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Dear Reader:

In this issue of the *Yale Review of International Studies*, the seventh since our founding, we’re proud to continue and renew our commitment to providing the best possible platform for the outstanding student scholarship produced at this university. Having welcomed work from across the country in our last issue, we return in this installment to our roots: highlighting the diversity and depth of our student body’s body of work.

These pages include, among other essays, a study of the Chinese healthcare system, a reflection on the work of Kazimir Malevich, and a psychoanalytical inquiry into Saddam Hussein. These we bring together under the heading of international studies, not because of disciplinary sympathies among them but because of a conviction that thoughtful critique has little respect for the constraints of the disciplines.

Joining this remarkable crop of essays is a suite of pieces from our editorial staff, a collection that features Nils Metter on the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy; Allison Lazarus on the choice of Janet Yellen to head the Federal Reserve; and Aaron Berman on the forces at work in Shanghai’s marriage market. Grayson Clary contributes a review of *Lawrence in Arabia*, Scott Anderson’s recent entry in the hagiography of British scholar-soldier T.E. Lawrence.

Alongside these works, we present a pair of interviews with Daniel Ellsberg (of Pentagon Papers fame) and James Reston Jr., who has written a new contribution to the field of Kennedy assassination studies. We juxtapose the two on the instinct that the roiling counterpoint of conspiracy and disclosure has enjoyed a peculiar influence in American history. This dynamic is compellingly in force today in a political culture that attends to both the continued disclosures of Edward Snowden and the fiftieth anniversary of the killing of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.
It's been our pleasure to bring these pieces together; as always, we hope you'll enjoy reading them and consider submitting your own work for publication.

Sincerely,

The Editors
Looking at the European Union from an outside perspective — let’s say from Yale — leads almost inevitably to one question: When will they finally solve their economic crisis? Currently, the world has primarily one interest in the EU, and that is the recovery of the globe’s largest economy. This is understandable and certainly legitimate. Nevertheless, anyone who has a stake in Europe’s trajectory should look at the broader picture: The EU as a global player has no bright future without a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Freshly reelected German Chancellor Angela Merkel points out that Europe, while comprising 7 percent of the world population and 25 percent of global GDP, is responsible for roughly half of worldwide social spending. And if the Union wants to remain a shaper of world politics, it must balance spending with income and productivity. However, what the European crisis showed on a regional scale is that separating economics from politics simply does not work: a single type of currency for 17 different countries without fiscal and political coherence cannot succeed. Currently, the primary focus in the EU is on more fiscal integration, which is partly a step towards greater political integration. Nonetheless, ignoring the lack of common foreign policy stances now will severely harm Europe’s ability to be a stabilizing factor in the world, even after a hoped-for economic recovery.

During the last four years, the European agenda has been dominated by stabilizing the Union’s economy. Roughly a year after the onset of this ongoing debacle, another international crisis emerged: the Arab Spring. This kaleidoscope of revolutions and civil wars struck right on the doorstep of the EU. And to address such events, institutions like the CFSP and its major branch, the Common Security and Defence Policy, were established. Still, when it came to specific and crucial decisions about military engagement, countries could not find a common ground. Germany even abstained from the United Nations resolution authorizing a no-fly zone in Libya, while two days later the United States intervened alongside France and Britain. If the EU wants to play the role of an influential global power, then a basic prerequisite is a cohesive strategy for Europe’s immediate neighborhood.
But why should the US care about a geopolitically weak EU? A European attempt to substitute a real common foreign policy with economic stability would have two negative effects on the US. First, it would increase the uncertainty about possible future collaborations, meaning the US would have to reassess its relationships with several countries. As we’ve seen, even when a crisis like the Libyan civil war arises that pertains to both parties’ interests, only an ad-hoc coalition can form, leaving the vast responsibility to few powers. A second issue is the loss of EU capacity to address Middle Eastern security issues. If the compromise building process took place within the EU, then more countries would be driven to combine resources. Germany was able to abstain from voting on the UN’s resolution because committing to European unity in foreign affairs was not its primary objective: both upcoming elections and public opinion polls indicated no support for foreign intervention. The current shift in US foreign policy towards Asia and less direct intervention has a clear impact on responsibilities; the US will have to rely more on Europe to tackle problems within their sphere of influence. On the other hand, the EU (and Germany in particular) must accept that, for the immediate future, they can expect less direct assistance from the other side of the Atlantic.

Drawing an analogy from intra-European affairs to an international scale, it seems highly unlikely that the EU can expect to maintain worldwide influence without a coherent foreign policy. Economic prosperity always works in a specific political frame. Within Europe, the lack of agreement over political framing has led to an economic downturn that yet to be resolved. Internationally, the influence of the EU is not based on pure economic power either, but relies on sufficient political unity paired with the capacity and credibility to execute common strategies.

The EU and US have interests in other regions, and most of these interests are of an interconnected security-economic nature. Both recognize that their own prosperity and security also rely on economic and political stability around the world. A growing European Union is of vital interest to the US and its trade partners worldwide; all the same, it is not enough. The ability to act as one entity in international affairs is necessary to project stability. The Euro crisis must not be used as an excuse to put off political integration, but as a lesson in the importance of making the Common Foreign and Security Policy a reality.

Nils Metter ’17 is a freshman in Ezra Stiles College.
Barack Obama recently announced his nomination of Janet Yellen as the next chairman of the Federal Reserve. Though the Fed chair has always wielded extensive power, Yellen will enter the post at a particularly pivotal time in the Fed’s history: quantitative easing continues unabated, and interest rates have rested near zero for years. She will face tough policy decisions, and because of the increasing interconnectedness of the global economy, her choices will resonate far beyond the United States.

Given Yellen’s open support of Benjamin Bernanke during his tenure as Fed chair, it is likely that her policies will be similar to his. Though of course Bernanke’s primary focus was on ensuring the health of the American economy, he frequently referenced the health of the global economy, asserting that his policies simultaneously worked to ‘support’ global and domestic stability. Yellen, similarly, will not hesitate to make dramatic decisions that will impact the global economy if she believes they will stabilize the United States.

That said, Yellen, because of her academic background and her gender, is also uniquely positioned to influence international economics — as well as other fields — more broadly. In contrast to previous Fed chairs, Yellen has a deep academic interest in foreign economies. She is known for her expertise in labor markets, but one of her most influential papers focused not on domestic markets, but on the economic history of German unification. Within this influential study, she demonstrated how workers in the eastern half of the country were priced out of jobs under the terms of the reunification. This research undoubtedly augments her understanding of Germany’s current economic situation and likely also influences her view of the current struggles of peripheral Eurozone countries, who face similar basic challenges, including a loss in competitiveness and high unemployment. Thus, Yellen’s specialization may help her to more deeply understand the intricacies of foreign economics, which may in turn affect her domestic economic policies.

Yellen’s academic specialization may be of particular help to her in her relationship with another prominent female world leader, Angela Merkel, though the positions of two women also draw attention to another aspect of Yellen’s biography. If appointed Fed chair, Yellen
will become a member of a newly empowered class of female political leaders, joining the ranks of such women as Karnit Flug of Israel, Elvira Nabiullina of Russia, and Christine Lagarde of the IMF, all of whom hold positions of power in a historically male-dominated field. While these three women differ greatly on matters of policy, the very fact of their holding the positions they do could inspire more countries to consider women for top economic jobs and more young girls to pursue economics as a career. Currently, at the top 100 universities, women account for just 28 percent of economics majors, with recent studies conducted at these schools attributing these statistics in part to the lack of strong female role models.

Ultimately, an understanding of the significance of Yellen’s appointment should take into account her knowledge of European economic history and her gender, both of which suggest that she is poised to have an event greater impact than just her prospective title would suggest.

*Allison Lazarus ('14) is a History major in Jonathan Edwards College.*
“Female, born in October 1974. Shanghai. 1.66m in height, unmarried. PhD at the London School of Economics & Political Science, now works at a famous university in London, UK. Looking for a boyfriend who, both a Chinese or a foreigner, is best at London or within UK, Europe and North America.”

Cozily ensconced between the sleek, glimmering skyscrapers that decorate Shanghai’s skyline lies People’s Square Park, a quiet refuge from the endless bustle of modern-day Shanghai. Each Saturday and Sunday afternoon, thousands of middle-aged parents flock to the park to browse countless rows of advertisements, anxiously hoping to find their child a suitable spouse. For a nominal fee, these parents can purchase the right to post a physical description of their child as well as a rundown of his or her education history, employment status, and astrological sign. The end goal in the Marriage Market is clear: these concerned parents, desperate for grandchildren, want their children to marry — oftentimes earlier than their children feel emotionally ready to do so.

Casual onlookers unaccustomed with the practice often view the Marriage Market as an amusing oddity — nothing more than a reminder of the rift in cultural norms and expectations between East and West. Yet many in recent years have looked at the Market with concern over the broader societal trends it reflects. Indeed, marriage has taken on newfound significance in 21st century China as the male-female ratio grows ever more unbalanced. There are nearly 30 million more men than women in China today, and a study at the University of Kent recently estimated that there will be 24 million unmarried men in China by the year 2020.

The gender gap in China has long been a concern of scholars and policymakers, and has only grown since the implementation of the controversial “One-Child” Policy in 1979. Given the restriction on birthing children, many parents yield to the culturally engrained mindset of zhongnan qingnu — roughly translated as placing importance on males and slighting females — and strive to raise solely male children. In the past, parents would go as far as to commit infanticide or abandon female newborns, but with the
advent of sonogram technology, parents have tended to preemptively determine the sex of their child and abort females. Though the Chinese government has taken steps to counteract such practices, including prohibiting doctors from telling parents the sex of their children before birth, the human rights implications of such actions—and the international criticism that they would generate—have caused government officials to stay away from this course of action.

More than the emotional burden this gender gap creates for unmarried young adults and their families, the unbalance also has alarming implications for the future stability of Chinese society. Studies have shown that young men who are romantically unsuccessful become hypersensitive to their suboptimal life situations and more likely to undertake risks in order to improve their prospects. Included in this risk-seeking behavior is an uptick in violence, mostly in the form of reactions to perceived slights and insults. More fights and brawls have erupted in recent years, and many cities have seen increases in man-on-man assaults and homicides. Combined with the impact on quality of life that unsuccessful romance creates, this increase in lawlessness will continue to spell serious concerns for Chinese lawmakers.

Rarely does romance factor into political decision-making. Yet as Shanghai’s Marriage Market clearly illustrates, controversial laws, such as China’s “One Child” Policy, can have serious societal impacts when combined with long-standing cultural practices and expectations. The Market is a magnifying glass for the emotional strife of millions of families and unmarried adults in China, as well as for the tangible impacts of this strife on Chinese society. These cultural and sociological phenomena must be taken into greater account as China confronts the emerging societal issues that have stemmed from its historically controversial policy decisions.

Aaron Berman (’16) is a sophomore in Saybrook College.

In 1973, facing charges against the Espionage Act, Ellsberg and co-leaker Anthony Russo faced a maximum total of 115 years in prison. Four months after the trial commenced, evidence of the government’s illegal wiretapping in Ellsberg’s office was revealed. The U.S. District Judge of the trial, William Byrne, Jr., also revealed that the government had offered him directorship of the FBI. Because of the large amounts of government misconduct, Judge Byrne declared a mistrial and dismissed all charges against Ellsberg and Russo.

Today, Ellsberg continues to speak out for whistleblowers, defending Chelsea Manning (referred to as “Bradley” in this interview) and Edward Snowden. He is one of the cofounders of the Freedom of the Press Foundation and can be found camping out with UC Berkeley students as part of the Occupy Cal movement.

This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

YRIS: What was your involvement in the Pentagon Papers, regarding the writing of it?

DE: Well I was one of the first people who were invited to be in the group that was writing the Pentagon Papers — eventually there were 36. And the criteria were to have participated in high-level decision-making, in some capacity, or to have been in Vietnam. I was both. I had spent a year in the escalation of
the war in the Pentagon, and then had gone to Vietnam for two years. Also I’d done earlier historical studies, although most of the people weren’t professional historians, nor was I. But I had done analytical studies in the past, so I was one of the first people they wanted to be on it.

Ultimately, I was given access to the entire study: 47 volumes, in order to do comparative studies of the different periods and to learn lessons—as I put it—lessons from failure in Vietnam. I was the only person on a Defense Department contract through the RAND Corporation, the only person doing research on lessons from Vietnam—which is odd in itself—but the U.S. government wasn’t really obsessed with learning lessons at that point.

**Did what you hope to accomplish by releasing the Pentagon Papers actually happen?**

The initial goal was that if the Papers were released, Nixon would realize how incompetent we were at handling the war, and he would declare it a hopeless cause. But in fact, Nixon had no intention of losing the war. His intention really was to win it, not in the most complete sense, but to win it in the sense of staying in Vietnam at an acceptable cost, indefinitely. His notion was to support an anticommunist government in Saigon, even if much of the country’s side was under the control of communists in a kind of permanent, low-level stalemate. And General Thieu was in power then—a so-called president of South Vietnam—and Thieu would be in power throughout his two terms of office.

And in fact Nixon achieved that at an enormous cost: more than about 25,000 or so American lives and more than a million Vietnamese lives. At that cost Thieu still was in office actually when Nixon was removed, and would’ve been for the next year or two. So first of all the Papers did not come out in the fall of ’69 as I hoped. The Senate postponed its hearings because Nixon successfully persuaded people that he was on his way out, which was actually not true. And even Fulbright, the head of the Foreign Relations Committee, knew that it was not true but his committee was not prepared to back him in hearings. So the Papers didn’t come out through the committee at that time.
Eventually, when I did put them out in ’71, I had very little hope that it would have much effect by that time, but that it might have some. The war was continuing to get larger, and I thought it would get larger still (Hanoi had not yet been bombed, Haiphong had not yet been mined, and I knew that was coming, as it did). And so I had some hope that people might extrapolate from the record here of four previous presidents who had escalated secretly and lied about the costs and the prospects in what they were doing, and that people might draw the inference that perhaps a fifth president was secretly threatening to escalate and planning to escalate, and was lying about it—as was true.

When the Papers came out, there was great disillusion with the war as a whole, but people were already against the war and Nixon was ignoring that in his policy, so the Papers didn’t really affect Nixon’s own plans. And the war even got larger than before, with an offensive by the North Vietnamese and the renewal of full-scale bombing by Nixon. So in that sense, by the end of ’72 I had no sense that anything had been achieved by releasing them at all.

The public, to my disappointment, really didn’t draw the inference that the man who was now in office was lying just like his predecessors. There was such a desire by people to believe that the current president was not misleading them, was not deceiving them. Even evidence of what Democrat and Republican presidents earlier had done did not really lead people to believe that they were being as deceived by the new one, as they were. So that wasn’t achieved nor was the policy really affected.

I could even go on from there. But it turned out that my actions in general had triggered actions by the Nixon Administration, which did in fact propel them out of office and allow the war to be ended. If I had only copied the Pentagon Papers, which ended in 1968 before Nixon came in, I think Nixon would have stayed in office and the war would have continued.

But Nixon knew that I had copied documents from his own administration having to do with his Vietnam policy, and he feared that I had documents and proof that he was threatening nuclear war, which he was. I didn’t actually have those documents that he feared, but it was reasonable of him to think that I had. So Nixon felt that he had to keep me quite and prevent
me from using what documents I might have. So even though I was on trial, he hired people in the White House to “neutralize” me, as they put it. Keep me quiet. They actually used people to go into my former psychoanalyst’s office to get information they hoped would blackmail me into silence about his threats. They didn’t find anything they could use in that way. But he later hired people “to incapacitate Ellsberg totally” on the steps of the Capitol, at a rally, to keep me from talking about his eminent mining of Haiphong, which took place just five days later.

And these criminal actions against me later faced him, when they were exposed by John Dean and Howard Hunt and others, with possible prosecution or impeachment, and ultimately led to his resignation facing impeachment. The war did end nine months after he left office and I don’t think it would have ended had he stayed in office.

**Does technology make a significant difference when it comes to leaks? Especially if you take into account WikiLeaks today?**

Well, technology makes it more useful to leak documents. Nowadays, Bradley Manning could put information on a hard drive and leak millions more documents than I did back then. What he did now, you would never have been able to do with a Xerox machine. However, in both cases, on one hand you have a likelihood of being found out because with such a large amount of material, their chance of chasing who did it is pretty high. WikiLeaks is trying to make that anonymous and in fact may have done so, at least so far. Bradley Manning is accused on the basis of things he said to somebody who informed people of him, not just through WikiLeaks. But you are likely to be found out. You have to be willing, then, to pay a very heavy price. And so there the real obstacle is not technical but a willingness to be prosecuted or to lose your career at least.

It so happens that in my case or Bradley Manning’s case, a law, or even a certainty of being found out, would not have stopped us because each of us was willing to go to prison. I say that for Manning because he did say to his informant that he was ready to go to prison for life or even be executed. But since he’s willing to do that, you can’t stop such a person.
Do you think technology decreases discretion? I know that you looked at every single page that you copied.

Well I had read it all for my study I was doing. I didn’t just come across it. Interesting question; would I have put it out if I had not read everything? I think I would have probably not put out information that I hadn’t read or if I didn’t know what it was. Although as in the case of the material that WikiLeaks got, it’s possible to read a large sample of it and make some good guesses as to what you had for the rest of it. But on the whole, it wouldn’t be advisable to do what WikiLeaks did do, which was to put out a whole lot of information that hadn’t been thoroughly looked over. However, the chance actually that that would be damaging to the country is not zero, but it’s not large. The fact is that so much is classified that does not need to be classified from the point of view of national security. The chance of hitting something would depend on the kind of things you were putting out.

The kind of material they were putting out was only “Secret” by the way, which is a relatively low classification actually. People think that Top Secret is the highest classification above Secret. It’s not true. Really sensitive secrets are classified much higher than Top Secret. And there, for example, it would be much more questionable to put that out without knowing what you were putting out. Since it was only Secret, the chance of harming the US is pretty low.

What is the highest classification?

Nobody’s ever asked me that; that’s an interesting question. But the surprising thing is there’s no clear answer to it. Basically, there’s no single highest level; it’s what they call a partial ordering. They can always make new ones from one day to the next, for kinds of material that they want specially, closely held. And they can invent a new classification, a new clearance for it. There are dozens and dozens of them. When I say it’s a partial ordering, what I mean is that it’s not a strict hierarchy — some of them are incomparable. I’ll give an example. To have a communications-intelligence clearance for example, I’m pretty sure you have to have Top Secret. Top Secret would be less than another classification. But there could be another clearance that
does not require the clearance for communications-intelligence. You can’t say that one is strictly higher than the other; they’re just different.

Moreover, it’s not at all clear, and the president has no way of knowing—he may believe, if he’s really naïve, that he has all the clearances. There’s no way for any one individual to know that he or she has all the clearances. And they don’t. There’s no such thing as having all the clearances. They can be made in the course of an hour; you can invent a new clearance that even the president doesn’t have.

What do you think the government should keep secret? Are there certain things that should be kept secret and not be shown to the public?

Of course. A lot of communications intelligence, for instance that we had a double agent working for Osama bin Laden on his email traffic, or that we were listening to Osama bin Laden’s cell phones. These were things that should well have been kept secret to keep him from knowing that we were listening, and in fact were revealed by members of the Administration for domestic-political reasons (to show how much they knew, things like that). That should not have been revealed. And there’s other material like that that should not have been revealed.

But how about secrets in diplomacy? I feel like that’s a grayer area.

Diplomacy in general is worth keeping private to a large extent. Remember that one question is whether things are properly kept secret and whether someone who reveals them should be subject to administrative penalties. Being denied access to material, losing clearance, even losing a job, being ostracized, or losing promotions, are very strong administrative sanctions that keep most people from revealing secrets. They just aren’t on the team.

That’s a little different from whether there should be criminal penalties for revealing secrets. We have a country that’s very unusual. We have only very few secrets that are protected clearly by criminal prosecution: communications-intelligence,
the revelation of nuclear weapons (that would be another example that I would approve of keeping especially secret by criminal prosecution), and the identities of covert agents.

In general, we don’t clearly threaten people who reveal particular secrets with prison. And I think that’s a good thing; it should remain that way though it probably won’t. We very likely will change that and become like other countries, in that respect: more like China, or the Soviet Union, or for that matter, England. But whether that’s necessary I think is another matter. We keep too many secrets just by the threat of losing clearance or losing jobs—more secrets than should be kept are in fact kept by those threats.

And another consideration is this: every organization starting with corporations, but really everything from unions to any social groups have their secrets. And in the case of corporations, we know from the many examples of pharmaceutical disasters (asbestos or tobacco), the secrets are extremely well kept. Hundreds of thousands of people die a year because of the secrets surrounding carcinogenic and addictive properties of tobacco, which only one or two people finally exposed. That’s half a million people a year dying from that (tobacco)—for reasons that actually could have been prevented I think if much more truth had been told earlier. Now, the people who kept that secret were not threatened with prison. Nobody has been prosecuted but actually nobody’s lost a job for keeping that secret or for not telling the secret. The secrets are very well kept just by these threats, which also exist in the government.

So people don’t keep secrets primarily because they’re afraid of prison if they don’t keep them (well that’s a very unusual statute). People assume that to keep a secret you have to have a law that prevents you from telling it. That’s not so. The world runs, and is permeated with, secrets that don’t have that sanction. Too many secrets. I know you’re going to ask if there should or should not be secrets, and I must say that there will always be secrets and that many of them are appropriate.

**Besides Nixon’s eventual resignation, was there an unexpected positive effect of the Pentagon Papers release?**

Oh yes. I think that for a while, it revealed to the public, as did Watergate (which again, as I said, is related), that presidents lie.
All the time. That's a fact. That's a reality. And of course that's an unhappy fact, and it doesn’t make people happier to know that, but I think it reveals what Jefferson had in mind when he said, “Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.” Presidents, get in fact, undue credibility. They lie all the time, Democrat and Republican, and that’s not just American of course. As journalist I.F. Stone used to say, “All government officials lie. And nothing they say is to be believed.” The meaning is: believe without further evidence, believe as the last word. There’s a very strong tendency of people to want to believe that’s not true, but I believe the Pentagon Papers did bring that out. It showed the history not just of one administration, but of four in a row followed by Nixon, who was doing the same. And so really, five.

And I think that point did come through, and it led to some really good investigative journalism for a while of journalists asking questions they hadn’t been asking before which they should’ve been asking now (and haven’t been too much). These are questions like: “What is the president really doing when he says this?” “Why does he say this?” “What is he trying to achieve and what is really going on?” When a president like George W. Bush says, “We do not wire-tap without warrants,” unfortunately there was not adequate skepticism about that statement. He in fact had a massive program of wire-tapping without warrants going on at the very time. The lesson of the Pentagon Papers would have pointed toward that possibility. It’s gotten away from it. In a way, even after 9/11 people want more than ever to believe they’re not being lied to. But they are.

How can Americans today still benefit from the lessons of the Pentagon Papers?

Well look, we could have avoided the war in Iraq had one of the many, many people who understood that it would be a disaster had told the truth. The war was unnecessary, wrong, a crime against the peace actually, a really aggressive war, and one likely to lead to great loss of life for no benefit. If they had told the truth in the year and a half or so leading up to the war when they knew this and that we were heading toward it, that war I believe could have been avoided because it was so ill-
founded and had so little justification. Had there been in other words a Pentagon Papers in time, we might have been able to stop the war.

It’s true that if people revealed that though, they would do it at great personal cost and certainly risk. There are the costs of losing clearances, losing their jobs, losing their careers altogether, perhaps going to prison (although really very few have suffered that: 2 to 3 people). So there is a risk of that, though it’s not a large risk. But the risk of losing their career is indeed large, and that could even mean losing their marriages because marriages don’t often stand up under these pressures, such as the loss of income, pressure, and prosecution.

But the stakes are very great, and the lesson I would like people to learn, which is there to be learned so far, is that they do have the power, if they’re willing to pay a personal cost, to save very many lives or to preserve our democracy, and that can very well be worthwhile. And that’s why I identify so much with Bradley Manning: on the assumption that he is the source of these documents. I see in him someone who, like me, forty years later was willing to pay a very high personal cost, go to prison even for life, in order to stop wrongful practices: the torture he was looking at and the wars. And I think more people should follow that example. If they did, we’d be safer.

That’s all. Thank you very much.

You’re welcome.

This interview was conducted by Andrew Tran (’16), who is a Political Science major in Berkeley College.
“A Completely Muddleheaded, Confused, Angry Young Guy”
An Interview with James Reston Jr.

This interview has been lightly edited for clarity.

James Reston is the author of 15 books, three plays, and numerous articles in national magazines. He was awarded the Prix Italia and the Dupont-Columbia Award for his 1983 90 minute radio documentary on National Public Radio, “Father Cares: the Last of Jonestown.” His pieces have appeared in The New Yorker, Vanity Fair, Time, The New York Times Magazine, George, Esquire, American Theatre, Playboy, and Rolling Stone. His most recent book, The Accidental Victim: JFK, Lee Harvey Oswald, and the Real Target in Dallas, argues that Oswald’s aim on that fateful day in Dallas was to kill former Secretary of the Navy and Texas governor John Connally — not the President.

This November 22nd will mark the 50th anniversary of President Kennedy’s assassination.

YRIS: The thing I want to start with is right in the title. You’ve called your book The Accidental Victim and you’ve proposed that Connally was the real target Oswald was gunning for that day at Dealey Plaza. One of the things that most stuck with me is that your thesis of why JFK was killed is a little more nuanced than that it was just a mistake, because you have that gap between the first and second shot: the first shot where you say Oswald was aiming for Connally and then that second when Kennedy was the only available target. Can you elaborate on what you thought was going on inside Oswald’s head in that moment?

JR: When you get into that area, of course, your opinion is as good as mine; I mean, we’re all speculating here. You’d like to think this is all science, but it’s history, and there are a lot of unknowns. It’s one of the aspects of this kind of speculation that everyone can be a murderer or assassin and think, “What’s
the logical and rational processes they’re going through?” if indeed they are rational. But it’s really instructive to go to Dealey Plaza and to look at that window where he was, then to imagine that car going by him, because the motorcade had to come down this street called North Houston Street for just one block then slowly turn left onto Elm street and that’s right below where Oswald was. Unfortunately from — well I guess from everyone’s standpoint, the car had to get under a rather large tree that is also under that window. It meant by the time that the limousine actually emerged from that tree — if you’re thinking in terms of a line of sight from the rifle — the two bodies are basically lined up with one another. There’s a very small discrepancy between Connally’s body and Kennedy’s body.

So you know, whether Oswald at that point presented with that situation was still trying to discriminate between two targets, I have no idea. People say that he must have been a terrible shot if he was going for Connally and not for the President but in fact that first bullet nearly kills both of them with one shot. If it had been just a few millimeters to the left or right, it could have gone with one bullet through the President’s spinal cord and Connally’s heart. So I think you have to kind of back it up probably to the morning of November the 22nd and try to imagine what was in his mind when he actually picked up the rifle. When you get to the actual moment with all the adrenaline moving, it almost becomes a non-rational moment.

To what degree do you hope this book will be an invitation to a conversation on what was going on in Lee Harvey Oswald’s head? You’ve said that historians of the JFK assassination haven’t really been attentive to what Oswald’s motive might have been. Is it more important for you to settle the debate of who killed Kennedy or to shift the discussion to the question of why Oswald killed Kennedy?

Well it’s even before that question, of all that noise out there that has to do with second, third, fourth, tenth shooters who might have been out there. It’s an extraordinary thing that 75–85 percent of the American public still believes it was a conspiracy. It was my first point of entry into this that I really wanted to attack the conspiratorialists, to attack the conspiracy...
theories and to bring it back to the obvious lone killer in this thing. So when it’s brought back to the lone killer then indeed it’s the question of, “What is the motive?” So point one is to get rid of all the conspiracy theories, and then point two to get into I think the only flaw of the Warren Commission which was to just consign his motive to being intellectual. That he was a dedicated Marxist and that’s why he killed Kennedy or that he had grandiose notions about becoming a figure of history, or that in fact he really wanted to bring down the US government by bringing down its head — I think those are all very transparently unacceptable explanations for murder. So that’s point number two then; I’m bringing it down to the actual mindset and the impulse to murder.

One of the things that was really fascinating to me about your account of his motive was, given the degree to which we talk these days about the civilian-military divide in this country, the suggestion that many writers don’t understand what an important piece it would have been of Oswald’s psychology that his discharge was switched from honorable to dishonorable.

Well, you know this gets into a bit of personal stuff for me. I was in the military for three years as an enlisted man, you know, at a very young age, so that becomes a very, very profound experience for anybody who has it. Especially when you’re young. And the way in which it happens, whether it goes well or badly, is important. Then if it goes reasonably well and you get discharged with an honorable discharge, that becomes extremely important and it becomes a source of great pride. I think partially the reason that this has been ignored by historians of my generation is that most of the intellectuals of my generation avoided service. They were involved with their graduate work or they for sure didn’t want to go to Vietnam. Many got married early to take advantage of marriage deferment. So what historians who never had a military experience tend to go for are the political explanations and political motives, what the Warren Commission went for. Intellectuals can understand the politics of ideology. So I think that’s where my insight comes into this whole thing: that the unfair summary change in his discharge was a huge blow to Oswald. And he understood instinctic-
tively that as he was trying to go back to the United States, having attempted to defect to the Soviet Union and having a 9th grade education, the change in that discharge was going to be monumental in terms of his ability to find work because it was really the only thing of any value he had accomplished in his life. So the emotional baggage, if you will, that that change had for him connected I think very much to his emotional makeup.

Given how important the mythos of the Kennedy administration has been both on the right and on the left in American politics, do you think it’s going to be possible to durably depoliticize the discussion about Kennedy’s assassination?

Well this does connect to the heart of the Kennedy mythology. I think one of the reasons that the figure about conspiracy belief is so high is it has something to do with the martyrdom of Kennedy — that if Kennedy was killed because a foreign government wanted to get him for his political stances, or a Mafia organization wanted to get him because he was giving them trouble, it gives you a big evil empire behind this terrible horrendous act. So I think it’s a very comfortable position for the American people to have to imagine this vast empire out there that actually killed him. If it’s reduced down to this muddle headed character of a limited man who is full of obsession and grudges it seems to some people, I think, to trivialize or downsize the grandeur of the martyrdom. And I think that is going to be a difficult transition, but I really do feel like with this book — I have to say with some pride — that transition is starting. I mean, it was always my hope that the serious writers and historians in this thing would take the occasion of the anniversary to discard the conspiracy theories and get the bedrock history correct. And I’m beginning to see other writers come out after the whole conspiracy nonsense.

In that regard, was it important to you to try to steep yourself in this really epically extensive conspiracy literature? Did you feel the need to try and get into that mindset?

No, no, not at all. I completely ignored all of that because, you know, it just made absolutely no sense. Again, this goes back to
my military career. Having been trained in the recruitment of foreign agents, if you’re a foreign government that is going to recruit someone to do an extremely dangerous thing — what I was trained for was the finding out of information of some sort, but much less if a foreign government is trying to recruit someone to assassinate a foreign leader — you’ve got to have a professional. And similarly, if it’s a big Mafia organization, they have tons of people who can be contract killers who are far, far more skilled than Lee Harvey Oswald was. So when you have a starting point of a completely muddleheaded, confused, angry young guy who goes out and gets a rifle through the mail and is using the lowest possible grade of ammunition — I mean it’s just impossible, inconceivable that any major outside organization would have hired such a character as that. So with that firmly fixed in my mind, I didn't feel that I needed to steep myself in these theories.

And what’s your take on the way that, beyond the assassination, the public still views Kennedy today as a political figure? There was a headline in *Politico* the other day that Kennedy still ranks as Americans’ number one reported preference among presidents. Do you think the administration Kennedy actually ran justifies that kind of beloved status, or do you think it’s more colored by that martyrdom?

Well I think you have to separate greatness as a politician and romance. I mean, this is a romantic story — Kennedy’s is — and it has all the elements of great romance and tragedy. Great looking guy; the beautiful wife; these great crises domestically, in particular civil rights, where he performs very well; and then this huge crisis of Cuba, where he also performs brilliantly right at the cusp of the annihilation of the human race; and then at the end of it this tragic martyrdom.

Well, that perfectly comports with the standards of great literature. It’s hugely romantic, and I think that’s what people are reacting to. Very, very secondarily does anyone except the political scientists get into how terrible he was in congress, that there was nothing going on in the relationship between the White House and Congress and how by comparison to Lyndon Johnson he couldn’t crack heads and twist arms and so forth. That doesn’t capture people’s imagination. So that would be my
answer to that—people are really thinking romantically when they are asked about the greatness of the president

Just as a concluding question, you say that when you went to go look at Kennedy’s back-brace, the brace that held him up during those five seconds between the first and second shot, that you had come closer than you intended to again with the quintessence of tragedy. What did you mean by that? What is so essentially tragic about Kennedy’s death that it really touches upon the very essence of tragedy?

Well this has to do with the tactile part of history, actually seeing the device that in my view killed him. Had it not been for that back-brace, he would in my opinion have survived, because I think that first shot would have blown him forward and he would have flailed around in the car the way that Connally did. It was the fact that not only was he winched in there, he was almost mummified with an additional Ace bandage that held him up for five seconds for that second shot—that’s hugely tragic. And you can sit in an ivory tower or library somewhere and speculate about that, but I have always felt as a writer that if I could actually see the artifacts of history, or certainly if I could go to the places where history took place, it gives you a far more vivid understanding of what actually happened. So it was a very emotional moment for me to have them bring out this box, this sterile box, and put on the white gloves and take the top off this thing and then reveal this device that at that point I was fairly certain had been responsible for his ultimate death. It was just that—as I write—that closeness, but also to bring it down to a piece of cloth and shoelaces and straps and an Ace bandage, just was—I don’t know, it almost made me faint.

Do you think this will be your last foray into assassination studies?

Yes.

This interview was conducted by Grayson Clary ('14), who is an Ethics, Politics, and Economics major in Jonathan Edwards College.
In December 2003, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was hiding in a spider hole. It was a stark decline for a dictator responsible for ensnaring the United States and its allies in two wars. After nine months, the revelation that Saddam had finally been captured led to U.S. viceroy Paul Bremer’s infamous proclamation: “Ladies and gentleman, we got him!” Saddam Hussein is likely one of the most psychoanalyzed minds in recent memory. His actions as leader of the brutal Ba’ath Party spanned a dark thirty-year period in Iraq, characterized by the horrors of regional warfare, the use of chemical weapons on Kurdish populations, the oppression of his own people, and the transformation of his country into a police state held together only by the unflinching use of force. Following Saddam’s capture, he was interviewed informally by American military intelligence and then formally interrogated at the hands of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Almost exactly three years following his capture, Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death and hanged. He went to his grave maintaining to be the rightful and current President of Iraq.

The following discussion will explore the viability of Saddam Hussein’s claims to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This essay will argue that Saddam Hussein’s WMD program can be seen through three lenses: public — through a rhetoric of denial and refusal to comply with UN inspections; private-made-public — through publicized findings of UN weapons inspectors; and private — by way of Hussein’s final interrogations at the hands of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These three windows into Saddam’s rationale provide an understanding of perhaps the biggest bluff in recent history — the world thought Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and was claiming not to have them; in reality, he was claiming to have them at his disposal when he did not. Considering Mr. Hussein’s public actions will construct a fuller picture of the Ba’ath leader’s psyche and motivations. Digging deeper into the transcripts from Saddam’s interrogations will help to reconcile his admissions with UN inspectors’ reports, and reveal that the discouragement of Iran and other enemies is a feasible explanation that resolves the inconsistency in Saddam’s WMD claims versus reality.
Saddam Hussein has been called an irrational megalomaniac bent on the consolidation and projection of his power. Others, such as political scientist Williamson Murray, have called him a calculating, but ultimately flawed strategist, “demonstrating a mix of delusion and perception.” Murray argues that Saddam understood how to best maintain power in terms of the Iraqi political theater, but “had no capability to understand the external world,” instead resorting to an interpretation of the external world as an extension of Iraqi politics: “a murderous, violent, and ferocious struggle for survival.” In their seminal work on the deposed Iraqi leader, entitled *Saddam Hussein: a Political Biography*, Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi reject the popular notion that Saddam was crazy; instead, they cast the Iraqi dictator as “permanently beleaguered” by the “ceaseless struggle for survival.” The authors argue that to Saddam, “plots lurked around every corner,” yet he was able to remain one step ahead, once boasting that he was “far cleverer” than his enemies, enabling him to “get them before they [had] the faintest chance of striking at me.”

Saddam’s personality arises at once from the tumultuous and ruthless political system that he commanded for decades, and according to Karsh and Rautsi, from his troubled childhood that “taught him . . . the cruel law of the survival of the fittest, a law he was to cherish throughout his entire political career.” To be sure, Saddam Hussein was not a highborn son slated for the rule of Iraq. Instead, he was born to poor Sunni peasants in the town of Al-Awja, near Tikrit in April of 1937. Saddam’s official biographer wrote: “His birth was not a joyful occasion, and no roses or aromatic plants bedecked his cradle.” His rise through the ranks of Iraqi politics defied odds: at age twenty-two the Ba’ath party assigned him to assassinate then-General Abdul Karim Kassem. The coup attempt failed and Saddam suffered a leg wound for the cause. As an increasingly influential Ba’athist, he formally became head of Iraq in 1979 after successfully quelling Shia rebellions and Kurdish efforts at independence. He realized that “fear was not enough to secure absolute power; that if he were to stay at the helm for an indefinite period of time — and he had never had any other intention — then the Iraqi people had to be made to love and adore him.” He began a campaign to construct a personality cult, portraying himself as a “strict but righteous” leader. Sites ranging from mosques and airports to neighborhoods and even entire cities bore his name. His goal was to create a “specifically Iraqi identity” out of the disparate factions in Iraq. The method to his rule: crush any opposition. Having constructed a network of palaces, Saddam ran the country “through a combination of deep fear and awesome grandeur.” His “excessively suspicious mentality” tacked well with the “fear he evoked...
among his coterie” — he would last some twenty-four years as the icon and leader of Iraq.\textsuperscript{15}

Kevin Woods, David Palkki, and Mark Stout compiled a vast archive of Saddam Hussein’s political career. In their work, The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime, the authors see Saddam as:

A highly intelligent yet frequently deluded man…his worldview consisted of a curious mix of shrewdness and nonsense. He was a tyrant who foolishly and ruthlessly invaded his neighbors and repressed his people, yet he was also a pragmatist whose perspicuity at times exceeded that of his generals and advisors.\textsuperscript{16}

British journalist Con Coughlin has written several books on Saddam Hussein, and he emphasizes how the dictator built a broad support base and modernized Iraq using the oil revenues to improve infrastructure, housing, and quality of life. Saddam’s regime was a “complex mechanism were family and tribe are central.”\textsuperscript{17} Neil MacFarquhar of The New York Times explains that Saddam tried to “be a tribal leader on a grand scale. His rule was paramount, and sustaining it was his main goal.” Saddam aimed to develop Iraq by harnessing its “considerable wealth and manpower,” and had few qualms about the use of unconventional weapons in order to advance his goals.

The Iran-Iraq War

Any assessment of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities must include the Iran-Iraq War, a conflict that specifically involved the use of chemical weapons, setting the stage for future WMD claims. Many historians, including Coughlin, believe that Saddam was a poor military strategist who failed to weigh the costs and benefits of starting wars.\textsuperscript{19} In 1980, fearing the spread and incisiveness of the Iranian Revolution and Shi’a rebellion, Saddam ordered the Iraqi military to invade Iran, provoking an eight year conflict involving considerable civilian suffering. Following a long history of border disputes, the offensive yielded very little in terms of strategic or territorial gains, and by 1988, a United Nations-monitored ceasefire finally ended the conflict with little to show. The Iran-Iraq War had taken a toll: the conflict is believed to have killed over 200,000 Iraqis.\textsuperscript{20}

At its conclusion, Iraq found itself $80 billion in debt with a stalling economy, suffering from “high levels of inflation, unemployment, shortages in basic goods, growing and highly visible economic inequality, and the emergence of a brisk black market in foreign currencies.”\textsuperscript{21} Some observers compared the Iran-Iraq War to World War I because of the magnitude of the loss of life and the use of chemical weapons.\textsuperscript{22}
Use of Unconventional Weapons

Concerns over the Iraqi possession of unconventional weapons were very much grounded in reality. In 1986, the UN declared that Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iran, in violation of the Geneva Convention. Definitive evidence confirmed Iraq had used mustard gas starting in 1983 and the nerve gas Tabun starting in 1985 to repel Iranian troops. Beyond open warfare, in 1988 Iraq unleashed chemical attacks against the Iraqi Kurds in the north — some of whom had joined Iranian forces and others who were maintaining their fight for independence. Estimates of a March 16, 1988 mustard gas attack on the Kurds of Halabja yielded casualty estimates of 3,000 – 5,000 killed. Most famously, Saddam embarked on a “scorched-earth” chemical campaign against the Kurds, called the al-Anfal Offensive, in which an estimated 50,000 Kurds were killed and numerous settlements were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable.

The Gulf War

Less than two years after the conflict with Iran ended, Saddam touched off another war by invading Kuwait, an oil rich neighbor to which Iraq had long laid territorial claims. Within a short period of time, the Iraqi military took control and occupied Kuwait, prompting an international crisis. The United Nations Security Council imposed a trade embargo and economic sanctions in response. Soon, the United States mobilized a coalition of over thirty nations, consisting of over 500,000 US soldiers. The coalition overwhelmed the Iraqi military and produced a definitive victory within 100 hours in a show of massive force that came to exemplify the Colin Powell Doctrine. While the United States certainly wanted to see the end of Hussein’s despotic rule, the coalition stopped short of marching to Baghdad. President George H.W. Bush also called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam, but there was no attack plan drafted or military support given. US Secretary of State Dick Cheney advocated against the advance to Baghdad, warning that US forces would be marching into a quagmire — an ironic foreshadowing of a conflict to occur a decade later. Because the coalition stopped at the border, Iraq’s Republican Guard units were able to stave off major casualties. With his army largely intact, Saddam authoritatively stamped out all post-conflict uprisings.

One may question why Iraq did not use WMD when facing the American coalition, but such a choice proved rational in the interest of self-preservation. On January 20, near the eve of the battle, Saddam warned: “Our ground forces have not entered the battle so far … when the battle becomes a comprehensive one with all types of weapons, the deaths on the allied side will be increased with God’s help.” He would later announce:
“I pray to God I will not be forced to use these [unconventional] weapons... but I will not hesitate to do so should the need arise.”

Looking back on the conflict, Saddam was clearly best served by his hesitation. Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, and Matthew Waxman argue in *Survival* that Iraq did not use its unconventional arsenal against coalition forces because Saddam feared a nuclear reprisal. In refraining from using his WMD, he was rationally responding to American policymakers’ statements warning of a “massive retaliation” to potential biological or chemical attacks. The purposefully vague language convinced Saddam that it wasn’t worth using them. Furthermore, even barring a nuclear response, Hussein may have felt more personally vulnerable had unconventional weapons been used; US Secretary of State James Baker warned that the US would hold any individuals complicit in the use of chemical weapons accountable. Saddam feared that the use of chemical weapons, no matter how tactically advantageous, might shift the coalition’s goals to regime change. Though it cost him the war, it was a wise move in the interest of self-preservation.

During the Gulf War, it was clear that Saddam Hussein and his elite military units possessed stockpiles of unconventional weapons. In the ensuing years, Saddam played a game of cat and mouse with the international community.

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**Background to UN Weapons Inspections**

At the conclusion of the Gulf War, it was no secret that Saddam Hussein and his elite military units possessed stockpiles of unconventional weapons. In the ensuing years, Saddam played a game of cat and mouse with the international community.
To show “good-faith” efforts and to discourage the sanctions against their country, the Iraqis presented several “full, final and complete” weapons disclosures to the weapons inspectors, which were each in turn deemed inadequate, inconclusive and incomplete. Saddam made it more difficult to access various installations around, he erected a web of inconsistent statements about the country’s weapons capacity, and periodically kicked the UN weapons inspection teams out of the country. Each Iraqi disclosure documenting and cataloging the status of the country’s weapons programs and caches gave the impression that Saddam had dismantled and disposed of his NBC programs. But the international community was not convinced; people understandably distrusted the dictator and sensed that his claims and his non-cooperative actions did not exactly line up. The only explanation to many people was that Saddam was making his best efforts to hide the fact that he had weapons of mass destruction.

By 1998, UNSCOM formally withdrew from Iraq. Controversy erupted over whether or not they had been expelled, and testimony from members of UNSCOM indicated the team’s frustration. Due to continuous Iraqi subversions and non-cooperation, they saw their mission as sabotaged. However, Scott Ritter, a UNSCOM inspector claims that the inspectors were relatively successful:

“There’s no doubt Iraq hasn’t fully complied with its disarmament obligations as set forth by the Security Council in its resolution. But on the other hand, since 1998 Iraq has been fundamentally disarmed: 90 – 95% of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capacity has been verifiably eliminated.”

Shortly after the withdrawal and conclusion of UNSCOM’s activities, American and British forces launched airstrikes on suspected Iraqi weapons facilities and strategic disarmament targets as part of Operation Desert Fox. The weapons inspection mission in Iraq had been dealt a major blow, but it was not yet completely doomed.

Private-Made-Public Part I: IAEA & UNSCOM Findings

The following section will briefly outline the reports prepared by the IAEA on Iraq’s nuclear program, as well as present UNSCOM’s assessment of Iraq’s biological and chemical capacities. Between 1991 and 1998 the IAEA made over 1,500 inspections. The agency’s definitive report, released in 1997 and updated in subsequent years, states that after the 1990 Kuwait invasion, Iraq launched a “crash program” to quickly develop a nuclear weapon from research reactor fuel. Experts estimate that had Gulf War not derailed the project, there would have been a deliverable weapon by 1992. The IAEA identified seven nuclear-related sites in Iraq. At all of these locations, “all
sensitive nuclear materials were removed and facilities and equipment were dismantled or destroyed.” In 1998, the IAEA concluded: “There were no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons...[or] that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-useable nuclear material of any practical significance.” The IAEA did concede that Iraq was close to a “threshold” where it would be easy to finish producing a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, the agency speculated that the remaining “know-how and expertise” could provide the basis with which the program could be restarted.

UNSCOM’s final 1999 report to the Security Council outlined some seventy inspections relating to Iraq’s biological warfare program. UNSCOM explained that Iraq’s biological weapon development was “among the most secretive of its programs of weapons of mass destruction.” The report claimed that Iraq “took active steps” towards concealment, including “inadequate disclosures, unilateral destruction, and concealment activities.” Iraq admitted in 1995 that it once possessed biological weapons but that the entire program was “obliterated” in 1991 and that all biological agents had been destroyed. Even so, UNSCOM could not find evidence to support the destruction of the quantities claimed: “the Commission has no confidence that all bulk agents have been destroyed...and that a [biological weapon] capability does not exist in Iraq.” Large amounts of biological growth media were reported as missing.

The UNSCOM report notes that its inspections of chemical weapons were more successful because Iraq was more cooperative. “A significant number” of chemical weapons and related components were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. Iraq admitted to developing a large-scale chemical weapons program between 1982 and 1990. According to reports from cooperating Iraqi officials, aerial bombings in the Gulf War destroyed the majority of its chemical production facilities and that 80% of Iraq’s chemical weapons were used between 1982 and 1988. Finally, Iraq reports to have unilaterally discarded 130 tons of non-weaponized chemical agents during the 1980s, a claim among others that UNSCOM could not verify.

One can conclude from the IAEA and UNSCOM efforts that Iraq boasted viable nuclear, biological, and chemical programs at different points in time. The reports by each agency effectively concluded that the development of NBC weapons had ceased by that time and the programs had been actively dismantled. Nevertheless, the inspectors’ reports left many questions unanswered and claims unsubstantiated. What was the fate of the NBC materials and components declared “missing”? Where was the evidence for the alleged unilateral destruction of countless warheads and agents? Could these programs be restarted easily? These questions did not receive satisfactory answers. A satisfactory answer might not have existed in the first place.
In 1999 former head of the IAEA Dr. Hans Blix was appointed to lead the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) — the replacement to UNSCOM. Under S/RES/1284, UNMOVIC was tasked with overseeing the disarming of Iraq through specific monitoring and verification programs. Saddam Hussein readmitted UNMOVIC inspectors into Iraq in November of 2002. Ultimately, UNMOVIC would report that UNSCOM had successfully dismantled the Iraqi NBC programs in the 1990s, finding no trace of unconventional weapons. In a presentation to the UN Security Council at the conclusion of UNMOVIC’s mandate, Dr. Blix reported, “UNMOVIC has not found any such weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions, which should have been declared and destroyed.”

Dr. Blix has since written a definitive account of his work, called Disarming Iraq, in which he explains that UNMOVIC’s efforts confirmed UNSCOM’s assessment that Saddam Hussein ceased the development of NBC weapons following the first Gulf War. The UNMOVIC report surmises that Saddam ordered the destruction of the remains of weapons program not to hide them, but rather as a genuine attempt to comply with the UNSC resolutions. Despite interference and reluctance to comply with inspectors, Dr. Blix is adamant that UNMOVIC never found significant evidence of WMD. He writes: “Containment had worked... It has also become clear that national intelligence organizations and government hawks, but not the inspectors, had been wrong in their assessments.”

Dr. Blix concedes that at the beginning of his task, he privately suspected that Iraq was hiding a sophisticated WMD program or stockpiling weapons from the past. But in the end, inspections proved a “worthwhile and effective method of containing potentially dangerous regimes.”

Dr. Blix also describes a pattern of American unwillingness to accept the evidence his organization produced. For example, upon giving a joint presentation to the UN Security Council reporting that Iraq had “greatly improved its work with the inspectors,” both Dr. Blix and Mohamed El-Baradei of the IAEA received criticism from the American representative for failing in their task. Blix also points to a specific event in 1995: Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamel had defected to Jordan. Kamel claimed that Saddam had ordered the complete dismantling of the WMD programs in 1991 — a declaration that Dr. Blix found believable given the inspectors’ findings. But this unsettled Blix: why did Iraq refuse to fully cooperate and produce complete and categorical evidence to UNMOVIC? Blix provides a number of potential answers, ranging from Saddam’s pride, to the argument this essay advances — that he hoped to retain the threat of WMD in his weakened state. Only with the perception...
that he possessed unconventional weaponry could he be protected from his enemies such as Iranian Shi’a, Israel, and the Kurds.  

Blix offers this conclusion: “The UN and the world had succeeded in disarming Iraq without knowing it.” While it is worth condemning policymakers for not listening to the evidence gathered by Dr. Blix and the UN weapons inspectors, it is also understandable why the West was so suspicious of Saddam Hussein’s actions, given his tenuous cooperation. Saddam, by January of 2003, realized the imminence of a US attack and was “frantically agreeing to almost anything the inspectors demanded: interviews outside Iraq of key scientists, over-flights by U2 spy aircraft and the destruction of dozens of Al Samoud 2 missiles, which were its technical pride and joy.”

What is perhaps saddest is that though so much inertia was driving the Bush Administration, there was not much that Saddam or Blix could have done to avoid the war. Unequal information on all sides was a major driver of the conflict, but with the clarity of hindsight, Blix’s reports to the Security Council, and his account in Disarming Iraq, one can view Saddam’s WMD program through a private-made-public lens.

Public: Saddam’s Actions and Denial of WMD

With the UNMOVIC findings and Blix’s revelations in mind, it is prudent now to turn to both Saddam’s fervent public denial of possessing WMD and the actions he took in relation to his alleged WMD programs. This is the public window into Saddam’s WMD program. Saddam confused the international community because he acted exactly how a rational actor would have, had he possessed WMD. On the surface Saddam denied the existence and production of WMD and more discretely acted to subvert the weapons inspections—both strategies that he might use if he truly did possess unconventional weapons. For example, in a rare interview with a Western reporter, Saddam Hussein sat down with CBS’ Dan Rather and resolutely denied having any WMD or anything that might violate the UN resolutions:

Which is that? Which missiles are you talking about? We do not have missiles that go beyond the prescribed ranges, by the…U.N. The inspection teams have been here. They have inspected every place. And if there is a question to that effect, I think the question should be addressed to them.

Later, Saddam continued: “I think the United States and the world also knows that Iraq no longer has the [unintelligible] weapons… These missiles…have been destroyed and are no longer there.”

This was a frequent pattern Saddam set when talking to leaders, politicians, and the media. In another interview, Great

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59 Ibid. 290 – 292.
63 Ibid.
Private: Interrogations Following Capture

Britain’s Anthony Benn asked Saddam if Iraq possessed WMD to which the dictator responded: “There is only one truth and therefore I tell you as I have said on many occasions before that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction whatsoever. We challenge anyone who claims that we have to bring forward any evidence and present it to public opinion.”

However public statements aside, Saddam’s actions were an endless source of confusion to observers who could not understand why he actively sabotaged UN weapons inspections. In retrospect, it is likely Saddam was making a calculation. He deemed it necessary to make out that he might have had WMD by continually denying it and simultaneously complicating UNSCOM and UNMOVIC’s inspections. According to Blix, “like someone who puts up a sign warning beware of dog without having a dog,” Saddam “did not mind inspiring in others the thought that he had [WMD].”

Hostile neighbors like Iran and Israel appeared far more threatening than the United States at the time, and if he had fully cooperated with the weapons inspections it might have come to light that his country was weaker and more vulnerable than it seemed.

When Saddam was captured, the first words he spoke to American forces were, “I am Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq, and I am willing to negotiate.” Immediately following his apprehension, Saddam was never under the control of a specific American agency for long. Military intelligence officers initially ceded control over Saddam to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); however, the CIA soon transferred custody to the FBI, an organization better accustomed to interrogating suspects prior to legal proceedings. At the recently renamed Baghdad International Airport, the FBI had five “casual conversations” and twenty formal interviews with “High-Value Detainee #1.” These interviews provide the private insight into Saddam’s WMD program. FBI Special Agent George Piro carried out the interrogations, which yielded a number of revelations including Saddam flatly denying any connection to Osama bin Laden, whom he called a “zealot.”

Because Hussein was not deemed an immediate threat, Agent Piro was able to conduct the interviews over a span of months and “build rapport” with Hussein. Agent Piro was relatively new to the FBI, and he was chosen as a young man from the Middle East who spoke fluent Arabic. His presence, it was correctly predicted, would be non-threatening to Saddam Hussein, who might treat the up-and-coming Piro paternalistically. At no point did Piro reveal his affiliation with the FBI, only that he was a representative of the US Government and that some of his reports might make it to President George W. Bush.

Especially during his “casual” conversations with Agent Piro, Saddam talked openly about his WMD, providing new explana-
tions to the subject. Several passages in Saddam's declassified interviews are of particular interest: “Regarding destruction of weapons, Hussein stated, ‘We destroyed them. We told you, with documents. That’s it.’”\(^{71}\) When Agent Piro provided Saddam with a list of locations where UN inspectors’ efforts were restricted, Hussein replied: “By God, if I had such weapons, I would have used them in the fight against the United States.”\(^{72}\) Later in the interviews, Hussein stated that the UN inspections had achieved their objectives in dismantling Iraq’s WMD: “Iraq does not have any WMD and has not for sometime.”\(^{73}\) When pressed on the beliefs of many in the international community that Iraq was reluctant and difficult during the inspections, Saddam shot back that Iraq had cooperated and that “it took time and occurred in steps,” for it was difficult for the “loyal hard working people dedicated to their work” to be “told one day to open all of their files and turn over all of their work and government secrets to outsiders.”\(^{74}\)

So was there a purpose to Saddam’s maneuverings? Why did he insist that he did not have WMD while discretely hindering inspections? In one casual conversation, Saddam provided a critical revelation in support of this essay’s argument:

Even though [Saddam] claimed Iraq did not have WMD, the threat from Iran was the major factor as to why he did not allow the return of the UN inspectors. [Hussein] was more concerned about Iran discovering Iraq’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities than the repercussions of the United States for his refusal to let weapons inspectors back into Iraq. In his opinion, the UN inspectors would have directly identified to the Iranians where to inflict maximum damage.\(^{75}\)

Under this logic, the expulsion of UNSCOM inspectors in 1998 could have been a calculated move. Saddam could have been worried that the successful completion of inspections would reveal that he conclusively lacked WMD, opening the door to his enemies.

Saddam pointed out that Iran’s weapons capabilities “have increased dramatically, while Iraq’s have been eliminated by the UN sanctions” — thus causing an asymmetry in strategy and tactics making Iran a “greater threat to Iraq and the region in the future.”\(^{76}\) Interestingly, because of Iran’s advantage, Saddam claimed that had the sanctions on Iraq been lifted, he would have pursued a security agreement with the US for his country’s protection.\(^{77}\) When asked if others might continue and reboot the WMD program in Iraq without his knowledge, Saddam answered no, and claimed to have met with his senior ministers to confirm the dismantlement of all unconventional weapons. His position on WMD, he argued, was well understood by his government.\(^{78}\)

Several other important clarifications on WMD arose from the toppled leader’s conversations with Agent Piro. Saddam

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\(^{72}\) Ibid.


\(^{74}\) Ibid.


\(^{76}\) Ibid.

\(^{77}\) Ibid.

\(^{78}\) “Casual Conversation, May 13, 2004.”
stated that Iraq’s WMD were for the “defense of Iraq’s sovereignty.” Saddam did not choose to use WMD during the Gulf War in 1991 because he did not believe that coalition forces intended on removing him from power.79 Put simply, he did not feel Iraq’s sovereignty had been threatened. Finally, Saddam commented that UN inspectors were allowed back into Iraq to counter what he claimed were incorrect British intelligence reports, upon which the Americans were basing their decisions. When Saddam realized that war with the United States was imminent, he fully cooperated with inspectors in hopes of averting war; but he soon realized that the war was inevitable.80

**Analysis & Conclusions**

In assessing the convergence of three sources of information: 1) UN weapons inspection reports; 2) Saddam’s public statements denying WMD and his belligerence directed towards inspectors; and 3) his interviews and conversations with the FBI; what conclusions may be drawn? It would seem that perhaps the only explanation that can properly address all three would be Blix’s “Beware of Dog” sign. It is possible — even likely — that Saddam’s Iraq dismantled its WMD programs following the 1991 conflict, and benefited from the international perception that he did have them in order to discourage attacks from his enemies, most notably Iran. He had dog, but without overtly claiming so, he needed his enemies to believe he did.

In a 2006 interview with the Editor-in-Chief of the Yale Journal of International Affairs, Williamson Murray saw Saddam as,

> Clearly playing a double game: trying to comply to a certain extent with UN sanctions, or to the demands for Iraq to destroy the substantial WMD capabilities it had, to get sanctions lifted; at the same time, not wanting to come fully clean because Saddam wanted the Iranians — particularly the Iranians — and the Israelis, to think that Iraq had substantial WMD capabilities; probably the United States as well.81

Saddam was caught in a catch-22: he wanted America and the West to believe that he no longer possessed WMD; at the same time, he thought it necessary to give the impression to his neighbors and potential enemies that Iraq was strong and not afraid to defend itself through unconventional warfare. Moreover, he strove to maintain his status in the eyes of the Arab world as a rugged and defiant leader, unafraid of the Americans.82

How feasible are Saddam’s claims in his interrogations? Might he have been lying? Hussein was not ignorant of his fate and expressed this to Agent Piro: he had no qualms that he would be found guilty and killed.83 A condemned prisoner

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79 Ibid.
80 “Casual Conversation, June 11, 2004.”
81 Williamson Murray, “Saddam’s Table Talk.”
82 Ibid.
has little incentive to lie or revise the truth, so it would appear entirely possible that Saddam’s claims were, in his mind, true. Furthermore, over time Agent Piro developed an increasingly complex relationship with Saddam Hussein; Saddam would implore Piro to spend more time with him, and he visibly enjoyed talking with Piro. At their final parting, the two men smoked Cuban cigars, and visibly choked up, Saddam gave Piro three kisses on the cheeks, the traditional Arabic farewell.\textsuperscript{84} This might indicate that the rapport that Piro developed with Saddam might have encouraged Saddam to be truthful during their conversations.

Saddam once told his inner circle of advisors and confidants: “We have nothing; not even one screw.”\textsuperscript{85} The preponderance of evidence now points to a lack of WMD in Iraq. Woods, Palkki, and Stout write in \textit{The Saddam Tapes}:

[He] ordered his lieutenants to restrict UN inspectors’ access to suspected WMD sites, to bribe inspectors, and to refuse to deliver information on Iraq’s foreign suppliers of WMD-related materials. Despite such obstructionism, [the primary sources] are consistent with other evidence indicating that Iraq had divested itself of prohibited nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon stockpiles.\textsuperscript{86}

Also, the “missing” chemical agents and warheads, and lack of evidence for unilateral purging could have been a deceptive ploy by Saddam. By leaving the issues unsolved, he could indirectly signal to his enemies that he might still have unconventional weapons. In his interrogations he called destroying some weapons without UN supervision “a mistake.”\textsuperscript{87} This, according to Dr. Blix, does not mean that Iraq still had WMD, it meant that the UN inspectors were not given enough evidence to prove their destruction. If true, the decision to not provide evidence also contributed to the international community’s mistrust of his claims.

With no hard evidence for WMD, how can America and Britain’s rush to the warpath be explained? Today it has become clear that sad intelligence failures combined with the refusal to listen to Hans Blix and UNMOVIC’s reports drove the march to war. The 2003 Iraq invasion and subsequent “quagmire” that then-Secretary of State Cheney foreshadowed — and in which he was complicit — went unimpeded. Most importantly, for a variety of reasons, the Bush Administration seemed to be convinced from the beginning that war was inevitable. It was understandably difficult to take Saddam’s word, for he walked a thin, self-interested line. His psyche notwithstanding, Blix’s inspections and Saddam’s increasing cooperation and steadfast denial of WMD were drowned out in the rumbles for combat.

An assessment of the linkages between Saddam’s statements and actions, the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC reports, and the transcripts of his interrogations leads to the entirely possible
conclusion that in the years following Dessert Storm and leading up to the 2003 invasion, Saddam did not possess WMD in any substantial capacity. Of course, hindsight is 20/20, and we are left scratching our heads, wondering how and why we were misled. The truth is that Saddam’s bluff was finally called. Saddam had consistently hinted to his enemies that he had WMD, but his lie fell upon the wrong ears, and the ruse he created for his protection ultimately led to his downfall. Sitting atop Saddam’s bloody legacy should read this headline: Saddam Hussein — the man who fell prey to the greatest backfire in modern military history.

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KWL


After Chairman Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, China’s political transition was accompanied by an equally important economic transition and rapid liberalization. Deng Xiaoping, serving as paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China from 1978 to 1992, promoted an international, market-oriented economic “reform and opening up” that replaced Mao’s ideologically driven strategy and catapulted China into a 30-year period of unprecedented growth and development. Although in many ways China has benefited from this transition, the medical benefits that Chinese citizens enjoyed during the Maoist Era have been largely removed during the economic reform. These cuts included significant reductions in medical care subsidies, undoing the Mao Era legacy of low-cost universal health care coverage. Ever since this program was dismantled, China has struggled to provide universally accessible and affordable health care. China’s inadequate social safety net creates a sense of fear and insecurity among Chinese citizens about a future with limited government support for health care financing, which was the third largest expense in Chinese households after food and education as of 2007. This uncertainty prompts massive amounts of precautionary saving among the Chinese, who are the world’s largest surplus savers, with total saving likely to reach 50 percent of gross domestic product in 2012. Excessive precautionary saving has hindered domestic consumption, forcing the production-based Chinese economy to depend on foreign demand. As the impetus for China to balance its economic strategy grows stronger, China must stimulate domestic demand to reduce export-driven reliance on foreign markets.

Reforming the health care system represents not only the potential to radically improve the social safety net and sustain economic development by creating jobs in the services industry, but also provides an opportunity to improve people’s standard of living, labor productivity and social harmony. Although Chinese leadership has begun to prioritize health care reform in recent years, China still has much room for improvement. A wide variety of factors inhibit affordable and accessible health care. This paper will examine incentive structures that affect behavioral decisions on the part of physicians, hospitals, policy makers and patients in the current Chinese health care system. Based on an analysis of these incentive structures, the paper will conclude by proposing potential health care reform policy initiatives.
During the Mao Era, spanning from the 1950s through the 1970s, China implemented a low-cost universal health care system. Three heavily subsidized medical insurance schemes ensured universal coverage: the Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS) in rural areas and the Government Insurance Scheme (GIS) and Labor Insurance Scheme (LIS) in urban areas. Focusing on preventive and primary care, relying on a network of modestly trained health care providers, and implementing effective price controls kept costs low for patients. A large portion of China's success in providing basic care, while spending only three percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on medical programs, can be attributed to The Communist Party’s ideological fervor and many party members’ backgrounds in medicine. The Chinese government established village health care centers where many Communist Party members trained “barefoot doctors” for little or no pay. Barefoot doctors received basic training and provided preventive and primary care, providing a less expensive alternative to more qualified physicians for basic medical needs. Although their training was minimal, usually lasting only a few months, the widespread availability and use of basic medicines contributed to dramatic health improvements. During the Mao Era, health care was organized into an effective three-tiered system that provided efficient patient referral for treatment of health problems. In rural areas, the three tiers were comprised of village clinics, township health centers, and county hospitals. The first tier, village clinics, and the second tier, township health centers, provided preventive and primary care, providing a less expensive alternative to more qualified physicians for basic medical needs. Although their training was minimal, usually lasting only a few months, the widespread availability and use of basic medicines contributed to dramatic health improvements. During the Mao Era, health care was organized into an effective three-tiered system that provided efficient patient referral for treatment of health problems. In rural areas, the three tiers were comprised of village clinics, township health centers, and county hospitals. The first tier, village clinics, and the second tier, township health centers, provided preventive and primary care. Only the most seriously ill patients were referred to the third tier, the county hospitals, which provided specialty health services and were staffed by fully qualified doctors. The urban medical system was similarly trifurcated into community health centers, district hospitals, and tertiary hospitals, but were staffed by more qualified health professionals.

Physicians were not rewarded on the basis of how many patients they treated, so they would advise patients to seek treatment from a doctor of appropriate skill to treat their medical needs. This cost-efficient referral system ensured that patients did not receive unnecessary and expensive treatment from overqualified doctors.

Beginning in 1978, large-scale economic reform disrupted the Mao Era health care structure. This transition represented a trade-off between government-financed programs and free-market ideology, creating many challenges that persist today for contemporary health care reform. The shift to a market-based health care system accompanied a decrease in government subsidies as a share of total hospital revenues from more than 50 percent in the pre-reform era to approximately 10 percent in the 1990s, forcing hospitals to focus primarily on maximizing profits to compensate for the loss in funding.
The elimination of collective agricultural economics in the 1980s and declines in tax revenue from state-owned enterprise reforms in the 1990s help explain why a widespread market-based transformation was necessary during this period.\textsuperscript{13} Tax revenues fell from 35 percent of GDP in 1980 to a low of 11 percent from 1995 to 1996. The immediate effect of this revenue contraction was a significant reduction in government subsidies to health institutions.\textsuperscript{14} Chinese citizens whose medical coverage depended on state-owned enterprises and rural agricultural collectives were left without insurance. The dissolution of collective economies removed funding for the Cooperative Medical Scheme that financed rural health care.\textsuperscript{15} As public funding declined, the urban health insurance schemes incorporated copayments and other associated costs borne by the patients themselves, increasing the cost of coverage. As a result, health insurance coverage fell in both rural and urban areas.\textsuperscript{16} Between 1980 and 2000, the majority of China’s population, eight out of ten people as of 2000, did not have health insurance.\textsuperscript{17} Government subsidies to public hospitals and clinics were reduced from more than 50 percent to about ten percent of total costs.\textsuperscript{18} The remaining coverage costs were earned through fee-for-service payments, a system that remains in place today, by which providers are reimbursed according to a government-controlled price schedule for each service rendered.\textsuperscript{19} Hospitals began rewarding physicians with bonus payments and promotions on the basis of the profits they produced rather than the quality of their care in an effort to maximize revenues to fund hospital expansions and investment in medical technologies.\textsuperscript{20} Access became dependent on ability to pay and vulnerable to the increasingly for-profit market behavior of health-care providers.

One of the most outstanding impacts from the economic reforms on the health care system is the growth of the private share of health care expenditure. Although recent reforms have expanded coverage to encompass 90 percent of the population, they only cover a small share of expenditures.\textsuperscript{21} Government health care expenditure per capita rose from five yuan to 119 yuan per capita in nominal terms between 1978 and 2005, but was offset by even greater increases in out-of-pocket payments, which rose from three to 346 yuan per capita.\textsuperscript{22} Profit-oriented hospitals drive up overall total costs, and individual patients are bearing an increasing percentage of those costs.\textsuperscript{23} As of 2005, patients’ out-of-pocket costs accounted for 52 percent of total health expenditure, compared to 20 percent in 1978. Meanwhile, the government share dropped from 32 percent to 18 percent of total costs.\textsuperscript{24} Currently, the share of medical expenditures paid by individuals is 35 percent (an improvement from the 60 percent figure in 2003) compared to the government’s 28 percent.\textsuperscript{25} Chen Zhu, China’s health minister, has pledged to decrease...
the private burden to 30 percent while raising the government share to 33 percent by 2015, in line with the objective laid out in the 12th Five-Year Plan.\textsuperscript{26} As long as consumers bear the majority of the cost, there is no urgent financial incentive for the government or medical institutions to reduce costs.\textsuperscript{25}

Despite the ongoing decentralization of China's health care system, government regulation of market entry continues to preserve the monopoly power of large government-owned public hospitals, impeding true market competition.\textsuperscript{27} This monopolistic structure removes the financial incentives for potential competitors to attempt entering the market. As long as public hospitals are sheltered from competition, there is no incentive to reduce costs or improve quality of care.\textsuperscript{28} The intention behind government ownership of health care institutions is to ensure broad access to basic health care services.\textsuperscript{29} However, conflict arises when the very institutions that regulate the industry are also the only competitors.\textsuperscript{30} As of December 2011, the government owned about 95 percent of Chinese hospital beds but provided only ten percent of hospitals' recurrent costs, rendering Chinese hospitals dependent on patient charges for their revenue.\textsuperscript{31} This monopolistic system allows the Chinese government to own Chinese hospitals without providing the funding to run them, removing the incentive to moderate costs. Recent reforms of government-run hospitals have already started to address this issue by soliciting more private investment.\textsuperscript{32}

Because private capital was not allowed into the medical sector until 2009 and still only constitutes a small portion of the market, there is still great opportunity for progress.\textsuperscript{33} In January 2012, the Chinese government relaxed regulations on foreign investment in the health care service industry. Under the new regulations, there is no longer any cap on the proportion of investment in health care institutions provided by foreign sources. Previously, wholly foreign-owned investments were prohibited and foreign investors were limited to a maximum stake of 70 percent in joint-venture health care investments. In March 2012, the Chinese government announced its goal to have 20 percent of hospital beds privately owned by 2015, presenting great opportunity for both local and foreign private investors to enter the market.\textsuperscript{34} The current monopoly conditions in the health care market promote cost-inflationary, profit-oriented incentives that detract from the efficiency and quality of care. Increasing participation by the private sector will allow competition to intensify, which will drive down costs.\textsuperscript{35} China should pursue a balance of market forces and government regulations in order to achieve the most accessible and cost-effective health care system going forward.

In an attempt to keep care affordable, doctors' salaries have been kept artificially low. Even though reduced subsidies to public hospitals made health care providers reliant on user fees
and drug sales to survive financially, the government still set prices for medical services below cost. As a result, patients with minor ailments tend to consult specialists rather than more basic generalists since there is no significant cost differential to the patient, which contributes to overcrowding at large hospitals and escalating costs within the industry. For example, most doctors’ consultation fees are still under two dollars, even in large hospitals. Hospitals generally prefer to spend their revenue on infrastructure construction than physician salaries, which are lower than those of government employees on average. China’s Vice Health Minister, Ma Xiaowei, recently promised that the government would increase investment in hospital infrastructure and equipment to ensure a greater proportion of hospital spending goes to medical workers’ pay.

To compensate for the below market cost of medical services, the government set prices for new and high-technology diagnostic tests above cost, and a 15 percent profit margin for drugs was allowed. Price-setting has created a leveraging effect whereby physicians must dispense seven dollars worth of drugs to earn 1 dollar of income. As a result, doctors overprescribe drugs and profitable tests. Consequently, China’s health care expenditure growth has been one of the most rapid in world history, increasing at a rate of 16 percent per year, outpacing GDP growth by seven percent.

For example, 75 percent of patients suffering from a common cold are prescribed antibiotics, as are 79 percent of hospital patients overall. These figures are more than twice the international average and have contributed to massive growth in health care expenditures. Artifically depressed physician salaries create an incentive for doctors to order excessive medical tests, overprescribe expensive drugs, and accept bribes. These systemic distortions have created a health care system in which profits are prioritized over the wellbeing of the patients. Several changes would help curb the cost-inflationary practice of over-prescription. Allowing the price of services, which are currently undervalued, to appreciate would compensate physicians for the loss of income they would incur from prescribing fewer drugs. Capping drug costs and removing drug sale subsidies from the supply-side would make over-prescribing less lucrative for physicians.

In addition to over-prescription of drugs, over-treatment also contributes to inflationary medical costs. Under the fee-for-service system, physicians are reimbursed for each treatment they provide, creating an incentive to deliver more care than is necessary. The intention of the policy is to improve quality of care and physician accountability for patient health by creating an incentive for physicians to do everything in their power to cure their patients, assuming that ordering additional procedures helps achieve that outcome. The policy deters patient neglect but also encourages over-treatment,
which escalates costs unnecessarily. Since the policy rewards physicians for treating more patients, the three-tier referral system breaks down, leading to overcrowding in large public hospitals due to large inflows of patients and underutilization of lower level facilities. This excess demand for large hospital services removes incentives for hospitals to improve the quality of care and allows them to extort value from patients.

An alternative payment method could be adopted to correct the distorted incentives associated with the fee-for-service system. Methods of aggregated payment, whereby physicians are compensated with case-based payment per visit or admission for example, provide better incentives to reduce costs. The case-based payment system prevents providers' incomes from increasing with the provision of more services. In 2011, the national government issued a policy document that advocated local policy experimentation with case-based payment methods, which focus on medical conditions that have defined clinical pathways and health outcomes. Chinese policy makers could also introduce payment methods with prospectively set rates in order to improve incentives to reduce costs. Under the fee-for-service system, physicians are retrospectively reimbursed for each service they order, which rewards the physician for ordering as many tests as possible. Prospectively set rates provide a reference point for how much a doctor should spend on medical tests, which shifts the burden of financial risk from the customers, including the government, insurance, and individuals, to the providers, the physicians and hospitals.

Prospectively set rates create a standard of spending responsibility for doctors. However, these payment methods have their own set of drawbacks that mirror those of the fee-for-service payment system. By projecting the appropriate cost for treatment and holding physicians accountable to that standard, providers may reduce the quality of care by under-providing treatments to save on costs and refusing to treat sick patients who require expensive treatments. Some of these negative consequences could be offset by the incorporation of a pay-for-performance method, which links payment directly to the quality of care. Chinese policy makers should aim for a payment policy that balances these conflicting incentives in an attempt to make physicians financially indifferent toward the type of treatment they provide, leaving only their medical expertise and professional ethics as the foundation for their decision-making.

Another challenge that the health care system faces is the epidemiological transition of China's primary burden of disease from infectious to chronic, non-communicable disease, which has highlighted that curative care is not sustainable. This economic and public health reality underscores the necessity to develop a more effective primary care system in China.
brovascular diseases, are currently the leading causes of death in China. These diseases are more expensive to treat than infectious diseases.\textsuperscript{50} Even if China’s health care system were previously equipped to pay for infectious disease treatments on a curative basis, maintaining that trend will be much more costly for chronic diseases. Focusing on preventive and primary care rather than curative care would benefit China’s economy and the health of its people. Under the current fee-for-service system, health promotion and prevention services are neglected because they yield the lowest profits among the different types of treatment. Instead, physicians favor over-prescription of antibiotics and intravenous injections even for simple health problems.\textsuperscript{51}

To increase the quality of primary care in China, policymakers should consider expanding lower-level health institutions and funding training programs for general practitioners. All Chinese hospitals are categorized by size into three levels: tertiary (500 beds or more), secondary (100 to 499 beds), or primary (20 to 99 beds).\textsuperscript{52} China’s current health care system is largely hospital-based. Smaller health care institutions such as community health centers, village clinics, and township health centers, provide basic public health services such as disease prevention and control, treatment of common health problems, and management of chronic diseases. Expanding these programs would greatly increase the health care system’s capacity to provide the population with preventive care.\textsuperscript{53}

Between 2003 and 2007, the central government directed 3 billion yuan toward the establishment of rural health clinics in the central and western regions of China.\textsuperscript{54} In 2010, Vice Premier Li Keqiang emphasized that the pilot-reforms of government-owned hospitals in 2011 would be particularly focused on county-level hospitals in an attempt to reinvigorate the three-tiered system.\textsuperscript{55} The rising prevalence of chronic diseases requires an integrated health care system that can provide all levels of diagnosis, treatment, and follow-up according to the needs of the patient. Different stages and aspects of chronic diseases require different types of medical attention.\textsuperscript{56} If China can reintegrate the tiers of its health care delivery system, it will be better equipped to treat the changing medical needs of the Chinese population.

To accompany the expansion in health institutions for basic care, China will need to train more general practice doctors. In July 2011, the State Council announced that a general practitioner system would be implemented throughout China by 2020. In order for policymakers to deliver this goal, the government needs to provide incentives for physicians to practice general medicine. Part of this plan should involve removing the strong financial incentives to overprescribe drugs and overtreat patients as well as strengthening financial incentives to provide primary care through salary increases.\textsuperscript{57}
Improving physician salaries across the board will also help deter corruption, which pervades the current system and impedes health care reform. In a system that provides financial incentives that are stronger than those for providing quality care, patients often resort to bribery, offering doctors “red envelopes” that contain cash before surgery to secure better treatment during and after procedures.\(^\text{58}\) Recently, China’s Ministry of Health has confronted this issue by ordering patients and hospitals to sign a document agreeing that no bribes will be offered or accepted by the two parties. The document asked hospitals to strengthen control and supervision of administrative power and practices of medical workers.\(^\text{59}\) These ubiquitous informal “red envelope” payments to doctors are not included in the official calculation of the share of medical expenses paid by individuals, indicating that out-of-pocket expenditures are even larger than the official figures suggest.\(^\text{60}\) By promoting primary care through the implementation of financial incentives and broader access to basic medical training, health care reform can motivate doctors to focus on preventive treatment rather than expensive curative treatment.

Major government subsidies for drug sales have led to higher medication costs and corruption. By reducing dependence on drug sales for income, policymakers can abate corruption.\(^\text{61}\) Hospitals often receive kickbacks from drug companies and medical suppliers for prescribing their products, intensifying the financial incentive among physicians to overprescribe drugs.\(^\text{62}\) Regulation of drug costs and distribution is one area within the health care system that would benefit from more government intervention of an appropriate form. The creation of a national Essential Drug System, which was proposed as part of an implementation plan for the New Cooperative Rural Medical Scheme in 2011, defined price guides for retail drugs and issued a guideline on the essential clinical drugs with the intention to control health care costs and diminish prescription abuse. According to the 2011 Work Plan, the essential drug system will cover all government funded health institutions at the grassroots level. In exchange, these organizations shall follow the principle of a “zero percent mark-up” which will eliminate the cost inflation that occurs in the transactions between drug distribution and prescription.\(^\text{63}\) In 2011, the National Development and Reform Commission put dramatic retail drug price cuts into effect, capping the costs for over 1,200 antibiotics and circulatory system drugs, which decreased prices by 21 percent on average.\(^\text{64}\) These cuts mark a reversal of the government’s previous price-setting initiative, which allowed a 15 percent profit margin for drugs.

Expanding the essential drugs list to include a wider array of drugs would help control costs for customers across the board. In fact, China is set to increase the number of products on its price-controlled essential drugs list from 307 to 700 by

\(^{58}\) “China Steps Up Campaign Against Healthcare Bribery.”

\(^{59}\) Ibid.

\(^{60}\) Eggleston, “Health Care for 1.3 Billion.”


\(^{62}\) Yip, “Realignment of incentives for health-care providers in China,” 1121.

\(^{63}\) Eggleston, “Health Care for 1.3 Billion,” 18.

the end of 2012.65 However, implementing these lower price caps could cause consolidation within the pharmaceutical industry, leading to a less competitive market place. The government could mitigate this risk by reducing drug subsidies and promoting private competition to drive prices down, while managing and gradually removing cost controls. Recently, many experimental initiatives have been launched at the local level as a test for potential national policies. The success of these policies depends in part on their innovation and structure but also depends on the Chinese government to enforce and implement these policies effectively.

The distorted incentives provided under the current Chinese health care system create unintended consequences that are counterproductive to the program’s objectives. Predominantly, lack of effective cost controls and insufficient state funding through subsidies lead to cost inflation of drugs and medical procedures. The incentives that lead to these excessive expenditures also contribute to overcrowding in major hospitals, the disintegration of the three-tiered referral system, and corruption. All of these problems are the direct result of distorted incentives and create a significant roadblock to affordable, quality health care for Chinese citizens. During the economic reform period, the government believed that the economic advantages of reform would compensate for decreased state support.66 In some respects, this logic is circular. Precautionary spending is an important issue that the Chinese economy must address in order to forge a path to an economically sustainable future. Improvements in the Chinese social security net will set Chinese consumers at ease, relieving the need to save excessively for future unexpected health costs. Health care reform is a significant component to achieving social stability and boosting domestic consumption.67 These important implications of health care reform make it an essential element for China’s future economic success.

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Appendix

Growth of China’s Health Care Expenditures
Prices are in nominal terms.  

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Obliteration and Affirmation: The Language of Suprematism in Malevich's Late Work

Oliver Preston

Following the First World War, the prevailing modernist trend in art underwent a startling transformation. While it initially appeared that painting was traveling along a teleological path towards abstraction, the post-war years saw a widespread return to the conventions of figurative painting. The Russian avant-garde was by no means immune to this change. Russian art’s metamorphosis from the 1920s into the 1930s was in many respects a caricature of the overall trend: while the radical geometric shapes of Suprematism and the utilitarian objects of Constructivism were by all counts the established Russian art form into the 1920s, the rise of Josef Stalin saw a complete overthrow of the modernist tradition in favor of the pastel colors and smiling faces of Socialist Realism. Given the ideological fervor and fatalistic language of the Russian avant-garde, the shift is nothing short of bewildering.

At the heart of this shift is Kazimir Malevich. Malevich, whose “Black Square” brought on the flourishing of the Russian avant-garde, in many ways invented the Suprematist, defamiliarizing, nonobjective visual language that would come to define post-revolutionary Russian art. Given his central role in establishing the Russian avant-garde, Malevich’s strange return to figuration — what he would call “objective” painting — can be seen as a microcosm of the greater trend towards Socialist Realism. When one observes the trajectory of Malevich’s oeuvre, it is easy to characterize his return to figuration — what he would call “objective” painting — as regressive.

When Malevich unveiled his startlingly austere canvases in the 0.10 exhibition of 1915, he articulated along with them a new, apparently absolute artistic ideology, what he called “Suprematism.” The visual principles of Suprematism were strict and highly specific: flat, geometric forms, entirely removed from any referent, presented on a white background. By “atomizing” the traditional picture and presenting the viewer with monochrome planes of color devoid of any objective reference, Malevich claimed to have reduced painting to its first principles, creating “the new realism.” This essentially teleological language — language that prefigured the vitriolic, anti-bourgeois rhetoric of the Constructivists — makes Malevich’s eventual abandonment of Suprematism in favor of figurative painting somewhat hard to stomach. Indeed, Malevich’s later work was met with harsh criticism in his time.  


Yet to write off Malevich’s later period as regressive is unproductive at best, at worst entirely myopic. In order for Malevich’s post-Suprematist work to qualify as regressive, it would have to demonstrate both a reversion to the Cubo-Futurist style of his earlier work and a wholesale rejection of his Suprematist ideals. This, however, is far from the case: in his later peasant portraiture and “retrospective impressionism,” one can detect a union between the formal innovation of his Suprematist canvases and the rural, distinctly human subject matter of his earlier peasant portraiture. Regardless of the exact causes of the dramatic shift,—which are no doubt many and multifarious—Malevich’s return to figurative painting constitutes not a complete reformulation of his artistic ideology but a repurposing of established Suprematist ideals. With Suprematism, Malevich invented a distinct iconography, a symbolic system in which forms, colors, and spatial relationships are given their own distinct meaning. By applying the visual language of Suprematism within a figurative, generally human framework, Malevich put Suprematist theory into practice. The result is a series of emotionally complex images that communicate a mounting disillusionment with emerging Soviet realities—forced collectivization, widespread famine, and state control.

Given the abruptness of Malevich’s return to figurative painting in the late 1920s, much scrutiny has been devoted to the circumstances surrounding the shift. A number of explanations have emerged as to what exactly caused Malevich to “reconsider” his aesthetic. Some suggest that the shift was simply necessary for Malevich’s survival as an artist: the rise of Stalinism, with its intolerance of the avant-garde, must have left little room for Malevich to experiment with abstraction during the late 1920s. Yet even if Malevich’s return to figurative painting involved a compromise with the political forces of Stalinism, it remains unclear whether or not Malevich himself was vehemently opposed to the shift. By the time Malevich returned to figurative painting in the late 1920s, he had not been painting anything, let alone Suprematist canvases, for a number of years. Instead, he had taken up a series of teaching positions following the 1917 Revolution and travelled to Warsaw, Berlin, and Munich. It seems that in using Suprematism as a teaching tool, he regarded it not as the new, teleological and exclusive mode of painting, but as a pedagogic method with which the artist could reduce painting to its first principles. As K. I. Rozhdestvensky, a student of Malevich’s, described: “The first phase of [Malevich’s] pedagogy was a purification from all influences. The task was to achieve a pure painterly culture and to bring into it
additional elements. At that time it was important, since we had very many influences from all sides.”4 It appears, then, that Suprematism may have simply been to Malevich a process of purification — not the end of art, but a reduction of painting to its state of nature so that it might start anew.

It may be impossible to deduce the exact cause of Malevich’s return to traditional modes of painting. It is likely that the shift involved an inescapable compromise with the Russian state’s ever-growing intolerance of the avant-garde. However, as his teaching method suggests, Malevich may not have objected to the application of Suprematist ideology within a more traditional framework, such as landscape or portraiture. In any case, searching for a cause for Malevich’s perplexing decision does not seem entirely lucrative, and may even prove futile. The real investigation thus lies in the question of coherence: Are Malevich’s two periods at all reconcilable with each other? Can one extract any threads of continuity between Malevich’s Suprematist canvasses and the work of his later period? If so, what is the meaning located therein?

Malevich’s later work can be separated into two distinct categories: first, his peasant cycle, in which mysterious, often featureless peasant figures stand motionless in front of rolling Suprematist landscapes; and second, his impressionistic, Renaissance-inspired portraiture. While the two categories are strikingly different (in fact, it often seems difficult to reconcile even these two periods with each other), they both draw on Suprematist iconography to generate complex layers of emotion and meaning. Taken together, the two groups stand as an articulation of Malevich’s growing disillusionment with the oppression of Stalinism. In this sense, there is in fact a strong continuity between Malevich’s Suprematist period and his return to figurative painting.

Malevich’s late peasant portraiture is rife with double meanings. Superficially, each canvas seems to present the peasant as a heroic figure, to glorify the every day and rejoice in the victory of Communism — much in keeping with the tropes of Socialist Realism. However, beneath this apparent optimism runs a strong undercurrent of longing, suffering, and despair. Quite notably, Malevich generates this subtext by way of engaging with the optimism of Socialist Realism: by taking the propagandistic visual language of Socialist Realism to its extreme,
he exposes the inherent absurdity and consequent oppressiveness of the Stalinist agenda. Crucial to this bait-and-switch is his manipulation of his pre-established Suprematist iconography.

Take, for example, *Complex Presentiment*, painted between 1928 and 1932. Here, one of Malevich’s characteristic featureless peasants stands upright and motionless in front of a sprawling landscape. The application of Suprematist techniques — namely, large, flat planes of primary color — contributes to a certain sense of universalism. Because Malevich regarded his Suprematist forms as first principles, or universals, his use of them here to articulate the form of the peasant and the surrounding landscape rid the scene of all specificity. In this way, Malevich offers the viewer an image of the universal peasant in a universal environment. This strong universalism is further articulated by the featurelessness of the peasant and the rigidity of the torso: in some sense, Malevich presents the viewer with a metaphysical portrait of the Russian peasant. Confronted with a faceless figure, the viewer is compelled to project his own face onto the blank slate he finds before him, to take up the role of the peasant. The peasant could be anyone. This universalism, as articulated by Malevich’s distinctly Suprematist visual language, coincides with the iconography of Socialist Realism, which concerned itself with the glorification of universal stereotypes: the athlete, the shock worker, the peasant, and so on. By presenting the viewer with a blank, universal figure, Malevich has taken the stereotype to its logical extreme: he has painted the consummate Soviet peasant. There is nothing individual or distinctive about the figure; he is the every-man, the realization of the Soviet dream.

Yet, under scrutiny, this apparent optimism gives way to despair. By vehemently universalizing the figure of the peasant, Malevich strips him of all humanity. His rigid stance and his smooth, featureless face essentially commodify him — he becomes little more than a figurine, a puppet. The land he stands on is bare, unintelligible, and bizarre; the Suprematist house in the background appears cold, uninviting, and prison-like. During his Suprematist period, Malevich was careful to distinguish white from blue in its ability to suggest infinite, empty space. The former indicated unboundedness, allowing the viewer to conceptualize the infinite. From an optimistic stance, Malevich’s use of white thus seems to indicate the infinite potential located within the peasant. However, if one is to take a more pessimistic standpoint, the white begins to suggest a void, oblivion. The yellow paint on the peasant’s torso, applied ostensibly to create volume, begins to resemble one of Malevich’s Suprematist forms dissipating into nothingness (compare *Complex Presentiment* with *Suprematism* above). A more human reading of the painting almost inevitably subscribes this latter, pessimistic interpretation. Malevich presents
the viewer with a figure devoid of flesh, a corpse-like peasant. What is so powerful about this result is that hopelessness and despair emerge quite naturally from Malevich’s extreme visualization of the Soviet dream: by reducing the peasant to a universal figure, Malevich has created a cold, lifeless figurine. Given the actual plight of the peasants under the Stalinist program of forced collectivization — a plight that Malevich, who often self-identified as a peasant, must have been aware of and sympathetic towards — this implication becomes all the more poignant.\(^{10}\)

This *reductio ad absurdum* of Soviet iconography forms a common thread that runs throughout Malevich’s second peasant cycle.\(^{11}\) In *Girls in the Field*, Malevich pushes the de-individualization of the peasant even further. Aside from coloration, none of the three girls display any defining characteristics.\(^{12}\) The three figures stand on the same plane; in the same, inactive stance. Here, Malevich pushes his use of white to define the figure to its extreme. The color on the peasants’ torsos entirely fails to convey a sense of volume. The forms are left empty, hollow. The girl on the far left, perhaps the best example of this effect, appears in places as merely the outline of a figure. The individual seems to have been cut out of the painting by the hand of a censor.\(^{13}\)

Here one should also note two tropes that, though absent from *Complex Presentiment*, are near staples within Malevich’s second peasant cycle: first, a reliance on cross-like perspective; and second, an emphasis on the emptiness of the inactivity of the peasants’ hands. In *Girls in the Field*, as in many of Malevich’s peasant portraits, the three figures stand pressed up against the picture plane with the landscape unfolding behind them towards a high horizon line. The result is a clear “cross” shape.\(^{14}\) This compositional detail alone contains some of the same double-meanings as Malevich’s engagement with Socialist iconography. Is one to take the cross to signify the peasant’s messianic power, or his crucifixion? Second, the painting displays Malevich’s interest in gesticulation — or rather, the lack thereof. Here, the girls stand with their hands hanging empty.

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\(^{10}\) Katsnelson, 72

\(^{11}\) Ibid., 80.

\(^{12}\) In some of his peasant portraits, Malevich removes even color as a defining characteristic. See Sarabianov, 147.

\(^{13}\) One should note, too, that the titles of many of Malevich’s peasant paintings communicate a similar idea: nearly all of them provide the viewer with only the gender of the figure portrayed. These generic titles further remove the individual from the painting in quite a radical way.

and inactive at their sides. This small detail constitutes a major departure from Malevich’s pre-Suprematist peasant portraiture, in which peasants were nearly always depicted in action, with tools in hand. Their limp hands seem to suggest impotence, furthering the concept of the peasant as a puppet or corpse.

The despair that lurks below the surface of Girls in the Field and Complex Presentiment comes to a head in Peasant. Here, the thick impasto brushwork that Malevich uses to describe the peasant’s beard and clothes only emphasizes the complete void that is the peasant’s face. The figure, instead of representing an optimistic vision of the “ideal” peasant, becomes a haunting monstrosity. The peasant’s limp, hollow gesture, directed at nothing in particular, invites the viewer to gaze upon the barren land, the emptiness that has come to define the peasant’s life.

In nearly all of his late peasant portraiture, Malevich’s extreme engagement with the visual language of Soviet realism — an emphasis on the universal over the individual — seeks to expose its inherent absurdity, dehumanizing potential, and ultimately tragic consequences. Crucial to this visual exposé of Stalinism is Malevich’s reliance on a distinctly Suprematist visual language. Thus, the often powerful meaning that emerges from Malevich’s peasant portraits is entirely dependent on a kind of continuity between his Suprematist period and his return to figuration.

If Malevich’s late peasant cycle sought to explore the Soviet infatuation with the collective and the universal, his final series of paintings — impressionistic portraits composed in a manner reminiscent of Renaissance paintings — sought to reject it. In these paintings, Malevich portrays the triumph of the individual over the de-individualizing forces of universals. Again, Malevich’s use of his pre-established Suprematist iconography is absolutely essential in understanding this shift.

In both Female Worker and Self-Portrait, Malevich abandons white as the primary descriptor of the human form and returns enthusiastically to flesh tones. He fills the female worker’s face with rich coloration — her cheeks are rosy, and her lips are red. The result is not simply a subject with a definite sense of volume but a subject with life. Her veins bulge out of her thick, strong arms; one can almost feel the blood coursing through her body and the breath passing through her parted lips. Her substantive arms and lively visage stand out from the rest of the canvas, emerging out of flat, almost abstract planes of color. Her distinct face and figure thus assert themselves over the universal, Suprematist forms that constitute the rest of the painting. In this way, she is the opposite of the faceless peasant: she is an individual. Unlike the limp, largely gestureless hands of the peasants, the woman holds her hands upward, apparently caught in the act of raising them. The gesture is generative and assertive, suggesting a unique sense of human agency.
Malevich’s *Self-Portrait*, composed soon after he learned that he was suffering from a terminal illness, constitutes the apotheosis of this affirmation of the individual. First, the very concept of a self-portrait runs contrary to the extreme universalization that Malevich engaged with when painting his peasant portraits: it is in many ways the ultimate declaration of the self. This self assertion is only amplified by Malevich’s choice to present himself as a Renaissance artist: he has become the ultimate individual, a man of great acts and extreme creative power. Here, as in *Female worker*, Malevich’s face competes with and emerges out of universal Suprematist forms — the flat planes of color that constitute his hat and collar — ultimately asserting itself over them. His hand is turned upward, his palm open. The gesture, like that of the female worker, exudes a certain sense of power: it resembles the out-reaching palm of Lenin in a number of memorials. Finally, in the lower right corner of the canvas, Malevich leaves his signature: not his name, but a small black square. The artist thus merges with his most famous work and, more generally, with the act of painting itself. This constitutes a strong form of individualism: Malevich is defining himself by a unique and powerful act. Thus, where Malevich used the language of Suprematism to expose the tragic consequences of the extreme Stalinist universalization in his peasant portraiture, he uses it here to showcase the individual.
At first glance, Malevich's return to figuration may appear as nothing short of perplexing. However, Malevich's continued reliance on a certain Suprematist iconography in order to convey meaning generates a strong sense of continuity. Malevich's late work thus constitutes not a complete departure but a kind of Hegelian synthesis, a union between the objective and the non-objective, a practical application of Suprematist theory to figurative painting. Malevich's about-face, bewildering yet ultimately reconcilable, thus exposes the mistake that was the teleological language surrounding abstraction in the early 20th century. “Black Square,” which can be read as the apotheosis of the entire project of abstraction, thus did not put an end to conventional painting. If anything, Malevich's experimentation with Suprematism ultimately bolstered his later figurative work, inherently reflective rather than regressive. Time and time again, Malevich demonstrates that the gaze of art is not directed forward towards an end, simultaneously arriving at a critical realization: art can progress only by looking inward.

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In the past twenty years, the world has experienced tremendous progress in the accessibility of information communication technologies (ICTs). According to the World Bank, the percentage of global Internet users has soared from zero percent in 1990 to nearly forty percent today. Other key forms of information communication technologies include mobile phones and satellite televisions. Approximately 66 percent have satellite televisions, according to the Information Technology Union.\(^1\)

By the end of 2013, there will be 6.8 billion mobile phone subscriptions worldwide. Given a global population of 7.1 billion, this prevalence of mobile phone use is astounding, enhancing connectivity and ICT accessibility globally.\(^2\)

Though the accessibility of ICTs has improved greatly, there remain stark discrepancies between regions, classes, and gender. Nonetheless, the increased presence of information communication technology throughout the world is transforming social structures. People now have an online platform through which they can build better societies: instead of settling for the status quo, individuals can now express their views freely with others who hold similar social and or political priorities. And because this opportunity exists at all levels of society, from nuclear families to national governments to international regulative bodies like the United Nations, global discussion is wider-reaching.

Challenges to the creation of a truly connected global public remain, however. Those able to build virtual communities are, naturally, only those with the access and ability to use the Internet and other forms of information communication technologies. Nonetheless, those that do have access to ICTs are perhaps able to make greater impacts than ever before: ICTs are a tool for social change, and as a scholar of the Arab Spring, Ekatarina Stepanova explains, “No region, state, or form of government can remain immune to the impact of new information and communication technologies on social and political movements.”\(^3\)

ICTs can infiltrate every aspect of a community or nation, from the ways people interact to the methods by which laws are passed and elections are held. ICTs have been indispensable in many recent activist movements, particularly feminist ones, during which groups unrelentingly used the Internet to voice views that would have been very difficult to project effectively without a web platform.
International Atmosphere and Attitudes Towards ICTs

The catalytic role of ICTs during the Arab Spring has led to twowidespread attitudes toward ICT development: cyber-utopianism, the idea that the Internet will have purely beneficial impacts on a group and that all have equal voices and impacts online, and internet centrism, the idea that Internet possesses an unfailing ability to shape and transform its surrounding communities.4 Touted as a “Facebook Revolution,” the Egyptian Revolution was kick-started by a social media campaign called the “April 6th Youth Movement.” International media accredited Twitter and Facebook for the uprisings. The success of protests coordinated online set an international atmosphere that ICTs are incredible instruments for change.

In addition to enabling connection and the dissemination of information, ICTs are also accredited for tangible progresses in health, education and economic opportunity. The trendy term “ICT4D” (ICTs for Development) is popular among politicians and activists at all levels. On key news search engines like Lexis Nexis, the terms “Information Communication technologies and women’s empowerment” yielded 997 hits, while the terms “Information Communication technologies and women’s oppression” yielded only 41 hits. Similarly, “Technology women’s empowerment” yielded 999 hits while “Technology women’s oppression” yielded only 253 hits.5 There is more attention paid to the benefits of ICTs.

ICTs have provided benefits to feminist movements, which have also been widely celebrated by international media. This paper seeks to prove that because of cyber-utopianism and Internet centrim, increasing ICT use poses significant challenges to feminist movements, especially ones that do not receive enough international attention. ICTs have hampered feminist progress for two central reasons; opposition movements almost always reap the same benefits from ICTs, and ICTs may deepen a dangerous gender divide between men who can access and use ICTs, and women who can do so to a significantly lesser degree.

Women and ICTs: The Context

Around the world, women’s access to ICTs is arguably higher than ever. In fact, 37 percent of women are Internet users, just four percent fewer than the percentage of men, and of those women between ages 15 and 24, 77 percent use social media. Unfortunately, gender divisions are evident. For example, although there are nearly six billion mobile subscriptions and the data is not gender-disaggregated, estimates predict that women are 21 percent less likely to own a mobile phone than men.6 Additionally, 66 percent of households have televisions, though the accessibility of these TVs to women varies widely.7
In the developing world this technology gap is greatest, with 16 percent fewer women using the Internet than men.

Benefits to Feminist Progress

ICTs have undeniably aided efforts for feminist progress. By granting the ability to connect and organize “defenders” of women’s rights, especially to those unable to make their voices heard or join movements, ICT’s have helped foster the formation of many key support networks that act as springboards for action and support. For example, the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) has staff in places as widespread as Bangalore and Toronto. The Association organizes feminist efforts and projects around the world, provides helpful information on health and political rights for women, and offers a safe space to share grievances. AWID even has a program called the “Young Feminist Wire,” a webpage where female adolescents in the developing world can share their experiences, ask questions, and get advice from specialists in women’s empowerment. These users may become more assertive and inclined to fight mistreatment in order to break cycles of oppression.

Another organization is MIDEAST Youth, an innovative online forum for Middle Eastern youth, which houses human rights discussions. “Kolena Laila” is a blogging project in which countries in the Middle East blog for a week, discussing the injustices facing nations’ “Lailas.” This has helped bring women’s issues to the forefront of people’s awareness and inspired discussion about preventing the mistreatment of women. Another example of the connectedness and support that these online feminist networks provide is Isis-Women’s International Cross-Cultural Exchange. This group has an evocative website and social media presence. In Uganda, they provide psychological support for women in areas ravaged by warfare.

Feminist groups capitalize on this support, forming political movements through ICTs. An online campaign that proves the success of these endeavors is the “One Million Signatures Campaign” from Iran. In an effort to stop the enactment of a tax on prenuptial agreements, the One Million Signatures Campaign started to circulate online. Although the group was pursued by the Iranian government and had to change domain names and site location often, they alerted their followers each time they did so. The One Million Signatures Campaign succeeded not only in preventing the bill from passing, but also in raising awareness about how important the cyber world is for feminist efforts.

Furthermore, ICTs and social media have drastically increased the speed at which activists can respond to social occurrences. In fact, Studies of the Arab Spring have shown that Facebook now disseminates news faster than Al-Jazeera in the Arab World. In Azerbaijan, activist Layla Yunusova was
ICTs also enable initiatives like “Harassmap,” an Egyptian project designed so that women can report where they are sexually harassed or catcalled. Once women have reported their experiences, government officials and trained activists reach out to communities where the greatest amount of harassment occurs and work to reduce it.\textsuperscript{13}

ICTs provide women with opportunities to improve their health, education and economic situations. These three basic pillars are central to the well-being of any woman and thus certainly have the potential to make an activist group stronger. Activist groups have empirically provided such improvement services more efficiently through ICTs. Examples include OneWorld School House Project, which provides virtual education to women and children in rural locations worldwide, and Jordan’s E-Villages project, a program responsible for connecting rural female producers with wider networks of consumers to increase each woman’s customer base.\textsuperscript{14} Yet perhaps the most important form of education that women access through ICTs is information about how to use ICTs themselves. AWID leads a campaign called “Take Back the Tech!” which aims to increase women’s voices in the media to create a safe source for women to learn about technology and its uses.

ICTs also empower women to help build cyberworld culture. The lack of female participation online makes it easy and common for the Internet to propagate harmful stereotypes about women and improper standards of female treatment. However, by engaging online, women can change sexist cultures. Websites such as nist.tv, which collects videos from online sources about women’s empowerment projects, have even been created in response to a dearth of feminist media available on YouTube and Wikipedia.\textsuperscript{15}

### Challenges that ICTs Create for Feminist Progress

Just as the Internet has given feminist groups the opportunity to shape web culture, it does the same for misogynistic organizations. Unfortunately however, the administration for ICT’s is predominately male, so oppressive, male-dominated groups have an advantage. Globally, women account for only 21 percent of people working in ICTs. The gap is even greater in developing nations.\textsuperscript{16} Since women cannot strongly influence ICT culture administratively, sexist stereotypes prevail online within a cyber-culture that alienates women. This makes it very difficult for feminists to effectively use the Internet. The Saudi fight for women’s right to drive faced such obstacles. The movement began in 1990 when 47 women drove in 14 cars.
down a main street in Riyadh. In 2006, a group drove again, and ever since, there have been numerous online campaigns, petitions and videos related to the cause, but they have been unsuccessful. Retaliations from media sources, political officials, social leaders, and even scholars have been tremendous, effectively impeding any social progress. As Eman al-Nafjan, a prominent Saudi blogger and founder of Saudiwoman's Weblog summarizes:

Since 2006, every few months there would be a study, petition, video or campaign but to no avail. This is no surprise, because there are just as many studies, videos, petitions and campaigns calling on the government to maintain the ban.17

There is a sort of cyber warfare occurring, and just as activists groups have broadly reaching platforms to express their opinions, so do the most misogynistic conservatives who cut at the core of feminist efforts. Al Jazeera reported that conservatives responded with their own “Iqal” campaign attempting to persuade people to beat women found driving. Their Facebook page earned 6,000 likes. The response to the Saudi women’s campaign shows that ICTs give oppressive groups the same abilities to connect and collaborate as they give feminist ones.

Oppressive groups around the world have created an unprecedentedly misogynistic culture online through skillful ICTs use. In the Association for Progressive Communication’s Statement to the UN’s 57th Commission on the Status of Women representatives wrote,

Violence against women (VAW) that is mediated by technology is increasingly becoming part of women’s experience of violence and their online interactions. In the same way we face risks offline, in the streets and in our homes, women and girls can face specific dangers and risks on the internet such as online harassment, cyberstalking, privacy invasions with the threat of blackmail, viral ‘rape videos’ and for young women in particular, the distribution of ‘sex videos’ that force survivors to relive the trauma of sexual assault every time it is reposted online, via mobile phone or distributed in other ways. These forms of violence may also be mediated through technology but they cause psychological and emotional harm, reinforce prejudice, damage reputation, cause economic loss and pose barriers to participation in public life. Reporting and responses of these violations are generally limited and the harm and abuse are poorly understood.18

Online social media has created more ways to exploit women than ever before. Other new developments include newsgroups for postings on how to locate and sexually exploit women, websites to distribute prostitution information, chat rooms for
Fighting against these forces is very difficult since men have much control over the online domain, especially in the Middle East. Recently a report called the “Facebook Fatwa” was published with examinations of 40,000 online postings by extremist Saudi figures. The study found that while pleas for international violence were only five percent of the postings, seventy-five percent were xenophobic, intolerant of minorities or misogynistic. These kinds of posts make the web hostile for all women and minorities.

The lack of female representation in those employed as ICTs administration renders men in control over female ICTs use. This level of control seems to impede feminist movements. As Asma Barlas quotes, “The master’s tools will not dismantle the master’s house.” There is a risk that technology is commoditized for women by men, allowed only during supervised and limited hours. In certain parts of the world, the use of technology poses increasing conflict between men and women, as men grow fearful of women having too much independence.

In a case study across developing nations in Africa and the Middle East, 300 women were given cell phones. They were then monitored for three years. Women with cell phones were twice as likely to be victims of domestic violence, in part because men feared their wives were cheating on them through text messages.

Men are using technology to track women like never before. When women leave Saudi Arabia, their husbands are notified by text message. Columnist and activist Badriya al-Bashar writes, “the authorities are using technology to monitor women… women are kept in a state of slavery.” These dangerous efforts to control women, which sometimes result in violence, have the potential to become deeply rooted in an already sexist ICT culture.

Although feminist groups may be able to break into the ICT world through web pages, call centers, TV channels, and other venues, the accessibility of ICT’s for women still remains dubious. Women are 21 percent less likely to own cell phones than men. Men are twice as likely to own personal computers — and even if women have access to the technological devices they need, it is questionable whether they will have the skills to use technology. As Kofi Annan stated at the World Summit on Information Society,

The so-called digital divide is actually several gaps in one. There is a technological divide — great gaps in infrastructure. There is a content divide. A lot of web-based information is simply not relevant to the real needs of people. And nearly 70 per cent of the world’s websites are in English, at times crowding out local voices and views. There is a gender divide, with women and girls enjoying less access to infor-


Empirically, increasing ICT usage has posed challenges to feminist progress, and the discrepancy in media attention might become extremely problematic. Indeed, authors like Malcolm Gladwell and Evgeny Morozov, through their concerns with cyber-utopianism and Internet centrism, have provided a meaningful framework to evaluate the challenges and risks of online activism. By employing the same benefits ICT provide for communication technology than men and boys. This can be true of rich and poor countries alike.24

Moreover, the communal aspects of technology further exacerbate this problem. If a group of people is using a certain technology, it is more likely that others in that community will start to as well. Furthermore, the level of skill with which they use technology rises since they can pool knowledge and seek help when they face difficulty. But because there are immense entry barriers for women, cyclic problems wherein entire groups of women do not use technology or feel comfortable with online resources arise.

The greatest risk related to ICTs however is total exclusion of women from the cyber world. Here the “Arab Spring” example comes into play. Historically, governments have taken extreme measures to curb online activism. In Egypt, the government employed unprecedented measures by attempting to shut down all media and Internet providers. Not every provider complied, but 93 percent of the Internet was shut down in Egypt, including all services provided by Telecom Egypt, Vodafone, Raya, Link Egypt, and Etisalat Misr. This led to the use of proxy servers, the path diversity method, and Google voice. Though the government caused this technological block, it is a problematic precedent in terms of the way that online activism is handled. It would be a tragedy for feminist activism if women were excluded from the Internet or other ICTs. However, given feminism’s transnational nature, this would be an incredibly difficult ban to place, though bans could occur in particular regions. Reuters has reported that cell phones have been banned for women in a small village in the Indian town of Bihar. There has been discussion of instating this policy in other villages, and potentially the entirety of the region.25

This complete and total restriction of ICT access to women exemplifies the possible “commoditization” of access to technology as a right that can be granted and denied rather than one that exists freely due to the existence of technology. Viewing technology as a commodity or privilege is very risky, as doing so sets the groundwork for oppression, the hindrance of feminist movements, and restriction of the opportunities and qualities of life that ought to be afforded to all women.

Conclusion
feminists, patriarchal, extremist groups have stymied attempts for change.

It is clear that increasing ICTs offer benefits to both feminists and oppressive forces. Increased ICTs also pose challenges to both groups. Ultimately, the central question will not be which group reaps greater benefits or faces more challenges, but rather which group uses the benefits and tools that ICTs afford better than the other. The next productive question to ask is about steps that the international community can take to ensure that women are best able to use ICTs.

Viable recommendations include prioritizing acquisition of gender-disaggregated data on ICT use and funding initiatives to provide women with education and skills to use ICTs. Other key initiatives yet to occur are international programs to teach women how to use and understand ICTs. Since ICT jargon is not accessible to most people in the world, many women cannot engage fully with their use. Perhaps the recommendation worth stressing the most is gender mainstreaming in all ICT policies, ranging from regulations about media providers to pornography. According to the United Nations,

Mainstreaming involves ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are central to all activities — policy development, research, advocacy/dialogue, legislation, resource allocation, and planning, implementation and monitoring of programmes and projects.

In 2002, a study revealed that in 80 ICT development projects, gender issues were not even considered because donors did not require this information. Yet the effects of policy on both genders must be considered before any ICT policy is passed, especially if ICT policy is to play a role in shaping the future of feminist movements. Historically, a Gender Evaluation Method developed by APC-WNSP has proven its efficacy through its contributions to 27 projects in 19 countries in Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America, suggesting the necessity of an international gender mainstreaming protocol. Feminist progress depends on women’s ability to engage meaningfully with ICTs globally, and as such, the world needs to recognize this engagement should be a development priority for many years to come.

Alessandra Powell (‘16) is a sophomore in Trumbull College.
Appendix: Media Analysis

Growth of China’s Health Care Expenditures

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<th>Search Term</th>
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</table>

Appendix: Primary Source Blogs

HARASSmap.org

nist.tv

Association for Women in Development; Young Feminist Wire, yfa.awid.org/

MIDEAST Youth: www.mideastyouth.com/

ISIS Womens Cross-Cultural International Exchange: www.isis.or.ug/


Association for Progressive Communications, “Homepage” 2013, Web. www.apc.org/


Association for Progressive Communications, “Homepage” 2013, Web. www.apc.org/


Necessity is the sister of tyranny, and nowhere is such a bond stronger than in Pakistan. In 1958, just eleven years after Pakistan’s founding, Chief Justice Muhammad Munir invoked the “doctrine of necessity” and “test of efficacy,” effectively allowing the military to justify its takeover by arguing that the country needed it. It also set a precedent that subsequent courts in the latter half of the twentieth century followed.¹

When General Zia ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf staged military coups, the court acted as a tool of the state, establishing legality for the extra-judicial actions but, in turn, weakening its own credibility. Up until the early 2000s, the court remained a puppet of the executive branch.

Years later, in September of 2007, the political scene had dramatically shifted. People in suits and ties came out in major cities in Pakistan and demanded the reinstatement of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, who refused to resign despite pressure from Musharraf. Musharraf himself was rapidly losing momentum; the country was witnessing its first widespread demonstration against the military. Carlotta Gall of the New York Times describes the scene:

As [the protesters] marched the hundred yards from the Supreme Court down Constitution Avenue to the Election Commission, police officers with helmets, shields and long sticks blocked their way. Lawyers began hurling stones, and the officers retaliated, throwing the stones back and firing tear gas, and then charging and beating protesters.²

Eventually, the movement led to the resignation and flight of Musharraf out of Pakistan. The ouster of a dictator by a civilian was unprecedented in Pakistan. At no other time in history did the judiciary have such support from the people and the military have its power so seriously challenged. Chaudhry’s court had shifted the political order in Pakistan, successfully undoing a decades-old relationship between the judiciary and the military.

The momentum continued, and Chaudhry’s power grew with it. Today, Pakistan is on the verge of making democratic history by having the first peaceful transition of power between elected governments. But no matter who is elected — Bilawal Zardari’s PPP, Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N, or the Imran Khan’s rookie party — chances are that they will operate under the

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The Pakistani constitution has been rewritten three times and, in all these versions, judicial independence has, in principle, been guaranteed. In fact, under the current constitution, the President cannot fire or appoint any judges; the power to select judges belongs to the Judicial Commission of Pakistan, which consists of the Chief Justice, the four most senior judges of the Court, a former Chief Justice or Judge nominated by the incumbents, the Federal Minister for Law and Justice, the Attorney-General for Pakistan, and a Senior Advocate of the Court (nominated by the Pakistan Bar Council). Given the makeup of the Commission, if the Court insists on independence, it could get it: there are only two executive branch members in the Commission, compared to the six derived from the judiciary.

In some particular cases, the independence guaranteed in the Constitution has translated to fair rulings. Throughout the latter half of the 20th Century, the Court has maintained its impartiality on some important issues, including ruling against the executive branch to protect due process, expand privacy rights, and suspend the use of military courts for civilians. It also forayed into social equality — when, in *Ghulam Ali v. Mst Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi* (1990), the Court ruled in support of women’s education, affirming that if enough women were qualified for acceptance into college, a special gender quota could not restrict them from attending. These cases demonstrate that the Court was not absolutely corrupt before Chaudhry’s arrival; in several key situations, it lived up to its independence promised in the Constitution.

However, when it came to issues of constitutionality of regimes, the Court became the lackey of the military. The reason for the judges’ bias was that if the Constitution was abrogated or ignored under military rule, they were not protected. Without this protection, they were afraid of the power that military rulers held over them: to fire them, to imprison them, or even to threaten their lives. Instead of openly resisting these
dictators, they developed a theory of prudence, one that traced its roots back to Munir. The reasoning went like this: if they refused to endorse the coup, the dictator would replace them with even more regime-friendly judges — which would damage the institution irreparably; if they legalized the coup, however, they would be able to serve as watchdogs over the military regime and step in if an egregiously illegal act was attempted. In short, their legalization of these takeovers was driven by their wish to prevent the concession of full judicial authority to the executive branch.

The reasoning can most clearly be seen in the judiciary response to Zia’s 1977 coup. When Zia took over, he ordered the judges to take a new oath of office that did not mention any loyalty to the existing constitution. Perhaps, because the enforcement of the oath was unclear — it did not technically repeal the previous oath they had sworn — the new oath was taken without any hesitation or backlash. The judges went through with the oath without any hesitation; civil society was similarly silent. Justice K. M. A. Samdani summarized the judges’ thoughts, writing, “...it was perhaps not advisable at that stage to precipitate a confrontation between the judiciary and Martial Law regime.”

If this attitude was meant to save judicial power for a more critical time, then this grand plan failed. Until 2007, the judiciary under military rule had never successfully confronted the regime on issues that threatened the military’s power. It had not dared to release itself out of the confines of judicial prudence, a box that it drew around itself for protection. And while the Court thought that drawing this box around them would protect the judiciary from corruption, their actions instead diminished the credibility of the institution. The Court endorsed extra-judicial actions, and no matter how infrequent these endorsements were, they threatened the very rule of law that the institution intended to uphold. In the words of Shoaib A. Ghias, the pre-Chaudhry courts were known to “validate everything, legitimize nothing.”

Perhaps this lack of formal resistance was due to a mistaken conventional wisdom that judges could not marshal enough popular support to overrule a dictator’s decision. Whit Mason put it simply: judges “had always feared the unknown: what would happen if they stood up to the bullies?” He added, “They had been oblivious to the potential role of public support if they took a principled stand.” While this may have been true for many judges — especially those who were appointed for political reasons — Mason’s account unfairly caricatures the judiciary as pushovers and officials who are interested in self-preservation over anything else. The truth is more complicated than that, since there have been multiple instances through history where judges have attempted to fight takeovers and failed.
In 1977, for example, when Zia staged his coup, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Yaqub Ali butted heads with the Chief Martial Law Administrator, a senior official in the regime, after Ali agreed to rehear a petition that threatened the legitimacy of the revolution. When the differences could not be resolved, Zia decided to remove him by proposing amendments that forced his retirement. Despite this pressure, the Chief Justice refused to budge.\(^{11}\) However, unlike Chaudhry, his refusal to back down did not galvanize any popular grassroots support.

Ali’s case is not the only one in pre-2007 Pakistani history. The other instances when the judiciary tried to reassert itself similarly failed. That, of course, begs the question of why Chaudhry succeeded when his predecessors did not.

In the next section, I explore the key factors that made Chaudhry’s rebellion different — arguing that civil society (especially the Bar), the expansive independent media, along with Chaudhry’s pre-rebellion image and political tactics, were the main contributors to the campaign’s success.

Chaudhry’s Defeat of Musharraf: The Drama, The Man & The Backdrop

The rebellion in March 2007 was widely televised. In front of a nationwide audience, Musharraf summoned Chaudhry to his official residence. After gauging how much of an activist Chaudhry had proved himself by investigating his regime’s illegal detentions, Musharraf was afraid that Chaudhry would eventually go after him. Chaudhry was no longer the regime loyalist that Musharraf had imagined he would be, and that meant that he would have to go. Therefore, on March 9, 2007, Musharraf stood in front of Chaudhry, with his prime minister and intelligence chiefs by his side. Clad in his military uniform, Musharraf ordered Chaudhry to dismiss himself from office. Chaudhry refused. His refusal was caught on camera, as was Musharraf’s shock. Angered, Musharraf imprisoned Chaudhry in a cell and issued a presidential order stipulating that Chaudhry was suspended from office.\(^{12}\)

That action tipped the first domino in Musharraf’s fateful tale. Musharraf’s presidential order had sparked the organization of protests of lawyers in major cities, which eventually spread throughout the country. People in black suits and ties faced off against law enforcement officials, enduring beatings, tear gas and propaganda by the regime. Civil society — from NGOs to the general media — believed that Chaudhry represented the cause of restoring justice and rule of law to the country. Approximately five days after his suspension, Chaudhry was forced to make an appearance at the Supreme Court for a hearing. Instead of riding in a police car like most criminals did, he decided to walk to the Court. The public watched from the sidewalk. During the walk, however, security personnel grabbed him by the hair and threw him headfirst into the police car.

\(^{11}\) Samdani, Role of the Judiciary, 87.

The public was appalled. Most importantly, these actions were caught on film and broadcast throughout the country. These broadcasts only added to the passion of the movement.

The rest, as they say, is history. Protests, dubbed the “Lawyer’s Movement” to recognize the critical role that the legal profession played, spread like wildfire through the nation. In July 2007, Chaudhry was restored to his position after a Supreme Court ruling annulled Musharraf’s order. This ruling was largely driven by public pressure. But in 2008, history repeated itself when Chaudhry decided to take up a case challenging Musharraf’s eligibility to run for reelection, and Musharraf declared a state of emergency. This state of emergency granted him powers to suspend the Chief Justice, which he did. Chaudhry, again, became the center of a reenergized Lawyers’ Movement. The demonstrations spread throughout the country and climaxed on July 2008 with the “Long March” from Karachi to Islamabad, led by Chaudhry himself. Due to the intense public backlash over his state of emergency, Musharraf was forced from office and fled the country.

Chaudhry was not always an icon for change. As a judge on the Supreme Court in 2000, he had reviewed and legitimized Musharraf’s coup. But as he grew in stature, and took the helm of the Supreme Court in 2005, he slowly became known as a popular hero among Pakistanis. He went to great lengths to test the limits of his power in defending the common man. He used his *suo moto* powers — which allowed him to establish authority in a case on his own, without the need for another party to file a suit — in order to examine issues that burdened the populace. These investigations would often lead him to rule in defense of the people’s rights, in favor of relief for victims, or to expand justice for citizens. As time went on, he expanded his use of the *suo moto* notices, and even began investigations based on letters and newspaper articles. He inserted himself into the smallest local matters, such as a disappearance of a child—a case in which he proceeded to call police officers by going up the chain of command until he received the answers that he wanted.

Chaudhry did not want to make a bold entrance and directly confront Musharraf, so his activism began in the economic rather than political arena. His interventions were possible because regulations and government oversight had not caught up with the unprecedented economic growth under Musharraf’s rule. For example, when the earthquake hit in October 2005, causing tens of thousands of deaths and tremendous infrastructural damage, Chaudhry heard a case that claimed that the Capital Development Authority (CDA) had been negligent in enforcing code, causing the collapse of a residential tower in Islamabad. Instead of limiting his decision to the case, Chaudhry decided to use his *suo moto* powers to expand the scope of his investigation to study earthquake damage as a whole and the state of relief efforts. The result of the investigation was that provincial

officials were forced to provide reports about their regulations and relief efforts. When these relief efforts were not up to par, the Court would mandate more help for the earthquake victims. After defending the victims of the earthquake, Chaudhry forayed further in the economic sector and pursued a case that ended up in deregulation of price controls.  

By pursuing issues in the economic sector, Chaudhry knew he could avoid a major confrontation with Musharraf. His cases involved smaller political figures — local ones in particular. He realized that despite his growing power, he could not afford to risk being seen as a threat to the regime. After all, Musharraf did not suspect that Chaudhry would be disloyal to him, because he had been part of a Court that legitimized his rule in the first place. But as time went on, Chaudhry tested and pushed at the limits bit-by-bit. The economic interventions were the start; then came the illegal detentions case, which was the turning point.

When Chaudhry expanded his jurisdiction from economic questions to basic human rights, Musharraf quickly took notice. Musharraf had begun illegally detaining people during the US “War on Terror.” The problem, however, was that human rights organizations pointed out that most of the detainees were not Al Qaeda or Taliban terrorists, but political enemies of the regime, especially those from Baluchistan. Chaudhry took a personal interest in this case, and started investigating the whereabouts of missing people, resulting in twenty people being found. Emboldened by the success — which had gone viral in the media — this led to an order by the Supreme Court for government officials to trace other disappearances.

The case of illegal detentions moved from the local to national level, causing Chaudhry to directly confront senior members of Musharraf’s regime. Musharraf, of course, was wary, and started to question Chaudhry’s loyalty to him. Much more than the outcome of the illegal detentions, Musharraf was afraid of what Chaudhry would rule on a potential case concerning his eligibility to run in the October 2007 presidential election. The media outlets and civil society had been abuzz with rumors that Chaudhry was about to take up the case, and according to a strict reading of the law, Musharraf would probably be ineligible. Out of fear, Musharraf suspended Chaudhry the next day, and the Lawyers’ Movement began.

Throughout the ordeal, Chaudhry retained the ability to fight for the everyday, Pakistani man despite his lack of elected office. He could use the law and expand the traditional judicial power sphere to defend citizens and raise the standard of government’s duty to its people. He also realized that the law was a very distant concept if it was not applied to everyday concerns of the people. Thus, he expanded the court’s power, because of his knowledge that Pakistanis are much more interested in government’s ability to offer essential services than


19 Mason, “Order v. Law in Pakistan,” 64.

the structure of government itself. According to a 2009 national poll, Pakistanis had “high expectations” that courts would be independent of political or military influences. However, the reason for these expectations was not because Pakistanis valued democracy — only twenty percent believed that the military should never be able to stage a coup — but because they believed that the courts could advocate and defend economic needs and basic rights.17 In this regard, Chaudhry represented their needs exactly at the top of the judicial branch. The people depended on him, and appreciated him when he defended them. Even Imran Khan, a current presidential candidate, pinned his hopes on the Chief Justice. In a 2012 issue of *Time* magazine, he wrote, “Iftikhar Chaudhry has become the first…to attempt to bring the powerful to justice…A nation long deprived of justice now anxiously awaits it.”18

While Chaudhry was the icon of the movement, there were multiple forces — the media, the Bar, short-term political tactics — that transformed his one act of defiance into a larger movement for rule of law in Pakistan. The protests started in the north-central Punjab region, and turned into a movement with a national complexion. Among other factors, the independent media’s broadcasting of the protesters’ messages throughout Pakistan, along with its criticism of Musharraf’s rule, allowed the Lawyers’ Movement to spread. Ironically, the growth of the independent media from 2000 – 2008 was led by none other than Musharraf himself.

In 2000, Pakistan had one national channel; today, it has hundreds. This massive growth spurt can be traced back to the Kargil/Kashmir dispute with India in 1999 – 2000. In the middle of the crisis, the Pakistani military covertly crossed the Line of Control — a boundary that divides the region into Pakistan-administered and India-administered regions — causing India to counterattack the Pakistani infiltration with bombings. Talks were under way between the two countries, but Musharraf, then an army chief, was not looking to back down. The problem for him was public opinion: it had begun to wane in support of military action toward India. A chief cause of the decrease in public opinion, according to Ariq Zafar, CEO of Communications Research Strategies in Islamabad, was that Pakistan only had one national channel, which prompted many Pakistanis to turn to Indian newscasters to get their news.19 As a result, Pakistan was bombarded by Indian propaganda and the Pakistani government was unable to effectively communicate its message to the people. The Kashmir incident impelled Musharraf, when he assumed the presidency, to revamp Pakistan’s media industry by encouraging the opening of independent agencies and removing restrictions and regulations.

It did not help Musharraf that Chaudhry was a particularly media savvy Chief Justice. Chaudhry recognized that as he increased his *suo moto* powers, he would make more and more
political enemies; as such, his survival would depend almost solely on popular support. He became image-conscious of the Supreme Court, even dedicating a section of the Supreme Court Report of the 2006 to media relations. “Supreme Court and the Media” was the title of the section, which included eighteen press reports on what Chaudhry had accomplished over the course of the year.\textsuperscript{20} These press reports were intended to remind reporters what they had covered, while also giving them a long-term view of the progress of the judiciary. In addition, Chaudhry established connections with journalists and pressed them to write editorials that hailed him. Through all of these efforts, a national narrative developed: this court was the people’s court, and their expansion in power was not dictatorial but rather an effort to defend the people from other corrupt institutions.

As such, the television images that reverberated through TV screens — of Chaudhry resisting Musharraf to his face, and of police officers shoving Chaudhry into a police car — angered citizens. These were vivid pictures of courage and abuse, respectively, and they became a rallying point for the movement. The lawyers were especially moved by these images; they felt that shoving Chaudhry into a police car was an affront to the dignity of the legal profession, in which they worked. While the legal community was enraged by these images, Chaudhry had consolidated lawyers’ support far before the march even began. The Pakistani Bar Council (PBC) and Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) had traditionally been very divided organizations, split along partisan lines. However, Chaudhry had managed to garner the support of both of their leaderships, an important move for both image and mobilization efforts.

To establish such support, Chaudhry had to actively shape the election of the president of the SCBA — which he did with the election of Munir Malik, an anti-Musharraf candidate. The election for SCBA chief was held in October 2006, and there were two candidates in the running: Malik, an anti-regime contender, and Raja Haq Nawaz Khan, who supported Musharraf. After a close election in which Malik won, there was a forced recount and an appeal to the Lahore High Court, which ruled that Malik could not hold the position until the voting disputes were resolved. Malik, in turn, appealed to the Supreme Court. Chaudhry saw this as an opportunity: he could ensure that the SCBA would support him — thus gaining a huge ally in the Bar — with the drawback being that he would be directly declaring war against Musharraf. He chose to take the risk and overturned the Lahore High Court’s decision, which ensured that Malik would be elected to the helm of the SCBA.\textsuperscript{21}

The consolidation of support was significant for two reasons. First, Chaudhry was able to project the image that his actions had broad support. When he refused to step down, both the PBC and SCBA were immediately on his side, alleg-

\textsuperscript{20} Ghias, “Miscarriage of Chief Justice,” 998.

\textsuperscript{21} Ghias, “Miscarriage of Chief Justice,” 1004.
Mason, “Order v. Law in Pakistan,” 64.


Second, the SCBA and PBC gained the respect and attention of practicing lawyers around Pakistan — so when they organized the marches, the lawyers followed. The bar councils played a crucial operational role in turning anti-regime sentiment into action. These organizations had contact information for almost all the lawyers in Pakistan, and they were able to effectively network and get them into specific places at specific times. Considering that Musharraf had virtually demolished political parties’ ability to unite, the bar’s organization was one of very few institutions that Chaudhry could rely on to coordinate such a movement.

In addition to the media and the Bar’s role in pressuring Musharraf, the game-time political decisions by Chaudhry managed to galvanize the demonstrators. As soon as he was released from prison, Chaudhry assumed the role of chief campaigner, and traveled to rallies with the former Minister of Law, Justice and Interior Aitzaz Ahsan. Unlike most chief justices, he did not see campaigning as below the dignity of his job or below the prestige of the court. The people loved him, and he knew that the easiest way for the movement to gain momentum was for them to see him in person, in flesh and blood. A key benefit of campaigning was that local leaders and bar officials — the very people who organized the local protests — could get the credit and recognition they deserved. They were also able to share the stage with him and “bask in [Chaudhry’s] glory,” Sarwar Bari recalls. Ahsan’s and Chaudhry’s speeches would often express extensive gratitude to the local officials for their help. These personal connections, forged by Chaudhry’s knack for politicking and networking, motivated local officials to do even more for the movement. All of these protests put enough pressure on Musharraf that he eventually had no choice but to resign.

Much of current political science literature argues that Chaudhry is a force for good in Pakistan, a countervailing force to dictators who have stained Pakistan’s history for too long. “Pakistan’s Reluctant Hero,” *Time* magazine’s cover dubbed him in mid-2007. While Chaudhry managed to restore the rule of law to Pakistan’s highest office in 2008, he seemed to shed his “reluctance” by 2013. In 2012 alone, the Supreme Court had intervened and ruled for the removal of two prime ministers serving under President Asif Ali Zardari. Had the Supreme Court over-stepped its boundaries? Had it become too political?

The image of Chaudhry in front of thousands of citizens, rallying the crowd and promising to fight on their behalf does not fade easily. Since he began using his *suo moto* powers to intervene in economic and human rights issues, he had been named the “man of the people.” This name was fitting for two

A Populist, Political Court?
reasons: first, he was a people’s advocate for the policies that he supported and the rights that he defended. These range from cracking down on illegal detentions to pushing for more economic relief. Second, unlike his predecessors, he came from the people. His power did not come from appointment by the Commission; it derived from the populace, who pushed him back into power through the demonstrations. In this way, Chaudhry was more like a politician than a judge — he owed his position to the people and, therefore, felt it necessary to keep cultivating their allegiance to him.

The judiciary in Pakistan, as in other democracies, was originally created to maintain a check against the political interests of the executive and legislative branches. These branches depend on public support for their policies and election, and since public opinion is always changing, politicians are assumed to be relatively shortsighted. The Supreme Court’s role — reflected in the appointment-based nature of the job — is to maintain a check against these political decisions. Since they will not need to run for election, judges are blessed with the ability to overlook short-term political gains and focus on longer-term effects of policies on the law, the rationale went. As such, the Supreme Court would not make policy but simply deliberate on it.

Chaudhry does not fit this description of an ideal judge. Since Chaudhry’s rise was driven primarily by popular support, there was a strong likelihood that the Court was going to act more politically than a traditional court would. Chaudhry viewed himself as a man of the people, not a man of the law. While taking on Musharraf’s regime, he also inevitably created political enemies and struck political deals that needed to be redeemed during his tenure. A prime example of this is his firing of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani for not pursuing corruption charges against Zardari.

Chaudhry and Zardari never had the strongest relationship. But their relationship took a turn for the worse in March 2008, when Zardari opposed Chaudhry’s reinstatement as chief justice. Musharraf had agreed to stop pursuing several corruption cases against Zardari and his wife, Benazir Bhutto, which allowed both of them to stay out of jail. When Chaudhry was removed, Zardari agreed tentatively with Sharif’s PPP party to establish a deadline for Chaudhry’s reinstatement. However, Zardari got cold feet, afraid that Chaudhry might reverse Musharraf’s original decision to annul the corruption cases against him and his wife. He then chose to support Musharraf’s candidate, Abdul Hameed Dogar, to replace Chaudhry.24

Chaudhry, naturally, was not pleased and he appeared to launch a campaign against Zardari when he was reinstated. In February 2010, Chaudhry suspended Zardari’s judicial appointment for the Supreme Court;25 in March 2010, he arrested Zardari’s top anticorruption official for failing to reopen corruption cases against Zardari;26 in June 2012, he issued an arrest

warrant for Zardari’s close political ally, who was rumored to be a likely contender for the next presidency; and finally he ousted Zardari’s prime minister, Gilani, for his failure to press the Swiss to open an investigation on whether Zardari had laundered $12 million.\textsuperscript{27,28} Although Chaudhry had reason to pursue charges against Zardari — the current evidence suggests that he indeed is guilty of corruption — the extent to which Chaudhry interfered with the stability of the government makes his actions seem like personal vendettas rather than actions of deliberation and measured reasoning.

Zardari’s term came to an end in March, and presumably he will not return to politics. It remains to be seen whether Chaudhry will tone down his political rulings and judicial activism. For now, the identity crisis for Chaudhry — between judge and politician — still remains. After all, is it even possible to fairly review cases when one is considered a representative of the people?

An Elitist Movement?

Lawyers in suits and ties, sweating under the hot Pakistani sun, marching on the streets, enduring tear gas and resisting lines of policemen — that is the classic image of the Lawyers’ Movement. Unlike most organized demonstrations, such as the Arab Spring, the Pakistani movement did not begin from the ground up. Everyday citizens were not the first to mobilize and march on the streets. During the first few days of September 2007, when the movement was in its infancy, the people who participated in the protests were not the Pakistani equivalent of an Average Joe. They overwhelmingly came from one group: the legal community, an upper-middle class profession.

The media has labeled the Lawyers’ Movement as a successful example of a national uprising. While average citizens did indeed participate in some of the marches, especially in the climax of the movement, the rallies were organized and attended overwhelmingly by lawyers. According to Haris Gazdar, labeling the movement as “national” is not very accurate. “What was not in the picture [of the movement] was the rest of the country — southern Punjab, most of Pakhtunkhwa, and all of Balochistan and Sindh.”\textsuperscript{29} The exclusion of these geographical regions, he argues, makes the Lawyers’ Movement an elitist uprising that was simply painted by the media as representative of the popular will.

If Gazdar is right, then Chaudhry should be unable to truly claim that he has popular backing by the people. His reinstatement as Chief Justice, then, was not the result of any consensus by the people, but a power grab by the members of the legal community. This movement ousted a dictator, Musharraf, but then illegally put in place their nominee as head of the judicial branch. If it was not a truly national uprising but a political


ploy co-led by Chaudhry’s allies and Sharif’s PML-N party, then where was the rest of the nation during the movement? According to the 2009 poll previously mentioned, chances are that they did not care about the outcome of the protests.

The idea that Chaudhry is the “man of the people” — especially when he may very well not be — may have dangerous consequences. By removing two prime ministers, Chaudhry’s foray into judicial activism has begun to bleed into the category of judicial coups. His judicial expansion, from his *suo moto* interventions to the removal of Zardari administration officials, implied that he had support from the people to extend the court’s mandate. During Gilani’s firing, for example, Chaudhry ignored the existing rules as mandated by the constitution and created his own.30 While reading his order, he seemed to imply that his authority to circumvent the law could be justified because the people demanded it. After all, who would dare stand up against a person around whom the entire nation allegedly rallied?

The elitism of the movement also raises a practical concern. If the lawyers, not the people, indeed mobilized the movement, how could the people truly “check” Chaudhry if he went awry? Since the legal community backed Chaudhry in the first place, it would probably not be the first to oppose any of his actions. The burden of keeping Chaudhry in check falls to the public. However, the public currently does not have the tools in order to unite and organize a full demonstration. The logistical problems associated with mass-mobilization will make difficult any future effort to curb judicial activism.

### Potential Constraints on Chaudhry’s Power

If Chaudhry continues to expand his authority, Pakistan may be headed toward a dictatorship of the judicial branch. The potential spoilers to his power are the influential institutions in the country — namely, the Bar, the people, and the independent media. Out of these institutions, the independent media is the most likely to be vigilant in checking Chaudhry’s power.

While the Bar possesses one of the most powerful organizational capabilities, it is unlikely to be the first to defect from Chaudhry. Historically, the executive branch has oppressed both the judiciary and the Bar. Thus, during the past few years, the Bar has attempted to increase its stature to make up for its loss of power during the Musharraf years. In addition, the leadership of both the SCBA and PBC seem to be supportive of Chaudhry’s actions. For the past few years, these leaders have supported his decisions, including the firing of Gilani, and there is no indication that they will stop doing so. The current SCBA president, Asma Jahangir, participated in the Lawyer’s Movement against Musharraf and is a supporter of strong judicial independence, after having been put under house arrest by Mush-

Riaz ul Hassan, “Media Boom: 90 Channels, 106 FM Stations in 10 Years,” *Viewpoint* (Online Issue No. 147)

While Jahangir may have her limits with judicial activism, she has not shown any reservation concerning Chaudhry’s recent moves. Therefore, we should consider Chaudhry and the legal community as acting like one unit, in concert, without any plans of breaking apart from one another.

The people, on the other hand, have the opposite problem: while the desire to stop Chaudhry may be there, the organizational tools are not. As mentioned in the previous section, the Lawyers’ Movement was not a grassroots movement of any kind; lawyers spearheaded it. The lack of any existing infrastructure to connect disparate voices makes it much more difficult to encourage changes and coordinate rallies throughout the country. In addition, the populace also does not have any leaders who can take on the role of a principal organizer or rallying icon of the movement. For the 2008–2009 Lawyers’ Movement, Chaudhry was the icon; for a future movement, there is currently no one who seems able to replace him. For these reasons, the people may not be the most promising group to begin an opposition movement against Chaudhry.

The media, on the other hand, has none of these problems. The high number of channels in the media allows for both diversity of opinion and effective communication. The diversity of opinion comes from the quantity of news channels, which now number over ninety based in Pakistan. The number of radio stations has also increased to 106, as of a report based in 2010. This thriving media industry, coupled with lax regulations on freedom of speech, ensures that many viewpoints will be presented to citizens. It also ensures that at least a few of the outlets will be critical of Chaudhry’s expansive judicial philosophy. In addition to the diversity of opinion, the media is also extremely effective in projecting messages to the entire nation. During the Lawyers’ Movement, Pakistan watched as television channels broadcasted Chaudhry’s act of courage against Musharraf in September 2007. This exposure helped push the movement forward by giving people an icon and image to rally around. Any potential movement against Chaudhry would require the same extensive coverage that the Lawyers’ Movement received. Therefore, the reach of media stations, and their ability to directly project images into citizens’ living rooms, makes it the most likely venue for opposition against Chaudhry to develop — given, of course, that the media is allowed to stay independent.

On March 24, 2013, Musharraf returned to Pakistan after years of self-imposed exile. It was the first time he had set foot in the country since the Lawyers’ Movement drove him out of office. “Where has the Pakistan I left five years ago gone,” he remarked upon his arrival. “I want to restore the Pakistan I left.”

The Practicality of Justice

It seems, however, that the Pakistan he left may not want him restored. The crowd that he expected to greet him did not materialize; his return was only welcomed by a little over a thousand people—a tiny crowd according to Pakistani standards. The subsequent rally he had planned later in the day was also cancelled due to security concerns. On April 17, his promise to save Pakistan ended when the Court ordered his arrest; he fled the grounds of the High Court that day with his security guards, but was forced to surrender when the police raided his compound. Musharraf was arrested and brought to back to the court on April 18.34

Perhaps the clearest way to exhibit the remarkable political shift between 2007 and 2013 is to compare two iconic images side-by-side: in 2007, the clip of Chaudhry shoved into a police car after Musharraf’s order of his arrest, and in 2013, the images of Musharraf’s arrest and subsequent transport to the court. Chaudhry and Musharraf, in a way, had traded places. Chaudhry is now in a position of power as compared to Musharraf, who is currently at the mercy of the judiciary. This shift in power has put Chaudhry at the helm of the regime—especially since an interim government is currently in place for the elections—and given him extensive influence in determining the stability of the country.

The trade-off between stability and justice in Pakistan could not have higher stakes. As Chaudhry demonstrated with the expulsion of two of Zardari’s prime ministers, his relentless pursuit of justice against Zardari’s corruption caused Zardari’s administration to suffer immense political costs. With the upcoming election closely contested between several parties, there is currently a vacuum of power in Pakistan. When the new president is inaugurated, he will be required to launch an extensive campaign to revive legitimacy in the government whilst battling a jihadi militancy that seeks to impose chaos on the country. Chaudhry’s expansion of the judicial branch, namely his increased use of suo moto powers, threatens to add to the instability. Whether the inevitable instability is a fair price to pay for justice—something that Pakistan lacked during Musharraf’s years—is a question that Pakistan will have to decide in the coming months and years.

Placed in the context of history, the Lawyers’ Movement was an extremely unique force for change: it was led by an ardent desire to restore a rule of law to Pakistan and not by dreadful economic conditions like most popular revolutions. But the nature of the Movement also presented the country with unique challenges, the most concerning being the rapid rise of the judiciary. As detailed in this paper, there are very few institutions that are currently capable of stunting its growth. Judicial coups, by their nature, are much more vague and nebulous than physical military takeovers—no tanks are seen on the street, no guns fired, no bodies counted. While these coups are nonviolent,
their damage cannot be assumed to be less severe. In fact, these soft coups can be much more dangerous than military takeovers — for they are harder to directly confront, more institutionalized, and based on a perceived interpretation of law, not of force.

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Jahangir, Asma. “Musharraf has Lost His Marbles and is Targeting Progressives.” The Independent. November 5, 2007


Conditional Convenience: 
Venezuelan Support for FARC Since Hugo Chávez 
Miguel G. Goncalves


2 Based on the political philosophy of John Dewey, the term “organic political system” here refers to a synergistic, evolving body whose interests remain in flux. See Dewey’s 1916 book, Democracy and Education. This definition should not be confused with the Organic Theory of the State, in which state power transcends all other influences.

Throughout his time in power, Venezuelan president Hugo Rafael Chávez Frias had a profound effect on the continuity and development of Colombia’s largest guerrilla movement: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Consequentially, a large body of conservative scholarship has portrayed Chávez as a staunch, ideologically infatuated supporter of Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. Although accurate in some cases, such interpretations present only one side of a multifaceted conversation — discussions of Chávez and his administration tend to devolve quickly to assumptions and sweeping generalizations. In his widely publicized report on emerging security threats from Venezuela, security strategist Daniel Charles Hellinger puts it best:

In a world where information is clouded by propaganda, black ops, blowback, highly partisan analysis (on both sides), and so forth, it is difficult to make absolute judgments about the degree to which Venezuelan military and political officials have been involved in drug and human trafficking or support for insurgents within Colombia.¹

Given the presence of these intellectual “clouds,” what was the true extent of Venezuelan state support for FARC during Chávez’s presidency, and why did Venezuela ultimately distance itself from the group? A satisfactory answer necessitates an examination of the fluid nature of Chávez’s relationship with FARC, an exploration of the methods and motivations behind Venezuelan sponsorship, and educated speculation on how such support may change in the future.

A closer examination of Chávez’s presidency reveals that his relationship with the guerrillas was not as clear-cut as many foreign policy scholars would have us believe. As is characteristic of an organic political body,² the Venezuelan government offered FARC many types and levels of support at different times. Although FARC enjoyed a decade-long surge of support from Venezuela, state-sponsored aid declined dramatically in the final years of Chávez’s administration as a result of Venezuela’s dynamic political circumstances.

Hugo Chávez’s victory in the 1998 Presidential Election was widely lauded as a key step in addressing the past failures of Venezuelan democracy. A revolutionary figure long before his political career, Chávez had advocated for true democracy as a military officer, coup leader, and prisoner since the 1980s. In the first three years of his presidency, he focused on the promises of his Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) party, drafting a new constitution designed to promote a protagonistic, participatory democracy. In November of 2011, Chávez and the National Assembly implemented a comprehensive package of twelve decree laws, the most controversial of which shifted control of Venezuela’s primary oil company (PDVSA) largely to the state. An intense opposition movement arose from Venezuela’s middle classes, fueled by suspicions of Chávez increasingly evident leftism.

Based in Colombia, Venezuela’s western neighbor, FARC boasted political and numerical strength in the end of the 1990s. About 20,000 men strong, FARC had staged high-profile kidnapings, bombings, airplane hijackings, drug trafficking operations, extortions of multinational companies, and conventional assaults on Colombian forces since the latter half of the twentieth century. Under President Andrés Pastrana, the Colombian government began a new round of peace negotiations with FARC in 1999; their failure gave way to border skirmishes and the prominent kidnapping of Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt in 2002.

The period between 1998 – 2002 marked the beginning of constructive relations between Chávez and Colombian guerrillas. Although relations were fundamentally positive, Chávez’s focus on expanding his party’s influence in Venezuela largely precluded him from offering explicit monetary or military aid. In 1999, Chávez met with Raul Reyes, a top FARC commander, and suggested the possibility of future assistance intended to alter the “military balance of power in Colombia.” Aside from this notable incident, friendly relations between Chávez and the guerrillas did not amount to expansive state sponsorship: Chávez’s support manifested itself primarily through sympathetic gestures on the international stage and the offering of asylum to “Colombian guerrillas and soldiers alike.”

Chávez’s early years in power were especially significant in that they set the stage for a future breakdown of relations with Colombia and cultivated increasingly favorable relations with FARC. In 2002, the failure of peace negotiations between Colombia and FARC helped Chávez establish further contact with leftist revolutionary leaders. Chávez’s emergence, which “coincided with a period in which the Colombian insurgency had turned away from violence,” allowed a beleaguered FARC to seek refuge after it had been expelled from a government-
The year 2002 marked the decade’s most important turning point in relations between Colombia, Venezuela, and leftist guerrillas. The two drivers for such a profound change were: one, an attempted military coup in Venezuela; and two, the election of center-leftist Alvaro Uribe as the new president of Colombia.

In Venezuela, the catalyst for vastly improved relations between Venezuela and FARC ironically came after Chávez had been removed from power. On the morning of April 11, 2002, tensions between Chávez’s oil industry reforms and the united opposition movement boiled over: agents within the Venezuelan military detained Chávez and transported him to a secure location off the mainland. An international scandal ensued when the United States and several European countries recognized Pedro Carmona’s interim government. While in custody, Chávez reached out to key allies, namely Fidel Castro in Cuba and FARC leader Manuel “Tirofijo” Marulanda. The standoff ultimately ended when the loyalist Venezuelan Presidential Guard reoccupied the presidential palace at Miraflores without firing a shot, negating prior speculation that Chávez had voluntarily resigned to oppositionist factions.

Confiscated FARC documents corroborate Chávez’s increased radicalization after the attempted coup. Weeks after the Miraflores incident, FARC blocs11 provided documented training in guerrilla and urban warfare to various civilian militias designed to defend Chávez. In September 2002, Rodrigo Granda, a top FARC commander based in Caracas, passed on an appeal from the Venezuelan government requesting small arms and demolitions experts “to get rid of counter-revolutionaries.” Most notably, Chávez’s administration developed a “Contingency Plan” later that year, which specified that FARC-trained paramilitary forces would “attack, neutralize, or liquidate opposition supporters…through sabotage and targeted assassination.”

Under the leadership of Alvaro Uribe since the May 26 presidential elections, Colombia also saw significant sociopolitical changes in a short time span. Centered on a hardline anti-guerrilla and anti-crime stance, Uribe’s political platform dramatically increased Colombian military activity against FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) along the Venezuelan and Ecuadorean borders. In two years, thousands of fighters and mid-level guerrilla commanders were taken into custody, and long-standing guerilla fronts at Cundinamarca and Antioquia
had given way to a commanding Colombian military presence. With US backing, Uribe continued the implementation of “Plan Colombia”—a broad counternarcotics and counterterrorism initiative designed to curb the influence of subversive non-state actors.

By 2005, Venezuela’s initial period of political reorganization had devolved into radicalization, confrontation, and power consolidation measures. Chávez rebranded his “Bolivarian Revolution” as “socialism of the twenty-first century” and confirmed his pan-American political movement’s leftist orientation; a landslide reelection victory in 2006 further bolstered his campaign. The period between 2003–2007 was characterized by a strong shift toward anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism, and increased alignment with leftist governments in Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. As part of this new diplomatic platform, the Venezuelan government sought closer alliances with non-state ideological allies including FARC. Almost simultaneously, Chávez began to break off diplomatic relations with Colombia under a cloud of bellicose rhetoric and accusations of imperialist aggression—an air of political tension that lingered for almost a decade.

Motivations

Before detailing the specific methods by which Venezuela aided FARC, the underlying reasons behind state support must be explored. What, if anything, did Chávez and his country stand to gain from an alliance with an international guerrilla movement?

Venezuela’s increasing support for FARC between 2002–2010 was motivated by several key factors: compatibility between Chavist Bolivarianism and Marxist-Leninist ideologies, the desire to accomplish political goals with plausible deniability, and to a lesser extent, economic benefits. In short, FARC was at once an ideological ally—a profitable vessel for undermining imperialist forces—and a non-state actor that could be courted or abandoned at will, depending on political circumstances.

At the time, Chávez’s administration and FARC’s leadership shared fundamentally similar ideologies. Since its founding in 1964, FARC’s stated goal had been sociopolitical: to create a Colombia that freed working classes from “economic depredations of the ruling bourgeoisie,” neo-imperialism, corporate resource monopolies, and repressive violence from Colombian state forces. Chavismo, which aimed “to establish a loosely aligned federation of revolutionary republics as a resistance bloc in the Americas,” appears different from FARC’s Marxism-Leninism at first glance, suggesting a nationalist pan-American ideology over traditional leftism. Once Chavismo is united with its broader roots in Bolivarianism, however, its socialist credentials become more apparent: goals
Saab and Taylor, 456.

The Bolivarian Continental Coordinator was renamed in February 2008 and is now known as the Bolivarian Continental Movement (MCB). An extension of the new United Socialist Party of Venezuela, which evolved from Chávez’s original MVR, the organization’s present purpose remains the same.


Ibid., 165.

included the establishment of South American economic and political sovereignty (anti-imperialism), elimination of corruption, encouragement of working class participation via popular votes (participatory democracy), and equitable distribution of natural resources. From a historical standpoint, both Chávez and FARC sought to correct centuries of injustice; the former desired the reestablishment of a united pan-American state comparable to Simon Bolívar’s Gran Colombia in the 1800s, while the latter opted for a Colombia ruled by collective labor.

It is an especially notable point of similarity that these ideologies shared a belief in popular revolution. Under the leadership of key FARC commanders including Raul Reyes and Manuel Marulanda Vélez, Venezuela founded the Bolivarian Continental Coordinator (CCB), an organization whose “primary stated purpose [is] to militarily support the Venezuelan revolution and contribute to the struggle against...the United States and its ‘moribund capitalist system.’” In a 2005 presentation to Venezuela’s National Armed Forces, Chávez further detailed his vision of future warfare against imperialist entities. “Fourth-generation war” (4GW), as it became known, emphasized the creation of an anti-American “super-insurgency.” Under 4GW, asymmetric conflict and small people’s militias interspersed within populations reigned supreme, as did the usage of low-tech weapons to wage a war of moral — rather than military — strength against a potential US invasion. An army of the people in Chávez’s eyes, FARC became a key political ally in the CCB as well as a prime example of an asymmetrical fighting force.

Ideological complicity, though important, was not enough to account for Chávez’s support of FARC from 2002 to 2010. Instead, a more macroscopic look at the time period reveals inherently practical motivations for his actions. Demonstrably supportive of realpolitik, Chávez recognized the importance of gaining something, whether regional influence or strategic advantage, from his efforts. He gradually came to see FARC as a vessel to realize subversive actions against imperialism. Pro-American Colombia, which he berated as a proxy force of American imperialism, became a natural target for destabilization. Chávez’s tactic — a natural extension of the David and Goliath complex he held toward the United States — served the ultimate goal of converting Colombia from a strategic US partner to an anti-imperialist ally.

Equally advantageous was the element of plausible deniability that FARC afforded Chávez. Traditionally, supporting a non-state actor allows a state sponsor to shroud its actions with a façade of ignorance. As relations with Colombia continued to devolve in the mid-2000s, Chávez and his top advisers recognized the strategic importance of turning a blind eye to FARC and denying involvement with the guerrillas on the global
stage, while nonetheless offering them tacit support. In several instances, FARC leaders perceived Venezuela’s complex diplomatic game as a duplicitous one: a 2007 email exchange between military commander Víctor Julio Suárez Rojas (“Mono Jojoy”) and another high-level commander characterized Chávez as a “deceitful and divisive president who lacked the resolve to organize himself politically and militarily.”

FARC’s historic ties with Colombian drug cartels and arms traffickers added potential economic incentives to Venezuelan support. The true extent of state complicity in FARC trafficking operations, however, is debatable. With some exceptions, the highest echelons of Chávez’s administration supported antidrug operations in and out of the public sphere; by 2007, Venezuela had become the world’s fourth largest confiscator of trafficked drugs. Between 1999–2010, Venezuela’s national anti-drugs bureau, Oficina Nacional Antidroga (ONA), seized over 500 metric tons of cocaine, the equivalent to roughly a year’s worth of production. Although a significant body of conservative scholarship correctly posits that Venezuela’s net exportation of cocaine and other drugs nearly quadrupled from 2004–2007, it remains difficult to tie the increased flow of drugs to an unchecked financial motive for Chávez and his cabinet. A more likely explanation for the drug surge is that Chávez’s administration was selectively lenient with drug seizure operations to maintain positive relations with FARC and preserve their strategic fighting capabilities in the broader Bolivarian cause.

Hence, economic incentives are not necessarily as significant in that they were not motivators of state support insomuch as drivers of individual corruption. Unlike the ideological and strategic advantages of supporting FARC, the prospect of financial gain was individualistic. In a notable scandal that began in 2010, a Syrian-born Venezuelan drug trafficker named Walid Makled opted for extradition to the United States after being detained in Colombia. After Makled gave up names of Venezuelan civilians, military officials, and FARC operatives on his payroll during his decades-long operation, Venezuela retreated diplomatically and asserted its “firm commitment to fighting drugs.” A minor purge ensued in Chávez’s administration as it worked to cleanse itself from individuals involved in the scandal. The takeaway from the Makled incident is that the interests of a state cannot be confused with those of an individual, and that it is important to make such distinctions when identifying key motivations for state support. The initial assertion that financial gain was not an important factor can now be further nuanced: although economic considerations are not as significant in explaining state support as FARC’s ideological parity and strategic importance to the Venezuelan government, they are appropriate justifications for incidents of support at the individual level.
Methods


35 “Active support” is defined here as “a deliberate regime decision to provide critical support to a terrorist group, typically in the form of weapons, money, or media support.” “Passive support” refers to “when a regime’s deliberate inaction allows terrorist groups to flourish.” See Byman, 1–48.


38 *The FARC Files*, 47.

The assertion that Venezuela had strong reasons for supporting FARC, though accurate, necessitates a more detailed discussion on the specific methods that constituted state support. Moreover, a significant body of existing media and scholarship tends to portray Venezuela’s sponsorship efforts as monolithic — a combination of open borders, monetary payments, arms transactions, diplomatic relations, military training, and public defenses. This view has disturbingly survived and perpetuated itself.

On one hand, it is difficult to deny that FARC enjoyed most, if not all, of the aforementioned benefits from Venezuela at some point. The most compelling evidence supporting this view originated in the morning of March 1, 2008, when Colombian military forces raided a FARC encampment approximately one mile inside sovereign Ecuadorean territory. Among the FARC casualties was Raúl Reyes, a top FARC military commander and Secretariat member. The Reyes operation, a *de facto* act of war against Ecuador, created an international incident and subsequent emergency meetings in the Organization of American States (OAS). Chávez quickly denounced the violations of sovereignty and attacks on his guerrilla allies, proclaimed that Uribe’s decision “could be the start of a war in South America,” and preemptively mobilized troops to the Colombian border.33

As part of the raid, Colombian authorities seized three laptop computers from Reyes’s compound, each containing hundreds of gigabytes of information. What seemed like another instance of Chávez defending FARC turned far more serious when the Colombian government uncovered secret communications between FARC and high-ranking Venezuelan officials. An INTERPOL report released in May confirmed the authenticity of the laptop data.34

The Reyes files contained numerous examples of active and passive support35 for FARC: since the early 2000s, the Venezuelan government had funded an office in Caracas and allowed the group to “use Venezuelan territory for refuge, cross-border operations and political activity”; had enlisted the help of both Ramón Rodríguez Chacín, the second most important member of Venezuela’s National Intelligence Directorate (Disip), and Freddy Bernal, the former mayor of the municipality of Libertador, in contacting and sustaining relations with FARC36; had permitted senior officials such as Rodrigo Granda, Marín Arango (“Iván Marquez”), and Rodrigo London “Timochenko” Echeverry to move freely in Venezuela; had promised surface-to-air missile systems and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS); and had offered over $300 million in monetary assistance.37 Only $50 million of the promised funds had been paid by 2007, spurring a remark from Manuel Marulanda that “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.”38
The same Reyes files, however, also painted an entirely different picture of Venezuelan support. A 2011 analysis by the Institute of International Strategic Studies noted that Chávez “was ready to put relations with FARC on the back burner or even act against FARC interests” when necessary. In November 2002, for instance, FARC asked Chávez for permission to transport supplies through Venezuelan territory. The Venezuelan Army granted it permission yet proceeded to ambush the convoy, seize eight FARC operatives, and deliver them to Colombia in exchange for a marginal improvement in relations with Alvaro Uribe and the United States. Similarly, Venezuelan troops arrested FARC operative Rodrigo Granda in 2004 and extradited him to Colombia for trial. Until 2008, instances of Venezuela acting decisively against FARC were nonetheless few and far between, and good relations among parties had permeated interactions for a decade, notwithstanding several drug seizure campaigns and small-scale FARC extraditions.

Even between 2002 and 2007, the period of greatest Venezuelan-FARC cooperation, state sponsorship cannot be adequately explained by a blanket list of methods. The ebb and flow of Venezuelan support suggest that the types and quantities of aid were subject to larger geopolitical factors and strategic objectives. In a 2011 statement to the United States Senate, terrorism expert and scholar Douglas Farah summarized several types of active and passive support Venezuela had offered FARC at different points since 1998:

[A] relationship between non-state and state actors provides numerous benefits to both. In Latin America, for example, the FARC gains access to Venezuelan territory without fear of reprisals; it gains access to Venezuelan identification documents; and, perhaps most importantly, access to routes for exporting cocaine to Europe and the United States — while using the same routes to import quantities of sophisticated weapons and communications equipment. In return, the Chávez government offers state protection, and reaps rewards in the form of financial benefits for individuals…

Farah went on to link the Venezuelan government to FARC funding and training operations in concert with other international terrorist organizations such as ETA, IRA, and Hezbollah. Perhaps the most useful takeaway from his remarks is that successful state – non-state interactions must be mutually beneficial. When Chávez perceived the net benefits of aiding FARC as fewer in number than those reaped from acting against the guerrillas (as was the case with the 2002 supply transport) he would not hesitate to act in the best interests of his country.

The period from 2008–2010 was in many ways the beginning of the end for FARC’s safe haven in Venezuela. While the Venezuelan government continued to maintain productive relations
with FARC (evidenced primarily by Venezuela’s mediatory role in a new round of FARC-Colombia negotiations), public tension increased notably. Over the course of several months in 2008, Chávez became especially critical of FARC. After brokering the release of Colombian vice presidential candidate Clara Rojas and former congresswoman Consuelo González, Chávez condemned FARC’s use of kidnapping and extortion as illegitimate revolutionary tactics.⁴³ This measure came only months after the Ecuadorean crisis of March 1, 2008, and after he had declared that FARC was a “real army that occupies territory in Colombia” instead of a terrorist organization.⁴⁴ Later reports revealed that FARC maintained as many as 1500 guerrillas and 28 encampments in the Venezuelan border regions of Apure and Zulia between 2008–2009, a sign of either continued state support or deliberate indifference.⁴⁵

The Decline of Relations (2010–2012)

Although Chávez’s public support for FARC began to falter in the latter half of 2008, passive support demonstrably continued. On one hand, significant political pressure in 2008 and 2009 forced Chávez, at the very least, to distance himself rhetorically from FARC. Yet pressure alone was not enough to account for Venezuela’s increasing resistance to the guerrillas. Aside from negative international scrutiny, 2010 saw significant setbacks in FARC leadership and structure as well as a new Colombian president. When examined, it is a more appropriate time period in which to situate a turning point in state sponsorship.

There are three primary reasons why Chávez’s administration gradually stopped aiding and abetting FARC operations between 2010 and 2012: one, international scrutiny; two, political rapprochement between Venezuela and Colombia; and third, a weakened FARC unable to accomplish Chávez’s political and ideological goals.

The Andean crisis in Ecuador marked the beginning of the end for Chávez’s strategy of deliberate denial. Faced with an all but insurmountable body of evidence linking FARC members, weapons, and matériel to his administration, Chávez was catapulted to ignominy in much of the international community. Western European powers increasingly perceived Venezuela’s underprotected borders and paramilitary-controlled towns as embarrassments to Venezuelan sovereignty. Between 2006–2007, Colombian military operations seized Swedish-made AT-4 launchers traced to Venezuelan purchasers and sparked a tense diplomatic exchange with Stockholm.⁴⁶ Colombian intelligence reports released during Alvaro Uribe’s final months in office, furthermore, had found that key guerrilla leaders such as ELN’s Giraldo Quinchía and FARC’s Noé Suarez “Grannobles” Rojas were known to operate comfortably in dozens of Venezuelan border regions. In 2010, the ordinarily mild
Organization of American States released a scathing 300-page report presenting compelling evidence of Venezuelan complicity with foreign terrorist operatives training in FARC camps, prompting the US to debate adding Venezuela to the Department of State’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. By 2011, the international community had grown accustomed to Chávez’s bombastic denials — no longer would stories of “cheap propaganda films from the American government” suffice to justify outbreaks of highly incriminating news. When compounded, the body of accusations and evidence linking FARC with the “terrorist haven” of Venezuela made international diplomatic pressure a significant anti-FARC motivator.47

Unlike the international pressure exerted on Chávez that lasted for years, improved diplomatic relations with Colombia were an entirely new development in the period between 2010 – 2012. As Alvaro Uribe’s second presidential term came to a close in 2010, his successor opted for a less confrontational stance with Venezuela. Elected in May, President Juan Manuel Santos Calderón kept up Uribe’s hard stance against FARC and other Colombian paramilitaries, simultaneously nurturing closer cooperation with his “Latin American colleague” to the east.48 Though Chávez recognized that to cooperate with Colombia meant he would be forging ties with an imperialist sympathizer, realpolitik once again overcame Bolivarian doctrine — both sides were well aware of the political and economic stability that diplomacy might accord. A recent report from the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) identified the main incentives to a bilateral relationship:

Before relations between the two countries began to sour (again)…trade had reached an all-time high of $7 billion per year. In the year after the break in relations, until the election of Santos, annual trade plunged to about $1 billion. While there is a significant trade imbalance between the two countries — Venezuela imports far more from Colombia than vice versa — both countries depend on this trade…[I]t is probably fair to assume that the Colombian government also sees Venezuela as an issue of [border] security that needs to be neutralized either by threats of force or by engagement. In contrast to Uribe, it seems that Santos has decided for the latter approach.49

Aside from benefitting both parties involved, diplomatic relations with Colombia shifted the focus of Chávez’s administration decisively away from FARC. Chávez, vocally critical of certain FARC tactics since 2008, went on to expand his role in anti-violence talks and hostage releases; conciliatory gestures permeated interactions with Colombia and contributed to the greatest drop in active and passive Venezuelan support FARC had seen in years.50 As a gesture of cooperation, Ven-

47 Ibid., 136.
48 Ponniah, 188.
50 Ibid.
ezuelan and Colombian intelligence forces began to plan and execute joint search-and-destroy operations targeting insurgent camps along the border. In the spring of 2011, Venezuelan authorities detained Joaquín Pérez, a senior FARC operative, and Nilson “Tulio” Teran Ferreira, a key ELN chief, deporting both to Colombia. Later that year, Chávez enacted a comprehensive law against organized crime and terrorist financing, admitting that officials in his administration had at times worked with Colombian guerrillas “behind Venezuela’s back.” In response, Santos reciprocated his colleague’s gesture: when a scathing report on the Reyes files was released in 2010, Santos demonstrated “no great alarm or outrage” over Venezuela’s past transgressions.

In April of 2012, Santos offered significant praise to the Venezuelan government by announcing that Venezuela was “entirely free of FARC camps and units.” For the sake of political pleasantries, Santos’s announcement contradicted compelling suspicions that FARC commander-in-chief Rodrigo “Timochenko” Londoño and vice-commander Luciano Marín Arango (alias “Ivan Marquez”) continued to operate material and medical operations in Venezuela under the auspices of corrupt government officials. From a strategic standpoint, it is unlikely that Venezuela halted FARC operations within its borders or cut off all friendly relations after 2010. Santos’s remarks and Chávez’s consequential actions against the FARC instead suggest that guerrilla support eroded at the state level yet likely persisted individually. As much control as Chávez claimed to have over his officials, it would have been impossible to prevent unilateral actions from radicalized or corrupt members within his socialist bureaucracy. In his evaluation on Venezuelan security, Daniel Hellinger confirms this viewpoint, noting that “any actions or communications by Venezuelan officials, even high ones, did not necessarily have the endorsement of Chávez, the ultimate arbiter of state interest.”

Venezuela-Colombia relations aside, increased setbacks in FARC’s military and political strength from 2010 – 2012 meant that Chávez could no longer rely on the group to further his regional aims. In a matter of years, Colombian operations had whittled FARC’s strength from over 20,000 men and women during 2002 to a historic low of 9,000 at end of Uribe’s presidency. Though impossible to fully decapitate, FARC had suffered the nearly total loss of its powerful founding generation over a four-year period: in 2008, Manuel Marulanda died from a heart attack and a successful Colombian military operation freed key political prisoners including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. A Colombian operation also resulted in the 2010 death of Mono Jojoy, and a similar operation in 2011 killed Alfonso Cano, one of the few remaining FARC commanders with ties to the group’s beginnings. Beleaguered yet aware of its residual political strength, FARC requested comprehen-
sive peace talks with the Colombian government in the latter half of 2011. To Chávez, however, the calls for peace also represented a subtle show of weakness — a sign that FARC’s utility as a viable military force had diminished. Venezuela-brokered negotiations culminated in the “General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace,” a comprehensive military truce agreement signed by all parties in the summer of 2012.\(^{57}\)

In light of diplomatic efforts with Colombia, increasingly ineffective and militarily weakened guerrillas, and pressure from the international stage, supporting FARC became strategically imprudent for Chávez’s administration. No longer did the group have the power to further Venezuela’s political aims — let alone its own — FARC’s ideological parity with Bolivarianism was not enough to overcome the tolls that international criticism and sour relations with Colombia had taken on Chávez. To this day, unilateral decisions by corrupt or sympathetic officials continue to provide passive support for FARC in the form of borders that are not policed; however, Chávez’s administration came to dismiss FARC as little more than an expendable tool of Venezuelan statecraft. Chávez, hardly the “steadfast ally of leftism” Western media and scholars alike had portrayed him to be, recognized FARC’s increasingly distant role in his own grand strategy. “The era of the traditional Latin American guerrilla,” Chávez would later proclaim, “was over.”\(^{58}\)

The death of Hugo Chávez Frias on March 5, 2013, took the international stage by surprise. His increasingly precarious health condition, the details of which remain a well-guarded state secret to this day, sparked a period of significant sociopolitical unrest within Venezuelan society. The presently tense nature of a post-Chavist Venezuela makes assessing future links between Venezuela and FARC an especially risky and uncertain endeavor.

Riding a wave of populist support and a powerful sympathy vote, Chávez’s handpicked Nicolás Maduro defeated the opposition’s right-centrist candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski in an April 2013 interim presidential election. Maduro’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) gained a much narrower margin of victory over Capriles’ Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) — a slim 1.83 percent — than that predicted by the majority of international spectators. The election results presented an especially troubling outcome for Maduro, a visible step down from Chávez’s 55 percent to 45 percent victory over Capriles in the October 2012 elections.\(^{59}\)

Subsequent challenges to electoral legitimacy threw entire cities into protest and galvanized an increasingly bold opposition movement under the direction of Capriles. As allegations
of widespread voter fraud and poll intimidation propagated, many of them deemed false by international auditors and a nationwide vote recount, the inexperienced Maduro was left with widespread social and economic challenges, the most pressing of which was the search for stability and political recognition in a fundamentally divided society.\textsuperscript{60} Since the elections, uniting his own support base has continued to pose a challenge for Maduro, as have been his efforts to demonstrate allegiance to the rigid Chavist doctrines under which he was elected.

Within the Venezuelan populace, tensions with Maduro’s leadership style have called the very future of the Chavist movement into question. Recent reports of politically-motivated terrorism on both sides are especially troubling and highlight the gravity of a divided Venezuela.\textsuperscript{61} Maduro’s administration is now at a critical juncture: he must work to sustain the allegiance of influential Chavist loyalists such as Diosdado Cabello, quell increasingly bold demonstrations led by opposition figures, and simultaneously tackle the scores of economic and social problems left unresolved by his predecessor — the same issues that nearly ended Chávez’s presidency in 2002.

Consequentially, Venezuela’s current circumstances present numerous difficulties in predicting the scope and degree of future state support for FARC. More specifically, it is difficult to ascertain Maduro’s political ideologies, leadership style, and ability to control vestigial authoritarian Chavist policies mere months into his presidency. Aware of this uncertainty, FARC recently began seeking closer alliances with other leftist Colombian insurgencies. By the summer of 2013, FARC and its former enemy ELN (Colombia’s second largest guerrilla movement numbering approximately 5,000) had proposed increased codependence: both advocated for each other in peace talks, conducted joint operations along the Venezuelan border with increasing frequency, and reconciled their different interpretations of Marxist-Leninist ideology. In response, the Colombian government employed measures to keep the guerrillas separated and extended positive diplomatic relations to Maduro’s new administration.\textsuperscript{62}

The future of Venezuela is now as unpredictable as that of FARC itself. Corruption remains widespread among government officials, many of whom turn a blind eye to guerrillas and organized criminal activity largely for personal economic benefit. A “well-known” FARC payment office based in Arauca that collects extortion payments from Apure, for instance, is widely suspected of operating under the payroll of several regional Venezuelan officials.\textsuperscript{63} Maduro’s government, moreover, has recently shown interest in improving relations with the United States, yet regularly accuses the Obama administration of imperialist destabilization in Venezuela and resists US demands for increased compliance with international arms purchasing agreements and DEA-sponsored anti-FARC operations.\textsuperscript{64}
Maduro’s presidency now stands in a precarious balance between potentially improved relations with the United States and the need to fill the Bolivarian void Chávez left behind. As Maduro strives to consolidate power within a divided PSUV and forge new solutions to Chávez-era problems, it is unlikely that Venezuela will adhere to the United States’ strict demands for counterterrorist and counterdrug measures in the short run. Even so, relations with Colombia have remained largely positive, with the exception of a brief flare-up when Juan Manuel Santos agreed to meet with Capriles shortly after his defeat. Since the incident, Venezuela has agreed to return as a mediator in guerrilla peace talks.

Assuming that Venezuela remains stable enough for Maduro to stay in power, there are several potential scenarios for interactions with FARC over the next three to five years. One possibility is that Maduro, in an attempt to bolster his credibility as the true heir of the Bolivarian Revolution, steps up guerrilla support to pre-2008 levels. For these same reasons, however, it is also possible that Maduro may maintain the status quo and follow Chávez’s policies before his death. Such an approach would involve a continued presence in Colombian peace negotiations, little to no active state support for FARC, and few crackdowns on corrupt government officials. A third possibility is that Maduro’s administration may become more moderate, improve relations with the United States, and adopt more expansive countermeasures against guerrilla fronts and internal corruption.

The most probable outcome for future Venezuela-FARC relations, however, is the one that promises maximal political stability: preserving the status quo. The mixture of rejecting US involvement, cooperating with Colombia, and turning an occasional blind eye to guerrillas in the border would appease most Chavists and keep moderates at bay. At the same time, such a policy would ensure continued economic interaction and relative border security between Venezuela and Colombia. In comparison to other potential scenarios, following in Chavez’s footsteps represents the lesser evil.

Although a sharp swing leftward is also a possibility for Maduro, it is unlikely that he would expand FARC support and alienate Venezuela from Colombia and the international stage. In its present state, FARC cannot fight the ideological battles it once waged; hence, supporting the group as Chávez once did carries significant strategic and logical shortcomings. Conversely, a centrist shift during Maduro’s presidency is not entirely inconceivable. If Maduro chooses to expand ties with the United States — as he has hinted at — and take a harder stance against FARC, he would at the very least appease Capriles’s opposition movement as well as most of the international community. In doing so, however, Maduro would almost certainly alienate hardline factions within the PSUV,
potentially catalyzing a debilitating conflict over his desire to fulfill Chávez's vision.

Though educated speculation can be an important political tool, it is equally crucial to note that hypothetical scenarios yield hypothetical predictions. A great many FARC critics now predict that the group will continue to dwindle in size and strength if the Colombian military continues its campaign. As FARC has demonstrated for the past forty years, however, it would be exceedingly foolish to assume that these conditional statements are accurate forecasts for a remarkably resilient and adaptable organization. Since 2012, FARC has increasingly abandoned uniformed tactics in favor of clandestine terrorism, bringing the guerrilla threat ever closer to Colombian homes. Military hit-and-run attacks are giving way to networks of city fighters in civilian clothes. New threats have surfaced, and the Venezuelan and Colombian governments alike must strive to keep them at bay. The future is far from certain.

For over a decade, the international community has tracked Venezuela's transition into a haven for international terrorists. In 1998, it witnessed the rise of a charismatic socialist ready and willing to oppose the United States. Months ago, it observed a breakdown of his Bolivarian system. Even more recently, it witnessed the birth of an entirely new type of guerrilla insurgency. While one cannot predict what will happen today or tomorrow, one thing is certain: as the complex wheels of Venezuelan politics turn, the world will be watching.

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It begins with his eyes, “light blue and piercingly intense.” The eyes are synecdochic for the man, a tell; the myth precedes them. That’s of course the challenge of a book about T.E. Lawrence: the myth inevitably precedes him. The man has been so thoroughly freighted with hero worship as to vanish under its weight.

Scott Anderson’s exhaustively entitled *Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly, and the Making of the Modern Middle East* isn’t, nor does it intend to be, pure antidote to those heady vapors of history-as-fable. Instead, *Lawrence in Arabia* is an engaging and heroic effort at contextualization. This titular “in” contrasts itself self-consciously with the “of” of the finely hagiographic *Lawrence of Arabia*, and is forcefully underlined on the work’s cover. Lawrence will be located, will be situated, and the structural conceit that drives that undertaking is the joint biography of Lawrence alongside three contemporaries: American oilman William Yale (of the family and the university); spymaster, Zionist, and agronomist Aaron Aaronsohn; and polyglot German agent provocateur Carl Prüfer.

Juxtaposing Lawrence’s Middle Eastern exploits with his fellow participants in the Great Game, Anderson puts forward an account of why Lawrence should have become a figure of such staggering presence without reducing his achievements to sterile happenstance. Anderson’s answer: the neglect shown the Near East by the Powers That Were allowed the weird and the wayward, the oddly qualified and the ethically entrepreneurial, to wield outsized influence over the course of events in the region. It’s a smart line to take, but also a frustrating one. Gifted as Anderson is at enlivening his cast of characters, it’s no easy task for the comparatively diminutive Yale, Aaronsohn, and Prüfer to stand toe-to-toe with the man himself. That’s not to say that these arcs don’t bear a healthy portion of the dramatic weight Anderson asks them to; they do, on their merits and on the merits of Anderson’s own writerly talents. But they don’t have Lawrence’s historic heft, enjoying neither his factual nor his fictional influence; “Aaronsohn of Arabia” did not captivate, and President Wilson did not eulogize Yale. They’re ultimately also-rans, and the framing device they constitute leaves in place essential questions in the biography of T.E. Lawrence — that is, to what degree his is a story of heroism, chance, or fakery — even as it casts useful light on the ground truth of Europe’s Middle Eastern imagination during World War I.

A word about the degree to which Lawrence, as we find him “in Arabia,” finds himself amongst the Arabs. Certainly Anderson doesn’t elide or diminish the roles of the key figures in the Arab Revolt, but they regrettably fail to emerge as the rich characters found in Lawrence’s own *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (a work, as Anderson cites coyly, “more often praised than read.” This reviewer has been through the much-abridged *Revolt in the Desert*). Still, Anderson’s Arabia is not Camus’s Oran — a place infamously depopulated of Arabs in *The Plague*. Rather, this European emphasis comes across as a statement on what was, in the end, the decidedly Eurocentric character of the dynamics that drove the construction of the troubled states of the modern Middle East. After all, the titular deceit and imperial folly are both European in their character. All the same, one wonders if the ink spilled over Yale might have been better spent bringing
a figure like Faisal to life in the same depth and color.

Extensive, insightful, striking, *Lawrence in Arabia* lacks all the same a certain sense of biographic closure; in the case of Lawrence, this may be inevitable. At the end of the day, it would be difficult to say whether Anderson is too credulous or insufficiently so, whether his Lawrence is too large or too little. The work’s clever architecture places certain brakes on its ambitions, and even as Anderson speaks to and feints towards Lawrence’s exceptionality within the historical framing proposed by this group portrait, that exceptionality is, in the final accounting of things, underserved by that same framing. One instinctively feels that Lawrence must have been either the greatest of men or nothing at all; his image, constructed or congenital, is too singular to occupy the middle ground.

If the question cannot be resolved to any kind of satisfaction, *Lawrence in Arabia* is still a decidedly worthwhile entry in the dialogue on Lawrence, as well as on certain modern themes in the development of the Middle East. Anderson has charted a sure path through treacherous territories of hero, image, and mythos — and this is no small task. Perhaps we must conclude by weighing this measured accounting against the essential lyricism of Lawrence’s own account, which can perchance be tamed but can hardly be matched. Lawrence wrote: “All men dream: but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find that it was vanity: but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dreams with open eyes, to make it possible.”

And this T.E. Lawrence most certainly did.

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