Chapter I: General Introduction and Background of Study
General Introduction
The goal of this research is to understand the role of international non-governmental organizations, INGOs for short, in Rwanda’s reconstruction efforts after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. It aims to also examine the opinion of these organizations held by the Rwandan people. This research will discuss how the massive failures of the “international community,” particularly Western powers, impacted the attitude towards INGOs among the Rwandan population post genocide. The paper will furthermore discuss the current role of international organizations in Rwanda and the legal and social framework in which they exist.
Background of Study
In the pre-colonial period, Rwanda was “organized as a unitary state, hierarchically well structured and with political entities comparable to those found in modern states.” Following the 1919 Treaty of Versailles at the close of the first World War, the Belgian government took over as the colonial authority in charge. Belgium remained in control of the country until 1962, during which time its government instituted extremely harsh and highly divisive ethnic lines between the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. The creation of these divisive ethnic lines was supported, encouraged and organized in no small part by the international powers present in the country at the time.
These groups, during the pre-colonial period, had been purely economic statuses, which one could move freely between. The Tutsi were cow breeders, the Hutu were agriculturalists and the Twa were hunters and gatherers. The Belgian authorities turned these into ethnic lines using the deeply faulty Hamitic myth. In the 1930s, a census was carried out which prescribed that all those who had ten or more cows would be identified as Tutsi, all those who had less than ten cows would be identified as Hutu, and those with no cows would be identified as Twa. Following this, identity cards were issued to the population clearly listing their ethnic status. The Hamitic myth, or “the assertion that African ‘civilization’ was due to racially distinct Caucasoid invaders from the north/north-east of Africa,” was then used by the colonizers to place the Tutsi in positions of power in the country, claiming that because they had more stereotypically European features and lighter skin tones they had the intelligence and predisposition to rule.
Rwanda eventually gained its independence from Belgium in 1962, following waves of violence against the Tutsi in 1959 which happened as a result of a rumor that a Hutu politician had been killed by Tutsis. In 1962, the country was incredibly divided with very little solidarity among citizens, largely because of the divisions between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. The following First and Second Republics of Rwanda only became more entrenched within ethnic lines and tensions, and the international players who were present offered little assistance.
Habyarimana, international players became key in the decline towards the 1994 genocide. The governments of France and the United States are especially culpable in this. General Roméo Dallaire, the commander of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), sent his now infamous “Genocide Fax,” in January of 1994, to the headquarters of the United Nations in New York warning them he suspected a possible impending genocide. This fax stated that a “top level trainer” in the Interahamwe, the Hutu paramilitary organization which was later responsible for a majority of the killings during the genocide, claimed that he had been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. Furthermore he warned Dallaire that “he suspects it is for their extermination” and that “in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1,000 Tutsi.” The fax also warned that Dallaire suspected the existence of arms cachés and a plot to kill Belgian Peacekeepers in Rwanda. The US government, in addition to the UN leadership in New York, fresh off of the catastrophe in Mogadishu in October of 1993, decided to do nothing with this information. UN leadership stated that because UNAMIR was present in Rwanda under a Chapter VI mandate, which prevents any military intervention, Dallaire would have to stand down. Dallaire’s request for the authority to raid these arms cachés was denied, and just under three months later the genocide of the Tutsis began.
INGOs present in the country at that time were also culpable in not helping to prevent or lessen the genocide against the Tutsi. Storey writes that “the pressures of relief work may mean that there is little time or energy to develop an informed view of the country.” However, there
were some INGOs which did as much as they could to help the situation. Some “took care to ensure that their recruitment and business practices did not lend support to the old regime’s adherents” while others “wrote an internal memorandum, recommending that continued assistance to the displaced be made conditional on action being taken to facilitate the arrest of leading criminals.” Despite these endeavours, none of the actions undertaken by INGOs or their representatives in Rwanda were able to significantly mitigate the extent of the genocide against the Tutsi.
When the genocide broke out following the successful attack on Habyarimana’s presidential plane on 6 April 1994, the response of the international community focused only on the withdrawal of their own foreign nationals from the country. The Peacekeepers remaining in the country under the egis of UNAMIR after their withdrawal numbered only 450, who were incredibly ill equipped besides. The genocide was eventually brought to a stop only because of the efforts of the RPF, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, who chased many of the genocidaires into the neighbouring DRC.
Towards the end of the 1994 genocide, the French government set up the Zone Turquoise under UN Security Council Resultion 929 with the intention of “contributing to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk…until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength.” Instead, the Zone Turquoise “allowed leaders responsible for massacres to escape clandestinely,” especially members of the Interahamwe, the Hutu-backed paramilitary
group which carried out much of the killings. It was only in 2021 that the French government wrote the Dulcert Report, a 1,000 page document outlining France’s role in the genocide against the Tutsi. This report concluded that “nothing … examined demonstrates” that France was an accomplice to the genocide. However, it did conclude that France was responsible for not adequately preventing the genocide and helping the guilty escape.
Chapter II: Research Problem and Relevance
Research Problem
The betrayal of the people of Rwanda by international communities and governments who were present in the years leading up to and during the genocide against the Tutsi is clear. These governments and organizations arguably had the power and the knowledge to do something to stop or significantly lessen the magnitude of the genocide in 1994, but did next to nothing. The UN headquarters in New York ordered the extraction of a majority of the UNAMIR peacekeepers, leaving only 450 behind. Many Western governments, particularly those with permanent positions on the UN Security Council, had advanced knowledge of the genocide thanks to General Dallaire’s “Genocide Fax” and did not make moves to stop it. Instead embassies were shut down immediately and the evacuation of all non-Rwandans happened within days. Human rights activist Monique Mujawamariya, after being labeled as a target by the government-sponsored radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), managed to flee to the United States. While there, she repeatedly attempted to convince the Clinton administration to send help to Rwanda, but was instead told that Rwanda was outside of the interest of the United States government.
Rwanda now is an effective example of how a country can come back from unbelievable atrocity and function as a peaceful and reintegrated nation. There is an immense amount of pride among the Rwandan people for being able to so quickly and effectively create a strong, peaceful and stable society. This is emblematic of what Kamatali refers to as “the totality of the social organization” which existed in Rwanda during the pre-colonial period. Many of these achievements were made possible because of the highly effective transitional justice system, known as the Gacaca court system. Some members of the international community, particularly INGOs, donated funds to support the logistics and training of Gacaca judges, but most of this system came from Rwandan tradition and homegrown solutions. All 19 prisons in Rwanda at the end of 1994 were operating at over 200% capacity, and even then there were still many genocidaires who were not imprisoned.
Additionally, some Rwandans regard the United Nations’ International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the ICTR, as a completely useless and exorbitantly expensive process that only served to indict 93 people. To make matters worse, only 62 of those indicted were sentenced. The ICTR also took place in Arusha, Tanzania, and not Rwanda, which posed many logistical struggles for the victims and witnesses who had to travel a long distance to testify. To add insult to injury, Rwandans to this day still do not have access to the full records of the ICTR trials. Dr. Robert Kayinumura, the Deputy Permanent Representative and Political Coordinator to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Rwanda to the United Nations in New York, said in a statement to the UN General Assembly on 16 October 2024 that “first, and certainly our most important request, is of the relocation of ICTR/Mechanism archives to Rwanda.” This request has not yet been granted.
Given all the many ways in which the international community the Rwandan people during the genocide, it makes sense that there would be a permanent sense of distrust that could make international collaboration difficult. It is also entirely understandable that the Rwandan populace would be unwilling to accept help or cooperation from international parties, especially considering that the homegrown solutions that were established after the genocide worked significantly better than any internationally established solutions. Further complicating the issue is the fact that international governments who did not offer any support to the Rwandan people during the genocide against the Tutsi have not made any efforts to apologize or attempt to make restitutions for the actions committed that resulted in the deaths of so many. Even still, there are just over two hundred INGO’s operating in Rwanda in 2024. They operate in many different sectors of the Rwandan milieu, and are all approved by the Rwanda Governance Board, which oversees and promotes “good governance principles” in both the private and public sectors.1
Research Relevance, Purpose and Objectives
This research is very relevant in the world of international relations, particularly relationships between the global north and the global south. The era of international aid and peacekeeping the way it was established after the close of the second World War and especially after the Cold War is coming to an end. Perhaps what is needed now is a more individual country-centric approach, rather than having massive powerhouse countries dictate the way the global community functions. The example of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda can be used as a very effective tool to highlight the idea that the previous status quo for the ways in which powerful countries intervene in other areas of the world is no longer, or perhaps never was, effective. This indicates the potential need for a rethinking of the role of the “international community” in global governance.
Furthermore, as stated by Stephen and Zürn, “a multilayered system of overlapping and differentiated institutions and actors has emerged [on the world stage] that goes beyond the traditional world of governments and interstate diplomacy.” Many of these actors are NGOs and INGOs. Recent research and publications have indicated that NGOs are becoming increasingly important players in world governance, which implies the need for more expansive research on the subject. The relationship between NGOs and post-colonial countries is also particularly salient in this research, given that many major INGOs have originated in the West, such as CARE International, Amnesty International, Oxfam and Doctors Without Borders. Evidently, there is a certain role that is played by the international community through these INGOs, and this paper seeks to elaborate on what that role is and what the general opinion among Rwandans is about the effectiveness and overall presence of these organizations. Beyond this goal, the specific objectives for this study are:
– To establish which kinds of INGOs operate in Rwanda and what their role is in the post-genocide reconstruction process
– To understand how the presence and purpose of INGOs in Rwanda has changed between the immediate aftermath of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi and the present day
– To establish what the general opinion of these INGOs is among the Rwandan population, 30 years after the genocide against the Tutsi
Chapter III: Literature Review and Definition of Key Concepts
A General Overview of INGOs
To begin, it is important to accurately define what an INGO is and how it operates. Murdie defines INGOs as “organizations…made up of groups of actors, typically individuals, that purposely structure their interactions to reflect some basic rules…most formalize these rules in charters or mission statements, and many have a formal headquarter location.”19.
The existence of both NGOs and INGOs in world governance is nothing new. Organizations, whose raison d’être can vary widely, which do not have an official government capacity but rather operate outside of state control, have existed since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
At its most basic level, the essential motivation and purpose of many INGOs can be defined as “trying to change how states and transnational actors behave…basic to this process is the attempt to change understandings of appropriate behavior and identity.” Interestingly, Anthony Judge writes in a 1995 article on NGOs in civil society that “early thinking amongst intergovernmental development agencies, notably the World Bank, UNDP and OECD, discounted NGOs as of marginal significance to national development, [which] reinforced national government biases.” Judge furthermore explains that “international NGOs, when studied at all, tend to be viewed through a very limited number of fashionable case studies, notably those on the Red Cross.” However, these international NGOs are increasingly becoming more prominent and respected on the world stage. The post-WWII and post-Cold War era of international intervention arising out of the Washington Consensus and the neoliberal development paradigm is arguably ending. INGOs are quite possibly the next big thing, and as such deserves the publication of a more dedicated scholarship on the subject.
INGOs in Africa: A Post-Colonial Understanding
Given that this research operates in an African country, the establishment of some kind of framework outlining the role and presence of INGOs in that context is also greatly important. According to Cullen, McCorriston and Thompson, the “rapid expansion of non-governmental activity promoting aid and development occurred along-side, and was fundamentally affected by, the collapse of European colonial rule.” Their 2022 study delved into the history of INGOs that originated in former colonial countries and operated in former colonies. These results are intrinsically tied to this research and as such worth mentioning in some detail here. Less than half of the INGOs operating in Africa in 1967, for example, were “cases of former colonial powers operating in former colonies.” In fact, 54 percent of these INGOs originated in countries without a history of exerting colonial power in Africa.
They also found that “the presence of non-governmental organizations from countries without a history of formal colonialism in Africa increased far more rapidly” than the presence of NGOs originating from former colonial powers. Cullen, McCorriston and Thompson also argue that this increase in non-former colonialist INGO presence in African countries was directly tied to the increase in competition between the West (particularly the United States) and the former Soviet Union. Thus, many NGOs operating in Africa were driven by “the need to promote the values of liberty, democracy and free markets.”
Fundamentally, the collapse of Western colonial power was intrinsically linked to the emergence of NGO and INGO power, further complicating a history which is at present deeply mired in issues of neocolonial influence. It is important therefore to also emphasize the danger and potential harm that is carried by certain NGOs and INGOs in post-colonial countries. Some researchers have found that “the role played by NGOs in helping Western ‘development’ agencies to ‘get around’ uncooperative national governments” is a distinct possibility, particularly in attempting to implement more Western systems of knowledge and infrastructure. The neocolonial nature of certain NGOs and INGOs must not be ignored in the execution of this research.
INGOs in Post-Genocide Rwanda
Following the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, the presence of NGOs, both international and not, has skyrocketed. A former commissioner of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission stated in an interview that “the beneficiaries down at the grassroots were quite happy that there were so many NGOs coming” in the period between 1994 and 2000. Because so much of Rwanda’s infrastructure and government systems had been totally destroyed after the 1994 genocide, many INGOs were needed in order to rebuild and reestablish the country. In this emergency period, most INGOs were supplying basic survival services, such as food, water and shelter. They also focused their efforts on helping those who were most at risk and most in need.
Furthermore, RGB states that “in the framework of inclusive governance the Government of Rwanda has committed to strengthening partnerships between government and civil society actors to fast track national development and people-centered prosperity.” To give a specific example, Golan and Gal argue that “a number of international NGOs are involved not only in bringing together and training journalists from conflict areas but actually producing conflict resolution programs.” One such INGO, Search for Common Ground, actively makes efforts to go against the anti-Tutsi propaganda which still exists in the neighboring DRC, and is aided by the Burundian radio station Ijambo, meaning “wise words.” The organization targets an anti-Tutsi Congolese pirate radio station by emphasizing that “Hutu and Tutsi can live together, and that the shooting should stop.”
According to a Rwandan law ratified on 17 February 2012, an INGO is considered “an organization that was established in accordance with foreign laws and the objective of which is related to public interests.” As mentioned briefly in the statement of problem section, all NGOs and INGOs in Rwanda must be approved by the Rwanda Governance Board, or RGB, in order to be allowed to operate. The official RGB website states that it “is mandated to register and monitor the functioning of national non-governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs) and political organizations (POs).” Every single INGO, NGO, FBO and PO in Rwanda is registered and monitored annually through RGB’s e-Imiryango system, which also has the capability to receive and process applications for new organizations. For INGOs, the requirements for registration include a signed proof of funding form, a budget and action plan, a notarized statute from the country of origin, and a payment of 300,000 Rwandan francs which is roughly 215 US dollars. The full explanation of the registration, maintenance and closure process for INGOs in Rwanda is listed in Appendix B of this paper. Once an INGO is officially registered the RGB continues to monitor it consistently to ensure compliance with government policy and good governance principles.
Beyond this mandate to monitor the various organizations in the country, RGB also performs extensive research “on governance in Rwanda to regularly…gauge citizens’ perception with service delivery and governance.” Two of these research methods are the Rwanda Governance Scorecard (RGS) and the Rwanda Civil Society Barometer (RCSB). The goal of the RGS, which is usually published annually, is to “to generate credible and reliable data on governance, and serve as an evidence-based source to inform policy, decision making and implementation.” The RCSB, which is on its fourth edition, exists in order to assess “the status of Non-Governmental Organisations in Rwanda.” These reports give statistical evidence of various important indices in Rwandan society. These indices include citizen satisfaction rates with various government services and anti-corruption indicators, and the reports also conclude with an analysis of how these indices have improved since years prior and by giving recommendations for how to even further improve upon government and civil society services. The RCSB is of particular interest for this research, and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter IV of this report.
Furthermore, the Prime Minister of Rwanda also established the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) in 2015, which is a “platform comprised of representatives from the public sector, private sector and civil society…put in place to facilitate and promote full participation of citizens in the decentralized and participatory governance and improve service provision processes.” Members of JADF include both local and international NGOs, FBOs and POs, and also any other development partners which might be present in each district of Rwanda, which can include UN agencies and individual government agencies, such as USAID. All members of JADF meet twice a year at the district level to discuss issues that have come up and to make new decisions and recommendations for ways to improve the functioning of all the various organizations and institutions operating in that area.
JADF is also responsible for submitting “quarterly reports of JADF activities to the Rwanda Governance Board” which contains the action plan decided on in each JADF meeting and also highlights the budget that is reported by each organization and agency. Ideally, JADF ensures that there is a high level of accountability and anti-corruption in all non-governmental organizations and also attempts to mitigate any issues that arise in the community. Another reason why JADF was organized is to ensure that there is no double work being done in each district. Each district in Rwanda has many different CSOs working in various sectors, as well as various government institutions, health care organizations, law enforcement, etc. The JADF meetings keep track of the actions of every public, private and civil organization in the district to make sure that there are no two organizations doing the same thing. For example, if an INGO was working in a certain district to distribute medical supplies, JADF would keep track of that and if there was another INGO that wanted to come in with the goal of distributing medicine, they would be sent elsewhere because that need is already being met.
Chapter IV: Presentation and Analysis of Data
Over the course of one month, multiple interviews were conducted with various members of the NGO and INGO community in Rwanda. The interviews were conducted with three different categories of people: employees of various INGOs currently working in Rwanda, members of various government institutions which deal with the functioning of INGOs and employees of local Rwandan NGOs which receive some kind of support, either financially or materially, from INGOs. The interview questions (which are listed fully in Appendix A of this paper) were ordered in two distinct sections: the role of INGOs in Rwanda immediately after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, and their role in the present day. The various responses to the interview questions, in addition to secondary research performed in government archives and online databases, will be analyzed in the following six subsections:
– INGOs in the Immediate Aftermath of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi
– INGOs in the Present Day
– The Role of the Government
– Government Research
– Room for Improvement
– Looking Into the Future
INGOs in the Immediate Aftermath of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi
The participants unanimously stated that in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the presence of international NGOs was invaluable. They ensured that adequate resources and survival materials were available to those in the country at the time, and aided in the establishment of local NGOs which then continued with similar work on their own. Because the entire infrastructure of Rwanda had been utterly decimated by the 1994 genocide, it was necessary to use and implement the resources that were supplied by INGOs in order to effectively restart the country. One participant stated that:
As a country that we are coming from the atrocities that we had, we needed really the international support from government organizations, from some international NGOs, from other countries to support Rwanda, and we can really say that they played a big role.
while another stated that:
international NGOs came with skills and capacities like at that time there were no strategies no nothing…so it was really starting from zero, I don’t think if there were no international organizations it was possible for the government to work.
The responses from all three categories of participants were relatively similar, if for different reasons. The employees of INGOs stated that they were overall satisfied with the role of their organizations in the immediate aftermath of the genocide because they felt that they were able to function effectively with the help of the government, and because they were able to achieve the goals they had. The government employees stated that they believed the relationship between their offices and INGOs to be good because they were able to effectively follow the policy that had been laid out by the government. The employees of local NGOs were satisfied because they received a lot of helpful funding, resources and training from INGOs which allowed them to better establish their own organizations. They also emphasized that much of the resources and training they received from INGOs in the immediate aftermath of the genocide are still being used by them today, and even that they are now capable of training new employees themselves, thus making them entirely self-sufficient.
Interestingly, it was mentioned by more than half of the participants that some INGOs present in the immediate aftermath of the genocide were kicked out of the country by the government. These participants gave different reasons for why these organizations were removed from the country, which included the following:
after genocide, some INGOs were closed because of not providing sufficient support or because they didn’t have clear projects and clear programs, so the government chose to stop them.
by the period around 1997-98, some of the NGOs were kicked out by the government, because they said we are seeing a lot of stuff without much action, and some of them were even suspected of spying on the government…we had other people who weren’t so satisfied with the performance of some NGOs, and we even have some who weren’t satisfied because they were corrupt and they wanted to just grab or just get a hand on the money
some of them actually were kicked out for good reasons, because they started just going to the population and kind of siding with this side of the population or that side of the population, and the government wasn’t so happy about that kind of approach, which as a matter of fact goes against the policies of the government in terms of unity and reconciliation.
some of them actually were kicked out for good reasons, because they started just going to the population and kind of siding with this side of the population or that side of the population, and the government wasn’t so happy about that kind of approach, which as a matter of fact goes against the policies of the government in terms of unity and reconciliation.
The policy in Rwanda concerning the removal of an INGO is very highly organized. The law mentioned in Chapter III of this report is also very clear on the ways and circumstances under which INGOs get shut down or are suspended. This law stipulates that the authority in charge of INGO monitoring, in this case the RGB, may at any time ask an INGO “to conduct an
internal audit on its activities and finances.” This audit must be returned within 90 days, and if the organization is found at fault, it will be issued a warning and receive a suspension of three months. If the fault has not been resolved at the end of these three months, the organization will be permanently shut down. Reasons for being shut down can include mishandling of finances and situations in which “the organisation jeopardizes security, public order, health, morals and human rights.”
INGOs in the Present Day
The current role of INGOs in Rwanda is in some ways very different from how it was in 1994-1995, but very similar in others. The emergency resources that were desperately needed in the immediate aftermath of the genocide are clearly no longer needed. What is still needed, however, is the huge amounts of money that INGOs supply. Many participants indicated that INGOs in Rwanda now mainly serve the purpose of funding various projects which are designed and controlled by either the government of Rwanda or local NGOs. A member of a local Rwandan NGO which focuses on helping genocide survivors and their children to process their trauma and PTSD explained that:
the majority of them (INGOs) partner, there is no INGO implementing directly in the community, they normally partner or go through a local NGO, because they understand [it is important] for sustainability, for the context in the country.
This was also corroborated by a different participant, who explained that:
The policy in Rwanda requires international organizations to work with the local organizations, not go directly to implement some activities, but work with the local NGOs to capacitate them and to implement the activities at field level.
This sentiment is also reflected in a subsequent quote from the same participant in which it was explained that:
I think when you respect the rules and regulations of Rwanda, you don’t have any issue because there is accountability structure, there is zero tolerance to corruption and embezzlement…I can say that when there is that kind of willingness to the side of the government, and working together with international organizations, I think the result is tremendous, is very good.
This idea is also reflected in the official policy governing INGOs in Rwanda, which enshrines the right to propose policy and new initiatives to the government. The official wording is that INGOs have the right “to put forward views on national policies and suggest recommendations relating to the national policy designing and legislation related to its activities [and] to advocate within its activities.” There is, however, no guarantee that these proposed policies or advocacy routes will be accepted or allowed by the government.
Another role played by INGOs in the present day is mobilization and capacity building. Multiple participants who were members of local NGOs indicated that their organizations had received training from various international organizations in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 genocide, which they then used to train others. Their organizations now are entirely independent of international actors, but many of those in leadership positions within local NGOs cite the capacity building given to them by INGOs as one of the many reasons why their organizations became successful. One participant mentioned that:
most of the time I can say that they [INGOs] are specialized in mobilization, informing the population about peace and through those programs, those reconciliation programs, joining together ex-convict and survivors, but also with the rest of the community, not only the survivors but also others, because we are aiming at not dividing individuals into those two categories.
The Role of the Government
According to the participants, one of the most significant reasons for the success of INGOs in Rwanda was the government policy that dictates and controls the functioning of all civil society organizations in the country. The majority of participants explained that the government understands the areas in the country where the need is greatest, and can therefore direct the resources of INGOs down the best possible avenues. An employee at PFR stated that:
we can say that international organizations played a role in rebuilding, restoring the community relations, even building peace within the Rwandan community, but with the support and the goodwill of the government of Rwanda. Without their good initiatives and good policies, this shouldn’t be possible. But with that support, moral support, even financial support from the government institutions we can say that we are part of, as an international organization, we are part of actors to build peace and stability in Rwanda.
This sentiment was echoed by many other participants. The general consensus was that INGOs in Rwanda have been successful and well received because the government has implemented sound policies that have guided the actions of these organizations. This participant continued to point out that
International organizations, as we work together with the UN agencies, with many organizations here, they play a big role, but this is because the government of Rwanda is able to manage that support and to orient it to where it has to go. Otherwise we can say in many other African countries, the support comes but it finishes in the pocket of some people, some leaders, and doesn’t play or yield results in the community. So in Rwanda we have structures that support every coin that come to support the community.
Government Research
This research has shown that the government of Rwanda is highly involved in even the non-governmental sphere of Rwandan life. The government performs extensive research each year on the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) each year and publishes this research annually in their Civil Society Barometer (CSB). The most recent barometer publication, which includes data from 2023 suggests that there is a very high level of satisfaction in the Rwandan population concerning the role of CSOs in various fields, which is displayed in the graph below.
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The data used to achieve the results of the above graph was collected using surveys from any Rwandan citizen aged 18 or older in all 30 districts who had interacted with any CSO (both INGOs and NGOs) over the three years prior. Furthermore, data was also collected from representatives of all the NGOs and INGOs examined. As can be seen in the above graph, the vast majority of those citizens whose opinions were used in this study indicated that they were satisfied with the contribution of CSOs in the Rwandan government. The only moderately negative result came from the perception of quality of service delivery in CSOs, while the most positive perception of CSOs came from their promotion of human rights. This slightly lower view of the delivery of quality service was also reflected in an interview with a member of a local NGO, who explained that this is the challenge that our government is facing: implementation, to put into practice the policies and the roles.
Another important source of government research is the Rwanda Governance Scorecard, or RGS. This is a report published by RGB which uses data from the RCSB in addition to the CRC (Citizen Report Card), and the SDMR (Service Delivery Monitoring Report) and data from original surveys to analyze the state of governance in Rwanda and identify areas for improvement. This report encompasses all areas of governance, including the work of CSOs, under which INGOs fall. There are two data points of interest to this research that will be discussed further.
Firstly, under the report’s section concerning citizen participation and inclusiveness in government, which refers to “citizens’ involvement in public decision-making at the same time ensuring that no one is left behind in the national social, political and economic development,” it is indicated that the scores for CSOs are quite high.
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As can be seen above, the participation of CSOs in Rwandan governance overall is at 76.10 percent, which indicates that these organizations have a high level of involvement in governmental systems and proceedings. What is not shown in this graph is that this score is up from the previous edition of the RGS, which scored overall participation and inclusiveness in government at 74.23 percent. The current number for overall participation and inclusiveness is 84.04 percent. The other significant mention of CSOs in this report is concerning relationships between CSOs and individual districts in Rwanda. This data is listed under the chapter of the report concerning investment in human and social development.
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This finding indicates that only 40.00 percent of CSOs participate in formal partnerships between districts in Rwanda when it comes to social protection. This number is much lower than other scores in this chapter, which consistently rank between 70 and 100 percent. This number is also consistent with findings from interviews. One participant mentioned that
in terms of evaluating NGOs we should go beyond just having used a lot of money, or having distributed water tanks or whatever, and say actually you have been here but has the mindset of the people changed, are they moving towards self sustainability?
This sentiment was a common one in many interviews. While participants were generally very happy with the role of INGOs in Rwanda, they did mention that there are times when they came in without fully understanding the cultural context in which they find themselves. This has been somewhat aided by the new policy which ensures that INGOs must work with local NGOs in some way, but many participants mention that this issue also extends to whether or not they get support. An employee at a local NGO helping orphans highlighted that:
they [INGOs] may come and dictate what to do, and I accept because of money, because of funding, however, they should come and learn because I have something to start on…sometimes, the INGOs come, I may say sometimes they are subjective, they are not objective in choosing their partners, they come, they love you, so they help you and give you money, not based on what you are doing or your work…they [agencies like the UN] refuse us money because they give money to international NGOs because they speak the same language.
Room for Improvement
While all of the interviews conducted gave an overwhelmingly positive view of INGOs in Rwandan society, both in the immediate aftermath of the genocide and in the present day, it is important to also highlight that there are some dissenting voices to this narrative. A 2011 commentary written by a Rwandese person in response to a report made by Human Rights Watch (HRW) claimed in relation to the work of INGOs in Rwanda that “the action of a Western or affiliated civil society, is negatively influenced by the stand taken against political options which are not to their taste nor in harmony with their culture, and in accordance with the absolute freedoms dogma and western model tyranny, their action is unlimited and unrestrained…this behaviour often makes of NGOs more of enemies than collaborators of the state.” The report went on to say that “the struggle between NGOs and Rwanda for population control began early,” especially in jockeying for control of those internally displaced persons and refugee camps, and that “immediately after the genocide…the Rwanda Government cut a sorry figure
beside the flourishing splendor of the NGO”
While participants explained that INGOs which did not follow government policy or did not manage money correctly were removed, this commentary suggests that there was also a possibility that INGOs in Rwanda in the immediate aftermath of the genocide were, either purposefully or not, promoting a very deeply Westernized ideology and system of knowledge. Indeed, Roger Riddell suggests that “it is far from easy for them (INGOs) to raise searching questions about, to challenge and to call for fundamental change to, a system of which they are a part, and from which they benefit, both directly and indirectly.” This indicates the need for further research into the long lasting impacts of INGO intervention, particularly those INGOs which originate and receive a majority of funding from Western countries. This issue is furthermore complicated by the fact that “NGOS have often been as guilty as official aid agencies in suggesting, in their informational literature, a far greater lasting impact of their own aid projects and programmes than the evidence would support.”
A few participants also suggested that INGOs sometimes lack nuance and cultural understanding when coming into Rwanda. An employee at a local NGO mentioned that:
maybe international NGOs will say I come to give you water, while maybe the client needs food, but it gives water and goes back, for us [local NGOs] we advocate, we do whatever we want to meet the needs of that client.
This sentiment was further corroborated by a member of the Ministry of National Unity and Civic Engagement, who explained that INGOs sometimes have programs that do not match the needs of the community and as such become unnecessary. This participant also explained that:
another issue is that INGOs are independent somehow, they don’t follow their plan and their budget to see whether what they have planned has really been implemented, because they are fully independent we don’t really know the projects we are partnering on because they are fully independent…the main issue is that what they are doing sometimes is not matching the needs of the community, nor the national policy.
This participant did however go on to say that sometimes
some of them change their programs when arriving here, because after learning the needs of the community they comply with it.
Looking Into the Future
Although the legacy of Westernization in the work of INGOs is a very complicated one with an often painful history, there are those who work in the field of NGOs who are trying to come up with new ways to interact with the global south. Riddell argues that “a growing number of NGOS, both secular and religious, are now articulating the way they work, and how they interact with poor people and poor communities, through a rights-based perspective, with some additionally emphasizing the importance to their work of aiming to enhance human dignity.” This concept works well with the previously mentioned Rwandan policy on the functioning of INGOs in Rwanda, which emphasizes that any organization in the country which does not support or goes against what the government defines as human rights and morality will receive a warning and possibly be removed from the country.
A former Commissioner at the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission explained that he thought that the government needed to be even more involved in the running of INGOs. He stated that
I would rather see more exchange between the government and the NGOs than I see now, because they tend to be enjoying too much independence…for instance, if you look at projects funded by the USAID, or the DFID or the European Union, very often they prefer to channel their money through NGOs, which means the government should have a kind of close control on how the money is used because…I don’t mean to say the government should go and maybe take the money or what, but they should be at least holding the people accountable for their results in terms of what they do with the population.
Another area which was identified by participants for improvement was the prestige of local NGOs. Many participants who were members of these local organizations said that they at times felt marginalized or ignored because they had less money. These participants explained that they were the ones who had the most knowledge about the area and the community, but that sometimes this was overlooked in favor of the huge amounts of money that could be brought in by massive INGOs. One participant in particular explained that frequently at JADF meetings, he was told to sit down and not speak, giving more time to representatives of INGOs. He explained that
I may say that local NGOs, they may be best in mastering the reality of the community, and the government may be second, and then the international: NGOs…local NGOs play a very big role in the community, I think they need to be considered, this is the motivation, and also they need means, they need funding…national organizations, they need support from the government, moral support, and financial support, this is actually the main challenge.
Chapter V: Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
The role of INGOs in Rwanda is a fascinating example of how international forces can both help and hinder the process of reconstruction and peacebuilding. The majority of responses from participants, as explained in Chapter IV, indicated that the general opinion of INGOs in Rwanda from people in various areas of Rwandan life is a positive one. People were overall happy with how INGOs function in the country, and especially happy with the government policy that guides their presence. There does not seem to be a huge amount of lingering resentment towards international organizations on behalf of the Rwandese people, just given the results of the interviews. In fact, one participant stated that
even when I speak of some INGOs that were kicked out, they weren’t kicked out by the population, the population is totally ignorant about some of those issues that happen, so it’s mainly some of the administrative units that do that, but otherwise the population has no problem with the INGOs.
Furthermore, even when there is some resentment towards international presences in Rwanda, the participants made it clear that they see the success of these organizations as a government achievement. They view the government as being the constraining factor that ensures that INGOs do the work they were intended to do, and that they do it correctly. There is a sense of security among the population that suggests that even if there is an international organization in the country with bad intentions, the government will be there to fix it.
This does not mean that there are no problems that exist between INGOs and the population of Rwanda, but the general consensus of the participants was that they viewed the presence of INGOs in their country as a good thing, holding them separate from the events of the 1994 genocide. To be more specific, the participants had a very positive view of INGOs in
Rwanda by and large because of the government policy that guides them. The idea conveyed was that in large part the population of Rwanda is happy with INGOs and does not hold lingering resentments, but that is because the Rwandan government has done, in their view, such a good job with organizing their presence.
There were a few main issues identified by participants in this study. The first was that INGOs coming into Rwanda sometimes lack adequate understanding of the cultural context in Rwanda, and as such, they attempt to implement strategies which are not fit for the community. One such example was given by a participant who explained that certain INGOs in the country stay on only the paved roads, so their aid does not really reach the areas where it is needed most. This participant also elaborated that sometimes, INGOs focus on bringing aid into the countryside of Rwanda, but forget that there are also pockets of poverty in the big cities, mostly Kigali, that also need their assistance. The second big issue identified was that INGOs sometimes partner with local organizations which they already know of, and don’t make attempts to reach out to other organizations. The participants also suggested that this issue can also apply to international donors, who often prefer to make donations to Western organizations, rather than donating directly to local NGOs who have a much better understanding of the cultural context in the area and therefore can more effectively say exactly what kind of help is needed. The third issue identified by participants was that while government policy towards INGOs in Rwanda is generally perceived in a very positive light, there are some issues with implementation. This point was made especially by those participants who were affiliated with local NGOs. One participant stated that
it’s as if the international NGOs, when they go with the policies of the government it’s ok and it works very well, however what we need is to look at the policies of the government and how it can be adapted to the reality of the country.
This is of particular concern for local NGOs which get significantly less attention and funding than big INGOs. In fact, “the rapid growth in the income of larger national and international NGOs means that in terms of overall NGO aid funds, a relatively small number of (big) NGOs dominate the expenditure of NGO development and humanitarian aid projects and programmes…an educated guess would be that the largest 500 national and international NGOs are probably responsible for over 90 percent of total NGO aid expenditure.”
This research is of particular interest to those studying the ways in which areas that have recently been devastated by conflict can rebuild in a sustainable manner. It is also particularly interesting for those looking at the ways in which INGOs interact with local governments. What has been demonstrated here is that the government of Rwanda has a very high level of control and knowledge about the goings-on of INGOs in the country, and that there are very strict laws dictating what these international organizations can and cannot do. Further investigation is definitely needed in this area, because during the course of this process it was not possible to organize an interview with any representative of RGB. As mentioned frequently above, RGB is the most important government institution to take into account when it comes to studying the role of INGOs in Rwanda. Frequent attempts were made to get in contact with any representative of RGB, but these went unanswered. Further research, given a longer time frame, would benefit greatly from the input of a member of this government institution.
Further research on this topic would be highly recommended. Global conflicts currently are on the rise, and studying the ways in which INGOs can help to either mitigate these conflicts or assist in the reconstruction afterwards is of the utmost importance. Of even more significance is the possible role INGOs can play in peacebuilding. The world order as has been the norm for the past half a century is changing rapidly, and the existing research on this topic has generally come to the conclusion that the new big thing is going to be INGOs. Given that INGOs have only existed on the world stage for about forty years, it would be highly advisable that more in depth research on the ground in areas where INGO intervention is the most impactful is done. Particularly now that AI and other technologies (such as expanding internet access) are booming, in addition to the global crisis that is climate change, are becoming massive issues, more knowledge on the field of international non-governmental intervention and aid is deeply important.
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Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: UN Workers in Kigali, Rwanda, Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made
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Appendices
Appendix A: Interview Questions
Interview questions are divided into two different themes: INGOs in immediate aftermath of the genocide, and the current role of INGOs in Rwandan society
Immediate Aftermath
a. What was the role of INGOs in Rwanda in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi?
b. Do you think that INGOs helped to facilitate the reconstruction process? If so, how?
c. Do you think that INGOs helped to facilitate the peacebuilding process? If so, how?
d. What is your opinion of the role played by INGOs in the immediate aftermath of the genocide?
e. How do you feel about INGO intervention in Rwanda immediately post genocide, as opposed to the intervention of local organizations?
Current Role of INGOs
a. What are your thoughts and feelings about INGOs in Rwanda currently? b. How do you see INGOs interacting with local organizations now?
c. Are there any issues in your opinion facing the role of INGOs in Rwanda at the moment?
d. Do you think Rwandese people hold remaining resentments against international organizations as a result of the genocide?
e. What do you think the value of INGOs is in Rwandan society, as opposed to local NGOs?
f. How do INGOs in Rwanda interact with the government and its policy?
Appendix B: e-Imiryango Registration Requirements for INGOs in Rwanda International Non-Governmental Organisation Registration Requirements FIRST REGISTRATION
● To present a power of attorney from the Head Office assigning a representative of new INGO applying for registration in Rwanda. However, this is not applied to the founder/ CEO of the INGO
● Application letter addressed to the CEO (RGB) requesting to register the organization
● Annual action plan and budget (clearly indicate administrative/office expenditures and activities budget)
● Notarized Statute in accordance with laws, issued by competent Authority from the country where that organization Head Office is located
● Signed proof of funding or a commitment letter from the donor or INGO Head Office
● Valid Memorandum of Understanding from the partnering line Ministry ● The organizational structure of the office in Rwanda
● Proof of payment of a non-refundable fees of 300.000 frw
RENEWAL OF REGISTRATION
● Application Letter addressed to the CEO (RGB)
“Welcome to e-Imiryango,” RGB, accessed 28 November 2024, https://e-imiryango.rgb.rw/#/home.
● Annual activity report
● Annual Action plan and budget for the fiscal year (clearly indicate administrative/office expenditures and activities budget)
● Signed proof of funding or a commitment letter from the donor or INGO head office
● A Valid Memorandum of Understanding from the partnering line Ministry where necessary
● Fees for Renewal registration:200,000 Frw
REGISTRATION FOR MORE THAN 1 YEAR TO 5 YEARS (only granted for already registered INGOs)
● Application Letter addressed to the CEO (RGB).
● Strategic plan of activities for more than one year, showing its budget execution and performance indicators endorsed by the Line Ministry.
● Annual Action plan and budget for the current fiscal year.
● Signed proof / a commitment letter by the donor / head office of the INGO. ● A Memorandum of Understanding with the line Ministry, covering the period applied for.
● Fees for renewal registration for 1 year up to 5 years: 500.000 Frw CHANGING THE NAME OF THE ORGANISATION
● Application Letter addressed to the CEO (RGB) explaining the reason(s) of changing the INGO name.
● Notarized By-laws or statute bearing amended articles showing the new name acquired. It should be certified by competent authority in the Country where that Head Office is located.
● A valid copy of registration certificate issued by the competent Authority. CLOSING OF OPERATIONS
● Application Letter addressed to the CEO (RGB) with a copy to the partnering line ministry and the District explaining the reasons for closure.
● Notify the Rwanda Governance Board 90 days before closing.
● Consult RGB for orientation especially on the transfer of assets. ● Annual activity report.
● Financial statement for the previous fiscal year showing planned budget and used budget.
● Proof of Rwanda Revenue Authority Tax Clearance.
● Proof of Social Security Fund of Rwanda Employee Payment clearance. ● Proposal of assets transfer plan to three (3) registered national NGOs op- erating in similar domain that has been existing at least for three years.
● An INGO closing out its activities in Rwanda will advertise the closure in three (3) widely read newspapers twice in three (3) months before it closes out its operations in the country.
● An INGO shall close operations upon reception of an official closing certificate from the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB). ● Fees for closing certificate: 200,000 Frw