The Yale Review of International Studies
Spring Issue 2019

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Dear Reader,

The Yale Review of International Studies Editorial Board is proud to present to you our third issue this year: the Spring Issue 2019.

As ever, we were humbled by our pool of submissions, which was larger than the Spring Issue has ever had. This issue features two Yale students: Alexandra O’Brien (’20) writes about the relationship between Venezuela and Russia in the 21st century, particularly relevant given the current unrest in Venezuela and the politics of Russian involvement abroad. Min Byung Chae (’20) examines the efficacy of UN peacekeeping in reducing the magnitude of violence against civilians within political conflict, a perplexing field of inquiry ever since UN peacekeeping operations first began in 1948.

We are always pleased to see the YRIS call for submissions land further and farther afield, particularly ever since our change this year to welcome undergraduates from other universities to submit to both the Winter and Spring Issues. In this issue, Uzair Sattar and Atrey Bhargav from Tufts University write comprehensively about water politics in the Indus River Basin, which pertain to both India and Pakistan. Our cover piece, written by Anna Lipscomb from the University of Southern California’s Korean Studies Institute, explores an exciting and tasty field: gastrodiplomacy and its relevance to South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan. Finally, Ben Gardner-Gill from Stanford University analyzes the political dynamics of post-communist Czechoslovakia and the use of political memory in that time period to build a lasting narrative of "the people" versus "elites," a theme that obviously continues to pervade our political discourses today.

We also invite you to try your hand at our first ever crossword, located on page 40. The first 10 people to send yris@yira.org a picture of a completed, physically-written-in crossword (include your name on the page, and only one person can submit one completed crossword) will receive a prize!

See you next time,
Elisabeth Siegel, Jake Mezey, and Qusay Omran
YRIS Executive Board 2018-2019
Venezuela and Russia: Geopolitical Allies in the 21st Century

Introduction

In recent years, Russian interest in Venezuela has grown considerably, particularly in regard to its natural resources. Given Russia’s historic role in the Cold War and today’s geopolitical balance of power, one can see the Kremlin’s renewed interest in Venezuela as an attempt to recreate Cold War-era spheres of influence. This time, however, Vladimir Putin’s Russia does not attempt to support the spread of Marxist ideals. Instead, Russian and Venezuelan interests are symbiotic, as Venezuela looks to Russia as a lender of last resort and Russia looks to Venezuela to expand Russia’s oil production, and thereby acquire greater geopolitical influence while gaining wider access to international markets. Venezuela’s 46th President, Nicolás Maduro, went as far as to award the inaugural Hugo Chávez Peace Award in 2016 to Putin for “promoting world peace” and supporting a “multipolar world.”

On December 5, 2018, during a meeting between the two leaders in Moscow, Vladimir Putin stated that he was against “any attempts to change the situation [in Venezuela] by force.”

The demise of the Soviet Union was concurrent with a decline in its economic power, and it could no longer afford to provide support for its allies in Latin America. It also saw little reason to do so, given that Boris Yeltsin’s government looked to work with Western regimes and did not want to alienate them through further support for elements antagonistic to the United States. Therefore, Russia largely withdrew from the region throughout most of the 1990s, as it was not a priority for the struggling

nation. Thus, its influence in Latin America declined.  

In the late 1990s, Russia's relationship with Latin America began to change, and Russian diplomats increasingly found a presence in the region. In 1997, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeny Primakov traveled throughout Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, and Costa Rica, and spoke of the importance of an alliance between Russia and Latin America to create a multipolar world. The previous relationship between Russia and Latin America, based mainly on similar ideological leanings, has quickly evolved, and is now characterized as one aiming to promote tangible economic and political benefits for both parties in line with Putin's worldview.4

Russia’s Ambitions: Latin America

After the demise of the Soviet Union, Moscow’s geopolitical efforts focused on defending its claim to a “sphere of privileged interests.” Then-U.S. president Barack Obama dubbed Russia a “regional power,” given that these “privileged interests” were concentrated in Russia’s periphery. However, since Vladimir Putin assumed the Russian presidency in 2012, Russia has taken on a campaign to influence political systems globally and expand Russia’s reach. Putin hopes to achieve this multipolar world order through a blend of diplomacy, military action, intelligence, energy, and trade. His objectives consist of undermining the United States and the European-led international order and its cohesiveness; furthering Putin’s legitimacy domestically by raising Russia’s profile on the world stage; promoting military, commercial, and energy interests; and encroaching on regions traditionally under the United States’ influence.5

First, Russia looked to undermine the Western and transatlantic institutions that it views as its adversaries: The United States, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Kremlin’s security establishment generally holds the view that the previous U.S. administrations actively attempted to weaken Russia both domestically and internationally, and increase its isolation. Russia is looking to do to the West what Russia believes the West has done to it, and thus has made attempts to exploit any internal tensions within these organizations. The most relevant and consequential example is Russia’s attempt to exploit the United States’ “America First” foreign policy under Donald Trump, which presents an opportunity for Russia to fill power vacuums left by the US.6

Russia has attempted to expand its influence in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, creating coalitions with emerging powers to rival the international system dominated by the West. Efforts in Latin America involve fostering relationships with authoritarian leaders and taking advantage of conflicts between the United States and its traditional partners. By becoming a more dominant presence in Latin America, Russia hopes to challenge the US’s historical sphere of influence, and to counter U.S. attempts to bring former Warsaw Pact states into NATO. Russia looks to impose its own will on former states of the USSR on its periphery, and counter the influence of the West; it is essentially looking to create “pro-Russia” buffers. This is exemplified by Russia’s aggressive actions toward Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, countries formerly under the Soviet sphere that are increasingly looking westward. Moscow has used its propaganda arm to influence these regions, and has made attempts to undermine their political transitions and prevent any integration with the West.7

One also cannot discount the benefits that Dmitry Medvedev, president of Russia from 2008 to 2012, and Putin derived domes-

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6 Ibid.

"Putin’s increasing engagement in Latin America showed to the Russian people that Russia was playing a prominent role on the world stage."

...tically in terms of popular support. Russian military activities in Latin America, as well as economic projects and diplomatic efforts with Latin American leaders, demonstrate Russia’s international influence to the Russian public, thereby promoting a sense of pride in the citizenry. For example, Putin’s increasing engagement in Latin America showed to the Russian people that Russia was playing a prominent role on the world stage, and that his actions in 2014 in Ukraine did not fully isolate Russia internationally.8

The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, or Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America (ALBA), founded to promote Latin American political and economic integration, has been a key ally to the Russian government, having ties with Moscow dating back to the Soviet Union.9 The nations of ALBA, which include Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, have a similar perspective to that of Putin’s government; they view the United States as having imperialist ambitions and a willingness to interfere in the governments of Latin America. This is not unwarranted, since the U.S. has a history of orchestrating coups and supporting dictators in the region. The member states of ALBA, however, have been perceived as authoritarian or repressive, and at times have allied themselves with governments antagonistic to the United States, such as North Korea, Syria, Zimbabwe, and, of course, Russia. Additionally, ALBA supports organizations listed by the United States as terrorist, such as Hezbollah, the Basque separatist group ETA, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). ALBA and Russia mutually benefit because they can, through Russia, veto any efforts in the United Nations Security Council to hold their governments accountable for human rights violations and/or electoral fraud.10

Russia-Venezuela Economic Diplomacy: Arms Deals

The Soviet Union had maintained economic relationships with a number of countries in Latin America beyond verbal support. For example, it relied on food sales from Argentina and Brazil, despite their conservative governments, when the United States cut off grain sales. The USSR additionally conducted hydroelectric power plant projects in Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, and irrigation programs in Venezuela and Peru. Moscow’s re-entry into the region after the fall of the Soviet Union came with a shift in its economic designs, consistent with Russia’s new post-Cold War economic restructuring. Russia looked to focus on the industries leading its economy that would address its internal needs and foster its global ascendance: arms, petroleum, electricity generation, and mining. It was within this context that Venezuela became an integral part of Russia’s re-engagement in the region.11

Moreover, throughout the 2000s, the governments of Russia and Venezuela became closer through a series of arms agreements, as Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez saw an

8 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
alliance with Russia as a counterweight to the U.S. presence in the region. The lynchpin of cooperation between Russia and Venezuela was forged in July 2006, when Chávez signed an arms deal with Russia for $3 billion, purchasing 24 Sukhoi-30 attack aircrafts, 53 military helicopters, and in return receiving Russia’s aid in building various arms factories within Venezuela. Shortly before, Venezuela had agreed to purchase 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles from the Russians. This deal went through only weeks after the United States banned American weapon sales to Venezuela, depriving it of spare parts for F-16 fighter aircrafts previously acquired from the US. The United States took these measures due to Venezuela’s ties to the FARC in Colombia as well as the governments of Iran and Cuba, and the suspicion that Venezuela was acting as a transit point for arms and individuals threatening to the United States. U.S. State Department spokesperson Tom Casey echoed this sentiment, stating “the arms purchase planned by Venezuela exceeded its defensive needs and are not helpful in terms of regional stability.” Chávez, on the other hand, asserted that these purchases were necessary for self-defense.

“The Russians are going to install a Kalashnikov rifle plant and a munitions factory so we can defend every street, every hill, every corner.”

Chávez stated. “The United States is failing in its attempts to blockade us, to disarm us”. His rhetoric in this instance captured the essence of his animosity toward the United States and his friendliness toward the Russian government.

Venezuela again made itself available to Russia against the backdrop of the 2008 crisis in Georgia, a former soviet state. Russia supported the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in their desire to break away from Georgia and become independent. However, neither the United States nor Georgia supported their cause. The U.S. brought its navy to the Black Sea during the conflict. Russia responded by sending Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela and deploying a four-ship Russian naval flotilla to first conduct joint military exercises with the Venezuelan navy and then make port calls to Cuba and Nicaragua. This was a reminder of Russia’s military capability, and its ability to strike the U.S. with nuclear weapons. “The Yankee hegemony is finished,” Chávez was reported to have said. In threatening the U.S. in its “backyard,” Russia hoped to divert U.S. resources going into winning over Russia’s traditional “sphere of influence” on its periphery. This was also significant in that it marked the first time the Russian navy had returned to Latin America since the Cold War, and the fact that Chávez demonstrated his willingness to act beyond anti-U.S. rhetoric and receive Russian armed forces that would pose a threat to the United States, and even potentially elicit military action from the Western powers. Venezuela maintained this openness to Russian military forces. In March 2009, Chávez announced that he would allow Russian strategic bombers to be based in Venezuela despite U.S. concerns.

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Most recently, following Maduro and Putin’s meeting in December 2018, strategic bombers (Russian Tu-160 “White Swans”) landed in Caracas, the Venezuelan capital. This took place in light of the US’s recent decision to pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and Russia (Russia and the U.S. accused each another of non-compliance). For the past three decades, this treaty had prohibited the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles and prompted the destruction of over 2,600 missiles, keeping the European continent free of these weapons. According to HIS Markit analyst Diego Moya-Ocampos, Russia’s recent deployment of Tu-160s shows that Russia is “trying to force the U.S. to say, ‘listen, if you withdraw from this and if you make these moves in Europe, we will make these moves as well’.”

Venezuela’s purchase of Russian arms has gone hand in hand with Venezuela’s friendliness with the Russian military. In September of 2009, Chávez agreed to buy short-range missiles from Russia, which would be in range of the U.S. presence in Colombia, Aruba, and Curacao. This was due to Chávez’s discomfort with U.S. military activity in neighboring Colombia, and so the president stated the missiles were “defense tools, because we are going to defend our country from any threat, wherever it may come from.”

Venezuela was the top client for the Russian arms industry in Latin America between 2001 and 2013, purchasing over 11 billion USD worth of Russian weapons. Russian arms sales made up 69% of Venezuela’s imported arms purchases. In fact, Venezuela purchased so many helicopters from Russia that the Russian company, Transas, decided to open a regional center for helicopter instruction in Venezuela.

As Venezuela’s economic crisis worsened, government purchases of Russian military equipment decreased, and the relationship between Venezuela and Russia became increasingly centered on transactions within Venezuela’s energy sector. Russian oil companies were able to take advantage of the favorable political conditions between the two countries to conduct their business. At first, Russia had provided Venezuela with loans guaranteed with Venezuelan oil sales. Soon, however, deals between the two countries became increasingly complex. Russia demanded more real assets as guarantees, and Venezuela complied by providing Russian companies with shares of Venezuela’s oil companies and giving them rights to Venezuela’s oil fields.

Venezuela in Crisis

During the 1950s, Venezuela had one of the highest GDPs per capita in the world. A rentier state throughout most of the 20th century, Venezuela today has the largest oil reserves in the world at 300 billion barrels, surpassing even Saudi Arabia’s. In 1982, Venezuela had the wealthiest economy in Latin America, using oil revenue to fund social programs and subsidize health care, transportation infrastructure, food, and education. Its workers were some of the highest paid in Latin America. According to OPEC, oil currently accounts for 95% of Venezuelan exports, and these oil exports make up a quarter of the country’s GDP.

However, Venezuela’s dependence on oil as a source of revenue made it especially vulnerable to fluctuations in prices on international markets. The mid-1980s saw an oil glut, which put oil prices in free fall. Subsequent economic hardship helped fuel the rise of Hugo Chávez, who came to power in 1998, and with him “Bolivarian socialism.”

Fortunately for Venezuela, from 2005 to 2014, oil prices recovered, and were high enough so that the country’s revenues could be channeled into welfare programs. Unemployment rates were cut in half and poverty rates substantially decreased. The infant mortality rate

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also declined. Global oil prices soon crashed, however, falling from $111 per barrel in 2014 to $27 per barrel in 2016. That same year, Venezuela’s GDP dropped by ten to fifteen percent. The state budget experienced a deep deficit, and the government, then under Maduro, responded by printing more money to be able to compensate workers and continue to fund welfare programs. This monetary approach triggered the hyperinflation we are seeing in Venezuela today. According to the International Monetary Fund, prices are currently rising with an annual inflation rate of around one million percent. Venezuela’s foreign exchange reserves are dwindling. These reserves peaked at $42 billion in 2009 and have declined to less than $9 billion today. This decline has made it more likely for the government and PDVSA, Venezuela’s state oil company, to default on foreign currency loans, not only losing Western creditors, but also putting Russian and Chinese interests at risk.

Venezuela’s economic woes have had far reaching and devastating consequences. Countless lives have been lost in what is considered a public health and humanitarian crisis. The Venezuelan people have not had access to basic amenities, with hospitals in utter disrepair, unable to provide basic services. “It is like something from the 19th century,” said Dr. Christian Pino of the University of the Andes Hospital, in response to a number of calamities, like a shortage of antibiotics and increasing mortality rates for newborns and their mothers. Poverty has skyrocketed and malnourishment among children has become increasingly common. Violence has also become a major problem in Venezuelan society, and, while Maduro has pledged to use the military to combat crime, various human rights groups and foreign media outlets have reported abuses and even extra-judicial killings.

Venezuela’s economic crisis has largely scared away foreign creditors. US-imposed sanctions and economic mismanagement has made Venezuela more vulnerable than ever. China had been Venezuela’s main foreign lender, but Russia has become increasingly influential, given Medvedev and Putin’s efforts to cultivate relations with Chávez and Maduro for both geopolitical and economic reasons. China also has withdrawn somewhat from its previous economic relationship with Venezuela, given the volatility of the region and the unlikely repayment of Chinese loans. Russia has stepped in and become Venezuela’s lifeline, its lender of last resort, increasing Venezuela’s reliance on Russia.

In fact, in November 2017, the Russian government came to the rescue of Venezuela, which had recently been declared by credit rating agencies to be in default on international bonds worth more than 60 billion USD. Moscow announced an agreement for the restructuring of 3.15 billion USD worth of sovereign debt, allowing Venezuela to repay the money over a ten-year period. This would not only free up cash and allow Venezuela to meet shorter-term debt obligations, but also allow the country to look to creditors apart from traditional Western economic powers within the Paris Club and IMF. Venezuela has already been denied the ability to borrow from the banks of the United States and Europe to try to restructure or pay off its debts.

Maduro’s dealings with the Russian government on not only kept Venezuela from defaulting, but also helped Maduro maintain power. The opposition, though heterogeneous, was united in its belief that Maduro’s policies were ruining the country, and the Venezuelan leader was therefore at risk of being deposed. Maduro had looked to keep a potentially discontented military at bay, and the arms deals struck with Russia legitimized him as a leader in their eyes.

In July 2017, Maduro created a legislative
body called the Constituent Assembly, which would give him virtually unlimited power. This action received international condemnation.\(^24\)

Maduro's allies won all 545 seats, giving them the power to rewrite the Venezuelan constitution and eliminate state institutions, such as the opposition-dominated National Assembly, and even fire state officials considered dissidents.\(^25\)

The majority of officials comprising the National Assembly had opposed oil deals with Russia and wanted to keep the power to veto them. The need to secure Russian loans was one of Maduro's motivations in creating this new legislative body. Russia has been one of the few international players to support him politically, endorsing Maduro's dissolution of the National Assembly while the United States, Colombia, and Brazil refused to recognize the newly formed Constituent Assembly. In superseding the National Assembly, the Constituent Assembly grants Maduro the power to make deals with Russia without needing the approval of legislators.\(^26\)

**Rosneft in Venezuela**

Coming to power in 2000, Putin felt he needed to counterbalance the influence of Russian oligarchs and reassert state control. Given Putin's thesis that Russia's economy should grow by exploiting its natural resources, the development of Rosneft as a successful oil company was crucial. He supported initiatives to prop up Rosneft as a major player in the domestic and international economy, and thus further establish Russia as a leader in the global oil industry.\(^27\)

Despite partial privatization of the company, Rosneft issued an initial public offering in 2006 to be traded on the London Stock Exchange, with a total placement value of $10.7 billion, making it the largest of Russia's companies.\(^28\)

Thus, Rosneft's dual position of being a partially private company but also at the disposal of the Kremlin allowed it to mediate between private oil companies and the state authorities responsible for the regulation of Russia's oil industry. By 2007, Rosneft had become Russia's largest oil producer.\(^29\) As Russia's national oil company, it was able to receive tax cuts and preferential access to new resources. It also assumed additional responsibilities, such as contributing a significant portion of its profits to social programs and investing in politically significant regions, such as in the Caucasus after the war with Chechnya. Thus, Rosneft became not only a profitable enterprise, but also a geopolitical instrument.\(^30\)

After the global financial meltdown in 2008, Russia began to expand investment in Venezuela's energy sector, seeing opportunity in Venezuela's vast oil fields. In October 2008, Russia's largest energy companies—Rosneft, Gazprom, Surgutneftegaz, Lukoil, and TNK-BP—

"The need to secure Russian loans was one of Maduro’s motivations in creating this new legislative body." 

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\(^{26}\) Ibid.


formed the National Oil Consortium (NOC) to consolidate previously separate efforts to exploit oil fields in Venezuela. In 2010, NOC and PDVSA began the PetroMiranda Joint Venture, which aimed to develop the massive Junin-6 oil field of reserves, which could yield more than 50 billion barrels of oil. Venezuelan law required that 60% of the project be owned by a subsidiary of PDVSA called Corporación Venezolana del Petróleo (CVP), with the other 40% held by the NOC. It was not long, however, before Rosneft consolidated its position in the region, and became the only company actively investing in Venezuela within five years of the NOC’s formation. In 2014, Russia suffered through a collapse in oil prices and economic sanctions from the West. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military activity in Ukraine’s Donbas region, the United States and Europe placed various sanctions on companies and individuals operating in Russia’s financial, defense, and energy sectors. Western oil companies had to abandon projects with Russian oil companies, like Rosneft, thus depriving them of much-needed expertise from companies such as BP Plc and ExxonMobil. The sanctions were hard-hitting because they were “designed to effectively shut down this type of oil exploration and production activity by depriving these Russian companies of the goods, technology and services that they need to do this work,” according to an anonymous senior U.S. official.

ExxonMobil, for example, was forced to give up a $720 million joint venture with Rosneft for hydrocarbon drilling in Russia’s Arctic Sea. This forced Rosneft to look to new oil fields as replacements for its reserves and thus turn to places like Latin America, particularly Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia had declined to vote in favor of the UN resolution, condemning Russia’s actions in Crimea, making them even more viable as partners in the region. Among the Russian officials sanctioned by the United States in 2014 was Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin, a further blow to Rosneft’s activity. Rosneft, already suffering from the worldwide drop in oil prices, was also in major debt from its rapid rounds of acquisitions in the early 2000s.

Instead of focusing on repairing its balance sheet and waiting for better and more stable economic and political conditions, Rosneft instead looked aggressively to expand its international business. “Taking into account the future decline of shale production in the U.S. and Canada, it is Venezuelan oil that can become the substitudional element for the receding volumes of those markets,” Sechin stated in December 2014, after Rosneft’s stake in the NOC rose to 80%.37

Venezuela’s economic volatility makes it difficult to view Rosneft’s activities in the country as ones that are purely profit-oriented. Given the risk, the returns on any investment made in the region would have to be extraordinarily high in order for the investment to be worth making. Rosneft’s activity in Venezuela somewhat reflects the developments of 2014, specifically Putin’s broader geopolitical strategy and how Venezuela’s failing and heavily indebted economy might have a role to play. Venezuela provided Rosneft with stakes in oil and gas projects at a deep discount. The following year, Rosneft and PDVSA came to an agreement where over 1.6 million tons of oil and 9 million tons of oil products would be supplied from Venezuela to Rosneft within five years, and Rosneft would put in 14 billion USD worth of investment into Venezuela’s energy sector.38 In February 2016, Rosneft and PDVSA struck a deal to increase Rosneft’s stake in Venezuelan crude oil producer Petromongas JV to 40%, and in December 2016, Rosneft took a 49.9% share of Venezuela’s state oil refining subsidiary in the United States, Citgo, as collateral for a 1.5 billion USD loan to PDVSA.39 Venezuela then used the money to pay bills and keep its oil fields in production. In December 2017, Rosneft was given a license to develop the Patão and Mejillones gas fields off-shore.40

The Petro

Another recent point of cooperation between the Venezuelan and Russian governments has come in the creation of a cryptocurrency, which was launched on February 20, 2018. This would take the form of digital cash linked to the value of Venezuela’s oil reserves. Thus, this new currency makes it possible for Venezuela to sidestep recent sanctions imposed on it by the United States, which occured in August 2017. Maduro declared that this would be “kryptonite” against U.S. power, and thanked his two Russian advisors, Fyodor Bogorodsky and Denis Dzhzhkov, for helping him combat what he deemed as American imperialism. This elicited an executive order from U.S. President Donald Trump on March 19, 2018, declaring that any buying or using of the currency would be in violation of the sanctions previously imposed, causing the Kremlin to downplay its role in creating it. The Finance Ministry of Russia denied any involvement in the creation of the “petro” despite evidence to the contrary. An executive at a Russian state bank, speaking on the condition of anonymity, stated that “people close to Putin … told him this is how to avoid the sanctions… This is how the whole thing started.”

This push toward cryptocurrencies is a challenge to the U.S. dollar as the dominating medium of exchange, and therefore a challenge to U.S. power. However, Russia has deflected claims by the US; “If we say that the only reason we do it is to avoid U.S. sanctions, then the U.S. is definitely going to be displeased about it,” the aforementioned executive claimed. “Venezuela has nothing to lose. For them it’s the only chance.” Also, Russia’s Central Bank refused to digitize the ruble to imitate Bitcoin because it would destabilize its own currency and posed risks it was not ready to handle. Thus, Venezuela becomes a test case. Venezuela’s National As-

assembly remains in opposition to the initiative, and has tried to block the creation of the new currency. According to Armando Armas, “So Russia made its stronghold here in Venezuela… Now they are using Venezuela as a guinea pig for their experiment.”

Conclusion

Putin’s hopes of legitimizing Russia on the world stage and gaining domestic support have greatly affected Venezuela, which is providing an outlet for Putin to fulfill his aims. Putin has mobilized Russian military forces in Venezuela in retaliation for U.S. interventions in what Russia considered its own affairs and other actions that have negatively affected Putin’s international ambitions. The most recent example is Russia’s deployment of “White Swan” bombers in Caracas following the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Venezuela has benefited from this relationship with Russia given that it too has an antagonistic relationship with the United States and hoped to deter an invasion. Arms deals with Russia in the 2000s came after the U.S. cut off weapons exports to Venezuela, which Chávez claimed were necessary for the country’s self-defense. Given the proximity of U.S. military bases to the South American continent and the deteriorating relationship between the two nations, Chávez felt an ever-increasing need to bolster the military.

Venezuela is also in dire need of creditors and investment due to the oil crisis. The country has been embroiled in social turmoil and lack of food and supplies, so it has looked to Russia to provide loans in exchange for preferential access to their oil fields. This has yielded a multitude of joint venture projects between Rosneft and PDVSA. Also, the recent petro cryptocurrency project is an attempt to circumvent sanctions on Venezuela and undermine the U.S. dollar.

The nature of the relationship between Russia and Venezuela extends beyond any attempt to defy the United States. Russia and the ALBA voting bloc are able to help prevent the UN Security Council from punishing their governments for human rights abuses or electoral fraud. Both Maduro and Putin derive domestic benefits from their relationship as well. Russian activity in Latin America can be advertised as evidence of Russia’s preeminence geopolitically, while for Maduro, arms deals legitimize him in the eyes of the military. Ultimately, Venezuela and Russia are natural partners in challenging the Western-dominated world order, and their mutually-beneficial relationship supports their leaders’ aims.

42 Ibid.

About the Author:
Alexandra is a junior in Yale College majoring in History, graduating in 2020. Her field of interest is Latin American geopolitics in the 21st century.
Introduction

In February 2002, The Economist coined the term “gastrodiplomacy” to describe a new effort by the government of Thailand to promote Thai cuisine across the globe, marking the start of state-sponsored food promotion campaigns which scholars such as Paul Rockower have sought to explain. Paul Rockower describes gastrodiplomacy as “winning the hearts and minds through stomachs.” Other scholars including Mary Jo Pham have expanded on this definition, adding that gastrodiplomacy is a “government’s practice of exporting its national culinary heritage as part of a public diplomacy effort to raise national brand awareness, encourage economic investment and trade, and engage on a cultural and personal level with everyday diners.” While the state is the primary actor in gastrodiplomacy, private organizations, businesses, and people are also relevant to the discussion.

The state refers to the government which is frequently initiating, directing, and funding gastrodiplomacy efforts. Private organizations and

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businesses include restaurant owners and food brands who promote food and gastrodiplomacy activities. In some countries such as South Korea, the government and private sector may have a close relationship. During the Lee Myung-bak administration, which was “self-proclaimed pro-business,” the South Korean government sought to collaborate more closely with the private sector as it undertook its globalization efforts. The “people” refer to domestic and foreign publics. The domestic public includes citizens whose support and public opinion may sway government actions and hold decision makers accountable. The foreign public is the receiving party of another country’s cuisine.

First, this paper will provide an overview of states’ domestic and international rationale for participating in gastrodiplomacy. Then, it will compare and contrast gastrodiplomacy campaigns in Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan by providing background, explaining implementation, and analyzing the outcomes. Thailand’s campaign is relatively successful and viewed as a model of gastrodiplomacy, while South Korea and Taiwan attempted to follow its footsteps but have fallen short.

Previous research analyzes gastrodiplomacy campaign execution through either a large cross-comparison, as done by Juyuan Zhang, or a focused study on an individual country such as Paul Rockower and Mary Jo Pham. Zhang examines the branding themes and message appeals of gastrodiplomacy campaigns in Japan, Malaysia, Peru, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand and finds that each presents its respective cuisine as healthy, exotic, and natural. Rockower discusses the function of national cuisine as a “niche” area for middle powers to promote its values, as well as specific efforts that Taiwan has undertaken to follow Thailand’s gastrodiplomacy model. Mary Jo Pham explains the benefits of the South Korean gastrodiplomacy campaign in spreading its national brand and encouraging investment and tourism.

However, few studies take into account the broader, unique socio-political conditions and controversies that exist in each country that may have influenced the success of [gastrodiplomacy] campaigns.

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7. Pham, “Food as Communication.”
campaign, serving as a backdrop for future gastrodiplomacy campaigns in Asia. However, it is important to note that the inception of this campaign was influenced by socio-political motivations that will be explored further in this paper. From a historical perspective, Thailand has never been colonized by a Western power; it was invaded by Japan in 1941 but entered into an alliance and did not become a colony of the Japanese empire. Thailand was previously a constitutional monarchy but now has an interim military-affiliated government following a 2014 military coup. South Korea and Taiwan were selected because they initiated their gastrodiplomacy campaigns within two years of each other—in 2008 and 2010, respectively. They also share additional similarities with each other: both are former colonies of Japan, semi-presidential (Taiwan) or presidential republics (South Korea), and are recognized as “East Asian Tiger” economies for their rapid economic growth and increased standards of living. All three countries may be categorized as middle powers. Rockower describes middle powers as neither great nor small powers, but “face the fundamental challenge of recognition in that global publics are either unaware of them, or hold negative opinions—thus requiring the need to secure global attention.” The previously mentioned similarities are intended to highlight areas in which South Korea and Taiwan, and to a certain extent, Thailand, might share common ground and experiences that shape the way they perceive their position relative to others in the international sphere. However, they still face unique challenges that influence their diplomacy choices. This paper provides a broader perspective than just a single country but also allows more in-depth analysis on each campaign than Zhang’s six-country approach. Her approach focused primarily on multiple countries’ marketing strategies and overlooked the broader socio-political conditions that influenced such strategies. The paper will also synthesize these three cases together and look for common themes as well as unique challenges. Finally, this paper will conclude with the lessons and implications from each of these cases.

Why Gastrodiplomacy?

Since a nation’s cuisine is being promoted to foreign audiences, gastrodiplomacy may seem to be a predominately outward-looking practice. There is, however, also a strong domestic component. Pham’s definition of gastrodiplomacy specifically focuses on governments’ role in promoting culinary heritage as public diplomacy abroad, but states must also convince private actors and citizens within a country of the value of gastrodiplomacy and the notion of a unified national cuisine. In an age of globalization, cuisine represents historic identities and associations between food, places, and people at national, regional, and local levels. As a result, cuisine is a unifying factor that reflects a country’s nostalgia for its past and its government’s national attempts at identity-building in the present. However, national cuisine may also be a dividing force, as a gastrodiplomacy campaign may promote just one image of “authentic” cuisine. Nevertheless, gastrodiplomacy can still evoke a sense of national pride and unity around food. For example, South Korea’s Global Hansik campaign intentionally portrays Korean cuisine in a selective, nostalgic light, reminding Koreans of a time before industrialization and modernity. Promoting Korean cuisine abroad is reflective of the promotion of a constructed Korean identity at home.

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9 Ibid.
Gastrodiplomacy also benefits a nation’s domestic economy, especially its tourism industry. Prospective tourists are exposed to other nations’ cuisines at restaurants in their home countries. Their dining experiences can foster a positive association between the cuisine and the culture it represents, thus driving consumers’ desires to visit those places. The official tourism websites of Thailand (tourismthailand.org), South Korea (english.visitkorea.or.kr), and Taiwan (eng.twan.net.tw) all feature easy-to-navigate information about food tours and food information. As of December 2018, The Tourism Authority of Thailand provides a tool for users to search for recommended restaurants based on “lifestyle” (street food, all you can eat, romantic dining, and Michelin), category (containing specific preferences such as waterfronts, gay-friendly, or budget restaurants), cuisine, destination, price, and tourism standards (such as Halal), and keywords. It also features two structured food tours called “Chiang Mai Cafe Hopping” and “Famous Bites in Bangkok Old Town.” Meanwhile, the Korea Tourism Organization dedicates an entire tab to “Food” with an introduction to Korean food, what and where to eat, how to cook, recommended food columns, and dining for vegans, vegetarians, and halal customers. Finally, as of December 2018, the Taiwan Tourism Bureau features similar information on Taiwanese cuisine (gourmet guide, snack guide, local specialties, and Taiwan’s Michelin restaurants), as well as planned snack/night market/food tours in cities such as Lugang, Taïpei, Kaohsiung, Keelung, Hsinchu, Taichung.

The structures of these three websites reveal differing motivations. Instead of limiting them, the Thai site expands the options that tourists have available to them in terms of food. The Korean site, on the other hand, is more focused on educating people on Korean food. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese site seems to be a mix of both with information on Taiwanese food culture and planned activities to experience Taiwanese cuisine in Taiwan.

Since gastrodiplomacy focuses on building a nation’s image through the spread of its cuisine, it fits under the broader notion of “cultural diplomacy,” which is the cultural exchange among different nations and peoples in order to promote better understanding of one another’s similarities and differences. Gastrodiplomacy fulfills this purpose because people in all countries can relate to cuisine even though cuisines may vary from one place to another. For example, Korean food may seem foreign to an American audience, but gastrodiplomacy can lead foreigners to develop an appreciation for it when they learn more about it. The use of cultural diplomacy to advance state interests is particularly useful and expected behavior of middle power states. According to Mary Jo Pham, gastrodiplomacy allows middle powers, such as South Korea, to distinguish themselves in the eyes of foreign consumers by creating a “positive” and “palatable” image of their national brand. Paul Rockower echoes this sentiment, emphasizing that gastrodiplomacy provides an opportunity for under-recognized, middle power nations to increase their cultural visibility and enhance their national brand. Cultural visibility is particularly significant to the case of Taiwan because it lacks diplomatic recognition from most countries.

Investing in food promotion abroad offers an opportunity for nations to spread awareness of their cuisines as well as meet a rising demand and growing international market. Studies show that Millennials spend 44% of their food dollars on eating away from home, meaning that gastrodiplomacy can access this generation and their spending power. Furthermore, the Strat-

20 Pham, “Food as Communication,” 6.
"Gastrodiplomacy provides an opportunity for under-recognized, middle power nations to increase their cultural visibility and enhance their brand."

In the discourse of gastrodiplomacy in Asia, Thailand serves as one of the earliest examples and as an ideal case study due to its relatively successful promotion of its cuisine abroad from the early 2000s through the present.

**Case 1: Thailand - First Model of Gastrodiplomacy**

Thailand’s gastrodiplomacy began in early 2001 as part of a Thai government’s effort to brand Thailand as the “Kitchen to the World” and “The food basket of Asia.” At the time, there were only around 5,500 Thai restaurants abroad, but this plan sought to increase the number to 8,000 restaurants by 2003. Under the name of the “Global Thai Campaign,” this gastrodiplomacy campaign was just one of multiple national projects related to food, fashion, health, culture, and tourism aimed to create a positive image of Thailand abroad and draw attention away from negative stereotypes associated with Thailand’s sex tourism.

Therefore, the Global Thai Campaign is placed in a political, post-colonial context, in conjunction with other culture-promoting initiatives, to change Thailand’s image abroad and market itself as an ideal travel destination and unique culture. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, and Ministry of Labor were among the government ministries involved in the implementation of the campaign.

**Origins of Thailand’s Gastrodiplomacy Campaign**

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Execution of Thailand’s Gastrodiplomacy Campaign

Thai gastrodiplomacy has been implemented in multiple ways, however, one theme has remained consistent: the role of the Thai government in conceptualizing and enforcing its campaign abroad. Multiple groups in Thailand were involved in the implementation including the Export Promotion Bureau, Ministry of Commerce, media and advertising organizations, as well as finance and education support. First, it created “Thai Select”, which certifies overseas Thai restaurants as “authentic” and of “high quality” based on inspections and criteria such as being open for at least a year, operating at least five days a week, being certified by Visa or American Express credit card companies, employing Thai chefs with Thai cooking backgrounds, using materials and equipment from Thailand, and offering at least six Thai dishes on the menu. These standards reveal the government priorities regarding Thai restaurants— to be operational and accessible, convenient for foreign audiences, and “Thai” in its employee demographics, educational backgrounds, methods, and food offerings.

Another method used by Thailand to promote its food abroad is by training Thai chefs to work abroad, which had been supported by special visa arrangements with other countries so chefs could get work visas. For example, New Zealand has a special visa issued specifically to chefs from Thailand to promote Thai food. The “Thai Chefs Work Visa” allows Thai citizens who are also qualified, experienced Thai chefs to work in New Zealand for up to 3 years and are eligible for a one year extension. The Thai Chefs Work Visa is a sharp contrast to the visa process in other countries such as the United States, where there is not a specific visa for chefs - let alone from Thailand— and can vary depending on the nature of the job. Efforts by the Thai government to facilitate training and sending chefs abroad not only allow Thai citizens to...
experience another culture, but it also provides opportunities for those who may have received culinary training from government programs to go abroad and spread Thai cuisine.

Results of Thailand’s Gastrodiplomacy Campaign

Overall, Thailand’s gastrodiplomacy campaign is highly-regarded for its ability to increase the number of Thai restaurants abroad from around 5,500 in 2001 to over 13,000 in 2008. According to Sarunya Lertputtarak, this increased presence of Thai food and culture abroad can provide a good cultural experience by foreigners and increase tourists’ intentions to visit or revisit Thailand. Likewise, through interactions between tourists and restaurant owners, Thai restaurants positioned themselves as spaces to teach Thai culture and treat customers in a polite, friendly manner that increased customer satisfaction towards Thailand and Thai food. This success has inspired other nations to use national cuisine to advance their interests, while also spurring broader, deeper engagement via gastrodiplomacy between Thailand and other countries.

Even though Thai gastrodiplomacy began in 2001, it continues to be a priority today. In May 2018, the Bangkok Post reported that the ‘Kitchen of the World’ campaign is getting a reboot, citing the Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak’s speech at the Thaifex: World Food of Asia convention emphasizing the need to boost food exports and get Thai food products up to international safety and hygiene standards, as well as continue supporting Thai restaurants abroad. The continued advancement of Thai cuisine abroad and increasing food exports can be observed in the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Thai missions abroad. Using the featured stories under “Social & Culture News” on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, multiple trends emerge that provide insight into Thailand’s gastrodiplomacy efforts.

Figure 1 in Appendix A shows a time-series graph of the number of articles published per month under this category of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand’s website, as well as a list of the articles found. Articles were selected based on keywords such as “food,” “gastronomy,” and “cuisine.”

From the period of January through December 2018, over 36 news releases contained keywords such as “food” and “gastronomy” in conjunction with events, festivals, and other activities related to Thai missions abroad. At the time of this research, only posts from 2018 could be retrieved on the site. Over half of them were published in the months of May (20%) and June (34%). Given that these two months are popular times for travel and tourism, it may suggest that Thailand is purposely promoting itself abroad in the early summer in order to appeal to prospective tourists abroad. The scope of these events range from the Thai Ambassador to Kuwait giving an interview on the TV program “With Ambassador” to introduce Thai dishes to the Kuwait audience to Thai night markets and street food in the United Arab Emirates.

At least seven engagements were in collaboration with other countries or groups such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the ASEAN Bazaar, held in the residence of the Thai ambassador in Buenos Aires or at the ASEAN Food and Culture...
Festival in Brasilia.\textsuperscript{41,42}

A majority of the recent efforts mentioned are not in the United States or Western European countries—many were instead in countries such as Brazil, Japan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Poland.\textsuperscript{43} Given that the early campaign focused more on the United States and other Western countries, current activities suggest that the Thai government is broadening and deepening the scope of its gastropedipolymy campaign beyond Western countries and restaurants to other nations.

One factor that may have influenced this shift from Western to non-Western countries as a target of Thai gastropedipolymy efforts are the worsening relations between Thailand and Western countries following Thailand’s 2014 military coup and resulting military government. On May 22, 2014, former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry issued a statement condemning the Thai military on the suspension of its constitution and seizure of government, expressing concerns for the detainment of senior political leaders, freedom of press, human rights, and democracy.\textsuperscript{44} He also emphasized the negative implications that the coup will have for the U.S.-Thai relationship and relationship between the two militaries.\textsuperscript{45} The Secretary-General of the United Nations also issued a statement expressing its concern for the situation in Thailand, urging parties to refrain from violence and preserve human rights.\textsuperscript{46} Finally, the Council of the European Union issued its conclusions on Thailand, explaining that it has re-evaluated its engagement with Thailand, suspended official visits to and from Thailand, and refused to sign the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement until a democratically elected government is restored.\textsuperscript{47} The impact of this diplomatic fallout from the 2014 military coup in Thailand and establishment of a military government on Thai public diplomacy efforts warrant further attention in future studies.

**Case 2: South Korea**

**Origins of South Korean gastropedipolymy**

Inspired by the success of Thailand and other gastropedipolymy campaigns in the region, South Korea officially announced the Global Hansik Campaign at the 2008 Korean Food Expo with the objective of promoting Korean food as a leading ethnic cuisine in the world by 2017.\textsuperscript{48,49} In 2009, steps were taken to implement it with the Hansik Foundation Act and Hansik Globalization Development Agency, in which 36 members from government, academia, and food industry executives including former First Lady Kim Yoon-ok took part.\textsuperscript{50} Similar to Thailand, South Korea’s gastropedipolymy campaign was an intra-governmental effort but key ministries were the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism.\textsuperscript{51,52}

Furthermore, the campaign was consistent with other political goals at the time such as former President Lee Myung-bak’s “Global Korea” strategy, which sought to forge closer ties between the government and the private sector, increase South Korean soft power abroad, and...
advertise South Korea as a global brand. The Global Hansik campaign fits within the scope of Global Korea because it advances those goals as the private business expertise and activities assist in the execution of the Hansik campaign abroad.

South Korean gastrodiplomacy also serves as a means of nation-building and promoting a selective interpretation of the Korean identity. Royal court food from the Joseon dynasty was selected as the representative of Korean food abroad due to its historical significance as traditional cuisine passed down over generations and containing ingredients from many parts of the country, as well as its ability to forge Korean nationalism by creating a refined image of a sophisticated, noble Korea. Kim also asserts that using court food from the Joseon dynasty allows the South Korean government to bypass darker periods of Korean history such as Japanese colonial rule, American occupation, the Korean War, and the division of Korea and instead promote a more positive image.

**The Implementation of the Global Hansik Campaign**

The Global Hansik campaign was implemented in a similar manner to that of Thailand. Like Thailand’s campaign, it focused on the health aspects of national cuisine. The South Korean government branded Korean food with the following characteristics: natural ingredients and recipes, health and well-being through organic, fermented, and environmentally-friendly food such as kimchi and soy sauce, and low calorie diet using mainly vegetables and seafood as opposed to meat. Although meat-heavy Korean food such as Korean barbecue exist and are popular abroad, it seems that the South Korean government is instead choosing to focus the attention of the campaign on the healthier aspects of Korean food.

Like Thailand, South Korea has also hosted multiple overseas events to promote its cuisine. For example, in 2011, the Korean Food Foundation (now known as the Korean Food Promotion Institute) collaborated with nine NYC Korean restaurants to drive a food truck around New York City and give out free Korean lunches. This event brought Korean food to new American audiences who might not otherwise

"Royal court food from the Joseon dynasty was selected as the representative...due to its historical significance...as well as its ability to forge Korean nationalism by creating a refined image of a sophisticated, noble Korea."

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53 Kalinowski and Cho, “Korea’s Search for a Global Role,” 245.
55 Ibid., 9.
57 The Korean Food Foundation was renamed to the Korean Food Promotion Institute in 2017.
58 Pham, “Food as Communication,” 10.
Korean food themselves. The Global Hansik campaign also created the “K-Food Supporters Alliance” which invites foreign university students in Korea to participate in food tastings, food tours, and other cultural events with the hope that they will return to their home countries and spread their knowledge of Korean food and culture.59

A defining characteristic of Korean gastrodiplomacy is that it capitalizes on the growing popularity of the Hallyu wave (Korean wave), which is responsible for the mass spread of Korean pop culture, music, and film/TV across the world and enhanced South Korea’s image as a culture producer and exporter.60 Around the same time as the gastrodiplomacy campaign, the South Korean government also invested heavily in building up and exporting K-pop. In the 2013 fiscal year, the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism allocated 319 billion won (USD $286.4 million) to support Hallyu assistance and grants, with 8.7 billion won (USD $7.8 million) specifically for promoting Hallyu, revealing the importance that the South Korean government places on Hallyu and K-pop.61 Therefore, the Global Hansik campaign is in addition to the broader Korean wave that can benefit from the growing awareness of Korean culture as a result of K-pop.

For example, Hansik.org, the main website of the KFPI, features a ‘K-Food Collaboration Album’ of Korean food-themed music by Korean artists such as Jay Park, Electro Boyz and Big Star, Teen Top, and ZEA: A available for the public to download.62 The site also has interviews and video clips with K-pop idols promoting food such as “Super Junior promotes Korean Bibimbap.”63 Zhang refers to the use of local celebrities and figures as the “opinion leaders strategy.”64 Drawing a connection between Korean entertainment and the government gastrodiplomacy campaign reveals government-business collaboration as government pays the Korean entertainment industry to use its global popularity and name brand recognition to help in the campaign.

Korean gastrodiplomacy and Hansik campaign is also reflected in Korean TV and film culture as well. An early example of using television to expose audiences to Korean food was the 2003 Korean drama “Jewel in the Palace” (Dae Jang Geum), which was exported to over 91 countries and showed traditional Korean cooking and culture.65 More recent shows in-
clude Let’s Eat (Siksyareul Habsida) (2013) and Flower Boy Ramen Shop (Kkotminam Ramyeongage) (2011). Using tools such as social media and TV shows may prove to be an effective way to promote Korean cuisine abroad because it is creating interest “organically” through culture and the Hallyu wave rather than through state-sponsored efforts. A study by Kim et al. found that Korean TV food dramas increase international viewers’ recognition of Korean food and Korean traditional culture and leads to an improved perception of South Korea’s national image after directly experiencing Korean food.

The Korea Tourism Organization has collaborated with notable chefs and Korean entertainment stars to develop food tours and combine Korean food culture with TV. Packaging Korean food alongside Korean pop culture creates indirect associations between the two and can be another inspiration for foreigners to travel to Korea to try Korean food. While some of the celebrities featured may be top Korean chefs, many of them are not in the food industry but instead film, music, and TV stars who are not necessarily experts in Korean cuisine.

Gastrodiplomacy Results

Promoting Korean cuisine to the world with celebrity promotions and advanced cooking classes comes at a hefty price of nearly $1 billion. Although the stated key objective at the start of the Global Hansik campaign was to raise Korean cuisine as among the top five ethnic cuisines in the world by 2017, determining whether the campaign met this is a challenge as critics argue it is unmeasurable. Financial Times correspondent Christian Oliver criticized the Hansik campaign for lacking breadth and argued that Korea is “seeking to quantify the unquantifiable” since no objective, official international ranking system exists to determine the most popular ethnic cuisines and whether South Korea is among them. Without an effective method of measuring progress and achievement, the South Korean government is, in a sense, seeking to fulfill an unreachable goal, which could jeopardize the gastrodiplomacy campaign if the large amount of resources cannot be justified or defended politically.

While the impact of the campaign on the global scale is unclear, it still made an impact on a more local level. A survey by the South Korean Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs found that the percentage of New Yorkers who were aware of Korean food increased from 24.2% in 2011 to about 64.3% in 2016. It also found that more Korean restaurant franchises have opened up overseas, from 234 restaurants by 41 chains (2012) to 732 restaurants by 73 chains (2016). While these numbers look promising, they do not reveal the inefficient allocation of time and resources associated with the project. The South Korean National Assembly Budget Office (NABO) reported that around 23 billion won (USD $20.65 million) had been spent on it, and that after the campaign was pushed, similar projects by different organizations arose, leading to inefficiency and a waste of funds. The Global Hansik campaign cost the South Korean government a large amount of money that was being used ineffectively and only yielded limited results, which negatively influences domestic public opinion towards the project and makes it difficult to justify its costs for the continuation of gastrodiplomacy activities.

Finally, political controversy and corruption charges against South Korean politicians and business conglomerates have negatively impacted the image and effectiveness of the Global Hansik campaign as well. Although the

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68 Jeon, Global Report on Food Tourism, 36.
69 Pham, “Food as Communication,” 16.
70 Ibid.
campaign started under the Lee Myung-bak administration, it continued under Park Geun-hye. After she was arrested and jailed for corruption, others close to her were also investigated and charged including Cha Eun-taek, an influential figure in the Korean culture scene as an ad film director who had produced some content for the Hansik campaign. These arrests, although not directly related to the Global Hansik campaign, created a negative public perception toward the Ministry of Culture and related departments. Former president Lee Myung-bak was also indicted for embezzlement and bribery, and former First Lady Kim Yoon-ok, who was a leading figure in the Hansik campaign, also faced investigation. Given the large role that Lee and Kim played in promoting Korean globalization and the spread of Korean culture and cuisine abroad, these scandals exacerbate the criticisms of Korean gastrodiplomacy and overshadow its achievements.

Despite the controversies of its first campaign, South Korea shows signs of a re-launch of its Global Hansik campaign, with the appointment of Yoon Suk-ja as the new Chairperson of the Korean Food Promotion Institute in 2016. Before assuming this role, she already had a strong culinary profile from her experience as a teacher at multiple culinary institutes, involvement in overseas fairs and major summits, and success of her book, The Beauty of Korean Food: With 100 Best-Loved Recipes, which has been published in eight languages. Among her priorities are standardizing the names of Korean dishes in major languages, promoting both traditional court food and more creative, “contemporary” foods, and educating Korean chefs who can be sent overseas. The previous experience from the old campaign offer knowledge and lessons about global markets that can be useful. The 2009 Strategy for the Globalization of Korean Food found that some of the cultural factors and obstacles that Korean restaurants serving foreigners abroad faced included having an excessive number of side dishes, unsanitary communal utensils, communication difficulties, and the lack of images and explanations of items on the menu.

Todd English, an American celebrity chef told The Korea Herald, “[The Global Hansik campaign] was too ethnic. It wasn’t fun. People (American consumers) didn’t understand it… It was too serious, you got Americans the wrong way.” English explains that Korean food should market its health benefits and encourage more Korean fusion. Lee Chang-il, the deputy director of the Food Industry Promotion Division in the Ministry of Agriculture, says that “Korea should give its campaign to globalize its food more time to succeed” and assures that the government will continue to globalize Korean food and support the private sector in globalizing Korean food without telling it what to do.

**Case 3: Taiwan**

**Origins of the Taiwanese Gastrodiplomacy Effort**

Inspired by the success of the Global Thai campaign, the Republic of China (Taiwan) government also initiated its own gastrodiplomacy efforts under the Ma Ying-jeou administration. According to Taiwan Today, an English-language publication of the Government Information Office of the Republic of China, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economy Affairs proposed a plan passed by the Executive Yuan to invest NT $1.1 billion (US $35.8 million) from 2010 to 2013 in order to “internationalize local” and “localize international” Taiwanese food.

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77 Ibid.
78 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Strategy for Globalization of Korean Food (plan), 7.
80 Lee, “Korea’s ‘hansik’ globalization bears fruit.”
also expected to boost Taiwanese tourism, attract nearly NTD $2 billion (USD $65 million) in private investments, establish 3,500 local and overseas restaurants, and create 50 new brands and 10,000 jobs. It was sponsored by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, but other players such as the Taiwan Tourism Bureau, which is an organization under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, also played an important role.

Like the other two countries mentioned before, Taiwan forges its middle power identity through cultural diplomacy, but faces a unique issue of weak diplomatic recognition. Historical controversy between the People’s Republic of China (China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) has left Taiwan in a precarious political situation where it lacks formal diplomatic relations and allies with a majority of countries. As a result, it relies heavily on public diplomacy to bypass its diplomatic isolation and continue to spread its value and culture abroad. Gas trodiplomacy offers Taiwan an area to distinguish itself from Mainland China and educate foreign audience about Taiwanese culture.

**Execution of Taiwanese Gastrodiplomacy**

The NTD $1.1 billion (USD $35.8 million) investment in gastrodiplo macy funds the Taiwanese gastrodiplo macy campaign that involves hosting international gourmet festivals, sending Taiwanese chefs to international culinary competitions, establishing Taiwanese restaurants in overseas shopping malls, department stores, and airports, and establishing a Taiwanese food foundation.

One of the most successful Taiwanese chains is Din Tai Fung, known for its xiaolongbao (soup dumplings). Even before Taiwan’s gastrodiplo macy efforts, Din Tai Fung already achieved international success and recognition with chains across the world and recognition by the New York Times. It has over a hundred chains in 13 different countries (Taiwan, Japan, United States, Main land China, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Australia, United Arab Emirates, and the Philippines). Another example is 85°C Bakery Cafe, a Taiwanese bakery chain, which was founded in 2003 and now has over 1,000 locations worldwide. Both were already recognized internationally prior to Taiwan’s gastrodiplo macy campaign, yet still served as an ideal for aspiring Taiwanese restaurants opening abroad.

Similar to South Korea, Taiwan also saw a large number of food-themed film and TV dramas both before and after it launched its gastrodiplo macy efforts. This ranges from shows such as Love Recipe 料理情人梦 (2011), Hap-

Rockower, “Projecting Taiwan,” 110.
Ibid., 126.
"According to the... Taiwanese Tourism Bureau, 67.78 percent of respondents said that “gourmet food or delicious snacks” was one of the top reasons that attracted visitors to go sightseeing in Taiwan."

Results
Taiwanese gastrodiplomacy succeeded in attracting more tourists because of its cuisine. According to the 2017 Survey Report on Visitors Expenditure and Trends in Taiwan by the Taiwan Tourism Bureau, 67.78 (68 persons per hundred) of respondents said that “gourmet food or delicious snacks” was one of the top reasons that attracted visitors to go sightseeing in Taiwan, followed by scenery (60 persons per hundred), and shopping (26 persons per hundred). Likewise, 81.98 (82 persons per hundred) of respondents indicated that night markets were the #1 spots they visited, especially Shilin Night Market (46) and Raohe Night Market (14).

These numbers have increased since 2011, when the reasons why inbound visitors decided to take a sightseeing trip to Taiwan was for scenery (61 persons per hundred), food (41), and customs/culture (35). Night markets were also the main spot visited for tourists (74) with Shilin Night Market (47) and Kaohsiung Liouhe Night Market (25) as the most popular night markets. In terms of the ranking of activities of inbound visitors in 2011, shopping was ranked as #1 (83 persons per hundred), followed by night market sightseeing (74) and historical relics sightseeing (36).

These statistics reveal that even in 2011,
Taiwan was already well-regarded for its food, as night markets and Taiwanese food were large parts of the inbound tourist experience. However, the number and percentage of tourists that came to Taiwan for these reasons increased based on the data from 2017. Since Taiwan's gastrodiplomacy campaign began in 2011, and gastrodiplomacy efforts can benefit the inbound tourism industry, it seems that Taiwan's gastrodiplomacy efforts improved during this time period.

The success and popularity of Taiwanese night markets inspired seasonal night market events overseas such as 626 Night Market in Arcadia, California, which was founded in 2012 by Jonny Hwang, the OC Night Market in Orange County, the NorCal Night Market in the San Francisco Bay Area, and many others in places such as Koreatown, Monterey Park, Long Beach, Philadelphia, Minneota, New Jersey, New York, Vancouver, and Atlanta. These night markets have "authentic" Asian street food, as well as creative, photogenic Asian fusion foods that drew attention on social media and Instagram. The Taiwanese government, particularly the Taiwan Tourism Bureau, has been particularly active in taking advantage of these opportunities to promote these night markets by acting as a sponsor, as well as giving out prizes and plane tickets to Taiwan at these night markets. Witnessing the power of social media in promoting these overseas night markets, the Taiwan Tourism Bureau also took advantage of Instagram to spread awareness of its brand with the hashtag #timefortaiwan. Appendix B contains photos from the Instagram account of Taiwan Tourism Bureau, North America (ttb_na) at the 626 Night Market, where it raffled away prizes and plane tickets if people took a picture and posted it on Instagram. The Taiwan Tourism Bureau has separate accounts for different regions such as North America, Singapore (traveltaiwansg), India (ttb_in), Australia and New Zealand (ttb_aunz), and Turkey (ttbturkey), which suggests targeted, localized messages to each region.

Despite its efforts to distinguish itself from the Mainland, Taiwan has faced challenges in determining its culinary identity. On one hand, gastrodiplomacy – in particular, with bubble tea – has enhanced Taiwan's culinary image abroad and had some tangible economic and political benefits. In the Philippines, Chatime, a Taiwanese tea house franchise, opened its first store in the Philippines in 2011, and is now operating over 40 stories in Metro Manila as well as almost 400 stores in nine different Southeast Asian countries. Not only has this expansion benefited Taiwanese investors and overseas recognition for Taiwanese tea, but it is also taken as a successful exam by the Tsai administration to promote its "New Southbound Policy" which encourages Taiwanese investors to invest more in Southeast Asian countries and avoid over reliance on Mainland China.

Despite the success of milk tea and Taiwanese brands like Din Tai Fung and 85°C Bakery Cafe, Taiwanese gastrodiplomacy efforts have struggled in defining its cuisine. May Chang, a chief executive at the Foundation of Chinese Dietary Culture, told BBC in a June 2015 interview that it is hard to find one type of food to represent Taiwan given that a strong sense of a 'Taiwanese' identity only started to emerge since 2000, and given that Taiwan's history is closely tied to mainland China and Japan. This socio-political uncertainty can cause confusion as Taiwanese cuisine is seeking to distinguish itself from Chinese cuisine, yet may actually share many similarities with it.

Although 85°C Bakery Cafe is considered a "successful" example of Taiwanese food making an international impact, it was caught in the crossfire between China and Taiwan when Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen visited a branch in Los Angeles in August 2018. Since Tsai is a part of the Democratic Progressive Party in Tai-

95 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
wan, which has historically advocated Taiwanese independence, cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and Beijing have been increasingly tense since her inauguration in 2016. After this visit, Chinese companies and netizens responded with Chinese food delivery apps such as Meituan-Dianping and Ele.me removing the chain from their apps, investors selling their shares of 85°C’s parent company Gourmet Master leading to a 9.8% drop in stock, boycotting the 600 branches in China, and hacking its Chinese site.\textsuperscript{101} In response, 85°C affirmed its “firm support” of the 1992 Consensus which states that Taiwan and China are “one China”, thus sparking criticism in Taiwan for giving into Chinese demands.\textsuperscript{102} Such a controversy reveals a unique challenge that Taiwan faces in promoting its cuisine overseas. While their most successful chains spread Taiwanese culture and food abroad, they are not exempted from the political realities that limits Taiwan’s reach and puts them into conflict and confrontation with the Mainland.

**Comparing Gastrodiplomacy Campaigns**

**Gastrodiplomacy and Identity**

The theme of national identity runs consistently across the three gastrodiplomacy campaigns in Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan. Gastrodiplomacy involves national identity as national governments make conscious decisions when selecting dishes or types of food to brand itself with and creating a united image of the national cuisine. This may cause controversy as government-promoted national cuisine becomes a representative of that country, thus uniting the country but also failing to take into account the diversity within society. In South Korea, royal court food from the Joseon Dynasty is chosen because of its tradition as well as the fact that it is untouched by the darker episodes of South Korea’s recent history such as Japanese colonial rule and the Korean War. As a result, South Korea’s gastrodiplomacy becomes a part of the government’s plan to enhance its image as a middle power and reflects its view towards its own past and historical memory that presents Korea as a place of tradition, culture, and strength.

Meanwhile, Thailand’s gastrodiplomacy campaign was treated as an opportunity to rebrand itself from negative associations of Thailand as a place of sex tourism to a country of rich culture, unique foods, and tourism. It ensures that a more consistent image of Thailand is presented at restaurants abroad by offering incentives such as the “Thai Select” certificates and funding to restaurants that met government-approved standards. While variations still may exist across different Thai restaurants, these types of standards help maintain foreign audiences’ expectations as they may find similar menus, dishes, and hospitality. As Thailand’s campaign becomes increasingly successful abroad, it is a source of pride for Thailand and a source of envy to other countries.

Taiwan’s gastrodiplomacy efforts are closely related to its attempts to understand and its own national identity in the midst of diplomatic uncertainty and tension with Mainland China. Taiwan’s historic ties with Mainland China, Japan, and its own indigenous populations mean that some of its cuisine share characteristics with other countries, thus impacting some of its claims to being “authentically Taiwanese” food. Nevertheless, aspects of Taiwanese food culture such as night markets and bubble tea have reached considerable popularity among international audiences.

**Common Techniques and Strategies**

All three campaigns promoted their cuisine at international food events and festivals both within their country and overseas. In some cases, these were Embassy or Consulate General-hosted events, which Thailand continues to do throughout the year. While early efforts by Thailand seemed to target the West, now most of the recent food promotion events happen in non-Western countries like Kuwait, Moscow, or Morocco.\textsuperscript{103} For South Korea, many of the efforts by the Korean Food Promotion Institute

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, “Social & Cultural News.”
seem to exclusively target urban, international cities with the help of partners in New York, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Seattle, Tokyo, Yanbian (a Korean autonomous prefecture in Mainland China), Shanghai, Hong Kong, London, Paris, Sydney, Auckland, and Jakarta. In others, it may involve government participation in local events such as the Taiwan Tourism Bureau’s sponsorship of and participation in the 626 Night Market in California. Taiwan’s efforts seem to be in the West but also in Southeast Asia, perhaps given its plans to orient away from a dependence on Mainland China. They have also developed educational materials and provided funding to train chefs in the national cuisine so that they can work at restaurants overseas, and constantly send top chefs to international cooking competitions.

The use of pop culture in advancing or representing national cuisine and food culture was used heavily by South Korea and, to a lesser degree, Taiwan. The South Korean government directly employed celebrities in the Korean entertainment industries to sing or appear in videos related to Korean food and gastrodiplomacy. Although the Taiwanese entertainment industry is not as far-reaching on the international stage as that of South Korea, it still indirectly added to Taiwan’s gastrodiplomacy efforts as more Taiwanese food-themed television series and films were being made and exported to other countries. Furthermore, the effectiveness of tying a close association between Korean pop culture stars and the Global Hansik campaign is unclear. The Korean government invested a great deal of money to produce content filled with celebrity endorsements, but doing so could impact the authenticity of the promotions. Furthermore, many of these videos were promoted on the food sites of Hansik.org or the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism websites, which could limit the visibility and reach of these materials.

Websites were an important component of each campaign, but only South Korea’s website is still live. In 2011, the Republic of China’s (Taiwan) Government Information Office launched a food culture website (http://taiwanfoodculture.net) which was available in Chinese, English, French, Japanese, and Spanish. The website is now defunct. Although the government-created website is no longer operating, other information on Taiwanese cuisine and gastrodiplomacy is available from private organizations. For example, the Foundation of Chinese Dietary Culture (FCDC), a private foundation founded in 1989 that promotes Chinese dietary and culinary culture, maintains regular information about ongoing activities, events, and scholarships on its website in English and Chinese (www.fcdc.org.tw). Given that FCDC was established before Taiwan’s gastrodiplomacy ef-

forts, it already had an established mission and expertise that has allowed it to continue. Thailand also had a website (www.thaikitchen.org) to accompany its gastrodipomacy efforts. Like Taiwan's website, however, it is also defunct.

Of the three campaigns, only South Korea's gastrodipomacy website (hansik.org) is still running. This site was an important component of the Global Hansik campaign and was run by the Korean Food Promotion Institute, a public institute established by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, and provides extensive information about the stories behind specific Korean dishes, popular Korean recipes, and Korean restaurants in different countries. The website is available in six different languages (English, Korean, Mandarin Chinese, Japanese, French, and Spanish). Many of the pop culture materials related to South Korea's gastrodipomacy efforts such as the K-Food music playlist and celebrity interviews are also posted on this site. Based on the activity under the “KFPI News” section, the website was frequently updated and active throughout 2016 and 2017; however, activity has since waned - only two updates have been posted on February 9, 2018 related to the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics.interestingly, none of the three sites were hosted on government sites even though they were launched by their respective governments. This might be an attempt to separate the image of national cuisine from the larger government influence behind the campaign. In other words, promoting culture and cuisine too obviously may come off as propaganda or as unnatural to foreign audiences. Even though the national government may have a huge influence on gastrodipomacy campaigns, the website is playing it down. Furthermore, Taiwan and Thailand's websites had simple domain names that explained what they were about - “taiwanfoodculture” and “thaikitchen” - which are easily understandable names for foreign audiences. South Korea, however, chose “hansik” which means “Korean food” in the Korean language instead of promoting it under an English translation or name.

"None of the three sites were hosted on government sites even though they were launched by their respective governments...promoting culture and cuisine too obviously may come off as propaganda or unnatural."

Unique Challenges

Despite enormous amounts of money and resources, Taiwan and South Korea fell short of their objectives and failed to reach the same level of success as Thailand in their gastrodipomacy efforts. In addition to a lack of measurable indicators of success, Taiwan and South Korea each faced unique controversies and obstacles that made it difficult to succeed.

Although Taiwanese gastrodiplomacy has benefited the perception of Taiwan and helped the Taiwanese tourism industry, the strong political and nationalistic implications of promoting “Taiwanese” cuisine can hinder its success. The recent controversy with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen's visit to 85°C Bakery Cafe and the companies subsequent defense and assurances of the “One China” principle of the 1992 Consensus raise the questions as to whether or not a Taiwanese restaurant can safely be “Taiwanese” without endangering its business and reputation among Chinese audiences. Furthermore, the most successful Taiwanese chains such as Din Tai Fung and 85°C Bakery Cafe were already famous internationally long before the government gastrodiplomacy campaign started. Few other Taiwanese franchises have achieved global success since then, making it difficult to determine the level of success or failure of the campaign in terms of enhancing the profile of new Taiwanese brands. Even the success of established brands struggle to avert diplomatic controversy that threatens their businesses.

South Korea’s gastrodiplomacy campaign also suffered for political reasons, specifically from the negative perceptions associated with government corruption and wasted resources. Although Park Geun-hye did not pursue the campaign as actively as her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, did, she still supported the campaign and many of her close associates worked in the Ministry of Culture and other government departments that participated in its implementation—however, the corruption and scandals within her administration implicated many key officials also created a negative perception of the gastrodiplomacy campaign. As a result, internal politics and inefficient policies overshadowed the positive efforts and intentions of the campaign.

In 2008, the Korean government started a project to open an upscale, state-run Korean restaurant in Manhattan and ended up spending almost 80 billion won (USD $71.8 million); however, five years into the project, the plan fell apart and was considered to be a “money-losing operation.” Likewise, even as new Korean restaurants were opened up abroad during the Global Hansik campaign, many of them ultimately closed down. As of December 2018, of the 40 Korean restaurants in New York listed under “World of Korean Restaurants” on Hansik.org, 11 of them have closed down. The open or closed status was determined by cross-referencing the listed restaurants from Hansik.org on Yelp. These challenges ultimately led to a sense of distrust and lack of faith in the campaign, as well as the enormous amount of money and resources that made it inefficient.

Conclusion

Ultimately, Asian gastrodiplomacy campaigns provided an opportunity for Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan to enhance their national and cultural brands to international audiences. While they adopted similar strategies such as funding overseas restaurants and hosting food promotion events, the three campaigns achieved varying levels of success in reaching their objectives as a result of unique socio-political factors at home. Thailand, which is home to the original gastrodiplomacy campaign, achieved the greatest level of success in boosting its international image and food profile that it continues to promote today in non-Western countries. Meanwhile, Taiwanese cuisine has also managed to promote its brand – most notably bubble tea and night markets – to other countries, but still struggles to promote a national identity while in the position of overwhelming diplomatic isolation. Finally, South Korea has devoted enormous amounts of money and resources to promote Korean cuisine and link it to the Hallyu wave, but struggled to justify its purpose and level of success to the Korean public when people questioned its value.

Investment in gastrodiplomacy efforts in Asian countries reveal the value that nations place on its cuisine as a part of its domestic national identity, as well as the representation

109 Doo, “Cultural Ministry denies being ‘taken over’ by Choi, Cha.”
110 Park, “Don’t be ethnic in K-food globalization.”
of self that is promoted to the international community. As these campaigns require large amounts of money and resources, governments must adjust their strategies and implementation. They are held accountable by their domestic publics as well as market forces abroad. Nevertheless, gastrodiplomacy represents an increasingly important aspect of cultural diplomacy that states are learning how to utilize.

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Kim, Da-sol. “Sharing recipe for success.” The Korea
ACROSS:
1. "City of Life"
5. Nuno Monteiro’s kind of revolution
6. Delicacy of the Thai heartland
9. The answer is Muriel Wang
17. Course that contributes to #6 book sales
20. Leader completely unrelated to the death of Jamal Khashoggi
21. European capital we never ratified
22. Smallest military in NATO
25. "It’s the real me, I assure you"
26. Teddy carries this
27. Director of Yale World Fellows Program
28. Only country whose national flag is not rectangular
30. Twitter handle of the most followed world leader outside the U.S.
Email a picture of your completed (by hand) crossword to yris@yira.org. Make sure your full name is written clearly somewhere on this page. **The first 5 people to send in a completed crossword will receive a cash prize!** One entry per person allowed. Corrections not allowed; the crossword must be complete and correct upon submission.

DOWN:
1. Most likely to call another foreign leader "son of a whore"
2. Most googled TV show is the history of this Chinese dynasty
3. Yemen, except in the water
4. To place inside
5. Only nation to lose two wars against flightless birds
6. Gong xi fa cai! Happy year of the___
7. Location of China’s only overseas military base
8. First elected female head of state in Africa
9. Puts the "offensive" in offensive realism
10. Late leader of the Lion City
11. Nuclear guru and Egyptian national (hint: Nobel Peace Prize)
12. Location of China’s only overseas military base
13. First elected female head of state in Africa
14. Puts the "offensive" in offensive realism
15. Bismarck’s alternative to speeches and resolutions
16. Theresa May’s least favorite city
17. Indonesia’s first unicorn company
18. Co-founder of Alibaba
19. Indonesia’s first unicorn company
20. Very long and thin
21. This country recently ended a long, long war with Ethiopia
22. It’s fun to stay at the ____ (our 501(c)(3))
Effective or Not?
Causal Features of United Nations Peacekeeping in Protecting Civilians

Introduction
The fall of the Communist bloc in 1991 brought high hopes for the international community. In particular, there arose an “early optimism about the potential” of the United Nations to “help settle internal conflicts.”\(^1\) Previously, the constant clashes between the United States and the Soviet Union and the resulting vetoes prevented the United Nations Security Council from intervening to maintain international security. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Security Council seemed to be free to finally exercise its primary responsibility through the active deployment of UN peacekeepers.

This hope was unfortunately shattered by the marked failures of the UN peacekeeping operations of the 1990s. In Rwanda, understaffed Belgian troops could do nothing but watch as Hutu rebels massacred Tutsi refugees and moderate Hutus. In Srebrenica, Serb forces held Dutch peacekeepers hostage and killed more than 8,000 Bosniaks. These tragedies increased skepticism about the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. This doubt still remains even after the United Nations resolved to emphasize its protection of civilians in later peacekeeping operations.

No wonder the scholarship remains divided on whether UN peacekeeping reduces intentional violence perpetrated against civilians. Specifically, does UN peacekeeping decrease the count of one-sided violence, defined as “purposeful killings” of civilians by combatants?\(^2\) Answering this question through the exami-

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nation of empirical data has proved especially difficult. For example, based on a dataset from intrastate conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa from 1991 to 2008, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon claim that “UN peacekeepers prevent civilian killings when they are appropriately tasked and deployed in large numbers.” Kocher, however, finds “little evidence that” peacekeeping has “affected the level of violence against civilians,” after examining the very same dataset Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon used. Conflicting scholarship has led to opposing policy advice on whether to increase or decrease the involvement of UN peacekeeping in resolving civil conflicts.

This quandary raises two central questions. First, does peacekeeping truly reduce violence committed against civilians in civil wars? If so, then what are the mechanisms that allow UN peacekeeping to reduce one-sided violence against civilians most effectively? To answer these questions, this essay will first examine the evolution of peacekeeping throughout history and explore the different types and components of UN peacekeeping operations. It will then examine the motivations of different actors, such as the rebels and the government forces, in perpetrating violence against civilians. After discussing the challenges to empirical study of peacekeeping, the essay will scrutinize the causal mechanisms by which different features of peacekeeping operations, from their size to their quality, help reduce civilian casualties under specific conditions.

The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping

Although peacekeeping has now become an essential arm of the United Nations in its mission to maintain global peace and security, it was not originally included in the United Nations Charter, the founding document of the UN. The UN Charter describes the possible strategies that UN member nations can take to prevent war in Chapter VI, entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” and in Chapter VII, named “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.” Notably, Article 42 of Chapter VII states that should economic or diplomatic sanctions be insufficient to contain threats to peace, the Security Council may stage “demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces” provided by the member nations. But this power was not exercised regularly due to disagreements between veto-holding members of the Security Council, with the noteworthy exception being the intervention in the Korean War in 1950. Instead, peacekeeping was a measure original-

"Does peacekeeping truly reduce violence committed against civilians in civil wars? If so, then what are the mechanisms that allow UN peacekeeping to reduce one-sided violence against civilians most effectively?"
ly formulated in response to the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, to “supervise the retreat of foreign troops from the canal zone.”

Until the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was primarily used to mediate inter-state conflicts. Fortna notes that prior to 1989, the purpose of peacekeeping was “to contain the conflict to prevent direct superpower intervention,” in lieu of directly preventing the resumption of war. Most missions consisted of observers and small-scale troops “unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops” who monitor ceasefires and build confidence between warring parties, with the notable exceptions being the large-scale deployments to Congo in 1960 and to Cyprus in 1974. The mostly limited character of UN peacekeeping before the fall of the Berlin Wall was thus very different from how people conceive of the role of peacekeeping today.

The dynamics in peacekeeping shifted after the 1990s. With incidences of inter-state war decreasing and those of intra-state civil conflict rising, UN peacekeeping also began to focus not just on the cessation of war but also on building sustainable peace. This meant that UN peacekeepers incorporated “multidimensional” missions that included human rights monitoring, security sector reform, disarmament, and re-integration of former combatants alongside more “traditional” missions involving military personnel observations. After the widely-criticised missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, the Security Council began mandating many peace enforcement missions under Chapter VII to use force beyond simply self-defence purposes, in order to achieve their objectives. At the same time, the UN decided to include civilian protection in the main agenda of peacekeeping missions, reflecting on the mistakes in Rwanda and Bosnia. Today, the number of deployed peacekeepers has increased to 110,000, a staggering surge from mere hundreds in the mid-20th century. In addition, peacekeeping forces now include military troops, police officers, and civilians, such as legal experts and humanitarian workers, illustrating a noticeable transformation from the unarmed or lightly-armed observ-

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7 The Suez Canal Crisis broke out in 1956 when Israel, the United Kingdom, and France invaded Egypt in response to Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The UK and France vetoed a resolution that called on Israeli forces to withdraw behind the borders.


11 Fortna notes on page 4 that due to this reason, peacekeeping missions before 1989 reveal little about peacekeeping’s ability to maintain peace. This also means that empirical studies on peacekeeping’s effect on reducing violence or preventing resumption of civil war often limit themselves to studying peacekeeping missions deployed after 1989.

12 “Our History.”

13 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?, 5.
ers and military personnel in the early days of peacekeeping.14

**Types and Components of UN Peacekeeping**

Contrary to popular perception, the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces come in numerous forms, varying in their missions and compositions. Distinguishing different types of peacekeeping missions allows us to disentangle how peacekeepers affect the outcomes of war and the incentives of the involved actors. Peacekeeping missions differ in their scale of involvement, from observation missions composed of observers that monitor ceasefires or troop withdrawals to multidimensional missions that “help implement comprehensive peace agreements” with substantial military and civilian involvement, to cite just a few.15

These peacekeeping missions can be further disaggregated into three types of roles. As UN troops intercede between combatants and disarm the belligerents, UN police forces patrol behind the frontlines and protect vulnerable populations.16 Meanwhile, UN observers document combatants’ actions for the general public, “report to a global audience on atrocities committed by combatants,” but unlike UN troops or police they are not armed and do not have the mandate to use force.17 Differentiating these components is important in analysing UN peacekeeping’s effect on reducing violence against civilians, since their presence and actions alter the motivations of government forces and rebels differently.

**Motivations for Committing Violence against Civilians**

Why do belligerents attack civilians in civil conflicts? The rationalist school of literature argues that in civil wars, combatants are motivated “to misrepresent privately held information” to bargain for a more beneficial outcome and wage war, rather than to pursue “peaceful solutions to their grievances.”18 They are thus motivated to show their will to continue fighting by inflicting significant losses on others. Since attacking civilians involves lower risk for the perpetrator than confronting armed adversaries does, belligerents often target civilians strategically to improve their relative position vis-à-vis their opponents.19 Combatants might also resort to coercion and violence against civilians to secure their loyalty and punish them for supporting their adversaries.20 This violence could intensify if there is a possibility that adversaries are hiding among civilians for support.21 In addition, belligerents may commit violence against civilians to acquire valuable resources and land.22

Combatants, however, also have the incentive to attack civilians even after the cessation of conflict. A particularly strong motivation comes from the commitment problem, in which the belligerents believe that “gains from fighting outweigh the concessions offered by a negotiated outcome,”23 especially when there is “uncertainty over future distribution of political power.”24 The security dilemma from disarmament aggravates this,25 since combatants give up their ability to protect themselves by disarming...

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14 “Our History.”
15 Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*, 7.
17 Ibid., 880.
25 Security dilemma refers to a case in which under anarchy, states’ actions designed to increase its security unintentionally provoke other states to take similar measures, eventually leading them towards military conflict.
and make themselves vulnerable to government forces that can renege on their "previous commitments to the group." This compels warring factions to maintain military capabilities and "use violence to shape civilian" behaviour to grab power in the post-conflict political process.

Factionalism within combatting groups may also motivate belligerents to victimise civilians. Hardliners or informal militia members sometimes worry that the negotiated settlement could marginalize them from the post-conflict political process; as such they may view settlements as more costly than continued fighting. This compels warring factions to maintain military capabilities and "use violence to shape civilian" behaviour to grab power in the post-conflict political process. In this case, inflicting violence on civilians can "signal a fringe faction's willingness to continue the fight" and to spoil the peace negotiations by portraying their more moderate partners as noncredible.

Finally, profit-seeking behaviour among armed factions lends itself to violence against civilians. The absence of "a strong security apparatus" allows former combatants to loot resources from unarmed civilians. Some combatants might also form new organisations or "apolitical militia groups" solely dedicated to exploit profitable resources, potentially instigating another civil conflict and jeopardising the recently-attempted peace.

These motivations illustrate how combatants could be incentivized to perpetrate violence against civilians, both during and after the conflict. The success of peacekeeping operations in protecting civilians from these threats hinges on their capacity to attenuate or alter these malicious incentives. How can peacekeeping operations achieve that?

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Challenges to the Quantitative Studies of UN Peacekeeping

Identifying causal mechanisms requires a closer examination of the relationship between causes and effects. Many scholars use some forms of regression to empirically studying this relationship. But grave danger exists in naively regressing civilian casualties on the presence of UN peacekeepers, because many regression models require strict quantitative assumptions that the data often does not meet. There are two empirical challenges to studying the effect of peacekeepers on civilian casualty reduction, which merit discussion before exploring the causal mechanisms themselves.

Issue with Coding Peacekeeping as a Dichotomous Variable

The aforementioned variety in peacekeeping implies that UN peacekeeping differs in their forms and abilities. But many scholars rely on a blunt measure of peacekeeping by merely documenting the absence or the presence of peacekeepers. This does not "capture nuances across and within missions." For instance, the peacekeeping mission sent to Burundi in 2005 included only 200 observers, whereas the one to Somalia had 30,000 military troops in late 1993. Moreover, the peacekeeping mission to Mozambique grew in size from 200 to 1,000 police members within 10 months in 1994. Yet, the binary coding will treat these different peacekeeping missions in identical fashions, failing to measure the variations across and within missions. It would also "ignore the tools available" to peacekeeping operations and "their capacities for" dealing with post-conflict
The diverse features in peacekeeping must therefore be disaggregated to scrutinise how each mission affects the level of violence inflicted on civilians differently.

**Issue with Causality in the Study of Peacekeeping**

Another challenge in empirically investigating peacekeeping operations comes from issues with causality. Researchers must thus employ innovative empirical strategies to ensure that their results are robust against statistical insignificance. A prominent concern is the non-randomness of peacekeepers’ placement and the resulting endogeneity. For instance, the assignment of peacekeeping forces “may seem to lead to more deaths” if peacekeepers are intentionally sent to regions with high civilian casualties, when even higher level of civilian victimisation could have occurred without the presence of the peacekeepers.\(^{37}\) In essence, these studies fail to establish a baseline for what would have happened had the UN not sent peacekeepers.\(^{38}\) While a randomised control trial involving the random assignment of peacekeepers to different regions in a conflict would be the most effective way to measure the causal effect of peacekeepers on civilian casualties, this method be unfeasible and also highly unethical. It would be difficult to conduct the experiment on a national scale, and no scholar or policymaker would tolerate inflicting harm on civilians. A possible way to overcome this issue could be to use a matching strategy.\(^{39}\) This would ensure a more balanced dataset that ensures results will not be caused by systematic differences between regions with or without peacekeeping deployment.\(^{40}\) Another strategy would be to use an exogenous instrumental variable that causes an “as-if random” variation on the assignment of peacekeepers. For instance, using the rotating presidency in the Security Council that determines the placement of peacekeeping forces could account for possible unobservable factors that could affect the level of civilian victimisation.\(^{41}\)

\(^{39}\) The technical explanation for this strategy is beyond the scope of this paper. Essentially, using the matching strategy allows researchers to compare datapoints from similar contexts and backgrounds.
\(^{41}\) Carnegie and Mikulaschek, “The Promise of Peacekeeping,” 2.
certain features of peacekeeping better reduce violence against civilians than other features do, with robust empirical evidence from recent studies. In particular, peacekeeping operations’ size, role, diversity, and quality will be considered, along with the type of violent perpetrator.

Returning to the controversy mentioned in the introduction, Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon claim that greater numbers of UN troops and police are associated with fewer civilian deaths, while more observers increase civilian casualties. They point to the role of UN troops in creating buffer zones between combatants as barriers and disarming them. This alleviates the security dilemma by removing “each faction’s threat of subjugation by the other” and in turn remove the “incentives to coerce civilian loyalty” and the means to “inflict harm upon the civilian population.” Similarly, the UN police patrolled behind the frontlines and increased “the costs to the combatants” for inflicting violence on civilians. The researchers maintain that the increase in the numbers of deployed troops and police amplifies “the capacity and the credibility of the UN’s commitment to protecting civilians.”

To the contrary, the presence of observers creates more incentive for belligerents to target civilians, since observers cannot actively protect civilians, which belligerents interpret as the UN’s lack of resolve. Alternatively, the arrival of observers may signal the imminent arrival of stronger UN peacekeepers, which increases the belligerents’ incentives to improve their relative power before the status quo is consolidated.

While Kocher objects to Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon’s interpretation, his argument is questionable. Kocher observes that “declines in violence typically led, rather than lagged, the introduction of peacekeepers,” hypothesising that combatants might have “reduced their targeting of civilians” with anticipation of peacekeepers’ arrival. Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, however, already accounted for this argument by including a variable that represents the passing of a Security Council resolution to launch a peacekeeping operation in the regression. They confirm that the interpretation of their regression coefficients does not change after including the variable. Furthermore, Kathman and Wood demonstrate that greater numbers of peacekeeping troops reduce anti-civilian violence, a valuable result keeping in mind that post-conflict violence against civilians remains

45 Ibid.
50 Kathman and Wood, “Stopping the Killing,” 149.
a serious concern. They show that the causal mechanisms Hultman et al. explain remain mostly valid for post-conflict violence, further noting that increasing troop deployments allows peacekeepers “to distribute resources to other tasks that promote human security.”51

One difference between the results of Kathman and Wood and those of Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon is that the effect of the UN police force on reducing violence against civilians varies across the types of violent perpetrators. While the UN police’s alleviation of the security dilemma reduces violence committed by rebels, it does not decrease that of militia who treat the UN police as “a threat to their ability to engage in illicit activities” and inflict further violence to resist political order.52

Peacekeeping operations’ reduction of civilian violence also has a different effect if the state is the main perpetrator of the violence. Carnegie and Mikulaschek show that after “exploiting exogenous variation in power” within the Security Council, peacekeepers have a greater impact on civilian casualties inflicted by rebels than those by government forces.53 This is because peacekeepers are incentivized “to not respond harshly to civilian” victimization by government forces, due to their need to actively collaborate with host government.54 This is especially crucial towards a successful peacekeeping mission, since host governments often provide knowledge on local language, customs, and geography. Conversely, peacekeepers can “reduce rebel-caused civilian fatalities” through disarmament.55 Moreover, higher number of peacekeepers “can signal the UN’s determination to stop the conflict to combatants,” since their size makes them more visible, and their withdrawal would “incur greater costs.”56

Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson find using subnational data that while the local presence of peacekeepers reduces rebel-inflicted anti-civilian violence, it is less effective in preventing government-inflicted violence.57 They argue that since the presence of peacekeeping forces increases the costs of violence for rebels, which may include directly fighting the peacekeepers or facing disarmament,58 the likelihood of violence against civilians by rebelling groups would be lower.59 In contrast, since host governments facilitate the peacekeepers’ “access to civilian population” and can effectively veto UN’s access to particular areas,60 the deployment of UN peacekeepers would not affect the probability of anti-civilian violence by government forces. To reconcile this result with previous national-level research, Fjelde et al. suggest that applying political cost on the national level through international shaming may be more effective for reducing anti-civilian violence by government forces.61

Meanwhile, characteristics like troop quality and diversity can influence the efficacy of UN peacekeeping in reducing violence against civilians. Haass and Ansorg assert that peacekeeping forces with higher troop quality protect civilians better. Firstly, high-quality missions “deter violence” by further increasing the “combatants’ costs of civilian victimisation.”62 Secondly, they can create buffer zones more easily using superior military equipment like transport helicopters and airplanes, which are crucial “in the absence of functioning streets and railways.”63 Finally, high-quality peacekeeping missions can monitor combatants’ behaviour better through effective reconnaissance with superior equipment like airplanes and satellite imagery. Financially committed home governments can also apply greater diplomatic pressure on warring parties.

51 Kathman and Wood, “Stopping the Killing,” 156.
56 Ibid.
enhancing the quality of their peacekeeping missions. Using the contributing nations’ military expenditure per capita as a proxy for troop quality, Haass and Ansorg report that “substantial commitment by troop contributing countries with a better equipped military can substantively reduce the killing of civilians.”

Similarly, Bove and Ruggeri claim that greater diversity in the peacekeepers’ countries of origin improves their capacity to protect civilians, and “incorporating linguistic and geographic distances” into the measures of diversity strengthens the effect of peacekeepers’ diversity on reducing civilian casualties. Bove and Ruggeri attribute this to diversity’s complementarity: greater diversity increases the probability of “having more technical capabilities and more recent campaigning experience,” which discourages combatants from using violence. Furthermore, they claim that peacekeepers from multicultural backgrounds are more effective in dealing with culturally diverse environments. In addition, diversity ensures “mutual monitoring among contingents” and reduces incidences of misconduct, which debilitates the cooperation between peacekeepers and locals and adversely affects their ability to protect the local civilians.

Whether the effect of higher quality troops dominates the effect of greater diversity among troops or vice-versa is uncertain. It is also possible that the two effects are complementary, as Bove and Ruggeri suggest: pooling skills from troops of diverse backgrounds could aggregate their expertise and supplement their ability to protect civilians. Discerning this would require a careful empirical evaluation, preferably through randomisation.

**Conclusion**

Taking into account the evolution of UN peacekeeping, its diverse types of missions, and the challenges in empirically studying it, UN peacekeeping is effective in reducing violence against civilians through altering the motivations of perpetrators, under certain conditions. Military troops of substantial size and high technical capabilities tend to protect civilians best. If they are stationed near the population and the conflict zone, they also contain threats from non-state actors better than those from government forces.

What does this mean for future peacekeeping operations? It should be recognised that the success of peacekeepers in protecting civilians depends not only on their presence but also on their characteristics like size, quality, and place of origin. Moreover, imposing military cost works better when subduing rebels, whereas inflicting political cost affects government forces better. Policy-makers should thus consider the spatial and political environments of the region, in order to craft the most context-appropriate peacekeeping operation for that specific time and place.

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64 Ibid.

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Crossing a Bridge of Memory
Historical Memory and Populist Rhetoric in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia

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“The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.”

— Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting

Introduction

February 2, 1993: As Václav Havel crossed the Charles Bridge in Prague to attend his inauguration as President of the Czech Republic at the Prague Castle, he embodied the democratic ideals for which he and his compatriots had tirelessly fought. The Charles Bridge is one of the landmarks of Prague and has seen the ups and downs of the city’s history, from glorious independence to treacherous oppression. Democracy was not new to Prague; the city had served as the capital of a democratic Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1939. After so many years under Nazi and Soviet influence, the memory of democracy, among other motivations, propelled Havel and millions of others to make demands of the communist regime in 1989. From the beginning of the revolution, Havel pushed for a popular democracy, and like the founders of interwar Czechoslovakia, he saw democracy as an aspirational goal. The memories of both democracy and communism remain powerful political tools in the Czech Republic to this day, but are not necessarily used in the positive, motivational way that Havel did. Rather, historical memory has been used across the political spectrum for a wide variety of goals. In this paper, I will examine how historical memory was used in Czechoslovak politics from 1990 to 1992, and how those usages established the framework for populist rhetoric surrounding historical memory, particularly that of the communist era and its abuses of power and societal cohesion. Despite their policy disagreements, parties from across the political spectrum used history and historical memory to build a collective framework, with quintessentially populist rhetoric pitting “the people” against “the elite,” that survives and flourishes to this day.

Methodology

Populism

I define populism as a political ideology in the purest sense, in that it is used by politicians to get elected. To define its scope I will use a version of Cas Mudde's 2004 definition of populism: “A thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” I will make only two edits to Mudde’s definition: to remove the adjectives of “pure” and “corrupt” before “people” and “elite,” respectively. While the purity of the people and the corruption of the elite are two prominent themes within populist rhetoric, they do not fully encompass the range of themes that populists employ.

Mudde’s definition has been among the most cited in the field, and much of our contemporary (academic) understanding of populism is influenced by his work and this article in particular. Mudde also brings to the scholarly conversation two important points regarding what counts as populist. First, Mudde concludes “Most mainstream parties mainly use populist rhetoric, but some also call for populist amendments to the liberal democratic system (most notably through the introduction of plebiscitary instruments).” Rhetorical tools do not comprise a full strategy in and of themselves; populism is not a binary, with politicians either being fully populist or not, as many parties and politicians can engage in populist rhetoric. Second, Mudde says, “While charismatic leadership and direct communication between the leader and ‘the people’ are common among populists, these features facilitate rather than define populism.” In other words, populism is not dependent on the method of communication, but on the content of communication. We may think of the typical populist as being brash, outspoken, and male, but a populist can be quiet, technocratic, or female, and any other trait one could ascribe to a politician. In other words, it’s what they’re saying, not how they’re saying it.

Historical Memory

Historical memory is a process wherein people “construct and identify with particular narratives about historical periods or events,” according to Katherine Hite of Vassar College. This paper addresses both historical memory and history, though for use in political rhetoric, the two are practically inseparable, so the distinction is commented upon only when salient.

This paper addresses historical memory in the context of one country, Czechoslovakia, and one use, its role in populist rhetoric. This specificity and interaction have been ignored in the field of memory studies partially because they do not fit within the field’s theoretical debates. This paper will not adjudicate between Western European narratives based on “trauma” and Eastern European narratives based on

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“mourning,” as described by Uilleam Blacker and Alexander Etkind, because both sorts of memories co-exist. Nor will this paper attempt to classify different sorts of memory in politics, as Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik do in “Twenty Years after Communism” and Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker do in “Communism’s Shadow.” The focus of this paper is what binds memory rhetorics together, in the sense that they contribute to populist rhetoric, rather than what splits them apart. Nor will this paper attempt to put memory in transnational context as with many recent works, including those of Timothy Snyder and Philipp Ther. Instead, this paper only looks at Czechoslovakia.

The work that has been done on the intersection of memory politics and populist rhetoric in Czechoslovakia is limited. James Mark’s “Revolution with a Human Face” is a must-read for its depth and care taken to highlight the voice of the common man between the years of 1989 and 1992, the turbulent period that is also covered in this paper. In his 2015 article “Anti-Communism of the Future,” Petr Roubal explores the intellectual rise and fall of the Civic Democratic Alliance (Občanská demokratická aliancia, ODA), and while his deft touch makes the article an important addition to the field of Czechoslovak intellectual history, his focus is on the party’s conservatism, not its populist rhetoric or use of history. Finally, in his 2010 book The Unfinished Revolution, James Mark shows that politicians like to ‘write’ themselves into the history of the revolution as a means of elevating their stature in front of voters. While this may be characteristic of populist leaders, it does not define populist rhetoric. This paper thus seeks to fill a gap in the literature on populism and historical memory by examining the two concepts together in a specific place, at a specific time, in a way that has not been done so before.

Sources

To examine political rhetoric, this paper investigates documents published by parties and politicians whose audience was the voting public. These documents range from comprehensive party platforms to issue-specific pamphlets to personal manifestos of politicians. Some of the latter type of document likely were aimed at a more limited audience, but were nonetheless publicly distributed. Public documents, unlike internal party communications, display populist rhetoric in the context which is most important for defining “populist.” when politicians were seeking votes.

This paper will focus its analysis on several parties active in the early 1990s, namely the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ), the Christian Democratic Party (Křestanskodemokratická strana, KDS), the right-conservative-Rally for the Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro republiku - Republikánská strana Československa, SPR-RSC), the liberal-conservative Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS), and the big tent liberal Civic Forum (Občanské fórum, OF).

This paper will be analyzing the OF and ODS as separate parties, despite the fact that since the ODS is a successor party to the OF, the two parties could be considered one contiguous political party. The OF and ODS shared some members, but former OF members who founded the ODS took the ODS in a decidedly more right-wing direction than its predecessor. On occasion, the ODS recalled and refuted the OF’s rhetoric of a year or two prior, and where relevant this paper notes the dates of these interactions. The two parties also had other salient differences beyond ideology. The OF was the party of the Velvet Revolution that set up a big tent across the political spectrum to include all anti-communists, whereas the ODS defined itself on a distinct portion of the political spectrum.

and looked to present a policy program that was much less centered around anti-communism. Because of the differences in ideology and goals, these two parties represent fundamentally different perspectives in Czechoslovak politics, and can thus be compared in opposition to each other when analyzing political rhetoric.

Historical Background

The Czech and Slovak peoples were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire for years. They had varying degrees of autonomy largely based on the whims of Vienna or Budapest, but nonetheless maintained their culture. Thanks in part to these strong traditions as well as some clever politicking, the victorious Entente of the First World War supported the establishment of a democratic Czechoslovakia, founded on October 28, 1918.10 The new democracy faced hurdles when establishing a functional, multiethnic democracy, but also had significant advantages in industrial production that allowed it to rebound from the war. While not a perfect state by any reckoning, Czechoslovakia and its internal faults cannot be blamed for its downfall.

After the National Socialists took power in Germany, Adolf Hitler began to pursue Lebensraum for the German people. First on his checklist of territories was the Sudetenland, a thin strip of land in the north and west of then-Czechoslovakia. The majority of the Sudetenland’s residents had ethnic German roots, but the lands had been under Czech control for hundreds of years and many of the Germans had integrated with their Czech neighbors. However, the Western allies feared German aggression and, throwing Czech claims out the window, attempted to appease Hitler by granting him the Sudetenland at the Munich Conference of 1938. Hitler did not stop there, and during the subsequent World War subjugated Czechs under a “Protectorate” with a Nazi Reichsprotektor in charge. For the Czech people, their time under Nazism was a harsh withdrawal from the system of European democracy which they had so treasured in the interwar years.

After the war, hope for a democratic

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Czechoslovakia returned, but so did a desire to take revenge for the country’s suffering. President Eduard Beneš pursued retributive justice against ethnic Germans in the country through a series of decrees, which remain on the books to this day. However, domestic politics were unstable and the democratic parties proved too weak to maintain their foothold. The Communist Party staged a coup in February 1948, known in Marxist historiography as Victorious February (Vítězný únor). They quickly consolidated their control of state apparatuses, initiating forty-one years of one-party rule.

The communist state was all-encompassing but not all-powerful, as demonstrated by the 1968–1969 period of reform and protests known as the Prague Spring. Responding to public dissatisfaction with the prior twenty years of communist rule, the Central Committee of the KSČ under First Secretary Alexander Dubček adopted a reformist “Action Programme.” The effort was quickly met with backlash from the Soviet Union, which organized a coalition of Warsaw Pact troops to invade Czechoslovakia and extinguish the small light of hope that the Prague Spring had provided the people. The next iteration of the regime, referred to as “normalization,” lasted from late 1969 to late 1989, and was marked by authoritarian, conservative rule under close Soviet supervision.11 Fed up with their oppression, a growing movement of underground anti-communist activists began building support, and as the communist regimes in the Warsaw Pact

10 Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed (Yale University Press, 2009).
11 Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed (Yale University Press, 2009).
states around them fell, these activists took the opportunity to revolt.

This democratic revolution, among the last to occur in the former Warsaw Pact countries, was quick, prompting historian Timothy Garton Ash to quip in its midst, “In Poland it took ten years, in Hungary ten months, in East Germany ten weeks; perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will take ten days!” The revolution was also bloodless, earning it the nickname of the Velvet Revolution. The Czech group which was the dominant ‘party of the revolution,’ the Civic Forum, became a fully-fledged political party and the odds-on favorite to dominate the 1990 Czechoslovak federal elections. They set the tone for Czechoslovak democracy from the outset, but that became complicated over time with ideological and rhetorical disagreements among numerous factions.

Setting Democratic Norms

The Civic Forum focused on the foundation of interwar Czechoslovakia to provide historical context and inspiration for the task of democratization at hand. The 1918 revolution was depicted as a broad-based popular movement, with references to a “rabid crowd” that established “our common house.” This rhetoric helped reinforce the OF’s message of historical justice, that the post-communist movement was merely a restoration of the status quo, rather than the establishment of something new. Politicians were also keen to drawn on the parallels between the two periods, and continued to do so for some time. Two years after the fall of communism, Václav Klaus, leader of the ODS, wrote, “This task stood before our families or grandparents in Czechoslovakia after the First World War, this task facing us after the collapse of the communist regime.” Klaus and others placed the contemporary democratization of Czechoslovakia in the grand arc of history, making themselves historical actors of great importance whose decisions would immediately be written into the history books. When this rhetoric was combined with the reminder of the popular nature of the first revolution, a clear message emerged, encouraging the public to get involved in their democracy, and to strike a new path forward. However, this did not mean the communists were entirely removed from the political discourse.

As the Communist Party began to...
pick up the pieces of their oppressive regime and try to contend in the 1990 elections, they simultaneously tried to make a range of historical arguments to legitimize their continued presence in a democratic system and to delegitimize the previous communist regime. Among the most prominent of these was the argument that the past state was deeply flawed: “The state of development of the society we have achieved in the past cannot be considered as genuine socialism. The name of the republic as socialist was unwarranted and voluntaristic.”15 The KSČ argued that genuine socialism is compatible with democracy, whereas the disingenuous socialism of the past regime was naturally autocratic and incompatible with democracy. This was a legitimate rhetorical strategy, as the Czechoslovak people had been relatively welcoming of the liberalizing, yet still communist, reforms of the Prague Spring. The leader of those reforms, Alexander Dubček, said only a few months prior to the publication of this platform, “The idea of socialism with a human face became the idea of the people, the memory of the nation… Its inheritance is in you.”16 The Communists of 1990 were trying to build upon this memory of the Prague Spring, the memory that communism could be promising and invoke passion for change, uplifting the people rather than crushing them. Perhaps this memory of the Prague Spring weakened under the harsh “normalization” regime that followed it, but the Communist Party, like so many others, believed memories could endure through oppression. However, most parties had a radically different interpretation of history, and historical memory, than the communists did.

There was general consensus amongst non-communist parties established prior to the 1990 elections, and carried from there on, that the KSČ was inherently undemocratic, regardless of the successor party’s declared commitment to reform. A Civic Forum pamphlet in December 1989 declared that “democracy can only be promoted and improved by democrats,” reflecting a cautiousness about allowing undemocratic actors into the newly established system.17 This cautiousness was widely shared when considering the KSČ’s role in the political system, with a profound sense of distrust driving the rhetoric of other parties. The OF’s Jaroslav Chloupek wrote, “KSČ is likely to be willing again to promise anything in its election program that could bring success to it in the upcoming elections even when it is clear that these promises will not be able to be fulfilled because its unlimited government for the last forty years has left us a sad legacy.”18 Similarly making no distinction between the past and present Communists, the Christian Democrats invited the public to “vote against totalitarianism.”19 This rhetoric does not distinguish between the contemporary KSČ, which wanted the voters to believe it had reformed from communist times, and the KSČ which was the ruling party for over forty years. By doing so, the non-communist parties sought to tie the present and past communists in the voters’ minds, and hoped that the voters’ bad memories of the past would motivate them to oppose the KSČ in the election. The OF proclaimed “We must not allow these forces to gain [an advantage] in the forthcoming elections, because that would mean the end of our still weak, yet being born, democracy.”20 The natural counter, of course, was to vote for a non-communist party. To advocate for themselves as non-communist parties, the KDS campaigned on the martyrdom of its political forefathers who opposed communism during the 1970s, and the OF campaigned on the platform that its leaders were the ones who had overthrown communism in the Velvet Revolution.

However, even these mainstream parties were still dogged by the fact that some of their leaders had held, even briefly at local levels, some affiliation with the Communist Party. In a strike against both the communist regime and their contemporary foes, Miroslav Sladek’s SPR-RSČ proclaimed to voters that “Republicans are not communists, the KDS campaigned on the martyrdom of its political forefathers who opposed communism during the 1970s, and the OF campaigned on the platform that its leaders were the ones who had overthrown communism in the Velvet Revolution.

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17 Civic Forum pamphlet, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 2.
19 Václav Benda, public letter, 1992, Czech subject collection, Box 12, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives.
Despite other illiberal statements, the SPR-RSČ was still fundamentally a democratic party. Whether or not the mainstream parties would include them among their number is a separate issue, but the SPR-RSČ pushed themselves forward as a truly democratic, committed anti-communist party.22 Other parties recognized the poor political optics of having members with a communist past involved in a democratic future. The process of preventing said members from taking public office, known as lustration, came up in the debate about the democratic future of Czechoslovakia.23 In a statement typical of the era, Jan Chudomel of the Civic Movement (Občanské hnutí) argued that both legal and political routes needed to be traversed in order to deal with the issue of lustration: “It is necessary to condemn all individuals to whom we can blame. However, we think it is an illusion to think that we can deal with the past by law or by some administrative decision.”24 The law, after all, had been monopolized by the communist regime. Under the democratic state, the basic laws were promulgated within a few months. However, it takes time for the legal institutions of any new regime to take root in the minds of the public and of politicians, and Czechoslovakia was no different. There were also invocations of the last, failed effort to establish Czechoslovak democracy after the Second World War, such as an OF pamphlet written by Miloš Zeman: “The Communist Party, after three years, took absolute power and did not intend to deal with any of the other domestic political forces. It follows that [the party] also bears full responsibility for what’s been going on for another forty years in the country.”25 Zeman is making three points here. First, he implies the law was no barrier to the last communist rise and would be no barrier to another. Second, he makes a point against a political rival. Third, and most importantly, Zeman highlights the monopolization of power by the Communist Party on the political level, subduing dissent and opposition. When viewed in conjunction with the concerns surrounding lustration and individual connections of party members to the past regime, as the OH and SPR-RSČ emphasized, one may ask how these characteristics came to be the defining traits when politicians were denouncing the anti-democratic nature of the prior regime. The answer lies in the same place: the intensely elite nature of the communist regime, in which a small group of individuals wielded the entirety of the party’s power.

**Anti-Elitism**

Non-communist parties seized upon the prior regime’s elite character as a central point of criticism, and won political points by invoking the memories of the bygone communist structures and the harm they did to the public’s trust of the state and political engagement. Under the communist regime, political power was highly centralized, and the same cadre of people controlled every party and state function. As Miloš Zeman wrote, the regime’s elites did not allow much dissent, especially not during the post-Prague Spring normalization or by any other organized political parties. According to this interpretation of history, the elites were shut off from the rest of society, only debating amongst themselves to make political decisions and only communicating to the outside world when it was politically expedient. Orthodox communists may have disagreed with this interpretation and argued along traditional ideological lines that strong central control was needed in an economically unstable, ethnically fractured state which required significant central planning. They may have also disagreed with the characterization of the central leaders as elites, and rather cast those leaders as public servants, in the same way that a democrat might.

However, the dominant view amongst non-communist parties was that these Communist political leaders were elites disconnected from their subjects and exercised their power in ways detrimental to Czech society. From the very beginning, the Civic Forum argued that communism was an ideology that inherently promoted elite structures: “The Communists’ objective, as shown by Marx’s teachings, is the violent takeover of power and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which has always been in fact a dictatorship of a narrow ruling Communist Party, a dictatorship

22 Smer, the ruling party in Slovakia, was founded on a similar principle: no former communists allowed.
24 Jan Chudomel, Interview, 20 May 1992, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 9, Hoover Institution Archives.
"It takes time for the legal institutions of any new regime to take root in the minds of the public and of politicians, and Czechoslovakia was no different."

Directed against all, including the proletariat."26 Marxism–Leninism was grounded in the idea of a vanguard to lead the revolution, but the Civic Forum ultimately overstated the proletarian nature of Marx’s own teachings. Regardless, Czechs and Slovaks recalling their experience under communism would not distinguish between Marxism and Marxism-Leninism, and so the OF had no need to do so, either. The notion of “dictatorship of the proletariat” is relevant because it invokes another negative memory: the Soviet Union’s dictatorship and its dominance over Czechoslovak politics. Another operative concept is a dictatorship “directed against” the proletariat. This “elite” antagonism towards “the people” is a crucial component of populist rhetoric, because it serves the larger populist message that “the people” are not properly represented or listened to. In this manner, the OF cast the communist elites against the people living under the regime, and thus established, in one small way, the “elite” versus “people” paradigm of populist rhetoric.

Some of the OF’s members echoed the overall party line, but others added their own perspectives that strayed from the party’s typical stance. Miloš Zeman took slight turns in his own rhetoric that are suggestive of the populist rhetoric he would later employ as President of the Czech Republic. As he wrote in 1990 for an OF pamphlet, “The system of uncontrolled power without feedback leads to the general degeneration of political culture, to the extinction of political personalities of interest.”27 Zeman adopted the OF line to the extent that he characterized the past regime as one of “uncontrolled power” that was a “degeneration” of a political culture, meaning interwar Czechoslovak democracy. However, Zeman’s choice of words suggests that the personalities of interest, meaning political figures with ties to both the public and the government, were, in fact, beneficial. As such, Zeman argued the self-sequestration of elites under the communist regime was fundamentally harmful to the people at-large. Since the previous regime’s power had gone unchecked, the subsequent system of government necessitated checking power by creating a “feedback” relationship between the politicians and their constituents in such a way that leaders were bound to serve the people rather than themselves. For the Civic Forum, the only option capable of meeting this criterion was a representative democracy. Thus, Zeman simultaneously advanced the OF’s chief rhetorical goal of promoting a democracy in light of an undemocratic past while also constructing a framework to support “political personalities of interest.” As one of those personalities, Zeman later could and would take advantage of this framework. Regardless of Zeman’s own future ambitions, though, his characterization of the communist regime as lacking “tangled bonds” was resonant for other parties in the early 1990s.

Other politicians critical of the communist regime’s elitism focused their attacks on the lack of engagement with the populace. This lack of “tangled bonds” was a common theme in the context of contemporary political struggles. When discussing the rough first few years of democratic growth in Czechoslovakia, Václav Klaus was particularly keen to link the

26 Jaroslav Chloupek, “Člověk a Komunismus, Ideologie a Skutečnost,” Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 1.

lagging areas of contemporary development to the harms inflicted by the past regime. In the context of a discussion on political decision-making and the struggle of politicians to balance party and public, he characterized the communist leaders and “intellectuals” as possessing a “central reasoning” and as “a group of people who have acquired the feeling of total decision-making freedom.” In other words, politicians felt as though they were always right, and did not feel bound in their decision-making capacity by the people they claimed to represent. Klaus’s frequently stated dislike of communist central planning manifested itself in a more generalized anti-elite sentiment in the post-communist period. “Intellectuals” in this context is an anti-elite term because of the implication that intellectuals are removed from the people and popular concerns. Klaus further frames this anti-elite sentiment in both a historical and social context, advocating for a “government for the citizen” and for the restoration of the “most precious social values.” This directly contrasts the model of communist leadership, thus setting Klaus up as a consummate anti-communist democrat. Nevertheless, not every party took the opportunity to portray itself as a sensible, honorable party with a long history of opposing communism and many ties to the people. The KDS’s strategy stood in contrast to Klaus and his political vehicle of the ODS, who were more outspoken about their own fitness for a ‘democratic rebuilding’ role. In spite of these differences, both parties spoke the same language regarding the deficiencies of the past.

A range of parties acknowledged that the main task in building a post-communist democratic society was repairing the “tangled bonds” first established between voters and their representatives during the interwar First Republic, but these parties also expressed concerns about potential weaknesses in the rebuilding process. The KDS engaged in a theoretical exposition on the subject, arguing...
that the institutionalization of “self-governing structures” was ultimately the right path, with a “natural involvement of the individual” in the system serving to “effectively [prevent] the emergence of monopolized structures of power.”

The KDS was advocating for a balance between the individual and the structures of power. The rhetoric utilized to describe those structures of power, such as “monopolized,” however, could easily be deployed in more anti-elite rhetoric as well; the elite monopolization of power necessarily means that “the people” do not have that power, which plays into the hands of politicians using populist rhetoric.

Although this may not have been the intention of the program, it certainly left the door open for such applications. So, while parties agreed that the main task of building a democracy was to build confidence, or bonds, between the voters and the representative, they had to confront another rhetorical challenge: what would happen if one of the sides of the “tangled bonds,” either voter or politician, did not trust the other? The answer was that politicians would take advantage of the voters.

In early 1990, the Civic Forum posited that the threat to democratization in Czechoslovakia would come from politicians failing to properly engage with voters, prompting parties across the political spectrum to attempt to engage voters with rhetoric that drew on the memory of communist elitism and its relation to the present danger of contemporary politics. In December 1989, the OF laid out an aspirational goal for what voters should look for in a leader, including the “trust” and “confidence” required to rebuild bonds between voters and their representatives, but with provisions for a voter’s “admiration… anger, and annoyance.” Ultimately, though, the OF promulgated a cautious message, saying that while the public and honest politicians (including themselves in this category) were working to build a democracy, “We can be threatened both from the outside and from the inside.” To some extent, this is not a surprise. Emerging from decades of authoritarian leader-driven politics, including Nazism and communism, the Czechoslovak people were naturally skeptical of individuals who claimed political leadership after the fall of communism. Voters in 1990 tangibly felt the weight of their country’s long and complicated history: some harmful leaders had come from outside and imposed themselves, such as Rudolf Heydrich, the Nazi Reichsprotektor of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, while others had come from within to betray their people, such as Klement Gottwald, who led the 1948 coup that signaled the beginning of forty years of communist domination. Yet neither case is cut and dry as “outside” or “inside” political players. Heydrich had domestic collaborators, and Gottwald received significant aid from the Soviet Union. With these grim memories at the forefront of the Czechoslovak voter’s mind, the OF set out an optimistic path, winding through the dark forests of Czech history to a brighter, democratic future. However, this prompts another question: presuming that voters’ memories would lead them to be on the lookout for unscrupulous politicians, why were politicians able to threaten the voters? Wouldn’t the voters be able to pre-empt and monitor such politicians? The answer, according to parties in the first few years of democratization at least, was no: voters did not have the capacity to keep their politicians in check because the communist regime had harmed them and their Czechoslovak society.

Addressing a Broken Society

Parties from across the political spectrum argued that the communist system had broken Czechoslovak society to such an extent that the people could not properly hold their politicians accountable and prevent them from acquiring too much power. The OF argued that the destruction of the Czechoslovak citizen began with the core conceit of the communist regime. In the context of a pamphlet urging laborers to protest on International Workers’ Day, May 1, the party charged that the Communists had abandoned their working-class roots and cared little for the common man, forcing injured workers to the “periphery” of the workforce without

[32] Ibid., page 10.
[33] “Co by nás mohlo demoralizovat,” 15 December 1989, Czech subject collection, Box 13, Folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives. The article is on page 3 of a longer pamphlet.
[34] Ibid. The statement also seems incredibly prescient three decades down the road, as in the search for good leaders threats can come from anywhere. This can be interpreted to mean both future populists coming from positions within politics, like Miloš Zeman, and from outside of politics entirely, like Andrej Babiš.
The publishers of this pamphlet wanted to motivate workers to continue their anti-elite fight on International Labor Day, and the best way to do so was through utilizing the past, rather than the present. In a pamphlet written for the OF around the same time, Miloš Zeman cautioned that the present process would be a slow one because the injustices of the past are hard to overcome: “For forty years, we have been trained to behave normally [according to communist rules], and it is not to be expected that adopting new rules of behavior will take place [quickly] and painlessly.” Together, the two OF arguments say that communism fundamentally changed the way society functioned and the relationships of individuals. Ondřej Matejka of the Prague-based Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes remarked that “the demand for democracy and freedom in our country is more in the habitus we have inherited from the communist regime.” In other words, the common people were so neglected under communism, and so unable to change their disenfranchised status until the Velvet Revolution, that they had retained much of their inherent disposition, or habitus, from the communist era. This theme, that these peripheral laborers, people “trained” to behave normally, would be unable to maintain and defend democratic government from power-hungry politicians, was central to the rhetoric that the Civic Forum set out in early 1990.

The Christian Democrats echoed the Civic Forum’s rhetoric in their own campaigning, though with more provocative wording befitting their electoral base. The main problem as the KDS put it was an “atomized society after 40 years of communist totality.” The KDS viewed its role as bonding those atoms together, a process they initiated through the incorporation of historical rhetoric: “We are obliged to decipher a deeper understanding of how oppression, lies, and fear associated with the communist totality have destroyed everything human.” This dramatic rhetoric was intended to attract the attention of voters, and perhaps to provoke them to consider the injustices of the communist regime. To invoke the voter’s humanity is a strategy to invoke their sense of self-worth, thereby potentially making the voter perceive the party more positively. The KDS hoped that the voters would conclude that drastic change was necessary to handle a drastic situation, and thus would vote for the KDS to accomplish that change. However, the KDS’s approach that distinguished leaders and voters as two separate entities was not a popular approach amongst other parties.

The ODS agreed that the national habitus needed repair, but framed their vision for the rebuilding process in inclusive terms that portrayed the ODS as a party of the common man, which in turn established a template for future populist appeals. Like the KDS, their argument had a historical basis, saying, “Yes, we have to deal with our past,” but the immediate political and legal applications of dealing with the past, such as lustration and releasing prisoners wrongfully convicted under the communist legal system, were of less importance overall. Rather, as Václav Klaus argued on behalf of his party, “The most complex [problem] is the eradication of Bolshevism in us, the eradication of the habits and the comfort of communism, collectivism and irresponsibility, a process that is far more difficult than several… processes and laws.” According to Klaus, dealing with the past would only work by engaging society and individuals, and it could not be handled at just the political level. This view informed his politics and led to his use of rhetoric that shifted the emphasis away from political leaders and toward the collective task of the people. Klaus very much saw himself as a part of this collective task, using “we” as the operative subject dealing with “our past” and the “Bolshevism in us.” Klaus’s message reaffirmed that the ODS was a part of the people and shared their experiences and concerns. Thus, even though they said dealing with the past cannot solely be a political process, Klaus and the ODS turned it into one. This was a critical part of the political strategy of the party, which recognized that the average voter was not going to have their voice automatically injected into the national conversation, and so

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37 Ondřej Matejka, interview with author, July 24, 2018, Prague.
38 Václav Benda, public letter, 1992, Czech subject collection, Box 12, Folder 5, Hoover Institution Archives.
39 Ibid., page 11.
40 Václav Klaus, Interview, První Zprava, Czech subject collection, Box 9, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 68.
41 Ibid.
in response the ODS framed itself as the means for the people to have their “own chance.” This positioned Klaus to be the person to carry the voter’s “chance” to the national stage, and for the ODS to be able to stand up and, per their own rhetoric, claim to be speaking truthfully on behalf of the people. This stands in contrast to the KDS’s more provocative rhetoric about both history and the role of leaders, but at the roots of their rhetoric, the KDS and OF are still similar.

The ODS and KDS both agreed upon the systemic problem at hand set out by the OF in 1990: the people’s spirits have been broken down and that was dangerous not only for them but for the system as a whole. The OF had developed that rhetoric while it was still the big tent, relatively apolitical party of the revolution, but quickly had to come up with a corresponding electoral strategy as it transitioned to being a political party contesting an election. Miloš Zeman described the basis of this new strategy in March 1990: “We therefore appeal to the self-esteem of each of us, not to the humiliation that has long been cultivated in us.” This was a fairly simple strategy: appeal to peoples’ idealized selves, and tell them that the OF values these idealized selves. This is a different type of messaging from the KDS’s separation of leaders and voters and the ODS’s call to collective action; the OF was distinguished from the latter because the ODS framed the process in negative terms, e.g. the “eradication” of Bolshevism, whereas the OF framed it in positive ones, e.g. an “appeal to the self-esteem.” All three parties, though, recognized the need for some sort of popular action. Regardless of the nature of the balance they sought to strike between voter and representative, they agreed a balance needed to exist. But even as their lofty political goals aligned, the question remained how those goals would be achieved and how politicians would take advantage of the fractured society. The answer begins with the “appeal to self-esteem.”

The non-communist political establishment predicted a nationalist incursion into the nascent democratic system because voters’ desires for a sense of purpose and worth could be fulfilled by nationalism. These non-communist parties had established early on that the individual spirit had been bruised and battered under a communist regime that shunted the people off to the side in favor of an elite political system. The KDS came to the conclusion that such a battered individual would be in no position to resist an attractive candidate who would convince the voter to renounce “their individual veil in favor of some personality or in the spirit of skillfully manipulated group interests (local, social, professional, religious, national, etc.)… [There is] only a single functional way: one movement and one leader. Thus, to the corporative, authoritative state of the Franco-Spanish or Mussolini Italy. The process… inevitably leads to the end of democracy.” This call back to two fascist regimes served as a clear reminder; the KDS wanted its voters to understand that the newborn democratic system could slide back to the authoritarian depths from which it came. The logic was that any reasonable voter would hear this appeal and turn up their nose at any politician seeking to “manipulate” group interests. But this logic is not complete, and not

"To invoke the voter’s humanity is a strategy to invoke their sense of self-worth, thereby potentially making the voter perceive the party more positively."
fully fleshed out considering the circumstances of the day. As expressed by the ODS, “people are looking for a group to associate them on the basis of shared characteristics - language, customs, traditions, historical experience - and this is a good reason for the rise of nationalism.”45 This draws yet another contrast with the KDS, as the ODS portrayed the nationalist decision as understandable given the context of forty years of communist rule, whereas the KDS fundamentally believed the people were good liberal, individualistic citizens who had just been harmed, and once recovered, they would reject nationalism. The Communist Party ultimately bet on a nationalist approach similar to that which the ODS had described.

The Communist Party’s support for nationalism provoked other parties to both denounce the Communists and then position themselves as distinctly opposed to the now-tinged nationalist rhetoric. The KSČ attempted to adopt a wide range of strategies in the few years immediately following the fall of the prior regime. One strategy which won the favor of party leadership was the national unity strategy, described as follows: “We are committed to bringing together patriotism, a feeling of national pride, common interest, and a concern for the better future of the country. We are in favor of developing the national identity.”46 At first glance, this seems to be in opposition to traditional Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which de-emphasizes the role of nations in favor of emphasizing class struggle as the primary driver of society’s ills. In practice, though, there was some leniency during the communist regime for expressions of national goodwill, so the KSČ’s position was not historically baseless. The national strategy was their replacement for communism’s role as a governing ideology in people’s lives; for those voters who felt that communism gave them a sense of unity, the KSČ hoped they would feel the same about national unity in a democratic system.

Referring to the mainstream parties’ predictions of voter behavior, the KDS was proved wrong. Not all voters rejected the KSČ’s nationalist message, whereas the ODS’s position was somewhat validated. Writing in 1992, Václav Klaus struck an assured tone: “people have

"But even as their lofty political goals aligned, the question remained how those goals would be achieved and how politicians would take advantage of the fractured society. The answer begins with the 'appeal to self-esteem.'"
nothing more than a tactic to be deployed at will. More piercing than just his basic dismissal of nationalist leaders, however, was Klaus's explanation for why precisely, in his democratic worldview, the communists could not employ nationalist rhetoric:

_Different socialist thinkers are trying to redefine socialism and give it a whole new, uncompromising sense, but it seems they will not succeed. They had to make sense of the people to erase the experiences of several decades, they would have to find a new Marx, someone who would... once again convince romantic dreamers among the intellectuals that it is possible for the state to organize our lives better than how we are able to organize ourselves._48

Here, Klaus linked the re-establishment of socialism with the erasure of memory. By neglecting to clearly define socialism, Klaus could apply this rhetoric to a wide variety of left-wing parties, ascribing to them a great sin: disrespecting the memory of the Czech people. He also incorporated anti-elite rhetoric by saying that only “romantic dreamers among the intellectuals” would buy the new iterations of socialist thinking and thus ignore the “experiences of several decades,” which were presumably those of “ourselves,” meaning the common man, including Klaus himself. As such, Klaus wielded historical memory as a tool to forward a populist outlook on the present and future of Czech politics. The core of his rejection of the post-Velvet Revolution KSC lay in his own memory and his belief that many voters felt the same way he did. Not only the political mainstream attacked the KSC’s newfound nationalism, however, as the far-right Republican Party also took issue with the communists. The SPR-RSČ and ODS alike painted the KSC as swindlers, liars, and opportunist characteristics which they hoped would send voters into their arms and away from the communists. The SPR-RSČ, ODS, OF, and KDS all firmly opposed the KSC and its political strategy in the new democratic Czechoslovakia, focusing their criticisms on the KSC’s lack of respect for the people’s memories and belief that the KSC policy of national unity was not constructive for rebuilding a strong Czechoslovak democracy. Because the non-communist parties were unified against explicitly nationalist rhetoric, they each had to present their own distinct rhetorical alternative that would simultaneously reach out to the people through an “appeal to self-esteem” and re-establish the “tangled bonds” that would limit the government and thus new elite formation.

**Solutions within a Democracy**

The non-communist parties sought to promote themselves as honorable and relatable, and emphasized their solidarity with their voter base rather than a broader national unity with all Czechs or Slovaks. Prior to the 1992 elections, Václav Klaus opined that, despite his less-than-stellar confidence in the success of the country’s future democratization, he still trusted that some political actors would be more successful than others: “it will not be ambitious, nationalist slogans of the desperate politicians (ohánějící politikové) who say the last word, but the thoughtful and pragmatic thinkers.”50 Klaus contrasted “desperate politicians,” a way to disparage elites, with “pragmatic thinkers,” a category in which he implicitly put himself.

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48 _Ibid.,_ page 11.
50 Václav Klaus, _Proč jsem optimista?_, 1992, Václav Klaus miscellany, Box 1, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 14.
He thus situated himself as a man of the people ready to fight against the worst tendencies of those politicians. Klaus's more general sentiment of “thoughtful and pragmatic thinkers” proves to be informative when analyzing other parties’ rhetoric; through their campaign materials, they each answer what it means to be “thoughtful and pragmatic.”

The Civic Forum portrayed itself as a practical party that sought to unite the people under a shared mission to build a better society. They prefaced some of their more negative rhetoric by reminding voters that they were the ones who had “stood at the head” of the revolution. This was a way to remind voters of their leadership credentials and hopefully make the party’s pessimistic program more palatable. The program did not pull punches, saying “the current state of our house is therefore bleak,” but also responded to this harsh truth directly: “the electoral program of the Civic Forum is primarily a rescue program for the house.” Such rhetoric framed the task of democratization as a mutual struggle to be shared by the party and its voters. The OF wanted to emphasize that they, too, lived through communism, and shared the same experiences as the voting public. One experience they highlighted was that of the common laborer under communism: “Millions of people have worked honestly, but their work has often been falsified in absurd jokes, ruining our birthplace.” With this proclamation, the OF sought to capture voters on two counts: the “falsification” of experience, and the invocation of the shared past, as in “our birthplace.” Regarding the falsification of experience, the party recognized that its voters deserved to be acknowledged for their work in a way that they weren’t previously, and by bringing light to this injustice, the OF implied their own ability to correct it. Regarding the shared past, such rhetoric created a strong sense of belonging and togetherness, in addition to the OF’s unique position as being the party of the revolution. Despite all of the historical motivation and popular rhetoric, the OF understood its “rescue program” might not be popular amongst voters, and so pre-empted a backlash: “We are aware that the willingness of

The victims is not very popular in the electoral program and that the formulation of this goal can be abused in the electoral struggle by those who have caused our shameful lag behind the advanced world.” This is indicative of a key political point, as the OF characterized its political opponents as opportunists who hindered the country’s democratization. In this sense, the OF appealed to the desire of the Czechoslovak people to move away from communism and back into the community of democratic states. It is simultaneously a popular and anti-elite argument, but in such a way that built off of the OF’s rhetorical strength as the party of the revolution. The OF was thus both thoughtful and pragmatic with this approach, which incorporated an understanding of challenges facing the party on both policy and political fronts, but also was pragmatic for the sake of its own political gains. As the OF predicted, though, other parties would be quick to decry its outlook.

Despite being a successor party of the Civic Forum, the ODS was quick to criticize the OF’s rhetoric as being elitist and insufficiently conscious both of history and of contemporary popular sentiment. Writing in 1992, Václav Klaus remarked that political parties had a duty to fight on behalf of their voters, but some parties were less suited to do so than others: “Elite clubs… can not fulfill this task. They can not get people “down” for such a program.” Klaus attributed this to a chief weakness: “The lack of respect for historical experience, continuity and tradition.” This was a direct repudiation of the Civic Forum’s effort to build support by energizing voters to vote for a program. In the abstract realm, away from policy, Klaus was also setting up an important anti-elite rhetorical construct by describing the former OF politicians as belonging to “elite clubs.” This harkens back to the concern about the “uncontrolled power without tangled bonds,” in other words the elite club of the communist regime. So, when Klaus slammed “the lack of respect for historical experience,” he was attempting to refocus the historical debate away from the OF’s leadership role in the Velvet Revolution, and toward the

52 Ibid., page 2.
53 Ibid., page 1.
54 Ibid., page 3.
55 Václav Klaus, Proč jsem optimista?, 1992, Václav Klaus miscellany, Box 1, Folder 3, Hoover Institution Archives. Page 32.
56 Ibid.
character of its leadership. Embedded in this was the implication that the ODS was not an elite club, because to be an elite club would be disrespectful of “historical experience, continuity and tradition,” and for Klaus, that disrespect was a most foul crime. He wanted voters to believe the same thing about the ODS that the OF wanted its voters to believe: that our party is comprised of people just like you, who understand your historical experience and who will fight for you. This thoughtful and pragmatic end goal was shared by parties outside of the political mainstream, namely the SPR-RSČ, even if the means to reach that end were different.

The SPR-RSČ used flamboyant rhetoric to emphasize its comprehension of contemporary dynamics between the elite and the people. Underlying most SPR-RSČ rhetoric was a recognition of the importance of the past, and the “honor” of the people to speak openly of their memories. Accompanying this, however, were drastic statements about the harm done to the people under the communist regime, and how it had not ended when the regime left. A few months after the Velvet Revolution, the SPR-RSČ insisted that “The public is perfectly emotionally and intellectually manipulated. All the means of this psychotechnical manipulation are concentrated in the hands of a narrow group of internationals.” The word “internationals” in this context is code for the elite who worked against the people from abroad. This evokes the communist era, when Moscow pulled strings in Prague. Encompassed within this argument are domestic collaborators as well, implied to be the SPR-RSČ’s political opponents. The SPR-RSČ warned voters that the other parties may not be as tame as they seem, and not genuinely concerned with, or ingrained in, the public consciousness. The SPR-RSČ’s positive message, to accompany this doom and gloom, took on a revolutionary, almost philosophical tone: “The only real danger to the government is free and brave citizens, morally autonomous, powerful and independent people... Our people have forgotten that freedom must not be left before life, for living without it is mere shame.”

"Because the “non-communist parties were unified against explicitly nationalist rhetoric, they each had to present their own distinct rhetorical alternative that would simultaneously reach out to the people through an “appeal to self-esteem” and re-establish the..."

58 Ibid., page 6.
59 Ibid.
recognized the value of aligning their personage, and thereby their goals, with voters. In this sense, the SPR-RSČ was not much different from the ODS or OF: all portrayed themselves as parties of the people, standing with their voters rather than being aloof leaders. After all, nobody wanted to be accused of being an elite."

Conclusion
In the immediate aftermath of the fall of an oppressive communist regime, Czechoslovak parties and politicians sought to win support by using history and historical memory to construct populist rhetoric. This rhetoric appealed to voters’ dissatisfactions with the communist regime’s elitism and destruction of Czechoslovak society. The post-communist parties responded accordingly, on the former issue deploying anti-elite rhetoric, and on the latter issue advocating for the reconstruction of “the people” as a unit. These two rhetorical tools, “the people” and “the elite,” define populist rhetoric, then and now.

On the basis of painful historical memories, the non-communist parties rejected attempts by the Communist Party both to stake a place in the democratic system, and to introduce explicitly nationalist rhetoric into political debates. The non-communists debated fiercely about what non-nationalist path should be taken, but all converged on the same principle of “thoughtful and pragmatic” popular representation. This was deployed in a variety of fashions, with the Civic Forum proclaiming a big tent to face the practical problems of the era, the Christian Democrats seeking to lead the people based on a shared set of values, the Civic Democrats pushing a policy agenda forward from a place amongst the people, and the Republicans riling up their voters with fervent rhetoric in order to stand out.

Partisan ideological differentiation in the Czech Republic has become richer over the years, and so has the overt presence of populists in Czech politics. These populists include the current President, Miloš Zeman, the very same who was a loyal member of the Civic Forum, and Prime Minister, Andrej Babiš, a political outsider. While some analyses seek to explain their success, and the success of other populists in the region, as a new phenomenon, this paper has sought to show that their success is merely building on a long rhetorical tradition. The focus of their messages change, perhaps corruption one year and immigration the next, but the framework that undergirds their appeal has a long history. In order to best understand the present, we must understand the past, and in order to best advocate for the future we want, regardless of ideology or tactics, we ought to educate ourselves on what successful rhetoric looks like.

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Hydropolitics in the Indus Basin:
The Indus Water Treaty and Water Mismanagement in Pakistan

Introduction
Pakistan could be water scarce by 2025. In recent months, this prediction has generated headlines and galvanized the country as a whole. However, this is not new information; the UN, IMF, and Pakistan Council for Research in Water Resources (PCRWR) have been deliberating potential water scarcity for the past few years.

The fact that the seriousness of this danger was not well known within the Pakistani populous for so long is unsurprising, as the warnings of water security experts have been largely ignored. But today—primarily due to three events that occurred this past year—the water crisis seems to be getting the attention that it deserves. First, Pakistan’s Permanent Indus Commission objected to the Kishanganga hydroelectric project initiated by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on grounds that it violated the Indus Water Treaty. Simultaneously, the Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources predicted that Pakistan could “run dry” by 2025. Both of these events catalyzed public outcry and brought the severity of the situation into mainstream discussion. These first two events then culminated in the most tangible representation of the urgency of the water crisis: The Supreme Court of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Diamer-Bhasha created the Mohmand Dams Fund—an attempt initiated by the Chief Justice of Pakistan to crowdsource $14 billion for the construction of a large dam.

These events successfully created awareness amongst the public regarding the severity of the crisis Pakistan faces. At the same time, this awareness has led to the spread of rampant misinformation about the nature of the water crisis.

3 Ibid.
The general public has yet to understand what the water crisis is, how it is to be defined, what its causes are, and where the solutions lie. This paper will attempt to remedy this.

The paper will be structured based on our findings regarding the following three questions:

1. What is India’s role in Pakistan’s water crisis and how effective are the existing mechanisms, namely the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, in safeguarding Pakistan’s interests?

2. What is and what is not the water crisis — how to define exactly the causes, components, and realities of Pakistan’s true water crisis?

3. What steps should be taken by all stakeholders that will contribute to improving the understanding, management, and distribution of water resources?

Part One of this paper will address international transboundary water sharing challenges in the Indus Basin between Pakistan and India. After the Uri attacks in September 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a provocative statement targeted at Pakistan claiming that “Blood and water cannot flow together.”

Sartaj Aziz, the de facto foreign minister of Pakistan at the time, emphatically replied by saying that any attempts by India to revoke or quell the flow of water into Pakistan can be taken as an “act of war.” Two years later, the Kishen-ganga inauguration on the Jhelum river played into these pre-existing dispositions. An atmosphere of fear was created in Pakistan through a widespread perception that India possesses the ability to stop water flow into Pakistan through their projects. Our findings will show that this is merely a perceived crisis, as the legal mechanisms in place for transboundary water sharing between the countries are strong enough to ensure Pakistan’s complete water security.

Part Two will detail the true nature of Pakistan’s domestic water crisis. Based on our findings, we will examine the substance behind Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources prediction that Pakistan could “run dry” by 2025 by analyzing the historical, structural, and macro-economic deficiencies in domestic water resource management and policy. It is here that we identify the real crisis and formally define Pakistan’s water crisis, identify its causes and components.

Part Three uses the analysis and evidence presented in the paper to make recommendations on how to best move forward with India through the mechanisms outlined in the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) as well as addressing the domestic structural deficiencies in Pakistan’s water resource management. We hope that the discussion in this paper will contribute towards practical policy discourse on tangible structural, legal, and normative measures stakeholders in the region can undertake in the hope for introducing new approaches to understanding the

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water crisis and positing long-term solutions for Pakistan.

But before launching into this inquiry, we turn to the basin itself.

**Indus Basin Overview**

The Indus River is Pakistan's lifeline. Originating from Tibet in the upper reaches of the Himalaya, the river moves through Indian-controlled Kashmir (a disputed territory) and finally enters its most dependent area, across the international boundary into downstream Pakistan.\(^9\) It flows through the fertile plains of Punjab and then Sind, eventually draining into the Arabian Sea.

The British expanded the irrigation network in sheer size and scale to the point where the Indus Basin in Pakistan is the largest irrigation network in the world, accounting for seventy-one percent of the country's territory.\(^10\) The Basin is directly responsible for the employment of nearly half of Pakistan's labor force and a quarter of the gross domestic product.\(^11\) Given the size, magnitude, and dependence Pakistan places on the basin, it would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of the Basin in the security calculus of the country.

**Part One: Indo-Pak Transboundary Water Challenges**

The most significant addition to the political framework of the Indus Basin's water infrastructure was the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) between Pakistan, India, and the World Bank.\(^12\) The Treaty established how waters in the Indus Basin are to be shared between the two countries, established technical engineering parameters for construction projects, and outlined a dispute resolution mechanism in case of differences from either side. It is here that we will begin our discussion.

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Salient Issues in Indo-Pak Water Relations:

- The Indus River encapsulates a host of sensitivities for Pakistan's national security apparatus. By flowing through Indian-administered Kashmir, India has theoretical control over the water flow and timing as they are upper riparian's of the river. Given the adversarial relationship between the two countries, Pakistan has always viewed the Indus River through a security lens and consequently views Indian projects a potential threat to the country's security.

- Many in Pakistan's political and security elite believe their security concerns regarding Indian encroachments on the Indus are valid due to the burden of history. India stopped water flow into Pakistan on April 1, 1948. For the first (and only) time, India had demonstrated their willingness and ability to control water flow into Pakistan. This heightened the state's insecurity as it became evident that the lifeline of Pakistan's economy—the Indus River—was at the mercy of a hostile Indian government. The act defied the natural geography of the Indus Basin, leaving the newly-formed Pakistani state with the acute realization that it had to guarantee access to the waters of the Indus river system. For many in the Pakistani bureaucratic elite, the memory of April 1, 1948, is still alive, giving rise to paranoia concerning Indian projects on Pakistani rivers. Subsequently, Pakistan tends to view Indian projects through a security lens.

- The Indian government itself has politicized the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. In 2016, Modi infamously said that “blood and water cannot flow together.” A few weeks later on the banks of the Ravi, he said that he “would not let a drop of the Ravi flow into Pakistan.” Some reports indicated that India was even reconsidering their participation in the Treaty. This inevitably brought all Indian projects on Pakistani rivers under political scrutiny and caused people in Pakistan to be overly skeptical about India's role in Pakistan's water crisis.

- Pakistan has been particular concerned regarding two Indian projects: the Baglihar and Kishenganga hydroelectric dams. Both have become highly emotive issues for Pakistan as there is a perception that India can affect the timing and flow of water into Pakistan using these structures.

Before delving into the substance of these issues, it is imperative to understand how history shaped the water sharing arrangements between the two countries.

Making Nature Conform to the Territorial Nation — Partition and its Aftermath

The partition of the Indian subcontinent divided the Indus Basin between India and Pakistan. The Radcliffe Commission's 1947 demarcation of the border drew a line over the largest contiguous gravity flow irrigation system in the world. The political leaders at the time were all too aware of this and used their influence to gain strategic advantages for their respective countries. This was especially true for the manner in which Punjab—the most important province at the time of partition given its central role in Indian politics—was partitioned. The Commission deviated from their duty to fairly and impartially draw the boundary between India and Pakistan a day or so before the announcement of the official land award because of one reason: water. Radcliffe’s private secretary at the time of partition, Christopher Beaumont, revealed that Britain's last viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, was apparently goaded into action by Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru, who pressured him to alter the first draft of the land demarcation. We now know that the division was changed to give India a substantial tract of land - the Zira and Ferozepur sub-districts of Punjab's Ferozepur district. Both were Muslim majority, and thus, should have ordinarily gone to Pakistan. But important infrastructure that controlled the flow of water in the Sutlej river lay in these districts,
making them an area of immense strategic importance. In the words of Beaumont, this incident brought “grave discredit on both men” and undermined the legitimacy of the ostensibly impartial Radcliffe Commission. Therefore, the tensions between India and Pakistan predate the very inception of the two states and set the tone for what was to follow.

In the post-partition era, the relationship between people, territory, and state was fragmented. This led to a crisis of legitimacy which caused both states to take measures to establish their undisputed sovereignty. The Indus River directly challenged unified sovereignty by flowing across borders. Pakistan had territorial sovereignty over the river, whereas India, as the upper riparian, ensured its absolute sovereignty through control of the headworks infrastructure. Controlling water flows within national territory was essential to establishing legitimate state sovereignty. In this light, “controlling water” revealed the contradictions the partition had engendered by attempting to make nature conform to the political boundaries.

The Water Stops

The most overt example of an exercise of control occurred on April 1, 1948. After the expiration of a standstill water-sharing agreement between India and Pakistan, India unilaterally stopped water flow into Pakistan. Ironically, it used the very headworks India had covertly procured from Pakistan in the Mountbatten meetings pre-partition to do so. The Ferozepur headworks stopped the water coming into Pakistan from the Dipalpur canal as well as the upper Bari Doab Canal. India’s action left 5.5% of the sown area and almost 8% of the cultivable land in West Pakistan at the time without water. It also became an issue of provincial rhetoric for the Punjabi middle class as the impact was most visibly felt in the province’s cultural capital of Lahore, whose population saw a barren canal in the heart of the city. As The Pakistan Times editorialized, in the five weeks without water, “what should have been green fields” had “shimmered barrenly in the merciless sun.” When “water gurgled” once again in the canal on May 5, the paper reported that the “great excitement of the Lahori people” was palpable as they “flocked” the canal bank.

Overnight, Pakistan and its people understood what it meant to be the lower riparian. The country was now all too aware of the fact that India possessed the ability to create a water shortage in the country at will. It was at this critical juncture that Pakistan swiftly moved to protect its water rights and security through negotiation with their Indian counterparts.

Pakistan’s Need for Protection — Introducing the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960

"Pakistan had territorial sovereignty over the river, whereas India, as the upper riparian, ensured its absolute sovereignty through control of the headworks infrastructure."

While New Delhi insisted that water is no different from any other natural resource within India, Islamabad asserted that the natural flow of rivers across borders produces shared sovereignties. These diverging narratives caused the bilateral talks between Pakistan and India to fail and created a space for the international

18 Ibid.
21 Ibid
"Therefore, the bulk of the negotiations were not over Pakistan’s water rights, but the amount and scope of the aid package Pakistan was to receive for the construction of these development works."

community to step in and broker an agreement. David Lilienthal, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, visited the Basin and pushed for the World Bank to take an interest in the dispute and broker talks for its resolution. Under the pretext of the Cold War and increasing Soviet influence in the region, the United States decided to take interest in this dispute. Using its auxiliary economic institution, the World Bank, the Eisenhower administration took a fundamentally challenging role in offering its "good offices" to mediate the water dispute. With this, the decade long negotiation process began.

During the initial stages of the negotiations, India originally offered Pakistan control over five rivers. Pakistan rejected this as they felt they should claim all six rivers. As the talks went on, India offered Pakistan fewer concessions, until Pakistan was forced to accept control over only three rivers. Thus the Eastern Rivers whose courses run more in India were allocated to India, and the three Western Rivers that primarily run through Pakistan were allocated to Pakistan.

While this negotiation meant that Pakistan had to give three rivers to India, further analysis reveals that Pakistan gained substantially more waters than they lost. All river flows are measured at rim stations in the northernmost monitoring stations. Pakistan extracted this information during the negotiations to understand how much water flowed in each river. The information revealed that Pakistan only gave up 29 Million Acre Feet (MAF) of water at the time in the three Eastern rivers and gained 114 MAF from the Western Rivers.

However, Pakistan's major population centers such as Lahore, Bahawalpur, and Multan are more situated towards the Eastern rivers. The IWT's sponsor entities (US, UK, and the World Bank) decided to launch an ambitious infrastructure plan to compensate for the loss of the Eastern rivers. A new system of barrages, dams, and link canals was intended to be constructed to divert excess water from the Western Rivers to the Eastern rivers. The cost would be borne by governments around the world, including India. However, this plan was delayed for nearly ten years as talks dragged on.

In the latter half of the negotiations, Pakistani officials switched their position from claims over river waters to discussions about the extent of the financial compensation for developmental works on the three rivers Pakistan was losing. Therefore, the bulk of the negotiations were not over Pakistan's water rights, but the amount and scope of the aid package Pakistan was to receive for the construction of these development works. This is most succinctly articulated by Aloys Michel, a seminal writer on the Indus Basin, who noted that the final Treaty was appropriately "an Annexure to the Development Fund Agreement rather than vice versa" and that "the Bank and friendly governments, chiefly the United States, had actually purchased an agree-

25 Naqvi, Faisal. Personal Interview. 10 August 2018.
26 Ibid.
However, what was critical in the agreement from a security perspective was not the developmental assistance, but the manner in which the water was to be shared between India and Pakistan. This, ultimately, was why there was a need for the Treaty in the first place. In this regard, the basic postulations of the Treaty can be summarized as follows:

- The waters of the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) would be given to Pakistan and India would be under an obligation to “let flow” their waters (subject to certain specified limitations for domestic, non-consumptive, and agricultural use).

- The waters of the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas) would be given for use to India exclusively.

- India would be free to construct “run-of-the-river,” hydroelectric projects on the Western Rivers (subject to various dam design limitations aimed to restrain India’s capacity to affect water flows).

- The Treaty also obligated both countries to regularly exchange data regarding flow and utilization of the waters and constitute a Permanent Indus Commission that serves as a regular channel of communication on matters related to the implementation of the Treaty.

To say that the Treaty established a mechanism for “water sharing” or “cooperation” would be false. The Treaty effectively divided the Indus River into two independent segments: the Eastern and Western Rivers. India was not allowed to make large storage projects on these rivers or impact the flow and timing of water coming into Pakistan. In this regard, Pakistan’s immediate security concerns were resolved as the Treaty ensured their protection.

Evaluating the Success of the Indus Waters Treaty

The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960 after almost a decade of negotiation, is considered to be “the world’s most successful water treaty.” The treaty has remained intact for over fifty years and survived three Indo-Pakistani wars. While there exists no doubt that it has been successful, we will address the various complexities and intricacies of the Treaty and its implementation.

We will evaluate the success of the Treaty using three metrics. First, we will analyze the technical issues that have arisen in the Treaty by using the Baglihar and Kishenganga hydroelectric projects as case studies. Next, we will look at the normative impacts of the Treaty through its politicization, securitization, and perception in both countries. Finally, given that the treaty has not been revised since 1960, we will attempt to analyze whether or not it is structurally sound in the 21st century and attempt to shed some light on what the future may hold.

Technical Issues

From 1960 to 2002, the Treaty seemed to work effectively. In this time, there were no major disputes between the two countries regarding water. While small issues did arise, such as the Salal and Wullar projects initiated by India, but they tended to subside after both parties stated their respective positions. This changed in 2002 when India started aggressively pushing ahead with the Baglihar and Kishenganga projects.

Under the Treaty, all “questions” are first required to be addressed bilaterally by the Indus Waters Commission. If the two sides cannot resolve this, then questions become “differences,” and finally “disputes.” If the two sides cannot resolve a “question” or “difference” bilaterally, they are referred to either a Neutral Expert or an International Court of Arbitration, depending on the nature of the question. For example, technical or engineering differences are referred to a Neutral Expert. Other disputes are referred to a Court of Arbitration. In nearly six decades,

the options to resolve a “dispute” have only been used twice; once for the Baglihar and the other for the Kishenganga project.\(^{34}\)

**Baglihar**

The first dispute that Pakistan formally litigated related to the Baglihar hydroelectric project and was taken up by Raymond Latiffe who was designated as the Neutral Expert. The most important question was India’s usage of low-level outlets.\(^{35}\) In simple terms, the level of an outlet matters because it allows India to drain all the water above the outlet. The act of draining all water in a reservoir is called “drawdown flushing.”\(^{36}\) Drawdown flushing’s primary role is to clear sedimentation from the reservoir.\(^{37}\) This is done by having low-level outlets. However, the lower the outlet, the greater India’s capability to interfere with Pakistan’s water flow, and consequently, a greater threat to Pakistan’s security.\(^{38}\)

The ability to control water flow through low-level outlets is especially relevant in the winter months. The Indus River is unique in the sense that most of its water flows from the months of April to October (the summer) are due to glacier melt and monsoons.\(^{39}\) In the winter months of November to March, water flow reduces significantly. Experts in Pakistan stated that the project would deprive Pakistan of 321,000-acre-feet of water during the three months of Rabi season and would have far-reaching consequences for agriculture as well.\(^{40}\) The project would cause a serious setback to wheat production in Punjab, Pakistan’s biggest wheat-producing province. This fear is compounded with the possibility of India constructing a cascade of projects with low-level outlets, as they would have control of Pakistan’s water supply.\(^{41}\)

India argued that the low-level outlets were a necessary design requirement for sediment control.\(^{42}\) In purely engineering terms, India is correct — low-level outlets are more effective in clearing sedimentation. However, knowing the security implication that low-level outlets cause for the lower riparian, the treaty has ostensible measures against these designs. Subpoint (d) of Paragraph 8 of Annexure D states that outlets “shall be of the minimal size and located at the highest level” consistent with the sound design of the project.\(^{43}\) The only time outlets for sediment control could be built were in an “unforeseen emergency.” Therefore, Pakistan’s argument to Latiffe as follows

a) Low-level outlets are only superior to higher outlets for drawdown flushing — lowering the level of water in a reservoir.

b) The Treaty prohibits lowering of the reservoir water level except in the case of an “unforeseen emergency.”

c) Sedimentation does not constitute an unforeseen emergency.

d) Therefore, the low-level outlets built by India were a violation of the Treaty.

The Neutral Expert rejected Pakistan’s argument and sided with India. Feisal Naqvi, Pakistan’s legal counsel for Baglihar and Kishenganga, believed that Latiffe made several grave errors in his interpretation of the law and the facts of the case. One of these errors was his interpretation of sediment control constituting an “unforeseen emergency:”

> “Contrary to popular belief, issues like siltation were known in 1960. Paragraph 8(d) clearly stipulates that outlets are available for sediment control. The people drafting the Treaty were the best engineers that the World Bank could get a hold of. So it’s not like people woke up in 2010 and suddenly realized sedimentation was an issue. It was a known issue with known problems and solutions. How could it then have been an unforeseen emergency?”\(^{44}\)

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37 Ibid.
41 Naqvi, Feisal. Personal Interview. 10 August 2018.
42 Ibid.
44 Naqvi, Feisal. Personal Interview. 10 August 2018.
The Pakistani legal team failed to convince Raymond Latiffe that sedimentation did not constitute an unforeseen emergency. They then argued that India’s dam design was a violation of the Treaty. They argued that the Treaty had to be seen as part of Pakistan’s broader security concerns. But to the dismay of the legal team, the Neutral Expert was bent on interpreting the Treaty from a purely engineering perspective with a singular focus on the Treaty’s technicalities:

"India wanted to construct its dams in a more ‘modern’ way... integrated management and that sort of thing. My answer was that the Treaty is not about optimization. It is there so that we don’t kill each other in wars, so I don’t want you controlling my waters. Build a different design but build them with the minimal ability to control my [Pakistan’s] water. So the point is India needs to build the projects differently. You [India] can’t just say that because we have these dam design in Nepal or China or wherever we will continue to do it in this way... [apart from] that there is no dispute within the Treaty except dam design. And the only problems that arise are because of Indian intransigence."

However, Indian officials persisted. They argued that the current design with its low-level outlets was necessary for the “sound design of the project.” They justified this by making a distinction between “operation” and “maintenance.” Latiffe ultimately agreed with the Indian position and used the new distinction to justify the low-level outlets. This represented a security risk for Pakistan as drawdown flushing would allow India the ability to control water flow and timing, especially with the large number of projects India was planning to build using the same model.

For these reasons, Mr. Naqvi is of the belief that Pakistan was unlucky with the appointment of Raymond Latiffe as the Neutral Expert.

“We were dealing with a 70-year-old engineer-cum-professor from Switzerland, an upstream country, whose view was that dams are beautiful and large dams are more beautiful and why can’t you [India and Pakistan] just get along. To which we were though ‘how many times do we have to kill each other for you to understand we can’t get along. That’s why we have a Treaty!’"

The Neutral Expert’s judgment sent shockwaves through Pakistan. By ruling in favor of low-level outlets, India had the potential to control the timing and flow of water into Pakistan. It emerged shortly after the award that

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45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
India was planning to construct 135 dams on the Western Rivers, 24 on the Indus, 77 on the Jhelum, and 34 on the Chenab. Overnight, the issue was not a minor question about the dam design of one project anymore, but a matter of life-and-death for Pakistan.

**Kishenganga**

Pakistan tried to contain the fallout of the Baglihar decision by challenging India’s construction of the Kishenganga hydro-electric project on the Jhelum river. As India had similar designs of low-level outlets in Kishenganga, Pakistan could hope to reverse the Baglihar decision indirectly by taking up Kishenganga. According to Naqvi, Pakistan attempted to hit “two birds with one stone.”

The Kishenganga project is a run-of-the-river plant designed to divert water from the Kishanganga river to the Jhelum river. After the diversion, the water flows down the Jhelum river and into Pakistan (this is shown in the figure below). However, Pakistan believed the project violated the IWT due to engineering issues in its dam design that could supposedly affect Pakistan’s water security.

Pakistan framed two legal questions and four technical questions. The two legal questions were:

a) “Whether India’s proposed diversion of the Kishanganga (Neelum) into another tributary, i.e. the Bonar-Madmati Nullah, being one central element of the Kishanganga Plant, breaches the legal obligations India owes Pakistan under the Treaty, as interpreted and applied in accordance with international law, including India’s obligations under Article III(2) (let flow all the waters of the Western rivers and not permit any interference with those waters”) and Article IV(6) “maintenance of natural channels?”

b) Whether under the Treaty, India may deplete or bring the reservoir level of a run-of-the-river plant below dead storage level in any circumstances except in the case of an unforeseen emergency?

Whereas, the four technical questions were as follows:

a) Whether the design of the plant is in conformity with Paragraph 8(a) of Annexure D to the Treaty?

b) Whether the design of the Kishanganga Plant is in conformity with Paragraph 8(c) and Paragraph 8(f) of Annexure D to the Treaty?

c) Whether the design of the plant is in conformity with Paragraph 8(d) of Annexure D to the Treaty?

d) Whether the design of the plant is in conformity with Paragraph 8(e) of Annexure D to the Treaty?

The legal questions affected all Indian projects, whereas the specific technical questions only affected Kishenganga. For this reason, the legal questions were naturally of more importance to Pakistan’s long-term water security.

These legal questions were posed in an International Court of Arbitration (ICA). This was a risky move as the ICA’s ruling would have precedential value, and if it ruled against Pakistan, India would be allowed to construct low-level outlets for all of their future projects. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s legal team was confident that the Baglihar ruling was not grounded on a sound legal basis and would prove to be unsustainable.

The first question Pakistan posed was solely concerning the Kishenganga project (and not a general question applicable to all projects such as that of drawdown flushing). They asked whether or not the Kishenganga project violated Paragraph 15 (iii) of Annexure D, which stipulates that India cannot construct a Plant on the Jhelum river if it adversely affects “the then existing…hydro-electric use by Pakistan.” Pakistan argued that since their Neelum-Jhelum hydro-electric dam was conceived before Kishenganga, the project constituted “the then existing use,” and therefore made the construction of Kishenganga illegal. However, this question posed problems for the Pakistani legal team.

“Neelum-Jhelum came up in the late 80s, whereas Kishenganga came up in 1996…The Pakistani team was aggrieved by the fact that

the ICA rejected evidence that we had started first. The ICA said India started first, and therefore Neelum-Jhelum did not constitute an existing use. My argument was that it was a ‘continuous obligation’ — this meant that India could use the waters as long as Pakistan was not using them. We referred to the Helsinki rules of 1966 and the London/Barcelona rules of 2004, but the argument failed.”

Mr. Naqvi also indicated that the ICA had to give some credence and meaning to a special clause in the Treaty by ruling against Pakistan:

“The further problem was there was an entire chunk of the Treaty that said that India can’t touch Pakistani waters, that it had to let the water flow. But then there is one clause which says that you can take a specific tributary of the Jhelum and put it in another tributary. Why was this put in the Treaty? The short answer is that someone had thought of it earlier; it was an exception. To that extent, [the ICA] had to give some meaning to this stupid clause even though it applies to no other project known to humanity.”

However, Mr. Naqvi didn’t believe that the ICA ruling on this point was a big blow to Pakistan’s overarching concerns regarding security. Average water loss at Neelum-Jhelum was supposed to be 16%, whereas after Kishanganga it would be 10%. Secondly, the water from the Kishenganga diversion eventually comes to Pakistan. And if the proposed Kohala hydropower project gets constructed, any electricity lost will get be recovered.

The second legal question was of far greater importance to the long-term water security of Pakistan. Pakistan asked whether or not India was allowed drawdown flushing except in an unforeseen emergency. This question attempted to overturn the verdict in Baglihar, where it was decided that low-level outlets and drawdown flushing were permitted for sedimentation control. According to Mr. Naqvi, there was no need for low-level outlets for the Kishenganga project because there isn’t a sedimentation problem on the Kishenganga river:

“Why do you [India] have low-level outlets when you don’t have a sedimentation problem... Where Pakistan gets paranoid is when India decides to use low-level outlets when there is absolutely no need for it. According to our research, Kishenganga would last 80 years.

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54 Ibid.
On the question of low-level outlets, the ICA ruled emphatically in Pakistan’s favor. They stated that no future Indian project design could include low-level outlets for sediment control as it does not constitute an “unforeseen emergency.” Because of the precedential nature of the ICA’s ruling, the Baglihar decision was “grandfathered.”

This meant that the Neutral Expert’s decision contained no precedential value and was limited to the Baglihar project. In this regard, the Kishenganga ruling represented an unequivocal win for Pakistan.

However, the ICA’s decision was not self-executing, and further steps had to be taken before it could be fully implemented. The steps included taking the four remaining technical questions to relevant forum. Pakistan did not take these steps and failed to capitalize on Kishenganga.

As mentioned above, the two forums available to India or Pakistan for dispute resolution was either the Neutral Expert or the International Court of Arbitration. Naturally, technical or engineering questions fall within the purview and jurisdiction of the Neutral Expert.

Pakistan’s poor experience with Raymond Latiffe, the Neutral Expert for Baglihar, Pakistan was hesitant to take the remaining four questions to another Neutral Expert. However, this is incorrect as a new Neutral Expert would have been bound by the Kishenganga Award, which ruled in favor of Pakistan. A Neutral Expert appointed for the Kishenganga case would, therefore, not be able to repeat the same mistakes as in Baglihar. Finally, if the Neutral Expert ruled against Pakistan, their decision would only have affected the Kishenganga case, and Pakistan could challenge such an adverse finding in a Court of Arbitration on a legal basis.

Instead, Pakistan wanted to immediately take the matter to the ICA, where previously they had greater success. India categorically refused to go to the ICA and rightfully stated that the questions belong within the purview of the Neutral Expert. This impasse led the World Bank to declare in 2016 that both countries had to agree on the forum. The stalemate that followed has resulted in the Pakistan being unable to capitalize on the Kishenganga Award, and India has since been able to construct the Kishenganga project.

Pakistan’s stubborn decision to attempt to go to the ICA instead of the NE baffled Mr. Naqvi. He argued that it made no sense to go to the ICA and that it was in Pakistan’s interest to accept India’s offer and take the matter up with a Neutral Expert.

First, he believed the risk of going to the ICA greatly outweighed the benefits. As stated earlier, the ICA’s design has precedential value. Any ruling against Pakistan would not only overturn the Kishanganga Award but apply to all future Indian projects. He explained the Pakistani decision in cruder terms as follows:

“Look, Kishenganga has been decided in a favorable manner… why should Pakistan reopen a case they won? In my opinion, it should be India who should want to go the ICA as it benefits them, not us. Pakistan’s view is moronic beyond belief.”

Secondly, he argued that India’s refusal to participate in any ICA proceedings would significantly harm the legitimacy of any outcome. He even stated that any ex-parte trial would pressure the Court to “bend over backwards” for India.

Mr. Rafay Alam, a Lahore-based lawyer who has worked on the Treaty, also believes that Pakistan should have gone to the Neutral Expert, but is confident that they now will:

“It was the first time you could take one issue and plug it into two different forums. The difference is where there is tension. But I think that more powerful vested interests have prevailed, and Pakistan will go to the Neutral Expert.”

In a recent column, Mr. Naqvi succinctly

56 Ibid
61 Ibid.
summarized the case as follows: “Imagine a case involving the most sensitive issues of national security possible. Imagine that Pakistan wins a conclusive victory in that case. Now imagine that Pakistan wastes that victory and spends five years blundering about in a dead end. Kishanganga is that case.”

The Securitization and Politicization of Water

“It’s India, it’s Pakistan, it’s Kashmir, and it’s water. How much more sensitive can you get?”
— Feisal Naqvi

The controversial Baglihar and Kishanganga projects have sparked a passionate debate about India's role in Pakistan's water crisis. The "looming" water crisis, Pakistan's dependence on the Indus Basin for economic security, and vulnerability as the lower riparian to further Indian projects all underlie the heated water discourse among farmers, political leaders, and the public at large. Pakistan and India's seemingly eternal standoff has only sharpened the sense of vulnerability.

The government and political leadership have been quite vocal in voicing their concerns about Indian projects. In October 2008, shortly after India filled the Baglihar dam, causing a sharp reduction in the flow of the Chenab river, President Asif Ali Zardari warned that that “Pakistan would be paying a very high price for India's move to block Pakistan's water supply from Chenab River.” He warned India "not to trade important regional objectives for short-term domestic goals." On January 28, 2009, President Zardari warned in an article in the Washington Post that, “The water crisis in Pakistan is directly linked to relations with India. Resolution could prevent an environmental catastrophe in South Asia, but failure to do so could fuel the fires of discontent that may lead to extremism and terrorism.”

Then Chief Minister of Punjab, Mian Shahbaz Sharif, stated that the water issue had become a serious problem between India and Pakistan. Earlier, Pakistan's minister for education and former head of the ISI, Javed Ashraf, had warned the Senate in 2005 that the country could go to war with India over the Baglihar controversy.

The Chairman of the Indus Waters Treaty Council, Hafiz Zahoor-ul-Hassan Dahr, has warned that Pakistan could become another Somalia and Ethiopia. He said the Indian projects were aimed at controlling the waters of the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus rivers, were illegal and a clear violation of the Indus Waters Treaty.

"Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus Basin for economic security and vulnerability as the lower riparian to further Indian projects all underlie the heated water discourse among farmers, political leaders, and the public."

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65 Ibid.
Our research has found no reason to suggest that the Treaty fails in guaranteeing Pakistan's security. The outstanding problems with the Treaty are purely technical in nature, as we have discussed above. These are “engineering problems with engineering solutions.” Consequently, there is a public relations program: the technical nature of the Treaty is not understood by the vast majority of the population or even the political elite. The outstanding technical problems are all related to the dam designs of run-of-the-river projects (such as that of Kishenganga and Baglihar). However, the majority of these technical issues have now been resolved. All Pakistan needs to do now is take the remaining questions of Kishenganga to a Neutral Expert, and all outstanding technical issues in the Treaty will be put to rest.

It is critical that Pakistan stops conflating the technical aspect of the Treaty with broader security concerns. The two issues are mutually exclusive and should be treated as such. However, the powerful security establishment of Pakistan continues to needlessly interfere with transboundary water issues. By conflating the Treaty with broader concerns of national security, the establishment undermines the autonomy and independence of the Commission.

Rafay Alam talked to us about his experiences with the security establishment and the level to which they are involved in transboundary water issues. Mr. Alam worked on the Treaty between 2008 and 2010 when he was teaching at Lahore University of Management Sciences, a leading research university. He took part in an Indus Basin Transboundary Review. He recounted his experience during his interview:

“It is critical that Pakistan stops conflating the technical aspect of the Treaty with broader security concerns. The two issues are mutually exclusive and should be treated as such.”

According to Mr. Alam, this is what some academics call a “hegemony over the discourse:” when the conversation is limited to one facet of a subject. In this case, the facet is the security aspect. He explained how entrenched Pakistan's security establishment was in deciding Indo-Pak water policy:

“I had the chance to meet the Indus Waters Commissioner as part of my project. He was trying to set up a meeting regarding the Kishenganga matter. In the process, he is speaking to the secretary of water and power, someone from the

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70 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
foreign office, the Military Secretary, someone in the military intelligence. And then there is a phone next to his foot that doesn't even ring, he just picks it up and goes 'jee...jee' [yes...yes] and puts it down.74

With so many actors from various facets of the security establishment in the loop, the Indus River has become securitized amongst the political elite, as well as the Pakistani public. For example, after Pakistan lost the Baglihar decision, the Indus Commissioner at the time, Syed Jamaat Ali Shah, was accused of “betraying” the country by “giving” India the ability to control water supply by a Senate Panel.75 This statement is not only blatantly false but is representative of how Pakistan seeks to blame India for its water woes rather than focusing on structural issues of mismanagement and inequitable distribution. This kind of rhetoric, from the Senate no less, indicates how little Pakistani policymakers truly know about the water crisis. Rafay Alam had this to say on the matter:

"Whenever I hear the Jamaat Ali Shah betrayed the nation, I laugh and recount the experience I told you about [mentioned above]. So it occurred to me that firstly, everything that the guy does is obviously monitored. All the phone calls, the communication, is monitored by someone else. To then say that he sold the river is a huge cover-up. The folks that I could see were keeping an eye on him either didn't know what they were doing, or it wasn't an issue."

Alleged complicity by the security establishment not only undermined the autonomy of the Commission but put Mr. Shah’s life at risk. Seeing the inflated passions of the public, coupled with being accused of treason and betrayal, Mr. Shah fled to Canada.76 The authorities have asked for his repatriation, but the request has been denied. The character assignation of Jamaat Ali Shah is an example of how Pakistan politicized water as part of general Indian paranoia. This creates long term problems as political issues quickly descend in broader issues of identity, ideology, and nationalism — all of which have nothing to do with the actual crisis at all.

The politicization of water in Pakistan intensifies when India initiates it. In retaliation to Pakistan’s alleged support for the Uri Attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir in 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave his infamous “blood and water speech.” It was the first time since 1948 that India had threatened Pakistan through water. The speech marked a new period in Indo-Pak water relations: the weaponization of water by India. This would have severe ramifications on the discourse and understanding of water by the general public.

Yet, all politics are local. A closer inspection of the timeline of the speech reveals larger truths regarding the causes of this newfound politicization.

July 2016: Secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan collapse over the designs of the Kishenganga and Ratle projects.77

August 2016: Pakistan requests the World Bank to establish an International Court of Arbitration for Kishenganga and Ratle.78

September 2016: India accuses Pakistan over the Uri Attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir. Modi delivers infamous “blood and water speech.” Suspends annual Commissioners meeting.79

November 2016: India criticizes the World Bank for “favoring Pakistan.”80

December 2016: World Bank “freezes” all matters related to Kishenganga.81

February 2017: President of World Bank comes to Pakistan. Expresses concern about water.82

74 Ibid.
76 Ibid
March 2017: NIA releases two Pakistani teens alleged for Uri attack.  

March 2017: Indus Commissioners resume meeting.

Rafay Alam highlighted the importance of the context in which the “blood and water speech” was delivered:

“Consider the timeline. In November 2016, Modi gives a speech in Bhatinda, Punjab, where he says that he won’t let a drop of water from the Ravi into Pakistan. There is a BJP-Congress by-election on the horizon a month and a half away. So, he is ratcheting up the anti-Pakistan rhetoric for domestic political gain. I think he used Uri to leverage the bank into supporting India’s Neutral Expert request [for Kishenganga].”

Modi set up a committee to review options for India to leverage Pakistan within the framework of the Treaty as well as examine the possibility of India unilaterally withdrawing from it. Sartaj Aziz responded by saying any attempted abrogation will be considered an “act of war.”

With each statement by India and with each rebuttal by Pakistan, an atmosphere of anxiety was created around the possibility of India “closing the tap” on Pakistan. This rhetoric did not help ease Pakistan’s water concerns.

Pakistan has also accused India of not sharing data on the rivers. Article VI of the Indus Waters Treaty states that daily data recordings of rivers, reservoirs, canals, and link canals have to be shared by both parties on a monthly basis. Mr. Naqvi confirmed that this was true in his experiences with his Indian counterparts:

“A lot of parameters of dams are built on flow data. But when it came to Kishenganga, we barely had any data. The two sets of data we received [from the Indians] were not matched or coordinated. Even in Baglihar I distinctly remember going up to the Secretary and telling him ‘for God’s sake give us data, there is no point arguing without data.’”

India not sharing data with Pakistan only adds to mistrust on both sides. According to Daanish Mustafa, the cause for Indian apprehension to share data with Pakistan is not rooted in India’s mistrust of Pakistan, rather, intra-provincial tension in India:

“There is tension over water between Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Kashmir. They don’t publish their water statistics, so data is classified. By attempting to hide statistics from each other, they, in turn, hide it from Pakistan. In the 1980s, around 45,000 people died in Indian Punjab. One of the biggest causes of conflict was water distribution between Punjab and Haryana. India cannot afford to see an uprising of the sort again and hide statistics from Punjab.”

The Indus Commissioners meetings are private, and therefore, the minutes and meetings are not publicized. The question thus arises: why can’t data be shared amongst Commissioners if they are not shared between provinces? Daanish Mustafa provided an explanation:

“The Commissioners obviously don’t deal with intra-provincial matters. India gives us a final number of the amount of water they release. We check this number and confirm its validity. But they don’t share any river gauge data behind the point of release. They don’t share this because the Punjab and Haryana will get their calculators and start calculating their share, or lack thereof. This is their political constraint having witnessed a decade long civil war in Punjab.”

Both countries must take confidence-building steps in the realm of water to repair the trust deficit. The nature of the Indus Commission allows this to happen more easily (as compared to broader Indo-Pak relations) as the dealings are behind closed doors. India must take steps to put

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90 Ibid.
aside internal political differences to ensure the smooth coordination on the international transboundary level. This is especially relevant now given the recent politicization of water.

In 2018, Narendra Modi inaugurated the Kishenganga power plant amid calls from Pakistan that the dam violated the Indus Waters Treaty. The inauguration was widely reported in local media and quickly made the rounds on social media. Pakistan then sent a delegation led by the Attorney General to the World Bank headquarters in Washington D.C. They were unable to achieve a favorable result and came back empty-handed.

Daanish Mustafa argues that the politicization of Kishenganga is one of the primary stimulants that helped allow the water crisis to “catch the country’s attention.” In a recent op-ed, he argued that the Kishenganga “is a run of the river project with almost negligible effect on water flow to Pakistan, especially in light of the Court of Arbitration’s ruling in favor of Pakistan in 2010. So why do we believe that we are doomed?”

The reality is that the Kishenganga project has done more damage to the public conversation than it has good.

The Treaty Going Forward

Before, delving into the question of the future of the Treaty, one must be cognizant of why it has been so successful. Feisal Naqvi believes the success of the Treaty lay in its division:

“...And the reason there is such a clear demarcation, what is ours is ours and what is theirs is theirs (in terms of Pakistan’s control of the Western Rivers and India’s control of the Eastern rivers), is because you don’t have the ability to work together. I think that was a sensible recognition, and that is what has made the Treaty workable.”

We believe his argument has merit. While it may not have been an explicit reason for the division of the rivers, it is clear that the two countries cannot hold a regular dialogue at a political level given the repeated breakup of talks. The two countries have failed to work together effectively. In this context, perhaps it was best that the Treaty did not share water control on particular rivers but gave each country three rivers to meet their requirements. According to Rafay Alam, it is the only water Treaty in the world that divides a river. However, given the political climate of India and Pakistan, we believe this is beneficial.

The IWT has been successful in bringing both parties to the table through the regular meetings of the Indus Commissioners. This represents a larger achievement for Indo-Pak relations: a continuation of non-politicized, private, established communication and dispute-resolution mechanism. Article VIII (5) says that the both the Pakistani and Indian Permanent Indus Commissions are to meet at least once a year. The Commissioners are “the sole representative of their government for all matters arising out of this Treaty” and are serve as a “regular channel of communication on all matters relating to

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the implementation of the Treaty.” Mr. Naqvi argues that this channel of communication can only prove to be beneficial to the wider Indo-Pak relationship:

“Whenever someone mentions that the Treaty is terrible, especially from the Pakistan side, I get baffled...look, it's a good thing! The Treaty makes two paranoid countries deal rationally with each other. Leave it alone and stop messing with it.”

And herein lies one of the Treaty’s greatest success: an established mechanism for dialogue and communication between two countries that do not engage in regular dialogue.

However, contemporary issues have emerged given the fact that the Treaty is now 58 years old. Not a word of it has been modified, altered, or changed in any way. Science and technology have changed the way water experts understand and approach hydrology in the present day and have shed light on issues that were not known in 1960. Many people in Sindh, the southernmost and second-largest province in Pakistan, feel that the Treaty didn’t address their concerns as the lower riparian of Punjab. The IWT was negotiated between India and Pakistan in a manner that evaded the issue of Kashmir’s disputed status despite giving the countries a license for agricultural and hydropower developments. Moreover, China and Afghanistan, the two other states that encompass the Indus Basin were not included in the Treaty.

Hydrology has evolved since 1960. The understanding of issues in 1960, such as siltation, was limited compared to what we know today. This has had practical ramifications on the Indo-Pak water relation in the present. In the Baglihar dispute, siltation and sediment control was the primary reason why India opted to install low-level outlets. This was the main point of contention for Pakistan. Daanish Mustafa explained how the supposed lack of knowledge affected the case:

“Whenever you divert water to create a ‘head,’ That is, diverting water where it normally did not flow, it seeps into the groundwater. So, if you look at a hydrograph, you will realize the 4-5% of the water level, depending on the density of the water, has reduced. It is a very simple physical process. But the rum is that there are probably only one or two people in Pakistan who know this. Now, this process was not known in 1960.”

However, many stakeholders in the region that feel that the Indus Waters Treaty robbed them of a “seat at the table.” These stakeholders include Sindh, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent, China.

During the negotiations of the Treaty in the 1950s, the government of Pakistan adopted the “One Unit” scheme. This was a scheme that amalgamated and merged the four provinces of West Pakistan (present day Pakistan) into a single entity to act as a counterweight to East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh). By ‘unifying’ western Pakistan, the state removed the Sindhi perspective from the entirety of the negotiations. Ayesha Jalal, a professor at Tufts University, described the One Unit scheme in the context of water in the following way: “The One Unit Scheme enhanced suspicion and mistrust within Pakistan. It was imposed on smaller provinces and has generated hatred and anger. That is why Kalabagh is such a monster for you [Pakistan].”

Sindhis (natives of the southernmost province in Pakistan: Sindh) have consistently felt that the brunt of Pakistan’s water crisis has fallen on them as they are the lowest riparian in the Indus Basin. Moreover, with most of Sindh’s arable land falling prey to the menace of waterlogging and salinity, anger over poor water mismanagement has been streamlined to Punjab, Pakistan largest and most fertile province. Punjab is the upper riparian whereas Sindh is the lowest riparian in the basin. Sindhis have mistrusted Punjab and its use over water and argue that Sindh does not receive its fair share. They

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point to the One Unit scheme and argue that depriving the “Sindhi perspective” during negotia-
tions culminated in a Punjabi-centric Treaty. They argue that the IWT has to be revised to
ensure the water rights of Sindh are protected.

Similarly, the Indus Waters Treaty completely avoided discussing the disputed region of
Kashmir in the negotiations or the final draft. However, the bulk of the Treaty directly affects
the physical land mass of Kashmir and thereby, the Kashmiri people. This lack of representation
prompted the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly to table a resolution in 2003 rejecting the Indus
Waters Treaty and hire a consultant to quantify their losses.105

The Indus Basin also comprises Afghani-
stan and China, two states that are not includ-
ed in the Treaty. Zafar Adeel has argued that
the need to incorporate the two countries into a renegotiated Treaty is of critical importance.
Given that Afghanistan’s developmental agenda will put more pressure on the basin’s waters,
and the exacerbation of China’s freshwater crisis which may lead them to exploit Tibetan glaciers,
all four countries might need to renegotiate this treaty and discuss shared water management in
the future.106

Given these tensions and criticisms, calls
for possibly abrogating the IWT have surfaced in recent years. From the Pakistani perspective:
“The IWT worked well till the 1980s until India started building dams…on the Western Rivers…
building tens of dams without the consultation of the lower riparian leaves the Treaty virtually
defunct.”107 In turn, from the Indian perspective:
“India must harness the water sources…given
the support to terrorists by Pakistan…it is time
India use the water leverage to force Pakistan to
review its security compulsions.”108

There is no doubt that the Treaty does not
encompass various stakeholders in the Basin. There is also conclusive evidence that issues
such as climate change and the advancements in science and technology make this Treaty out-
dated. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the Treaty should be opened up for any form of re-
negotiation from the Pakistani side. The Treaty

was meant to ensure Pakistan’s water security by
creating a legal framework through which India
could not control Pakistan’s waters. As we have
argued throughout our paper, there seems to be
no indication that the Treaty is failing to achieve
this. Furthermore, Pakistan opening up the
Treaty implies that they believe they can derive
further benefits from India. This is simply not
true. India has no reason to give up any of their
share of water and make concessions to Pakistan
given the growing needs of the population and
the developmental plan India has embarked on.

Moreover, we do not believe that India will
unilaterally leave the Treaty. A glance at geo-
political dynamics supports this. India is a rising
power and sees itself as such. It is also a respon-
sible actor and has upheld international agree-
ments and treaties in the past. Furthermore, with
its push to become a permanent member of the
Security Council, India needs to demonstrate
restraint and uphold its neo-liberal tendencies.
This view was echoed by Zafar Adeel, author of
Imagining Industan and leading academics on
water in Pakistan:

“Strategically, India does not gain. India
cannot systematically go about depriving Pa-
kistan of their water. It does not gain them
anything. Any attitude to do otherwise would
hurt its aspirations of making them a regional
and global power. Additionally, India wants
to sit on a permanent Security Council in the
United Nations, which Pakistan is strongly
opposed to. Any de-escalation and furthering
talks with Pakistan, could even help India get
its much-desired seat in the Security Council.”
[Zafar Adeel]109

Abandoning the Treaty will hurt India’s
reputation internationally for taking advantage
of its position to threaten Pakistan. Moreover,
India has to be cognizant of the fact that it is
a lower riparian of the Brahmaputra river with
China being the upper riparian. India or Chi-
na do not have any water-sharing agreement
or treaty regarding the Brahmaputra river.110 Any
threats on India’s side will give China the op-
portunity to start its own projects on the Brah-

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pak-and-hydro-politics/291555.html
109 Zafar, Adeel. Personal Interview. 8 August 2018.
brahmaputra-river-an-eternal-conflict-between-india-and-china/
maputra. This will negatively affect water inflow into India, who would want to avoid these projects at all costs given China’s close relationship with Pakistan.

**Recommendations**

We make the following recommendations for utilizing the Treaty to enhance greater cooperation in the Indus Basin:

1. Execute the Kishenganga Decision by complying to India’s request to take the matter to a Neutral Expert rather than the International Court of Arbitration. The Kishenganga Decision in 2013 represented an unequivocal victory for Pakistan. However, the impasse over which forum to use in implementing the settlement led Pakistan to squander their victory. The status-quo position of using the ICA over the Neutral Expert has led to more harm than good. We do not believe that it is in Pakistan’s best interest to take the matter to the ICA, who would be better off accepting India’s request to take remaining questions to the Neutral Expert.

2. Ensure a working definition of “Pondage” that is acceptable to both parties. There are two competing and conflicting definitions of pondage under the Treaty. The two countries should take the issue to either the ICA or Neutral Expert and request clarification on the matter. We hope this will preempt and prevent future disputes.

3. Timely data sharing through installation of telemetry systems. As a downstream country, Pakistan cannot be denied access to gauge levels and data regarding river flow. Without this information, Pakistan cannot ascertain whether India is adhering to the IWT. There is a genuine concern that India is not sharing this data as stipulated by the Treaty, nor in good faith to reconcile differences and regain trust. One step that can be taken is to install a satellite-based, telemetry system for real-time hydrology data on rivers. This issue has been discussed in the past between Commissions, and steps should be taken regarding implementation.

4. Transparency between Commissioners regarding new Indian Projects on Western Rivers. Pakistan’s concerns are multiplied due to lack of timely and adequate data sharing which has deepened distrust between the two countries. Islamabad strongly believes New Delhi has not been fulfilling its obligations stipulated in the IWT such as communicating details of new projects six months before their commencement, diversion for storage and farm purposes from Western Rivers, and providing details about ancillary projects. India needs to supply timely information on the design of its projects on Western Rivers before starting work on them. This will allay Pakistan’s apprehensions regarding their incompatibility with the Treaty and transboundary impacts on the Pakistani side.

5. Mitigate the role of the World Bank and other international institutions in Indo-Pak transboundary water relations. The World Bank’s role in helping negotiate the Treaty and disperse the necessary funds for the Indus Basin Project. The Bank has no contemporary role except to help appoint a Neutral Expert and ICA panel in case when both parties cannot resolve outstanding issues bilaterally. Going to the World Bank, as Pakistan has repeatedly done in recent years, is

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unnecessary and detracts from more substantial, structural issues.

6. De-politicize and de-securitize the Treaty and broader Indo-Pak water relations. The current problems with dam design are engineering problems with engineering solutions. These issues should not be conflated with needless political rhetoric or “point-scoring,” which is usually not grounded in fact. By securitizing and politicizing the Treaty, the discourse is shaped away from the true reasons for the crisis, which we will discuss in Part II.

Conclusion

We have conducted our analysis of the Indus Waters Treaty to understand India’s role in Pakistan’s water crisis. Our research concludes that India does not directly cause the crisis in any way. The limited effect of the run-of-the-river projects, such as Baglihar and Kishenganga, only negligibly affect water supply into Pakistan. The indirect effect is much greater: Tensions with India serve to distract from the bigger issue of inequitable distribution and misallocation which we will elaborate in Part II.

Pakistan has genuine grievances regarding Indian projects on the Western Rivers. However, the IWT has an established dispute-resolution mechanism that has been respected by both parties and continues to service their needs today. For these reasons, we do not believe the Treaty should be revisited, revised, or discontinued. Using Article VII to open the Treaty up for “improvements” might be problematic given the political climate between the two countries and a recognition that Pakistan will face immense challenges in deriving concession from India.

Pakistani President Ayub Khan truly concludes it best, “We have been able to get the best that was possible...very often the best is the enemy of the good and in this case, we have accepted the good after careful and realistic approach of our entire overall situation...the basis of this agreement is realism and pragmatism.”

Part II: Domestic Water Mismanagement, Allocation, and Prioritization

“There is a crisis. It’s worse than you think.” - Dr. Daanish Mustafa, Professor at King’s College London

Post-Colonial Legacies of Water Control in Contemporary Pakistan

An accurate understanding of history explains the present. Therefore, one cannot explain modern day deficiencies in Pakistan’s domestic water policy without understanding the effect of the British Empire on the Indus Basin. The present irrigation system in Pakistan owes its birth to the vast public works drive undertaken by the British colonial administration in the late 19th century. All previous irrigation systems in the subcontinent pale in comparison to the enormous expansion of the canal system undertaken by the British. Famine prevention was ostensibly the initial impetus for the colonial administration to undertake the expensive project of irrigation development. But many scholars including Gilmartin and Mustafa have ascribed the following additional motivations behind the almost missionary development of the colonial irrigation system in the Indus basin:

• Anticipation of the increase in tax returns of the new irrigation system;

• Increased government control of the population through agricultural employment thereby minimizing the threat of a revolt;

• Reinforcement of the superiority of British “imperial scientific” discourse in the eyes of the “natives” through control of geography and the environment;

• Cultivation of local elites through a network of support including settlement and resettlement policies. These elites owed their prosperity to the irrigation system and therefore to the British.

The ethos governing water management was not driven by a micro-level concern for public well-being and equity, or for the provision of public service to the people, but rather, by the need for consolidation and rationalization of colonial control by creating specific geographies of access to resources and social control. Today, Pakistan’s water management policies are mere-
ly a continuation of the British colonial legacy.\textsuperscript{117} The post-colonial Pakistani state inherited a colonial administrative system whose ethos was not changed at the time of independence. The countervailing rural civil society, for which the Canal Act was supposedly made, was weak at the time of independence and has remained dis-enfranchised due to the Pakistani state’s inability to change the modus operandi of using water for control and power.

The water bureaucracy is still characterized by a definable hierarchy of functionaries, who are typically more in tune with the requirements of their internal administrative hierarchy than public demands for equity and public efficiency in management.\textsuperscript{118} Irrigation departments seem to be conveying an impression of being more of a policing body against a rogue population than a public utility working for their benefit.

Water continues to be used as a form of control by those who have access to it: the state, feudal lords, and landowners.\textsuperscript{119} Fawad Khan explained the continuation of power relations in regard to inequitable distribution:

“If you live in a nice posh area you get good municipal services, water is pumped. If you live in a slum, there is not even a tap. A majority of agricultural usage of water is tied to the amount of land you have. If you are a big landlord, you have a lot of water, sometimes even millions of gallons of water per day. Whereas, there are thousands of landless people who have no water and no claim to anything.”\textsuperscript{120}

There is no noteworthy contrast when it comes to differentiating the mentality of those in power today from those who were the colonial rulers of the past. In the coming sections, we will show how this mentality is the fundamental problem in addressing contemporary water concerns. Until water is seen as a means of influence, power, and control, and not a public utility that is equitably distributed to all citizens (as enshrined in Pakistan’s constitution), no policy, reform, or dam—no matter how visionary or grand—will substantially alter the course of the crisis. In the coming sections, we will show how structural deficiencies have been molded by Pakistan’s colonial legacy but have presented themselves contemporarily through grossly decadent state priorities vis-a-vis water allocation and distribution.

The Reality of Pakistan’s Water “Scarcity”

The first page of Pakistan’s National Water Policy 2018 introduces Pakistan’s water crisis as follows: “With a rapidly growing population, Pakistan is heading towards a situation of water shortage and by corollary, a threat of food insecurity. Per capita surface water availability has declined from 5,260 cubic meters per year in 1951 to around 1,000 cubic meters in 2016. This quantity is likely to further drop to about 860 cubic meters by 2025 marking the transition from a “water stressed” to a “water scarce” country (the minimum water requirement to avoid food and health implications of water scarcity is 1,000 cubic meters per capita per year).”\textsuperscript{121}

This statement has sparked national conversation, albeit in a problematic fashion. A preliminary reading of the aforementioned statistic introduces the problem to be a “lack of water per capita.” This is highly reductive and simplistic as it does not highlight the true components of the crisis. A simple reading of the statistics implies that the physical availability of water has decreased. In reality, the statistic is related to a wholly different issue altogether: population growth:

“This one statistic has been the biggest catastrophe about the way to think about water! It does not take a mathematical genius to tell you that if your population increases roughly five-fold, your per-capita water availability will decrease five-fold. Yet, people don’t think of this statistic that way. When they read it, they start thinking about the absolute scarcity of water — that there is five-time less water in the country. This is a misnomer. Pakistan has the same amount of water as it did 3 billion years ago and will have the same amount of water 3 billion years from now. Ask any fourth-grade geography student who knows about the water cycle and he will tell you why.”\textsuperscript{122}

The fact that the physical quantity of water

\textsuperscript{117} Jalal, Ayesha. Personal Interview. 9 August 2018.
\textsuperscript{118} Mustafa, Danish. “Colonial law, contemporary water issue in Pakistan.” Political Geography Vol. 20, 2001. pp 817-837
\textsuperscript{119} Jalal, Ayesha. Personal Interview. 9 August 2018.
\textsuperscript{120} Khan, Fawad. Personal Interview. Aug 7, 2018.
\textsuperscript{122} Mustafa, Danish. Personal Interview. 4 August 2018.
has not changed leads to the question: is there enough water in the Indus Basin to sustain the lives of 210 million people?

The UN declared a human right to water on 28 July 2010, with the issuance of Resolution 64/292. This resolution provided that between 50 and 100 gallons are needed per person per day to provide basic needs, such as water for drinking and bathing. If we use the upper limit of 100 gallons being the daily requirement—and with 200 million people living in Pakistan—this will amount to a demand of roughly 33.6 Million Acre Feet (MAF) per year. Given that the total annual freshwater in the Indus Basin roughly amounts to 263–268 MAF, daily requirements are much less than the total estimated annual flow of Indus surface water. This suggests that there is more than enough water to adequately sustain the country’s population.

Experts were mostly in complete agreement regarding this hypothesis and cited agriculture as the primary cause of the water crisis: “The notion that there is a shortage of water in Pakistan is wrong, there is no scarcity. In fact, there is too much water. Agriculture consumes the most water. In Pakistan, we have surplus food. That means we have surplus water. The problem is we are using water in a disastrous way. Since there is no pricing mechanism, no one has an incentive to use water efficiently. That is why you see practices like flood irrigation waste so much water. We have an issue of water management, not scarcity.”

Other experts supported this claim and added that the issue of scarcity is simply constructed based on state policies: “If you throw 1000 cubic liters of water over someone’s head, and they don’t know how to swim, they will drown. According to the UN, a human being needs a minimum of 40 liters of water to live. Multiply that by 200 million, and you will see there is no scarcity. If you want to make a swimming pool for every cow, there could be a scarcity. If you want to cultivate sugarcane, there you will probably have scarcity. And if you want to do corporate farming, then you’re screwed because you will have scarcity. But if you want to have roti (bread), then there is no issue, no scarcity.”

It is clear that Pakistan does not have a physical scarcity of water, but that the water Pakistan possesses is not equitably distributed as millions of people do not have regular access to it. Pakistan allocates 95% of its water to agriculture, making it the largest fraction of water con-

"Total annual freshwater in the Indus Basin roughly amounts to 263-268 MAF, so daily requirements are much less than the total estimated annual flow of Indus surface water. This suggests that there is more than enough water to adequately sustain the country’s population."

There is a little scarcity. If you want to cultivate sugarcane, there is bigger problem. And if you want corporate farming, you’re screwed. But if you want roti (bread), there is no scarcity.” – Daanish Mustafa

Pakistan’s reliance on agriculture is the single largest cause of the water crisis today. The state allocates 95% of its water to produce 20-25% of its annual GDP output.

Cotton and sugarcane are two of the most water-intensive crops to produce. The amount of water these crops use is staggering; roughly 22,500 liters of water are required to produce one kilogram of cotton and 1,500-3,000 liters for one kilogram of sugarcane.

However, Pakistan has not only allowed, but encouraged, the growth of these water-thirsty crops. Sugar cane is arguably the most controversial. Sugar is a delicacy and does not contribute to the food security of the country. Yet, the government has taken no steps to limit its growth and save water.

Mansoor Awan, a lawyer based in Lahore, talked to us about the effects of growing sugar-cane on water levels in an area. Mr. Awan’s associate, Asghar Leghari, is from Rahim Yar Khan, a border town between Sindh and Punjab that lies on the banks of the Indus River. There is no canal system there, so there is greater reliance on groundwater. In the last two decades, eight new sugar mills opened in the district. The water level dropped from 20 feet to 80 feet and is on its way to reaching 100 feet.

“I am a proponent of doing away with sugarcane and the sugar industry entirely. We can always import sugar from Brazil. But we cannot allow our water to be wasted. Sugar is a delicacy, but water is life. But the interests are too entrenched.”

The “interests” that Mr. Awan was alluding to were that of the sugarcane lobby. Pakistan’s sugar millers are mostly influential politicians. Sugar is the fuel that national politics runs on. The sugar lobby primarily funds the three largest political parties. But this is not an issue of crony capitalism, which symbolizes the relationship between the business and political class. Here, the business class is the political class.

In 2009, The Nation reported that there were 78 sugar mills in the country and the leaders of the three biggest parties alone—mostly through relatives and associates—owned more than fifty percent of these mills. While an ar-

129 Ibid.
131 “5 Most Water Intensive Crops.” Claroenergy. N.D. http://claroenergy.in/5-most-water-intensive-crops/
gument could be made that this data is outdated, a simple review of the politicians named in the report makes it clear this is not the case. Nawaz Sharif (ex-Prime Minister), Asif Ali Zardari (ex-President), and Jehangir Tareen (the biggest financial contributor to the current ruling party’s government) all continue to play an active role in the politics of Pakistan today. The fact that powerful political players all have high financial stakes in the sugarcane industry makes the issue more complex. The policymakers who are trusted to act as representatives of the people happen to be the ones gaining from the existing policies that cause of the crisis itself.

This is most directly seen in the continued support and patronage of sugarcane cultivation through subsidies. Billions of rupees are paid from the Public Exchequer in the form of subsidies to boost sugarcane production, primarily for exports. For example, in the 2017-18 season, the Sindh government alone paid a provincial subsidy of Rs 3.25bn (Rs9.3/1kg) to sugar mills located in Sindh as export rebate. Of the 1.7m tons Pakistan exported, 0.9m were from Sindh.134

Daanish Mustafa believes that one of the best ways to save water is to stop subsidizing sugarcane production:

“The easiest way…is stopping subsidies. The irony lies that the government lays the seed of its own destruction by making sugarcane commercially viable because of its subsidy. Subsidizes the crop on the water stage, electricity stage, support price stage and even the marketing stage. These subsidies are not the small farmer but for the politically connected sugar mill owner.”135

However, former members of the government we interview were not so open to the change:

“We [Pakistan] are…an informal association of farmers…bringing water-efficient practices. A population that has for a thousand years used to growing rice, [it is] very difficult for them to convince them to grow anything else. The government can motivate and demonstrate but cannot make a law. Sugarcane is poor man’s only source of energy as they can’t afford pro-
teins. We are a large sugar consumer country.”

When we asked whether or not sugarcane subsidies negatively affect water resources in Pakistan, the bureaucrat went on the defensive:

“We are going in subjects…not connected to water problems. These large land growers are only in name. Absentee landlords lease out to small farmers. Very few hired as labor and most cases were where land is leased out. [emphasis added].”136

While one bureaucrat is by no means a representative sample, it was clear that there was an embedded status-quo that did not feel that 95% of water devoted to agriculture was a problem at all.

“You only count human beings. Pak has top 5–6 million in livestock population. They need more water than human beings. Even for drinking cow needs more water than a man does. Half of our rural population is dependent on agriculture and livestock. For instance, with a shortage of water in the Thar desert, both animals and human beings die. Human beings are priced more, but as far as those human beings which have survived, a death of [their] cattle are their own death because cattle are only means of livelihood.”

The resistance to changing the status-quo and the refusal to reform existing agricultural policies bodes poorly for Pakistan’s future. The current policy is divorced from the majority of financial compulsions of people whose livelihoods depend on the agricultural sector. It prioritizes economically privileged groups which not only breeds inequality but also leads to the production of high-water needs crops which is counterproductive for the water supply of the country. While rice is necessary for food security, products like cotton and sugarcane, which as Adeel Zafar claims have the “optics of harming a farmer” have caused detriment to Pakistan.137

Across our interviews, the improper state allocation of water resources, given their relative decline, was a universal theme. Fawad Khan claimed:

“If there were really a crisis, sugarcane would not have been an option. Similarly, many other crops, rice consumes a lot of water, wheat is

better than rice, then millet is better than rice. People will grow according to what is available. What I am trying to say is not that we need to ditch agriculture to save water. What I'm trying to say that we need to practice agriculture that will produce enough food with the water you have. There are other ways of doing it. Interestingly, you export cotton and import food. Then there is this business of virtual water. Virtual water is when you produce your water to grow cotton, and you export it, what you have done is, in essence, exported your water. You've got to be cognizant of that. We're the largest exporter of groundwater in the world. If you're exporting water, you have enough water.” (emphasis added)  

Another expert, Ali Sheikh, acknowledged improper state priorities and mentioned that: “Pakistan’s economy in percentage terms is growing, and while a conscious decision has not been taken to move away from agriculture, we are transitioning towards other economies. The percentage of people moving out of the agricultural economy is rising too. While this might not come in the form of a policy document, it is the new reality shaping this country.”

A paradigm shift is necessary. Pakistan must move away from agriculture, or at least have a vision of doing so. It seems that this is unlikely to happen until the entrenched status quo is not overturned.

Pricing of water
With the water crisis now taking center stage in public discourse, people are quick to posit their own solutions. The Chief Justice of Pakistan believes that the solution lies in the construction of a $14 billion-dollar dam. Consumers of canal irrigation water pay an abiana charge levied under the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, which states that “The rates to be charged for canal water supplied for irrigation to the occupiers of land shall be determined by the rules to be made by the provincial government, and such occupiers shall pay for it accordingly.” Provincial governments publish water rates. In Punjab, until 2003, there were sporadic increases in water charges. Now the government has applied a flat rate system of 85 rupees (Rs) per cropped acre during the kharif season and Rs. 50 per acre during the rabi season. The Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa government charges up to Rs. 250 for non-food crops.

This system allows provincial governments to gain revenue which could be spent on improving water infrastructure. The Punjab government, for example, manages an estimated $20 billion in water infrastructure. According to water expert John Briscoe, “this would imply that the cost of replacement and maintenance of Punjab’s stock of water resource and irrigation infrastructure would be US $0.6 billion a year” and that the government should be investing around US $0.3 billion a year in replacement and maintenance. As of 2006, the Government of Punjab’s budget for maintenance was about 6.5%

138 Khan, Fawad. Personal Interview. August 7, 2018
145 Ibid.
"Studies back this up by showing that there is excess demand for water in Pakistan: people demand more water than they normally would if they had to pay the environmental and supply cost of water."

of that benchmark. Pricing water would help the government recover much-needed revenue to bridge the gap between required spending on water infrastructure and the current levels of actual spending. In no way is this abiana pricing in Punjab sustainable. It doesn’t even cover the cost of operation and maintenance costs.

With such low water prices, it is unsurprising that practices such as “flood irrigation” still occur in Pakistan. With no incentive to reduce water usage, farmers flood their fields to irrigate their land and crops. It is for this reason that Pakistan’s water productivity is extremely low, leading to the needless waste of water. In 2005, water productivity stood at 0.13 kg/m$^3$ — which is relatively small compared to Indian productivity at 0.39 kg/m$^3$, and miniscule in comparison to the USA with 1.56 kg/m$^3$, and Canada with 8.72 kg/m$^3$.

Domestic water prices in urban cities are priced under flat, block-rate schedules. According to Rafay Alam, they were established to ensure “the efficient use of the resource, as well as to achieve equity, environmental conservation, cost recovery, and public participation.” However, the water experts we interviewed all unanimously agreed that the current pricing model does not encourage conservation.

Human response to incentives dictates that if water used in irrigation is priced according to available supply, demand should reduce. Studies back this up by showing that there is excess demand for water in Pakistan: people demand more water than they normally would if they had to pay the environmental and supply cost of water. Fawad Khan said, “How do you solve this [crisis]? I’m an economist so my response would be pricing...The problem is you’re getting free water...there is a genuine market failure because costs are not recovered.”

Saying that water should be priced as a commodity rather than a public good makes intuitive sense. However, several challenges must be overcome to do so. First, one must ask the moral question: is it justifiable to price water—a fundamental right that upholds dignity and life—and in turn exclude certain segments of the population that may not be able to afford it? Is it politically possible to do so? How will the public react to paying more for water?

In answering these questions, we once again turn to the largest consumer of water: agriculture. Water represents a very small amount of the cost of production. Therefore, pricing water will not greatly affect the overall cost of any particular good. There is a need to create incentives and expectations for rural landowners, in particular, to save water by switching to more efficient irrigation techniques.

We believe the first step to changing rural behavior actually lies in pricing water in the urban localities. Since most rural landowners live in cities (as opposed to their villages), metering their homes—and everyone else’s—would create a normative trend of responding to incentives and conserving water. By measuring

147 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
the amount of water consumed in a household through metering, there can be a radical reduction in the consumption of this resource. We hope this important first step will ultimately lead to more awareness on water conservation. In the years that come, we hope that this step would lead to a situation where the government has the political capital and will to push for a more widespread approach at pricing water throughout the country.

Supply-Side vs. Demand Management

As mentioned in Part I, the state had attempted to use “development” to ostensibly unify the fragmented and vulnerable Pakistani nation after partition. A key component of this was the $30 billion (in today’s currency) “Indus Basin Project” that the World Bank helped broker in the wake of the Indus Waters Treaty. The construction of Mangla and Tarbela dams in the 1970s became symbols of national pride amongst the populace and representation of Pakistan’s “development.”

However, Mangla and Tarbela were not the only sites identified to construct a large dam. The small town of Kalabagh was also recognized as a strategic location because this is the point where the Indus River becomes a natural dam. As early as 1953, the site was chosen as the location to construct a large dam. It is this reason that at one point, the construction of the dam was considered to be more important than building a nuclear bomb.153

However, due to the turbulence of the seventies and eighties—the breakup of Pakistan and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—the dam could not be constructed. It was only under Pervez Musharraf that the issue of Kalabagh gained traction. Musharraf wanted the dam to be built at all costs and encouraged all stakeholders to come to a consensus. However, the question of Kalabagh became a highly politicized issue in inter-provincial affairs.

...And what’s left is often unfit for consumption: a whopping 91% of water in Karachi contains sewage and industrial waste, according to a Pakistani judicial commission report.

The political motivations behind the opposition of Kalabagh dam between Sindh and Punjab (two provinces in Pakistan) strongly resembles Pakistan’s political motivations when it criticizes India’s projects on the Indus. Sindh is the lower riparian of the Indus river as compared to Punjab. Furthermore, Sindh is a relatively barren province in comparison with Pakistan and faces the brunt of Pakistan's water woes. As much as 53% of Sindh's land has been destroyed by the menaces of waterlogging and salinity, essentially rendering the land useless. In Karachi (provincial capital of Sindh), the state of water access is abysmal. Over 50% of the ten million residents of the city don't have uninterrupted access to water. And what’s left is often unfit for consumption: a whopping 91% of water in Karachi contains sewage and industrial waste, according to a Pakistani judicial commission report.154

Given the plight of many residents of Sindh, as well as the geographic fact that Punjab is the upper riparian and has access to more surface water, the issue of water has been successfully used by Sindhi politicians for short term electoral gain. By politicizing Kalabagh, and subsequently water, there is a large anti-Kalabagh lobby that has polarized the country.

Advocates of the Kalabagh dam say that its construction is a matter of life and death for the survival of the country. They cite the benefits of the dam by saying that it would provide additional water storage, generate electricity, and irrigate millions of acres of land. Opponents say that it will only heighten the imbalance between access to water between Punjab and Sindh as the upper riparian (Punjab) will have control over water flows. The sentiments have polarized the country and manage to fill the headlines: “Punjabi farmers reject 1991 Water Accord without Kalabagh dam”\textsuperscript{155} and “Sindh rejects construction of Kalabagh dam.”\textsuperscript{156}

There is a theory of public opinion that states that citizens are cognitive misers. This means that citizens form opinions on complex and technical matters that are beyond the scope of their knowledge through “filters” or “aids.” Some of these filters include identity, ideology, partisanship, gender, etc. The merits and demerits, advantages and disadvantages of the construction of complex projects such as dams are beyond the scope of understanding of the common man. Yet, people still form opinions on the matter through their predispositions. Professor Daanish Mustafa believes that Kalabagh has now become an issue of Pakistani identity.

“What is a Pakistani patriot? It has to be a Man, a Sunni, a Punjabi, anti-India, and pro-Kalabagh. If you don’t have any of these characteristics, you become a hyphenated Pakistani. It is interesting that I mentioned Kalabagh. It has become an issue of identity. That’s the discourse you’ve [the Pakistani state] promoted, the society you have built. You can go into the costs and benefits of the dam, but it is not about that — the debate is about what Pakistani polity is and should be.”\textsuperscript{157}

This discourse plays into our previous discussion on development. Adopting a neo-liberalist view of development has created a developmental paradigm; dams, technology, mass production, and consumption were the demands of the day. This thinking has not changed, and this is reflected in the fact that contemporary notions of development, particularly water resource development, have not changed. This is further evident by the almost missionary approach to the construction of Pakistan’s newest water obsession: the Diamer Basha dam.

As we were researching for this project, Pakistan tried a new way to fund the construction of a dam: crowdsourcing. Over the summer of 2018, the Chief Justice of Pakistan launched a “dam fund” in attempt to crowdfund the construction of the $14 billion-dollar Diamer-Basha dam. Officials say that the construction of this dam will solve the endemic shortages of water. Television news shows repeatedly show large donors handing cheques to the dam fund in masse, including the Pakistani football team, Pakistani politicians, government officials, and military officers. Citizens can text “dam” to the number 8000 and donate Rs. 10 (the equivalent of 10 cents) directly from their phone. These donations, however, are simply not going to be enough to construct the dam. As of Jan 12, 2019, only US$65 million has been collected since the fund was launched in May 2018, which is a little over one percent of the dam’s estimated cost.\textsuperscript{158} At this rate, it would take 120 years to completely fund the dam.\textsuperscript{159}

However, there is a larger problem at play here: it makes little economic sense for the government to divert this much money to one project. According the World Commission on Dams, the average cost overrun for large dams is 56%.\textsuperscript{160} Diamer-Basha’s estimated cost is $14 billion. If conservative estimates are followed, Diamer-Basha’s cost may well swell to over $22 billion. Pakistan’s official GDP in 2017 was roughly $300 billion.\textsuperscript{161} It does not take much math to tell that with the Diamer-Basha dam, Pakistan will be roughly committing to a project equivalent to almost 8 percent of their total GDP. The biggest infrastructure project in Europe today is the Crossrail project in London at $20 billion.\textsuperscript{162} But that is being financed by the

\begin{enumerate}
\item Mustafa, Danish. Personal Interview. 4 August 2018.
\item Fund Raising Status for the Supreme Court of Pakistan and Prime Minister of Pakistan Diamer-Bhasha and Mohmand Dams Fund: http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/page.asp?id=2757
\item Appiah, Litz-Ama. “Crossrail: Inside Europe’s Most Ambitious Engineering Project.”
\end{enumerate}
British economy, which is worth $2.6 trillion. The Pakistani people are being asked to make a disproportionate commitment which may not be necessary in the first place.

Dam building is a classic example of political myopia. These are short-sighted policies that appear to have great political benefit. When the government invests in something tangible that people can see—such as dams—the population is under the impression that progress is being made. This also helps politicians electorally by giving them a “ribbon-cutting” opportunity to showcase concrete work (quite literally) that the government has completed. People will be better served if the government moves away from brick-and-mortar projects to a more off-the-screen approach aimed to manage water demand, where the real solution of the water crisis lies.

In short, Pakistan doesn’t need to build dams to solve its water crisis. There are many policy tools at hand to chart a different path for water conservation. Some are focused on agriculture: switching to less water-intensive crops, lining conveyance canals, leveling fields, using drip irrigation instead of flood irrigation, paying farmers to conserve, and eliminating politically-backed subsidies for sugarcane. Other solutions are aimed at municipal and industrial users: establishing tiered water rates, replacing inefficient water appliances with high-efficiency models, using water barrels and roof-top cisterns to collect rainwater, removing water-intensive vegetation, and replacing aging, leaking delivery pipes. Taken together, these methods can dramatically reduce water use. Prioritization to demand management in Pakistan undoubtedly will require a fundamental shift in thinking, an earnestmustering of political will, and considerable funding possibly including international and/or bilateral assistance. This shift appears essential if Pakistan’s irrigated society is to continue to exist.

Recommendations

1. Stop perpetuating the post-colonial mindset of using water as a form of control. The ethos governing water management should now be driven by a micro-level concern for public well-being and equity, or for provision of a public service to the people. The current structures and bodies in place should be reevaluated and reintegrated with the current discourse to better implement water distribution and allay the issue of water inequity and distribution within the subcontinent.

2. Stop using the term “water scarcity.” Water scarcity implies that there is not enough water. In the case of Pakistan, we have proved that this is not true. There is an abundance of freshwater in the Indus Basin that can fulfill the need of all citizens if managed correctly. Neo-Malthusian theories of “not having enough” detracts from the real water crisis: misallocation and inequitable distribution. “Water crisis” would be more appropriate terminology.

3. Re-allocate water away from agriculture. According to the Pakistan Water Policy 2018, 95 percent of the water use in Pakistan is for agriculture. The vast majority of that water is used for cash crops like cotton, rice, and sugarcane for exports and not to provide food to the poor. If the commercial agriculture is the ultimate victim of water scarcity, surely it could part with just 2-4 percent of water for the domestic sector, for a few million tons less of sugarcane, rice or cotton. That could double or triple the water availability for the domestic sector and eliminate any supply problems in one go.

4. Price water in large cities, and eventually the farms. There currently exists no political will to start pricing water at all levels of society. The current model of flat-rates in the domestic sphere and the abiana charges for the agricultural sphere do not create incentives to conserve models and fall proportionately more on the poor. To ameliorate this, we propose “metering” water in cities the same way as is done with other utilities such as electricity and gas. We hope that this will start a normative trend of responding to incentives, eventually leading to the state possessing enough political will to start pricing irrigation.

5. Focus on demand management rather than supply-side approaches. There exists a need to look beyond supply-side solutions such as building dams and other structures to ameliorate the present crisis and look at demand control mechanisms which can enhance the future sustainability of agricultural production within Pakistan. Acts such as crowdfunding

164 Mustafa, Danish. Personal Interview. 4 August 2018.
for dams only perpetuate post-colonial legacies and do little to tackle the main crisis at hand. While this requires political will, it is necessary for policymakers and politicians to look beyond projects which provide optical popular support and challenge the way of agricultural production in Pakistan.

Conclusion

Throughout the course of this paper, we have been hesitant to use the term “scarcity” to refer to the water crisis in Pakistan. This is a deliberate effort to show that there is not a scarcity of water, but instead the wrong prioritization, usage, and distribution of the available water. We believe that “water crisis” is more appropriate terminology and is one that encompasses systemic problems within the Pakistani administration, attitudes and polity. As highlighted through the course of the paper, some key elements have been the accentuation of the post-colonial mentality of water control through the perpetuation of the 1873 Canal Act, mis-allocation of water to agriculture, lack of water pricing in irrigation and domestic usage, and an irrational focus on supply side water management through infrastructure projects such as dams—thereby neglected demand management. While these in no way provide an exhaustive list of problems to the issue of water in Pakistan, they try to direct us to the main avenues and causes of the precarious situation of water in the country and hope to resolve them in the foreseeable future.

"This is a deliberate effort to show that there is not a scarcity of water, but instead the wrong prioritization, usage, and distribution of the available water."

Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without the support and patronage of the Tufts Institute of Global Leadership, and many other friends and supporters. The project quickly became “larger than the sum of its parts.”

We are extremely grateful to Heather Barry for vouching for us and supporting our research plans throughout the process. Her advocacy on our behalf would not have made this project possible. She remains a constant source of guidance, advice, and support.

Thank you to the entire IGL family—Professor Abiodun Williams, Heather Barry, Saida Abdalla, Stacy Kazakova, Susan Ojukwa—who have welcomed us as one of their own and given us a “home away from home.”

The mentorship, encouragement, and expertise of Professor Ayesha Jalal has fueled our passion inquiry in South Asia. Her continued support for our academic and career pursuits has been at the heart of our journey at Tufts.

We would like to particularly thank Erum Sattar for her encouragement and patronage. She was the first person we met since starting the project. Her input on the topic helped create the final project outline.

Special thanks to all the experts we interviewed who were extremely generous with their time. Each interview enriched our understanding of the topic and has helped us form the views we hold today.

Many other individuals offered their help at various stages of the project. Thank you to Irfan Wahid and Babar Sattar, who were so helpful in facilitating Atrey’s visa.

Thank you to Shahid Aziz, who sent us a photograph he took of the Upper Neelum Valley at Keran which splits acts as a border between India and Pakistan (India on the left of the river, Pakistan on the right).

We are both indebted to our families for their constant encouragement and support throughout the course of the project. They be-
lieved in our goals, stood resolutely alongside us in times of difficulty, and helped us along the way as we achieved them.

Thank you to Saqib Hafiz and Yasir Mirza for facilitating our trip and ensuring we have a perfect trip in Pakistan.

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