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
Why Citizens Vote for Women: An Analysis of the 2015 and 2019 Swiss Federal Elections

Cover Story
by Sina Ladina Benesch pg. 5

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Dear Reader,

We are pleased to present you with the fifth annual edition of the Global Issue, our distinctly international issue wherein we feature some of the best undergraduate scholarship from students around the world. The mission of this annual publication is to feature the research, stories, and perspectives of students from outside the United States—a guiding principle of the Yale Review of International Studies since its inception.

We would first like to take this portion of the letter to thank our preceding Editors-in-Chief, Vishwa Padigepati and Blake Bridge, for their continued support, guidance, and efforts which helped make YRIS the publication it is today. Both Vishwa and Blake played an integral role in reinstating our print circulation and reinvigorating our academic community during the return to campus after over a year of remote work due to COVID-19. We hope to follow in their footsteps by continuing to strive for journalistic excellence in the 2022-2023 cycle.

We would further like to thank our incredible Design Team, Board, Assistant Editors, and everyone who submitted their work for consideration. We recognize what an incredible privilege it is to not only read such passionate scholarship on a truly diverse range of issues each cycle, but also to have a support system allowing us to promote that work via online and print platforms. Our Board, especially, is instrumental in helping us foster passion for global affairs among Yale and international students alike. Their commitment is the foundation of our success.

Our Global Issue this year focuses on the themes of marginalization and imbalances of power. Considering growing global inequality perpetuated by enduring systemic biases, we hope the work of our featured authors sheds light on how these issues will shape the future of international relations.

Sincerely,
Maya Albold and Faisal Al Saud
Editors-in-Chief

SINA LADINA BENESCH

AARUSHI SHEKHAR

JASMINE AHMED

YEJOO MOON

SAMRAGGI HAZRA

Essays

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Why Citizens Vote for Women

An Analysis of the 2015 and the 2019 Swiss Federal Elections

This paper attempts to explain how occupation, place of residence, and stereotypical perceptions about issue competence influences the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender.

Furthermore, this paper examines whether the politicization of women's representation in parliament impacts the voting decision between two candidates of different gender. Therefore, the Swiss federal elections of 2015 and 2019 are analyzed by calculating and discussing binomial logistic regressions. The results show that occupation, place of residence, and stereotypical perceptions about issue competence affect the voting outcome between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. Moreover, many groups did not differ in their likelihood to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate between 2015 and 2019. Some groups, such as service workers and rural citizens, were significantly less likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate in 2019 compared to 2015. These findings imply that not only do occupation, place of residence, and stereotypical perception about issue competence influence the voting decision, but also the politicization of women's representation in parliament.

Introduction

The 2019 Swiss federal elections were elections for women. The proportion of women in the National Council (Nationalrat) reached a record level of 42% and the proportion of women in the Council of States (Ständerat) increased for the first time in 12 years. The politicization of women's descriptive representation in parliament before the federal elections contributed to this electoral success for women.[1] This paper will examine the effect of this politicization and the effect of other factors, such as stereotypical perceptions about issue competence, on the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. Giger et al. examined the federal elections of 2015 and 2019 by considering women's descriptive representation.[2] However, this paper will focus on citizens' individual voting decisions rather than on the parties and their list compositions as Giger et al. did. Therefore, I examine the impact of occupational class, place of residence, and stereotypical perceptions about issue competence on the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender.

First, the literature states that work experience influences political attitudes and party affiliation.[3] However, no previous research has examined whether work experience also influences the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. Second, urban citizens on average hold more libertarian values compared to rural citizens.[4] I contribute to this discussion by investigating whether urban citizens are more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate compared to rural citizens. Third, I examine whether political values indirectly affect the relationship between occupational class and the voting decision between two candidates of different gender, as well as the relationship between residency and voting decisions. These indirect effects have not been examined before. Fourth, I also examine the influence of stereotypical perceptions about issue competence on the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. This correlation was not found in several elections in the United States.[5] However, I examine the Swiss federal elections, where the affective

1   Werner Seitz, "Die Frauen Bei Den Nationalratswahlen 2019: Ein Grosser Schritt Nach Vorne - Im Bundeshaus. Mit Einem Exkurs Zu Den Frauen Bei Den Wahlen in Den Kantonalen Parlamenten Und Regierungen 2015," Statistische Analyse Der Kandidaturen Nach Geschlecht, Kanton Und Partei. Mit Einem Vergleich Zu 2015, 2020; Anke Tresch et al., Eidgenössische Wahlen 2019. Wahlteilnahme Und Wahlentscheid (Lausanne: Selects-FORS, 2020).
2   Nathalie Giger et al., "The Surge in Women's Representation in the 2019 Swiss Federal Elections," Swiss Political Science Review (accepted for publication) (2021).
3   Line Rennwald, "Class(Non)Voting in Switzerland 1971-2011: Ruptures and Continuities in a Changing Political Landscape," Swiss Political Review 20, no. 4 (2014): 550–72.
4   Alberta Andreotti, Patrick Le Galès, and Francisco Javier Moreno Fuentes, Globalised Minds, Roots in the City: Urban Upper-Middle Classes in Europe, Studies in Urban and Social Change (Chichester, West Sussex, UK ; Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2015); Will Jennings and Gerry Stoker, "The Bifurcation of Politics: Two Englands," The Political Quarterly 87, no. 3 (July 2016): 372–82; Rahsaan Maxwell, "Geographic Divides and Cosmopolitanism: Evidence From Switzerland," Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 13 (November 2020): 2061–90.
5   Kathleen Dolan, "Gender Stereotypes, Candidate Evaluations, and Voting for Women Candidates: What Really Matters?," Political Research Quarterly 67, no. 1 (2014): 96–107; Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy Pope, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3rd ed, Great Questions in

polarization is lower than in the United States.[6] Therefore, the gender of the candidates, and also stereotypical perceptions about issue competence, should be more important for the voting decision in Switzerland than in the USA. Finally, I examine the impact of the politicization of women's representation on the relationship between the variables occupational class, place of residence, and stereotypical perceptions about issue competence and the decision to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate. This also represents a research gap.

This paper aims to answer the following questions in order to fill these research gaps:

Question 1: *How do occupation, place of residence, and stereotypical perceptions about female candidates influence the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender?*

Question 2: *How does the effect of different occupations, place of residence, and stereotypical perceptions about female candidates on the selection of a female over an equally qualified male candidate differ between 2015 and 2019?*

These research questions are especially relevant for increasing the representation of women in parliament, because this paper shows which groups of citizens are least likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate in Switzerland. People who want to increase women's representation in parliament can address these groups more specifically when planning electoral campaigns. Furthermore, the results of this paper contribute to a more detailed scientific understanding on how the politicization of women's representation impacts voting decisions.

Context of the Federal Elections of 2015 and 2019

The federal elections of 2015 were dominated by discussions about Switzerland's asylum and migration policy. The ongoing Syrian conflict, which caused a wave of refugees to flee to Europe, affected the election campaign leading up to the federal elections.[7] Although the proportion of female politicians in the National Council increased to 32% compared to 29% in 2011, the decline in women's representation in the Council of States, has continued since 2003.[8] Four years later, in the federal elections of 2019, there was a record success for women's representation. Not only

Politics (Boston, MA: Longman, 2011).

6   Reiljan, "'Fear and Loathing across Party Lines' (Also) in Europe."

7   Georg Lutz, Eidgenössische Wahlen 2015. Wahlteilnahme Und Wahlentscheid (Lausanne: Selects-FORS, 2016).

8   Werner Seitz, "Die Frauen Bei Den Eidgenössischen Wahlen 2015: Der Schwung Ist Weg" (Eidgenössische Kommission für Frauenfragen, 2016); Werner Seitz, Auf Die Wartebank Geschoben: Der Kampf Um Die Politische Gleichstellung Der Frauen in Der Schweiz Seit 1900 (Zürich: Chronos, 2020).

did 1,873 women run for the National Council (40.3% of all candidates), a record in Switzerland, but more women were also elected compared to 2015. This resulted in a 42% share of seats for women in the National Council, which is a record in Switzerland as well. The share of seats for women also increased in the Council of States to a record height of 26.1%.[9]

There are several reasons for this significant increase of women's representation in Swiss parliaments. On one hand, several new women's movements were established between 2015 and 2019, demanding gender equality and address the underrepresentation of women in politics and the economy. The first major movement was the Women's March, which took place on the 18th of March 2017 and mobilized over 10,000 people in Zurich. This movement originated in the USA, where women and men demonstrated against the presidency of Donald J. Trump.[10] Six months later, the #MeToo movement emerged, with women reporting sexual harassment, coercion, and rape on social media. Social media increased social interest and awareness of women's issues.[11] This social change resulted in the second national women's strike, which was organized by several trade unions. On the 14th of June 2019, more than 500,000 people took to the streets to demand equal pay, recognition of unpaid or low-paid care work, better retirement security for women, and to support the fight against sexism and violence against women.[12] The second women's strike was a great success in terms of the number of media reports on discrimination and gender issues, which accumulated weeks before and after the strike.[13] These movements brought issues of gender equality back into political debate, which contributed to women's electoral success in the federal elections of 2019. Furthermore, the project Helvetia ruft! (Helvetia is calling!), launched in 2018 by the women's umbrella organization alliance F, contributed to the electoral success of women at the institutional level. The project's mission is to motivate women to run for office at all

"...NOT ONLY DO OCCUPATION, PLACE OF RESIDENCE, AND STEREOTYPICAL PERCEPTION ABOUT ISSUE COMPETENCE INFLUENCE THE VOTING DECISION, BUT ALSO POLITICIZATION OF WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT."

9   Seitz, "Die Frauen Bei Den Nationalratswahlen 2019: Ein Grosser Schritt Nach Vorne - Im Bundeshaus. Mit Einem Exkurs Zu Den Frauen Bei Den Wahlen in Den Kantonalen Parlamenten Und Regierungen 2015."
10   Lena Schenkel, "Women's March in Zürich: Von Segen Und Fluch Eines Labels," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2019, https://www.nzz.ch/zuerich/womens-march-in-zuerich-vom-segen-und-fluch-eines-labels-ld.1452814[Visited:06.04.2022].
11   Seitz, Auf Die Wartebank Geschoben: Der Kampf Um Die Politische Gleichstellung Der Frauen in Der Schweiz Seit 1900, 191.
12   Seitz, 121–22.
13   Fabrizio Gilardi et al., Der Wahlkampf 2019 in Traditionellen Und Digitalen Medien (Selects Medienstudie 2019, 2020).

political levels and to convince parties to distribute the most promising list positions fairly between genders.[14] The mission was effective in the federal elections of 2019, as there had never been so many female candidates on party lists.[15] In most parties, female candidates were even positioned in more promising list positions than male candidates.[16] Helvetia ruft! also brought the issue of women's underrepresentation to public attention and thus contributed to women's electoral success at the institutional and voter level.[17] However, this paper examines changes between 2015 and 2019 in the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. The focus lies on the impact of women's movements on the voting decision rather than the impact of Helvetia ruft! on party list compositions. Therefore, the influence of Helvetia ruft! on institutional level is not examined in this paper.

Switzerland is a special case in this context, as the proportion of women in other national parliaments did not increase as much in one single election in recent years.[18] Furthermore, the debate on the representation of women in politics before the 2019 federal elections was extraordinarily high in Switzerland.[19] This makes Switzerland a particularly interesting case, as it allows us to examine the impact of a strong politicization of women's representation in politics on the voting decision of different groups.

Theory and Hypotheses

This chapter discusses the current state of the research and theories behind the hypotheses. Furthermore, this chapter formulate hypotheses are formulated, and expectations are pointed out.

Occupational Classes

Effect on Voting Decision

A person's profession influences his/her political opinion since occupational classes differ systematically in their political attitude. While small business owners, service workers, and production workers favor the protection of national tradition, socio-cultural (semi-)professionals are generally in favor of multiculturalism.[20] These differences can be attributed

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14   Alliance F, "Helvetias Formel," Alliance F, 2022, https://de.alliancef.ch/helvetia-ruft/projekt[Visited:14.02.2022].
15   Seitz, "Die Frauen Bei Den Nationalratswahlen 2019: Ein Grosser Schritt Nach Vorne - Im Bundeshaus. Mit Einem Exkurs Zu Den Frauen Bei Den Wahlen in Den Kantonalen Parlamenten Und Regierungen 2015."
16   Giger et al., "The Surge in Women's Representation in the 2019 Swiss Federal Elections."
17   Angelika Hardegger, "2010er-Jahre," in Jeder Frau Ihre Stimme. 50 Jahre Frauengeschichte 1971-2021, ed. Denise Schmid (Zürich: Hier und Jetzt, 2020), 269–70.
18   IPU Parline, "Monthly Ranking of Women in National Parliaments," IPU Pairline, 2022, https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=1&year=2022[Visited:12.04.2022].
19   Hardegger, "2010er-Jahre."
20   See Appendix 1 for the description of class allocation.
Pablo Beramendi et al., The Politics of Advanced Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Daniel Oesch and Line Rennwald, "The Class Basis of Switzerland's Cleavage between the New Left and the Populist Right," Swiss Political Review 16(3) (2010): 343–71.

to the cultural dimension of the two-dimensional space of political values. The cultural dimension distinguishes between authoritarian/ traditional and libertarian/ universalistic values. On the one hand, libertarians, such as socio-cultural (semi-)professionals, are in favor of cultural integration, individual autonomy, and basic equality. On the other hand, authoritarians, such as service workers and small business owners, defend cultural homogeneity and national demarcation.[21]

These differences in political values are explained in literature with the horizontal and vertical division of classes. The vertical division describes the differences in political values due to different qualification levels. High-skilled socio-cultural (semi-) professionals are located at the libertarian pole, while low-skilled production and service workers are encountered at the authoritarian pole. This division is explained with the ongoing modernization and globalization.[22] The main argument of the vertical division is that the working class is the loser of modernization, which is why production and service workers support traditional values and reject modernization. Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals are among the winners of modernization, since the service sector, and with it job opportunities for socio-cultural (semi-)professionals, grew.[23] Meanwhile, the industrial sector became steadily smaller, which is why many workers lost their jobs and social reputations. These workers feel abandoned by modernization and develop authoritarian values to counteract the rise of the service sector.[24] Since gender equality belongs to libertarian values, this suggests that that service and production workers have a lower probability of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than socio-cultural (semi-)professionals.[25] The horizontal division exists between the socio-cultural (semi-)professionals and the small business owners, which follows a work logic. These two classes do not differ in qualification level, but in different work environments. While

21 Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy; Kriesi et al., "Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space."
22 Simon Bornschier and Hanspeter Kriesi, "The Populist Right, the Working Class, and the Changing Face of Class Politics," in Class Politics and the Radical Right, ed. Jens Rydgren, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy. Routledge Research in Extremism and Democracy 16 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2013), 10–30; Hilde Coffé, "Gender, Class, and Radical Right Voting," in Class Politics and the Radical Right, ed. Jens Rydgren, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy. Routledge Research in Extremism and Democracy 16 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2013), 138–55; Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Hanspeter Kriesi, "Movements of the Left, Movement of the Right: Putting The Mobilization of Two Types of Social Movements into Political Context," in Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, by Herbert Kitschelt et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 398–420; Daniel Oesch, "The Class Basis of the Cleavage between the New Left and the Radical Right: An Analysis for Austria, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland," in Class Politics and the Radical Right, ed. Jens Rydgren, Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy. Routledge Research in Extremism and Democracy 16 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2013), 31–51; Oesch and Rennwald, The Class Basis of Switzerland's Cleavage between the New Left and the Populist Right."
23 Oesch and Rennwald, "The Class Basis of Switzerland's Cleavage between the New Left and the Populist Right."
24 Coffé, "Gender, Class, and Radical Right Voting"; Piero Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford University Press, 2003); Kriesi, "Movements of the Left, Movement of the Right: Putting The Mobilization of Two Types of Social Movements into Political Context."
25 Richard L. Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2004); Oesch and Rennwald, "The Class Basis of Switzerland's Cleavage between the New Left and the Populist Right."

tasks are clearly structured and people must apply technical and economic principles to the individual case in some professions, innovation and creativity are required in other professions. In these jobs, people can only complete their tasks if they tolerate new situations.[26] Additionally, these people often work with humans and deal with human individuality on a daily basis.[27] Such experiences tend to lead to libertarian values, where gender equality is recognized and demanded.[28] Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals, such as teachers and journalists, often interact with people in their work. Therefore, they must be creative and innovative to fulfill their working tasks. In addition, small business owners do not have to be as creative as socio-cultural (semi-)professionals to do their tasks at work. Furthermore, they do not interact with people as much as socio-cultural (semi-)professionals, which is why small business owners tend to hold authoritarian values.[29] Following this line of reasoning, socio-cultural (semi-)professionals are expected to be more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate compared to small business owners. But the impact of work experience on the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender is not yet well understood and therefore represents a research gap.

To test whether the profession of a citizen influences their voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender, the following hypothesis is put forward:

Hypothesis 1a: *Socio-cultural (semi–)professionals are more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than service workers, production workers, and small business owners.*

Effect of Politicization of Women's Representation on Voting Decision

When comparing the federal elections of 2015 and 2019 regarding women's descriptive representation, the women's movements, which emerged during the same time, are particularly relevant. These movements belong to the "New Social Movements," which are instruments of the New Left. The demands of those movements, such as equal pay and the fight against sexual harassment, appeal primarily to people with libertarian values (e.g., socio-cultural (semi-)professionals). This class also forms the base of the New Social Movements and is therefore most likely to participate in their demonstrations.[30] Hence, the demands of women's

26   Herbert Kitschelt and Philipp Rehm, "Occupations as a Site of Political Preference Formation," Comparative Political Studies 47, no. 12 (2014): 1670–1706.
27   Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy; Walter Müller, "Class Cleavages in Party Preferences in Germany - Old and New," in The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context, by Evans Geoffrey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
28   Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class; Oesch and Rennwald, "The Class Basis of Switzerland's Cleavage between the New Left and the Populist Right."
29   Kitschelt and Rehm, "Occupations as a Site of Political Preference Formation"; Oesch and Rennwald, "The Class Basis of Switzerland's Cleavage between the New Left and the Populist Right."
30   Kriesi, "Movements of the Left, Movement of the Right: Putting The Mobilization of Two Types of Social Movements into Political Context."

movements might have most likely influenced socio-cultural (semi-)professionals in their voting decision. Therefore, it is assumed that socio-cultural (semi-)professionals who did not choose the female candidate in 2015 had the highest probability of changing their minds and choosing the female candidate in 2019 out of all classes. This probability should decrease the more authoritarian values a class has on average. Thus, small business owners, production workers, and service workers, who did not choose the female candidate in 2015, should have been least likely to choose the female candidate in 2019.

There are other factors that may have impacted voting decisions. For instance, it has been questioned, whether an anti-feminist backlash could have occurred between 2015 and 2019. According to Faludi, anti-feminist backlashes emerge when individuals perceive a threat to the status quo, resulting from the pressure of the women's movements.[31] As shown above, production and service workers feel abandoned by modernization. Small business owners, production workers, and service workers also tend to be skeptical towards social change.[32] This suggests that citizens of these classes are more likely to oppose women's movements and their demands, as those movements strive to change the status quo in society. Consequently, a backlash of these groups might have been possible. However, anti-feminist backlashes have decreased compared to the 1990s.[33] There were also no major backlash movements of the women's movements between 2015 and 2019 in Switzerland.[34] Therefore, it is not likely that there was a backlash among production workers, service workers, and small business owners in the 2019 federal elections.

The women's movements, which emerged between 2015 and 2019, had neither a positive nor a negative impact on the voting decision of production workers, small business owners, and service workers. In turn, the socio-cultural (semi-)professionals, who did not choose the female candidate in 2015, should have been most likely to prefer a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate in 2019. The impact of the politicization of women's descriptive representation on the relationship between classes and voting decisions between two equally qualified candidates of different gender represents a research gap. To address this gap, the following hypothesis is tested:

Hypothesis 1b: The difference between the proportion of socio-cultural (semi-)professionals, who choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate, and the proportion of service workers,

31 Susan Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War against American Women (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006).
32 Kriesi, "Movements of the Left, Movement of the Right: Putting The Mobilization of Two Types of Social Movements into Political Context"; Oesch and Rennwald, "The Class Basis of Switzerland's Cleavage between the New Left and the Populist Right."
33 Clotilde Maricourt and Stephen R. Burrell, "#MeToo or #MenToo? Expressions of Backlash and Masculinity Politics in the #MeToo Era," The Journal of Men's Studies 30, no. 1 (March 2022): 49–69.
34 Eidgenössische Kommission für Frauenfragen, "Geschichte Der Gleichstellung: Frauen Macht Geschichte," 2022, https://www.ekf.admin.ch/ekf/de/home/dokumentation/geschichte-der-gleichstellung--frauen-macht-geschichte.html[Visited:23.03.2022].; Hardegger, "2010er-Jahre."

production workers, and small business owners, who choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate, increased in 2019 compared to 2015.

If this hypothesis can be confirmed, it implies that the politicization of women's representation in parliament had a greater impact on the voting decision of socio-cultural (semi-)professionals than on the voting decision of production workers, small business owners, and service workers.

"THEREFORE, IT IS ASSUMED THAT SOCIO-CULTURAL (SEMI-) PROFESSIONALS WHO DID NOT CHOSE THE FEMALE CANDIDATE IN 2015 HAD THE HIGHEST PROBABILITY OF CHANGING THEIR MINDS AND CHOOSING THE FEMALE CANDIDATE IN 2019 OUT OF ALL CLASSES."

Place of Residence

Effect on Voting Decision

A citizen's place of residence might influence on their voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender, as there is an urban-rural cleavage in Switzerland.[35] Whereas cities generally embrace globalization, welcome immigrants, and are in favor of the European Union, the countryside provides a different picture. Globalization, immigration, and the European Union are seen as threats in rural areas. Urban dwellers generally have more libertarian values than rural dwellers.[36] Indeed, the urban population in Switzerland is more libertarian than the rural population.[37]

The question is why urban citizens differ from rural citizens in their political values. There are two theories that explain these differences. The first theory argues with contextual effects of residency. According to this logic, geographic contexts of urban and rural areas shape political attitudes.[38] The theory states that people who live in cities are more

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35   Maxwell, "Geographic Divides and Cosmopolitanism."
36   Andreotti, Le Galès, and Moreno Fuentes, Globalised Minds, Roots in the City; Jennings and Stoker, "The Bifurcation of Politics."
37   Maxwell, "Geographic Divides and Cosmopolitanism."
38   Philip J. Ethington and Jason A. McDaniel, "Political Places and Institutional Spaces: The Intersec-

likely to share public spheres (e.g., parks, shops) with a more diverse set of people than rural dwellers.[39] This may lead them to develop tolerance towards diversity and openness.[40] Tolerance and openness are attributes of libertarian values.[41] However, almost no effect was found for this argument regarding attitudes towards immigration, European Union, and support for the Radical Right in European countries.[42] The second theory states that that compositional effects of the place of residence explain the urban-rural cleavage. They argue that there is a sorting based on education, which fosters people who tend to have libertarian values to live in cities. Higher-skilled people tend to live in cities, since they have more job opportunities in urban areas. In return, lower-skilled people tend to live in the countryside because they have more job opportunities there.[43] Highly educated people are more likely to have libertarian values regardless of where they live, which also counters the contextual effect.[44] Another argument of the composition effect theory is that people tend to live in and move towards regions where the neighborhood has, on average the same political attitudes as themselves.[45] Since cities are generally more libertarian than the countryside in Switzerland, people with libertarian values are more likely to move to cities, while people with authoritarian values are more likely to move to the countryside.[46] As mentioned above, the position on the cultural dimension influences the voting decision between a female candidate and an equally qualified male candidate.[47] Urban citizens should therefore be more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than rural citizens.

The literature does not heavily support the contextual effect. However, this theory has yet to be examined in the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. Therefore, I want to examine whether the experiences in the city itself influence the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender rather than the sorting that takes place. Therefore, I control for education in statistical analyzes. But due to the available data, I do not control the

tion of Political Science and Political Geography," Annual Review of Political Science 10, no. 1 (1 June 2007): 127–42; Rahsaan Maxwell, "Cosmopolitan Immigration Attitudes in Large European Cities: Contextual or Compositional Effects?," American Political Science Review 113, no. 2 (May 2019): 456–74.

39   Simon Parker, Urban Theory and the Urban Experience: Encountering the City (Routledge, 2015).

40   Susanne Wessendorf, Commonplace Diversity: Social Relations in a Super-Diverse Context (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014).

41   Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy; Shalom H. Schwartz, "Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values?," Journal of Social Issues 50, no. 4 (1994): 19–45.

42   Aina Gallego et al., "Places and Preferences: A Longitudinal Analysis of Self-Selection and Contextual Effects," British Journal of Political Science 46, no. 3 (July 2016): 529–50; Maxwell, "Cosmopolitan Immigration Attitudes in Large European Cities"; Maxwell, "Geographic Divides and Cosmopolitanism."

43   Niall Cunningham and Mike Savage, "An Intensifying and Elite City: New Geographies of Social Class and Inequality in Contemporary London," City 21, no. 1 (2 January 2017): 25–46.

44   Simon Bornschier et al., "How 'Us' and 'Them' Relates to Voting Behavior—Social Structure, Social Identities, and Electoral Choice," Comparative Political Studies 54, no. 12 (October 2021): 2087–2122.

45   Cunningham and Savage, "An Intensifying and Elite City."

46   Maxwell, "Geographic Divides and Cosmopolitanism."

47   Craig Leonard Brians, "Women For Women? Gender and Party Bias in Voting for Female Candidates," American Politics Research 33(3) (2005): 357–75; Jeffrey W. Koch, "Do Citizens Apply Gender Stereotypes to Infer Candidates' Ideological Orientations?," The Journal of Politics 62, no. 2 (May 2000): 414–29.

effect of people moving to regions where people have on average the same political attitudes as themselves. The following hypothesis is put forward to test this theory:

Hypothesis 2a: *Urban citizens are more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate compared to rural citizens.*

Suppose this hypothesis is confirmed by the analyzis. In that case, the following assumption can be made: Compared to rural citizens, urban citizens are more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate due to the experiences they have, which can only be made through living in cities.

Effect of Politicization of Women's Representation on Voting Decision

The question arises whether the politicization of women's representation between 2015 and 2019 had a stronger effect on the voting decision of urban or rural citizens. This assumption is supported by the fact that the actions of women's movements took place mostly in cities. Meanwhile, there were almost no events or demonstrations of women's movements in the countryside.[48] This suggests that urban citizens were particularly attracted to the demands of women's movements, such as the underrepresentation of women in politics. As a result, urban citizens, who did not choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate in 2015, are expected to have chosen the female candidate in 2019 with a higher probability than rural citizens. Rural citizens might have been less influenced by women's movements in their voting decision, since the actions of women's movements took place mostly in cities. Nevertheless, it is assumed that rural citizens were also more likely to prefer a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate in 2019 compared to 2015. Helvetia ruft! has the effort to mobilize women to run for office in all cantons.[49] As a result, the underrepresentation of women in politics also became an issue in rural and conservative circles before the 2019 federal elections. This led to more women being elected to the National Council in 2019 than in 2015 in many cantons, including rural ones.[50] However, the effect of politicization of women's representation between 2015 and 2019 on the voting decision was less pronounced for rural citizens than for urban citizens due to the reasons mentioned above.

The impact of politicization of women's representation on the association between place of residence and the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender represents a research

48   Seitz, Auf Die Wartebank Geschoben: Der Kampf Um Die Politische Gleichstellung Der Frauen in Der Schweiz Seit 1900; Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen SRF, "Lila Mobilmachung Für Die Gleichberechtigung," SRF, 2019, https://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/zweiter-frauenstreik-lila-mobilmachung-fuer-die-gleichberechtigung[Visited:14.11.2021].
49   Alliance F, "Helvetias Formel."
50   BFS Bundesamt für Statistik, "Eidgenössische Wahlen 2019," 2019, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/politik/wahlen/eidg-wahlen-2019.html[Visited:14.11.2021].

gap. To address this gap, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 2b: *The difference between the proportion of urban citizens, who choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate, and the proportion of rural citizens, who choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate, was larger in 2019 compared to 2015.*

If this hypothesis can be confirmed, it implies that women's movements had a stronger effect on the voting decision between two candidates of different gender of urban citizens than on the same voting decision of rural citizens.

Political Values

One of the main arguments of this paper is that socio-cultural (semi-)professionals and urban citizens are most likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate because they generally hold more libertarian values than service and production workers, small business owners, and rural citizens. Libertarian values increase the probability of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate, as gender equality is a core issue of libertarian values. Furthermore, gender equality is strongly politicised by the New Left.[51] Another argument is that citizens generally see female candidates as more libertarian than male candidates.[52] This indicates that citizens, who have libertarian values, are more likely to support the female candidate than citizens who have authoritarian values, which was empirically measured at the federal elections of 2019. Voters of the two left parties (Social Democrats and Green Party) not only had more women on their ballot than men, but they were also most likely to prefer a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate.[53]

Therefore, I assume that political values of the cultural dimension have an impact on the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. The question is whether libertarian values of socio-cultural (semi-)professionals and urban citizens are the only reason they are more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate, compared to service and production workers, small business owners or rural citizens. This argument is examined with the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: *Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals and urban citizens are only more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than service workers, production workers, small business owners, and rural citizens because the former have more libertarian values.*

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51   Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy; Daniel James Keith and Tània Verge, "Nonmainstream Left Parties and Women's Representation in Western Europe," Party Politics 24, no. 4 (July 2018): 397–409.

52   Deborah Alexander and Kristi Andersen, "Gender as a Factor in the Attribution of Leadership Traits," Political Research Quarterly 46, no. 3 (September 1993): 527; Koch, "Do Citizens Apply Gender Stereotypes to Infer Candidates' Ideological Orientations?"

53   Giger et al., "The Surge in Women's Representation in the 2019 Swiss Federal Elections."

This hypothesis measures an indirect effect of political values on the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. If this hypothesis is confirmed by the results of the subsequent regression models, political values are fundamental for explaining the mechanisms behind hypotheses H1a and H2a.

Stereotypical Perceptions

Effect on Voting Decision

For a long time, political scientists studying the underrepresentation of women in parliament focused on gender stereotypes. Literature on the impact of gender stereotypes distinguishes between stereotypes about personality traits and issue competence. Female candidates are generally viewed as compassionate, willing to compromise, and people-oriented, whereas male candidates are seen as assertive, active, and self-confident.[54] Further, male candidates are perceived as more competent than women in handling issues of foreign policy, immigration, economic development, agriculture, and law and order. In contrast women are assumed to be more effective in dealing with issues such as child care, health care, education, welfare state, and environment.[55] This differentiation of issue competence of female and male candidates may serve as a basis for citizens to choose between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. Due to stereotypical perceptions about issue competence, female candidates might not be perceived to possess the right set of skills for representing the citizens in parliament.[56] Dolan found that people more often include stereotypes about issue competence in their voting decisions than stereotypes about personality traits.[57] Therefore, the impact of stereotypes of personality traits on the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender is not analyzed in this paper.

However, some research found no significant effect of stereotypical perceptions about women's issue competence on the voting decision. These authors argue that candidate's party affiliation is more important than

"THIS SUGGESTS THAT URBAN CITIZENS WERE PARTICULARLY ATTRACTED TO THE DEMANDS OF WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS, SUCH AS THE UNDERREPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN POLITICS."

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54   Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, "Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates," American Journal of Political Science 37(1) (1993): 119–47; Jennifer Lawless, "Women, War, and Winning Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era," Political Research Quarterly 57 (2004): 479–90.

55   Huddy and Terkildsen, "Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates"; Koch, "Do Citizens Apply Gender Stereotyapes to Infer Candidates' Ideological Orientations?"; Kathleen Dolan, "The Impact of Gender Stereotyped Evaluations on Support for Women Candidates," Political Behavior 32(1) (2010): 69–88; Dolan, "Gender Stereotypes, Candidate Evaluations, and Voting for Women Candidates"; Kim Kahn, The Political Consequences of Being a Woman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Lawless, "Women, War, and Winning Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era"; Kira Sanbonmatsu, "Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice," Midwest Political Science Association 46(1) (2002): 20–34.

56   Lawless, "Women, War, and Winning Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era"; Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, "The Consequences of Gender Stereotypes for Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office," Political Research Quarterly 46, no. 3 (September 1993): 503–25.

57   Dolan, "The Impact of Gender Stereotyped Evaluations on Support for Women Candidates."

their gender when it comes to the voting decision. However, most scholars argue that this finding is owed to the high affective polarization in the United States, as the elections of the United States were examined in the research.[58] Affective polarization is the phenomenon of animosity between parties. It refers to the extent to which citizens feel more negatively toward other political parties (out-groups) than toward their own (in-group).[59] This suggests that when affective polarization is high, the party of the candidates is more important than their gender for the voting decision. This paper examines the Swiss federal elections, where the affective polarization is not as high as in the United States.[60] This suggests that the gender of the candidates, and consequently also stereotypical perceptions about issue competence, played a role in the voting decision at the Swiss federal elections of 2015 and 2019. Therefore, the impact of stereotypical perceptions about issue competence on the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender is examined in this paper.

As mentioned above, women are assumed to generally be more competent on certain policies, impacting the voting decision. Therefore, it is examined whether citizens who are concerned about an issue, in which women are stereotypically perceived to be more competent, are suggested to more likely prefer the female candidate than men, compared to citizens who are concerned about an issue in which men are perceived to be more competent. The following hypothesis is put forward to examine this theory:

Hypothesis 4a: *Citizens, who are concerned about an issue in which women are perceived to be more competent than men, are more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than citizens who are concerned about an issue in which men are perceived to be more competent.*

If this hypothesis can be confirmed, it implies that citizens have stereotypical perceptions about issue competence of candidates, which they consider when it comes to their voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender.

Effect of Politicization of Women's Representation on Voting Decision

As in other European countries, women in Switzerland have steadily been granted more rights.[61] This allowed women to increase their influence in the labor market and politics. For instance, since the introduction of women's suffrage in 1971, the share of seats held by women

58   Dolan, "Gender Stereotypes, Candidate Evaluations, and Voting for Women Candidates"; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, Culture War?

59   Levi Boxell, Matthew Gentzkow, and Jesse M. Shapiro, Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization, NBER Working Paper Series, no. 26669 (Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020); Shanto Iyengar et al., "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States," Annual Review of Political Science 22, no. 1 (11 May 2019): 129–46.

60   Andres Reiljan, "'Fear and Loathing across Party Lines' (Also) in Europe: Affective Polarisation in European Party Systems," European Journal of Political Research 59, no. 2 (May 2020): 376–96.

61   Eidgenössische Kommission für Frauenfragen, "Geschichte Der Gleichstellung: Frauen Macht Geschichte."

in the National Council has increased in every election, apart from the 2011 elections.[62] This progress helped to ensure that the presence of female candidates for political functions is normalized. This is also reflected in the fact that there is an ongoing easing of stereotypes and also an increase in egalitarian attitudes toward female candidates.[63] Therefore, stereotypical perceptions about issue competence might have decreased in Switzerland since the introduction of women's suffrage. This social change progressed between 2015 and 2019. Furthermore, the women's movements that emerged in Switzerland between 2015 and 2019 call for gender equality and, as a result, an end to stereotypical perceptions about female issue competence.[64] This contributed to a decreased stereotypical perception of issue competence between 2015 and 2019.

Stereotypical perceptions about women's and men's issue competence could have influenced citizen's voting decisions less in 2019 compared to 2015. I examine this theory with the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4b: *The effect of stereotypical issue competence on the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender decreased between 2015 and 2019.*

It is expected that the difference in the likelihood of choosing a female candidate between citizens who were concerned about an issue in which women are perceived to be more competent than men and citizens who were concerned about an issue in which men are perceived to be more competent, decreased in 2019 compared to 2015.

Data Selection and Methods
In the following section, I describe the data set used for analyzing the hypotheses and their operationalization. An explanation of the statistical approach used to examine the hypotheses follows

Data Selection and Operationalization
To test the hypotheses and to answer the research question, the Selects Post-Election Surveys of the federal elections of 2015 and 2019 are used. The surveys were conducted between October and November 2015 among 5,337 Swiss citizens and between October 2019 and January 2020 among 6,664 Swiss citizens, who participated via online or paper survey. The Selects Post-Election Surveys contain questions regarding voting

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62   Seitz, "Die Frauen Bei Den Nationalratswahlen 2019: Ein Grosser Schritt Nach Vorne - Im Bundeshaus. Mit Einem Exkurs Zu Den Frauen Bei Den Wahlen in Den Kantonalen Parlamenten Und Regierungen 2015."

63   Barbara Burrell, "Likeable? Effective Commander in Chief? Polling on Candidate Traits in the 'Year of the Presidential Woman'", PS: Political Science & Politics 41, no. 04 (October 2008): 747–52; Dolan, "The Impact of Gender Stereotyped Evaluations on Support for Women Candidates"; Kim L. Fridkin and Patrick J. Kenney, "The Role of Gender Stereotypes in U.S. Senate Campaigns," Politics & Gender 5, no. 3 (September 2009): 301.

64   Seitz, Auf Die Wartebank Geschoben: Der Kampf Um Die Politische Gleichstellung Der Frauen in Der Schweiz Seit 1900.

behavior, political preferences, and socio-demographic characteristics.[65]

  The dependent variable for all hypotheses is the likelihood of a respondent choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate. Since 2015, there has been a question in the Post-Election Survey that measures this variable: "If you could choose between two equally qualified candidates, would you rather select a man or a woman?" For this paper, the variable is coded 1 if the respondent selects a female candidate and 0 if they select a male candidate or are undecided. This way of coding the variable allows statements about groups of citizens, who prefer the female candidate, which this paper examines. Furthermore, 2,930 respondents were undecided about this question in 2019 and 1,944 in 2015. Excluding these responses from the entire analysis is not appropriate here.

  To answer the first hypothesis, the class classification of Oesch is used.[66] Therefore, respondents' present professions are grouped into eight classes. If respondents did not have a job when the surveys were conducted, their last profession or their partner's present or past employment are used. The professions are grouped into the following groups: self-employed professionals and large employers, small business owners, technical (semi-) professionals, production workers, (associate) managers, clerks, socio-cultural (semi-)professionals, and service workers.[67] This classification is useful for answering hypotheses H1a, H1b, and H3, as it allows the examination of vertical and horizontal divisions of the classes. To measure the influence of place of residence on the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender (H2a, H2b, and H3), the residencies of the respondents are grouped into three categories. The differentiation between city, agglomeration, and countryside is made based on the categorization of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.[68] To answer H3, I create an index that measures libertarian and authoritarian values. The Post-Election Survey includes questions on EU membership, equal opportunities for foreigners, and environmental protection vs. economic growth. These variables ask for opinions on political issues belonging to the cultural dimension of the two-dimensional space of political values. Political attitudes indicate whether a person has libertarian or authoritarian values.[69] Therefore, an additive index is created from the three items mentioned above. The index ranges from 3 (very authoritarian) to 15 (very libertarian). The hypotheses regarding the stereotypical perceptions about issue competence are based on respondents' answers to the question regarding which problem they consider most important in

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65 Lutz, Eidgenössische Wahlen 2015. Wahlteilnahme Und Wahlentscheid; Tresch et al., Eidgenössische Wahlen 2019. Wahlteilnahme Und Wahlentscheid.

66 Daniel Oesch, "Coming to Grips with a Changing Class Structure: An Analysis of Employment Stratification in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland," International Sociology 21, no. 2: 263–88.

67 See Appendix 1 for the description of class allocation.

68 BFS Bundesamt für Statistik, Gemeindetypologie Und Stadt/Land-Typologie 2012 (Neuchâtel, 2017).

69 Silja Häusermann and Hanspeter Kriesi, "What Do Voters Want? Dimensions and Configurations in Individual-Level Preferences and Party Choice," in The Politics of Advanced Capitalism, ed. Pablo Beramendi et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 202–30.

Figure 10: Predicted probabilities of classes (H1a).

Switzerland. Literature is consulted to decide which issues women or men are stereotypically perceived as more competent. Furthermore, the Selects panel survey of the federal elections of 2019 is used because respondents were explicitly asked whether women or men are a better fit for certain policy fields. Respondents' answers are consistent with the literature; however many respondents stated that female and male politicians fit the policy field equally well.[70] The topics of agriculture, economy, EU and Europe, finances and taxes, law and order, immigration and asylum, and foreign policy are attributed to men. The policies of education and culture, environment and energy, gender issues and discrimination, public health, and the welfare state are attributed to women.[71] Four issues cannot be stereotypically linked to a gender. These issues include labor market, political system, parties and politicians, and regions and national cohesion. Since few respondents (2015: 682 respondents, 2019: 357 respondents) indicated these answer options as the most important problem in Switzerland, they are excluded from the analysis.

The following characteristics were added to the regression models as control variables: education, age, and gender. The probability of voting for the female candidate is assumed to decrease with age.[72] Therefore, age is included as a continuous variable in the models. Furthermore, literature has often shown that women are more likely to vote for women than men. This indicates a gender gap in voting preferences.[73] Gender is coded 1 for woman and 0 for man. Finally, the models include education in three categories (Secondary I, Secondary II, and University). When class is examined as an independent variable, educational level is not included as a control variable. Oesch's classification is based on the educational level of the occupations in the qualification level, which means that educational level correlates highly with the classification of occupations.[74]

Methods

To answer the hypotheses, binomial logistic regressions are computed. This type of regression is chosen because the dependent variable (voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender) is coded binary. In all regression models, the oversampling of the cantons is compensated by the "weight_d"- variable, which weights for sample bias.

To answer hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H4b, the interaction

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70   Anke Tresch, "Selects 2019 Panel Survey (Waves 1-5)" (Selects-FORS, 2022).

71   Alexander and Andersen, "Gender as a Factor in the Attribution of Leadership Traits"; Dolan, "The Impact of Gender Stereotyped Evaluations on Support for Women Candidates"; Kahn, The Political Consequences of Being a Woman; Koch, "Do Citizens Apply Gender Stereotypes to Infer Candidates' Ideological Orientations?"; Lawless, "Women, War, and Winning Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post-September 11th Era"; Sanbonmatsu, "Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice"; Huddy and Terkildsen, "Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates."

72   Zoe Lefkofridi, Nathalie Giger, and Anne Maria Holli, "When All Parties Nominate Women: The Role of Political Gender Stereotypes in Voters' Choices," Politics & Gender 15(4) (2019): 746–72.

73   Giger et al., "The Surge in Women's Representation in the 2019 Swiss Federal Elections"; Lefkofridi, Giger, and Holli, "When All Parties Nominate Women: The Role of Political Gender Stereotypes in Voters' Choices.'; Sanbonmatsu, 'Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice."

74   Oesch, "Coming to Grips with a Changing Class Structure."

*Figure 11: Predicted probabilities of place of residence (H2a).*

Figure 12: Predicted probabilities of most important problem (H4a).

	Dependent variable:			
	Decision between two candidates of different gender			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Class: Self-employed professionals and large employers	0,373***			0,452***
	(0,114)			(0,131)
Class: Small business owners	0,228**			0,298***
	(0,100)			(0,114)
Class: Technical (semi-)professionals	0,353***			0,277***
	(0,086)			(0,099)
Class: Production workers	0,142			0,297***
	(0,090)			(0,104)
Class: (Associate) managers	0,151**			0,188**
	(0,075)			(0,085)
Class: Clerks	0,076			0,087
	(0,089)			(0,102)
Class: Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals	0,651***			0,714***
	(0,078)			(0,090)
Place of residence: Agglomeration		-0,017		-0,004
		(0,055)		(0,066)
Place of residence: City		0,165***		0,180***
		(0,052)		(0,062)
Stereotypically female competence			0,433***	0,411***
			(0,045)	(0,049)
Gender (women)	1,072***	1,123***	1,142***	1,102***
	(0,045)	(0,041)	(0,046)	(0,051)
Age	0,011***	0,010***	0,009***	0,010***
	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)
Education: Secondary II		0,173**	0,148	
		(0,075)	(0,090)	
Education: Tertiary		0,753***	0,761***	
		(0,080)	(0,095)	
Constant	-1,810***	-1,978***	-2,014***	-2,018***
	(0,096)	(0,106)	(0,120)	(0,121)
Observations	10'321	11'624	8'214	7'322
Log Likelihood	-6'004,63	-6'629,55	-5'317,24	-4'786,66
Akaike Inf. Crit.	12'029,25	13'273,09	10'646,49	9'599,32

Table 1: Binomial logistic regressions for answering H1a, H2a, and H4b.

between the independent variables and the election year is calculated. This makes it possible to examine the effect of the year of the election on the correlation between the independent and dependent variables. For the interpretation of the hypotheses H1a, H1b, H2a, H2b, H4a, and H4b, the predicted probabilities are calculated.

To measure the indirect effect of political values (H3), I first compute a binomial logistic regression with all independent and control variables, but not with the "political values" variable. Then, the same binomial logistic regression is calculated including the "political values" variable. If the values of the coefficients change by adding the "political values" variable, there is an indirect effect of political values.

Results

This section presents and discusses the results of the regression models of the seven hypotheses. Note that the reference category for the calculated models is the decision to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate. All effects are to be understood ceteris paribus. The predicted probability plots of the independent variables for the 95% confidence interval are presented to deepen the understanding of the calculated regression models.

Table 1 shows the results of the first set of binomial logistic regressions corresponding to H1a, H2a, and H4a. H1a states that socio-cultural (semi-) professionals are more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than service workers, production workers, and small business owners. This hypothesis is partially confirmed by the results shown in Table 1. The coefficient of socio-cultural (semi-)professionals is strongly significant and positive. Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals indeed have a higher probability of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than service workers, who are the reference category for the "class"- variable. Furthermore, socio-cultural (semi-)professionals (50.8%) by far have the highest probability of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate, as shown in figure 10. Moreover, service workers (33.6%) have the lowest probability of choosing the female candidate. Only clerks and production workers do not differ significantly from service workers regarding the probability of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate, as shown in the first model of table 1. The results of Table 1 and Figure 10 confirm H1.

H2a assumes that urban citizens are more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than rural citizens. The results of Table 1 confirm this hypothesis as the coefficient of City is positive and significant on the 99% level in Model 2 and in Model 4. The predicted probabilities of Figure 11 show that urban citizens are 6.6% more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than rural citizens. Interestingly, the probability of choosing the female candidate for citizens living in agglomerations does not differ significantly from the

probability of rural citizens choosing the female candidate. Furthermore, citizens living in agglomerations are 6.8% less likely to choose the female candidate than urban citizens, which is shown in Figure 11.

Table 1 also shows that citizens, who are concerned about an issue in which women are perceived to be more competent than men, are more likely to choose the female candidate than citizens who are concerned about an issue in which men are perceived to be more competent. The coefficient of stereotypically female competence is positive and significant at the 99% level. H4a can therefore be confirmed. Figure 12 shows that citizens, who are concerned about an issue in which women are perceived to be more competent than men, are 9.8% more likely to choose the female candidate than citizens who are concerned about an issue in which men are perceived to be more competent.

Turning to the control variables of Table 1, the coefficients of age and gender are strongly significant and positive in all models. Women are more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than men. Interestingly, older citizens are slightly more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than younger citizens. This counters the results of the literature, which suggests that younger people are more likely to vote for women than older people.[75] A higher level of education compared to basic vocational training also increases the probability of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate in Model 2 and, to some extent also, in Model 3.

The second set of binomial logistic regressions are illustrated in Table 2. H1b, H2b, and H4b are answered with Table 2 and figures showing the predicted probability plots of the independent variables in 2015 and 2019 for the 95% confidence interval. In H1b, I assume that the difference between the proportion of socio-cultural (semi-)professionals, who prefer a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate, and the proportion of production workers, small business owners, and service workers, who choose the female candidate, increased in 2019 compared to 2015. This hypothesis must partly be rejected, due to a number of reasons. The difference between the proportion of socio-cultural (semi-) professionals who choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate, and the proportion of service workers, who choose the female candidate, in fact increased in 2019 compared to 2015. The reason for this is not that the proportion of socio-cultural (semi-)professionals, who choose the female candidate, increased in 2019, but rather that the proportion of service workers, who choose the female candidate, decreased between 2015 and 2019. Moreover, the difference between the proportion of socio-cultural (semi-)professionals, who prefer the female candidate, and the proportion of production workers and small business owners, who choose the female candidate, decreased from 2015 to 2019. As demonstrated in figure 13, the reason is the decline in the proportion of socio-cultural

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75 Lefkofridi, Giger, and Holli, "When All Parties Nominate Women: The Role of Political Gender Stereotypes in Voters' Choices."

Figure 15: Predicted probabilities of most important problem by year (H4b).

	Dependent variable:			
	Decision between two candidates of different gender			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Class: Self-employed professionals and large employers	0,171			0,471**
	(0,183)			(0,217)
Class: Small business owners	0,184			0,246
	(0,157)			(0,183)
Class: Technical (semi-)professionals	0,185			0,024
	(0,126)			(0,152)
Class: Production workers	-0,013			0,067
	(0,125)			(0,149)
Class: (Associate) managers	0,0001			0,034
	(0,108)			(0,128)
Class: Clerks	-0,100			-0,137
	(0,128)			(0,150)
Class: Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals	0,502***			0,599***
	(0,116)			(0,138)
Place of residence: Agglomeration		-0,037		-0,077
		(0,072)		(0,089)
Place of residence: City		0,109		0,057
		(0,080)		(0,103)
Stereotypically female competence			0,411***	0,401***
			(0,090)	(0,096)
Gender (women)	1,075***	1,125***	1,138***	1,104***

	(0,045)	(0,041)	(0,046)	(0,051)
Age	0,011***	0,010***	0,010***	0,010***
	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)
Education: Secondary II		0,175**	0,149*	
		(0,075)	(0,090)	
Education: Tertiary		0,754***	0,766***	
		(0,080)	(0,095)	
2019	-0,176	-0,096	-0,192***	-0,693***
	(0,122)	(0,086)	(0,063)	(0,172)
2019: Self-employed professionals and large employers	0,352			0,060
	(0,235)			(0,273)
2019: Small business owners	0,106			0,183
	(0,204)			(0,235)
2019: Technical (semi-)professionals	0,314*			0,460**
	(0,169)			(0,198)
2019: Production workers	0,315*			0,442**
	(0,177)			(0,204)
2019: (Associate) managers	0,284*			0,316*
	(0,149)			(0,171)
2019: Clerks	0,341*			0,441**
	(0,178)			(0,204)
2019: Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals	0,276*			0,249
	(0,158)			(0,183)
2019: Agglomeration		0,040		0,148
		(0,112)		(0,133)
2019: City		0,115		0,289**
		(0,108)		(0,133)
2019: Stereotypically female competence			0,126	0,134
			(0,108)	(0,116)
Constant	-1,723***	-1,941***	-1,953***	-1,747***
	(0,114)	(0,112)	(0,122)	(0,144)
Observations	10'321	11'624	8'214	7'322
Log Likelihood	-6'000,25	-6'628,50	-5'312,62	-4'774,84
Akaike Inf. Crit.	12'036,51	13'276,99	10'641,25	9'597,67
Note:				*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01

Table 2: Binomial logistic regressions for answering H1b, H2b, and H4b.

(semi-)professionals who prefer the female candidate. Furthermore, the results of model 1 in table 2 show that in 2015 only socio-cultural (semi-) professionals were more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than service workers. The difference between the proportion of technical professionals, clerks, (associate) managers, and production workers who choose the female candidates and the proportion of service workers, who choose the female candidates increased significantly in 2019 compared to 2015. Figure 13 shows that only service workers had a significantly lower probability (-9.6%) of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate in 2019 compared to 2015. Other classes had a somewhat similar tendency, but the difference between 2015 and 2019 is not significant for them. However, socio-cultural (semi-) professionals were most likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate in 2015 and 2019 (see figure 13).

H2b suggests that the difference between the proportion of urban and rural citizens who chose the female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate increased in 2019 compared to 2015. Table 2 shows that in 2015, urban citizens were not more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than rural citizens, as the coefficient is not significant. However, urban citizens had a significantly higher probability of choosing the female candidate than rural citizens in 2019, as demonstrated in Figure 14 and in Table 2. H2b can therefore be confirmed. Nevertheless, this is not because urban citizens had a significantly higher probability of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate in 2019 compared to 2015, which was expected. The gap between urban citizens and rural citizens increased because rural citizens were significantly less likely (-8.8%) to choose the female candidate in 2019 compared to 2015.

In H4b, I assume that the effect of stereotypical issue competence on the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender decreased between 2015 and 2019. This hypothesis must be rejected with the results of table 2 and figure 15. Citizens, who were concerned about an issue in which women are perceived to be more competent than men, were more likely to choose the female candidate in both years than citizens who were concerned about an issue in which men are perceived to be more competent. However, the difference between the two groups in the likelihood of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate increased. Citizens concerned about an issue in which men are perceived to be more competent were 4.8% less likely to choose the female candidate in 2019 than in 2015. Citizens who were concerned about an issue in which women are perceived to be more competent than men also tended to have a lower probability of choosing the female candidate in 2019 than in 2015, but the difference is not significant.

For H3, I analyze if urban citizens and socio-cultural (semi-) professionals are more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than rural citizens, service workers, production

| | Dependent variable: | |
| | Decision between two candidates of different gender | |
	(1)	(2)
Class: Self-employed professionals and large employers	0,452***	0,326**
	(0,131)	(0,139)
Class: Small business owners	0,298***	0,325***
	(0,114)	(0,121)
Class: Technical (semi-)professionals	0,277***	0,257**
	(0,099)	(0,105)
Class: Production workers	0,297***	0,446***
	(0,104)	(0,110)
Class: (Associate) managers	0,188**	0,149*
	(0,085)	(0,090)
Class: Clerks	0,087	0,186*
	(0,102)	(0,108)
Class: Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals	0,714***	0,440***
	(0,090)	(0,096)
Place of residence: Agglomeration	-0,004	-0,032
	(0,066)	(0,070)
Place of residence: City	0,180***	0,048
	(0,062)	(0,066)
Stereotypically female competence	0,411***	0,193***
	(0,049)	(0,052)
Political values		0,243***
		(0,011)
Gender (women)	1,102***	1,154***
	(0,051)	(0,054)
Age	0,010***	0,009***
	(0,001)	(0,002)
Constant	-2,018***	-4,073***
	(0,121)	(0,160)
Observations	7,322	7,077
Log Likelihood	-4,786,662	-4,361,369
Akaike Inf. Crit.	9,599,324	8,750,737
Note:	*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01	

Table 3: Binomial logistic regressions for answering H3.

workers, and small business owners only because they have more libertarian values (H3). Therefore, Table 3 shows the results of two more binomial logistic regressions: one with and one without "political values" as a control variable. First and foremost, political values have a strong effect on the correlation between place of residence and the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. Urban citizens are, in fact, only more likely to choose the female candidate than rural citizens because they hold more libertarian values. Urban citizens with the same political values in the cultural dimension as rural citizens are not more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate. Secondly, political values also influence the correlation between occupational classes and the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. Self-employed professionals and large employers, technical (semi-)professionals, (associate) managers, and socio-cultural (semi-)professionals have a higher probability of choosing the female candidate than service workers since they have more libertarian values on average. This conclusion can be drawn because the values of their coefficients decrease in model 2 compared to model 1. Interestingly, the coefficient of socio-cultural (semi-)professionals decreases dramatically in model 2 compared to model 1. This suggests a strong effect of political values on socio-cultural (semi-)professionals. However, some classes have an even higher probability of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate when political values are considered. For small business owners, production workers, and clerks, political values have a reinforcing effect, as the values of their coefficients increase in model 2. Citizens with these jobs have a higher probability of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate compared to service workers, even though they tend to have more authoritarian values. However, the coefficients of all classes are significant in model 2, indicating that political values are not the only explanation for why they have a higher probability of choosing the female candidate than service workers. In Table 3, the control variables age and gender are also strongly significant and positive. Furthermore, the hypothesis also stated that socio-cultural (semi-)professionals are only more likely to choose the female candidate than production workers and small business owners because they have more libertarian values. To answer this part of the hypothesis, I calculated the same binomial logistic regressions as in Table 3 but with socio-cultural (semi-)professionals as the reference category.[76] Although the coefficients of production workers and small business owners are significant in the first model, they are not significant when "political values" is added to the regression model. This part of H3 can be confirmed.

In conclusion, H3 is partially confirmed. When considering political values, urban citizens and socio-cultural (semi-)professionals are no longer more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally

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76 See Appendix 2 for the binary logistic regression models with socio-cultural (semi-)professionals as reference category.

qualified male candidate than rural citizens, production workers, and small business owners. The other part of H3 must be rejected. Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals are still more likely to prefer a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than service workers when political values are considered.

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper examined how occupation, place of residence, and stereotypical perceptions about issue competence influence the voting decisions between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. It further aimed to find out which impact the politicization of women's representation has on citizens' voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender.

The first set of results shows that occupation, residency, and stereotypical perceptions about issue competence influence the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals are most likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate. Interestingly, production workers are significantly more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate as opposed to service workers. This result cannot be explained by literature. Further research should therefore examine why production and service workers differ in their likelihood of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate. Furthermore, urban citizens are more likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate than rural citizens. This result suggests that there is a contextual effect in Switzerland. However, the contextual effect cannot be confirmed because only education was controlled in the model. This is not the only reason people with libertarian values are more likely to live in and move toward cities. Further research should examine in more detail whether the composition or correlation effect influences the relationship between place of residence and the voting decision between two candidates of different gender. Moreover, stereotypical perceptions about issue competence influence citizens' decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. Citizens concerned about an issue in which women are perceived to be more competent than men are more likely to prefer the female candidate than citizens who are concerned about an issue in which men are perceived to be more competent. However, I could only indirectly measure stereotypical perceptions about issue competence due to the available data. A survey would be needed where respondents are asked whether they think female or male candidates are more competent in dealing with certain policies and whether they prefer a female candidate to a male candidate. This could allow us to directly examine the correlation between stereotypical perceptions about issue competence and voting decisions between two candidates of different gender.

The second set of results deals with the impact of politicization

of women's representation on the voting decision between two equally qualified candidates of different gender. The difference between the proportion of citizens who chose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate in 2015 compared to the proportion of citizens who chose the female candidate in 2019 is only significant for some groups. These groups are as follows: service workers, citizens who do not live in cities, and citizens who are concerned about a stereotypically male issue in which men are perceived to be more competent than women. For those groups, the probability of choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate declined in 2019 compared to 2015, which is surprising. This decline might have occurred because these groups of citizens preferred the "don't know" answer and not the female candidate in 2019. The ongoing debate about positive and negative discrimination of women might have led citizens to question the positive discrimination of women when choosing a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate. Respondents might have wanted to answer the question less often in 2019 compared to 2015 to avoid negative and positive discrimination against female candidates. Cross tables of the distribution of responses in 2015 and 2019 on the dependent variable support this assumption: for all groups analyzed, the percentage of "don't know" responses increased between 2015 and 2019, whereas the percentage of "women" responses decreased.[77] Further research should examine the impact of women's movements on the positive and negative discrimination of female candidates.

The generalization of the results of this paper is limited, as Switzerland is a special case regarding the increase of women's representation after the politicization of women's representation. In recent years, the proportions of women in other national parliaments have not increased in one single election as much as in Switzerland. Furthermore, the debate on women's representation in politics was extraordinarily high in Switzerland between 2015 and 2019.

The results of this paper are especially relevant for people who want to increase the representation of women in parliament, as it shows which groups of citizens (service workers, clerks, citizens, who do not live in cities and citizens, who are concerned about an issue in which men are perceived to be more competent than women) are least likely to choose a female candidate over an equally qualified male candidate in Switzerland. Hence, people who want to increase women's representation in Swiss parliaments should try to address these groups more specifically when planning electoral campaigns. Furthermore, this paper provides a basis for further research on the impact of politicization of women's representation on the voting decision. In further work, it should be analyzed for a longer period or between different countries to examine the effect of women's movements in more depth.

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77   See Appendix 3 for the cross tables.

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Appendix
Appendix 1: Descirption of Class Allocation

Work logic			
Qualification level	**Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals** Medical doctors Teachers Social workers	**Technical (semi-) professionals** Engineers Architects IT-Specialists	**(Associate) Managers** Administrators Consultants Accountants	**Self-employed professionals and large employers** Entrepreneurs Lawyers Salesmen
	Service workers Waiters Shop Assistants Home helpers	**Production workers** Mechanics Electricians Carpenters	**Office clerks** Secretaries Receptionists Bank tellers	**Small business owners** Shop owners Farmers Hairdressers

Table 4: Description of class allocation.

Appendix 2: Binary Logistic Regression Models for Answering H3

	Dependent variable:	
	Decision between two candidates of different gender	
	(1)	(2)
Class: Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0,263**	-0,114
	(0,124)	(0,131)
Class: Small business owners	-0,416***	-0,115
	(0,106)	(0,113)
Class: Technical (semi-)professionals	-0,437***	-0,183*
	(0,089)	(0,094)
Class: Production workers	-0,417***	0,006
	(0,095)	(0,101)
Class: (Associate) managers	-0,526***	-0,291***
	(0,073)	(0,078)
Class: Clerks	-0,627***	-0,255**
	(0,093)	(0,100)
Class: Service workers	-0,714***	-0,440***
	(0,090)	(0,096)
Place of residence: Agglomeration	-0,004	-0,032
	(0,066)	(0,070)
Place of residence: City	0,180***	0,048
	(0,062)	(0,066)
Stereotypically female competence	0,411***	0,193***
	(0,049)	(0,052)
Political values		0,243***
		(0,011)
Gender (women)	1,102***	1,154***
	(0,051)	(0,054)
Age	0,010***	0,009***
	(0,001)	(0,002)
Constant	-1,304***	-3,632***
	(0,113)	(0,162)
Observations	7,322	7,077
Log Likelihood	-4,786,662	-4,361,369
Akaike Inf. Crit.	9,599,324	8,750,737
Note:	*$p<0,1$; **$p<0,05$; ***$p<0,01$	

Appendix 3: Cross Tables of Distribution on the Dependent Variable Classes

Table 8: Distribution of classes on the dependent variable in 2015.

	Don't know	Women	Men
Self-employed professionals and large employers	42.4%	38.3%	19.3%
Small business owners	38.6%	38.1%	23.3%
Technical (semi-)professionals	39.7%	31.4%	29.0%
Production Workers	33.8%	31.8%	34.4%
(Associate) managers	35.5%	34.2%	30.3%
Clerks	34.5%	39.7%	25.8%
Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals	34.0%	51.1%	14.9%
Service workers	32.3%	35.9%	31.8%

Table 9: Distribution of classes on the dependent variable in 2019.

	Don't know	Women	Men
Self-employed professionals and large employers	45.5%	34.3%	20.3%
Small business owners	47.3%	33.2%	19.6%
Technical (semi-)professionals	50.2%	31.2%	18.6%
Production Workers	47.8%	31.0%	21.1%
(Associate) managers	46.4%	32.7%	20.9%
Clerks	44.1%	42.4%	13.6%
Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals	39.9%	49.3%	10.8%
Service workers	45.2%	33.7%	21.1%

Place of Residence

Table 10: Distribution place of residence the dependent variable in 2015.

	Don't know	Women	Men
Agglomeration	36.4%	36.4%	27.2%
City	35.8%	38.6%	25.6%
Countryside	34.0%	36.9%	29.1%

Table 11: Distribution of place of residence the dependent variable in 2019.

	Don't know	Women	Men
Agglomeration	46.1%	30.8%	23.1%
City	45.8%	37.5%	16.7%
Countryside	48.3%	31.6%	20.2%

Stereotypical issue competence

Table 12: Distribution of stereotypical issue competence on the dependent variable in 2015.

	Don't know	Women	Men
Female	31.1%	45.7%	23.2%
Male	33.7%	36.1%	30.2%

Table 13: Distribution of stereotypical issue competence on the dependent variable in 2019.

	Don't know	Women	Men
Female	43.8%	41.0%	15.2%
Male	43.8%	30.5%	25.7%

Note: The responses of all cross tables are weighted for sample bias, party voting, and participation.

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Russia Ukraine Crisis 2022

Comparing Classical Theories and Contemporary Praxis

D rawing parallels between contemporary world affairs and theories of international relations is inimical to understanding the paradigmatic shifts within global politics.

The following essay considers two mainstream theories of realism and liberalism in analysing the current Russia-Ukraine conflict. I will elaborate why the Russia Ukraine crisis is a supposed triumph of realism, a somewhat failure of liberalism, and a consequent need to consider alternative theoretical aspects for future courses of actions.

The Russian Side: Realism for the Win?

Amongst a myriad of reasons cited, the major motive of Russian invasion was the paranoia it experienced due to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expanding eastward toward Ukraine. Russia has always regarded Ukraine as its 'backyard'; the latter creates a buffer between Russia and NATO nations and serves as a satellite state. Mearsheimer's neorealist argument of 'insecurity of security' would argue in favor of Russia annexing Ukraine as a power maximizing strategy to achieve security within an anarchical dog-eat-dog world order, given the uncertainty of NATO's relative power with U.S.

hegemonic support at its helm.[1]

One may also focus on Putin's "strong man": personality in advocating for Russian adventurism.[2] This corresponds to the first image of the "individual" influencing behavior of states, albeit Waltz emphasized the third image of "system" determining states' behavior within international anarchical structures.[3] Classical realists provide a deeper insight into human nature driving Putin's projection of an aggressive personality cult, be it Morgenthau's claim of man as an "animus dominandi," Hobbesian analysis of man's nature driven by "competition, diffidence, and glory," or Thucydides' claim of "fear, honor and interest" driving human behavior.[4]

Jack Snyder mentions the relevance of innenpolitik to explain why nations over-expand, citing three factors: hoodwinking the public with myths of empire thus making retrenchment "highly unlikely" while guided by "selfish motivations of powerful groups within states."[5] Putin, for instance, held a massive rally in support of the Ukraine invasion, with the opening song lyrics being "Ukraine and Crimea, Belarus and Moldova, it's all my country."[6]

Gideon Rose's neoclassical theory justifies Russian incentive to invade Ukraine at two levels: first, the domestic factor attributed to Putin and high-ranking Russian policy decision makers determining power distribution in international politics through "decisions by flesh and blood officials," and second, the prevailing international anarchy influencing Russia's strategic posturing against NATO.[7]

The defiance shown by Ukrainian President Zelenskyy toward invading Russian troops is similar to the Melians' approach toward invading Athenians: Ukrainians desperately standing for what is right, yet Russians know that such a hope is expensive. Case in point: when a Russian ship demanded Ukrainian soldiers to lay down their arms to avoid bloodshed, the latter responded in resistance and were subsequently killed for their refusal to surrender. History repeats itself within the contemporary: the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.[8]

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1   John Mearsheimer gave the theory of offensive realism, which argues how states within the international anarchic system function as "aggressive power maximisers" enhancing their own survival and security by maximising their relative power compared to other states. States therefore constantly seek to diminish their competitor's power and to enhance their own, due to information asymmetry about the rival's relative power capabilities.
2   Russian adventurism, from a Western perspective, is often used to describe Russia's forays into West Asia (such as intervention in Syrian civil war in 2015), and Eastern Europe (such as annexation of Crimea in 2014, and recent ongoing invasion of Ukraine in 2022).
3   In his seminal work *Man, the State and War* (1959), Stephan Waltz propounded the "three images" which represent three different levels of analyzing international relations. While Waltz disregards the utility of the first and second image (human nature and individual nations) in understanding why wars happen, it is the third image (a "system" of states) that makes states go to war within an "anarchical" international system: the absence of a supreme sovereign with coercive power within international system creates a situation of self-help where each nation fends for its own survival.
4   Presenting a sceptical view of human nature, Hans Morgenthau in his work Politics Among Nations gave the concept of "animus dominandi": man harbours limitless lust for power to dominate over his fellowmen.
5   Innenpolitik theories are unit-level approaches that explain foreign policy primarily in terms of internal characteristics of states and their domestic political processes. These include considering the individuals, parties, and coalitions that lead the state as units of analysis influencing foreign policy of states.
6   East European countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus share geographical boundaries and trace historical ethnicities from the Russian mainland. Given the politically unstable regimes within these countries and annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, such countries face an imminent threat of territorial annexation by Russian military forces.
7   The term "Neoclassical Realism" was coined by Gideon Rose in 1998. Providing for a synthesis of classical realism and neorealism, neoclassical realists consider both human nature and domestic factors of states, as well as international anarchical structures, as important factors influencing foreign policy of states.
8   In Greek history, the "Melian Dialogue" represents a dramatization of negotiations by the invading

Stephen Walt's neorealist theory of balance of threat becomes relevant to analyze Ukraine's frenzied decision to join the European Union (EU) and NATO.[9] As a weak state eager to bandwagon to counter a bellicose Russia, Ukraine made a case for its membership bid for the EU within days of Russian invasion, yet was rebuffed equally quickly for failing to meet EU norms adequately.[10]

The NATO Side: Liberalism Laments?

The effectiveness of liberal international institutions' responses to the Russian invasion is somewhat dismal. Several challenges abound, including countless times Ukrainian President Zelenskyy lamented the failure of the U.S. and its allies to declare a no-fly zone and pleaded for EU officials to recognize a "humanitarian disaster" in Ukraine, as bombardments ravaged several Ukrainian cities. The UN General Assembly and International Court of Justice cry foul over Ukraine's invasion, while Russia simply rides roughshod and Ukraine is left high and dry. The grand illusions of Responsibility to Protect, the Wilsonian vision of making the world "safe for democracy," and the idealistic faith reposed in the moral force of international organizations all lie belied.

Keohane and Nye's theory of complex interdependence may explain the importance of economic variables for nations, but it is unable to explain the hierarchical relation between military gains and economic costs for nation states.[11] As the Russian case shows, security aims prevail and "high politics" dominate: even as Russia faces a slew of economic sanctions, Putin continues unfazed with his invasion. Russia thus may not be prudent economically, but it is certainly undeterred militarily.

Kenneth Oye's explanation of cooperation among states within an anarchical international system mentions how multiple players in game theory can lead to free-riding since there are multiple chances of defection.[12] In this context, economic sanctions or curbing of energy imports from Russia by the 27-member European Union becomes less effective.[13]

Athenians, who carry out the siege of Melos and overpower the Melians. Written by the classical historian Thucydides in his work History of the Peloponnesian War, the dialogue represents how the pragmatic Athenians offer no moral considerations for conquering Melians and simply do it because they are powerful enough to do so, while the Melians, despite their attempts at dissuading the Athenians, have to accept defeat in the face of a stronger adversary.

9   In his article *Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,* Stephen Walt gave the "balance of threat" theory which argues how states generally "balance" by allying against the perceived threats posed by other states, while very weak states are likely to "bandwagon" with the rising threat to ensure their own survival. For instance, Germany's expansionism during World Wars led to consequent alliance formations by European states.

10   Ukraine continues to face internal political and economic challenges such as democratic deficit, domestic power struggles and corruption cases, making European Union hesitant in including the country within the supra-national organisation.

11   Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye developed the theory of "complex interdependence" which expounds three basic ideas: (1) multiple channels connecting societies thus undermining the realist primacy accorded to "states" as unit of analysis; (2) absence of fixed hierarchy of issues, thus allowing "low politics" like environment to be at the high table; (3) decline in use of military or coercive force, making states less likely to go at war.

12   The concept of free-riding can be exemplified in the case of international environmental agreements, where developed nations such as USA (particularly under President Donald Trump) pointed out relatively relaxed emission norms for developing countries like China and India, while USA industrialists bear a larger economic cost of maintaining lower carbon emissions.

13   Hungarian Prime Minister Vicktor Orban for instance openly claimed Hungary would block any

The stationing of nuclear missiles by Russians may also be an attempt at what Oye sees as "altering payoff structures," reflecting military trust-building and reducing chances of defection by the adversary.[14] However, departing from the liberal lens, one can also view nuclear brinkmanship from the realist lens of nuclear deterrence theory: "mutually assured destruction" for both Russia and Ukraine, particularly economically, induces both states to not strike.

"THE SUNK-COST FALLACY HITS HARDER: THE LONGER THE WAR GOES ON, THE MORE THE RUSSIAN REGIME WOULD AVOID GIVING IN WITHOUT TANGIBLE OUTCOMES."

The Fallout: Paradigms for the 21st Century

Realism assumes states to be rational actors, but is Russian invasion driven by pragmatism or pride? Classical realism such as Sun Tzu's Art of War emphasises clinical precision in responding not out of pride or glory, but based on cost-benefit analysis of the likelihood of winning. Kautilya advocated a similar cool-headed advice: wage war only when worth, and prefer peace over conquest if possible.[15]

Putin, however, continues with increasingly aggressive maneuvers, much to the chagrin of the local populace, many of whom continue to migrate to neighboring countries in the light of recent government orders for military conscription.[16] The sunk-cost fallacy hits harder: the longer the war goes on, the more the Russian regime would avoid giving in without tangible outcomes. "The Chicken Game" thus becomes an ego trip for Russia invading Ukraine, and as Harvey Dent said in The Dark Knight: "You either die a hero, or live long enough to see yourself become a ~~villain~~ chicken."[17]

EU sanction proposals which include Russian energy imports, terming it a 'red line' that opposes domestic interests. Hungary is reported to get nearly 85% of its natural gas and more than 60% of its oil from Russia.

14 In game theory, "pay-off structures" are the incentives or losses that nation-states are confronted with while deciding to engage in cooperation or defection with other states. Such pay offs are altered by multiple considerations such as the number of players, "iterations" of cooperation and "shadow of the future" (multiple iterations incentivising greater cooperation).

15 In his work *The Arthashastra*, ancient Indian scholar Kautilya (also known as Chanakya) provided a methodology of statecraft, economic policy and military strategy that a ruler must abide by. As a senior advisor to Emperor Chandragupta Maurya, Kautilya sought to define the principles of what constituted a "good king" who could look after the welfare of his subjects.

16 In September 2022, Russia released its statement for recruiting civilians for military conscription to aid Ukraine's annexation. Nearly all healthy men aged 18 to 35 are eligible, and around 300,000 soldiers recruited to join Russian Army.

17 In game theory, the Chicken Game (also called Hawk-Dove Game or Snowdrift Game), is a model of conflict between two players. A head-on collision between both players can be avoided if any one player yields, yet the player yields at the cost of hurting his pride and enduring the shame of becoming a

Given food, fertiliser and fuel security plaguing several countries at present, rising oil prices following a ban on Russian energy would particularly hit postcolonial poorer nations harder in an already Covid-affected world.[18] Developing nations thus seem to craft their own path: Ayoob's subaltern realism explains India's reluctance to speak out directly against Russian belligerence, owing to the former's heavy dependence on military hardware imports from the latter.[19] Yet a recent statement by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, "Now is not the time for war," represents a collective sentiment of the third world, if not the global community.[20]

An environmental lens becomes important to understand the crisis of governance looming within European nations, even as an already Covid-stricken pandemic recovery and a recession-hit UK economy is further pressured by costlier energy imports in lieu of finding alternatives to reduce energy dependency on Russia.[21] Spiralling climate change in the light of record-breaking heatwaves across European cities have set the stage for the worst yet to come: the arrival of extreme winter conditions in the midst of an energy crisis. Europe is seen battling on all fronts.

Interestingly, social media misinformation campaigns and fake news lack adequate consideration in mainstream realist or liberal theories. The Ukrainian "Ghost of Kiev," hailed for his heroism in defeating Russian aircrafts, was in fact not a fallen soldier but a fictitious story.[22] Technological determinism of contemporary human evolution makes it imperative to evolve a theory of international relations analysing the role of technological aspects of global relations, especially given the immense potential of social media in galvanising global cooperation and conflict among state and non-state actors.

Given the perilous times within changing global order, liberal international organizations must rally to enforce rule of law and respect nations' territorial sovereignty. Following calls of referendum, Russia formally declared its annexation over nearly 15% of Ukrainian territory, including four regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia. A spill-over effect can be observed in countries like China, which recently enhanced its militant posturing in Taiwan, more so in the light of Nancy Pelosi's visit and the consequent US-China confrontationist stances.

"chicken."

18 Russia and Ukraine account for around 27% of world's wheat exports and 53% of world's sunflowers and seeds. The director of World Food Programme David Beasley commented how the global food crisis following Ukraine invasion could particularly exacerbate hunger crisis in least developed countries such as Yemen, Afghanistan and East African nations.

19 The theory of subaltern realism explains international politics from the perspective of weak postcolonial states. Mohammed Ayoob argues how developing nations are confronted with two levels of challenges: (1) domestic pressure such as political instability and economic backwardness (2) external pressure including great power rivalries between countries like US and Russia affecting politics and economies of developing countries.

20 India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke at the 22nd Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit recently held in September 2022 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.

21 EU has planned on ending its energy dependency on Russia by 2030. At present, Russia accounts for nearly two-fifths of EU's gas imports, around 27% of its imported crude oil and nearly 50% of its supply of solid fuel (including coal). The International Energy Agency in its "10 Point Plan" highlights EU's alternatives to Russian energy sources, including transition to clean energy sources and diversifying energy import countries including countries such as USA and Balkan states.

22 The Ghost of Kiev was a mythical pilot credited for shooting down six Russian planes during the Kiev offensive in February 2022. The story was shared by Ukrainians on social media handles, being credited as a major morale boost for Ukrainians during Russian invasion.

The result is an increasingly unstable world order with shifting global alliances. A Cold War revival seems in the making: a revamped version involving a new power axis of Russia-China nexus, US and EU jointly representing Western interests, and independent developing nations like India balancing on a tight-rope between the two camps.

As I write this essay, the threat of World War III, however far-fetched, remains a possibility nevertheless; instances such as the sporadic shelling of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant by Russia makes the conflict potentially inch closer to a full blown-out warfare.[23] As of now, the future of the Russia-Ukraine crisis remains elusive. Yet as aptly put forth by American scholar Robert Gilpin, there is no guarantee that a minor conflict between superpowers in today's nuclear age could not set the motion toward mutual destruction.

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23   Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is located in south-eastern Ukraine. It is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe and among the ten largest in the world.

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Bang for the Buck

How the Coronavirus Pandemic has Exacerbated Power Imbalances Between Clothing Brands in the Global North and Manufacturers and Suppliers in Bangladesh

T he World Health Orginzation's declaration in March 2020 of the outbreak of COVID-19 as a global pandemic sent the world into lockdown, changing our way of life and how our networks and connections across the globe interact forever.

Stuck indoors, many people in the West turned to the world of online shopping to help cope and fill the time, in particular the world of online clothing. And so, the relationship between clothing brands in the Global North and their manufacturers and suppliers in the Global South began to shift. The coronavirus pandemic highlighted the major issues in accountability across globalized production networks between countries in the Global North and the Global South, with the international ready-made garment (RMG) industry being one of the worst impacted supply chains during 2020. RMG industries in Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) and Less Economically Developed Countries (LEDCs)—such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Turkey—all felt the socio-economic

consequences of the disruption caused by the pandemic, ranging from unsafe working conditions and the exploitation of workers, to concern and outrage on national scales for the financial stability and future development of industries and economies, as the pandemic stalled growth in some of the most crucial industrial and financial sectors for many countries in the Global South. In particular the case of Bangladesh's RMG industry, the country's economic powerhouse, demonstrates some of the most documented and visible impacts of the pandemic on the relationship between manufacturers in the Global South and the companies placing orders in the Global North, with many major western brands and companies canceling orders and pressuring their Bangladeshi supplier's to lower manufacturing costs to make up for their pandemic-related financial losses, at the cost of their workers.

"IN 2019 BANGLADESH'S RMG INDUSTRY WAS WORTH APPROXIMATELY USD $33.1 BILLION; HOWEVER, WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR OF THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC, THE VALUE OF BANGLADESHI RMG EXPORTS FELL BY 17%."

Bangladesh is the second largest clothing manufacturer and exporter in the world after China, with 83% of its total exports in 2020 being apparel and garments, accounting for around 11% of its total GDP.[1] The Bangladeshi RMG industry's two main export markets are the European Union and North America, which account for around 80% of all total garment exports. There are roughly 4,600 clothing factories across the country, with over 4 million estimated formal and informal workers.[2] In 2019 Bangladesh's RMG industry was worth approximately USD $33.1 billion; however, within the first year of the coronavirus pandemic, the value of Bangladeshi RMG exports fell by 17%.

Thus, in this paper I aim to explore and better understand how the pandemic has exacerbated the power imbalances between clothing brands in the Global North and their manufacturers and suppliers in Bangladesh. I intend to utilize the political economic theories and concepts of Dependency theory and Global Commodity Chains (GCCs) to analyze the treatment of the Bangladeshi RMG industry throughout the pandemic by brands in the Global North. Whilst these two concepts alone are not enough to examine and explain the full scale of the impacts of COVID-19 on the relationship between the Bangladeshi RMG industry and their customers in the Global North, I feel they are an insightful and effective combination for the scope of this paper.[3]

1   S. Ganbold, "Bangladesh: Garment Industry's Share Of Total Exports 2020," *Statista,* 2022. https://www.statista.com/statistics/987683/bangladesh-garment-share-total-exports/.
2   ActionAid Australia, "Casualties of Fashion: How Garment Workers in Bangladesh and Cambodia are Wearing the Cost of COVID-19," *ActionAid Australia*, 2021. https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2021-12/apo-nid315591.pdf.
3   S. Ganbold, *Statista*, 2022.

A Dive into Dependency Theory and Global Commodity Chains

Global Commodity Chains were first proposed by Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz in the early 1990s as a way to organize and categorize the many different international flows and networks surrounding different goods and commodities, defining them as "sets of interorganizational networks clustered around one commodity, or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world economy. These networks are situationally specific, socially constructed, and locally integrated, underscoring the social embeddedness of economic organization." [4] They proceeded to break these clustered networks down into specific segments or subunits within the commodity chain called nodes, with each node interconnecting through networks to form a commodity chain. Nodes can represent a wide range of components in the production, transportation, and distribution of commodities, such as the acquisition and input of raw materials for manufacturing, labor power, commodity transportation, market actors, and consumers themselves. GCC theory thus enables us to better trace and illustrate not only the economic network and impacts a commodity may have from its conception to consumption internationally, but also its social and political networks, on a variety of scales, including the local, regional, national and international.

In the context of Bangladesh, I aim to utilize the concept of GCCs to explore and better understand the relationship between the Bangladeshi RMG industry and clothing brands in the Global North, under the argument that this relationship is a GCC, with the single commodity being low-cost garments. The relationship comprises a series of networks between companies, laborers, industries, markets, and consumers internationally, focused on ready-made clothing. The relationship can be broken down into related nodes, such as clothing production; labor rights and working conditions within factories in Bangladesh; and the international distribution of the completed garment orders. The relationship between Bangladeshi manufacturers and Western brands could be further categorized as within a Buyer Driven Commodity Chain (BDCC). This is a specific form of GCC in which the power to organize the commodity chain lies within brands, large-scale retailers, and multinational trading companies rather than with the producers of the specific commodity. The division of different aspects of this relationship into nodes allows for a clearer and closer analysis of the interactions between the suppliers and the companies placing the orders, including a clearer way of identifying issues and areas of exploitation. Using GCC theory to outline these different areas and networks also allows for a better understanding and illustration of how the pandemic has impacted the garment industry in Bangladesh and its international relationship with the brands in the Global North placing orders.

Alongside GCC theory, dependency theory is the other major theory I will be utilizing to analyze the relationship between the Bangladeshi RMG industry and clothing brands in the Global North. Dependency

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4   Gary Gereffi, Miguel Korzeniewicz, and Roberto Korzeniewicz, "Introduction: Global Commodity Chains" in *Commodity Chains And Global Capitalism,* ed Gary Gereffi et. al (Wesport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 2.

theory divides the international system into Core and Peripheral regions. Core regions are wealthier and more economically developed, whilst Peripheral regions are less economically developed; they are dependent on the Core regions due to power imbalances caused by their relational positions within the world system and the international economy. This dependency is arguably perpetuated in the economic relationships between postcolonial and former colonial states, with many of these relationships being exploitative and limiting to the Peripheral region's development but beneficial to the Core. Whilst there are many influential theorists and economists involved in the development of dependency theory—such as Raul Prebisch, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Andre Gunder Frank—in this essay, I specifically use Theotonio Dos Santos' definition of dependency as:

"...a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development."[5]

I feel that these elements of dependency theory make it a strong critical tool for the analysis of the relationship between the Bangladeshi RMG industry and clothing brands in the Global North; with Bangladesh as a Peripheral state whilst states in the Global North are the Core. Under this, economic exploitation and capital accumulation are the key elements for continuing the cycle of dependency in the world system.

In the international clothing industry, the main clothing brands placing orders in the Global South are based in Core regions (the USA and Western Europe), and can exploit manufacturers and industries in the Peripheral regions (mainly South and South-East Asia, but also regions like North Africa, Mexico, and Eastern Europe) to produce goods for the lowest prices.[6] Exploitation on this scale is possible through less or weaker regulation in industries located in the Global South compared to the Global North, and lower economic and industrial development levels. This allows companies to sell their products at lower costs to consumers in the Core (namely the US and Western Europe), at the cost of the safety and livelihood of workers in the Periphery. In the case of Bangladesh, the country's RMG industry is almost wholly dependent on orders from the US and the EU to continue to survive and fuel its growth.[7] As demonstrated by the global pandemic, the loss of this has significant adverse economic and social effects, which will be expanded in further detail in the following

5   Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure Of Dependence," *The American Economic Review* 60 (2): 231(1970), https://www.jstor.org/stable/1815811?seq=1.
6   Garments Merchandising, "Clothing Buyer List: List Of 100 Garment Buyers In Bangladesh," Garments Merchandising. 2022. https://garmentsmerchandising.com/list-of-top-100-garment-buyers-in-bangladesh/.
7   Mark Anner. "Squeezing Workers' Rights In Global Supply Chains: Purchasing Practices In The Bangladesh Garment Export Sector In Comparative Perspective," 321.

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"IN THE CASE OF BANGLADESH, THE COUNTRY'S RMG INDUSTRY IS ALMOST WHOLLY DEPENDEDNT ON ORDERS FROM THE US AND THE EU TO CONTINUE TO SURVIVE AND FUEL ITS GROWTH."

section.

GCCs and dependency theory can be interpreted as being heavily intertwined, with GCCs covering the spatial aggregation of commodities internationally, whilst dependency theory identifies and explains the positions and importance of different nodes within the GCC in the wider context of the world system. When examining GCCs, often the lower levels of the chain; the origins and the production of goods; are located in the Global South, which is generally recognized as the underdeveloped periphery. The upper links of the chain (i.e., the consumers, the groups making profits from the goods) are mainly located in the West and the Global North: the Core developed regions. There are then different power relations and dynamics within the chain between different actors, as actors in GCCs are not limited to purely state and governmental forms. Actors can include nation-states, multinational corporations, intergovernmental organizations, consumer markets, companies and brands placing manufacturing orders, individual manufacturers and suppliers, transportation companies, and even the workers themselves making the products. Different actors are able to exercise power within the nodes of a GCC in different ways. This can create potential knock-on effects on other actors within the chain, as all the actors are connected in some way by the GCC inside the international system. When these actors and their use of power in the GCC are examined, Core-Periphery Dependency theory can again be demonstrated. The more powerful actors within the chain are mainly located in the Core, whilst the less powerful and influential actors are found in the Periphery.

The imbalances in power relations highlight the dependency lower-level actors in the GCC have on the higher actors, as they are dependent on the higher actors placing orders, transferring goods, and creating a demand for the service and goods produced by the lower actors. Without this demand, lower actors in the GCC would be unable to benefit economically from their production of goods, as they themselves cannot create their own markets large enough for these products and services as they are often unaffordable and inaccessible to people in areas lower-level actors are located. Thus, actors in the Periphery become dependent on actors in the Core for their industries and livelihood. This unequal exchange of power and capital between actors within GCCs is not only a clear demonstration of Core-Periphery Dependency, but it also shows how this theory is enabled and enhanced by the development of GCCs, as they provide the networks and frameworks possible for economic exploitation on an international scale.

A Stitch Up

The global coronavirus pandemic left the Bangladeshi RMG industry facing over $3 billion USD in delayed, on hold, or canceled clothing orders between March and June 2020 from over 1,900 brands, as at the beginning of the Pandemic, consumption in Western markets declined.[8] Most were Western brands based in the Global North, including major clothing

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8   ActionAid Australia, *ActionAid Australia.*

brands such as Boohoo, H&M, Zara, Levi's, and Abercrombie & Fitch.[9] The majority of these cancellations were for orders which had already been completed, in which the brands were simply refusing to pay their suppliers or claim the goods. These cancellations meant that manufacturers in Bangladesh were stuck with millions of US dollars worth of unclaimed garments, from which no financial gain could be earned to pay their workers for their labor and maintain their working conditions. Some brands, such as H&M and Zara, did reverse their decisions and pay for their orders in full after public backlash and petitioning in the West, however, the majority of brands did not.[10] However, as the pandemic progressed, new orders from the clothing brands came in on top of the cancellations. Furthermore, many of these brands pushed their manufacturers and suppliers for lower manufacturing costs, which they justified as due to the financial losses from the pandemic, they were unable to maintain their previous payments and needed the lower prices to help them make up for these financial losses.[11] These lower costs, combined with a boom in online sales in the West due to people being forced to stay inside and online, saw many clothing brands turn profits greater than they had previously predicted by the end of 2020, which is a trend that continued into 2021.[12]

The Bangladeshi government has had conflicting stances over the impact of the pandemic on the RMG industry, as whilst it has tried to support its workers through the pandemic, such as through food distribution programs at the beginning of the pandemic, the country is

"THE MAJORITY OF THESE CANCELLATIONS WERE FOR ORDERS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETED, IN WHICH THE BRANDS WERE SIMPLY REFUSING TO PAY THEIR SUPPLIERS OR CLAIM THE GOODS. THESE CANCELLATIONS MEANT THAT MANUFACTURERS IN BANGLADESH WERE STUCK WITH MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS WORTH OF UNCLAIMED GARMENTS..."

9   Jasmin Malik Chua, "Sweatpants Sales Are Booming, But The Workers Who Make Them Are Earning Even Less," *Vox*, 2021, https://www.vox.com/the-goods/22278245/garment-workers-bangladesh-unpaid-factories-sweatpants.
10   Jasmin Malik Chua, *Vox*.
11   Mark Anner, "Squeezing Workers' Rights In Global Supply Chains: Purchasing Practices In The Bangladesh Garment Export Sector In Comparative Perspective."
12   Jasmin Malik Chua, *Vox*.

so heavily dependent on the income from the RMG industry to drive the national economy and development, that as the pandemic progressed fulfilling international orders and demands became a priority over the health and safety of factory workers, in multiple ways.[13] At the beginning of the pandemic, the government provided the industry with a $787 million USD bailout to allow factories to continue to pay their workers and make up for part of the cost of lost orders. However, only factories registered with the two main trade bodies - the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) and the Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA) - could access these funds, meaning thousands of informal garment workers were excluded from accessing support.[14] Controversially, the government also allowed for the continuation of manufacturing operations throughout national lockdowns in 2021 to continue to meet the demands for orders from clothing brands to help keep the economy afloat.[15] This put the health and safety of workers at risk not only directly from coronavirus but also physical and economic exploitation. Many desperate workers were forced to work in worse and unsafe working conditions due to their poor financial situations, as many factories relaxed their safety conditions to help cut costs and cope with the financial losses from the pandemic.

Furthermore, Bangladeshi manufacturers were not in a position where they could negotiate or refuse the orders from clothing brands, as they could not afford to lose any more orders and income. This pressure partly stemmed from the growing international competition from RMG industries in countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam, which meant that turning down orders during the pandemic could lead to a permanent loss of customers, orders, and income post-pandemic.[16] If Bangladeshi manufacturers refused the orders or the prices which brands were demanding, other suppliers in other countries, particularly those with growing RMG industries, would be more than willing to meet their demands.[17] In some cases continuing to take orders and work under new conditions was still not enough for some manufacturers to sustain themselves, and many factories in Bangladesh were forced to close completely, leaving all of the previous workers unemployed in the pandemic. It is estimated that 36% of Bangladeshi garment workers lost their jobs as a direct result of the pandemic, whilst the remaining workers suffered on average a 7.5% decrease in wages.[18]

The use of the negative impacts of the pandemic on the Bangladeshi RMG industry as an opportunity for Western brands to make

13   Humayun Kabir, Myfanwy Maple, and Kim Usher, "The Impact of COVID-19 On Bangladeshi Readymade Garment (RMG) Workers," *Journal Of Public Health* 43 (1), 2020: 47-52, doi:10.1093/pubmed/fdaa126.
14   ActionAid Australia, *ActionAid Australia*.
15   Jakir Hossain, Afroza Akter, and Mostafiz Ahmed. "The Impact of COVID Pandemic on the Garment Workers in Bangladesh," The Strategic Partnership For Garment Supply Chain Transformation. Fair Wear Foundation, 2021, https://api.fairwear.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/The-impact-of-the-COVID-pandemic-on-garment-workers-with-a-specific-focus-on-women-workers.pdf.
16   Mark Anner, "Squeezing Workers' Rights In Global Supply Chains: Purchasing Practices In The Bangladesh Garment Export Sector In Comparative Perspective."
17   Mark Anner. "Squeezing Workers' Rights In Global Supply Chains: Purchasing Practices In The Bangladesh Garment Export Sector In Comparative Perspective."
18   ActionAid Australia, *ActionAid Australia*.

a greater profit during the pandemic emphasizes how the relationship between the Bangladeshi RMG industry and brands in the Global North fits the form of a BDCC. Despite producing the commodity, Bangladeshi manufacturers and suppliers have almost no organizational power within the GCC; they are at the demands of the brands placing their orders and their consumers. Whilst state labor organizations like the BGMEA and BKMEA are also actors in the BDCC, they are again under pressure from both the brands placing orders and from the manufacturers themselves. They need to try to find a balance between ensuring brands still place orders in Bangladesh, and regulating Bangladeshi factories and workers conditions; unfortunately, the former is usually prioritized over the latter. This is a similar approach shared with the Bangladeshi government, as whilst the state is also an actor in GCCs, it has enabled the economic and labor conditions where this kind of treatment of manufacturers by Western brands can occur. Both state and national organizational actors in Bangladesh are in weaker positions in the BDCC than the Western brands.[19]

"IN SOME CASES, CONTINUING TO TAKE ORDERS AND WORK UNDER NEW CONDITIONS WAS NOT ENOUGH FOR SOME MANUFACTURERS TO SUSTAIN THEMSELVES, AND MANY FACTORIES IN BANGLADESH WERE FORCED TO CLOSE COMPLETLY, LEAVING ALL OF THE PREVIOUS WORKERS UNEMPLOYED..."

This network of power dynamics and unequal exercising of power within the GCC provides the perfect conditions for Core-Periphery elements of dependency theory as described by Dos Santos to be demonstrated. The delayed payments, cancellations, and renegotiations of the price of goods and labor by the Western brands provide clear examples of exploitation of the Peripheral region by the Core through the unequal exercising and distribution of power, and the dependency Bangladesh manufacturers and the RMG industry have on the West for orders and income. As actors within the BDCC, they are forced to accept poorer, more exploitative conditions and the devaluation of their goods and labor

19   Mark Anner, "Squeezing Workers' Rights In Global Supply Chains: Purchasing Practices In The Bangladesh Garment Export Sector In Comparative Perspective."

to meet the demands of the Core region. This is driven by the risk of permanently losing their income and demand for their goods to other competing national industries, such as RMG industries in Cambodia and Vietnam, on top of the temporary financial losses due to the pandemic. They were forced to accept poorer conditions than what would have been and was possible before the pandemic to avoid even worse economic outcomes, and to help navigate the Bangladeshi RMG industry and the national economy through the pandemic.

Conclusions

In summary, the relationship between clothing brands in the Global North and their manufacturers and suppliers in Bangladesh can be categorized as a Buyer Driven Commodity Chain, which upholds and enables networks and power relations between actors, which makes it possible for Western brands to control the organizational power within the Global Commodity Chain, whilst the manufacturers and suppliers in Bangladesh's ready-made garment industry have little to no organizational control or influence within the GCC. This exploitation can be clearly mapped using Gereffi and Korzeniewicz's concept of Global Commodity Chains and Dos Santos' approach to Dependency theory, which both help illustrate the power relations and dynamics between different actors involved in the international networks between workers and manufacturers in Bangladesh, and the brands placing orders and consumer markets in the Global North, mainly in the US and the EU. GCCs provide a framework for this exploitation to occur within the international political economy, whilst Dependency theory is intertwined into the GCC, as it helps explain the different positions of power between actors in the GCC and how powerful actors can exploit weaker ones. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the pre-existing power imbalances between Western clothing brands and their suppliers in Bangladesh, as the economic circumstances of the pandemic combined with the power relations within the BDCC enabled the greater economic exploitation of manufacturers and their workers. This economic exploitation enabled Western brands to make greater profits during the pandemic. In this BDCC, the brands in the Global North are the more powerful actors located in Core regions, such as the US and the EU, and they are able to use their economic power and influence to impact the weaker actors in the Periphery (i.e., the manufacturers, suppliers, and workers in the Bangladeshi RMG industry), as they and their RMG industries are dependent on the orders and demand for goods created by these brands. Brands in the Global North took advantage of the immediate economic shocks and impacts of the pandemic to refuse to pay their suppliers for goods properly, and to push for lower prices on new orders, as they knew that manufacturers and suppliers in Bangladesh could not afford to refuse their orders, with the lower prices coming at the cost of wages and safe labor conditions for garment workers in factories. This allowed for a level of exploitation and exercising of power by the Western brands over manufacturers and suppliers in Bangladesh, which would have been much more difficult to enact pre-pandemic. This dependency on garment orders from the Global North enacts a brutal cycle in which manufacturers and suppliers in Bangladesh have very little power

or control over the commodity chain and their treatment by Western brands. It is almost impossible for them to break due to their economic dependency on these orders on an industrial and national level, which is exacerbated by the pressure of the high level of potential competition from other national RMG industries in other countries in the Global South. GCC frameworks alongside dependency theory can map and illustrate not only the economic connections between suppliers and manufacturers in the Global South and their customers and consumers in the Global North, but also the social and political connections and impacts. However, these two theories alone are not sufficient for fully understanding the causes and the continuation of the dependency cycle or for providing frameworks and solutions for countries trying to break away from it. They can only illustrate and help explain our current networks and systems; they need to be used in conjunction with other international economic, political, and developmental theories to expand their capabilities and reasoning.

The pandemic has demonstrated just how connected our world is and in doing so, has highlighted and aggravated the power imbalances and inequalities within our globalized production networks. It has made it clear that the current system and its exploitations cannot be allowed to continue. As the world continues to move towards the end of the coronavirus pandemic, many manufacturers, suppliers, and workers in the Global South alongside Bangladesh are now starting to reevaluate their positions within Global Commodity Chains and the international system, including their treatment by more powerful actors in the Global North. As the world begins to start recovering from the social and economic costs of the Coronavirus Pandemic, the push to return to "normal" begins. But after an event like this, can we ever go back to normal? And more importantly, should we? The drive and demand for a fairer and safer world is slowly emerging from some of the people who have suffered the most under the pandemic. However, only time will tell if the "new normal" in a post-pandemic world will create a fairer and more empowering world for people like Bangladesh's garment workers.

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pact-of-the-Covid-19-Pandemic-on-the-
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gladesh.pdf.

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The Near Non-Existent Protection of North Korean Female Defectors' Rights in China

Exploitation, Trafficking, and Repatriation

The purpose of this article is to address China's ongoing human rights violations vis-à-vis female North Korean defectors.

China's repatriation of female North Korean refugees, failure to implement adequate measures to combat sex trafficking in China, an illicit business targeting North Korean women in particular, and unwillingness to fulfil the North Korean sex trafficking victims' rights to protection, resettlement, and rehabilitation, is of grave international concern as it breaches multitudinous international human rights treaties, including the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture. This article asserts that Xi Jinping,

the President of China, is obliged, under international law, to cease its repatriation of North Korean defectors, adopt strengthened measures to crack down on sex trafficking in China, and ensure that North Korean victims of sex trafficking are granted equal protection, resettlement, and rehabilitation, as Chinese citizens.

I. The Neglected Plight of North Korean Women in China

In 2019, before North Korea enacted draconian border control amid increasing Covid-19 concerns, 83 percent of North Korean defectors were women..[1] Since 2002, female North Korean defectors have outnumbered male defectors—75 percent of defectors on average (2002-2019) are female. This includes the North Korean defectors in China that are later exposed and repatriated. Once repatriated, defectors undergo brutal state-administered punishments including interrogation, torture, starvation, incarceration, forced labor, sexual violence, physical assault, and even execution.[2] Instead of finding an end to their plight in China, the traumatized victims are forced to return to the place they fled, where they will once again be abused and mistreated by the North Korean government, contract diseases and sustain injuries as a result of brutal beatings or sexual violence, even risking starving to death or public execution.

"ONCE REPATRIATED, DEFECTORS UNDERGO STARVATION, INCARCERATION, FORCED LABOR, SEXUAL VIOLENCE, PHYSICAL ASSAULT, AND EVEN EXECUTION."

In a report published in 2019, Korea Future Initiative (KFI), a British non-governmental human rights organization, identified that "an estimated 60 percent of female North Korean refugees in China are trafficked into the sex trade,"[3] and of that concerning number "close to 50 percent are forced into prostitution, over 30 percent sold into forced marriage, and 15 percent pressed into cybersex."[4] The victims of sex trafficking, according to survivors' testimonies, suffer from sexual harassment, drug rape, penetrative rape, forced marriage, forced abortions, forced pregnancies, forced labor, and induced compliance through starvation, brutal beatings, verbal threats, or repatriation.[56] In the report, KFI identified that most victims are girls and women between the ages of 12 and 29 but stressed that some victims are

1   Ministry of Unification. "Policy on North Korean Defectors". *Government of South Korea*. 2022. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/.

2   Yoon, Lina. "China Restarts Forced Returns of Refugees to North Korea". *Human Rights Watch*. 2021. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/22/china-restarts-forced-returns-refugees-north-korea

3   Engstran, Erin, Flynn, Caitlin, and Harris, Meg. "Gender and Migration from North Korea". *Journal of Public and International Affairs.* 31st ed. 2020.

4   Ochab, Ewelina. "Trafficking of North Korean Women in China". *Forbes*. 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2019/07/01/trafficking-of-north-korean-women-in-china/?sh=4f4c60817af0.

5   Smith, Nicola. "Trafficking, forced abortions and brutal beatings: How China's push to deport defectors is hitting vulnerable North Korean women". *The Telegraph*. 2018. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/03/30/trafficking-forced-abortions-brutal-beatings-chinas-push-deport/.

6   Yoon, Heesoon. "North Korean Women and Girls Trafficked into China's Sex Trade". *Journal of Trafficking and Human Exploitation*. v.3, no.1. 2019. p.159-175.

even younger. In one tragic example, KFI mentioned the case of a nine-year-old North Korean girl coerced into sexual acts and raped on camera inside a Chinese cybersex den.[7] Song (first name undisclosed due to safety concerns), another North Korean survivor of sex trafficking in China, shared to KFI her shock at witnessing an underage North Korean girl unable to stand, "crawl[ing] around the room" after sex traffickers ripped her vagina and anus apart.[8]

The issues of repatriation and sex trafficking are inseparable; sex trafficking victims are forced to remain in China for an extended period of time, increasing defectors' risks of repatriation, while defectors' fear of repatriation fuels sex trafficking, as traffickers often threaten to expose defectors to the Chinese police if victims resist sexual enslavement.[9] Therefore, the international community urges Chinese President Xi Jinping to adopt a dual approach that ceases China's repatriation of exposed North Korean defectors (most of whom are women) and consolidates measures to crack down sex trafficking businesses operating on the exploitation of vulnerable North Korean women within China.

II. China's Long History of Systematic Exploitation of Women

One of the most persuasive explanations for the gender imbalance among North Korean refugees is the intersectional oppression of both patriarchal culture and poor economic conditions that women suffer in North Korea.[10] In North Korea, women are considered "objects,"[11] usable and dispensable. Girls and women, perceived as "subhuman," are forced into dangerous and strenuous manual labor (i.e., as coal miners or construction workers) and designated as "sexual items" that exist only for men's pleasure.[12] One female defector went so far as to state that "in North Korea, a woman's dream cannot be achieved without being raped or without selling her body."[13] To escape their bleak realities, many women choose to escape patriarchal North Korea – which explains the greater number of female defectors relative to male defectors. [14]

Sex trafficking of North Korean victims in China is rooted in

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7 Kim, Sungtak. "9-Year-Old North Korean Girl Sexually Enslaved by a Chinese Cybersex Company". *DCNewsJ*. 2019. https://dcnewsj.joins.com/article/23473548.

8 Smith, Nicola, Ben, Farmer. "Oppressed, enslaved and brutalised: The women trafficked from North Korea into China's sex trade". *The Telegraph*. 2019.

9 Kook, Kyunghee. "I Want to Be Trafficked so I Can Migrate! Cross-Border Movement of North Koreans into China through Brokerage and Smuggling Networks". *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. v.676, no.1. 2018. p.114-132.

10 Kim, Eunyoung, Yun, Minwoo, Von Denkowski, Cordula. "Violence Against North Korean Refugee Women: Doubly Victimized By Repatriation and Premigration Traumatic Experiences". *Violence Against Women*. v.0, no.0. 2021. p.1-24.

11 García, Ana. "Denouncing Human Trafficking in China: North Korean Women's Memoirs as Evidence". *State Crime Journal*. v.8, no.1. 2019. p.59-75.

12 Power, John. "Woman, 23, reveals how she trekked for two months across mountains and crocodile-infested river to flee North Korea after being forced to work for 15 hours a day down a coal mine for 50p a day". *DailyMail*. 2015. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3089313/North-Korean-refugee-forced-work-coal-reveals-journey.html.

13 Wright, Jennifer. "Why North Korea Is Hell For Women". *Harper's Bazaar*. 2018. https://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/politics/a21527948/life-north-korea-women/.

14 Haggard, Stephan, Noland, Marcus. "Gender in Tradition: The Case of North Korea". *World Development*. v.41. 2013. p.51-66.

China's "one-child policy," an official initiative enacted in the late 1970s limiting families to one child each in an effort to curb China's population growth.[15] This policy led to a vast number of forced abortions, and since sons were historically preferred over daughters, many more female children were aborted, leaving China with 30 million more men than women.[16][17] The resulting shortage of marriageable women in China has led Chinese men to resort to sex-trafficked brides – most of whom are North Korean defectors. Sex traffickers prefer North Korean defectors since most of them travel as individuals or in small groups, making them easier targets.[18] North Korean defectors are often identifiable through their peculiar clothing, visible malnourishment, and their inability to speak or understand Mandarin, rendering them even easier targets as traffickers can then employ coercion tactics such as offering the chance to escape to South Korea or threatening to report defectors to the Chinese police.[19]

"'AN ESTIMATED 60 PERCENT OF FEMALE NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA ARE TRAFFICKED INTO THE SEX TRADE...'"

The issue of gender imbalance among the marriageable population has been endemic in China's rural areas, and as a result, a significant number of female North Korean defectors are trafficked to be sold to rural Chinese men.[20] Many trafficked female defectors are forced to bear their husbands children. The escape route from China to other countries (particularly from China's rural regions) is both demanding and dangerous, and so many women choose not to leave China for the sake of their children.[21][22] The defectors remain imprisoned in China – trapped by both their location and children. This illustrates the critical need for the Chinese government to ramp up its measures to combat sex trafficking in action since rescuing victims after the trafficking has been completed is near impossible.

Threatening to expose the female North Korean defectors is the most potent coercion tactic employed by traffickers because the punishment that defectors face after repatriation for unauthorized border crossing is

15   Kim, Eunyoung, Yun, Minwoo, Von Denkowski, Cordula. "Violence Against North Korean Refugee Women: Doubly Victimized By Repatriation and Premigration Traumatic Experiences".

16   Fong, Mei. "How China's One-Child Policy Led To Forced Abortions, 30 Million Bachelors". *NPR*. 2016. https://www.npr.org/2016/02/01/465124337/how-chinas-one-child-policy-led-to-forced-abortions-30-million-bachelors.

17   Denyer, Simon, Gowen, Annie. "Too Many Men: In China and India, men outnumber women by 70 million. Both nations are belatedly trying to come to grips with the policies that created this male-heavy generation". *The Washington Post*. 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/too-many-men/.

18   Zaugg, Julie. "These North Korean defectors were sold into China as cybersex slaves. Then they escaped". *CNN*. 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/09/asia/north-korea-defectors-intl-hnk/index.html

19   Yoon, Heesoon. "North Korean Women and Girls Trafficked into China's Sex Trade."

20   Haggard, Stephan, Noland, Marcus. "Gender in Tradition: The Case of North Korea."

21   Yoon, Heesoon. "North Korean Women and Girls Trafficked into China's Sex Trade."

22   Kim, Eunyoung, Yun, Minwoo, Von Denkowski, Cordula. "Violence Against North Korean Refugee Women: Doubly Victimized By Repatriation and Premigration Traumatic Experiences."

"brutal, torturous, and even lethal."[23] Yeonmi Kim, a North Korean human rights activist, argues that it is "impossible" for North Koreans to cross the river that leads to China without a broker bribing the North Korean guards (due to the guards' "shoot-on-sight" order).[24] However, most of these brokers are actually sex traffickers possessing ulterior exploitative motives. Kim adds that this means that the "sole means for North Koreans to survive in China without being repatriated is being obedient to their brokers and being sold".[25]

III. China's Persisting Failure to Protect North Korean Women

China's oppressive policies towards female North Korean defectors comprise three parts: the classification of North Korean refugees as "illegal economic migrants", a reluctance to combat a burgeoning domestic sex trafficking business targeting North Koreans, and China's refusal to grant North Korean sex trafficking victims appropriate protection, rehabilitation, and resettlement.[26] Criminalizing the traumatized women and then returning them to North Korea, where most, if not all, of them are guaranteed to suffer severe persecution breaches a multitude of core international human rights laws designed to protect migrants and women.[27]

The Chinese government's justification for its repatriation of North Korean defectors is grounded in its 1986 Bilateral Border Protocol with North Korea—an agreement obliging China and North Korea to "prevent illegal border crossings".[28] In accordance with this protocol, the Chinese government repatriates North Koreans without considering the defectors' right to non-refoulement. This stands in violation of China's obligations under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, which states that "no Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion"[29], and its membership in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Executive Committee (UNHCR EXCOM), a United Nations committee aiming to promote refugee protection.[30][31] Additionally, China's justification that the defectors are eligible to be repatriated due to their illegal status breaches Article

23   Kim, Eunyoung, Yun, Minwoo, Von Denkowski, Cordula. "Violence Against North Korean Refugee Women: Doubly Victimized By Repatriation and Premigration Traumatic Experiences."
24   Kook, Kyunghee. "I Want to Be Trafficked so I Can Migrate! Cross-Border Movement of North Koreans into China through Brokerage and Smuggling Networks."
25   Kook, Kyunghee. "I Want to Be Trafficked so I Can Migrate! Cross-Border Movement of North Koreans into China through Brokerage and Smuggling Networks."
26   Yoon, Heesoon. "North Korean Women and Girls Trafficked into China's Sex Trade."
27   Quintana, T. "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea". *OHCHR*. 2021. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/168/67/PDF/G2116867.pdf?OpenElement.
28   Cohen, Roberta. "China's Repatriation of North Korean Refugees". *Brookings*. 2012. https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/chinas-repatriation-of-north-korean-refugees/.
29   OHCHR. "Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees". *United Nations.* 1951. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-relating-status refugees.
30   García, Ana. "Denouncing Human Trafficking in China: North Korean Women's Memoirs as Evidence". *State Crime Journal.* v.8, no.1. 2019. p.59-75
.31   Cohen, Roberta. "China's Repatriation of North Korean Refugees."

3 of United Nations Convention against Torture (UNCAT) that all those fleeing to another state (regardless of their refugee status) who are guaranteed to face mistreatment in the form of torture, sexual violence, or even execution in their state of origin have a claim for refugee status.[32] As such, the Chinese government is obligated to grant all North Korean defectors refugee status or give them safe passage to their final destinations.

> **"THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT WAS ESTABLISHED AS A RESULT OF THE BRUTALITIES OF WWII AND THE HOLOCAUST AND IS GROUNDED IN THE NEAR-UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT THAT ALL STATES ARE OBLIGED TO 'NEVER AGAIN' RETURN REFUGEES TO THEIR STATES OF ORIGIN WHERE THEIR LIVES ARE AT RISK, AS MOST, IF NOT ALL, COUNTRIES DID DURING THE HOLOCAUST."**

The repatriation of sex-trafficked North Korean defectors also contradicts China's ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1980 as well as its own national laws concerning human trafficking. Article 3, Sub-clause 1 of China's National Action Plan against Human Trafficking (NAP), states that the Chinese government plans to "protect the lawful rights and interests of trafficked victims, protect the privacy of trafficked victims, and prevent them from secondary harm".[33] Since the repatriation of North Korean sex trafficking victims is contingent on the exposure of their identities and causes victims further harm, it is an explicit violation of Article 3 of the NAP. Furthermore, as per Article 6 of CEDAW, China is obligated to "take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women".[34] This objective is also found in Article 6, Sub-clause 1 of China's NAP, stating that China aims to "effectively prevent

32   OHCHR. "United Nations Convention against Torture". *United Nations.* 1984. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-against-torture-and-other-cruel-inhuman-or-degrading.

33   Office of the State Council. "China's Action Plan Against Human Trafficking (2021-2030) Released". *Teller Report.* 2021. https://www.tellerreport.com/news/2021-05-01-percent22china-s-action-plan-against-human-trafficking-percent282021-2030percent29percent22-released.HyfwsUdqP_.html.

34   OHCHR. "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women". *United Nations.* 1979. https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm.

and severely crackdown on the crime of transnational and cross-border human trafficking and strengthen assistance to victims of transnational and cross-border trafficking".[35] The Chinese government's reluctance to crack down on the North Korean victims-centered sex trafficking business in China and its refusal to grant North Korean victims of sex trafficking equal protection as Chinese victims not only goes against the human rights articulated in CEDAW, but China's own domestic law regarding sex trafficking victims as well.

IV. Recommendations to the Chinese Government

In order to ensure that the Chinese Government fulfills female North Korean defectors' rights as per the Refugee Convention, UNCAT, and CEDAW, the international community proposes two pressing recommendations to President Xi Jinping:

1. Urges the Chinese Government to stop the forcible repatriation of North Korean defectors, most of whom are women.

Terminate the 1986 Border Protocol. The designation of North Korean defectors as "illegal economic migrants," codified in the joint China-North Korea agreement, breaches the principle of non-refoulement articulated in Article 33 of the UN Refugee Convention (an indispensable international agreement that China ratified in 1982) and contradicts China's position as an EXCOM member of the UNHCR (a role that China agreed to in 1985).

Grant all North Korean defectors refugee status in accordance with the definition of a refugee articulated in Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention as a person possessing a "well-founded fear" of being persecuted in their state of origin.[36] Since all North Korean defectors risk maltreatment, torture, or even execution in North Korea as punishment for "illegal border crossing," China is obligated, under Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and Article 3 of UNCAT, to designate all those fleeing North Korea as refugees and thus, as eligible for asylum.

Give the UNHCR transparent and unrestricted access to all detained North Korean defectors and refrain from giving such access to Chinese authorities. Under Article 35 of the Refugee Convention, the Chinese Government is obligated "to undertake to cooperate with the UNHCR" as a means to authorize UNHCR to exercise its mandate to protect refugees.

Transpose the international legal obligation of non-refoulement into China's domestic legal immigration structures. This includes the establishment of domestic protection mechanisms aiming to support North Korean defectors in the forms of rescue, rehabilitation, and

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35 Office of the State Council. "China's Action Plan Against Human Trafficking (2021-2030) Released.".
36 OHCHR. "Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees". *United Nations.* 1951. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-relating-status-refugees.

resettlement programmes. Resettlement, depending on the preferences of the defectors, could either consist of a guided integration into China or ensuring defectors' safe arrival at their final destinations.

2. Calls on President Xi Jinping's administration to escalate crackdown operations on the illicit North Korean-centered sex trafficking business in China whilst ensuring that the rescue, rehabilitation, and resettlement of victims are in accordance with international human rights norms, the non-refoulement norm in particular.

Provide sufficient funding to regional governments to implement, in an effective manner, China's 2021-2030 National Action Plan against Human Trafficking (NAP) and ensure that the measures articulated in the plan are extended to North Korean victims of sex trafficking. The international community reminds President Xi Jinping that, per CEDAW's mandate, China is obligated to protect all victims of sex trafficking, including those from North Korea.

Increase governmental efforts to suppress and crack down on illicit North Korean victims-dominated sex trafficking operations in accordance with Article 6 of CEDAW. It is critical to note that the escalated crackdowns on these sex trafficking operations must occur alongside the guarantee of the non-refoulement of exposed victims.

"...REPATRIATION AND SEX TRAFFICKING... COMPOUND THE PLIGHTS OF THE DEFECTORS..."

Ensure that the North Korean victims of sex trafficking in China are provided with appropriate protection, rehabilitation, and resettlement, in accordance with China's obligations to the Refugee Convention, UNCAT, and CEDAW. Such a guarantee of the protection of the North Korean defectors' rights necessitates China to transpose the norms of non-refoulement and non-discrimination of women, regardless of their state of origin, into domestic legal documents and practices.

V. Looking Forward

The principle of non-refoulement was established as a result of the brutalities of WWII and the Holocaust and is grounded in the near-universal agreement that all states are obliged to "never again"[37] return refugees to their states of origin where their lives are at risk, as most, if not all, countries did during the Holocaust. China is not an exception to this

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37 Guterres, António. "'Never Again' Means Constant Retelling of Holocaust Story, Secretary-General Stresses at Exhibition Opening, Citing Rising Antisemitism, Other Hatreds". *United Nations.* 2020. https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sgsm19943.doc.htm.

international obligation. In addressing the human rights of female North Korean refugees in China, it is critical to examine both repatriation and sex trafficking because these issues intersect to compound the plights of the defectors. It is also critical that the Chinese government ceases its forced repatriation of North Korean defectors; consolidates its crackdowns on North Korean victims-centered sex trafficking operations in China; and provides appropriate protections, rehabilitation, and resettlement to North Korean victims of sex trafficking at the same time in order to fulfill China's obligations to the UN Refugee Convention , UNCAT and CEDAW. The international community calls on President Xi Jinping to ensure China's compliance with the aforementioned international conventions' core principles of non-refoulement and freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment– the "cornerstone of asylum and international refugee law" – and the protection of all women regardless of their state of origin.[38]

38   UNHCR. "UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement". *United Nations.* 1997. https://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html; OHCHR. "United Nations Convention against Torture;" UNWomen. "Factsheet: CEDAW and Women's Migration in Asia". *United Nations.* 2012. https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2012/9/factsheet-cedaw-and-womens-migration-in-asia.

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M.A. Jinnah and the Muslim Homeland

Pakistan as a Political Idea

T he Indian Independence Movement was marked by the creation of not one, but two independent states.

India and Pakistan were established out of the independence of what was perceived to be a Hindu and a Muslim nation, a separation that was spearheaded principally by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Father of what was soon to become Pakistan. This paper argues that the political evolution of M.A. Jinnah from a secular advocate of Indian unity to the leader of the Pakistan Movement was a reflection of the progress of domestic politics to meet the needs of a marginalized, minority Muslim community within British India. This was not a religious, but rather a political transformation with religious underpinnings as a response to divisions substantiated by the Muslims, the Indian National Congress, and the British Raj. The Muslims of India had formed an "imagined community," as identified by Benedict Anderson, on the basis of a shared marginalization by what they viewed as "Hindustan," a separate nation that no longer included them. Due to the divide from the Indian National Congress that was propagated by the policies of the divisive British Raj, the All-India Muslim League sought the creation of a separate Pakistan to ensure that the political rights and freedoms of the Muslim community were protected. This political movement was further driven by religious Islamic figures such as Muhammad Iqbal,

who emphasized the role of religious differences, thereby involving religion in a separatist movement that was primarily based on political motivations.

Pakistan as an "Imagined Community"

The creation of the mere idea of "Pakistan" was the process of a national consciousness emerging out of a pre-existing state. Pakistan can be viewed as one of Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities," which he uses as a definition for a nation. For Anderson, a nation is an imagined community that is both limited and sovereign by nature.[1] This definition can be broken down into smaller fragments, each of which connects back to the concept of "Pakistan."

Firstly, a nation is imagined because no members of any nation will ever know most of their fellow nationals and must therefore imagine their bond without coming face to face with one another.[2] Pakistan was imagined in such a way. Pakistan was conceptualized to be the homeland for the Muslims of British India, who were spread throughout the country. There were Muslim majority provinces, like Sind, Northwest Frontier Provinces, Punjab, and Bengal, as well as minority provinces in the central regions.[3] Pakistan was to be created out of the majority provinces, which were spread to the west, east, and north of British India, separated by the central regions. Such a geographical divide would mean that most "Pakistanis" would never come into contact with one another, but still imagined a common sense of nationhood.

"PAKISTAN WAS CREATED TO SECURE THE RIGHTS OF THE MINORITY MUSLIMS, THEREBY UPHOLDING THE VALUES OF FREEDOM IN A SHARED SENSE OF NATIONHOOD."

A nation is imagined to be limited because it is to have borders, beyond which it cannot claim authority over, as those territories comprise a different nation.[4] In this sense, Pakistan was necessarily created to be limited, as its founders designed it to comprise only of the provinces in which Muslims represented the majority of the population, whereas the provinces beyond them were to become India, as dictated by the Mountbatten Plan.

The nation is imagined to be sovereign because it upholds the liberty-based ideals of the Enlightenment.[5] The idea of Pakistan was created to uphold such ideals, as the Muslim community of India felt marginalized and undermined by the Hindu majority of the country,

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1 Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* Revised edition. London New York: Verso, 2016.
2 Ibid
3 Roy, Haimanti. *The Partition of India.* First edition. Oxford India Short Introductions. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 2018.
4 Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.*
5 Ibid

especially as Congress pursued policies that the Muslim League considered to be exclusively Hindu.[6] Pakistan was created to secure the rights of the minority Muslims, thereby upholding the values of freedom in a shared sense of nationhood.

Lastly, a nation is imagined as a community because it is thought of as a horizontal brotherhood based on the bonds of kinship.[7] With Pakistan, this becomes slightly complex. The Muslims of India did not have a shared class, language, or ethnic background.[8] Some spoke Bengali, some Punjabi, some Urdu. As such, their own sense of kinship arose from an allegiance to Islam, leading for religion to become the basis of the community that became Pakistan. However, Anderson does not go far enough in this definition. Although religion played a role, a strong sense of nationalism among the Muslims was not created until there also existed a sense of shared identity as a result of the political marginalization shared by the Muslims that would eventually form Pakistan.

British Divide and Rule

Hindu-Muslim conflict in India far outdated the Independence Movement and the Pakistan Movement, yet it wasn't until after the First World War that the idea of a separate Muslim state truly came into prominence. This communal divide must be tied back to the role played by the British in the process. During the close of World War I, Hindus and Muslims were brought together by a shared disdain for the British Raj. The Muslims felt slighted by Britain, which had chosen to ally itself against Germany, thereby becoming the enemy of the Ottoman Empire.[9] For Muslims, this was a gross betrayal by the British, as the Ottoman Empire was the seat of the Muslim Caliphate, the religious centre of Islam.[10] This united Hindus and Muslims, threatening the stability of British rule in India. The British knew that the key to retaining their rule was to keep the two communities at odds with each other.[11] This is commonly referred to as the British policy of "divide-and-rule."[12] The British primarily created this division by pitting the political interests of Hindus and Muslims against one another, such as through the Government of India Act 1935. The Act reserved seats for Muslims, which formed the minority community, that were a greater fraction of the legislature than the fraction of the Muslim population in the country, effectively creating a consistent political rivalry between the Hindus and Muslims.[13]

This competition created the division between Hindus and Muslims, shaping the political arena into which Jinnah entered. As

6   Guha, Ramachandra, ed. Makers of Modern India. Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011.
7   Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.*
8   Roy, Haimanti. *The Partition of India.*
9   Roberts, Moss. "Jaswant Singh. Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence. (Oxford, 2010)." *Critical Asian Studies* 43, no. 4 (December 2011): 653–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2011.623528.
10   Ibid
11   Ibid
12   Ibid
13   Ibid

a consequence of British electoral policy following the 1935 Act, a divergence between Hindus and Muslims was created that could never be bridged. In the international sphere, this allowed British hegemony in India to continue, allowing for the continued existence of the last remnants of the British Empire. However, domestically, this division set the stage for Jinnah's politics. His demand for a separate Pakistan was not one based on religious differences. Rather, due to the political games played by the British to ensure the longevity of their rule in India, Jinnah and the Muslim League could no longer trust Congress— which they deemed to be a Hindu party—to protect the interests of the Muslim community, making the creation of Pakistan a political move to ensure Muslim security.

Response to the Indian National Congress

Jinnah's entry into Indian politics was initially entirely secular, going as far to oppose the involvement of religion in politics. He emphasized the need for a united India, being referred to as the "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity," making his call for a separate Muslim Pakistan in Lahore in 1940 seemingly shocking.[14] However, this demand seems less surprising when looked through a political lens rather than a religious one. His demand for Pakistan was more a response to the growing marginalization of Muslims in the political sphere than it was a desire for religious separation.

Jinnah initially sought to create a united India post-independence, and condemned calls for separation on religious grounds. In 1916, he spearheaded the Lucknow Pact with both Congress and the Muslim League to give Muslims separate electorates in all provincial legislatures, as well as special weighting in provinces in which they were minorities, in return for which the Muslims promised to support Congress in the Independence Movement.[15] This agreement demonstrated Jinnah's motivations. Rather than seeking separation due to religious differences, Jinnah was focused on mitigating such differences by creating parity between Hindus and Muslims.

The beginning of the end for Hindu-Muslim unity, however, was the 1928 Nehru Report published by Motilal Nehru. This report laid out a scheme to remove the policy of reserving seats for Muslims in the central legislatures, igniting fears among the Muslims that Congress was trying to establish a "Hindu Raj."[16] Even at this point, Jinnah was willing to compromise with Congress, agreeing to give up separate electorates for Muslims if they could be guaranteed reservation of one-third of the legislative seats for Muslims.[17] Jinnah claimed to be making this compromise "not…as a Musulman but as an Indian," further demonstrating his focus on politics rather than religion.[18] Without a common consensus between the two parties, Jinnah formally "parted ways" with Congress, portraying it as a Hindu party, all the

14   Guha, Ramachandra, ed. Makers of Modern India.
15   Ibid
16   Metcalf, Barbara Daly, and Thomas R. Metcalf. *A Concise History of Modern India.* 3. ed. Cambridge Concise Histories. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012.
17   Ibid
18   Singh, Jaswant. Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence. New Delhi: Rupa, 2012.

"HIS DEMAND FOR A SEPARATE PAKISTAN WAS NOT ONE BASED ON RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES. RATHER, DUE TO THE POLITICAL GAMES PLAYED BY THE BRITISH TO ENSURE THE LONGEVITY OF THEIR RULE IN INDIA, JINNAH AND THE MULSIM LEAGUE COULD NO LONGER TRUST CONGRESS - WHICH THEY DEEMED TO BE A HINDU PARTY - TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY, MAKING THE CREATION OF PAKISTAN A POLITICAL MOVE TO ENSURE MUSLIM SECURITY."

while presenting the Muslim League as the only true representative of Muslim interests, with him as the 'sole spokesman' for Indian Muslims.[19]

While this may appear to be religiously grounded, Jinnah's actions were only a response to the political atmosphere created by the rivalry between Congress and the Muslim League. After the 1937 elections, where Congress won a majority of the seats and the Muslim League received only a fraction of the Muslim votes, even in Muslim majority provinces, Jinnah used Congress's subsequent undermining of the Muslim population to frame his political moves. By portraying Congress as a Hindu party that was ignoring the voice of the Muslims in the provinces where they were minorities, while condemning Muslims still affiliated with Congress, he appealed to the growing sense of nationhood among Muslims to respond to the political decline of the Muslim League. Due to political relegation, the Muslims began seeing themselves as a nation of their own right, and to further his agenda to seek parity for Muslims, Jinnah used this nationalism to his advantage to frame the conflict between Hindus and Muslims as an international one rather than an intercommunal one.[20] By the time of the 1940 Lahore Resolution, in which he established his "Two-Nations Theory" claiming that Indian Muslims were a nation in their own right, the dichotomy created between a "Hindu" Congress and the Muslim League had been firmly established, leaving the only way to ensure true parity between the two sides as being the creation of a sovereign state in which Muslims were the majority.

The Role of Muhammad Iqbal

Jinnah's abandoning of his secular stance was also a response to the creation of a growing sense of Islamic identity among a faction of the Muslim League under the influence of Muhammad Iqbal. Jinnah had been opposed to mixing religion and politics until as late as 1937, and his apparent transformation is as much a reaction to the changing political tensions in India as it is a consequence of the influence of Muhammad Iqbal. Between 23 May 1936 and 10 November 1937, Iqbal wrote a series of letters to Jinnah regarding his view for a Muslim homeland post-independence.[21] This influence, as well as the results of the 1937 provincial elections, caused Jinnah to take up a religious foundation for his political actions. Iqbal had been a strong advocate for Pan-Islamism as the political goal for Muslims, claiming that unity between Hindus and Muslims could not take place due to their religious differences, as he claimed that religion was the foundation of nationhood.[22] As such, unlike Jinnah, he argued from the beginning that religion needed to be the foundation of relations between the majority Hindus and minority Muslims.

After Jinnah failed to receive support from Muslims for the

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19   Metcalf, Barbara Daly, and Thomas R. Metcalf. *A Concise History of Modern India.*
20   Jinnah, Muhammad Ali. "Article for London Journal Time and Tide, 'The Constitutional Maladies of India', January 1940." *In Makers of Modern India,* edited by Ramachandra Guha, 2013.
21   Datta, V. N. "Iqbal, Jinnah and India's Partition." *Economic and Political Weekly* 38, no. 16 (2003): 1611–12. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4413465.
22   Ibid

1937 elections, he turned to Iqbal, who convinced him to use Islam and religious marginalization as the basis for his political goals.[23] Jinnah's communication with Iqbal has been documented in a series of letters written by Iqbal to Jinnah. These letters demonstrate the extent to which Iqbal's religious ideology influenced Jinnah's political actions. In a letter dated June 25th, 1936, Iqbal claimed that it was necessary for all matters related to the Muslim minority community to be made in collaboration with the Muslim League, which alone represented the interests of Indian Muslims.[24] This was Jinnah's introduction to the idea of their being a Hindu nation and a Muslim nation. Iqbal's phrasing indicated an image of a Muslim minority subject to the tyranny of a Hindu majority, thereby posing a stark contrast to the image of a united, singular Indian entity. Until this stage, the Muslim League, under Jinnah's leadership, had sought to work within the context of a greater India, of which they were a part. However, by claiming that Indian political parties and their interests no longer matched the will of the Muslims, Iqbal established a partisan relationship between the Hindus and Muslims. While the division between the two groups had existed on a social level, this is the mark of clearly delineating that Hindu politics and Muslim politics were no longer the same. Even the Congress's attempts at limiting the franchise had been tactically posited as solely a political move, looking at Hindus and Muslims as two communities within the larger Indian nation. Iqbal's integration of religion and politics affirmed the existence of two separate nations, which he established on the basis of religious differences. By May 28th

"HE THEREFORE HAD TO ADAPT TO THIS NEW IMAGE IN ORDER TO KEEP THIS POLITICAL POWER, LEST HE LOSE THEIR FAITH IN HIM ONE AGAIN AS HAD HAPPENED IN 1937..."

1937, he was writing to Jinnah to describe the political fate of the Indian Muslim and the necessity of the Law of Islam, which was not possible in a Hindu country, thereby necessitating a free Muslim state.[25] He referred to "Muslim India" as its own separate entity, and claimed that "a political organisation which gives no promise of improving the lot of the average Muslim cannot attract our masses."[26] Here, one can begin to see what shaped Jinnah's ideology. While still adamant on there being two different nations existing in India, Iqbal's words make it clear that to have any sway over the Muslims in India, Jinnah would have to play to their religious aspirations. As such, even Iqbal, a religious Muslim

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23   Datta, V. N. "Iqbal, Jinnah and India's Partition."
24   Guha, Ramachandra, ed. Makers of Modern India.
25   Ashraf, Sh. Muhammad, ed. *Iqbal's Letters to Mr. Jinnah.* Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1956.
Chatterji, Joya. *The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967.* Cambridge Studies in Indian History and Society 15. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
26   Ibid

thinker, put religion as a subsidiary to politics, and insisted that religion had to play a role in Jinnah and the Indian Muslims' political aims. Religion was therefore made out to be a tool, a means to an end rather than the end itself. Iqbal propagated this belief onto Jinnah, shaping his political ideology in the face of a Muslim national awakening.

It is important to note that Jinnah's first mention of the idea of a separate state for Muslims didn't occur until 1940, after a long correspondence with Iqbal, who had died in 1938. In an article in 1940, Jinnah claimed that the British offer for Dominion Status was not enough, as the heterogeneity of nations within India prevented it from coming together as one unitary state.[27] Since India consisted of a majority and minority nation, forcing them to remain united would only result in a rule of the majority nation, the Hindus, whereas the Muslims as the minority nation would be further marginalized.[28] This speaks to the role of religion at this time. The separation of religious identities had established distinct political groups in India: a majority Hindu population and a minority Muslim population. As such, religion was irrevocably integrated into the political climate. At a time when Indian nationalism was at the forefront of discourse, in order to ensure political parity, the minority population would also have to speak the language of nationalism. However, in order to rise from being minorities, separation was the only means available, as they could not change the fact that there were more Hindus in India than Muslims. The only option was to no longer remain in India. Since their political status as minorities were identifiable by their religious identities, their nationalistic aspirations also had to be defined by religion.

"THE PERSONA OF THE RELIGIOUS MESSIAH WHO DELIVERED THE MUSLIMS TO THEIR NEW HOMELAND WAS MERELY A RESPONSE TO THE POLITICAL DESPERATION OF INDIAN MUSLIMS AND AN EMBODIMENT OF IQBAL'S STANCE THAT RELIGION WAS A NECCESSARY ADDITION TO THE POLITICS OF INDIA..."

Even in 1937, Jinnah was willing to work with Congress in order to preserve an India of Hindu-Muslim unity, and was even prepared to accept joint electorates if the Congress allowed Muslims to have a one-third share in the Central Legislature.[29] However, Congress denied even this concession, leaving Jinnah with no choice but to accept Iqbal's claims that there indeed was a separate Muslim nation contained

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27   Jinnah, Muhammad Ali. "Article for London Journal Time and Tide, 'The Constitutional Maladies of India', January 1940."

28   Ibid

29   Javed, Ajeet. Secular and Nationalist Jinnah. 1st ed. New Delhi: Kitab Pub. House, 1997.

within India, and that the only option for any degree of political power would be secession.[30] Due to Congress's constant humiliation of him, Jinnah adopted the ideology that would see the minority population in India receive parity, thereby abandoning his political secularism and integrating religion into politics.

Having once been as distanced from Islamic thought as possible, Jinnah then found himself at the forefront of the Pakistan movement, being named Quaid-i-Azam, or "The Great Leader" by the Muslims of India.[31] He therefore had to adapt to this new image in order to keep this political power, lest he lose their faith in him once again as had happened in 1937; as such, he was embodying Iqbal's contention that only a religious leader could awaken the nationalistic sentiments among the minority Muslims. He began wearing ethnic clothes, learning Urdu, and attending mosques, all to preserve an image as the Quaid-i-Azam, the leader who would see independence for India's Muslims.[32] Even after Partition, standing before the people of the new Pakistan as its Governor General, Jinnah stated, "I still consider myself to be an Indian."[33] The persona of the religious messiah who delivered the Muslims to their new homeland was merely a response to the political desperation of Indian Muslims, and an embodiment of Iqbal's stance that religion was a necessary addition to the politics of India as they were at the time.

The Aftermath of Partition: 1947 to Today

The effects of the partition were to be felt in the new states of India and Pakistan for decades to come, and these effects continue to shape international politics today. In the immediate aftermath of the Partition, mass violence and exodus broke out in both countries. The Partition had come about in a haphazard fashion. After Lord Mountbatten, then Viceroy of British India, announced in June that the two countries would be created in August 1947, Cyril Radcliffe, a British judge who had never set foot on the subcontinent before, was given all of forty days to determine the new boundaries between the two states.[34] The areas deemed to have a majority Muslim population were declared to be West Pakistan and East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh), separated in the middle by a Hindu-majority India. While on paper, as Radcliffe surely thought, this may seem like a suitable compromise, someone who had never set foot in the country could not fully capture the gravity of its implications. Whereas the religious majorities in the areas determined which country they would belong to, there remained minorities in both India and Pakistan. Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan, as well as Muslims in India, awoke on 17 August 1947 to discover that they were on the wrong side of the borders, and were now minorities in their own homes.

Due to the fact that the Partition was the result of primarily

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30   Ibid
31   Ibid
32   Ibid
33   Ibid
34   Dalrymple, William. 'The Mutual Genocide of Indian Partition'. *The New Yorker*, 22 June 2015. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/the-great-divide-books-dalrymple.

political goals, combined with the religious fervour that underpinned their motivations, the relations between the majorities and minorities in the new India and Pakistan were fraught with danger. On both sides of the border, those who found themselves in the wrong country knew that they would be relegated to a political minority. For the Muslims left in India, they knew exactly what this entailed, having been subject to the very political marginalization that had resulted in their nationalistic awakening, such as the restriction of the franchise. On the other hand, the Hindus who found themselves in Pakistan had witnessed the other side of this experience, and were fearful of finding out what minority status would look like. These tensions erupted in mass violence. Riots broke out across both countries, but particularly in the Punjab and Bengal regions on both sides of the border, as those were the territories where the borders were drawn.[35] In both these areas, large numbers of refugees began crossing the border, fearing the violence and persecution that they would be subject to if they stayed, and hoping to get to the "correct" country. Trains filled with refugees on a mass exodus, leaving behind their lives in order to save themselves.[36] However, the nationalistic feelings that had risen in both countries led to tremendous violence. Riots broke out across the countries, and even the trains carrying refugees were attacked.[37] Trains arrived in railway stations filled only with corpses of those seeking to escape, as the political situation between the two countries became strongly bipartisan, even more so before the Partition: Hindus and Sikhs on one side, and Muslims on the other. Those who remained experienced daily discrimination and harassment, being relegated to second-class citizens.[38] The number of deaths in the aftermath of the Partition is still undetermined today, with between one and two million estimated to have died by 1948 alone.[39]

Beyond just the carnage, the nationalistic divide between the two countries as a result of the Partition exist to this day. One of the primary areas of contention is the region of Jammu and Kashmir, which had been split between India and Pakistan by UN intervention in 1949 through the Karachi Agreement after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48.[40] However, this "agreement" did not do much to resolve tensions. That is because the sense of nationalism that had been aroused by the political tension in the region continued to exist, and each side continued to covet Jammu and Kashmir in its entirety. This situation was further complicated by the nuclear armament of both countries. While nuclear deterrence would have theoretically worked out to prevent both sides from engaging in nuclear warfare due to the promise of mutually

35   Kaur, Navdip. 'Violence and Migration: A Study of Killing in the Trains During the Partition of Punjab in 1947'. *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 72* (2011): 947–854. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44146786.
36   Ibid
37   Ibid
38   Chatterji, Joya. The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967. Cambridge Studies in Indian History and Society 15. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
39   Dalrymple, William. 'The Mutual Genocide of Indian Partition'.
40   Suzuki, Akisato. 'The Nationalist Interpretation of Nuclear Deterrence: Evidence from the Kargil War'. *International Politics* 56, no. 1 (February 2019): 70–86. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0117-x.

assured destruction, the blinding effects of nationalistic bias prevented this rationality from wining out.[41] Both sides greatly overestimated their own strength, leading to the 1999 Kargil War, marking the first time in history that nuclear-armed states engaged in open warfare with one another.[42] This was no longer about religion anymore, but solely regional politics. The impacts of the political nature of Pakistan, which had used religion as a catalyst to separate a once united country into separate political entities, continued to be felt decades after the Partition, and shapes the relations between India and Pakistan even today.

India, Pakistan, and the International Community

The emergence of a political nationhood of Indian Muslims based on religious identity had several international parallels, the most prominent of which is exemplified by the Arab-Zionist tensions in Palestine at the same time, leading to the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states months later in November 1947.[43] Just like India and Pakistan, the idea of a Jewish state was proposed as a way to establish peace between the majority Arab and minority Jewish population as early as 1937 by the British government.[44] Partition as such was a tool of imperial dominance, as a final way of casting influence of the colonies and mandates that the imperial powers were being made to give up.[45]

> "...LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES BEGAN CROSSING THE BORDER, FEARING THE VIOLENCE AND PERSECUTION THAT THEY WOULD BE SUBJECT TO IF THEY STAYED AND HOPING TO GET TO THE 'CORRECT' COUNTRY."

The partition of Palestine was not a new conversation in the 1940s. The initial plans for partition arose from the Balfour Declaration in 1917, where British officials promised to establish a "Jewish national home," similar to the conception of a Muslim homeland, in Palestine, in order to receive Zionist support for their efforts in World War I.[46] While the official partition never happened, political relegation was very much active in Palestine. The main manifestation of this marginalization was regarding land disputes. Large numbers of land sales, often coerced, led to mass dispossession of Arab land by Zionists.[47] Laws were made so that the Jews, representing only about 10% of the overall population, would receive the same number of seats in government as the Arab

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41   Suzuki, Akisato. 'The Nationalist Interpretation of Nuclear Deterrence: Evidence from the Kargil War'.
42   Ibid
43   Dubnov, Arie, and Laura Robson, eds. "Introduction." In *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism.* Stanford University Press, 2019. https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781503607682/html.
44   Ibid
45   Ibid
46   Ibid
47   Ibid

majority.[48] After riots by Arabs and another partition plan by the Peel Commission in 1936, Britain handed over the issue of Palestine to the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which presented a majority proposal recommending the partition of Palestine.

The parallels in events and chronology between India and Palestine are remarkable. The idea of separate nationalities in India was propagated by the British desire to maintain control over India, which it did temporarily maintain. This was then reflected in British actions in Palestine, as it was the British commission that pushed for partition in Palestine. The UN General Assembly vote for partitioning Palestine took place in November 1947, merely a few months after the India-Pakistan Partition.[49] In those few months, both countries had seen extreme violence through riots and pillaging, a mass refugee crisis, and an overall state of political stability. As such, they were in the best position to make an informed vote in the General Assembly, being the only two countries to vote against the partition of Palestine. Nonetheless, partition still happened, leading to a series of conflicts in the region that would shape Middle Eastern politics in the future.

This situation also reinforces the argument that nationalism is in large part shaped by politics, which often trumps religious ties. Muslim Arabs, while sympathizing with their Muslim counterparts in India, were concerned by the idea of a Muslim sovereign Pakistan due to the implications it would have on the political atmosphere of their own region, as it would set a precedent that would negatively impact their stance against creating a sovereign state for minority Palestinian Jews.[50] In fact, Zionists actually attempted to use the Pakistan campaign as leverage for their own efforts to demand a Jewish state, claiming that the minority position of Muslims in British India paralleled their own status in Palestine.[51] As such, Muslim Arabs vehemently hoped that Pakistan would not be created, so as to not further bolster Jewish demands for their own state, as that would take territory away from the Arabs. This demonstrates that politics superseded religion when it came to partition, as it was Muslims hoping that Muslims would be held back and kept in their minority status, all so that they themselves would lose out politically in their own conflicts.

Ultimately, paralleling the aftermath of partition in India and Pakistan, mass violence broke out in the new states of Palestine and Israel immediately after their creation. The violence culminated in the 1948 War, known as al-nakba (the disaster) to Palestinians and the War of Independence to Israelis.[52] This eventually grew into the larger First Arab-Israeli War that lasted until 1949, pitting states such as Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, and Iraq alongside Palestine, against Israel. After much violence, the war ended in Israeli victory, with Israel retaining its territory as had been determined by the United Nations, but also

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48   Ibid
49   Ibid
50   Ibid
51   Ibid
52   Morris, Benny. *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War.* New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 2008.

taking over Jaffa, Western Galilee, and the Jerusalem Corridor.[53] This created tensions that exist even today. Palestine essentially ceased to exist as a territorially grounded nation, with the mandatory Palestine being divided into Israel, Egyptian-occupied Gaza, and Jordanian-occupied West Bank.[54] The conflicts over these territories and the regaining of Palestinian territory has shaped Middle Eastern relations since then, as both Gaza and the West Bank has been determined to belong to Palestine by the UN partition in 1947 yet are both under Israeli command at present. In parallel to India-Pakistan relations over disputed territory such as Jammu and Kashmir, both Israel and Palestine lay claim to the territories, and the unclear status over them is part of the source of the conflict between the two entities.

The discourse in present day is no longer grounded in religious terms. Even in the time of the initial partition, Arabs opposed the creation of Israel not because of religious divergence, but because they didn't want to lose territory to the Zionists. Similarly, the discourse regarding the disputed territories now is based more on nationalistic identity and entitlement to territory, rather than any religious rivalries. This is very much the same regarding India-Pakistan tensions, as the sense of nationhood was grounded primarily on political terms during the Partition, and since then, religious enmity is no longer a large factor contributing to the tensions. India and Pakistan were the first in a series of partitions enacted by Western imperial powers in the course of decolonization, and the consequences of this partition were echoed in other cases as well. As seen with the Israel-Palestine partition as well, both the lead-up and aftermath of the partitions, even if intermixed with religion, were primarily of a political nature, with disputes being grounded in nationalism, territory, and equal recognition.

Conclusion

The partition of India and the creation of Pakistan was the culmination of a nationalist movement driven by a shared sense of identity among Indian Muslims on the basis of political marginalization. While there were religious connotations to the movement, this nationalism was ultimately a product of both domestic politics between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress, as well as external manipulation by the British Raj, who sought to retain their rule in India. Although the defining feature of what eventually became Pakistan was a push for a Muslim homeland, its foundations were principally political in nature. The Muslims of India were divided by their culture and language and did not have much in common beyond a shared religion. The factor that united them, however, was a shared experience of discrimination and alienation from the political system of India, leading to a common understanding that they would not receive political parity as long as they were minority citizens in what they perceived to now be "Hindustan." This severance was not the result of a difference in religious ideology, but rather the pursuit of political

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53 Ibid
54 Dubnov, Arie, and Laura Robson, eds. "Introduction." In *Partitions: A Transnational History of Twentieth-Century Territorial Separatism.*

equality that fueled a separate national identity among the Muslim community, which was being denied this parity. The idea of Pakistan, while serving as a Muslim homeland, was therefore a political creation, based on political notions of parity and sovereignty tied to an abstract fealty to religious identity.

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