the Israelis and Palestinians only increased. For example, Oslo II, which was signed on the 28th of September, 1995 was substantively insignificant. Oslo II extended on the principle of Palestinian authority explained in Oslo I by providing elections to a Palestinian council, permitting the transfer of legislative authority to this council, and providing for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from more Palestinian urban centers.42 However, Oslo II was incredibly significant in the reaction it incited. The day the Knesset endorsed the agreement, demonstrators gathered in Zion square in Jerusalem. Netanyahu, the leader of the Likud, “was on the grandstand while demonstrators displayed an effigy of Rabin in an SS uniform.”43 A month later, Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir, a religious-nationalist. After the death of Yitzhak Rabin, settlement activity continued under several prime ministers, Labor as well as Likud.44

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Importantly, Oslo II was endorsed by the Knesset by a majority of just one vote. Oslo was not only doomed by a growing distrust between Israelis and Palestinians, but rather by its neglect of the divisions in internal politics, and the slim margins of consensus on both sides. Shimon Peres followed Rabin down the “pot-holed road to peace” but

42 Ibid., 47.
43 Ibid., 48.
44 Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 320.
his efforts ended with his electoral defeat in May 1996.45 Rabin’s successor, Ehud Barak, struggled with providing staunch leadership on the peace process and let his hand slide on settlements. The same was true of Ariel Sharon who succeeded him. Ironically, when Netanyahu came to power, intense American pressure actually compelled him to concede territory to the PA on two occasions, the Hebron Protocol of January 15th, 1997, and the Wye River Plantation Memorandum of October 23rd, 1998. The Likud government committed to withdrawing from a further 13% of the West Bank in three stages over a period of three months.46 However, a revolt in Netanyahu’s own ultra-nationalist and religious coalition brought down the government after just one settlement withdrawal. The fall of the coalition government was in some way inevitable because of the basic contradiction between its declared policy of striving for peace with the Arab world and its ideological makeup, which militated against trading land for peace in favor of a purely Jewish state.47 Meanwhile, on the other side of the green line, the bloody tug of war for legitimate rule over the Palestinian people continued to be fought between Hamas and the PLO.

The Oslo peace process did not provide an ideology or symbol of nationhood to match its policy of peace with the Palestinians.48 In the absence of a common narrative, “Jewish Israel” and “democratic Israel” re-engaged in an identity battle, each in an effort to cast their narrative as the mainstream. This identity struggle was exacerbated by the emergence of the “new historians,” who presented radically new national facts and modes of historical interpretation.49 Coined by author Benny Morris, “new historians,” describes a group of young Israeli writers recasting the standard Zionist narrative. Morris, along with Shlaim and several others, told a history of Israel’s triumphs

The end of the Cold War and the Gulf War represented seismic shocks to the international system which at the time seemed to reduce the risks of seeking peace and increasing the incentives to take such risks for both the Israelis and Palestinians. Indeed, the geopolitical arena had changed, shaping a “new world order,” more impartial to the conflict and willing to provide the time and resources to broker a peace.48 Moscow’s embrace of “new thinking” in foreign policy, and coalition making based on a united front for justice rather than bipolar Cold War competition, gave negotiators the hope that this Middle East peace — free of Soviet arms deals, proxy wars, or covert support to terrorist organizations like the PFLP — would be different. The purpose of the bi-lateral meetings in Norway was in a way to drown out the noise of the international community, now supposedly at peace with itself, to leave the Israelis and Palestinians to their own devices. While recent developments may have been conducive to global peace, this model neglected the internal divisions which had been sown in Israeli and Palestinian society. These will be explored in the coming two sections. They were the greatest barriers to building trust, and finding peace.

Israel: Contested Identity

Yaron Ezrahi writes in his book Rubber Bullets about the understudied effect of the intifada on Israeli society. The intifada ushered a transformation in the way Israelis envisioned their relationship with the Palestinians. It led many to acknowledge the quest for Palestinian national self-determination for the first time ever and changed Israel from a warrior to a peace-making nation. To Ezrahi, nothing symbolized this cultural shift better than the army’s use of rubber bullets to confront stone-throwing Palestinians during the second intifada.50 He credits democratic liberalism, which flourished as Israel inched further away from the intense military years of the Arab-Israeli wars of the 1960s and 1970s. Why was Israel unable to sustain a peace-making policy orientation after Rabin’s death and throughout the Oslo peace process? One simple explanation is the disruptive terrorist attacks discussed above. The attacks hardened both sides and sowed distrust. However, if Ezrahi’s thesis about liberal democracy is true, the return to warrior Israel is also about the defeat of an individualist and free-thinking identity in favor of a collectivist nationalist one.

The Oslo peace process did not provide an ideology or symbol of nationhood to match its policy of peace with the Palestinians.51 In the absence of a common narrative, “Jewish Israel” and “democratic Israel” re-engaged in an identity battle, each in an effort to cast their narrative as the mainstream. This identity struggle was exacerbated by the emergence of the “new historians,” who presented radically new national facts and modes of historical interpretation.52 Coined by author Benny Morris, “new historians,” describes a group of young Israeli writers recasting the standard Zionist narrative. Morris, along with Shlaim and several others, told a history of Israel’s triumphs

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
49 Yaron Ezrahi, Rubber Bullets: Power and Conscience in Modern Israel (New York: Straus & Giroux, 1997), 151.
that for the first time, did not hide a Palestinian history living by its side. In doing so, they challenged the foundational beliefs that Israelis held as self-evident. For decades, Israelis both politically left and right were raised on a celebratory version of their history — a story of the heroic return to Zion and the resettlement of the desolate Jewish homeland. Morris and his colleagues shifted the focus of historical inquiry away from the wonder of Jewish national rebirth to that of Palestinian suffering. This historical interjection essentially raised the stakes over narrative control, and furthered societal divisions. Israelis squabbled over the legitimacy of activist organizations like “Peace Now,” and the appropriateness of history school books and the national curriculum. The long-term structural forces of demography in the country, namely the disproportionately high growth rate of the ultraorthodox and Religious-Zionist segments of the population and their membership in majority coalitions in government, probably led to the victory of collectivist, warrior Israel over time. More importantly for this discussion, however, Israelis emerged as a disorganized unit with no common conception of their national aspirations. This hurt Oslo’s chances. The identity crisis proved debilitating.

It is important not to present this renegotiation of Israeli identity as purely factional, and especially not to present it as a conflict between secular and religious Israelis. Monumental questions about Israel, its place relative to Palestine, and its position in the Middle East, were prevalent amongst individual Israelis and engaged with in different ways. This is why the narrative of extremists dismantling peace is too simple.

Considering Israeli politicians’ views on the intervention in Lebanon helps to illustrate this point about how individuals, including political leaders, engage with contested ideologies. Ariel Sharon came to office in 2001 from a military background as former Minister of the IDF. In 1983, the Israeli Kahan Commission was appointed to investigate the Sabra and Shatila massacre committed in a Palestinian refugee camp during Israel’s intervention in the Lebanese civil war. The Commission found that Israeli military personnel, aware that a massacre was in progress, failed to stop it, and that Ariel Sharon bore personal responsibility for the bloodshed. Amos Oz speaks to this collective guilt, and later on selective memory of trauma, in The Slopes of Lebanon, a book about memory and historiography in Israel. Oz argues that Israelis cannot point to Menachem Begin, or Sharon who carried out his orders during the Lebanese War only. He insists, “this war was a war of the people.” He then asks who the people actually were. For example, the Labor party and the centrist Shinui party (Democratic Party for Change), either voted with the government or abstained in the vote of no confidence when the war broke out. Meanwhile, “M. K. Imri Ron, of the left-wing Mapam, was photographed in his army uniform and his officer’s insignia, calling upon his party to support the war and not to incense the people.” Labour party leader Yitzhak Rabin, who would be Oslo’s peace man, recommended “tightening the siege on Beirut.”

Final-status negotiations were consistently delayed in the context of the Oslo Accords, because they would force such moderates to engage with their contradictions. Importantly, it would also warrant that political leaders take a decisive position in the fight between the liberal and conservative conceptions of Israel. The argument which insists that the failure of Oslo was as a result of the failure of leadership in the face of resistance, disregards what was a complex reality for leaders who had to balance their personal political ideology, that of their party, and their prospects of political success. To win elections, politicians must align their platforms with popular sentiments. Final-status negotiations which would deal with the return of refugees, or indeed the simple recognition of the total number Palestinians living in Israel as citizens, posed a major dilemma to both the identity calculus and the political calculus. How could Israel remain both a Jewish and democratic state if the majority was Arab? This was perhaps the most important final-status question. As the internal struggle over identity persisted, Israelis and their leaders never emerged united to answer such difficult final-status questions.

52 Ibid., 246.
55 Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 411.
56 Amos Oz, The Slopes of Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers, Ltd., 1987), 40.
57 Ibid., 41.
58 Ibid., 42.
Palestine: Contested Leadership

The intifada was a mass uprising of Palestinians through mostly nonviolent means like boycotts and demonstrations.\textsuperscript{61} The PLO’s willingness to engage in the Oslo peace process with the intifada raging in the background fueled disenchantment and the view that Arafat and his henchmen were collaborators of Israel.\textsuperscript{62} Many Palestinians did not consider the international arena, no matter the promises of post-Cold War peace, an even playing field in which to seek a just end to the occupation. Where identity and ideology were contested on the Israeli side, the Palestinians were uneasy with the legitimacy Oslo gave to the PLO as their rightful leaders.

Furthermore, the loss of life and the despair that ensued after the popular resistance movement fell apart, led many to the Islamic militant group, Hamas, which grew rapidly in its pledge to Palestinian liberation through “sacrifice, blood and jihad.”\textsuperscript{63} Hamas of course became a significant spoiler of the frail pacifism which held Oslo together. Again, a recasting of “extremism” is required in this discussion in order to arrive at a better understanding of the essential internal divisions gripping the Palestinians. Criticisms of the accords were not exclusive to the periphery of Palestinian society, and indeed came from its very center, notably, from poet Mahmoud Darwish, who had written the 1988 PLO Charter which accompanied Arafat’s renunciation of violence at the United Nations, and academic Edward Said.\textsuperscript{64}

In the London Review of Books the morning after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, Said wrote about his many apprehensions with the deal. He saw in the PLO another corrupt Arab government, with injustices emanating from the considerable divide between the elite and the people, where Palestinians themselves were but “guests,” and never key partners in governance.\textsuperscript{65} He considered the gains of the intifada squandered by the PLO’s unwillingness to seek multiple alternatives in negotiations. This demonstrated that prospect theory – the “selling” of peace accords from the elite negotiators to the people – clearly failed. Edward Said provides an important reflection on violent terrorism, arguing that the terms of the accord and the framing of the process by the PLO drove people to violent extremism by renouncing their right to popular resistance.\textsuperscript{66} Though Hamas and Professor Edward Said stood at wildly different junctures in the world, it was the same point about the strait jacket of international diplomacy and the assignment of the PLO as the ultimate leaders by foreigners without the consent of the people, which both Hamas and Said questioned.

By no means was Said the singular voice of moderate resistance, nor should his particular criticisms be taken as the ultimate reasons for why the Oslo Accords failed. Nonetheless, his challenge to the idea of the PLO’s unquestioned predominance speak to the problem with Oslo’s negligence of Palestine’s long history of contested leadership, and indeed it’s constant negotiation between violent and

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\textsuperscript{61} Lawrence Freedman, \textit{A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East} (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), 322.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
non-violent resistance. Like its negligence of the Israeli contest over identity, this proved fatal.

The original Arab Nationalist Movement of George Habbash, was an umbrella organization which branched off into several other Palestinian groups like the PLO and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) during the 1970s. Intense rivalries divided these factions as they sought influence. The PLO including Arafat was expelled from Beirut to Tunis by the South Lebanon Army and the Christian Phalange following the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel, not to mention its earlier expulsion from Jordan following Black September in 1978. Distant from the active arena of warfare, and eager to gain a push towards legitimacy by the international community, the PLO developed an argument for non-violent resistance. Meanwhile, the PFLP which represented a secular socialist resistance, stood by its legacy of airplane hijackings and car bombs.

The first Intifada took a “new mythological character embodied in the ‘stone child’ or stone-throwing youth, which assumed the role of the fedayee who had been worn out by his conflict abroad.” This was of great help to the PLO, as the international and domestic trends favored the strategy of non-violence it had adopted by necessity. While this convenient alignment of values empowered the PLO at the moment, doubts about their commitment to full and meaningful justice for all Palestinians, including those displaced, led many to doubt the PLO’s intentions and the power given to them through Oslo’s interim governing arrangement. As Said and Darwish warned, this temporary structure imparted a long-term reality. The lethargy of the PLO and its elite organization, combined with a fervor for resistance that was ignored, led to a splintering of leadership between violent and non-violent. Palestine became “fragmented between two internal entities, having transformed the confrontation with the enemy into a confrontation within [itself].” As the spoilers of peace continued on the other side of the green line, and anger from Palestinians in the ever shrinking green line grew, the Palestinian leadership, like the Israeli, never meaningfully moved forward towards final-status negotiations.

Conclusion

The understanding of states as cohesive units in international affairs with secure leaders at their helm cannot be assumed in a situation where the Israelis are constantly re-negotiating their identity and the Palestinians do not know who is in charge. The two-state solution did not necessarily die because Netanyahu and successive Israeli governments were determined to kill it, and it was not because Palestinians allowed terrorism to take place. The moral courage of individuals is not what should be in question, but rather the compatibility of an agreement with the

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69 Ibid., 90
aspirations of the people. In such a theater of pain and distrust, both the policy solution, and the mode of its communication to the public are equally important. With no grasp of the internal battles which were re-negotiating national aspirations, Oslo missed the mark. Whether willful, or completely unintentional, “ignorance of narratives on both sides lead to a situation in which both sides including their respective leaders were unaware of the red lines and domestic constraints limiting the other.”

This discussion cannot be treated as a cultural after thought. Rather than theorize about what Oslo’s failure means, understanding the meaningful internal barriers to trust which leads to its downfall is critical if there is ever to be a revival of the peace process which fully acknowledges Palestinians and Israelis with full respect.

71 Ibid.

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Money is the lubricant to any political or military machine, and effective fundraising is integral to an organization’s ability to operate. This is particularly true for sub-state armed groups, who are sometimes forced to find creative sources of funding. For sub-state groups that are militarized, weapons, recruitment, and military training inherently enlarge the organization’s budget. Money is the so-called ‘lifeblood’ for armed non-state actors and “significant influence often accrues to individuals who prove to be particularly talented at obtaining financial resources”. As with any market, options are varied and sources of income are vast—so, given the plethora of options, why do some actors pick certain paths while others choose differently? Are all ‘menus’ the same, or do available choices vary from group to group? What causes this variance? If different actors possess different options, are these options pre-determined by geographic or political factors, or are they reflections of authentic choice? Assuming choice is present, what do organizations take into consideration, and how might the diversity of their funding reflect on the lifespan of the group?

Understanding the diversity of funding for armed non-state actors can help states (or other non-state actors) develop policies and improve strategies in dealing with sub-state militant groups—by way of negotiations, sanctions against host states and industries, or armed engagement. Conflict between states and non-state actors, as well as between non-state actors themselves, is becoming increasingly frequent. Irregular warfare—“conflicts that involve non-state armed groups”—is to become the primary mode of fighting in the future, with urban areas

In littoral zones as the main battlegrounds. The increasing relevance of armed non-state actors in contemporary and future conflict makes the study of their infrastructures particularly important in the field of political science, conflict studies, and international relations.

Though academic work on armed non-state actor, financing is available, the data is dispersed across qualitative literature, and is often broad, therefore overlooking the uniqueness of and variance among organizations. This study provides insight into the funding of armed non-state actors across geography and ideology, and inspects the factors that contribute to the diversification of their financial portfolios. It further evaluates the funding paths of militant organizations, as facilitated by opportunity or carved out deliberately to build intricate business networks.

In order to effectively dissect the financial portfolio diversity of armed non-state actors, I define key terms and paradigms relevant to the framework of the study. I then establish a hypothesis and theory as to why, where, and how militant organizations are funded and what factors are thought to play the greatest role in influencing a group’s diversity. Following the postulations will be a thorough breakdown of relevant variables: ‘Sources of Funding’ and ‘Actors’. Methodology will be addressed, including an explanation of the multi-variable scale used to create a ‘Diversity Score’ to measure inter-group variation. I evaluate several case studies—some to demonstrate key themes in organization funding diversity, others to highlight outliers and raise important questions. Organizations used for elaboration are chosen from the low, middle, and high regions of financial portfolio diversity. Finally, I formulate conclusions, speculate on policy implications, and propose extensions for further research on the topic. I address the influence on funding diversity in regards to natural resources, varied fundraising, and external support; I evaluate trends, anomalies, and other impacting circumstances in the context of potential policy decision in a world where armed non-state actors are prevalent and increasingly influence the arena of international relations.

"The pursuit of power is a principal driver for ANSAs, though this does not necessarily mean absolute or total power."

Definitions and Parameters

Armed non-state actors, henceforth referenced by their acronym ‘ANSAs’, are “any identifiable group that uses armed methods, and is not within the formal structure of a recognized state”. The pursuit of power is a principal driver for ANSAs, though this does not necessarily mean absolute or total power. These groups can act as both spoilers and partners, inasmuch that they are not inherently opposed to a peaceful solution to conflict. While ‘spoilers’ see peace as a threat to their power, ‘partners’ typically have political goals that can be achieved through negotiation. For the latter in particular, violence is a means of achieving political goals, but is not necessarily the “strategy of choice”: “An ANSA uses violence as a means—though not necessarily the exclusive or primary means—to contest...”

4  Ibid., 24–25; 103.
7  Ibid., 4.
political power with governments, foreign powers, and/or other non-state actors.” Tradition-
ally, ANSAs that resort to violence in order to achieve political goals are dubbed ‘terrorist or-
ganizations’ by state governments and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs). Though
this term has its utility, it can be limiting and highly politicized, regardless of its circumstan-
tial accuracy. Many terrorist organizations are ‘spoilers’ in that their ideologies are inherently
incompatible with the worldview of most mod-
ern states, and peaceful negotiation is therefore
limited or impossible as the actor may not seek it as an end-goal. However, many modern
groups who are consid-
ered to be terrorist orga-
nizations by the United
States and European
Union have separatist,
nationalistic, and po-
litical goals that, in
theory, can be achieved
through negotiated set-
tlement. Though cliché,
the adage ‘one man’s
terrorist is another
man’s freedom fighter’
is important to keep in
mind when striving for
academic objectivity. In
this sense, ‘terrorist’ is
both broad and subjec-
tive, therefore this study
will avoid the classification outside of contex-
tualizing the status of ANSAs (as they are per-
ceived) in relation to other non-state actors or
states.

Sociologist and political economist Max
Weber notes that a state “(successfully) claims
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
force within a given territory”, while a non-state
conversely does not control these institutions.”
The state remains the ‘sole source’ of the ‘right’
to use force, though may choose to delegate this
‘right’ to other organizations for political rea-
sons. “Consistent with this conceptualization,
state actor… refers to the group or groups that
control the amalgam of power institutions…”
Organizational structure is necessary to define
an ANSA, whether that structure be ‘decentral-
ized networks’ or ‘centralized hierarchies’. Shifts
to ‘lone wolf’ operators who work under the
banner of an ANSA call into question the ne-
cessity of a “basic command structure”. How-

"However, many
modern groups who are
considered to be terrorist
organizations by the United
States and European
Union have separatist,
nationalistic, and political
goals that, in theory,
can be achieved through
negotiated settlement."

8  Ibid., 11.
9  Ibid., 9. [See: Weber 1946].
10  Ibid.
11  Ibid., 10.
and many more, pledged their allegiance to the same mother organization. In such cases, though the umbrella organization may be uniform, and the fundamental goals may be shared, the foundational chains of command and the means or resources by which goals are achieved can vastly differ. Thus, groups of this nature (of which several are included in this study), will be analyzed separately—the links in ideology and funding will be recognized, but the unique nature of each organization will also be independently evaluated.

In understanding the organization of a group, it is similarly important to distinguish between group types: planned groups and emergent groups.

A planned group is one deliberately formed by its members or an external authority and includes traditional, vertically-structured organizations in which the hierarchical relationships among the constituent elements are formally or institutionally ordered, as well as horizontal networks in which autonomous cells loosely synchronize their actions with other cells on a more or less ad hoc basis. An emergent group, on the other hand, is a collection of individuals who come together spontaneously to act without prior arrangement. In this respect, then, an ANSA should be regarded as a planned as opposed to an emergent group. A rioting crowd is not an ANSA, though members of an ANSA may participate in or, indeed, actively encourage the emergence of such a violent gathering.13

Understanding the distinction between ‘planned’ and ‘emergent’ groups is essential when considering the changing trends of warfare, and is necessary to realizing the nuance of the environments in which many ANSAs operate. This is relevant to both warfare and to this study of determining whether distinctive groups contribute differently to the financial viability of the militant organizations.14

**Hypotheses and Theory**

There are many elements to consider in analyzing the relationship between ANSAs and their sources of funding. Organizations may simply pursue sources most readily available to them, geographically or politically, and though some sources are more accessible than others, some also may be converse to the group’s goals. Where do ANSAs draw the line in deciding when the cost of pursuing a source of funding outweighs the benefit? If money allows for operation, and operation furthers ideological or political goals, does the pursuit of secure, diverse funding become the true raison d’être of every successful armed non-state actor? In asking these questions, I expect the following:

Natural resources are an intuitively lucrative source of income. Those like fossil fuels, which are in ample supply and high demand, only reinforce this notion of profitability. Controlling large amounts of territory also presents opportunities for fundraising. Not only does land provide organizations with more natural resources, it also encompasses populations from whom money can be extracted, by means of taxation or otherwise.15 While there are increased costs associated with the control of larger amounts of geographical territory, the benefits of access to funds likely outweigh those costs. It is expected that ANSAs who control expansive, populated, resource-rich territory will be satisfied with fewer, but more lucrative and reliable, sources of income, and therefore will not diversify their funding. Conversely, militant organizations without access to such geographic advantages will be inclined to diversify portfolios of funding to compensate for the lack of secure foundations associated with territorial control.

**Hypothesis 1**: Geographic considerations (namely access to natural, in-demand, lucrative resources) will have notable effect on the diversity of a group's funding. Specifically, among ANSAs, the more access to natural resources and territorial control, the less diversely-funded a group will be.

External support, like natural resources, is a highly lucrative source of income. Unlike natural

13 Moore, “Understanding Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs),” 8–9.
resources, outside patronage is not geographically limited and is (potentially) inexhaustible. Different actors fund ANSAs for different reasons. States most often fund out of political consideration. Though they seek alignment with their ideological or religious principles, political goals are usually the primary forethought. External funding also comes in the form of non-state donors, such as wealthy individuals and organizations. 16 Ideological, religious, and political considerations all contribute to the external sponsorship of organizations, and so ANSAs with more favorable or popular causes will receive stronger outside financial support. Furthermore, the more external support a militant group receives, the less motivated they will be to procure funds elsewhere, thereby limiting their source diversity. On the contrary, ANSAs who do not receive notable external support will be more diversified in order to compensate for the lack of substantial funding that comes with outside money.

Hypothesis 2: Ideological, religious and political alignments will have notable effect on the diversity of a group’s funding. Specifically, ANSAs that are more ‘aligned’, or champion more popular causes, will have greater access to outside funding and therefore be less diverse in their portfolio.

Methodology

The actors analyzed in this study were chosen with several considerations in mind, namely access to information. Due to the policy implications that accompany a thorough understanding of ANSA funding sources, organizations benefit from a lack of transparency and thus have motive to hide their monetary networks. The data regarding the finances of militant organizations is either scarce, classified, or nonexistent, thus discouraging the use of random sampling. It was ultimately decided that handpicked ANSAs, representative of many group types and with available data, was the more promising method, as the availability of information regarding financial diversity was not guaranteed and thus bore little fruit in terms of research potential. Along with more plentiful resources of information, the ANSAs chosen are highly relevant to contemporary conflict policy, and are representative of a spectrum of active or recently disbanded groups with global influence, political aspirations, and popular support. They range from separatist groups with ambitions of independent statehood, to groups that accept power-sharing agreements within existing states, to groups who lack significant political aspiration but who have powerful ideological motivations. A variety of factors can be used to compare and contrast these groups: religion, ideology, political aims, geography, network structure, relationships with host states, and competition with other ANSAs.

As precise figures can be hard to find, this study uses ranges and estimates to evaluate the sums of capital procured by ANSAs. In some cases, no figures were available—only the emphasis of how a group’s funding was diverse. Using a multitude of sources, this study categorizes Primary Funding Sources, Secondary Funding Sources, and Partial Funding Sources. The scarce statistics disallow each category to have a specific range of values or percentages. Rather, an assessment is made based on the reliance each group has on that particular source of funding and the general extent to which they use it to sustain operations. While one group may procure hundreds of millions of dollars from one source, another may acquire a fraction of that and still claim it as a primary source of funding; this is true across variables and within the same source. This study addresses figures and comparisons of cash-flow qualitatively, and focuses on the diversity of funding, rather than the amounts fundraised.

For this study, thirteen ANSAs were chosen and evaluated on their relationship with seven different sources of income. A ‘Diversity Score’ was created for each ANSA, based on the level at which that organization engaged in activity associated with the source of funding. The

"As an example, facilitating the passage of drugs by one group does not compare to the full-scale cultivation and export of narcotics undertaken by another (neither in scale, practice, or importance to the group). Equating the two lacks the nuance necessary to express the diversity among groups."

Variables of Diversity: Sources of Funding

Three categories cover what many consider to be 'natural resources'. With little exception, these categories are directly tied to the geography in which the group operates. For decades, academics have studied the relationship between natural resources and conflict, giving particular interest to the effect of natural resources on the onset and prolongation of civil war.\(^{17}\) To some extent, given the environmental conditions (land, soil, water) related to the production process, narcotics production can act as a natural resource for many ANSAs. This need not be the case exclusively however, in that not all natural resources are profited from by means of production or extraction—some are lucrative by means of transport or facilitation alone. However, in this event, they are not a natural resource as their ties to geography and land control are less concrete.

Fossil Fuels principally refers to oil and gas, but coal, charcoal, and other non-renewables fall

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into this category. Like fossil fuels, Conflict Minerals and Other Natural Resources have much to do with geography and the extent of territory an organization controls or, at the very least, can influence. In traditional literature on the subject, fossil fuels (such as oil, gas, coal), conflict minerals (such as diamonds, rubies, tungsten), and other natural resources (such as timber and lucrative non-narcotic crops) are analyzed under the same umbrella of study. While this report does not contest such a method of analysis, it goes further by both circumstantially including Narco-Trafficking in the ‘Natural Resource’ paradigm, and by separating ‘Fossil Fuels’ from ‘Conflict Minerals and Other Natural Resources’ and from ‘Narco-Trafficking’. This achieves a holistic view of geographically-tied funding sources and adds a more nuanced view of their uniqueness. Studies have shown an overwhelming linkage between natural resources and conflict longevity, as well as it being an impetus for conflict. This is attributed to political instability and separatist inclinations with plentiful evidence that ties together economics and funding for ANSAs. Under this lens, these variations of natural resource are essential to the dissection of funding sources for ANSAs, as they are inexorably linked to the conflicts in which they engage.

Similar links to conflict outbreak and sustainability exist regarding ‘Narco-Trafficking’. Like fossil fuels and conflict minerals, much research has been done regarding the use of narco-trafficking as a means of financial sustenance for ANSAs. Clashes over growing territory can lead to armed conflict, and the funds from trafficking can affect the longevity and intensity of this conflict—providing salaries, weapons, and methods of bureaucratic subversion. While all funds share the ability to perpetuate conflict, notable distinctions exist between the trade of illicit drugs and other natural resources. Globally, states seek to import products—fossil fuels, minerals, gems, precious metals—that are highly sought after and, more importantly, considered legitimate market items. Although verifying the source of these commodities is a challenge in its own right, it is different than narcotics that are indiscriminately considered to be contraband. This becomes significant

"Although verifying the source of these commodities is a challenge in its own right, it is different than narcotics that are indiscriminately considered to be contraband."

when considering the networks that must develop so narco-traffickers can profit from their product, from its production to its sale. This product is most often cocaine or marijuana in Latin America, whereas in the Middle East and Asia it takes the form of hashish and opium, respectively. While some oversee the process from start to finish, others limit their involvement for logistic or ideological reasons.

The universal illegality of drugs presents a unique set of challenges for those seeking to profit from them. Since their contraband status makes them the popular target of state agencies, profits are more likely to be lost due to confiscation, and extra efforts must be made in production and transportation. However, the illegal nature of drugs makes them highly lucrative: pound for pound, illicit drugs are among the most expensive products on the market, with a steady international demand. Narco-trafficking is among the greatest revenue sources for ANSAs, profited from by many groups, indiscriminate of organizational structure or ideology.

In practice, the trafficking of human beings and animals is structured similarly to that of narco-trafficking in its movement of illegal imports across international borders. However, the practice of human trafficking, which can range from sex slavery to bondage to labor, is neither as widespread nor as lucrative as narco-trafficking. Even with the links between Human and Animal Trafficking and narcotics (usually through the use of drug mules), the levels of policy concern by states are not equal. “Human smuggling is the facilitation, transportation, attempted transportation or illegal entry of a person(s) across an international border...” and “Generally, human smuggling occurs with the consent of person(s) being smuggled.” This practice can range from sex slavery, bondage and labor, illegal immigration, or livestock fraud. Whereas the smuggling of drugs is widely accepted as a criminal problem, and as one evoking national security concerns, human trafficking is often viewed in terms of social justice and human rights. In recent years, the presence of human trafficking has increased in popularity among ANSAs, both as a means of recruitment and as a source of income.

The PKK, a Kurdish separatist group operating in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, has one of the most intricate human-trafficking syndicates of any ANSA. The expanse of their human trafficking network is immense, encompassing Southwest Asia, Central Europe, and it is estimated that the PKK smuggled 9,000 Kurds into Europe in 2001 alone, receiving up to $3,000 per head. Although the majority of those smuggled by the PKK are labor migrants, smuggled children have been forced to act as drug mules and narcotics dealers. Organizations might smuggle humans—most often refugees or laborers—in exchange for money, as a source of recruitment (such as in Africa or Afghanistan), or as means to break the population over which they exert control. States in need of inexpensive labor may turn a blind eye to the practice. As human trafficking is implemented as a more common tactic among ANSAs, the governments become progressively wary of those who enter their country illegally. Due to both national security implications and its role in funding mili-

27 Ibid., 27.
30 Ibid., 910.
tant organizations, human trafficking is an issue worth addressing and certainly worth analyzing as a means of income for ANSAs.

The category of Taxation, Remittance, Extortion, and Fraud covers a broad range of activities—mostly illicit, but not devoid of legal avenues. 'Taxation' refers to tolls on goods that the group controls access to, ranging from agriculture (such as sugar, coffee, fruits, and vegetables) to clothing to checkpoint fees. If an ANSA exerts enough control over a territory, they can even collect taxes from sources entirely out of their purview of operations, such as water and electric billing. Taxes can also be collected on natural resource exports, such as oil. For the purposes of this study, revenue from such examples are considered under the auspices of natural resources. Remittances—payments made by members of a community influenced by the group—are also an avenue for income generation. Though donations are given by willing individuals, this form of fundraising can also be collected by force or intimidation. Both traditional taxes on imports and exports, as well as forced remittances, are often referred to as 'revolutionary tax'. This form of money collection is particularly effective for groups with extensive global networks, particularly in western, urban areas. Diaspora communities living in western cities often have more wealth than the home communities in which the ANSAs operate (even if still poor compared to the population in which they reside). Therefore, remittances collected from these groups can be highly lucrative. A similar situation exists with the case of extortion. 'Extortion' is the coercive means of procuring funds from businesses or the government, violently or otherwise, and is usually done at the lower-level through extracting funds from urban businesses. However, in more successful instances, groups have collected hundreds of millions of dollars from the extortion of large companies, such as airlines and International Governmental Organizations. In these cases, the 'armed' aspect of a non-state actor becomes essential to their success. The ability to coerce by threats or acts of violence is effective in fundraising and consequential to the sources of funding groups are able to pursue. 'Fraud' can be highly lucrative for a group, while remaining non-offensive or even hidden to communities in which ANSAs operate. It most often takes form in the illegal sale of fraudulent products and counterfeits, or the use of legitimate and legal front-businesses. Simpler acts of fraud include the sale of pirated or fake merchandise, or the forging of documents and identification for sale. For this study, licit activity such as front-businesses are also included in the category of 'fraud'. These businesses include pubs and restaurants, taxi companies, networks of catering services, plumbing and construction companies, copy shops, and farms. The legal nature of these funding sources poses particular challenges for authorities who wish to stymie ANSA funding. Though these businesses rarely procure funds to the extent that natural resources or other external support systems do, their networks can be global, reliable, and more importantly provide operational cover in the countries they are located.

While taxation and fraud can take legal forms, Ransoming, Piracy, and Armed Robbery are exclusively criminal activities. Kidnapping for ransom is a popular method of procuring funds. Though this method takes coordination and opportunity, it has the potential for high payout—ranging into the tens of millions of dollars. Some groups, like Boko Haram in Nigeria, use this method as their main source of income, and it is not uncommon for western journalists, doctors, aid workers, and peace-keepers to be the targets of kidnapping. Armed robbery and

35 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing,” 466.
37 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing,” 469; La, “Forced Remittances in Canada’s Tamil Enclaves,” 381.
"At its height, the Islamic State and Jabhat Al-Nusra were perhaps most notable for their use of kidnapping as a means of fundraising as well as recruitment. In one of their more lucrative operations, the Al-Nusra received $25 million from Qatar for the release of forty-five UN peacekeepers from Fiji—all of whom were abducted on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights."

piracy, when done correctly, can also be lucrative sources of income. ANSAs frequently rob banks, post offices, and building societies, while pirates commandeer shipping vessels and ransom them, sometimes for hundreds of thousands of dollars each. All three methods share certain advantages and disadvantages beyond the economic sphere. In addition to being a powerful source of income, kidnapping and armed robbery act as effective intimidation tactics and self-promoting publicity techniques. At its height, the Islamic State and Jabhat Al-Nusra were perhaps most notable for their use of kidnapping as a means of fundraising as well as recruitment. In one of their more lucrative operations, the Al-Nusra received $25 million from Qatar for the release of forty-five UN peacekeepers from Fiji—all of whom were abducted on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights.

Militant organizations rely on popular support, or at least complicity, in order to succeed—notably from separatists with nationalist goals. When ANSAs directly compete with the state for community backing, they toe a fine line between asserting their authority (while still fundraising) and winning the support of the community in which they operate (while not breaking the backs of the population they control). Such bold and criminal acts are far from victimless and have consequences. Over time, many groups that once relied heavily on kidnapping and armed robbery as primary sources of income were forced to change their ways due to community backlash, even from those who were traditionally loyal. Ultimately, the costs of the activity can outweigh the lucrative benefits.

The final variable of funding diversity is External Support. Under the parameters of this report, ‘External Support’ refers to state spon-

sorship, the financial support of other non-state actors (militarized and non-militarized), International Governmental Organization (when not extorted or contributing through ‘revolutionary tax’), and specific funding by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and charities. For the purposes of this study, diaspora communities that contribute via remittances (willing or forced) are not considered in this category. Organizations such as the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) and The Holy Land Foundation For Relief and Development have been implicated in the funding of groups from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to Hamas.44 State financial capacities dwarf those of non-state actors. Likewise, global communities sympathetic to a cause can amass large sums of money and do so quickly. For these reasons, finding patrons abroad is often the most effective means of fundraising for ANSAs, and is a tactic that raises hundreds of millions of dollars per year.45 ETA, a Basque separatist group operating in northern Spain acts as an interesting case study for the use of external financial support. For years, unbeknownst to the Spanish government, grants for Basque cultural and language education were funneled to the group through their political wing Herri Batasuna. Not only did governmental funding become the ANSA’s primary source of income, but it also enabled the ETA to reduce its reliance on and usage of other financing means, such as ‘revolutionary taxes’. So, in addition to providing valuable assets, government funding also allowed the organization to grow in popularity and in public support.46

"Lack of autonomy, which can corrupt a group’s mission or ideology, is the most pressing conflict, as the alignment and pressure of patrons can push groups to take on roles they otherwise may not have taken. If an organization chooses to defy its donors, it risks losing valuable funds." 

Outside funding has the greatest potential for high-yield income, but it is not without its costs. Lack of autonomy, which can corrupt a group’s mission or ideology, is the most pressing conflict, as the alignment and pressure of patrons can push groups to take on roles they otherwise may not have taken. If an organization chooses to defy its donors, it risks losing valuable funds. If an organization undertakes operations that are inconsistent with their principles, it risks losing the support of its popular base or distract-

ing from the foundations of their political or ideological goals. Another inconvenient aspect to outside funding is the potential for changing political priorities, goals, and the disappearance of sponsors. This was the case with the collapse of the Soviet Union: many groups lost their superpower backing seemingly overnight, as the Soviet Union ceased existing in a state capacity and the United States found many ANSAs to be suddenly irrelevant.

From the perspective of the outside sponsor, whether state or non-state, little more than money is invested or at risk in supporting militant groups. ANSAs are unlikely to overthrow their one-time-sponsors, and financial sponsorship of ANSAs can even be a sound foreign policy decision for states. In fact, there is a high return for states investing in militant groups to achieve their political goals. Proxy wars are far less costly than conventional warfare, both in terms of money as well as political capital. Investing tens of millions of dollars in ANSAs pales in comparison to the financial costs of airstrikes and special operations, let alone boots on the ground. For example, in the 1970s and 80s, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi sought to subvert British and other western powers by funding the IRA and ETA, while having little other investment in their causes or methods of operation. States are able to align with ANSAs and utilize them for actions they would rather not undertake directly and let them loose, creating political distance when convenient and sparing themselves the political battle. In this sense, ANSAs are useful tools in accomplishing deeds for which governments do not want to take responsibility. ANSAs are consequently used as regular militias in larger proxy wars. The funds raised from external support are used toward training, equipment, and other bureaucratic costs, which can further the goals of the militant organizations, proving useful to both sides.

Variables of Diversity: The Actors

The selected actors embody a variety of ANSA models. Each has similar and dissimilar characteristics, different degrees of global influence, and varied political aspirations. Some receive more popular support, whereas others are championed by niche communities. Included in this study are separatist groups with aspirations of independent statehood, groups that accept power-sharing agreements within existing states, and groups without significant political aspiration but with powerful ideological motivations. There are paradigms in which these groups can be analyzed, including religious affiliation, ideological causes, political aims, geography, network structure, and relationships with states as well as with other ANSAs. The four selected groups are currently active or recently disbanded, having ceased armed struggle since the turn of the millennia, and are representative of varying ratings of financial diversity. Deeper analysis of these particular cases provides insight into the dynamics of organizational structure, penetrable markets, and the influence of territory control and source diversity.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Sri Lanka was among many former colonies to gain independence after the Second World War. Following decades of civil conflict between two major ethnic groups, the Sinhala and the Tamils, the LTTE (also known as the ‘Tamil Tigers’) emerged in the mid-1970s as militant response to the perceived oppression and discrimination by the Sinhala government. The foundations of their struggle centered around the call for a homeland in ‘Eelam’ for Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority. Over the course of several decades, the ANSA developed as a formidable and

48 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing,” 466.
violent fighting force, numbering up to 17,000 members in 2004, and even engaging in guerrilla warfare with the Indian military, the world’s fourth largest army. However, the group is not immune to hypocrisy. Though the LTTE claims to be a champion of Tamil rights in the fight for independent statehood, the conflict in Sri Lanka has displaced tens of thousands of Tamils seeking to escape the violence. The majority of the displaced are middle-class Tamil families who emigrated to Canada, where the largest Tamil diaspora community lives, and it is from this diaspora community that the LTTE gains much of its revenue. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the LTTE collected approximately $1 billion in the form of (usually forced) remittances in 1999, when the entire GDP of Sri Lanka stood just below $20 billion. Though it funds a militant group on the opposite side of the globe, this form of collection is particularly difficult to track, as it operates in the legal sphere. Front businesses are another popular means of collecting ‘revolutionary tax’ for the LTTE. As an example, those in the diaspora living in Tamil communities may be forced to use catering services for large events. Charities and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) act as another source of income. In the wake of the 2004 tsunami that devastated Southeast Asia, the LTTE capitalized on NGO aid to communities under its control; prior to being declared a ‘terrorist front organization’ by the United States, the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT) raised between $12-22 million per year for the Tigers. Despite forty years of operation, the Tigers lack financial diversity, with diaspora remittances as a primary source, charitable organizations and extortion of NGOs as a secondary source, and marginal profit made by smuggling Tamils out of Sri Lanka and into Canada, where they are then monitored and exploited abroad.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia]

The FARC is a left-aligned guerilla group that was active in the mountains of Colombia from the 1960s to 2017. Though the group originally established ties with the Communist Party and with global socialist movements, the formation of diplomatic relationships between the Colombian government and the Soviet Union limited the FARC’s ability to obtain funding from major communist patrons. Until their cessation from militant activity (and so throughout most of their existence) the group was self-funded and placed a heavy reliance on narco-trafficking for financial sustenance; “[a]s a ‘full-service’ guerrilla organization, the FARC [was] involved in all stages of production, processing, and trafficking of illicit drugs.” In addition to their own operations of narco-trafficking, the ANSA profited greatly from the cocaine production of others—most often individuals or small collectives of farmers—in the form of a 10-15% ‘revolutionary tax’ imposed on each shipment. In order to diversify their funding, as well as add legitimacy to claims that they did not profit off the drug trade, the ANSA was diligent in taxing the population they controlled in other ways. The group exerted power over many export hubs in the country and imposed tariffs on a range of outgoing products, such as papaya, mango, and coffee. Despite their desire to publically distance themselves from the

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54  Ibid., 501.
55  La, “Forced Remittances in Canada’s Tamil Enclaves,” 381.
56  Ibid., 382.
57  Ibid., 381.
59  La, “Forced Remittances in Canada’s Tamil Enclaves,” 381.
62  Ibid., 14.
64  Ibid., 240.
65  Ibid.
The drug market, the group actively partook in illicit means of fundraising, such as kidnapping, extortion, and other methods of violent extraction. At their height, the FARC controlled one-third of Colombian territory, and the expanse of territorial control had enormous implications on the organization's ability to procure funds—both in terms of increased coca production, as well as an enlarged population base from which they extracted money, usually in the form of taxes. Some estimates put the ANSA's annual budget at $1 billion.

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

This particular ANSA is well-known by a number of names, including ‘The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’, ‘The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’, ‘The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’, ‘Daesh’ (a derogatory Arabic acronym), or, simply, ‘The Islamic State’. The various names all refer to the same territory in which they aspire to create a new Islamic Caliphate, broadly matched with that of the old Islamic kingdom, from the Mediterranean, through historic Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. Regardless of name, ISIS was born from the power vacuum created by instability in Iraq following years of sectarian violence and a sudden overthrow of dictator Saddam Hussein. In several respects, the Islamic State is an outlier among ANSAs. In a conflicted region defined by sectarian and ideological alliances, ISIS is self-sufficient and ostracized even by organizations with similar aspirations. Uncommitted to the external support of formal state ties, the group appeals to the most extreme followers of radical Islam from around the globe, and shamelessly pushes the limits of modern norms with complete disregard for international opinion. While human trafficking is not new to the world of militant groups, the Islamic State is perhaps the first ANSA to publicly endorse the practice. Human trafficking—which, in the case of ISIS, usually takes the form of young girls sold into sex slavery—is neither the primary nor secondary source of ISIS's funding, but is rather a practice of subjugating the conquered and the enforcement of radical beliefs. Beginning in 2014, the Islamic State took the Middle East by force, capturing swaths of oil fields and populations. In 2015, half of the group's $2 billion budget was collected through

"Uncommitted to the external support of formal state ties, the group appeals to the most extreme followers of radical Islam from around the globe."

69 Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing,” 462.
The remainder was generated from extortion and kidnapping, namely of Western journalists and peacekeepers. The official and longstanding US policy of not paying ransoms has emboldened the Islamic State to kidnap and publicly execute Americans—not necessarily for financial gain, but as a means of publicity. The financial and moral consequences of this US principle are hotly debated amongst policy-makers dealing with armed non-state actors. It is worth noting, however, that before their successful land expansion, ISIS relied most heavily on extortion. In many ways, the group is a valuable example of the relationship between territorial control and revenue, both in the sheer sums collected, as well as the diversity of sources. When the group lost control of land due to aggressive Western-backed operations against the organization, ISIS expanded into narco-trafficking in an attempt to compensate for losses of oil and tax revenue. Ultimately, the group’s revenue dropped from $81 million per to $16 million per month.

Later in this study, I analyze the Islamic State more closely to explore the relationship between territory and revenue.

Hezbollah

The Lebanese Shi’a Muslim organization is perhaps the most impressively diverse ANSA in operation, and certainly the group with highest diversity score amongst those of this study. Their diversity can be tied to several key points, namely their lack of natural resources, which forced them to branch out; their raison d’être—opposition to the State of Israel—which is highly palatable to regional actors and a cause that surrounding populations enthusiastically support; and their Shi’a religious alignment, which has turned them into the global militia for the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the behest of the Ayatollah. Overall, they are enabled by their network of self-sustained financial sources, as well as substantial external support. Unlike Al-Qaeda and other globally expansive ANSAs, Hezbollah operates under one cohesive leadership that has a centralized chain of command, and cooperating political and military wings that are sometimes indiscernible in both rhetoric and activity."

78 Ibid., 85.
has penetrated and, in many cases, dominated the drug trade in Latin America;\(^8^0\) profited from conflict minerals in Africa, including Blood Diamonds;\(^8^1\) kidnapped, ransomed, and robbed individuals and groups;\(^8^2\) and has successfully embedded their organization into the political apparatus of Lebanon as a legitimate parliamentary force with substantial representation in the government, including veto power.\(^8^3\) The group’s political power vis-à-vis their position in the government is only emboldened and empowered by the plethora of public works and social welfare projects they undertake in the urban centers of Lebanon. Still, Hezbollah’s most influential source of funding is the Iranian state. In the group’s early years of operation, Iran provided an estimated $100 million per year for the securing of Lebanese Shi’a influence and for armed resistance against the State of Israel. With Hezbollah as a proxy militia for Iran in the Syrian civil war, funding has reached up to $800 million per year.\(^8^4\) Over time, Iran has remained the main financial backer of the ANSA, particularly as the state seeks to expand its regional influence. The ties between Hezbollah and Iran are so strong that, in many ways, they are directly affected by political and economic considerations related to their state patron. In the time leading up to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), colloquially referred to as ‘the Iran Deal’, Iran massively cut funding to its proxy in response to crippling sanctions and international pressure. However, following the implementation of the agreement—and with it, the lifting of economic sanctions and influx of western money—funding and support to Hezbollah was only restored to previous levels, but exceeded them in volume and extent.\(^8^5\) Despite substantial state-sponsorship, the organization has sought other means of fundraising to offset the uncontrollable fluctuation of cash-flow that accompanies changing political climates. More notable than the diversity of capital is the vigor and force by which Hezbollah pursues alternative sources of capital, becoming not only varied, but effective across a spectrum of fundraising activities. The United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has been investigating and conducting operations targeting deep-penetrating Hezbollah networks in Latin America and Africa. In addition to narco-trafficking and conflict minerals, the organization uses crime syndicates and smuggling routes to launder money and sell used cars, the profits of which all end up in the ANSA’s coffers.\(^8^6\) In 2004, the group was implicated in a ring of cigarette smuggling, fraud, and other forms of ‘white collar’ crime, generating millions of dollars in revenue.\(^8^7\) Global charities, front businesses (in Lebanon and abroad), and diaspora remittances are additional avenues in Hezbollah’s international financial network. Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, Hezbollah has transformed into a colossal and highly active militia—one that depends on their effective system of funding to continue operations.

**Diversity Score: Identifying ANSAs and Their Sources of Income**

### A Closer Look: The Relationship Between Territory Control and Revenue

At their peak, the FARC controlled one-third of Colombian territory,\(^8^8\) which it effectively utilized for coca cultivation, and the organization flourished. In a converse scenario, the Taliban lost control of many poppy fields as US operations were in full-force during the 2000s, which cut the group off from its main source of funding, and made it far more reliant on other sources of income—in this case, funding from

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83 Fanusie and Entz, “Hezbollah,” 2.
Pakistan. Increased territory also gives groups access to another source of wealth: taxation of newly controlled populations and an expanse of commodities. The nature of the relationship between ANSAs and their controlled population is likely to have a great effect on their efficiency of fund extraction. While this study does not spend time exploring the relationships between civilian populations and ANSAs, existing literature does explore this dynamic and its effect on funding efficiency.

In another case study, the Islamic State provides an interesting example of what can happen to an ANSA following the loss of territory. Between 2014 and 2017, ISIS lost nearly all the territory it controlled due to aggressive campaigns of multiple states and other ANSAs, but its greatest loss was its access to swaths of oil fields. The loss of territorial control had a significant toll on the group's cash-flow, and forced the group to seek alternative means of funding in order to compensate for the monetary losses, namely narco-trafficking. Still, the group could not recover from their situation, but this was likely attributable to tactical considerations, rather than a blatant lack of effort to fundraise. This strategic blow rendered them unable to invest time or manpower into other fundraising activities upon which they had previously relied, such as kidnapping. Interestingly, Jabhat al-Nusra, who previously controlled many of the oil fields taken by the ISIS, did diversify at the loss of precious territory and natural resources. This is likely due to the group's ability to retreat, regroup, reorganize, and pursue other means of fundraising—a luxury not enjoyed by the Islamic State under immense tactical pressure and in a fight for existential survival.

The size of territory controlled and the ability to maintain said control are both important in addressing geography's relation to funding. Jabhat al-Nusra's loss of Syrian oil fields crippled the organization financially, and forced them to find alternative sources of income—not unlike the Taliban's loss of poppy fields in Afghanistan. In this example, territorial control had direct consequences on the diversity of the group's funding. However, while the Islamic State experienced similar events, recovery and diversification were harder to achieve under their circumstances of war.

Conclusions

This study reinforces previously-held notions of the relationship between territorial control and revenue—the more geography an organization controls, the more access it has to natural resources as well as a population to tax, extort, or otherwise use as a fundraising tool. Those with the greatest control of territory fell into the middle range of diversity, partially disproving Hypothesis 1. Geographic primacy acts as a 'launch pad' for groups to expand their networks of finance, likely due to the access gained regarding natural resources and population. However, while financial portfolio diversification seems to go hand-in-hand with expanding territorial control, ANSAs become sufficiently comfortable with their sources of revenue, and are thus kept from pursuing other means.

Groups with a low diversity score, such as the Tamil Tigers, The Shower Posse, and Hamas, control little territory, as do groups with a high diversity score, such as the Irish Republican Army and Hezbollah. For those on the lower end of the scale, the lack of broad territorial control is believed to be a main contributor to the lacking diversity of funding, as these groups cannot meaningfully penetrate other markets. On the high end of the spectrum, lack of territorial control is also apparent. In these cases, the groups have succeeded in spite of lacking the resources accessibility associated with territorial control, and have instead found a multitude of diverse funding networks. For these groups, the lack of traditional land control acts as a driver

92 Solomon, Kwong, and Bernard, “Syria Oil Map.”
for creative diversification and, in many ways, exemplifies resilience in the face of challenges. Of the ANSAs analyzed in this study, those that fell in the middle (with a Diversity Score between 2.25 and 3.25) generally had influence over large areas of territory. Control over sizable territory both limits and expands diversity of funding for militarized sub-state groups; this is best exemplified by groups like the Taliban, Boko Haram, FARC, the Islamic State, and Jabhat Al-Nusra. On one hand, access to territory provides more avenues of fund-collection, such as a greater population to tax and exploit, as well as more natural resources. On the other hand, the availability of resources creates a comfortable middle-ground for groups. For these ANSAs, venturing into creative (and sometimes risky) methods of fund-procurement is both unnecessary and often not worth the work.

Possible exceptions to this pattern are ETA in Basque Spain and Al-Shabab in Somalia. While ETA exerts little control over physical territory, its few but highly developed networks of fundraising elevate its Diversity Score, where it may have otherwise been ranked lower and among others without significant land. Al-Shabab controls significant territory in Somalia, and is ranked highly on the diversity scale. In some ways, the Al-Qaeda affiliate is an outlier in that it has pushed itself to find creative and reliable sources of income, despite the obvious methods of fundraising available to the group within its substantial territorial zone of influence. This may be due in part to the necessary adaptive behaviors of the group, insomuch that when faced with challenges regarding one source of funding, it expanded into another market—sometimes maintaining the new avenue even when supply from the former returned (as seen throughout Al-Shabab’s existence with its relationship to charcoal production). Nevertheless, this flux of financial diversity is not unique to one group. While this study analyzes aggregate trends of financing for armed non-state actors, it does not delve deeply into the evolving and adaptive nature of funding diversity over the lifetime of a group. Further research regarding the longevity of a group (perhaps in a ‘snapshot’ framework looking at the ebbs and flows of ANSA operations) could provide an even more nuanced understanding of an organization’s behavior and needs, particular in the field of financing.

Regarding natural resources and funding diversity, there are mixed assumptions as to their

"On one hand, access to territory provides more avenues of fund-collection, such as a greater population to tax and exploit, as well as more natural resources. On the other hand, the availability of resources creates a comfortable middle-ground for groups."

95 Fanusie and Entz, “Al-Shabab,” 3; 7.
precise relationship relating to militant organization. While some scholars draw definitive conclusions between natural resources and the success of ANSAs, others contest that access to natural resource merely simplifies beginning stages and that the lack of natural resources does not preclude a group from becoming successful by seeking out other sources of income. Natural resources can, at least, empower ANSAs, allowing for the pursuit of more diverse funding. The Taliban and FARC are quintessential examples for comparison within groups that have access to natural resources. Both rely primarily on narco-trafficking as a source of funding (similarly producing, cultivating, and exporting). As with these examples, ANSAs that participate in narco-trafficking from its infant stages of cultivation, will also rely on taxation as a source of primary or secondary income. The more territory they control, the more potential product yield as well as population to tax. The FARC benefited from geographic proximity to the United States, who was its main consumer of cocaine. Likewise, the Taliban profited from Asia and the opium market. The lucrative and reliable nature of narco-trafficking led the groups to avoid pursuing a wide array of funding sources, though other means came with the territory, so to speak. For ANSAs like Hezbollah, a complete lack of natural resources did cause the expected outcome and forced an extreme diversity of funding in order to compensate. To its remarkable credit, Hezbollah has managed to infiltrate the drug markets of Latin America and conflict minerals of Africa, utilizing both as primary and secondary sources of income. The group deliberately established global networks of funding, profiting from natural resources even when they scarcely had their own.

To its remarkable credit, Hezbollah has managed to infiltrate the drug markets of Latin America and conflict minerals of Africa, utilizing both as primary and secondary sources of income. The group deliberately established global networks of funding, gaining involvement with natural resources even when they scarcely had their own."

97 DeAtley, “Illicit Drug Funding: The Surprising Systemic Similarities Between the FARC and the Taliban”; Labrousse, “The FARC and the Taliban’s Connection to Drugs.”
ANSAs from pursuing other sources of funding (though it may affect sums of income, meaning more ‘aligned’ or ‘popular’ groups may have more cash-flow). However, outside funding may act as a foundation for groups to expand their networks of finances, likely as an attempt to retain sovereignty and remain independent of their patrons. The ideological, religious, and political alignments of groups have an effect on the quantities on funding, rather than the diversity of funding. While this study did not set out to analyze the sums of money received by groups, there are indicators that endeavors with more popular support receive more money. The diversity of an organization’s financial portfolio, however, is largely unaffected. Nearly all of the actors studied have some form of external support, with more than half as either a ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’ source. Across the spectrum, groups either diversified or did not, regardless of outside help. The two most diverse groups, the IRA and Hezbollah, have external support as a primary source. Groups likely expand their portfolios in order to remain autonomous and less affected by the whims and will of their patrons. Another explanation is groups with popular support have inherently better networks, thereby facilitating more diverse financial portfolios.

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terrorism.
Using Koreanness: 
Fostering the Growth of the Republic of Korea

The state’s role in defining the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) relationship with its northern counterpart, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, has been tantamount to its push for ethnonationalism and stability in the nascent state. South Korea’s varying policies towards North Korea as they emerged during the Cold War, 1990s, and beyond, have been reflected in its understanding of its northern counterpart. These shifts show that perceptions of the DPRK’s citizens’ Koreanness from enemy, to a people to be pitied, to a partner in the eyes of the state has altered in accordance to the needs of the government. This paper will explore these changes and what they mean for the transience of Koreanness as an unfixed property used throughout modern Korean history that has been shaped by state policy furthering its national agenda towards unified, stable, and secure Republic of Korea.

**Background**

The South Korean concept of North Koreans is relatively new. Up until the mid-20th century Koreans were not defined by which side they came from on the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) they came from. Arbitrarily created by the United States at the end of World War II in 1945 and reinforced after the Korean War (1950-1953) the DMZ provided a new angle in defining Koreanness. The current debate on the possibility of there not being “Koreans” insomuch as “North Koreans” and “South Koreans,” is compelling as it indicates the shifts in the ROK’s views over time and how society has reflected it in everyday language. Tracking these changes from a policy perspective provides a deeper understanding of the malleability of Koreanness as seen through changing rhetoric around the inclusivity of North Koreans into South Korean society. Concepts like reunification, democratization, and anti-communism are common themes that

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emerge in discussions about attitudes towards North Korea and the regime’s people. These eras of varying relations can be roughly estimated by the time periods below.

**Periodization with contemporaneous state policies**

**1800-1945**

This era encompasses the final century and a half of a unified Korean peninsula in which many still held common narratives of oppressive colonization, pride in great dynastic histories, and roots of economic differences between the North and South began. Under the Chosun dynasty (1392-1897), the Korean peninsula experienced one of its longest and most stable reigning dynasties. The Chosun court employed the practice of “marginal adjustment,”

2 coping with struggles as they arose rather than attempting to create lasting change. This practice is notable as it displays increasing differentiation between Northern and Southern provinces at the time. Intentional political discrimination of the Northern areas by the Chosun court left the North with a lack of equal administrative support compounded with the North’s harsh climate led to further differentiation in living conditions.

3 Peasant revolts such as the Hong Gyeong Nae Rebellion of 1812 occurred in opposition to this inequality.

4 Under colonial rule and the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, this differentiation only continued. The North saw increasing amounts of industrialization and subsequent urbanization, which starkly opposed the Southern modernization experience.5 While both sides suffered greatly under Japanese colonial rule, the Southern area witnessed far more confrontations with the military. Heavy censorship and military rule in the capital area of Seoul and the confiscation of fertile lands under the 1910 Land Reforms both contributed to this “dark period.”6 Japanese rule had a severe impact on the South’s ability to industrialize later on as most of the factories were concentrated in the North and the South was heavily restricted in its land use and an unstable capital region.

**1945-1988**

Japan’s retreat from the peninsula and the subsequent war further divided and polarized between the communist North and democratic South. The Cold War’s first proxy war resulted from the creation of two Koreas at end of the Korean War in 1953. The continuation of Cold War tensions continued even after the

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4 Ibid.
5 “Manifesto for the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion.” In, Sources of Korean Tradition, 171-173, 177-180.
war itself ended. This was first emphasized in Syngman Rhee’s use of the National Security Law established in 1948. First Republic used the law, in the name of anti-communism and protecting the new state from the influences of the North, to censor its population and maintain control despite the shaky grounds of the state’s heavy reliance on American aid. Alongside this first nationwide policy actively condemning communist activity came the Jeju Rebellion of 1948-49. Some South Korean citizens saw the North Koreans and their communist system as the solution to their troubles of once again being placed under a different country’s administration, and told they would not regain their sovereignty until "due course." This exhibits that even though the state’s official attitude and policy towards North Korea was antagonistic, the dissatisfaction of the South Korean citizens bred sympathy for some aspects of North Korea due to its superior economic standing. This only continued through the Rhee administration and was reinforced through mandatory military conscription. A tactic that reinforced the perennial fear of Northern invasion, mandatory enlistment created an atmosphere of fear and instability regarding the South’s violence-prone counterpart. The implementation of mandatory enlistment in with the Military Service Law in 1949 (actually implemented in 1957- delay due to Korean War) represents a clear extension of the Rhee government’s anti-North Korean rhetoric. Little changed when Park Chung-hee took over after his military coup in 1961. His Third Republic swiftly established the KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency), a security apparatus meant to further monitor for communist activity. Although the state’s militarism in this period led to a heavily patrolled population, the economy boomed under Park Chung-hee’s economic plans and South Korea surpassed the North in terms of GDP. While citizens faced innumerable human rights and workers’ rights atrocities to build the nation’s economy, events like the attack of the USS Pueblo and the assassination attempt against Park, both in 1968, allowed Park to further abuse the National Security Law for his administrative needs. Moreover, Park Chung-hee harnessed anti-communist rhetoric to industrialize and modernize the Republic of Korea by building the Gyeongbu Highway in the 1960s. His slogan, “Let’s construct as we fight” epitomized how the state viewed infrastructure building as a link to the “struggle against North Korean communists of the nation.” Park presented conflicts like the USS Pueblo as a sign that the North was ever nervous of the South’s growing might. In this same speech, Park iterates how “our people should be the people who construct as we fight...to fight against communist...to promote construction on the other.” The ethno-nationalist paradigm that Park sets up by labeling “our people” and glorifying how their construction is to not only build a highway for the South betterment, but to construct a connection to the North. These declarations further promote the Otherization of the North while simultaneously enforcing the line of anti-communism. Chun Doo Hwan’s takeover of the Fourth Republic and anti-communist rhetoric after Park Chung-hee’s assassination and establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1981 created a new round of suspicion towards North Korea. The threat of the DPRK continued to loom in the 1980s with Chun Doo Hwan’s own attempted assassination in 1983 in Burma and the North Korean terrorist attacks on Gimpo Airport and Korean Air Flight 858 in the 1980s as well. This era not

15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid.
only showed a continuation of anti-communism but also an outline of a comprehensive proposal for reunification, “the most complete program so far submitted by South Korea” as reported by the New York Times on March 3, 1982.\(^8\) This break with Cold War tradition may have been to consolidate Chun Doo Hwan’s rule as he took power after the military coup. While the North responded negatively to the proposal of reunification, the offer remained open and further proposals were put forth, moves that kept the South Korean populace hopeful. The reunification proposal differed from Chun’s predecessors since they had been adamant in their staunch anti-communism. In this matter Chun’s advisor, Lee Bum Suk, was Pyongyang-born and this shows how Chun was more open as he allowed North Korean experts into his ranks and opened himself up to talks.\(^9\) As the economy surged ahead, Chun placed less emphasis on the “threat from the North” due to his view that a “perceived threat” was bad for business and decided to focus more heavily on unification talks. \(^10\) With the perceived threat from the North minimized the state furthered its economic plans. Interestingly enough, with Chun’s move towards more dialogue in his policy towards North Korea, the perceptions of North Koreans as unsympathetic, killers, and “terrible” people\(^11\) made new strides to see the North Koreans as compatriots rather than competitors as the tides shifted to South Korea having “won” and hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics to show its advances in modernization.\(^12\)

1988-1998

Gestures of goodwill continued under Roh Tae-Woo during the Sixth Republic, founded in 1988. Roh employed nordpolitik\(^23\) to bring the Republic of Korea closer to post-Socialist countries as the Cold War ended and relations with the People’s Republic of China were normalized in 1992. This benefitted business as South Korea increased its economic presence on the international stage. This pushed towards South Korea’s government’s overall outlook to shift towards establishing ties with North Korea who was increasing pressures to restructure economic policy and was losing international assistance. Roh followed his predecessor Chun in giving a second version of the Korean National Community Unification Formula in 1989 proposing amongst other items, a Council of Ministers that would operate through committees on humanitarian affairs, political affairs and diplomacy, economic affairs, military affairs, and social and cultural affairs to build a national unified culture. His Formula also included a Council of Representatives to draft a unified Constitution and advise the Council of Representatives. Both councils would comprise of members from both the DPRK and ROK.\(^24\) His policy focused on a gradual unification through consensus.\(^25\) Gradual integration was necessary to maintain South Korean prosperity while incorporating new members to its society. In this policy the North became a partner, not a competitor nor threat to South Korean economic success.\(^26\) His administration’s work towards the Basic Agreement of 1991 establishing the North’s recognition of South Korea as a state which stimulated economic and cultural exchanges.

Kim Young Sam continued this dialogue and exchange when his administration recognized the North’s need for support after the conditions of the Great Famine were made


\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.


\(^{26}\) Ibid.

known. Food aid was sent in the tons under his administration. However, the faltering of the Basic Agreement as the North struggled under the Great Famine and the death of Kim Il Sung lead to some tensions in South Korea. Kim Young Sam’s administration was criticized for its mismanagement of the issues. Nevertheless, by the time Kim Dae Jung was elected there had been significant institutional progress in viewing North Korea as a partner or at least someone to partake in dialogue with.

1998-Present
From the whirlwind of the 1997 Asian Financial crisis came the election of Kim Dae Jung in 1998. While this was a chance for South Korea to restructure its economy, it was also an opportunity Kim Dae Jung took to further ratchet up the nation’s relationship with North Korea. His work around this became known as the Sunshine Policy. He did not set a formula for unification like Roh and Chun, but instead argued:

"...that engagement with and even economic assistance to the North could be a 'win-win' proposition, bringing the North out of its shell, providing humanitarian assistance, and generally reducing tensions and thereby strengthening national security."  

Jung’s policy led to increases in tourism in the Kumgang Mountains in the North for both sides with Hyundai’s help and with state-to-state talks, both in 1998. Kim Dae Jung’s visit to Pyongyang in 2000 helped place into the imagination of the South the ability to overcome decades of aggression. Kim Jong Il’s remarkable displays of hospitality directly opposed decades of thought in the South of him and North Koreans as hostile. The follow up to this was a Joint Declaration the same year putting economic ties and the reunification of families as part of the agreement. Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy painted the state’s turn of the century with the hope that unification could be possible. With South Korea now firmly recognized as part of the First World with its entrance into the OECD in 1996 and rapid recovery from the 1997 economic crisis, the state could turn its focus to practicing a new national security paradigm. Specifically, one in which entertaining conversation with the North would not be viewed as a radical, communist-sympathizing thought.

Kim Dae-jung’s capitalization on this al-

"With South Korea now firmly recognized in world order as part of the First World with its entrance into the OECD in 1996 and rapid recovery from the 1997 economic crisis the state could turn its focus to practicing a new national security paradigm."

28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. 180
31 Ibid. 181
lowed for the South Korean government’s creation of the Ministry of Unification to begin taking count of North Korean defectors to the South. The Ministry reported an increase from 947 defectors in 1998 to about 31,531 defectors in the South today. The Ministry of Unification also reports the highest number of communications between the two states has concerned politics and the economy since 1971. The softening attitude towards North Koreans is exemplified by the South Korean government’s efforts to establish hanawons, a kind of educational resettlement facility for newly received North Korean refugees to learn the basics of South Korean society. Hanawons were established by Article 10 of the Act on Protection and Resettlement Support of North Korean Refugees with the first opening in 1999. The Ministry of Unification has created a manual for North Korean refugee resettlement and has listed the Hanawon’s program objectives to be: regaining emotional stability, overcoming cultural differences, and finding motivation to become socially and economically independent. These objectives illustrate the South Korean government’s efforts to integrate and accept of North Korean refugees into society. This policy shift moves beyond dialogue to active reception and welcoming of North Koreans, revealing how South Korea—from Kim Dae Jung to present—has moved towards having governmental apparatus to support North Korean refugees rather than cast them out as an Other.

Remarkably, this positive adaptation in policy for North Koreans comes hand in hand with the South Korean government’s agenda to upgrade how it presents itself to the world. With soft power emanating in the Hallyu Wave, its “Miracle of Han,” recovery from the 1997 financial crisis, and steady pace in democratization as the Sixth Republic continues, the Republic of Korea’s government is faced with maintaining its image to the public beyond its citizens as well. With denuclearization on the peninsula an ever-present agenda item, the shift in tactics by the South Korean government allowed them to use their diplomatic efforts to garner favor from the post-Socialist international community.

Sympathetic films and dramas Steel Rain (2017) and Doctor Stranger (2014), are ways in which the government humanized North Kore-

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36 Ibid.
an defectors to continue support for reunification efforts. Changes in language concerning North Korea and its people have also occurred in state-approved textbooks over time as the attitudes and administrations softened their positions. The terminology around the North can be evidenced as the parlance moves from being “cold” and a “satellite of the USSR” to the DRPK as a “failure” with “chaos” and collapse as the South Korean government loosens its anti-communist political ideology fueling its “Otherization” of the North. This can also be seen in stories in South Korean textbooks that go from dehumanizing North Koreans in “I Hate Communists” to feeling sympathy to “save” the Other that is simultaneously “us”, a notably softer take. All of this furthers the state agenda to ensure peace on the peninsula and try to stop war from breaking out. From the beginning of food aid in the 1990s to the welcoming of North Korean refugees, the government agenda worked to preserve the South Korean.

Ethnonationalism through Koreaness

All of these policies throughout time are not simply state insurance to ensure stability, but also a way for the state to define who fit into its constraints of being “Korean.” At each step, the state cast different lights and shadows on North Koreans, shifting their portrayal of them from Others, to compatriots, to that of the same blood. While this stabilized South Korea’s own nation-formation, it also simultaneously created the conditions for the contemporary discussion of North Koreans as not just Koreans and a people to be helped, but a political Other separate from ethnic ties they share with South Koreans. Events that have been present in the socio-historical imagination of the South Korean people are exclusive in their narratives and form a common bond for South Koreans, like the “Miracle on the Han,” as something uniquely theirs. The South Korean struggle to reach recognition internationally was peppered with “problems of illegitimacy, recurring political unrest...a series of corrupt and oppressive of regimes, and dependence upon foreign benefactors in politics and economics.” And yet they overcame this to create a robust and booming nation-state. Even though the two countries share common and experiences, like the Korean War and the Kangbyon incident, they have been marked by their respective government’s positions on the other. The popular notions of Koreans as a strong and resilient people is left mainly to reference South Koreans.

The internationally recognized story of Koreans today is very much skewed toward the South Korean rendition. South Korea’s “win” as a top player on the world stage represented more than just a victory between the Koreas, but also added to the political and physical divisions already present for the two. The North became the antithesis of everything the South came to represent. By shifting the administrative stance to one of helping the North Koreans through food aid and open dialogue in the 1980s and 1990s, rather than viewing them as a competitor, the South Korean government effectively made North Korea no longer an equal match to beat but an other that did not support the South’s own story of success and resiliency of Koreans. Koreaness was not a fixed, qualitative asset that was inherent in the eyes of the South Korean government, it was a curated concept that had been crystallized through the post-World War II events in the Southern half of the peninsula. The nationwide censorship under Rhee Syngman through the military coup cycles that followed with anti-Communist rhetoric were all policies that not only made a point of attacking North Korea, but creating an insular group of South Korean citizens that increasingly became the antithesis of North Koreans.

Drastic polarization between the two Koreas, from the last century of the Chosun dynasty to Korean War, also left its mark in this creation of an ethno nationalistic culture created and defined by South Korea. While post-World War II events fed into what it meant to be Kore-

"The South Korean use of this malleability is nevertheless unique as it matched the needs of the state and was not just 'marginally adjusted' to patch problems, but made to be the baseline justification for policy."

an.”42 Society remembers and, while official stances may change, in practice North Koreans are still not viewed as equals. With current news of peace and a formal end to the Korean War this may signal another need for the state to shape the identity of Koreanness to foster harmony with the possibility of an opening up of North Korea. However, the manner in which this will be framed is dependent on the state’s confidence that the state has reached maturity, security, and stability in itself and that recasting the national concept of Koreanness through policy will not shake this. A new era of Koreanness will face a hybridity of intermingling between South Korea’s own historical conceptions of its Koreanness but whatever North Koreans will bring to the table as their definition on what it means to be Korean. The current buzzword from the May 2018 Inter-Korean Summit, minjok, or ethnicity, is a shared value that the two Koreas may want to focus on,43 but with such different ideas of Koreanness the crafting of what a united Korea would look like will need to be agreed upon for both Koreas’ narratives and needs.

43 Ha-young Choi. “‘Homogeneous Korea’ May Seem Nationalistic www/nation/2018/05/731_248371.html.

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Victoria Isabel Quintanilla is currently a rising junior at Yale University majoring in History with a concentration in East Asia. She is most interested in researching ethnic identities in East Asia. Her current research is centered around the history of the “Other” in South Korea. Victoria is currently on a year-long fellowship in Seoul to further her language studies under the Richard U. Light Fellowship.
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