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Dear Reader:

We’ve been thrilled—though hardly surprised—to see just how broad and deep Yale’s pool of student scholarship in international studies runs. Each issue, we receive more excellent content than we can hope to publish, and we were particularly gratified to see the enthusiastic response on campus to the inaugural Dean Gooderham Acheson Prize for Outstanding Essays in International Studies.

Still, it’s long been a goal of this publication’s editorial staff to offer the Review’s platform to an even broader community. This issue marks the fulfillment of that effort, and another step in an ongoing project to better serve both the Yale community and the international studies community at large.

In this issue, you’ll find top-notch content from Harvard, Stanford, West Point, Dartmouth, and as far afield as Paris’ Institut d’études politiques, more commonly known as Sciences Po. The scholarship included covers topics as diverse as the role of Islam in Chechen separatism; a critique of the notion of the failed state; and a study of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Yale is represented in this collection by an essay on the work of the late Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm.

Also included in this issue are several Comments from our editorial staff and an interview with long-time State Department mandarin and Arab-Israeli peace expert Aaron David Miller, currently of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. If these more opinionated pieces catch your eye or spark your interest, please write to us; we’d be happy to publish your response and continue the dialogue.

Because we see our publication as being first and foremost in the service of the Yale community, not all of our future issues will be open to submissions from other campuses. If we have our druthers, we plan to continue the publication schedule we’ve had in place for this latest cycle: an open issue each fall, a Yale
exclusive issue each winter, and the annual Acheson Prize issue each spring. As part of the Review’s wider effort to support the conversation on international studies at Yale, we hope you’ll also keep an eye out for a number of YRIS events coming up this year with practitioners in international affairs.

Finally, we’d like to offer thanks: to all of the student-scholars who submitted content to this issue for their interest and enthusiasm; to the Yale International Relations Association for its support of our publication; and to our fabulous designers for another striking and elegant print publication. We immensely enjoyed putting this issue together, and we hope you’ll enjoy reading it.

Sincerely,

The Editors
Aaron David Miller is currently the Vice President for New Initiatives and a Distinguished Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Between 2006 and 2008, he was a Public Policy Scholar when he wrote his fourth book The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (Bantam, 2008). His other books include The Arab States and the Palestine Question: Between Ideology and Self Interest, The PLO and the Politics of Survival, and The Search for Security, Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy.

For the prior two decades, he served at the Department of State as an advisor to Republican and Democratic Secretaries of State, where he helped formulate U.S. policy on the Middle East and the Arab-Israel peace process, most recently as the Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations. He also served as the Deputy Special Middle East Coordinator for Arab-Israeli Negotiations, Senior Member of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and in the Office of the Historian. He has received the department’s Distinguished, Superior, and Meritorious Honor Awards.

This interview has been lightly edited for clarity.

YRIS: You’ve written a great deal on the Syrian crisis already, and you recently had a column in Foreign Policy diagnosing “What’s Really Wrong with the Middle East,” so the first question I was hoping to ask is: to what degree do you think the Syrian civil war is a familiar tragedy for the Middle East, and what do you see happening there that’s nationally specific?

ADM: I think it’s the poster child for a lot of the dysfunction and disaffection throughout the entire region, and it reflects a trend of—not necessarily fragmentation but decentralization of power.
Between 1970 and the Arab Spring or Arab Awakening, that period was a period of consolidation by strong minded Arab authoritarians. They came in two varieties: there were the acquiescent authoritarians, the Mubaraks, the Ben Alis, the Abdullah Salehs of Yemen, the Arafats, with whom we dealt, and then there were the adversarial authoritarians, the Saddams, the Qaddafis, the Assads. They were our enemies, even though at times we cooperated with the Assads, and the Saddams and in the end even the Qaddafis. That whole structure was washed away by the Arab Spring.

You don’t have concentration of power, with the possible exception of Iraq where you have a Shia strongman that we implicitly installed, emanating from our invasion of Iraq and our occupation. You have decentralization. In Libya, too many guns and grievances and really no central authority. We lost the first sitting ambassador since 1988 because in large part the central government couldn’t protect our diplomatic facilities, and we relied on militias to do it. Syria, you have a full-blown civil war, overlaid with ethnic and sectarian tensions plus external manipulation and intervention. Palestine is just divided, three ways. Abbas controls 30% of the West Bank, Israel controls the rest, Hamas controls Gaza. Lebanon’s been a non-state for years. It continues to have only the illusion of real sovereignty; it doesn’t control its borders, and there’s no effective compact between government and those that it governs. And even Iraq is highly decentralized: an aggrieved Sunni minority, very unhappy; a more or less privileged Shia majority, which rules; and Kurds that are making their own arrangements.

So Syria is the worst manifestation of this trend. This isn’t decentralization in Syria, it’s full-blown civil war and it could end — I’m not predicting it will — but it could end in fragmentation. Sectarianism, external intervention by powers that have their own interests — Iranians, Hizbollah, the Russians, the Saudis, the Qatars, the Americans. No central authority capable of re-imposing its control. An opposition that’s fundamentally dysfunctional and divided, and whose most effective elements are Islamists, in large part because they’re better motivated, better disciplined, and better supplied by other Islamists. And an international community that is too disinterested, divided, and preoccupied to mount anything akin to an effective intervention.
Civil wars end when one side or another triumphs, or alternatively when an external power throws its weight into the equation, which then tips the balance to one side or the other. None of that is happening right now. You have a slow grind in which the opposition won’t be defeated and the regime is still far too strong. At one point I thought this was an addition and subtraction problem. That the regime would be subtracted and attrited, the opposition would become stronger and more effective, and at some point these arcs of addition and subtraction would cross at a proverbial tipping point. Well, none of that’s happened, and as far as the US is concerned, my own view—and I feel very strongly about this—is we should be extremely risk averse when it comes to this issue for many reasons.

Number one, there’s no end state that we can clearly envision. Number two—the Iraq/Afghanistan metaphor or analogy, is not an exact one when talking about boots on the ground, no one is talking about the deployment of thousands of American forces in Syria. Where Iraq and Afghanistan are apt by comparison is in the relationship between how we apply military power to achieve a political end. And not only is there not precision or certainty in this, it’s in some respects chaotic. What is our objective? Is our objective to use force to defeat the regime outright? And then what? Or is our objective to put enough pressure on the regime to bring it to a negotiation? Where we are, what, going to sanction Assad’s semi-permanent status in Syria? So we don’t have a clear vision. And finally, I think the President is 100% right. His major—and Presidents get to do this—his major focus is not the Middle East, it’s the middle class, and his own legacy. Our house is not in the greatest of shape, and I just don’t believe after the two longest wars in American history that we ought to be chasing windmills, and expending resources to fix somebody else’s broken house when our own is sadly in need of repair. I’m with this guy, even though on many other issues he’s been a disappointment. But I support this, this foreign policy, no spectacular achievements no spectacular failures. That is an appropriate policy given his predecessor, given where the American people are—and I’m one of those—and given what we can accomplish abroad.

We don’t have the capacity any longer to use our own diplomacy and our conventional military power to do what we used to do. There are many reasons for that. Partly the world’s gotten
more complex; partly, frankly, I don’t think there’s anybody that I’ve seen that’s up to this, in terms of being capable. We haven’t had a truly effective Secretary of State since Jim Baker or a foreign policy president who really understood not only the strengths but the limitations of the American role since George H.W. Bush. I worked for every Secretary of State from Schultz to Powell, so I don’t see anybody who’s capable of being willful and skillful enough to do this. Plus we have our own travails here at home.

Now, that’s the general proposition. A lot about Syria is idiosyncratic, it’s unique to Syria. Syria, under Assad, the father and now junior, remained a very curious state, a minoritarian structure that tried to project its values, Arab nationalist values, beyond its borders in a very critically important part of the Middle East. Syria is the only state in the Middle East with whom we never had a truly — well, I guess you would have to add Iraq — but even with Qaddafi we managed to cooperate. We haven’t had a real relationship with the Syrians, ever, and that reflects a certain dysfunction in the way the Syrians see the world and also the way we do. So no, for me it’s a trap for the United States.

And you’ve said all the same that you think history is going to be very unkind to Obama, and I follow your reasoning on that. What I’d like to ask in that regard is: do you think history is a particularly good judge of these things? And as a historian, what are you trying to bring into the dialogue when you add that perspective, the notion that history is going to be unkind in legacy terms to Obama as regards the Syrian crisis?

Making tough calls for reasons of your own conception of the national interest is not always appreciated by history’s judgment. I didn’t say it was fatal. I mean, this isn’t LBJ in Vietnam. History was very unkind to Lyndon Johnson. He was a prospectively great president on the domestic side, but Vietnam was his undoing, and that was clear at the time. When he chose not to seek the presidency in March of 1968, he knew. Right now, you have a situation in which the vast majority of the American public agrees with Obama on this. All the polls, quite consistently, suggest they don’t want an American intervention in Syria. When he leaves the White House, assuming the Syrian crisis continues
unabated, I’m not sure people will be as respectful or as understanding, because the argument will be, as it was in Rwanda after Clinton, why couldn’t you have done more? The sense of how messy this was, and what a trap it was, will fade, and what will be left given the number of people who will presumably be dead by then, and the number’s now well over 100,000 . . . I don’t think the judgment will be a kind one on Obama.

The other player we have here who’s very aware of his legacy is Secretary Kerry, and he’s staking his place in history on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. He was instrumental in trying to set up these Geneva peace talks for Syria, but he just said the other day those probably aren’t going to happen until September at the earliest. Meanwhile, he’s having marathon sessions with the Israelis and the Palestinians. Do you think that’s the right balance of his attention right now?

I think our policy would not be different one if Kerry weren’t chasing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Some people think the priorities are completely out of whack. That assumes that if Kerry wasn’t devoting time to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, he’d be devoting time to something more important, and what would that be? I don’t think there’s much that we could or should be doing on Syria right now. So what is he supposed to be devoting his time to? He’s reflecting Obama’s priority, which is risk-aversion, and what he’s trying to do on the Israeli-Palestinian issue is resume talks on a sustainable basis. Now, whether or not he’ll succeed at that is anyone’s guess. I’ve been predicting that he’ll succeed at getting talks going, but talks have been re-launched, you know, seven or eight times, since permanent status negotiations began. At no time did they consummate, and they didn’t consummate for many reasons, but one fundamental reason, which has nothing to do with us, is that neither side is prepared to pay the price that is required to resolve the four or five core issues. Full stop.

There’s no reason you can’t have an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, it’s just that the Israeli leaders and the Palestinian leaders have to be prepared to pay for it. And they haven’t been able to, because they haven’t been invested in it to the degree that they need to be. They haven’t been invested in it because there’s no urgency, and urgency is driven by pain and gain. No pain,
no gain, no movement. And right now, as bad as the situation may appear, or as good as Kerry would like to promise that it will become — disincentives and incentives, pain and gain — it's not the way Abbas and Netanyahu see it. The risks of maintaining the status quo are still less frightening than the risks of trying to change it.

So you’ve spent, obviously, a great deal of your career on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. There’s a school of thought in all that that if only this conflict could be resolved, we’d see this positive ripple effect, that maybe we wouldn’t see so many conflicts in the Middle East, that maybe the region would become stable. Do you buy that?

Well, I think that if you could solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict our image would be better, the Palestinians would have a state, which they deserve, the Israelis would be freed from a tremendous burden of occupation, their own public image would improve. And that particular piece of this broken angry and dysfunctional region would be more stable. Do I think that resolving that is going to fix the Iranian bid to be a pre-eminent regional power and a nuclear power? Do I think that’s going to solve the political crisis in Egypt between Islamists and secularists, between institutions that are exclusive and those that are inclusive? Do I think that solving the Israeli-Palestinian problem is going to fix the problem of central authority in Libya? Or end the Syrian civil war? Or make Sunnis and Shias any more… — no. I never believed that. I believed it was more important than other issues, but that may well be because I was working on the issue. And it’s also because it resonates, the Israeli-Palestinian cause, resonates ideologically and emotionally in a divided and kind of broken Arab world more than any other issue. But no, there’s no key here. There never was. It doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t be trying to manage this, and do what we can to resolve it, and look for opportunities to do so, maybe even try to create opportunities.

The only cost of doing what Kerry is doing is that he will fail. And once again we will be tarred with responsibility for the failure. Once again, the negotiating process will be proven to be bankrupt. Once again, people will be disheartened and despair-
ing of the possibility of resolving this. To me, this is not a land of opportunity. This is a region where we’re stuck. We can’t fix it, and we can’t leave.
With the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) requesting time to deliberate both on the prosecution and defense’s appeals earlier this year, the fight to convict Charles Taylor has been postponed. Again.

On April 26th 2012, former Liberian president Charles Taylor was sentenced to fifty years in prison for aiding and abetting some of the “most heinous and brutal crimes recorded in human history.” Delivered by the SCSL, an independent tribunal designed to prosecute crimes committed during the Sierra Leone civil war, which lasted from 1996 to 2002, Taylor’s conviction is the first to target a former head of state since the Nuremberg Trials sixty years ago. Yet, the notion that Charles Taylor’s trial symbolizes an international moral victory is quixotic, especially with the former president’s appeal still looming. Yet regardless of the final result, Taylor’s trial is and will remain an embodiment of what remains the most difficult challenge for international courts today: striking a balance between expressing moral outrage against egregious desecrations of human rights, and preserving the basic rights to which every individual is entitled under the law.

From being criticized as tools for “victor’s justice” to being viewed as incompetent and bureaucratic institutions too weak to prosecute effectively, international courts have struggled to establish legitimacy for decades. But how, and more importantly, why, have these difficulties persisted? Unfortunately, the answer to such questions is inextricably tied to the nature of a legitimate judicial system itself. Indeed, while international courts must respect due process rights and uphold institutional fairness to remain legitimate, they often find themselves attempting to reconcile these stringent requirements with the desire to wreak moral vengeance on the accused. The solution to this “balancing act” remains elusive. If retribution is conflated with outrage, it is savagery; however, too many protections and the court signals weakness. With the Nuremberg Trials often criti-
cized as an example of this overextension and the political grand-standing afforded to former Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic characterizing the latter, history seems full of such failures. According to prominent German sociologist Han Joas, the cause for this paradox is unfortunately one and the same: the emotive process by which we have conditioned ourselves to refrain from cruel punishment is also what mandates it. For modern society, the individual is sacred, but in order to affirm society's solidarity, the individual must also be punished, especially because they have infringed upon the inviolability of others. And since international courts exclusively deal with crimes of particular heinous nature, the act of balancing between interests certainly doesn't get any simpler.

Charles Taylor's trial is no exception to this dilemma. Arrested in 2006 after seeking asylum in Nigeria, Taylor was accused of trading arms with Revolutionary United Front rebels in exchanged for diamonds mined in Sierra Leone. This mutually beneficial relationship is what ultimately allowed RUF rebels to continue terrorizing civilians through means such as rape, torture, and the recruitment of child soldiers. For the international community, such acts were unacceptable, and when rebel groups violated a UN peace agreement in 2000, former president Kabbah of Sierra Leone “requested the establishment of an independent court to address the violations committed by the Revolutionary United Force.”

Recognized as a hybrid institution, the SCSL contains both international and domestic staff, and while normally located in Freetown, Sierra Leone, it tried Taylor at The Hague because of worries that his return to Sierra Leone could spark conflict. The establishment of the SCSL is indicative of the evolution of international courts because of its inclusion of both domestic and international judicial actors. Not only is the representation of domestic interests a necessary requirement, but the founding of a mixed institution also symbolizes an innovative mechanism to resolve the “balancing act.” Through the inclusion of both domestic and international judicial actors, the SCSL more easily evades charges of politicization since global interests are represented instead of those of specific countries. Thus, it can more effectively function to fairly punish crimes against humanity, and affirms the emotive will of the international community.
When considering the actual events of Taylor's trial, the phenomenon of the “balancing act” only becomes more apparent. In contrast with the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, whose court performance convinced 39% of the Serbian population to rate his performance superior,⁹ a team of lawyers defended Taylor. Taylor’s representation by counsel reportedly contributed “to the generally respectful and organized tenor of the courtroom,”¹⁰ and facilitated the focus on substantive legal work instead of political ranting. Thus, in order to bolster its credibility, the SCSL deprived Taylor of his ability to grandstand and influence public perceptions, finding a means to simultaneously assert its dominance over its subjects and maintain appearances of institutional fairness. Additionally, by organizing their indictments into only eleven charges, and inviting victim witnesses to discuss their narratives about their experiences with the RUF,¹¹ the prosecution was able to effectively voice the emotional outrage of the Sierra Leone people,” exemplifying the duality of the “balancing act.” And with Taylor's guarantee of the right to appeal, the SCSL has continued to establish itself as a legitimate legal institution capable of fairly evaluating the most morally atrocious of cases. Even senior counsels at Human Rights Watch concede individuals ought to welcome Taylor's appeals process, as “a fair and credible justice means a right to appeal.”¹²

With recent polls indicating an overwhelming percentage of respondents to have identified the correct reason behind Taylor's trial (65%) and a large majority (67%) agreeing or strongly agreeing that Charles Taylor's trial has been fair (only 18% believe it was unfair), it seems that the solutions international courts have employed to resolve the “balancing act” are headed in the right direction. By respecting basic due process rights, yet simultaneously exercising strict discretion to regulate such rights, courts such as the SCSL have demonstrated no one, even former heads of state, are above the law. And along with the reduction of bureaucratic elements, these attempts at maintaining institutional legitimacy have earned public approval. Yet despite some citizens of Sierra Leone believing Taylor’s conviction to be justice’s triumph over injustice and evil,¹⁴ others remain unsatisfied, questioning why other individuals who may bear even greater responsibility for the Sierra Leone civil war were not also prosecuted. These criticisms are a salient reminder that mere sen-
tencing is not a panacea for a country’s problems; in order for a nation’s victims to truly move forward, international institutions must not only consistently indict all individuals connected to crimes against humanity, but must also invest more into aiding victims who have experienced such trauma and torture. It is time to recognize merely spending United Nations funding on charging potential criminals is insufficient to help a nation heal its wounds. Nonetheless, the events of Charles Taylor’s trial have forged a legacy the world should rejoice in: international justice that reaches even heads of state may be possible.

*Erwin Li (‘16) attends Yale University.*

2 Ibid.


4 Ibid.


8 Ibid.


11 Ibid.


There’s a whole range of reasons to be sensibly skeptical of American involvement in the Syrian conflict—our national interest there is poorly defined, we have little notion what any given policy prescription ought to achieve, and we might well make things worse. But since the commentariat began kicking around the question of U.S. intervention, a misguided thread has dominated the contrary side of the conversation. We shouldn’t arm/help the rebels, the theory goes, because there are al-Qaeda fighters among their ranks; our weapons might end up in their hands, and we would be complicit in the violence they do with them, guilty of abetting their cause.

By the time this comment goes to print, events will have outpaced it; I can’t say where the debate on our Syrian policy will go, or how the conflict will evolve. Where the debate has already been, though, is a telling and frustrating microcosm of what we talk about when we talk about foreign policy. In brief, there’s a confused understanding of our responsibility and/or culpability abroad where intervention is concerned, one that draws a bright line between action and inaction as if the former were naturally risky and the latter by its nature conservative and restrained. That’s emotionally appealing (the ghost of Iraq has a great deal to do with why), but it’s a distinction that collapses, fast, under scrutiny. The Syrian question is as good an illustration of that as any.

First, it’s worth recognizing that yes, militants of the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusrah Front have been thick as thieves on the battlefield with the Syrian opposition (though that alliance of convenience seemed to be fraying as of July). If we send arms to Syria, I don’t doubt some of them will make their way to al-Nusrah by mistake, by happenstance, or via sympathetic Islamist groups. Milton Bearden, the CIA officer behind the arming of Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s, provided Foreign Policy with an appropriately cynical take on that risk: “People have criticized the CIA effort in Afghanistan because we gave weapons to Islamic
fundamentalists. Well, I don’t know how many Presbyterians there are over there.” Given that fact of life, it’s entirely reasonable to be wary of sending Stinger missiles and other anti-aircraft weapons; it makes less sense to wobble on the question of light arms, for reasons that are largely our own doing.

On that front, we ought to ask ourselves why more moderate rebels would throw in their lot with Qaeda-linked fighters in the first place. The answer is straightforward: al-Nusrah has been, virtually since its entry into the conflict, the best-equipped group fighting Bashar al-Assad. They don’t particularly need light arms, because they have them. While the U.S. debated aiding secular factions, deep-pocketed Islamists in the region jumped in to back their horse — and it paid dividends, with even moderate rebels obliged to rely on the well-organized, well-financed, and well-armed extremists. In other words, Western inaction helped create the conditions for the rise of jihadists in Syria. Waffling, we shot ourselves in the foot; we had an early opportunity to crowd out the influence of radicals within the rebellion, and we let it pass. We’re not any less responsible for that reality on the ground than we would be for any of our weapons that end up in their hands. The moderate factions of the revolution have long been crying for some help, for any help, and we could have done something, anything, to prop them up and purchase some good will. In sitting on our hands, we handed al-Nusrah something significantly more dangerous than a Stinger: the opportunity to build real military and political influence.

None of that is necessarily an argument for intervention now — it may be that we can improve that situation, but there’s always room to make things worse — or even for intervention more generally, but it certainly is a critique of the effort to erect a moral and political divide between the devil we abet and the devil we abide. History, of course, will happily sit in judgment of both, and both will in practice bear just as powerfully on American interests abroad. Non-complicity is a poor ideal; inaction isn’t a sensibly conservative default setting, but rather a choice for which we’ll pay or from which we’ll benefit just like any other choice in foreign policy.

There’s another responsibility in play here too of course: the responsibility to protect. It’s an open question whether the United States is doing more or less than it should for Syria today in a purely self-interested sense, and I don’t know that
I feel qualified to judge on which side we’ve erred. All the same, it goes without saying that we’re doing less than we can. The humanitarian logic behind an intervention in Syria is the same as that behind the 2011 intervention in Libya; the distinction is, well, it would be more difficult in Syria. That calculus is entirely understandable. It’s also entirely transparent to the international community, and we shouldn’t fool ourselves into thinking that the Syrian rebels don’t know exactly where they figure into our tally of costs and benefits. In moral terms, we can’t abjure the responsibility that comes with the ability to do great good or prevent great evil. In strategic terms, we can’t avoid being tarred and feathered in the hearts and minds of those that we— even if acting, by some measure or other, carefully and responsibly— declined to help.

In all likelihood, the Syrian conflict will continue for some time yet; the war sits now in a cruel stalemate. It has brought and will continue to bring enormous suffering to the Syrian people as they struggle to oust Assad. The American strategic stake in the fight will continue to be irretrievably confused, but the moral responsibility of the United States won’t diminish with each passing day or passing death. That’s the curse of great power status; what happens happens, and it happens on our watch. It’s hardly worth making a distinction between our actions and our inaction because neither our friends nor our enemies will. In our foreign policy, we ought to confront that reality forthrightly.

Grayson Clary (’14) attends Yale University.
Access to classroom learning is far from universal, and even those enrolled in formal educational institutions may be looking for greater, free, and more convenient learning opportunities. In fact, the most heavily cited reason that students take MOOCs, according to a February 2013 Coursera report on the Bioelectricity MOOC from Duke University, is to satisfy intellectual hunger. The desire to extend existing knowledge on specific topics is cited as the second most likely cause for engagement, and professional development as the third.

This academic curiosity is international. Coursera, a platform that launches MOOCs with over 70 partner universities, has, according to on-site figures, enrolled about 9,500,000 students to date. The Knight Center for Journalism at the University of Texas at Austin launched a MOOC with only 2,000 students, but they came from 109 different countries. Students from countries with different political and socioeconomic conditions interacted with one another via discussion forums, as previous generations could not. The 687 participants from the United States corresponded with those from Egypt, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Israel, Iraq, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Educational discourse may eventually bridge conflict and unite citizens between states with historically tense relationships.

MOOCs cater not only to university students, but also to adults and working professionals. Many courses consist of students who hold less than a four-year degree, along with students who have Bachelors degrees, and others with more advanced degrees. MOOCs do not require participants to apply for entry or meet other standards for attending a traditional university. In this way, MOOCs provide high-quality courses without financial burden, rigid time commitments, or exclusive acceptance rates. They also allow students to take classes best suited to their abilities and preferences. Students choose MOOCs based on levels of difficulty, and study material at their own paces, based on individual schedules and learning needs.
But the success of this new educational frontier requires flexi-

But the success of this new educational frontier requires flexi-
bility in production, leadership, and participation. Some courses
thrive, with hundreds of thousands of active students (like
Stanford University’s computer science courses in 2011), while
others of similar quality fail, with few students watching course
videos and taking tests to complete requirements. Teachers
and students must interact dynamically. Instructors establish
platforms for discourse, monitoring and participating in message
boards, posting feedback and responding to student input.
Productive exchanges are structured; 40,000 people cannot par-
ticipate in the same Google doc. Professors divide students
into groups, in which they discuss different topics in alternate
forums. Regardless, message boards can fail if students post
early then disengage, or enter discussions late and cannot catch
up. Students engage in discussion threads, and, if inspired
by course discussions, also create their own forums. They often
interact over Facebook and Skype, and give instructors critical
course feedback.

Like in a traditional class, a professor first designs his sylla-
bus. But he adapts his teaching to the online medium, divid-
ing weekly material into small segments. Rather than allotting
50-minutes for each subject, professors partition material
into short clips, determining which subjects require subsequent
exercises. Instructors write and practice lecture scripts repeat-
edly, with unique challenges in mind. They cannot respond to
audience reactions, and also consider how international listeners
with different backgrounds will understand material. But
while recording their videos, teachers can polish monologues
by marking each mess-up and editing them out.

Lecture content depends not only on advanced editing, but
also on who is speaking. At traditional universities, students may
be taught by Teaching Assistants (TAs), particularly in intro-
ductive lecture courses. According to the American Federation
of Teachers data, the number of TAs has more than doubled since
1975. At American universities, TAs teach thousands of classes.
AFT data does not reflect the totality of classes led by TAs;
it only accounts for sections in which TAs are the listed teachers.
But graduate employees serve as teacher’s aides and share
teaching responsibilities. Between 16%–32% of undergraduate
sections at public universities are estimated to be taught by TAs.
MOOCs, however, ensure that professors, not TAs, teach classes.
By securing a high standard of content and allowing access to people worldwide, regardless of location, funds, credentials, and time, MOOCs present unprecedented educational opportunities. But the impact that MOOCs may have extends far past the educational: democratizing and liberalizing access to learning could have unforeseen economic and political ramifications. As increasing numbers of MOOC platforms arise and more universities partner with them to launch classes, short-term effects of these online courses will grow apparent.

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In 1991, Chechnya, an autonomous republic in the mountainous North Caucasus region of the former Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, declared its independence. Distinct from Russians in religion, ethnicity and language, the predominantly Muslim Chechens had struggled against Russian domination for hundreds of years and capitalized on the momentum of the Soviet dissolution finally to achieve independence. The result of this declaration was two brutal wars between Russia and Chechnya during which cities were leveled and thousands of civilians were killed. The Chechen insurgency and Russian counterinsurgency continued for years after the war’s battle phase had concluded. As the conflict developed and progressed, popular discourse surrounding the Chechens began to shift. What had once been understood as a nationalist struggle for self-determination became associated with a relatively new phenomenon to the Caucasus region: radical Islamism. Russian President Vladimir has since reframed Russia’s campaign against the Chechens as one not against nationalism but against Islamic terror.

In a press conference in Brussels in 2002, he described the supporters and financers of Chechen independence as “religious extremists and international terrorists” who “speak about the creation of a global caliphate,” and he warned that many had reason to be afraid: “They are talking about the need to kill all kafirs [infidels], all non-Muslims, or Crusaders, as they say. If you are a Christian, you are in danger!”

Islam has periodically resurfaced as a relevant factor in the long Chechen struggle against the Russians. During the Russian imperial era and the Soviet era, Chechen rebellions against Russia often coincided with calls for Islamization. Islam helped to unify the peoples of the North Caucasus against Russia during the Caucasian Wars and the commander of the Chechen forces Imam Shamil remains a legend among Chechens both for his military prowess and for providing Chechnya with greater societal structure through the implementation of Shar’a law. The early leaders of the Chechen secessionist movement beginning in the 1990s, however, explicitly described their aspirations for statehood as secular. In 1992, the first Chechen president Dzokhar Dudayev stated in an interview, “I would like to see Chechnya become a constitutional secular state. We are seeking it, this is our ideal. Religion should play an exclusively important role in the spiritual development of people, in moral and humane attitudes.”

Other than two religious parties, Chechen political groups during the early 1990s did not have specifically Islamic objectives.
The first Chechen secessionist movement began through a popular front that was established in the summer of 1988. The National Congress of Chechen People formed and had its first meeting in 1990 and elected Dzokhar Dudayev, a distinguished officer in the Soviet air force whose track record included bombing Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan in the 1980s, as chairman of its executive committee. Dudayev would eventually become the central leader of the Chechen secessionist movement. A political “outsider,” he “faced an immense task of building unity among the nationalists” as he consolidated power.6 In May 1991, Dudayev dissolved the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet, declaring the CNC executive committee the legitimate provisional government of the republic.7

There is no evidence that the early phases of this declaration of independence and initial development of the Chechen government was religiously motivated. As Hughes argues, “The evidence demonstrates that Dudayev, Yandarbiev, and other nationalist leaders were driven by a secular vision of nation-state building; beyond peripheral Islamic symbolism, such as the occasional cries of ‘Allah Akhbar!’ there was no significant Islamic content to the nationalist drive for independence at this stage.”8

Hughes does acknowledge that Dudayev relied on support from Beslan Gantemirov, leader of the Islamic Path party, essentially a paramilitary organization that formed the core of the new armed National Guard.9 But he describes this party as “far from an Islamic party” and argues that former Mafia Mob boss Gantemirov was “more of a freebooting criminal warlord interested in the materialistic gains that would come after overthrowing the Zavgayev regime.”10 Lieven, who interviewed Gantemirov in 1992, writes, “I… asked him all the proper questions about Islamic politics and social reform, Islam and pluralism, and links to Iran — and his answers of course were vague, not to say embarrassed — in fact, just like those of someone who has gate-crashed a party.”11

The revolution began in Chechnya in August 1991, when The National Guard seized the television center, the radio station and the building of the Council of Ministers, raising green Islamic flags above each one and constructing barricades on the streets and the streets crowded with people. Moscow did nothing in response.12 In September, Zavgayev finally agreed to sign an “act of abdication.” Eventually, the National Guard seized the KGB building in Grozny.

**Dudayev’s Chechnya**

Dudayev increasingly centralized power in Chechnya and was soon elected President in an overwhelming victory.13 A Russian coup attempt just after his inauguration in November failed, largely because Gorbachev, who still controlled the Soviet military, did not want to see more bloodshed after the violence that had occurred in Lithuania.14 Chechnya thus became de facto independent. Moscow wavered in its acceptance of Chechen independence between 1992 and the Russian invasion of 1994, although it had fully recog-
nized the independence of the former union republics and had recognized the split between Chechnya and Ingushetia, which had emerged out of a technically illegal referendum. Meanwhile, Dudayev failed to establish in Chechnya any of the institutions and infrastructure of a state. Imam Salam Khamsat estimated that two-thirds of the population opposed Dudayev, but many were afraid to speak out. He also noted that Dudayev had failed to build a single hospital, school, or mosque, and had shown little respect for religion or mullahs.

From the outset, Dudayev’s Ichkeria was a secular republic founded on nationalist principles. This is clear from its constitution, which made no reference to shari’a law or the establishment of a Muslim state. Article one of the constitution states:

The Chechen Republic is a sovereign and independent democratic based state, founded as a result of the self-determination of the Chechen people. It exercises supreme rights over its territory and national wealth; independently determines its internal and foreign policies; the adopted constitution and laws have superiority on its territory. The state sovereignty of the Chechen Republic is indivisible.

Dudayev had stated elsewhere that his “ideal” state system would be one based on Shari’a law, but that sentiment was not reflected in the state structures he initially created. Dudayev’s attitude toward Islam and the state was perhaps made most explicit in an interview with a Russian journalist in 1992. Stating that he liked neither the model of Turkey nor that of Iran with regard to the position of Islam within the state he said, “The place for Islam in Chechnya will depend on the political situation in the republic and on the external pressure which will be exerted. With the increase of negative external factors Islam is bound to grow. If we have the opportunity for the option of independence, independent development, a constitutional secular state would develop.”

Given the later development of fundamentalist Islam during the first war, Dudayev’s statement appears prophetic. He also warned that “if religion gains an upper hand over constitutional structures, then the Spanish Inquisition and Islamic fundamentalism in their extreme manifestations appear. No religion, upon subordinating the state structures, coming to power, can maintain a purely religion course due its nature.” Although Dudayev did at times reference religion in his statements, Hughes notes that his “use of Islam often correlated with moments of extreme urgency, when his leadership was seriously threatened.”

Hughes argues further that there is little evidence that Islam had been particularly significant in Dudayev’s life, personally or politically, until 1993, when the conflict with Russia became more intense. In addition, he cites a lack of evidence that any of Dudayev’s policies during this critical period of state building were intended to Islamize state structures or public life.
view on an unspecified date published on Nov. 21, 1991, Dudayev expressed the importance of Islam to him personally, in his leadership of Chechnya, stating “Taking the oath on the Koran is more binding on me than any secular constitution. We had a secular constitution but it failed to protect us or advance our rights. Therefore I gave my oath to the nation on the Koran that I will be faithful to my declared aims for which the revolution was launched.”

However, when pressed on whether his intent was to establish an Islamic orientation for the government, he said

“We are not prepared for such a move. We are still suffering from the dire effects of 70 years of witch-hunts against Muslim and religion. Each of us kept his faith alive in his heart….The declaration of an Islamic state calls for preparations so that people will air their views on the south Islamic principles of the Koran, advocating harmony and unity. When we get to that stage, it will be up to the people to decide what they want. For the time being, we have to build a constitutional, democratic government inspired by the sharia and the constitution.”

Such a statement seems to indicate that, at the time, Dudayev did not believe that Islam would serve the interests of the state in setting up strong institutions.

Although this project of state creation was secular, the period between 1991 and 1994 was marked by an increase of religiosity in Chechnya, as was common around the former Soviet Union following the long era of religious repression. In Chechnya, this process featured increased contact with the broader Muslim world, including Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Chechen leaders like Yandarbiev completed the Hajj to Mecca in 1992. Meanwhile, criminality and general social disorder became significant problems in Chechnya. According to Hughes, Dudayev armed a significant portion of the Chechen male population in 1991 and early 1992, many of whom were unemployed and impoverished highlanders; the result of this policy was an increase in social disorder and abuse. A significant portion of the Russian population fled the republic due to targeting by criminal gangs, and Russian politicians began to describe Chechnya as “the first criminal state,” a characterization they would use to help justify their invasion in 1994.


A brutal catastrophe for human rights on both sides of the conflict, the first Russo-Chechen war destroyed Chechen infrastructure and fomented greater hatred between the two sides without achieving a permanent resolution on the status of Chechnya. Months prior to the conflict, Russia had been attempting to topple the Dudayev regime by funding and even arming an opposition to his regime that included former National Guard and Islamic Path Party leader, Gantemirov. Smith argues that it had been the intent of the Rus-
On November 26, 1994, Russian soldiers and tanks secretly joined the opposition in an attempt to take Grozny. The army successfully reached the Chechen capital, but was destroyed by Chechen troops. The coup had failed. On December 9, 1994, Yeltsin issued a decree for the “disarmament of all illegal armed units,” and on December 11, 30–40,000 Russian soldiers invaded Chechnya.

The first war introduced as a major player to the Chechen struggle Shamil Basayev, a field commander who had earned the label “terrorist” in 1991, when he had helped hijack a plane flying between Russia and Turkey; the act was merely a political stunt, and the temporary hostages on the plane all were eventually released unharmed. Having gained notoriety in the Caucasus for his support of the Abkhazians in their separatist struggle against Georgia, Basayev came to Chechnya with substantial combat experience and brought with him one of the most well-trained and combat-ready fighting forces in the Chechen conflict. In the spring of 1994, Basayev and his top fighters went to Afghanistan to train in the Amir Muawia training camps. He also went to Pakistan, and met the leaders of two Islamist organizations: Harkat ul-Ansar (HUA) and Tablighi Jamaat (TJ). Basayev and his men joined the TJ organization. He then returned to Chechnya in July, 1994 and became one of the most critical military commanders in organizing assaults against the Russians. The conflict became personal for him when many members of his family, including his wife, child, sister and uncle were killed by a Russian bomb. After this Basayev vowed to kill any Russian pilot he captured, a promise he apparently upheld. Acts of terrorism intended to accelerate the turn of Russian public opinion against the war became the tactic for which Basayev was perhaps best known.

Basayev also played a critical role in introducing to the Chechen struggle a new breed of warrior from abroad that would forever change the political dynamics of Chechnya. Realizing that the Chechens needed training in guerilla war tactics in order to have any chance of defeating Russia’s much larger and more powerful army, Basayev sent for help from Saudi-born Omar ibn al-Khattab, who had already become legendary fighting against the Russians 20 years previously, in Afghanistan. A radical Islamist and devotee of the Wahhabi school, Khattab first became notable in Chechnya during the last days of the first war after he and eight other mujahidin travelled secretly to Chechnya through Dagestan to form a small reconnaissance-fighting band that launched several brutal assaults on the Russians. In 1996, a video showing Khattab cutting off the heads of Russian soldiers was circulated among Islamic organizations in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan in order to recruit more former foreign fighters to Chechnya. Islamic jam’ats that recruited unemployed Chechens and trained them in war tactics in anticipation of future conflict while also teaching the Wahhabi faith began to appear in Chechnya in the last days of the war.
tember 1996, Khattab founded the Training Center for the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, which officially operated under the command of the Chechen armed forces but in actuality was completely independent, operating as Khattab and his Wahhabi mujahideen’s personal base and training center. The encroachment of these radical Islamists would soon give rise to a new competing ideology in Chechnya that was antagonistic not only to Russia but also to the existing leadership structure in Chechen society.

There is little to suggest that Basayev was initially interested in establishing an Islamic state in the North Caucasus, based on his statements in early interviews. In later statements after the first war, however, he declared himself a warrior of Islam who no longer feared death and boasted that he was the first to establish *Shari’a* courts in Chechnya. Lieven, who interviewed Basayev on several occasions, noted that over the course of the first war, Basayev’s appearance had changed, and the commander had grown a long bushy beard resembling a “Mujahid of old.” Several other Chechen leaders such as chief propagandist Movladi Udugov and Yandarbiev also adopted Islamism as the movement progressed. Wilhelmsen writes, “On a general level, the strengthening of religious faith during a war is effected by a well-known mechanism: when in trouble, people turn to God. In the Chechen case, however, Islam was not only a source of comfort on the personal level; it also became politicised and served as a means of interpreting and organising an extreme situation.” Shari’a courts and punishments began to become more prevalent in the areas of the south controlled by the separatists from about 1995 onwards, but Lieven argues that this was largely due to military considerations. He writes, “This was partly a matter of individual psychology: men who have been under continual bombardment for months on end and have seen their comrades fall around one by one may well seek comfort in religion in the belief that their struggle is divinely inspired, But in forces with no military organization and no formal code, the need for military discipline also played a part.” Shari’a provided an effective means of discipline at times when motivation was low.

Dudayev’s statements during this period on occasion made references to religion, but only with regard to spiritual guidance and not policy. In an interview with a Ukrainian newspaper he stated, “Russia is ill with a horrific disease: racism, whose symptoms are extreme cruelty, insidiousness and a lack of spiritual values. Everything that Satanism has ever accumulated over this land, which is full of sin, is presently manifested in Russia…Russia is the only country in the world that has no spiritual values and no faith.” When asked about whether or not the Russo-Chechen struggle could be characterized as a struggle between Islam and Christianity, he said, “Nonsense. The aggressor does not have the army of Christ. It is an obscure military mass, ready to kill, burn and rape without any faith. Anyway, you can see how ‘Orthodox’ Russia adheres to the commandments of the Christian faith.” Such statements
do not discount the importance of religion to the Chechens but at the same time avoid labeling the conflict a religious struggle. Smith argues that though many Chechens, including Dudayev and future president Maskhadov, “were often quite ignorant, in an academic sense, about their faith” and engaged in practices forbidden to Muslims, including drinking alcohol, the traditions of the Sufi brotherhoods served to bolster morale and encourage ethnic identity and, over the course of the war, religion observance among the Chechens became stronger. 49 “Religion played a crucial supporting role to the resistance, although this was not by any means a religious war of Moslem versus Christian. Morale-boosting chants of ‘Allah Akhbar’ (God is Great) as they went into battle were standard, but many Chechens were only non-practicing Moslems at the start of the war.” 50

Radicalization in Chechnya: 1996–1999

The interwar years were a critical period in the development of Islamic radicalism in Chechnya. Chechnya had suffered significant destruction during the first war and in the aftermath of victory had failed to create the structures of statehood. Gilligan describes Chechnya after this war as a “failing state” that was “politically fractured and economically deprived.” 51 Wood argues that Chechnya’s plight was in large part the result of its unresolved status as well as Russia’s failure to meet its obligations to the country it had virtually destroyed. 52 Tishkov paints a slightly different picture of the cause of Chechnya’s plight, arguing that the “illusion of a ‘great victory’ limited efforts at restoring public order after the war” while Russia’s provision of free electricity and gas to the region was seen as war reparations. 53 The economy struggled during this period. While 20,000 people had been employed in Chechnya’s refineries prior to the war, by 1997 there were only 9,000. 54 Standards of living dropped precipitously, basic health needs were not being met, the transportation system had collapsed, and most of the population still had little means of communication. 55 State taxes ceased to be collected during the interwar years, and thus by 1999 the state treasury had not gotten the oil revenues it had expected would sustain it. 56 Crime, meanwhile, was a lucrative industry during this period, especially human trafficking. 57 These conditions provided a context amenable to radicalization.

In 1996, Chechnya had held a presidential election in which 16 candidates, including Yandarbiev, Basayev, and moderate Aslan Maskhadov, initially ran. Basayev’s campaign platform, which called for the establishment of a peaceful Islamic state in which Islam would serve to protect the poor, failed to compel voters. 58 Maskhadov garnered 59.3% of the vote, while Basayev came in second with 23.5%. 59 It seems therefore that, at least in 1996, the Chechen mindset still favored the moderate, secular movement over Basayev’s Islamism. 60 The radical faction in Chechnya was gaining momentum, however, while Maskhadov failed to create the structures of state-

49 Smith, Allah’s Mountains, 154.
50 Ibid., 154.
52 Wood, Chechnya: The Case for Independence, 81–82.
55 Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society, 189
56 Ibid., 188.
57 Wood, Chechnya: The Case for Independence, 85–86.
60 Williams, “Allah’s Foot Soldiers,” 163.
Russell describes Maskhadov as ineffective at controlling the warlords in Chechnya and setting up state-like institutions, which further turned public opinion in Russia against the Chechens. Meanwhile, Khattab's friends and allies began taking important government positions, and by 1998 Maskhadov began to worry about the increasing influence of the Wahhabi movement. In May, he removed several of the Wahhabi leaders from their positions. Violence eventually broke out in July 1998 between the Wahhabis and the secular National Guards, who in fact had the support of the Sufi Naqshbandi and Qadiri orders. Maskhadov declared on state television that Wahhabis were enemies attempting to seize the state and start a civil war in Chechnya. Eventually, the secular leader banned Wahhabism and ordered that Khattab's forces leave the republic, an order Khattab ignored.

Chechen researcher Vakhid Akaev writes, “In early 1999, the tension between the authorities and the opposition increased. Maskhadov faced fresh accusations of having deviated from Dudayev’s path, including numerous violations of the constitution in Chechnya, failure to observe Shari’a law, lack of interest in creating an Islamic state, and concessions to the hated Russia.”

The rising power of the Khattab faction put increasing pressure on Maskhadov to expand the role of religion in the government. The Wahhabis began to fill the structural void of the Maskhadov regime; outside Islamic organizations provided educational support and promoted social welfare in war-ravaged Chechnya. The Wahhabis became particularly popular among the poor highlanders, who had been impoverished since the collapse of the Soviet Union. “Once these foreign fundamentalists, with their money, war tactics, and outside connections, became more established in Chechnya, calls for Shari’a and the establishment of an Islamic Caucasian Emirate became louder.” In an interview with Sanobar Shermatova at Khattab’s house in 1998, Khattab stated: “I am neither a mercenary, terrorist nor hero. I am a Muslim, a simple mujahid who fights for the glory of Allah. Russia oppressed the Muslims, therefore I came in order to help my brothers free themselves from Russia. They fought against Muslims in Bosnia, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. I help my brothers.” The key to Khattab’s success was not just in importing foreign fighters and combat experience to Chechnya; he was also able to lure some Chechen leaders to adopt Wahhabism and join his movement. According to Schaefer, the motive of these leaders was to gain a “better mobilizing ideology for the war of independence” as well as to ensure funding from Islamic sources abroad. Under this pressure, in February 1999, Maskhadov introduced Shari’a law “with the aim of undercutting his opponents in his struggle for power,” according to Tishkov, who regarded the decision as a “surrender to the radical Islamists.” On July 3, 1999, the Congress of War and Resistance Veterans passed a resolution in support of the Wahhabis, which included a “universal agreement among all the war veterans and the patriotic forces for the cause of strengthening the Islamic state.”
Russians have often sought to portray Maskhadov as united with the radicals who gained power during the interwar years although, as Cornell argues, this view does not match reality: “The extremist-terrorist dimension of the conflict in Chechnya is a distinctively alien phenomenon grafted upon the Chechen struggle. It is the result of war, and not, as Moscow argues, its cause.” As evidence, he cites Maskhadov’s warning the Russians about some of the extremist’s terrorist plans in order to enlist their help in combating them. As in Afghanistan, Cornell argues, radical Islamism did not emerge as a powerful force until the devastation caused by war. Chechnya lost a comparable portion of its population to Afghanistan in the first war with Russia and a high number of those that survived suffered significant physical and emotional trauma. This context for radicalization would only worsen when the second war with Russia began in 1999.

In September 1999, over 300 Russians were killed by a series of bomb explosions in several apartment buildings in Moscow. On September 16, then-Prime Minister Putin expressed on television his attitude to the Chechens he held responsible for the attack: “Wipe them out in the shithouse (mol’chit v sortire).” Khattab and Basayev’s incursion into Chechnya’s neighboring republic Dagestan in August 1999 provided the initial justification for the second invasion, though the terrorist attacks in September helped turn Russian public opinion much more in favor of a second war, even though proof of responsibility for the attack was not found. Russia’s response was brutal and fairly indiscriminate: Far from targeting terrorists, the force of the Russian military was unleashed on the Chechen population at large. Since the 1994–1996 war, the Russian military had reformed and was much more combat-ready by 1999. The second war would not only rectify Russia’s humiliation after the first war, but would also help to bolster the image of the Putin regime as the new leader consolidated power. For Chechnya, the campaign would accelerate the pace of radicalization while wreaking havoc on the population.

Especially in the wake of September 11, Putin sought to portray the second war as a campaign against Islamic terrorism, focusing in statements almost entirely on the fundamentalist radicals in Chechnya. He also played into the existing divisions within Chechen society by “Chechenizing” the conflict, even propping up a pro-Moscow ethnically Chechen leadership in the republic headed by Akhmad Kadyrov. Interestingly, Kadyrov had once been the mufti of Chechnya and, in the first war had declared jihad against Russia. Violence peaked in April 2001 and over the course of the Chechen insurgency the Republic of Ichkeria gradually faded away. In 2002, the Chechen Madjlis-Shur (War Council), headed by Maskhadov, decided to revise the Chechen constitution such that Article I now read: “The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria is a sovereign, indepen-
Zaiavljenia presidenta chechenskoj republicii ichkeriia, Abdul-Khalima Sadulaeva, Feb. 13, 2006 in Hughes, Chechnya, 104.

Hughes, Chechnya, 106.


There is little evidence that, in the early stages of the Chechen secessionist conflict, Islam was the primary motivation for the conflict. The early Chechen leadership, particularly Dudayev, explicitly stated that the intention was to establish a secular Chechen state. Although Dudayev did at times reference Islam in campaign slogans and took his oath on the Koran, his statements indicate that the role of religion in the new Chechen state would be decided later, depending on the interests of the Chechen people. The original constitution made no references to Shari’a law and the original framing of the conflict was as a nationalist struggle, not a jihad. Hughes notes that, of the 60 presidential decrees, four acts, and 47 orders during the second half of 1992, none advanced policies that seemed intended to Islamize the state. Dudayev’s comments in interviews regarding the role of religion critique the Russians for their lack of religion and spirituality, yet again only place religion in the position of spiritual guide within the nationalist struggle. It is worth noting that nationalism itself is contrary to the ideology of Wahhabi Islamism, as it places the nation in a position superior to the faith. In addition, religious leaders did not initially head the cause of Chechen separatism. In fact, there is evidence that Dudayev and other leaders were not especially devout and engaged in practices that were inconsistent with some Islamic rules. Tishkov writes, “Dudayev was never seen praying; there were no Islamic symbols in his home or offices; and he never went to a mosque. On the other hand, he never missed a premier at the Groznyy drama theater.”

Some groups within Chechnya advocated for the establishment of an Islamic state, and they pressured secular leaders to demonstrate their support of the Islamic faith. After ignoring calls from some Chechens to replace the constitution with the Koran, Dudayev finally gave a speech in 1993 addressing the concern:

The Role of Islamic Doctrine

Schaefer, Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus 237.
Hughes, Chechnya, 67.
Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society, 169.
The Qur'an and the imamate are holy causes, and we should not use those words in vain. There is a time for everything. There are many Muslim countries in the world, but few of them live in strict observance of Shari‘a law. Besides, as we know only too well, not every Chechen is a Muslim. The roots of Islam have been badly damaged here by the communists. I respect your insistence but I find it premature. If we declare the rule of the Shari‘a today, tomorrow you will demand that the heads and hands of offenders be cut off, giving little thought to the fact that the day after tomorrow, it will be a rare man, even in this assembly, who keeps his head and hands. You are not ready for that, nor am I. So let us put our souls in order according the Qur’an, and our lives according to the constitution.

It is important to note Dudayev’s inclusion of non-Muslim Chechens in this speech. Even those who did not practice the faith could be included in the nationalist struggle. It is is also notable that Dudayev made these statements at a time when the goal of the new Chechen republic was to garner the support of the international community and expressing an interest in establishing an Islamic state, if that had been his intention, might have seemed a poor political choice. Islam became one of the primary factors in the conflict only after the devastation of the first war. Specific tenets of the Islamic faith, however, do not appear to be the primary driver of conflict.

Islam as a Structure

There is much stronger evidence in Chechnya for Islam providing organizational structure and institutional power that was able to outcompete other potential sources for mobilization. Much of Chechnya’s clan-based social structure had been destroyed during the Soviet era, while Islamic institutions, especially the Sufi brotherhoods, had survived. Even secular leaders like Dudayev learned that religion could be a powerful tool for building legitimacy in Chechnya. He aligned himself with the Kunta Hajji tariqa and by 1993, he began increasing his use of Islamic language in order to garner support from religious factions within the Republic. Wood writes, “Given the numerical weight of Dudayev’s more traditionalist support base, religious slogans proved an irresistible tool for sidelining the opposition, and a vital means for Dudayev to mobilize his constituency in a crisis.” In 1991, he turned to the Qadiris for political support and in 1993 he announced that Islam would be the state religion during a standoff with parliament. By this point, however, the secessionist movement was well underway. Despite its initially minor role in the Chechen separatist movement, eventually Islam became the central driving force in the continued conflict with Russia. There are four general reasons for this trend: (1) The secular leadership was unable to establish functioning state-like structures in Chechnya following the attainment
of de facto independence. (2) Islamic institutions were able to provide support for the Chechen population when the secessionist government was unable to do so. (3) Radical Islamists from abroad were able to provide military support to the rebels, bringing training and resources that the Chechens did not have. (4) The conditions of war and devastation drove Chechens to oppose the secular leadership and thus turn to the only organized competing ideology: Islamism. All of these reasons are related either to the structure and capacity of Islamic organizations or to the absence of organizations able to successfully compete for Chechen support. Islam became a salient feature of Chechen mobilization not as the secessionist movement was gaining momentum, but instead when it was struggling. Neither Dudayev nor Maskhadov were successfully able to establish effective state-like structures in Chechnya, while the Wahhabis were able to usurp the responsibilities of the government in providing welfare and education in the areas under their control.

External support was critically important to the rise of Islamism in Chechnya. Shamil’s appeals to Islam drew in fighters from abroad who were familiar with tactics of asymmetrical warfare and able to train Chechens who had been discouraged by the devastation of the first war. The Islamists in Chechnya had more funding than the secularists, were able to pay fighters a wage and could compensate the relatives of those who had been killed. Wahhabism also provided a powerful ideology to a movement that perhaps was otherwise not sufficiently compelling after the mass destruction of the first war. Radicalization did not cause the war, but instead was a cause of war, as several scholars have argued. It provided a cause and structure where there did not seem to be another alternative. In that sense, Islam outcompeted other potential mobilizing frameworks. While the secularist movement collapsed in Chechnya, the Islamist insurgency continued, culminating in the establishment of the Caucasian Emirate. By 2009, when Russia announced the conclusion of its counterinsurgency campaign, the vision of the remaining rebels in Chechnya bore little resemblance to the movement Dudayev had championed.

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In 2001, the term “state failure” became one of the structuring concepts of political thought and policy-making in the Western world. Although the term itself — along with the accompanying terminology of failing, troubled, and stressed states — was coined in the early 1990s to describe the situation in war-torn African countries and some of the post-communist societies, it was not until the attacks on the World Trade Centers on September 11, 2001 that it became popular. Any reflection on state failure must keep this relation between the concept and the historico-political arena in mind: since failed states could host terrorist organizations harmful to the national security of the United States, they could no longer be the focus of exclusively humanitarian organizations and political scientists, but now also merited discussion by American policy makers and security officials.\(^1\)

One of the most interesting consequences of state failure is violence. If for a great deal of modern sociology and political science the conception of the state is based upon Weber’s definition of the state as the entity that “upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order,”\(^2\) the failure of the state would be defined as the loss of this monopoly, and it would have an empirical and direct increase in violence as its first corollary.

In this essay, I will analyze the links between “state failure” and violence in sub-Saharan Africa through case studies on Zambia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the first part, I will discuss different views of what constitutes a “failed state.” In the second part, I will apply the most suitable view, expanding it in order to apply it to the aforementioned case studies. Afterwards, I will study incidents of violence and death in each country, drawing on statistics of homicide, crime and a few other social indicators of material welfare. Ultimately, I argue that the success of modern states cannot only be defined by the monopoly of violence; states must be seen as institutional actors responsible for the provision of certain amounts of material welfare. State failure, then, cannot be defined simply as the loss of the monopoly of violence, but also as the inability of the state to fulfill these basic obligations, in which case the mortality rate could be seen as a primary indicator of state failure.

Failed State Theory

Scholars themselves have not come to an agreement on what constitutes a failed state, which means the same states can be classi-

Harvey Starr, Introduction to the CMPS Special Issue on Failed States, <web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=11&sid=850753d8-c39d-45d3-915c-17fb4c7f0ed%40sessionmgr112&hid=121&bdata=JNpdGU9ZWJhc3QtGltZQ%3d%3d&sid=850753d8-c39d-45d3-915c-17fb4c7f0ed%40sessionmgr112&hid=121&bdata=JNpdGU9ZWJhc3QtGltZQ%3d%3d#db=sih&AN=35348043>.


The careful reader may have been struck by perhaps the most problematic aspect of the study of state failure and of the existing literature — issues of conceptualization, definition, and measurement. The articles in this issue reflect the heterogeneity (confusion?) of definition and measurement regarding “state failure” or “failed states.” In brief, Goldstone defines state failure in terms of “stability,” while Bates is interested in “political order.” For Bates, “the mark of state failure is the government’s loss of its monopoly over the means of coercion.” Iqbal and Starr, after raising the issue of conceptual and definitional disarray, see state failure as “collapse,” using the POLITY code of “the complete collapse of central political authority.” Chauvet and Collier are interested in “failing” states, based on “inadequate performance of socioeconomic functions.” Thus, they study low-income countries with extremely weak economic policies, institutions, and governance. Finally, Carment et al. are concerned with at-risk states or “state fragility,” which they admit is “an elusive concept.” For them, “fragile states lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home and abroad.”

It is necessary to chose one of the aforementioned definitions, or in any case to come up with a set of criteria applicable to our three case studies. The definitions that seem to be the most complete are Bates’ and Chauvet & Collier’s. For the sake of simplicity, I will use Bates’ definition and set the threshold for state failure as the point at which “the government loses its monopoly over the means of coercion.” This theory means that a “successful” state is one in which all political agents within its territory have agreed to submit themselves to the authority of the government. In exchange for this submission, the state provides its citizens with a) personal security, b) basic health care and decent living standards, c) property security, and d) education. Defining the state’s responsibilities in this way furthermore necessitates a shift in terminology from “failed states” to “failing states,” as mentioned by Chauvet & Collier, since these elements can be partially provided, or provided only to a certain subset of the population. Weber, in Politics as a Vocation, stresses that it is the use of violence that allows for the formation of states, but admits that “force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state (…) but force is a means specific to the state.” In this context, the four aforementioned elements constitute those other means of the state to preserve its power mentioned by Weber. One consequence of the adoption of an expanded Weberian definition of state and hence state failure combined with Chauvet & Collier’s focus on the performance of socio-economic functions is that sev-
eral of the elements of the Failed States Index appear to be theoretically wrong: for instance, states can be deemed efficient even should uneven economic development along group lines and the rise of factional, aggressive and nationalistic elites persist. States exist in class-divided societies, and one of the main roles of violence is to maintain such a divide, hence revenue inequality cannot be a measure of state failure.

The extent of failure of a certain state depends on its ability to provide the aforementioned elements of material welfare, but the mark to determine if it has failed or not depends on the emergence of a new political actor who uses force and the consequent inability of the state to stop it. In this way, states fall along a continuum in which an ultimately successful state, i.e. one in which there is no other violent political actor, may be haunted by its relative inability to provide its citizens with personal and property security, education, and decent living standards. Chauvet & Collier's definition, then, establishes this continuum; Bates’ sets the threshold for a state to be considered a failed one. However, Bates’ threshold sees state failure as contingent on the appearance of armed guerrillas. While this variable may be theoretically correct, as the existence of armed guerrillas indicates the failure of the state's monopoly on violence, it should be discarded. First of all, though the emergence of guerrillas constitutes violence, if one defines a failed state as that one in which non-institutional violence takes place, one cannot simultaneously see violence as a possible consequence of state failure, nor can one adequately address cases in which violence persists not in the form of armed guerrillas but in the form of petit-criminals. Furthermore, the mere existence of a guerilla group does not imply the inability of the state to eventually destroy it.

Before turning to the case studies, one must also examine the extent of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa more generally, by comparing statistics on the increase and decrease in violence in different African states to world averages. The Geneva Declaration calculates that 740,000 people die violently every year, but between three quarters and ninety percent of these deaths occur in non-conflict settings, meaning that crime is much more likely to kill an average citizen than armed conflict. Murder, furthermore, does not rank among the top ten causes of death: one is one hundred times more likely to die out of natural causes than to be killed by someone, and only one out of four assassinations has to do with armed conflicts. Even in light of this, however, the state's role is crucial. From here onwards, I will take the world mortality rate of -.87 percent as the “natural” one, and the gap between it and the mortality rate of an individual state as due to the state’s lack of intervention or lack of efficiency.

Three Case Studies

Zambia has been a fairly peaceful country for the past few decades, with neither civil wars nor guerilla movements since independence.
from Britain in 1974. After several years of a single party state, a wave of protests in 1991 pushed the long-time president Kenneth Kaunda to allow elections and a multi-party system. Following the victory of his rival Frederik Chiluba, the country has been democratized to a great extent, and it seemed an oasis of liberal democracy and economic growth amidst the desert of civil wars and poverty that affected Africa during the 1990s. Yet Zambia remains one of the most violent countries in the world, with a life expectancy of only 48 years. The child mortality rate was .038% in 1988 — three years before the end of the dictatorship — but .074% in 2002. Democracy did not improve the general living standards of the population, and, according to some indicators, it has diminished. Zambia’s death rate is 1.6%, significantly more than the continent’s rate of 1.17%, and almost twice the world’s rate of 0.87%.11 Zambia’s homicide rate is also one of the five highest in the world, at .038%, or approximately 4,500 people killed every year.

In sum, it is clear that the Zambian state does not currently provide its citizens with the basic services that modern states should: criminality is rampant, people die young and children die often. Simultaneously, however, the literacy rate is not one of the highest of the region, but neither it is one of the lowest. Zambia’s economy is a fast growing one: since 2006, it has grown at a rate of more than 5%, meaning that the high rates of criminality and death cannot be explained by poor economic resources.

It is very easy to see that in Zambia the state has the monopoly on violence: despite the country’s low social standards, there are no armed groups aside from the army and police force. In this sense, Zambia cannot be considered to be a failed state. However, it is not an efficient one, or at least not for the bulk of the population. The wealth produced by the country in the past years has not been distributed amongst the majority of the population, which still lives in poverty and resorts to violent crime. The fact that these homicides are not perpetrated by a political opponent of the state but by simple criminals does not change the underlying analysis: the Zambian state is unable to provide its citizens with basic physical security and health services.

Sierra Leone, in contrast, seems like the textbook example of a failed state. The country went through an eleven-year-long war, from 1991 to 2002, in which some 50,000 people are estimated to have died as a direct consequence of the conflict.12 Almost a decade after the war, in 2010, the country had one of the lowest levels of development: the life expectancy is below 50 years, the literacy rate under 60%, the infant mortality rate 0.185%.13 Even if there was an improvement from the wartime situation, it is fair to say that the state is not able to perform several of its basic duties.

The degree of violence, however, also merits further scrutiny. If 50,000 people died during an eleven-year-long conflict, slightly fewer than 5,000 people died each year, which for a population of 5,000,000 people means a homicide rate of .1%, 2.5 times higher than the Zambian rate. A few years after the war, in 2004, the
homicide rate dropped to .034%, meaning that the recovery of the monopoly of violence by a single political agent—the state—reduced homicide by 60 percent. Thus, while war-torn Sierra Leone had a yearly average of almost 5,000 violent deaths, three years after the end of the war, only slightly more than 2,000 people were murdered.

Two thousand assassinations, however, is still a high figure, and thus merits an explanation. Furthermore, why is post-war Sierra Leone as underdeveloped and violent as the politically stable and economically dynamic Zambia? If our initial model based upon Bates’ definition were true, there should be a direct correlation between the existence of armed groups outside of the state on the one hand and a very high homicide rate on the other. Additionally, the existence of armed groups does not explain the tremendous gap in death rates between countries that underwent civil wars. While an eleven-year-long conflict in Sierra Leone killed 50,000 people, a five-year-long conflict in Congo killed about 5.4 million people. This fact points to the existence of another cause or set of causes explaining the incidence of death and violence, i.e. the monopoly of violence is not the sole explanation for its occurrence.

The Second Congo War started a year after the peace agreement that followed the deposition of United States-supported dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled the country from 1965 to 1997. Laurent Kabila’s government quickly proved itself incapable of ruling the country. Following Kabila’s political failure and an end to what had been a strong alliance with the Rwandan government, the population found itself divided along ethnic lines, in a bloody fight between some twenty-five to thirty armed groups and eight different nations for the control of its extremely rich mineral resources. According to Reuters and several non-governmental organizations, some 500,000 people were killed during battle, 10 times more than in Sierra Leone.

It is clear that the fight for mineral resources was at the heart of the Congolese conflict, a possible cause of the high death ratio. Perhaps, in Congo, political order and stability were only necessary for the different warring groups insofar as it allowed them to exploit resources, which in practice meant that it was enough to control the main mining spots and the links between them and ports or borders, while extending political stability to the rest of the country was simply beyond the groups’ economic interests. A humanitarian crisis that under any other circumstances would hinder the foundations of the warring groups’ claim to legitimacy, therefore, was not a problem in this case, since the groups simply did not work under the logic of a state-building political project, but under a predatory, resource-exhausting one.

Consequences and Findings

The case studies reveal the increase in the incidence of violence as the direct consequence of the state’s loss of monopoly over vio-
lence, with the homicide ratio up to .1% of the total population, 2.5 times higher than that of non war-torn countries. On the other hand, as we have seen, Zambia’s death ratio is 1.6%; twice the world’s ratio of .87%. In Congo, however, some 5,500,000 people died as a consequence of the war, which gives us a rather similar yearly death rate of 1.66%.

Thus, a narrow definition of state failure as simply the loss of the state monopoly over violence cannot account by itself for all the violence that has taken place in these three case studies: the deadliest conflicts in Africa have killed around .1% of the population, doubtless a very high figure, but still low when compared to pre-modern wars and to the amount of death provoked by curable sicknesses or by the complete disorganization of the economic system in war-torn countries.

Is hard to understand why a country like Zambia, that has not been through any sort of war lately and with a rapidly growing economy, has such a high death and homicide rate, and, if the average citizen of the developed world lives 75 to 80 years, the fact that the average Zambian lives no more than 48 cannot be explained by simply natural causes. The explanation, then, must be related to the state: while the Zambian state has had, for the past decades, a very stable political situation and a growing economy, it has been unable to provide basic relief for its citizens. It is clearly not efficient and it does not honour its duties; yet its power is uncontested. Can it be said that the Zambian state has failed? Certainly not, since no other political actor has ever tried to stand against it. Is it, then, a successful state? That also does not seem to be the case: a country with relatively stable levels of economic development with such poor performance on social indicators cannot be deemed to be successful by modern standards.

This observation, then, provides the grounding for our preference of the concept of “failing state” over “failed state.” The Zambian state is clearly failing; even if it has managed to maintain political order. The same definition can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the Sierra Leone case: once the war was over, in 2002, the state recovered the monopoly of violence and there was an immediate diminution of the death ratio. The state stopped being a “failed” one. Yet, for international standards, the level of living of the population remained dangerously low, and the death ratio, though considerably lower than during wartime, remained very high. Did the Sierra Leone state suddenly jump from being a “failed state” to a completely successful and efficient one? Clearly not. Even if all the armed groups outside of the state were defeated, the state was nonetheless unable to provide basic health care, education or security for its citizens, which again places it into the category of “failing states.”

In this sense, the Congolese experience is an aggregated example of the aforementioned ones that allows us to measure the combined influence of civil war and lack of state efficiency. During the war, the state lost its monopoly of violence, which by itself killed
around half a million people, but the fact that the different armed groups or the state were unable to provide with basic relief assistance for the population was what produced the overwhelming majority of casualties. This points to another element that lies at the heart of the difference in death ratios between Congo and Sierra Leone: the fact that a nation state loses control over part of its territory due to foreign invasion or regional secession (losing monopoly of violence; i.e., becoming a failed state according to Bates) does not mean that it loses its power over those regions that it still controls, nor that the seized regions sink into a state of chaos, looting and anarchy. On the contrary, if the guerilla group that seizes power in that region is a legitimacy-seeking, organized group, it will be better for them to establish political order and to become a state within the contested official jurisdiction of the enemy’s territory. This is what seems to have happened in Sierra Leone, in which, for most of the conflict the country was split into two parts: the south and the east controlled by the Revolutionary United Front rebels, which based its popularity upon the idea of a more equitable distribution of the state revenues. In contrast, the volatility and number of guerilla factions and foreign powers intervening in Congo made the situation much more deadly for the average civilian since no political group had an interest in administering regions of the territory or aspired to produce any kind of political order within them. The consequence of this volatility is that the country as a whole sank into an abyss of chaos and anarchy.

Finally, then, the failed state theory does explain the levels of relative violence in these countries, but only when this theory is expanded to view the state as a set of political institutions that has the duty of guaranteeing a certain level of life and security to its citizens, as opposed to only as a violence-specialist holding a nation-wide monopoly. The failed state theory is problematic not because it is inherently wrong, but simply because it is used too liberally. Its future utility depends on the ability of the academic community to reach a consensus about its definition and methodology.

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Politics in Period Costume: The Popular Front in the Works of Eric Hobsbawm
Edmund Downie

All of us inevitably write out of the history of our own times when we look at the past and, to some extent, fight the battles of today in period costume. But those who write only out of the history of their own times, cannot understand the past and what came out of it.
— Eric Hobsbawm, *Echoes of the Marseillaise*¹

Were you to have first encountered the legacy of Eric Hobsbawm through the obituaries that followed his passing in October 2012, you would have discovered a life presented in terms of two identities: acclaimed historian, fervent Communist. The relative importance of these two identities varied from paper to paper. The *Guardian* called him “Britain’s most respected historian of any kind” and did not mention his communism until its fifth paragraph;² the *Telegraph* said in its lede only that he was “widely considered one of the greatest historians of his generation” and spent the next seven paragraphs laying out the depth of his Communist convictions.³ What other facts that did trickle their way into the obituaries — his work as a jazz critic, tidbits about his personal life — served mostly as adornments to the backbone formed from these two identities, the defining features, one would expect, of his popular legacy. He will “be remembered not as Eric J. Hobsbawm the historian,” said fellow historian Tony Judt, but “as Eric J. Hobsbawm the unrepentant Communist historian. It’s unfair and it’s a pity, but that is the cross he will bear.”⁴

If Hobsbawm is to remain in our memory as a Communist historian, then, it is worth considering how we should understand the form of communism to which he ascribed. The public image of him as an unswerving Party member draws on his decision to remain in the party after 1956, when the Soviet invasion of Hungary and Khruschev’s speech against Stalin gutted the intellectual and cultural authority of the Party in the British public eye. It emphasizes, too, his assent to what Michael Ignatieff, in a 1994 BBC interview, offered as a summation of his views on the Soviet experiment, that the deaths of “15–20 million” under Stalin “might have been justified” had he succeeded in establishing the “radiant tomorrow” that Marx foresaw.⁵ His critics saw underneath his historical works the distortory influence of such dogmatic Communism, attacking, for instance, his elision of communist atrocities in the Spanish Civil War⁶ or his cursory treatment of the Soviet gulag system.⁷

And yet, if Hobsbawm’s unstinting allegiance to the Party defined him as what his conservative detractors might call an “extrem-

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Hobsbawm conceived of the Popular Front. A useful starting point for this question is his 1985 essay, "Fifty Years of Peoples’ Fronts," in *Politics for a Rational Left: Political Writings 1977–88* (London: Verso, 1989), 1–99. Indeed, it was Hobsbawm’s Popular Front leanings that formed the foundation for his most significant and controversial intervention into contemporary leftist politics: his call for a rethink in Labour strategy to counter the rise of Thatcherism. In a series of essays from the late 1970s through the 1980s, Hobsbawm took aim at Labour for its continued dependence on its declining trade-unionist base in the face of Thatcher’s successes. Just as 1930s fascism set itself against the aims of communists and liberals alike, so, too, did Thatcher’s agenda pose a radical threat to British progressives of all stripes; in this vein, he urged the party to transform itself from class-based into a broad front for the progressive cause. Hobsbawm’s essays, coming from a prominent intellectual with strong Communist credentials, attracted widespread attention within the left and played a minor but influential role in weakening opposition among the British left to Labour reformists. At the same time, they earned the ire of many more traditional fellow travelers, who slammed him for prescriptions “well to the right of classic reformism” that would aggravate the very dangers they sought to alleviate.

Both Hobsbawm’s detractors and advocates have agreed that Hobsbawm’s Communism colored his histories in ineluctable ways. This essay will not concern itself with the entirety of that question, as complex and ideologically charged as the debate surrounding it has been. But I submit that, insofar as Hobsbawm the Communist was Hobsbawm the Popular Frontist, Hobsbawm’s historical writings are inseparable from his political convictions. From his scholarship on the French Revolution to his essays on Labour politics in the 1980s, Hobsbawm’s writings on social change can be understood as struggling with the central tension facing Popular Fronts: their necessity for stymieing the advance of the Right and their impotence in advancing the cause of the Left.

To understand this claim, it is important to first consider how Hobsbawm conceived of the Popular Front. A useful starting point for this question is his 1985 essay, “Fifty Years of Peoples’ Fronts.”
It may seem odd to call “influential” any essay that appeared in a 1980s theoretical journal put out by the Communist Party of Great Britain, but Marxism Today was an unorthodox Party journal. Formatted as a glossy newsmagazine, it sought a wide readership by consciously positioning itself as a reformist voice from the Left within debates over the future of the Labour Party in the 1980s. It also made a portion of its essays available to the Guardian; Hobsbawm was the most frequent benefactor in this arrangement, with ten of his essays picked up for republication. See Herbert Pimlott, “Eric Hobsbawm and the Rhetoric of Realistic Marxism,” Labour / Le Travail, no. 56 (Fall 2005), <www.jstor.org/stable/25149620>.

“Fifty Years,” 114.

Ibid., 108.

Ibid., 109. Hobsbawm had cited this passage before in another essay from 1984: see Hobsbawm, “Labour: Rump or Rebirth?” in Politics for a Rational Left, 82. His affinity for this quotation underscores its significance to his conception of the Popular Front.

Ibid., 113.

Ibid., 107.

Drawing implicitly on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, he attributes the isolation described by Dimitrov to the “institutions of civil society” on which rests the legitimacy of bourgeoisie rule; in this context, Popular Fronts can help bridge the gap between the vanguard and the masses.19

Though the Popular Front has often been interpreted as a defensive tactic, Hobsbawm is keen to emphasize that it was designed for greater aims:

The point I wish to make here is that the popular front strategy then adopted was more than a temporary defensive tactic, or even a strategy for eventually turning retreat into offensive. It was also a carefully considered strategy of advancing to socialism.20

The 1930s strategy for that advance, he acknowledges, was premised the unfounded assumption that fascism represented the logical culmination of capitalism, rather than a temporary phase. The
offensive thrust of contemporary Popular Fronts instead depends on the ability of socialists to “convince and carry along their allies, or at least neutralize them.”21 Independent of this, however, Popular Fronts enjoy an even bigger advantage over other socialist strategies: they are the one “that most frightens the enemy,” who “know that in most countries where socialism has come, it has been brought about by broad fronts led by Communists…rather than through the isolated actions of revolutionary Marxists.”22

Hobsbawm's political and historical works reinterpret and comment upon the theoretical model presented here in two ways. His scholarship on the French Revolution and its legacy buttresses his argument for the necessity of the Popular Front. But his empirical examination on the movement’s offensive capabilities points to the principal weakness of his case for the Popular Front: his faith in socialists' ability to bring their allies to their side.

Hobsbawm's discussion of the French Revolution provides a good starting point. As an academic historian, he writes on the French Revolution in two works: the first volume of his Age trilogy, Age of Revolution: 1789 – 1848,23 and Echoes of the Marseillaise, a reflection on the historiography of the Revolution in the 19th and 20th centuries. The former gives a more complete account of the Revolution: the era of the National Assembly from 1789 – 1791 and the Jacobin Republic of 1793 – 1794, through the consolidation and reformation of the state under Napoleon. Echoes focuses somewhat more on the historiography of the first two of these phases, and it is these two that bear most on the central concerns of his thinking on the Popular Front.

Hobsbawm's French Revolution is a bourgeois revolution, the culmination of a class struggle that brought to a close the feudal-aristocratic political order and established the dominant political language of 19th-century bourgeois liberal society.24 But its achievement required more than just the agitation of the bourgeois; it rested upon a convergence of their interests with those of the laboring poor and the peasants. The onset of an economic crisis in the late 1780s brought the peasants and laboring poor to the edge of a mass uprising. Their restlessness gave political force to the demands of the Third Estate, and the outbreak of revolution itself came through the storming of the Bastille by the Paris masses, sparking a surge of peasant upheaval that left the whole of the French state in ruins within just three weeks.25 In this way, peasant unrest cleared the way for the reconstruction of the French state along bourgeois-liberal lines; to Hobsbawm's mind, this bourgeois revolution “would not have been made but for the intervention of the people.”26 And yet, already by the early 1790s, the alliance was showing signs of strain. The upheaval that accompanied the eruption of the masses had unsettled a portion of the middle-class revolutionaries, who had begun drifting towards conservatism.

At this point, Hobsbawm interrupts his account with a passage of particular relevance to the Popular Front lens, a more general commentary on revolutionary change in the 19th century.27 The
tone shift that accompanies this passage underscores its special significance: he moves to a first-person plural voice narrating in the future tense to set up what he calls “the dramatic dialectical dance [that] was to dominate future generations.” His chapter on the French Revolution includes a number of similarly weighty passages extrapolating from particular phenomena larger historical trends. However, most of these passages last just a line or two. Hobsbawm does not come down from his theorizing here for ten lines, indicating the peculiar weight he places for his own historical project on this commentary.

Now, then, the model itself. The first years of the French Revolution outlined above, he suggests, establish the “main shape of French and all subsequent bourgeois-revolutionary politics.” They begin with “moderate middle-class reformers mobilizing the masses against die-hard . . . counter-revolution.” But the masses’ ambitions extend well beyond those of their middle-class allies, who split into conservative and left-wing camps. This process repeats itself until the revolution reaches its resolution.

Hobsbawm sees in the unfolding of the nineteenth century a middle-class that, when facing situations with revolutionary potential, leans more and more conservative. This partly reflects the rise of the proletariat, who, for the first time, provide the masses with a coherent political voice that underscores for the middle class what revolution actually might mean. But it also reflects the peculiarities of the French Revolution itself — in particular, the presence of the Jacobins, “the one section of the liberal middle class . . . prepared to remain revolutionary up to and indeed beyond the brink of anti-bourgeois revolution.” The Jacobins were possible in part because of the absence of a proletariat, but also, he explains,

because the French bourgeoisie had not yet, like subsequent liberals, the awful memory of the French Revolution to be frightened of. After 1794 it would be clear to moderates that the Jacobin regime had driven the Revolution too far for bourgeois comfort and prospects, just as it would be clear to revolutionaries that “the sun of 1793,” if it were ever to rise again, would have to shine on a non-bourgeois society. 29

The only forms of revolution left after 1794, then, were the very ones that the memory of the Jacobins had sullied for the middle class.

Hobsbawm’s accounts in the Age trilogy of the revolutions of 1848 in Europe and 1871 in France bear out the significance of this change. The various iterations of the 1848 revolution across Europe, he writes, all encountered the same problem: they were “social revolutions of the laboring poor” that “therefore frightened moderate liberals,” who saw in them the same sort of threat to societal order that had concerned the nobles and clergymen of France in 1789. As a result, the revolution survived beyond 1848 only in countries like Italy and Hungary, where the radical cause’s nationalist sentiments was appealing enough to overpower moderates in seek-
One could even say the fact that only national liberation could tie together radicals and peasant masses in itself doomed the revolution. While non-nationalist revolutions would founder upon a lack of popular support, nationalist revolutions would have to marshal military firepower on a scale only accessible to nation-states if they hoped to avoid foreign conquest by the pro-status quo powers of the Concert of Europe.

To read Hobsbawm’s presentation of the French Revolution and its legacy purely as a commentary on the Popular Front would seem a step too far; his conclusions on 19th-century revolutionary change, significant though they may be for the work, form just one pillar of a much broader exploration of the Revolution’s impact on democracy, nationalism, and even forms of scientific and technical exploration. But what he does say on the topic helps to flesh out the historical perspective behind his defense of the Popular Front, as the ideal strategy for confronting circumstances in which “the classical revolutionary situations of the type of the October Revolution or other types...[are] not to be expected.” The success of the Revolution in laying the groundwork for bourgeois ascendency — that is, the accomplishments of 1789–1791 — rested upon an ad-hoc alliance between the masses and the middle class. But the historical memory of the Jacobin Republic poses a formidable roadblock to the extension of that alliance to anti-bourgeois revolutions. That was true of the 19th century, and Hobsbawm’s *Echoes*, written in 1989, suggests he saw it as a continuing concern. The essay is devoted to rejecting the ascent of a revisionist school of thought in the historiography of the French Revolution, dating from the mid-1950s, that he sees as “entirely directed, via 1789, at 1917,” wherein the Jacobins are “the ancestors of the vanguard party.” In this sense, the Jacobin threat, reinterpreted through the lens of the October Revolution, had retained its power as a warning to guard against those who toy with the foundations of the social order. Meanwhile, the traditional left — the industrial working class — does not have the votes to win elections on its own; given the circumstances, then, Popular Fronts seem the most workable solution.

In fact, Hobsbawm thinks Marx would have said just as much. In his 1985 essay “The Retreat into Extremism,” Hobsbawm quotes Marx describing the strategy for proletarian advance that he developed from the failures of the Paris Commune as “the revolution of the Commune as representative of all classes of society which do not live off others’ labour”; this, says Hobsbawm, is “what we could call today ‘a popular front.’” Debatable though his claim may be, for Hobsbawm, even Marx was a Popular Frontist.


Interesting Times, 276.


Hobsbawm does describe the passage of major social reform and welfare packages to the growing strength of labor, but he sees this as part of a largely successful push to incorporate its moderate wing into existing political blocs, rather than as the first step of a larger campaign for socialism. Thus, he concludes that, “in the years between 1880 and 1914, the ruling classes discovered that parliamentary democracy, in spite of their fears, proved itself to be quite compatible with the political and economic stability of their regimes.” See Age of Empire, 84–111. The ineffectiveness of earlier post-1848 movements is described in Age of Capital, 114.

Labour’s Lost Millions,” 74.

“The Retreat into Extremism,” 94. My caveat in note 36 to his possible conflation of Marxism and Popular Frontism applies here as well.

ure in this regard can consign them to the role of water-carrier for liberals in power. Hobsbawm concedes that the historical record for Popular Front governments in this regard is far more mixed; he cautiously admits, for instance, that the French Popular Front’s attempt to advance socialism was rather half-hearted, and that other movements like Salvador Allende’s Chilean Popular Unity failed to recognize the difficulty of constructing effective governments out of ideologically diverse coalitions.37

In writing about the Labour Party in Britain, however, he seems more sanguine about its possibilities for advancing socialism. He lays out the strategy for this advance as part of his essay “Labour’s Lost Millions,” advocating essentially a shift in Labour’s rhetoric to convince nontraditional supporters of the merits and feasibility of socialism and to establish that Labour, like the Liberals, actually stands a chance against Thatcherism.38 Responding to criticisms of that essay in 1985, he reaffirms that he meant this program as a workable strategy — that his essay was not a surrender to Thatcherism or a call to join the centrist SDP-Liberal Alliance, but “about the ways to avoid either of these two outcomes.”39

As mentioned above, Hobsbawm’s advocacy played a role in quieting leftist voices decrying Labour’s strategy rethink in the 1980s. But the culmination of that rethink — the mid-1990s “New Labour” of Tony Blair — was hardly the grounds for socialism’s advance that Hobsbawm desired. He suggests in his autobiography that, before Blair came to power in 1994, he and his allies at Marxism Today “could barely even envisage” a Labour Party with the platform that it championed under Blair, whom he calls a “Thatcher in trousers.”40

Hobsbawm’s scholarship on the French Revolution fits well with his arguments for the necessity of the Popular Front. And so it is somewhat indicative that Hobsbawm’s histories and historical essays provide much less material in favor of the movement’s offensive potential. The latter half of the 19th century in Europe saw large-scale extensions of the franchise that brought into politics new “levels of the social strata…several of which might form rather more heterogeneous alliances, coalitions, or ‘popular fronts’”,41 and yet pre-1914 parliamentary socialism, to his mind, in Europe was ultimately unable to pose a serious challenge to the existing bourgeois-liberal hegemony.42 As implied above, “Fifty Years” does not present the post-1914 era as particularly fertile ground for examples of Popular Fronts that advanced the socialist cause. Nor do his Marxism Today essays spend much time discussing this element of the movement’s record. Only the contemporary example of the Italian Communist Party, praised in “Labour’s Lost Millions” as a traditional mass socialist labour party that has succeeded in expanding its reach while preserving its base, strikes him as a successful example worth emulating.43 As to social change in the non-European world, his 1980s essays do cite Lenin briefly as a strategist who saw broad alliances as compatible with class politics.44 But his portrayal of the Russian Revolution in The Age
Age of Extremes presents as a major factor behind the Bolsheviks’ success their ability to win support from a broad coalition of groups. Conservative patriots who might have otherwise opposed their program backed Lenin’s party for its unique ability to hold the empire together, while peasants saw their odds of preserving the land grabs they had made during the revolution as better under Lenin than under the gentry. But note here that the support from both groups was largely conditioned upon circumstances arising from the chaos of the revolution — in other words, on circumstances that Hobsbawm sees as unlikely in postwar Western Europe. See Age of Extremes, 64–65.

Indeed, the one area in which Hobsbawm seems to see long-term success for the Popular Front movement as an offensive strategy is not in popular politics, but in that form of politics fought in period costume, historiography. He places the movement at the heart of the journal he co-founded with other members of the Communist Party Historians’ Group (CPHG), Past and Present. Describing the journal’s early years in a 1983 essay, he and two fellow CPHG members present their goal of bringing together Marxists and non-Marxists as an attempt to “continue, or to revive, in the post-war period the politics of broad unity we had learned in the days of pre-war anti-Fascism.” Past and Present was a central force in the mid-century emergence of historical sociology and social history within academic history, and it still counts among the premier history journals in the English language.

Hobsbawm also presents the 1930s Popular Front movement in France as a key force for bringing Marxism into the historiography of the French Revolution. Its revival of the cult of Jacobin patriotism in the political arena legitimated the French left as the standard-bearers of a certain form of French nationalism, thereby creating the conditions for “the fusion of the Republican, Jacobin, Socialist, and Communist traditions.” These developments, he says, made the historiography of the Revolution “more leftwing and more Jacobin.” What was to Hobsbawm the greatest work produced by this shift, Georges Lefebvre’s The Coming of the French Revolution, was published in 1939, as Leon Blum’s Popular Front government lay in ruins.

Hobsbawm’s discussion of the Popular Front as a historiographical force can be seen as giving a certain sort of perverse credence to his strategy for realizing the movement’s offensive potential. In “Fifty Years,” he had argued that socialists in Popular Fronts would need to convince or at least neutralize their more moderate allies, and there are several reasons to think that academic history might better suit such an enterprise than liberal-democratic politics. The former’s emphasis on critical argumentation can give ideas a relatively greater degree of sway than they enjoy in the more restricted discourse of mass political appeals, especially for a socialist in the Cold War West. Alternatively, one could also argue for a liberal skew within the discipline that would make its practitioners more open to leftwing ideas. Both claims suggest that the art of persuasion would come more easily to Hobsbawm and his allies as academic historians than as political commentators.

A close reading of the discussion of Popular Fronts in The Age of Extremes suggests that, by the mid-1990s, the movement’s luster...
had somewhat faded for Hobsbawm. In discussing the anti-Fascist unity program, he qualifies the remarkable electoral gains of socialist and communist parties with an extended discourse wholly missing from his 1980s essays, laying out the movement's near-universal failure to draw in voters who had formerly identified with the right.\footnote{Age of Extremes, 147–149.} His discussion of Europe-wide shifts of the late 1970s in the composition of the working-class—a development whose British instantiation inspired his Marxism Today essays—evinces a similar shift. The labor and social-democratic parties of the West are singled out as the “major losers” of the period, undone by a combination of New Left ascendancy and the working-class fragmentation prophesied by his first salvo in that essay series, 1978’s “The Forward March of Labour Halted?”\footnote{Age of Extremes, 417.}

Juxtaposed against the earlier works of the Age trilogy, The Age of Extremes makes for a moving coda to Hobsbawm’s struggle with the tensions of the Popular Front movement. The French Revolution and its legacy had made Popular Fronts a necessary part of socialist strategy. And yet its record in the 20th century gave little evidence to suggest that it could help drive a real transition to socialism, leaving it, like the October Revolution, a movement of great promise that ultimately went unfulfilled.

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——. “Age of Extremes.” Interview with Michael Ignatieff. The Late Show. BBC. October 24, 1994. <www.youtube.com/watch?v=k0P7d7nTREW0>.


Afghanistan is often referred to as the Graveyard of Empires. In completing the mission that began in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the United States risks becoming the third global power to be defeated in Afghanistan. That this nation of thirty million provided both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union strategic defeats at the apex of their power frequently emerges in discussions over the future of U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) involvement. Such mentions of the Graveyard are accompanied, especially in media portrayals, by connections between the Soviet Union’s failed efforts in the 1980s and the ongoing conflict to prevent the reestablishment of terrorist safe havens. However, while numerous connections between the Soviet and ISAF efforts exist, and the reputation of Afghanistan as a difficult country to conquer is historically deserved, the automatic assumption that ISAF will fail in the same manner as its predecessors is rarely further developed. There is much to be learned from the Soviet experiences in Afghanistan, and this information should simultaneously provide hope and guidance to ISAF strategic planners as they contemplate the future of international involvement in Afghanistan.

In 2009, former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski stated, “we in fact are running the risk of replicating, obviously unintentionally, what happened to the Soviets...we are beginning to move to a level of military force which is beginning to approximate the Soviet engagement and already our top generals are saying we are not winning militarily.” This equation of the two operations laid the groundwork for informative ties, but risks being misquoted. Although there are many similarities between the two military operations, a deeper examination of Soviet lessons showcases both accomplishments in developing Afghan governance, as well as a series of objectives towards which both the modern Afghan government and its international backers should strive. Moreover, retellings of the downfall of the Soviet-selected President of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah, intricately tie the regime’s collapse together with the withdrawal of Soviet forces. However, while images of Red Army vehicles crossing the Afghan-Uzbek Friendship Bridge marked the 1989 withdrawal, Najibullah’s regime survived until 1992. More than three years elapsed between these two points, and in questioning the endurance of the current Afghan government, it is vital to examine the successes and failures of Najibullah.
Regime Comparisons

In retelling the Soviet withdrawal, the *Guardian* noted, “The Russians pulled out in good order and the government of Najibullah, whom they left in charge, survived for three more years. When it collapsed…it was not because of the insurgents’ prowess but because Moscow stopped delivering cash, fuel, and weaponry.” Thus, Najibullah was not defeated by the insurgency; external influences forced his downfall. The regime established a status quo, with the insurgency occupying much of the Afghan countryside but unable to seize population centers or win strategic victories. This status quo left the regime dependent on the Soviets, its future determined by shipments of arms, food, fuel and funds. Six weeks after this aid halted, Najibullah’s regime collapsed. In preparing for the future of Afghanistan, foreign supporters should consider benchmarks from the Soviet-era government, and discover lessons of sustainability remaining from the early 1990s.

Members of the Soviet Politburo noted this dependency several years before Red Army withdrawal. In 1986, officials complained that the Afghan Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense were non-functional. In addition, it was unequivocally stated that the Najibullah regime was unable to rule the country without external support. As the Soviets prepared for withdrawal, they knew the Afghan government was incapable of leadership. Even more striking, plans for withdrawal remained classified until the fall of 1987. Soviet forces withdrew on February 15, 1989, providing less than eighteen months of preparation for the Afghan government. Today, complaints regarding ISAF’s withdrawal strategy fear that the declarative timetable provides insurgents a date to retake the country. However, this also provides a timeline to the Afghan government to establish capabilities, and is necessary for proper preparation.

In the late-1980s, General Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, noted that “80% of the country is in the hands of the counter-revolution, and the peasant’s situation is better there than in the government-controlled areas.” Consequently, Najibullah faced violence with little to show for the enormous struggles endured by his people. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze restated this issue in 1987: “Very little is left of the friendly feelings toward the Soviet people…Not a single problem was solved in favor of the peasants.” During the same meeting, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Ryzhkov concurred: “The society is illiterate. The revolution resulted in the deterioration of the situation for the people [of Afghanistan.]”

Counterinsurgency is a battle over legitimacy, requiring improvements in quality of life; to his people, Najibullah was a pawn of the godless Soviets instead of the legitimate ruler of his country.

This legitimacy was further hampered by the Red Army’s failure to pass significant activities onto the Afghan government. A central tenent of counterinsurgency holds, “the host nation doing
Domestic capacity is vital. In order to establish a successful government in Kabul, the Soviets needed to gradually transfer authority and capacity. However, this transition began too late, and concerns voiced by the Politburo demonstrate its failure. Once Soviet forces withdrew, aid helped retain basic functionality and blocked incentives toward self-sufficiency. Without legitimacy and sans significant Soviet assistance, there was little hope of central government control or institutional improvement to the point where the regime could survive without international support. Today, similar story lines persist. The Afghan government is renowned for corruption, inefficiency, and dependence on international aid. According to the World Bank, 97% of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product comes from foreign aid, without which the economy would collapse. Afghanistan will be dependent for years to come, hitching its future to the whims of international governments. Regardless of domestic government capacity, the country will be vulnerable to a Najibullah-style collapse until it is self-sufficient.

However, several solutions could provide most of the funds required to maintain a moderately effective government. Afghanistan’s mineral wealth was rated in excess of $1 trillion by the Afghan Ministry of Mines. This ministry’s ability to develop the mining sector is vital to future economic development. Great strides must be made in terms of infrastructure, in addition to major deals with international corporations to commence mining operations. Furthermore, Afghanistan sits at a strategically vital link between South and Central Asia, supported by the New Silk Road initiative. Initially proposed by the State Department with regional support, this initiative seeks the development of a trade corridor through Afghanistan, connecting the mineral-rich Central Asian republics to population centers in India and Pakistan. This initiative includes the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline, which may earn the Afghan government hundreds of millions of dollars in annual transit revenue, while also increasing energy access for the Afghan people.

Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, its strategic location as a transit hub, and initiatives such as the TAPI pipeline offer solutions to economic deficiency. The full development of all three concepts will help inhibit insurgent strength by undercutting claims against government capacity. Economic development enables government strength, but as the Soviet experience demonstrates, legitimacy and domestic support is equally vital. The insurgency challenges regime legitimacy, and gains strength by convincing the population that they will be better served by different leadership. Without the endorsement of the Afghan people, the government will fail, ushering back in volatility.

Deficiencies in legitimacy contributed to the Najibullah collapse, but the current situation in Afghanistan is markedly different. Despite the fact that the current regime faces issues with legitimacy, particularly due to a lack of reach and efficiency, the Ameri-
can Conservative Magazine noted, “President Hamid Karzai enjoys genuine popular support, unlike the Soviets and their allies in the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan.” This legitimacy grows as ISAF combat forces withdraw, and will be buoyed by a democratic transition of power and signs of self-sufficiency. Both of these occurrences will demonstrate the ability of the government to sustain itself, a vital declaration in terms of domestic support.

To support these efforts, the international assistance mission must recognize Soviet lessons from more than two decades ago, and understand the need for eventual self-sufficiency. Although Afghanistan will certainly not be fully independent in 2014, steps must be accomplished now, while international military forces and government assistance remain. This process has been underway for several years, providing additional training time for the current regime than was afforded by the Soviets. In terms of legitimacy and capability, the Afghan government is already ahead of 1989, and more than one year remains before ISAF withdrawal. Such steps, undertaken by Afghans with international support, prepare the country for domestic governance. Furthermore, it is critical that post-2014, international efforts are not limited to aid. Extensive institutional knowledge is stored in the governments of the United States and its allies, and this is vital to accelerating Afghan capacity. In its current iteration, the Afghan government has only officially existed for nine years. Few governments operate effectively after such a short period of time, especially when facing an insurgency. That said, Afghanistan, with international institutional support, may learn from mistakes made by other governments to achieve a distinct trajectory toward self-sufficiency. In order to maintain this path, the Afghan government must rely on its own legitimacy and international support.

Negotiations

Oft-repeated solutions for the future of Afghanistan include negotiations with the Taliban, to create an environment fit for sustainable governance. Preparations are underway, including the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar to facilitate this dialogue. Debate regarding negotiation can gain insight from Soviet experience. Once the Red Army announced withdrawal, it initiated negotiations with mujahedeen commanders to establish a peace deal to reintegrate insurgents into the Afghan government. These efforts ultimately failed, but the process revealed weaknesses in the coalition of ethnic groups that comprised the central government in 1989, including individuals who reappeared in the current regime. Upon review of the Soviet experience, the Afghan government should cement its current power structure, instead of risking internal revolt in an effort to integrate the Taliban.

As the Soviets pursued a ceasefire, President Najibullah opened his government to dissenters to separate the moderate opposition from the enemy. However, these efforts were matched by a
18 Sandy Gall, War Against the Taliban: Why It All Went Wrong, (Bloomsbury USA, 2012), 160.
19 The United States Department of State estimated in 2010 that the Uzbek ethnic group makes up approximately 9% of the population of Afghanistan, while the Tajik make up 27% and the country’s population consists of roughly 9% Hazara. For comparison, the largest ethnic group of Afghanistan, the Pashtun, is estimated to make up roughly 42% of the population of Afghanistan. These figures were reported in: United States Department of State, Briefing Book on Afghanistan, July 2012.

determined counter-effort, led by the United States and Saudi Arabia. Between ineffective negotiating efforts and international pressure against peace, the negotiations ultimately failed.\textsuperscript{17} This failure is unlikely to be explicitly replicated, due to the lack of official international pressure on the Taliban to continue fighting. Yet terms acceptable to the Taliban would destroy the central power structure of the current Afghan government. As Sandy Gall notes, “the Northern minorities — the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and the rest — will not accept a settlement which puts the Taliban back in power, in any significant manner.”\textsuperscript{18} Due to ideological and historical differences, these minority groups openly voiced opposition to Taliban reintegration. Despite being minorities,\textsuperscript{19} they hold sway over major population centers in the North and West, and pockets of mineral wealth. Rapprochement with the Taliban requires concessions from the Afghan government, which are unlikely to be accepted by the Northern minorities. This may lead to a split within the government.

This split also occurred under Najibullah, and was a major contributor to the collapse of the Afghan government. As the Middle East Policy Council notes in its report on the Soviet withdrawal, “the collapse of the regime in April 1992, though, was not due just (or perhaps even mainly) to the actions of the Pakistani-backed Pushtun mujahedeen. Indeed, the immediate downfall of the regime was precipitated by the defection of the previously pro-regime Uzbek militia leader, Dostum, to the side of the non-Pushtun opposition to the regime.”\textsuperscript{20} The departure of Abdul Rashid Dostum, who commanded a major militia group, greatly weakened Najibullah’s power. Once Dostum’s forces defected, there was little incentive for other Northern supporters to remain loyal to the regime. Abdul Rashid Dostum played a crucial role in sustaining Najibullah’s strength, and his withdrawal may have been as sizable a contributor to the regime’s collapse as the cessation of Soviet aid. Yet while his decision-making impacted prior Afghan politics, General Dostum is not just a historical figure; he is a key official in both the military and government of Afghanistan. Dostum serves as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Afghan National Army, and is believed to control a force of 25,000 men. Furthermore, Dostum openly campaigned for President Karzai during the 2009 presidential election.

Due to his importance to the centralized power of the Afghan government, the support of the Northern minorities, and the strength of the Afghan National Army, it is essential that General Dostum remain allied with the central government. In considering a successful conclusion to negotiations with the Taliban, the Afghan government and its advisers must ultimately choose. Peace may be established with the Taliban, a group that ruled with authoritarian brutality, provided safe haven to Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terrorist network, and worked for more than a decade to undermine the current regime. If such a deal is reached, ardent supporters of the current government will likely abandon
During a prolonged campaign against the Taliban, aid is vital to sustain efforts. As mentioned before, Soviet aid sustained President Najibullah for more than three years; six weeks after these shipments ended, the government collapsed. This tie is no accident: the Afghan economy requires development before it will sustain a centralized government. Lessons from the Soviet era provide indicators of the funds necessary to sustain the current regime and hope for success, based in part on the lack of aid to the insurgency. Between early 1989 and late 1991, the Soviet Union provided approximately $300 million per month. When adjusted to 2012 dollars, this figure amounts to $6 billion dollars per year, directed at all sectors of the Afghan government—including the military. While a massive sum, this figure is below current forecasts for aid to the Afghan government, post 2014. These funds, which total approximately $8.1 billion, should sustain the current regime, and are closely tied to efforts to develop Afghan self-sufficiency.

Yet it is also necessary to consider the international support available to the insurgency. While the Soviet Union provided billions of dollars, the mujahedeen received support from the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. As The Nation reports, “The considerable covert military assistance provided by the United States was initiated by the CIA, generously funded by the Saudi government and jealously managed by Pakistan’s increasingly powerful Inter-Services Intelligence.” Although it is commonly believed that this aid only flowed to insurgents while the Red Army occupied Afghanistan, the aid continued to a significant degree until Najibullah’s fall.

The Nation’s report on American aid to the mujahedeen referenced the “bleeders,” a faction of the United States government that believed the Soviet Union could be bled dry in Afghanistan, ending the Cold War. “The bleeders, heavily represented in the CIA and the Congressional ‘Afghan lobby,’ were out for more blood and insisted that aid to the mujahedeen would end only when all aid to the Najibullah government stopped. In the end, the bleeders won. Viewed from Moscow and Kabul, the Reagan administration’s position was ‘completely uncooperative.’” The “bleeders” included Congressman Charlie Wilson, who ensured the Afghan mujahedeen received more than $70 million each year, matched dollar-for-dollar by Saudi Arabia. However, the CIA may have provided $250 million per year — matched by the Saudis — $500 million pales in comparison to $3 billion in Soviet aid; however, the latter sustained both government and military activities, and a standing army is considerably costlier than a guerrilla force. Therefore, although the regime, taking with them significant Northern support and large portions of the National Army. Although an end to the insurgency in the south would enliven the Afghan government, it is ultimately not worth the loss of Northern support.

Aid

21 Ibid.


24 Ibid.


21 Ibid.


24 Ibid.

mujahedeen received no more than one-sixth of the funding, this ultimately went much further than this numerical disparity suggests. In considering the future of the current Afghan government, this enormous insurgent sum must be considered. Although the Taliban receives aid from extremist organizations and private donors, these funds fail to reach the level provided by the CIA and the Saudi government. Therefore, while the Afghan government will receive slightly more aid post-2014 than Najibullah, the Taliban insurgency receives much less than the mujahedeen. This disparity should prompt ISAF to continue its support beyond 2014, during which time financial advantage will accompany legitimacy and military strength to sustain the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Military prowess is vital in ensuring the Afghan government is able to defeat the Taliban insurgency and bring about peace within its borders. Current plans call for a force of 195,000 Afghan National Army soldiers, supported by 157,000 Afghan National Police, for a total strength of the Afghan National Security Forces of 352,000.26 A central question of Afghan success hinges on whether this force can defend the country without ISAF assistance. In answering these questions, the force left in place when the Red Army withdrew provides a potential answer. The Afghan army of the early-1990s defended against a well-armed mujahedeen force, receiving hundreds of millions of dollars annually. When comparing such capabilities, it is revealed that its modern iteration is already far more capable.

Today's debate over Afghan troop strength mirrors that in Moscow in the late-1980s. As the Soviet Union prepared to withdraw, the Afghan army contained 55,000 men, in addition to the 10,000-strong presidential guard and varying militia support.27 Numerically, this force pales in comparison to the current security forces. The military was plagued by desertion and recruitment, rendering it incapable of rallying its full strength. Few were confident in the force's ability to retain control, especially due to its failures in joint operations with Soviet forces. During a meeting of the Politburo on October 17, 1985, three and a half years before the Soviet withdrawal, Mikhail Gorbachev's principle foreign policy adviser made a strong plea for improvements to the Afghan forces. Anatoly S. Chernyaev demanded, “Turn the army into an army... raise the salaries of the officers.”28 These words demonstrated the need for a professional force, instead of a band of militias. Despite the lack of capacity, the Afghan forces maintained control over major population centers and won a series of vital battles. As the Middle East Policy Council reports, “the effectiveness of Afghan government forces increased significantly after the Soviet withdrawal.”29 Sans support, the Afghan military was forced into sustained operations, and performed better than outsiders could have
imagined. Against a determined and well-funded enemy, this force that amounted to one-fourth of the current Afghan National Army, maintained control of the country for three years.

In approaching further improvements of Afghan Security Forces, ISAF must hold Chernyaev’s words in high regard. Troop numbers are important, but the force already outstripped its predecessor. Yet enormous strides remain with regard to professionalism. Issues of desertion and recruitment hamper force capabilities, and training is threatened by so-called “green-on-blue” attacks, in which Afghan soldiers turn their weapons on ISAF trainers and advisers. These issues will certainly continue, but improving the quality of the force can diminish them. In order to do so, it is necessary to pay troops more than their current wages. Soldiers initially receive $150 dollars per month, whereas Second Lieutenants receive $250 per month. These sums are competitive for Afghanistan, but the prestige and legitimacy of the force will be raised by increased compensation. This would increase the cost of the force — a major concern for donors, reducing the likelihood of self-sufficiency — but could be offset by reduced troop numbers. This combination would lessen the need for constant recruitment, which counters the effects of desertion. In addition, these investments should be combined with more extensive background checks for new recruits, and superior training. Additional checks on recruits reduce insurgent infiltration and desertion rates, while training inspires professionalism. These steps will encourage the recruitment of more dedicated soldiers, while blocking extremists through safeguards such as background checks. Altogether, these reforms will initially be costly and require steps to offset this expense, the long-term benefit may be the development of a professional force with low turnover rates and the ability to grow through both prestige and legitimacy, in addition to a well-trained cadre of non-commissioned officers.

Although such a force would be more sustainable than the current initiative to maintain the Afghan National Army via recruitment, its size would prevent the Afghan government from exerting control over the entire nation. However, this is nothing new: neither the Red Army nor ISAF maintained total control of Afghanistan. During Najibullah’s regime, the Afghan army controlled population centers; the Afghan military should do the same in 2014. Without support from the West, it is vital to build up economic and cultural safe-havens, which can be well-defended by security forces and in which the government and police forces can establish legitimate rule. By safeguarding major cities, it will empower international aid groups to improve quality of life, increasing legitimacy and reducing support for the insurgency. This strategy may take some time to implement, but the alternative is for the Afghan government to attempt to exercise its legitimacy over the entire country. Given the prior failures of the United States and Soviet Union in doing so, it is unlikely that the Afghans will be capable of such an objective in 2014.
Throughout their experience in Afghanistan, the Red Army was buoyed by close air support in suppressing insurgent activities. The effect of their air supremacy was reflected in the effort by the CIA to provide Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedeen,\(^\text{32}\) believing this to be one of the greatest obstacles to insurgent operations. Two decades later, when the United States initially invaded Afghanistan, close air support again demonstrated its vital role, enabling a small force of Special Forces operators and Northern Alliance fighters to defeat the numerically superior Taliban army in a short period of time. These are but two examples of the dominant history air power has played in recent Afghan history, and the ability to call in devastating fire support will remain essential in the future.

In preparation for withdrawal, the Soviets provided nearly 200 aircraft to the Afghan Air Force, including MiG-27 ground attack fighters.\(^\text{33}\) These aircraft ensured that the Afghan army would have sufficient cover, and were instrumental in maintaining the government throughout three years. However, after three years of poor maintenance, the fleet was severely depleted, and during the Battle of Jalalabad, the Afghan military was in danger of being overrun by a heavily armed, well-orchestrated insurgent force. Instead of capitulating, the Afghan government improvised, and resorted to rolling aerial bombs out of the cargo hold of An-12 transport aircraft. Furthermore, strategic missiles like the SCUD were used in a tactical setting, in order to provide fire superiority over the enemy.

As the United States and ISAF look to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, it is vital that similar measures are put in place. An initiative was introduced to provide the Afghan National Air Force with Brazilian-manufactured Super Tucano aircraft, but this has since been blocked by the United States Congress, which desires that any aircraft provided to the Afghans be American-made.\(^\text{34}\) The bidding process must be completely redone, meaning that a fully functioning, trained and equipped force will not be ready until 2017, at the earliest. In order for the Afghan regime to remain in power without ISAF support, these aircraft are vital, and yet they will not be capable until three years after withdrawal.

In preparing for this inevitability, ISAF should look back to the Battle of Jalalabad in search of an answer. Then, the Afghans used what they had available and developed an efficient, albeit make-shift, force. The Americans, in particular, have a platform already in their arsenal that is both inexpensive, and capable of extended loiter times as well as the delivery of heavy munitions. Predator and Reaper drones are already operating in the skies of Afghanistan, and these could be repositioned to cover Afghan positions. Through the use of a modified joint Afghan-American tactical air controller (TAC) the United States could receive calls for support from Afghan forces, and already have drones in the sky, able to be controlled in by Americans in Kabul, and piloted by officers as far
Any new protocol unveiled in the lead-up to the 2014 withdrawal must be consistent with current and future agreements between ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan. As the establishment of a TAC would not require the presence of American combat troops, and could be jointly staffed by Afghans and international service personnel, it is complementary to the current exit strategy. In addition, this strategy would minimize the need for international combat pilots to provide close air support for Afghan soldiers on the ground, by removing these pilots to their remote-operation stations in the continental United States. This would provide effective support away as the United States. This would provide effective support without the costs or risks associated with manned ISAF fighter-bombers, and extend Afghan capabilities until their own air force is capable of stepping into the war zone.

Furthermore, the transition of drones from a hunter-killer role to that of close air support would increase the legitimacy of the government, as the drones would no longer be seen as a violent menace, but as an instrument of government authority and protection. Currently, drones used to target militants along the Afghan-Pakistan border are justified with the belief that these strikes hinder insurgent movements. However, as a recent Associated Press report noted, sorties over these remote regions terrify local villagers and force them to flee their homes. Through the process of being uprooted and relocating, villagers sacrifice safety. In turn, this hinders their trust in the central government. Instead of operating as solitary unmanned strike platforms over villages that have little connection to the government, the benefits of extensive drone operations can be directly tied to government-supported strategies. If drones were instead used as a platform for close air support, they would be seen as guardians of Afghan soldiers, and essential for the development of safe zones.

In considering the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, there are numerous connections to the Soviet experience, which simultaneously provide hope for future success and lessons for additional strategic planning. By recognizing the deficits that the regime of President Najibullah overcame between 1989 and 1992, and identifying particular areas in which further developments could be made for the current Afghan government, international militaries and donors can improve the standing of President Karzai and his successors. These lessons should be analyzed as the strongest case studies available for the questions currently being confronted. Innovative answers are necessary to assist in the creation of a sustainable Afghanistan, but these answers will be all the more effective if they are inspired by the past.

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The popular protests that deposed Hosni Mubarak left in their wake critical questions: will the newly-democratizing Egypt continue on the path of former dictator Hosni Mubarak, whereby Egyptian foreign policy was constrained by an alliance with Western powers? Or, will it assume a new course inspired by the populist sentiments of its citizens?

Democratization in the Arab World, particularly in Egypt, not only invites discussion on shifting political alignments, but also raises academic questions. Powerful democratic states have long operated under the framework of the influential Democratic Peace Theory — which, in its most elemental form, states that democracies do not fight wars against other democracies — a “law” of international relations that may now be called into question. Theorists have historically maintained that public opinion in democracies acts as a constraint mechanism on war, since citizenry are less willing than ambitious autocratic leaders to endure the costs of war. In the case of Egypt though, this assumption of democratic peace’s causal logic merits reconsideration: recent public opinion polls cite that a majority of Egyptians demand nullification of Mubarak’s Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Thus, the public constraint may not operate as supposed; several indicators suggest that Egyptian voters remain willing, if not eager, to bear the costs of military engagement with Israel. Moreover, the theory’s validity originates from the historical absence of war among democratic states on two continents (North America and Europe), rendering uncertain its applicability to democratic entities in a region of continual violent strife.

However, the democratic peace literature makes no guarantee of peace for countries in transition to democracy, as Egypt is today. We must turn instead to dominant democratic transition theory literature, which empirically demonstrates increased hawkishness and warmongering among infantile, transitioning states. The literature suggests the probability for military conflict involving immature democracies is high because of nationalist bidding wars that arise as byproducts of an ensuing power vacuum. The reality of aggressive transitions threatens the democratic proliferation doctrine, yielding policy implications for Western powers. We must therefore consider the short-term implications of a democratizing Egypt to hypothesize about the Egyptian-Israeli dyad’s prospects for war and peace. To this end, we qualitatively estimate the likelihood of dyadic conflict by analyzing recent Egyptian foreign policy choices and behavior in the context of Mansfield and Snyder’s...
Many proponents of the theory trace its origins to the 18th century writings of liberal philosopher Immanuel Kant, author of *Perpetual Peace*. Kant presents a formulaic path towards the foundation of world peace, specifying three “definitive articles”: “The civil constitution of every state should be republican,” “The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states,” and “The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.” Kant does not believe that republican governments alone are sufficient to guarantee peace among nations, and therefore proposes the latter two conditions, considered of equal necessity. Nevertheless, it is Kant’s first definitive article that inspired subsequent exploration into the link between representative government and peace, which led to the contemporary conceptualization of the “democratic peace.”

Though Kant draws a clear distinction between democracy and republicanism in his writing, for better or worse, modern academia generally treats this distinction synonymously. In fact, most democratic peace theorists have substituted Kant’s “republic” in favor of the increasingly-specified classification “liberal democracy.” Kant argues that with an institutional separation of powers (i.e. a distinction between legislative and executive bodies), as is the governing practice characteristic of republics, war is infrequent since those bearing the costs of war decide whether or not to fight. This logic led to the formation of the “monadic” democratic peace thesis—the claim that democracy asserts a pacifying effect on a state’s foreign policy on the *unitary* level—maintained by few scholars today. Several studies have refuted the Kantian-inspired monadic thesis; some have even statistically demonstrated that democracies monadically engage in more wars and military interstate disputes (MIDs) than other regime types, and that wars involving democratic states tend to be longer and more lethal.

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**Philosophical Origins of the Democratic Peace Theory**

1. Kant, 1795.
2. In fact, in *Perpetual Peace*, while advocating democracy as a form of sovereignty (forma imperii), Kant equates democracy as a form of government (forma regiminis) to despotism, writing: “Republicanism is the political principle of the separation of the executive power (the administration) from the legislative; despotism is that of the autonomous execution by the state of laws which it has itself decreed. Thus in a despotism the public will is administered by the ruler as his own will. Of the three forms of the state, that of democracy is, properly speaking, necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive power in which ‘all’ decide for or even against one who does not agree; that is, ‘all,’ who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom” (Kant 1795).
Kant's thesis has been appropriately amended since 1795, as little-to-no statistical evidence has been found to sustain the monadic argument; however, the linkage of democracy and peace on the dyadic level has proven to be “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.” Babst9 pioneered the quantitative investigation of Kant’s conjectures, finding through statistical analysis of all wars between 1789–1941, that dyadic democratic peace is statistically significant on the 1 percent level.10 Future studies, increasing the temporal domain and sample size, altering the operationalization of military conflict and democracy, and controlling for possible confounding variables have strengthened the reliability of the dyadic democratic peace thesis.11 Thus, the leading consensus on the relationship between democracy and war is that democracy-on-democracy war does not occur, citing the historical absence of war between two authentic democracies.12 However, the invincibility of a dyadic democratic peace thesis has been challenged with evidence demonstrating that democracies have engaged in MIDs “that involve limited use of force and mild violence.”13 Herein lies the major caveat; the causal logics underpinning the democratic peace thesis habitually fail to operate appropriately among young democracies, which typically lack matured institutional checks on the exertion of aggressive military force. Since the logics often fail, such regimes in transitional flux remain especially prone to military engagement with democracies and autocracies alike. Ray14 notes that democratizing countries share a disproportionate likelihood of war if surrounded by undemocratic states, as is the case with Egypt.

Democratic transition theory asserts that states undergoing transitions to a democratic, and thereby representative form of government, possess a gap between high levels of political participation and feeble political institutions,15 leading to increased likelihood of interstate war and MIDs.16 According to Mansfield and Snyder,17 two lines of logic justify this theory. First, in the absence of political institutions characteristic of mature democracies, political leaders often exploit nationalism as a tool of mobilization against an “exaggerated foreign threat” in an effort to distract their constituents from the lack of internal political progress. Second, transitions to democracy promote aggressive foreign policy because the transition threatens status quo ante interest groups (e.g. military bureaucracies, business and political elites, and influential political parties) who, in an attempt to increase their relative influence, claim to act by popular mandate while remaining unbounden to true democratic accountability. The former and/or the latter often lead to “nationalist bidding wars” which are exacerbated by
been produced demonstrating the opposite trend, i.e. that democracies have initiated more military interstate disputes (MIDs) than any other regime type in the post-Cold War era. For an example, see Ole J. Forsber, “Another Shot at the Democratic Peace: Are Democracies More Aggressive Than Non-Democracies in Militarized Interstate Disputes?” Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences 1, no. 2 (2007): 1–18.

Nonetheless, a few studies have cited rare occurrences of democracy-on-democracy, direct warfare (Rosato 2003), leading staunch supports of the reliability of democratic peace theory to cite what they perceive as a deliberate manipulation of the definition and/or criteria of the independent variable (democracy) and the dependent variable (the dichotomous variable: war or peace) substantiating democratic peace theory refutation. Predictably, modern realists also accuse liberal, democratic peace subscribers of careful variable manipulation, leading to the sustainment of the theory.

A State in Democratic Transition

In order to confirm our classification of Egypt as a transitional democracy we consult the latest Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Indexes, published in 2011 and 2012. At the time of the 2011 publication, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) served as the caretaker government following Mubarak’s relinquishment of power. Lacking elected leadership, Egypt was rated the least authoritarian “authoritarian regime,” a remarkable improvement from its rankings in the Mubarak days. After hosting a series of local and national elections, several of which remain clouded by accusations of fraud and corruption, the country finally escaped classification as an “authoritarian regime” in the 2012 report, earning the “hybrid regime” designation. Though some caution may be warranted, it seems that, for the time being, Egypt is a regime in transition to democracy, as indicated by its favorable movement up the EIU’s constructed ranks. For the purpose of this study, we argue that EIU’s operationalization of hybrid regime is consistent with Mansfield and Snyder’s conceptualization of a regime in incomplete democratic transition. Certainly, Egypt’s democratic progress was evident in the first free elections Cairo has seen in fifty years, and is demonstrated daily by a civil society unafraid to take its grievances to the streets. Still, concerns persist. Egypt falls short of full democratization, owed to its questionable civilian supremacy of the military, court-ordered restoration of emergency law detention procedures, disdained judiciary, dissolved lower house of parliament, and an executive that reverts increasingly to dictatorial tendencies, apparently in the name of advancing democratization.

Under the established assumption that Egypt is undergoing a transition to democracy, we now turn to testing the applicability,
and thereby validity, of democratic transition theory, examining recent episodes of Egyptian domestic politics and foreign policy, thereby identifying any trends. Surely, there exists evidence of foreign policy realignment under the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom & Justice Party (FJP); after all, nearly all regime changes result in global strategic recalibration and realignment. But how much of the observed variation in foreign policy can be explained, or was predicted, by transition theory? That is, how much of the shift can be attributed to the emergence of logrolling coalitions and new political parties who engage in nationalist bidding wars that increase the probability of conflict?

Hypothesis

Because Egypt is in its early phase of transition, we expect to find limited evidence of nationalist bidding wars. As such, there will only be superficial foreign policy realignments. That is, Egyptian foreign policy, in large part, will follow the same path as Mubarak-era Egyptian policy despite bellicose rhetoric espoused by the Freedom and Justice Party.

Indicators of Realignment

Following a cross-border incident with Israel at the Sinai border in August 2011 — which resulted in the unintentional death of several Egyptian border policemen — the military sat idle as protesters demanded the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador and tore away at concrete barriers securing the Israeli embassy in Cairo. Under Mubarak’s regime, similar cross-border incidents had little impact on bilateral relations and protests were deterred by Egypt’s internal security apparatus. Eight months later, the transfer of natural gas to Israel was cancelled, much to the praise of all presidential hopefuls and their party affiliates.

In July, as one of President Morsi’s first foreign policy moves in office, the Egyptian government opened its border with the Gaza Strip, a crossing which had been only intermittently open previously, and officially closed since 2007. In August 2012, armored forces were deployed to reinforce beleaguered Egyptian border police, attempting to combat non-state actors in the Sinai who were targeting Israeli and Egyptian security forces. Days later, reports surfaced claiming that Egyptian anti-aircraft weapon systems were being deployed along with additional mechanized forces, raising concerns of militarized build-up in the Peninsula. Due to this adjusted force structure, Egyptian troop levels are at their highest since the 1973 Yom Kippur War and constitute a clear breach of the Camp David Accords. In perhaps the new government’s greatest divergence from the former regime’s policy, President Morsi recognized and embraced Hamas leadership during Israel’s November air campaign against the Strip. In a show of solidarity unknown under Mubarak, who considered Hamas a terrorist organiza-
results require a peaceful transfer of power.

Morsi denounced Israel’s military air operations, withdrew its newly-appointed ambassador from Tel-Aviv and dispatched Egypt’s prime minister to Gaza.

Nationalist Bidding Wars and Logrolling: Catalysts for Realignment?

Early evidence of a nationalist bidding war surfaced following the August 2011 Sinai cross-border incident. The event triggered a public response not tolerated in the days of Mubarak’s regime; protesters threatened to storm the Israeli Embassy and chanted at nearby soldiers to “go to the Sinai.” Political parties, vying for success in Egypt's first democratic presidential election, used the public mandate as a vehicle to compete in a nationalist rhetoric battle of intensifying proportions, in which the foreign policy threats and stakes rose sharply. In the ensuing bidding war, presidential candidates demanded the immediate termination of Egyptian gas supply to Israel and warned that Israel must “realize that Egyptian blood now has a price.”

23 The interim government finally recalled its ambassador in an attempt to appease the political parties and public, marking a strong about-face in Egyptian-Israeli relations. Then Prime Minister Issam Sharif summed the realigning mood, stating, “Our glorious revolution took place so that Egyptians could regain their dignity at home and abroad. What was tolerated in pre-revolution Egypt will not be in post-revolution Egypt.”

Seven months later, evidence of logrolling is found in the context of a parliamentary session in which the lower house voted to cut all diplomatic ties and halt gas exports to the “Zionist entity . . . the first enemy of Egypt and the Arab nation.”

While the vote lacked authority due to the SCAF’s domination of Egyptian foreign policy, it appears that the various interest groups were able to negotiate with military leadership on the issue. In a calculated political maneuver, just two months before a predicted win by Morsi’s FJP in the presidential elections, all natural gas transfers to Israel were terminated, much to the praise of all presidential hopefuls, their parties, and members of parliament. Many groups calling for a hard line foreign policy vis-à-vis Israel were mollified by the SCAF’s move, and thus remained indebted to military leadership.

The termination of gas transfers had a negligible effect on the Israeli economy; to the common Egyptian, however, it was a welcomed assertion of the state’s newfound sovereignty. Likewise, the decision provided the sought credibility to competing political factions engaged in nationalist outbidding strategies in parliament, who gladly accepted the public’s accreditation. In essence, the SCAF implemented an “all bark, no bite” approach to appease the wishes of emerging political forces and the larger public, who would have a significant impact on the military’s future role following the elections. It is likely that this logrolling coalition, formed between elements of the lower house and the SCAF, resulted in reciprocal promises to the military. Later that year, the FJP made good on that promise.
In August 2012, armed forces reinforced Egypt’s beleaguered border police in their fight against non-state actors using Sinai to stage attacks against Israeli and Egyptian security forces. Days later, reports surfaced claiming that anti-aircraft weapon systems were being deployed along with additional mechanized forces. The deployment’s significance lies in its overarching goal: giving the SCAF a military mission, whose objective is channeled externally, not internally. That is, the FJP’s decision to deploy Egyptian armed forces signaled to the public that the military can perform a vital defense function east of the Suez, instead of playing the internal security role to which it had been relegated since Mubarak’s ousting.

Following Israeli air strikes on Hamas leadership in Gaza, in a statement posted on November 11, 2011, a secular opposition party coalition criticized the Morsi government for its “bad management” of the Sinai insurgency and its supposed cooperation with Israel, inferring that Morsi’s government signaled Egypt’s quiet compliance with future Israeli aggression. The secular bloc organized a demonstration the following day to show solidarity with Gaza, several days before the FJP even issued a condemnation of the Israeli “assassination operation.” Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s delayed response received criticism from the right, as the Salafi Nour (Light) Party issued statements claiming that a Salafi-controlled government would have committed full financial and manpower resources to combat Israeli “aggression” and aid the Palestinian cause. This time delay suggests that Morsi’s subsequent decisions (i.e., recalling the Egyptian ambassador and dispatching its prime minister to Gaza on November 15 and 16, respectively) were inspired by their need to participate in the nationalist bidding war waged by the opposition blocs. It seems at least plausible that, had opposition parties not mobilized popular support around the issue, the FJP may have never diverged from the Mubarak-era indifference expressed towards Israeli operations in Gaza. While some actors, such as former prime minister and head of the Arab League Amar Moussa, communicated support with the FJP’s eventual initiatives, leftist parties claimed the party was only leveraging the situation for their own political gain. This condemnation demonstrates the perpetual nature of the nationalist bidding war evident in the transitional phase.

Of course, there is a cost for the young-but-ensuing nationalist bidding war and logrolling occurring, and payday may arrive sooner than some anticipated. The SCAF’s logrolling with Morsi’s government, in which the SCAF allows Morsi to play hard with Israel on the diplomatic front while Morsi grants the military missions that maintain its relevancy, has thus far averted crossing the retaliation threshold drawn by the American-Israeli alliance. The SCAF’s current priority seems to be the careful and strategic fulfillment of their dual mission. First, as a remnant of former regimes constituting a current veto group, they seek to preserve their ingrained position of relevancy, honor, and prestige in Egyptian
society. Second, they desire to maintain the $1.3 billion of annual military aid from the United States. These two mandates are now in ubiquitous tension. Fulfilling the first mandate is predicated on the military’s ability to competently respond to the demands of its citizens, both fueling and becoming further inflamed by nationalist bidding wars. Satisfying the second mandate, however, is contingent upon peaceful relations with Israel. The tension between the mandates shows no signs of tempering; in just a year since Mubarak’s fall, Egyptians have increasingly favored abolishing the peace treaty with Israel.\textsuperscript{30} The strategy adopted to reconcile the conflicting mandates works for the time being, but the balancing act may prove unsustainable.

More concerning though, is that the military’s trouble with walking the thin line is microcosmic of the regime’s position. Like the SCAF, Morsi’s government has its own intrinsically conflicting mandates. As Gamal Abdel Gawad, director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, stated in an Al-Jazeera interview:

The new regime is torn between two types of commitments…. One commitment is towards Israel and the United States regarding the peace treaty with Israel, even though this could be downgraded to the minimum only…. [The second] commitment, is [one to] a broad audience in Egypt and region-wide, where the Muslim Brothers have been preaching a kind of hard line policy vis-à-vis Israel and the Palestinians, rejecting all kinds of peace negotiations, not recognizing the state of Israel, etc., which would create in the current situation [i.e. crisis in Gaza] a kind of credibility problem.\textsuperscript{31}

Escaping this trap in a future escalation of tensions necessitates compromise on one of the Brotherhood’s aforementioned mandates. On the one hand, Morsi can choose to maintain his country’s ties with the United States and Israel, which remain vital to the state’s struggling economy and a cornerstone of its national security, thus ensuring the FJP’s fall from public favor in losing the nationalist bidding war. On the other hand, cashing in on campaign promises, maintaining the party’s ideological integrity, and responding to the rising public sentiment for a hard line Israel policy will likely result in a shooting war. Gawad warns, in this future “moment of truth… with tremendous pressure coming from the people [at] the street level… leaders could slip into situations that they didn’t really choose. Many conflicts develop this way.”

Figure 1 suggests a relationship between this pressure and the intensification of a hardline policy vis-à-vis Israel that characterizes the Egyptian nationalist bidding war. The figure also denotes that the battle for political legitimacy could force the administration into a decision that places them above what we call the Israeli “threshold of retaliation.” Initially, the FJP will respond to competing political factions’ criticism by intensifying their hardline policy with respect to Israel; however, a calculated effort to avoid

\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Fig1.png}
\caption{Nationalist bidding war}
\end{figure}
a foreign policy move exceeding the threshold of retaliation is to be expected. Unfortunately for the FJP, the nature of the bidding war is linear, in that each party continues upping the ante as they jockey for position in Egypt's unstable political space (i.e. the ruling party must respond adequately to increased criticism by the opposition in order to maintain power). Given the consequences of crossing this threshold, the FJP will respond to increasing criticism with a proportional intensification of its “hardline” policy until, upon approaching the threshold, marginal criticism of current foreign policy behavior induces diminishing returns on the intensification of hard-line policy.

Following this power-curve behavioral scheme allows the FJP to avert the costly crossing of the threshold. However, as the stakes of the bidding war amplify, “as pressure coming from the people [at] the street level” strengthens, the FJP may be forced to respond more linearly to criticism in efforts to maintain political legitimacy and power. Under such circumstances, there is high probability that the FJP, in crossing the threshold, falls into the “trap” of the nationalist bidding war, resulting in a kinetic Israeli response.

The FJP has demonstrated great caution, preventing disproportionate escalation, in an effort to increase the amount of time before the threshold is reached. The transition's unstable nature will ensure the linearity of the bidding war; thus, as long as the transition to democracy remains incomplete, pressure from opposition parties and “the people [at] the street level” will ultimately push the FJP's foreign policy to a point just below the threshold for retaliation (i.e. the inflection point of the bidding war), where it must choose political favorability, legitimacy, and power or international credibility, trust, and peace.

And if political science offers anything approaching a governing principle, it is that realpolitik considerations dictate the FJP’s survivalist instinct. This means, in effect, that we should not expect Morsi to silence the public demand for a hard line policy, but instead anticipate what Mansfield and Snyder predict in their theory: the waging of a diversionary war with an exaggerated enemy. Yet, even under this theoretical assumption, hostility with Israel is not entirely inevitable. It is conceivable that Morsi strategically diverts his country's attention away from domestic hardships and political failings and towards more manageable foreign threats to the south, namely the Sudan and Ethiopia, located at the headwaters of the White and Blue Niles, respectively. Nearly half of the political parties contending for the Egyptian presidency in 2011 cited continued access to the waters of the Nile Basin as a strategic issue; in perspective, an equal number of parties made mention to Israel in their electoral platforms.32 The nations’ significance lies in their geostrategic control of the headwaters of the Nile River, which are symbiotic with Egypt’s agricultural industry, employing 32 percent of its population.33 Recent Egyptian military threats directed against the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam support
this narrative, given that Egypt's water security is a greater long-
term strategic threat than the country's Jewish neighbor.34

Implications for Scholarship and Policymakers

Egypt's early transitional phase has yielded substantially more evidence of a nationalist bidding war and policy realignment than originally hypothesized. While Mansfield and Snyder found war's probability was highest seven years into transition, the unique circumstances of the Egyptian-Israeli dyad heighten the probability of conflict occurring even prior to that point. The Egyptian peoples' historic animosity vis-à-vis Israel, a result of decades of seemingly perpetual war and the still unsolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is increasingly exploited by political groups who may later find themselves trapped in their own nationalist rhetoric. Additionally, Israel's hyper-sensitivity to regional threats and willingness to launch preemptive and preventive military operations indicate that the nation may maintain a relatively low threshold of retaliation. A low threshold increases the risk that a miscalculation on either side could draw the dyad into another war well before Mansfield and Snyder's seven year milestone. Based on the evidence marshaled above, it seems that the trap predicted by democratic transition theory has been set. Now the FJP must rank its priorities; it can die a political death by standing down, or prompt Israeli retaliation by rising up.

In a speech delivered at the 20th anniversary celebration of the National Endowment for Democracy in 2003, George W. Bush fittingly stated, “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe—because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export.”35

A democratic transition leading to increased Egyptian-Israeli conflict would rebuke this claim, challenging policymakers and scholars to rethink the democratic peace theory’s age-old assumptions concerning the dyadic thesis. The “Eurocentric” theory would, in effect, loose its applicability outside of Western Europe and the Americas, and by extension, generalizability in academia and relevance among the policymaking community. Western elites must adapt to a new reality that challenges the comforting conventional wisdom that the spread of democracy is followed by lasting peace; they must recognize that “liberty” has been promoted at the expense of long-term security.

Examination of this dyadic case simply adds to the dilemma facing Western states. The reality of aggressive transitions threatens the democratic proliferation doctrine; Western powers invest faith in the pacifying effect of democracy, but must reconcile this desire with their fear of the war-torn journey associated with democratization. If the nationalist bidding war continues, along


with the FJP pushing anti-Israeli rhetoric, conflict may be inescapable. In such a scenario, Egypt becomes another failure in the West’s push for democratic proliferation in the greater Middle East, similar to Iraq and Afghanistan, albeit without direct military intervention. This realization, in conjunction with the aftermath of the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, may explain the Obama administration’s prudence in backing the Syrian opposition, despite liberal interventionist and neoconservative calls to increase America’s military commitment in the ongoing civil war. If, as we predict with the Egyptian case study, instability follows transition, a new government in Syria may deep-freeze the already frozen peace process. Considering the radical elements permeating the Syrian opposition, there are reasonable fears that they may erase the steps Assad’s autocratic government has made toward reconciliation with Israel. Do Western governments truly believe it is in their interests to remove a regime which has been a pillar of stability in the Levant, replacing it with a heterogeneous group of unknown actors in the hopes that they are Jeffersonian-like rebels fighting for liberal freedom? Current American policy toward Syria indicates that they do not.

Egypt as a case study informs our understanding of the Arab Spring revolutions and their short-term implications. Egypt, like Tunisia and Algeria, served as a host state of sporadic, spontaneous regime change. However, its regional neighbors Iraq and Libya, which are likewise in democratization phases, are undergoing coerced transition to democracy. That is, their regime change follows overt Western military intervention. An interesting avenue for future research may be assessing the effect of coerced democratization on the transitioning state’s prospects for war and peace. Does the effect differ significantly from those states experiencing sporadic democratization? Is Iraq perhaps less enslaved to the trap of a nationalist bidding war or somehow more prone to violence during its transition than the spontaneously-transitioning Egypt? A solid theoretical foundation, based on rigorous study, could provide answers before realities become problematic for policymakers.


Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index 2012: Democracy is at a Standstill, 2012.


Kerala stands out among the states of India, not only for its relative poverty, but for the truly remarkable array of basic health benefits which it manages to provide to its citizens. Despite having a per-capita GNP of only $298 in 1991, Kerala boasted a nearly one hundred percent literacy rate, and had one of the lowest incidences of child malnutrition in all of India. By contrast, the GNP in the rest of the country was $330, and the adult literacy rate only 52%.\textsuperscript{1} The robustness of health of Kerala’s citizens also shows through in a variety of other metrics, and the extraordinary success of Kerala’s ambitious program to settle entrenched historical inequities and promote truly exceptional widespread health demands an explanation. In fact, the phenomenon of the state’s development has been so well studied that the “Kerala Model” is frequently referred to by economists, anthropologists, and policy-makers alike.

However, looking simply at the health metrics in Kerala is not sufficient. To fully understand its current situation, one must take a biosocial approach. This means recognizing that “measurable biological and clinical processes are inflected by society, political economy, belief, desire, to a similar extent as other aspects of social life.”\textsuperscript{2} For Kerala, this entails looking not just at the failures or successes of currently implemented policy, but also at the historical circumstances which informed it and the social structures which surround and shape it. Only by looking at the Kerala model more deeply, analyzing it through a variety of disciplines, can we hope to find meaningful answers about the causes of its successes and failures, and its applicability and meaning in a broader world context.

One aspect that contributes to the uniqueness of Kerala is the strong civil activity and organization of its citizens. This history of mobilization started centuries ago under the oppressive and demeaning caste system, pressing vital reforms through entrenched local and national interests to result in the current notable health statistics. Though the benefits of these reforms are experienced both biologically and socially, they come as the result of deliberate moves of policy and advocacy which organized the disadvantaged to fight for their own rights. With that opportunity, the people of Kerala have managed to structure and enforce specific reforms which have direct, beneficial effects on the way they live.

Kerala is often dismissed as a special case, a perfect storm of ecological, historical, and individual circumstances. However, the characteristics of Kerala which enabled its success are not strictly limited by setting, and the approach it took toward advocacy, policy, and reform can apply in broader contexts, and has. The idea of


\textsuperscript{2} Paul Farmer, Arthur Kleinman, Jim Kim, and Matthew Basilico, eds., \textit{Global Health: A Biosocial Approach}. 
education as mobilization addresses one of the main problems in development today — the fact that it often enhances inequality even as it promotes GNP-level growth — by working to combat “structural violence” at its roots. Kerala challenges the assumption that countries have to experience economic growth on the national level to be lifted out of poverty by showing that meaningful education reform and the nurturing of an engaged active citizenry can create a better standard of life without succeeding on any traditional monetary growth metrics. The state’s uniqueness is not then a testament to the Kerala Model’s ineffectiveness or irreplicability, as some allege, but to the deep entrenchment of the economic growth model and the interests which support it.

Kerala’s successes are the result of a long history of division and struggle. Up through the 1900s, people in that area were bound by a rigidly inflexible caste system. Subtleties of dress and speech “ensured that a person’s place in society could be recognized at a glance.” These highly visible classifications in turn determined how wealth was distributed and how different social groups interacted. Higher-caste groups were considered pure; they owned the land or were priests, while lower castes were relegated to the most menial labor and considered contaminated or polluted. Though this system was in place throughout India, it was both particularly elaborate and exceedingly strict in Kerala. In the nineteenth century, Indian reformer Swami Vivekananda called the region “a madhouse of caste.”

Chief among the restrictions imposed on the lowest castes were their inability to own land, interact with higher-caste individuals, or enter Hindu temples, but other instances of structural violence against lower-caste Keralites were innumerable and utterly pervasive. These inequalities were doubly entrenched in tradition and religion in India, making them especially intractable. However, as described later, education for critical consciousness works to counteract the systemized violence of the caste hierarchy by teaching people to question the system rather than just adapt to it.

The caste system epitomizes traditional authority, which social theorist Max Weber described as “resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them.” Traditional authority differs from bureaucratic, or rational-legal authority in that it is historically derived. Because of this, policies are determined by custom, or the whims of whoever custom selects to rule. The utter lack of meritocracy in such a static caste society meant that edicts from the ruling class could only be enforced as long as the tradition on which they were grounded continued to prevail. As challenges to the traditional system came in the form of the caste liberation movement, they also inspired challenges against the idea of top-down authority at all. When the caste system finally fell, those who had been most disadvantaged by it had also learned

### History of Kerala

Education played an important part in Kerala's tremendous transition from a rigidly caste-divided society into one of India's most egalitarian states. Though the region historically had strong literacy rates, it was the early-1900s expansion of the education system into the countryside which paved the way for the mass mobilization and active citizenry which today define Kerala. However, this early emphasis on vernacular schools (schools which taught in the native language, Malayalam) was actually implemented with much the opposite intention. A Maharaja of Travancore explained the pro-education policies by saying, "a government which has to deal with an educated population is by far stronger than one which has to control ignorant and disorderly masses. Hence education is a twice-blessed thing — it benefits those who give it and those who receive it." Though advocating for education, he and other elites believed it would lead to a less barbarous, easier to control populace. In this case, limited knowledge about the effects of literacy and education, led decision-makers to implement policies with results almost diametrically opposite of what they intended, a phenomenon Robert Merton called “the unanticipated consequences of purposive social action.”

Ironically, the very education reforms structured to make the populace easier to govern would help inform the radical movements which later swept Kerala. This gap between expectations and results shows most clearly in the selection of Booker T. Washington's *Up from Slavery* as a required text. While educational authorities applauded “Washington's emphasis on deference and slow, peaceful change,” low-caste Hindus read it as a manual for how to go about challenging their oppressive situation. In this case, the maharajas were simply unable to fully understand the impact that the texts they selected would make, and because of this they never anticipated the revolutionary seeds their own purportedly placating school system would sow.

The school system in Kerala directly challenged the traditions of the past. It mixed the castes, even as it heightened awareness of ethnic identities by using them for scholarship distribution and other such organizational purposes. These hardened social identities challenged traditional modes of hierarchy and deference in Kerala, giving rise to a much larger movement. Schools became a testing ground for little acts of rebellion, and as Gandhi’s nationalist non-cooperation movement swept the country, it found many student followers. Rebellion was literally taught in class — teachers were paid little and irregularly, and they objected, noisily. “From the mid-1930s, vigorous teachers’ unions spread new ideas and forms of protest into distant corners.” This idea of dissent, of critically examining one’s situation and working to change it, strikes at the heart of structural violence, which perpetuates its injustice by being unnoticed. For this reason, the very first movements of the educationally engaged Kerala citizens were to combat these systemic injustices, mostly through land reforms.
The various modes of dissent against structural violence became part of the social landscape of Kerala, incorporated through years of organized activism like temple entry marches, which sought to gain access to segregated temples, and “interdining,” which publicly broke taboos by showing high- and low-caste Indians eating together. As the former students became teachers, this method of mass organization as communication became an integral part of Kerala’s culture, a process which Berger and Luckman refer to as “the social construction of reality.” However, while Berger and Luckman tend to use the term to describe the institutionalization of authoritative social realities as seemingly objective and binding laws, it means something rather different here. It still refers to the process by which a socially-constructed understanding becomes an opaque, concrete reality of life, but in Kerala that fact of life is not a monolithic structure, but a movement of people. The reality which has been socially constructed through years of protest is that of an organized populace, effective at representing their viewpoints. Literacy is widespread in Kerala, information-seeking and active citizenry encouraged, protest expected. Though these are all social facts, constructed by the activism of Kerala’s people, they also became objectified over time as a concrete reality, influencing policy and lives by the ever-present threat of mass mobilization.

In fact, it was this reality of this active peasantry that allowed for the passage of many of the most revolutionary reforms in Kerala. Education itself, though originally instituted by benevolently misguided maharajas, relied on the activism of the lower castes as well. They instituted reading and writing circles, which had a strong Marxist component and ensured that “the right to literacy in Kerala was transformed from a purely government-sponsored policy to a popular mass movement.” These sorts of grassroots movements, such as the 1990 Total Literacy Programme, helped Kerala to achieve 100% literacy by 1991, while the overall literacy of India was just 52%. However, key to understanding the literacy movement is an emphasis on what was being taught, that people were learning to think critically about themselves and their situations. This in turn led to a more active and engaged citizenry which was better able to protect its own interests throughout various forms of government. Paulo Freire described the prerequisite for participating in meaningful social change as “a form of education enabling the people to reflect on themselves, their responsibilities, and their role in the new cultural climate,” and though he wrote about Brazil, his words are equally resonant when trying to describe what distinguishes the political consciousness of Kerala. Though education began the reform movements in Kerala, those movements soon became the basis for education through the efforts of a class that prioritized and fought for empowering Keralites through meaningful, thought-provoking literacy campaigns.

However, education was not the people of Kerala’s only priority, nor even their first. Access to land had also been historically
highly restricted, and as the class consciousness of the peasants grew, they found the traditional system of tenancy increasingly exploitative and insufferable. Radical associations began as early as 1915, when activists formed the Malabar Tenancy Association, and they continued to gain steam all the way through 1957, when Kerala elected a Communist Party of India majority to the state legislature. The first priority of this administration was to implement significant land reform, which they did on November 9, 1957, through the announcement of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Bill (KARB). Immediately, the bill faced strong opposition from the landed interests, including a member of the Praja Socialist Party, a misleadingly-named organization which had in fact often been called “the party of the past” in India. In the debate, a prominent PSP member named Joseph Chazhikkadan “compared the KARB to Pandora’s Box, the revenue minister in charge of the Bill to Pandora, and the provisions of the Bill to leprosy, tuberculosis, rabies, a scorpion, snake, wolf, and so on.” In the face of this virulent opposition, however, there was widespread peasant mobilization to support the bill. Throughout the debate, radical groups mustered support for the KARB, including rallies, conferences, meetings, and other demonstrations. When the central government of India launched a joint steering committee to remove the elected radicals with “the declared aim of saving the state from communist attacks and establishing peace, democracy, and democratic government,” supporters of the communist ministry took to the streets for 50 days, picketing government institutions and schools. Though Kerala’s communist government was indeed dismissed by the ruling Congress party in India at the end of that period, the replacement ministry still had to deal with these activists. Despite a variety of adjustments made which eliminated many of the protections for tenants, the revised legislation passed in 1960 as the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act retained most of the provisions of the KARB, and still “provided major economic relief to tenants.” However, subsequent protests by wealthy landowners and appeals to the central government succeeded in substantially watering down the already diluted KARA.

Legislative disappointments aside, radicals in Kerala certainly gained more from the brief communist ministry than they lost. In addition to the precedent set by the passage of a substantial land reform act, there were also benefits which, though less immediately tangible would have even greater ramifications for the future. By the time the seven party United Front, led by the Communist Party of India-Marxist, was elected to power in 1967, many of the most substantial impediments to land reform had been removed. This revival of the leftists’ prior agenda was enabled by a variety of factors, such as the breakup of the anti-communist alliance which previously thwarted the KARB, the splintering and dissolution of the Congress party, and the increased mobilization of the peasantry which had resulted from the alliance of formerly anti-communist groups with the left to work for mass interests. Though the passage

18 Radhakrishnan, 1989.
of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act in 1969 was itself relatively uneventful — by this point, popular pressure had driven most political leaders to support the bill — the KLRAA still had a massive impact on the division of resources in society, turning 1.5 million tenants in small land owners. However, it is important to emphasize that this reform was not just the result of a quiet vote or secluded legislative debate. “Quite the contrary, it was the outcome of decades of organizing, petition signing, marching, meetings, strikes, battles with police and landlord goon squads, election campaigns, and parliamentary debates.”²⁰ Importantly, all this mobilization was initiated by a critically educated citizenry which was prepared to fight for its convictions.

Kerala’s transition in the early twentieth century from a rigid, caste-defined society to the implementer, in large part by a mobilized peasantry, of one of the most thorough land reforms in South Asia depended ultimately on early efforts to educate the entirety of its citizenry. Though that educational movement was started with much the opposite intention, the skills and material taught enabled everyone in Kerala to look critically at their situation and to fight for improvements, in both education system itself and in the exploitative distribution of property and the outmoded laws which protected established interests. Key to understanding the increased mobilization of popular resources was the institutionalization of radicalism as a mode of learning and of protest in Kerala. Through successes like the land reform acts, the great mass of the previously disadvantaged came to understand themselves as having a role in crafting of the policies which affect them, and over time this understanding solidified itself as a society in which even the most wealthy and elite were forced to reconcile their aims with those of the least privileged.

Tracing the history of Kerala shows how the disenfranchised took back crucial elements of their own governance through education and mobilization. However, the effects of that newfound government remain to be demonstrated. Though Kerala did not experience the economic boom that is often conceived as marking development in poor countries, the various metrics of quality of life have improved significantly, a phenomenon Sri Kumar Chattopadhyay and Richard Franke referred to as “accomplishing more with less.”²¹ On its most basic level, this can be shown as a comparison between Gross National Product and life expectancy. Under traditional understandings of development, an increased GNP corresponds with more wealth and a higher individual standard of living. However, Kerala is an exception to this rule. Despite having a per capita GNP of only $298 in 1991, as compared to India’s overall GNP of $330, Kerala had an average life expectancy of between 69 and 72 years. India’s average life expectancy was 60 years, and the life expectancy of other countries as economically destitute as Kerala was

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²⁰ Ibid.

only 55 years. In fact, Kerala’s life expectancy was only 4 to 7 years shorter than that of the United States of America, despite the latter having an approximately 75 times greater per capita GNP.\(^{22}\) Clearly, the state is outperforming classical expectations of development based on economic growth.

However, simply comparing GNP and life expectancy does not tell the whole story of a population’s health. Fortunately for Kerala, nearly all the other metrics are equally favorable.

By the end of 1991, Kerala had achieved 100% literacy, while the rest of India lagged behind at only 52 percent. In keeping with Kerala’s tradition of citizen-led movements, the 1989 Total Literacy Campaign which enabled Kerala to reach this goal was run in large part by the Kerala People’s Science Movement, a 70,000 member volunteer organization.\(^{23}\) Though literacy had regressed in Kerala by 1994, it retained the unique characteristic of being relatively equitably distributed between men and women. While the male literacy rate was 93.6%, female literacy was still 86.3%, which was 35 points higher than general literacy in the rest of the country. In contrast to this seven point literacy gap in Kerala, the difference across India was 25 percentage points — male literacy was 64%, and female literacy only 39%.\(^{24}\) Additionally, there is evidence that literacy in Kerala is not just learned as routine, but is put to active use. Despite their poverty, Kerala’s citizens have the highest newspaper consumption in all of India, supporting the assertion that “literacy in a progressive and mobilized political environment also enhances political awareness.”\(^{25}\) Kerala’s remarkable literacy rates are certainly an achievement in and of themselves; they speak to a remarkably far-reaching and engaging educational system. Even more important, however, is the fact that literacy in Kerala has a greater connotation, that it signals a well-informed populace, able to participate actively as citizens.

Literacy is only one metric of development, and it speaks little to the physical health of the population. However, it is not the only improvement in the lives of impoverished Keralites which was implemented by the radical regimes of the 1950s and 60s. In a 1981 census which measured the percentage of villages which had access to specific vital resources, Kerala ranked first among Indian states in nearly every category, ranging from schools, to food ration shops, to post offices and hospitals. A similar survey found that while India as a whole had only 263 hospital beds per 100,000 people living in urban areas, Kerala had nearly twice that, at 458. The difference was even more marked in rural areas, where for 100,000 people India averaged 12 beds and Kerala averaged 107, despite being significantly poorer.\(^{26}\) Though the region was still extremely impoverished, even compared to other Indian states, the resources which it did have were distributed more equitably, resulting in a higher basic standard of living and better access to healthcare.

This speaks to the prevalence of the institutions of care, but a still more biological analysis of population health is also necessary.
In addition to Kerala’s high life expectancy, it also had by 1991 an infant mortality rate of 17 per 1,000 live births, as opposed to the all-India rate of 85. Infant mortality per thousand in comparably low-income countries was 91, while in the USA it was 9.27 Whereas between 1990 and 1996, only 34% of births in India were attended by trained health personnel, in Kerala 94% of births were attended, a fact which no doubt contributes to Kerala’s relatively low infant mortality.28 Kerala also has a relatively low birth rate; at 20 per 1,000, it’s much closer to the USA’s 16 than India’s 31 or other low-income countries’ 38.29 These indicators — high life expectancy, low infant mortality, and low birth rate — all correspond with increased access to effective medical care, which is especially remarkable given the overall dearth of wealth in Kerala. These strong health metrics epitomize the central paradox of Kerala, that of accomplishing more with less.

However, the area of public health in which that trope of accomplishing more with less shows through most strongly is nutrition. Since the Indian food shortages of 1964, Kerala has used ration shops to provide nutrition for the most destitute. As a result of rationing and similar food provision programs, like free school and nursery lunches “nutrition in Kerala is equal or superior to that of other parts of India.”30 It is certainly true that Kerala suffers from less widespread malnutrition than the rest of India. Between 1988 and 1990, the percentage of children in Kerala who suffered from severe undernourishment was only 1.6% or 2.4% for boy and girls respectively, compared to the all-India rate of 9%.31 However, it is likely that this is not actually the result of a significantly increased per capita caloric intake (Indians averaged about 2100 calories per day in the early 80s, while estimates for Kerla ranged from 1600–2300), but rather from a mode of distribution which assures even the most indigent of their basic requirements, as well as from better access to primary healthcare centers, which can treat the effects of improper nutrition if necessary. The public food distribution system in Kerala is widely considered the most effective in the state, and 90% of individuals hold ration cards.32 However, it is important to note that these food reforms were not simply handed down from the administration, rather “it was primarily the outcome of decades of struggle by workers and tenant farmers to control the landlords and other elite forces exploiting them.”33 In this way, Kerala’s history of mass movements plays out on even the smallest scale, the individual bodies of its citizens.

The mobilization of Kerala’s citizens does not just change policy; it affects their health on the level of both a single individual and the entire population. The ability to effectively represent their own needs, enabled by a critical education, allowed the people of Kerala to pass redistributive reforms, in particular regarding land, food, and education, which in turn have a direct beneficial effect on their health as measured by any number of indicators. There are problems with this radical approach. One of the most common critiques is that the sort of social safety net in place in Kerala creates a
welfare state, where people have no real motivation to work. And at first glance, troubling economic statistics like Kerala’s 25% unemployment rate seem to support this view. However, unemployment is a much deeper historical problem in Kerala; it existed long before the communist ministries. Additionally the unemployment crisis in Kerala is most severe in agriculture, where male laborers averaged only 147 working days per year in 1983–84.  

Both these factors ought to be taken into account when looking for the cause of Kerala’s unemployment.

Because unemployment is a historic trend in Kerala, its cause must also be historic. The most likely candidate is Kerala’s extremely high population density; at 786 people per square kilometer, it is nearly three times that of the rest of India. This explains both the longstanding nature of Kerala’s underemployment and the fact that there are simply too many people to work the land every day. As more underlying causes of unemployment are fleshed out, the welfare state argument loses traction, and it becomes clear that the effect of the redistributive reforms in Kerala is not to discourage work, but to create a backup system for those who cannot find it. These reforms were designed and militantly put in place by the advocacy of the least advantaged members of society, in order to protect their most basic needs, like land and food. The citizens in question are both unreservedly motivated and extremely effective because of their high level of education, and their advocacy leads to a state with a standard of living much more advanced than its economic growth metrics suggest is possible.

Kerala in a Broader Context

Kerala is a large state, but it is still only a tiny fraction of a much larger developing world. However, its role as an alternative model of development makes Kerala of huge importance in the question of whether a similarly radical set of reforms would have the same effect in other places. The argument put forth in Franke and Chasin’s book is that the success of Kerala was locally defined, enabled by the specific conditions of Kerala’s ecology, history, and people’s movements. However, to say that the specificity of the conditions which preceded Kerala’s transformation preclude similar reforms in other regions is disingenuous. Though Kerala’s evenly dispersed resources (and therefore evenly dispersed population) may have made it easier to develop a comprehensive education system, the prevalence of similarly literate societies in regions as dissimilar as Azerbaijan, Cuba, and Equatorial Guinea makes shows that this primary goal of universal education can be accomplished in diverse settings if prioritized. From this understanding, the emphasis placed on the specific people and history of Kerala can be reexamined as just part of the impact of early educational reforms.

Through education, the citizens of Kerala were able to bring about for themselves the reforms they needed most, and though there are certainly extraordinary challenges associated with instituting full
literacy to the point of critical consciousness, they are not categorically prohibitive in the rest of the developing world. Nor are the beneficial effects of early education only evident in that particular state — a 1991 study with compared the differences in development between four Scandinavian countries and four comparably-sized Latin American ones identified the two critical components of the relative advancement of the Scandinavian countries as education and early land reform, a trend supported centuries later and half a world away in Kerala. Kerala, though a current and compelling model, is not the only evidence that a policy of radical reform and redistribution, informed by the advocacy of the people most affected, produces significantly better health and development outcomes than pursuing a never-ending policy of economic growth.

Why then, does the trope of economic growth as the premiere mode for human development persist? Despite being outmoded and possibly even counterproductive, that particular holdover from colonial ideology retains its power in the same way that the caste system endured for so long — by being a traditional authority, institutionalized over centuries. Throughout the colonial ages, it was simply the goal to get more, to grow straight through the edges of the map. Over time, this idea of expansion as the only possible method of development solidified and the colonial process which brought it into being became opaque. It existed as its own reality, a law of development. Kerala (and increasingly more and more research on similar phenomena) challenges this traditional understanding that development means economic growth because this growth comes at the expense of increased inequality and often does nothing to advance the interests of the vast majority of society. It shows that traditional models of growth fail to take into account the potential of a consciously educated and mobilized population, that such populations can and have instituted radical reforms policies through mass advocacy which end up drastically raising the quality of life for all citizens.

The problem which Kerala highlights in global health, is the persistence of traditional modes of examining development, of building more more instead of accomplishing more with less. The solution is then being willing to use seemingly radical techniques and reforms to accomplish development on a human scale, as opposed to on the economic scale it is measured on now. Put simply, it is the difference between raising life expectancy and raising GNP. However, the implementation of these reforms cannot be put equally simply, for the fundamental reason that the radical changes in society have to come from the advocacy of the population which they purport to affect. As such, education, not just for routine literacy, but for critical consciousness, is a vital first step. It teaches citizens to integrate meaningfully with the world around them, to define it rather than just adapt to it. The definitions of how to achieve human health and developmental success which countries struggling to survive in the Darwinian world of global economic development could come to are unknown, but Kerala shows that
critically examining one’s context and making, by mass protest if necessary, the appropriate adjustments leads to a radically more healthy, egalitarian, and meaningfully informed society.

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