The Beijing Consensus and African Autonomy

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The Beijing Consensus and African Autonomy

Abstract

            When trying to uncover the effects of Chinese investment in Africa on the local labor force, variations can be found from country to country. A purely quantitative analysis of employment percentages, wages, or income per household does not capture these complexities and overlooks the autonomy of African nations. Through a descriptive analysis of employment patterns in resource-for-infrastructure projects in Ghana and Angola, I hope to explain how the types of interests brought to the bargaining process by domestic political institutions create the observable variations.

Introduction

            “Always the Chinese will be the master and the Angolan the helper. This is our country. We should be in charge,” a Luanda taxi-driver complains, a sentiment that appears to reverberate in local labor populations across the continent.[1] A common perception  of China in Africa has been that Chinese companies prefer to import their own workers for their many public works projects, and when local workers are used, they are relegated to the lowest positions with long hours and low pay. Such employment models have invited accusations that China is flooding Africans out of their own job market in a mission to exploit the continent of its natural resources. However, when studying the employment patterns of local labor in Chinese projects, there are variations between the states that cannot be understood through quantitative analysis alone.

            How has Chinese investment impacted the local labor force in African countries? And given the differences in employment patterns, how is China’s influence mediated and complicated by domestic political institutions? This paper uses detailed case studies of Ghana and Angola, supplemented by descriptive statistics, to answer these questions. For consistency, the independent variable is limited to a certain type of investment that China has popularized: resources-for-infrastructure (RFI) agreements. RFI agreements pledge certain amounts of a natural resource from the borrowing nation in exchange for infrastructure construction by China. They are often cited as a prime example of China’s attempt at neo-imperialism as it appears to formalize an economically imbalanced exchange.[2] Impact to labor is measured in terms of employment patterns and working conditions for local labor since these are two of China’s practices that attract great criticism. Is local labor used and to what extent? What are the hours and wages of the African worker? Keeping in mind these criteria, when RFI agreements are present in both Angola and Ghana, the local employment on those projects tell different stories. This paper makes the argument that the variation is due to the actions of domestic political institutions in the bargaining process with China and whether the institutions of these African countries include representation of labor interests. In order to systematically analyze this intervening factor, I selected Angola, which is known for high counts of Chinese imported labor, and Ghana, which sees the employment of local labor and the organization of labor unions on Chinese projects. This paper also asserts that the effectiveness of the domestic political institutions depends on how democratic they are. Thus, drawing on Alden’s typology of African states, Angola and Ghana represent an example of an illiberal regime and of a stable democracy respectively.[3]

            The main argument of this paper is that the employment conditions in any given Chinese project is mediated through the channels of the African country’s government agencies and that the nuances of employment patterns are better explained through degrees of populist inclusion in the China-Africa negotiation process. Often in countries where the workforce expresses displeasure with the employment practices of the Chinese companies, the government is satisfied with it. For example in Angola, President Dos Santos has spoken out many times in the past to express his welcome of Chinese FDI, while local laborers have come into clash with Chinese contract workers.[4] This indicates that there are actors with varying goals competing in the negotiation for Chinese investment deals. Most likely, in cases of dissent, there is exclusion of the workers’ voices. Because China stands by a non-interference policy when it comes to local politics and its agreements carry no stipulations on governance or ethics standards, Chinese influence in its own hiring practice is tempered through the domestic political institutions. The argument supplements the existing scholarship on China-Africa that considers relations through a focus on domestic African politics. Hopefully, by analyzing the micro-level of employment patterns, further complexities and nuances of the China-Africa relationship can be revealed as well.

            The paper introduces the Beijing Consensus and the reasons for concerns with China’s Africa strategy at the state levelIt will also address common practices of FDI and multinational corporations and why they do not completely explain the employment situations in Angola or Ghana. In the Angola case, exclusionary enclaves within the state removed from the democratic process result in little to no Angolan employment. Meanwhile, in Ghana, the presence of opportunity structures can allow the state’s labor union to negotiate directly with Chinese companies. Finally, I present a generalizable understanding of employment patterns in China-Africa projects.

The Beijing Consensus and its Dissidents

            To understand why there is such hesitance and trepidation regarding China’s move into Africa, it is imperative to understand the components of the Beijing Consensus and how it deviates from previous international norms. The Beijing Consensus describes the framework for Chinese investment behavior abroad. The Chinese government positions itself on the same footing as the nations it invests in. They are all a part of the Global South as developing countries, and China believes that it can export its model of exponential development. Therefore, China stresses South-South cooperation and promotes a win-win model, where the other country will benefit along with China from whatever investment occurs.[5]

China proposes the Beijing Consensus as the alternative to the Washington Consensus, and the two frameworks differ on important counts. China argues that countries should not be kept from important developmental finance because the political situation does not meet certain standards, so they do not attach conditions to their loans, adhering to a supposed non-interference policy when it comes to domestic situations. Essentially, China does not require these African countries to adhere to specific budgeting philosophies, ethics standards, political systems, etc.[6] Unlike the big international lenders like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Chinese model for aid still emphasizes infrastructure over social funding and mixes their loans with business. Chinese companies sign onto aid agreements, and any loans dispatched from the donor banks, such as the China Exim Bank, go to the Chinese companies contracted to complete the construction work.[7] This contributes to China’s narrative of a win-win situation where the developing country gets the infrastructure it needs, and Chinese companies receive business. Building from these concepts, China has popularized a form of investment agreement called “resources for infrastructure.” The agreement is signed between nations, and Chinese companies utilize the released loans to complete public works projects in exchange for an agreed amount of resource extraction to be exported to China.[8]

This framework has received praise for what it can bring to the African continent. Moyo argues that the focus on trade, investment, and infrastructure sets these other economies further along the development curve and that these alternative characteristics do provide the win-win situation that China expounds.[9] Additionally, recent discourse on development has emphasized cooperation rather than donor and aid-recipient relationships. In the Sustainable Development Goals articulated by the United Nations, there was a push for allowing the receivers of aid packages to set the construction project proposals. In the past, the IMF or the World Bank tended to dictate to the developing nation the sort of infrastructure they required. Across countries in Africa, China does a more consistent job with signing onto projects by request and allowing for African government ownership of the ideas, even if that results in multiple soccer arenas in Zambia.[10]

Simultaneously, many of the qualities for which optimists such as Moyo would praise the Beijing Consensus are the same ones that draw the most criticism.  The lack of political stipulation has raised concerns about how China’s presence may exacerbate existing problems. China’s bad track record with human rights will be exported abroad and that their position of non-involvement could have negative social implications if the political situation is already less than ideal.[11] Some scholarship considers China’s behavior as that of a neo-colonial power.[12] The binding of aid with business and the RFI-structured agreements do not help this perception. The framework has been called a form of debt-trap diplomacy as China purposefully crafts relationships of economic dependency. Howard French showed through the interviews in his book that Chinese investment could flood Africans from the job market, and declared that China was seeking to make Africa their second continent.[13] While there is valid concern with China’s aid structure, namely the lack of transparency and the heavy focus on resource extraction, much of this perspective is more concerned by the threat China poses to U.S. hegemony than the danger it could impose upon African nations.

The generalization of China in Africa as an entirely negative or positive impact neglects the role of African states in the equation and fails to address how the China-Africa story contains various nuanced relationships. Bräutigam attempts to qualify the more absolute statements in The Dragon’s Gift, interrogating Chinese interactions with  Africa across sectors and ultimately discovering that Chinese investment is complicated. As with any form of foreign investment, there are aspects that are beneficial and aspects that are not.[14] In line with Brautigam’s conclusions, some of the literature around China-Africa has sought to understand the flexigemony of Chinese investment, or how the nature of investment changes from state to state.[15] This paper does not seek to provide any answers to the China-Africa relationship at large. Instead, it studies the presence of flexigemony in the effects upon labor specifically.

Bargaining for “the Dragon’s Gift”

            Examining Chinese FDI and its impacts on local labor as a bargaining process reveals the power of interests in settling deals and disagreements. It is a logical perspective when one considers the structure of FDI in general. The flow of FDI in or out of a country is ruled by sets of regulations, and so Chinese companies are subject to the domestic institutions responsible for bringing FDI into the borrowing country.[16] Where there are regulations, there are actors that crafted those regulations, and this is where the structure of a negotiated deal is especially useful in analyzing the interests that are and are not represented. This paper argues that the variation in local employment rates between African states, in this study being Angola and Ghana, can and should be viewed as a narrative of interacting interests in a bargaining process with China.

            From China’s side, the goals appear to be to generate business, revenue, and positive relationships for China. China’s deals explicitly tie their loans to Chinese companies for the construction portion. Thus, it is possible that the variation is perhaps a mere reflection of the wish to create profit by maximizing efficiency or minimizing cost, based on the demand versus supply of skilled labor or the preference for cheap labor. Yet, this conventional wisdom would have China employ more local workers, as is the common business practice for most multinational corporations, since that would be a far more convenient and often cheaper source of labor.[17] This assumption does not hold in the Angola case, where the status quo is for Chinese companies to import laborers. The next possible explanation would be that China is in need of skilled labor, but the positions filled by Chinese contract workers are most often merely that of the average construction worker. Ghana also defies this explanation. The workers hired in Ghana are not for managerial positions and the labor pool that Chinese companies draw from are not any more skilled than the labor pool in Angola.[18] In both cases, the managerial level of Chinese companies bemoan the local labor force for not understanding Chinese business models and for being less efficient than Chinese laborers who are accustomed to them.[19] If neither demand for skilled labor or cheap labor fully explains the variation between Angola and Ghana, and Chinese companies hold the same complaints about local labor in both, then there is something else affecting the employment patterns in these countries. The logic of general hiring practices for multinational corporations fails to explain fully the resulting labor patterns. Additionally, it offers no analytical power for the kinds of institutions that China relates to in these countries and reveals little to nothing about the complexity of the bargaining process from the African position.

China does not stipulate the FDI process or the general economic governance of a country to behave a certain way before engaging in business. Instead, this non-interference doctrine serves as an entry point for understanding the employment patterns. This extends to China’s perspective on labor laws and hiring practices. Since China does not interfere with domestic institutions and appears to have a similar motivation (to gain business and to leave a positive impression of Beijing) across different states, then the interests and power-structure within domestic political institutions provide a more complete explanation for the observable differences. For these case studies, I relate the ability of the domestic political institution to represent the interests of labor to the level of democracy in those institutions. This assumption stems from institutionalist theories that democracy provides more opportunity structures for civil society to mobilize and more tools to incentivize certain behaviors from elected politicians.[20]

The Angola Case

            Angola is one of the top five African contributors to the gross revenue of Chinese construction companies. By Alden’s typology and the World Bank’s governance index, it is considered an illiberal regime with a weak democracy.[21] The first significant agreement for Angola in this new era of China-Africa engagement occurred in 2002, not long after the end of Angola’s 27-year civil war. The country was in desperate need of financing for reconstruction and turned to China for an oil-based credit line with little conditionality. China offered up this RFI agreement, which was signed in 2003 by the Angolan Ministry of Finance and the Chinese Ministry of Trade, and in 2004 the first financing package of 2 billion USD for public works projects was approved.[22] Since then, Angola has received over 42 billion USD in loans, and in 2017, Chinese construction companies received over 6.6 billion USD of their annual revenue from Angola alone.[23][24] The credit line has opened countless projects in public works, fishing, agriculture, transportation, etc.

            By these metrics, it would appear that there is indeed a win-win situation in Angola. Li Ruoguo, the President of the China Exim Bank, summarizes China’s impact on Angola as follows: “… Before China’s engagement with Angola, their credit rating was [a] D, ‘highly risky’. Now the rating has been upgraded to [a] C or better. Germany, Japan, [and] Denmark are rushing in to provide loans to Angola.”[25] However, the loan money stays in the Chinese companies and the profits from extracted oil go back and are funneled into repayment or directly into the pockets of the elites controlling the deal from the Angolan side. Little of this money enters the real economy and so the average Angolan worker does not directly profit from Chinese investment. In recent years, this has garnered criticism from civil society in Angola, especially from the local labor force.[26][27]

            Angola is known for having some of the highest proportions of Chinese workers in the labor pools for their projects. At the end of 2017, there were over 25,500 Chinese migrants estimated to be employed in Angola as workers on contracted projects or as labor services with non-Chinese businesses, and Angolans have complained about feeling pushed out of their own labor market or being relegated to low paying positions on these Chinese projects.[28] These tensions have come to head multiples times in the past. Notably, in 2010 the resentment was expressed in the form of attacks and robberies on Chinese nationals by anti-government rebels and organized crime. In 2015, civilians planned protests against President Eduardo Dos Santos’ visit to China to discuss more oil-based agreements before being shut down by the military.[29][30] While Chinese companies find themselves embroiled in these less-than-ideal labor relations , the problems that Angolan labor has with political representation of their interests could not be resolved simply with the removal of Chinese investment. The employment patterns and subsequent labor responses are the result of Angolan institutions failing to represent local labor’s interests in their negotiations with China.

            Even though the incidents in 2010 and 2015 were directed against China and its presence in Angola, they were also a redirection of frustration about the Angolan government excluding workers from the benefits of Chinese trade. As briefly alluded to before, Chinese investment in Angola is primarily in extractive industries such as oil, which is monopolized by small groups of elites. All the contracts that Angola receives are filtered through an intentionally exclusive coalition of a select few agencies and companies, and contract negotiation for the credit-line projects happens with little public transparency. Typically, Angola proposes a project, China puts forth three or four companies for selection, and the companies are reviewed by a third party, making signs of elite brokerage not immediately clear.[31] However, many of the companies currently operating in Angola are listed with the same Hong Kong address as the China International Fund, where a collection of individuals own all the firms. As a private equity firm from Hong Kong, the China International Fund has ties to the state and has provided over 10 billion USD to the oil-backed enterprises in Angola. On the Angolan side, before 2010 Angola’s Reconstruction Office, the Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (GRN) managed this credit along with most of the major infrastructure projects. The GRN was accountable only to the President; in 2010, the management of the projects was handed to a private company called Sonangol Imobiliária (Sonangol Real Estate), successfully allowing elitist actors to dominate the bargaining with China.[32] This method of organization in Angola means that the holders of these companies were able to construct enclaved institutions that are completely removed from the democratic process and the interests of the average Angolan worker. These institutions of elite brokerage have been noted by scholars inside and outside of China-Africa studies and have been referred to as a species of parallel governments, the formal and the shadow.[33]

            And the success of these expedited channels of investment empowers the ruling party in a cyclic nature. President Dos Santos and the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) have used the influx of oil revenues and China’s financial support to strengthen their grip and enable them to dominate any opposing political forces.[34] China sees the enduring stability of President Dos Santos and the MPLA and will continue to court their interests at the expense of civil society and labor voices. However, the mere removal of China from this climate would not resolve the underlying issues of inclusive participation of Angolan civilians. It would not change the parallel governments of Angola, which survived the supposed reforms of 2010.[35] These exclusionary structures mediate the form that Chinese investment is expressed in, influence the Chinese companies’ interactions with local labor, and create a division in China-Angola relations. The weak democracy and the clientelist behavior within the Angolan government fails to represent the voices and dissent of the local labor force in their negotiations with China. As a result, these Chinese companies are experiencing two different kinds of reactions from Angola. While President Dos Santos refers to President Xi as akin to a brother, the Luanda taxi driver says, “We have always been slaves. We are lost in the world. We are the leftovers.”[36]

The Ghana Case

            For the purposes of this paper, Ghana is being treated as a stable democracy with a diversified economy. Although by some metrics Ghana is not considered truly diversified compared to states such as South Africa, it has one of the best democracies within sub-Saharan Africa and is a good case study to analyze when it comes to labor patterns in Chinese-contracted work. Its lack of a fully diversified economy means that China’s presence as an international developer is more prominent, and the level of engagement is more comparable to Angola than a diversified economy such as South Africa. Ghana has not established anything resembling a resource-extraction-backed credit-line, but it has received multiple agreements of the RFI variety. The construction of the Bui Hydroelectric Dam is the most prominent example by far, and the process and engagement of this project will be the focus of this case section.

            Chinese investment has seen an increase in recent years due to the greater resource potential in Ghana after the discovery of oil offshore. Overall, since 2000 Ghana has received over 1.09 billion USD in loans and at the end of 2017 had about 4,900 Chinese workers.[37] The local worker’s reality in Ghana shows great variance from that of Angolan workers. On the Bui Dam Project, a total of 1,876 workers were hired at the end of construction with only 100 of those being imported Chinese workers, and there was a formal trade union on site.[38] In general, Chinese business does not work in tandem with labor unions, making the Bui Dam an even more interesting study.

            The Bui Hydroelectric Dam was first considered in 1925; however, it was deemed that the location would be an ideal spot for a dam of the non-hydroelectric sort. In 1978, Australia and the World Bank were involved in the plan to construct a hydroelectric one, but it fell through after a series of coup d’états within Ghana. Finally, official plans for the hydroelectric dam were brought back at the 2006 summit of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in Beijing. It was funded by the China Exim Bank and constructed by Sinohydro. Like the Angolan RFI agreements, the loan money stayed with Sinohydro and the dam was gifted back to the Ghanaian government after construction was completed.[39] Representing the Ghanaian state interest in the project, the government created the Bui Power Authority as the agency to manage the day-to-day construction of the dam. The total cost of the project was estimated at 622 million USD with 60 million USD from the Ghanaian government, a concessional loan of 263.5 million USD, as well as a buyers’ credit of 298.5 million USD from the China Exim Bank.[40] It is generally agreed that without Chinese financial and technical support, the Bui Hydroelectric Dam would probably have not happened due to problematic building conditions.

            Even prior to the Bui Hydroelectric Dam, trade unions in Ghana had taken issue with low wages and long hours in Chinese businesses. Although Ghana was able to bargain for a required 90% local labor force, at least in the original deal, it appeared at the beginning of the dam construction in 2008 that the concerns about working conditions would be present once more.[41] However, Ghanaian workers on the project were able to organize and received the backing of the Bui Power Authority and the Ghana Traders’ Union Association. In 2008, there was no trade union present at the Bui Dam due to the actions taken by Sinohydro to break up any labor organization, but by the time the dam opened in 2013, workers were being paid almost double the national minimum wage.[42] China had shifted its practice on this project by opening negotiations with unions. Although Sinohydro had been determined to paralyze any attempts at labor organization in the beginning, they were forced to open communication and negotiate contracts at the prompting of the Bui Power Authority by 2009. In 2010, a representative from Sinohydro described the role of the labor union on site as being that of a monitoring force, which, due to its national support, was able to lobby for certain behaviors from Sinohydro.[43] A key difference in the domestic institutions involved in negotiating the China relationship in Angola versus Ghana lies in the quality of democracy. Ghana’s democracy gives a roadmap of how to react to mobilization and incentivizes positive responses since the continuation of any politician or political party’s authority is predicated on maintaining their voting base.

            Ghana’s democratic government has been in place since 1992, holding fair and free elections between its major parties since then. In the last two decades, these elections have been competitive and resulted in important electoral turnovers, which pushes Ghana past Huntington’s threshold of entrenched democracy.[44] Outside of the Bui Dam project, there have been other instances of Ghana’s government reflecting labor and civilian interests in their relations with China. The government has absorbed to some extent union concerns about the harsh working conditions in Chinese firms, the use of child labor in mining, and the potential of Chinese migrant workers to flood the job market. In 2013 this resulted in the deportation of a large number of Chinese nationals.[45] Although neither of the major political parties have included this anti-Chinese sentiment in official platforms due to the economic importance of continued Chinese finance, the crucial insight here is the extent to which labor can mobilize politically to shape the impacts of Chinese investment. As a local worker describes, “We know [the Chinese] are bribing the politicians and leaders, but we will not say anything. All we can do is vote them out of office.”[46]

African Autonomy and its Civilians

            At the beginning of this paper, the Angolan taxi-driver talks about how Angola should be in control of the projects, but when considering the structure of agreements between Angola and China, it is not clear if China is purely exploitative of the developing state. In terms of state ownership, China is more open to allowing the other party to set the agenda than traditional international donors.[47] The tensions of labor in Angola with Chinese firms would not dissipate entirely if China were to cease investment in the country. Even though the Angolan government exercises considerable autonomy within their credit-line projects with China by most comparable metrics for international development finance, the issue is that the autonomous actions taken by the state do not reflect the concerns that its civil society has with Chinese investment. On the other hand, Ghana successfully defends and supports their labor organizations in engagement with Chinese firms. The problem in Ghana is that while the state has a strong democratic system, they do not possess a diversified economy and still need China and other foreign financiers. Thus, the major political parties do not fully absorb those issues into their platforms. Another case to briefly note: South Africa has one of the most diversified economies in Africa and until 2016 received almost no loans from China.[48] Both its politicians and its working civilians, whose social prospects would be directly impacted by an increase in Chinese contractors, expressed hesitancy when it came to engagement with China as early as the first Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in 2006. As much as Chinese companies would like to have stronger economic relations with South Africa, they focused their attention elsewhere after facing such reluctance and suspicion.

            Accepting the popular narratives of Chinese involvement overgeneralizes the impact of China and ignores the role that the autonomy and structure of each state plays in shaping the conditions of deals. While analysis of labor has limitations due to its small scope, it still reveals a pattern in Chinese investment behavior that is based in state-by-state negotiations and changing approaches depending on the political and social environment. Chinese firms prove themselves to be quite flexible in their interactions. China continues to import workers into Angola, but as local labor became more disillusioned with Chinese companies, China has also decreased the number of workers they bring in. Since 2014, the amount has decreased by more than half, and there has been evidence that the number of local hires increases the longer a company conducts business in Angola.[49] With the current information available, it is hard to determine if this has a direct correlation with civil society responses, but regardless, we can observe the variability of Chinese investment.

            This variability implies that perhaps the Beijing Consensus is largely a work in progress and not as robust as we are meant to believe. M[1] any of these agreements are worked out between contractors and the borrowing state with Beijing only giving the final approval through the China Exim Bank. There is little proof of an imposing agenda beyond generating business and good impressions. Chinese companies are given significant free reign to make their own business decisions. There is no conditionality attached to the Beijing Consensus as there is with the Washington Consensus, making it harder to pin down its effects. At the same time, the lack of value standards is perhaps the most concerning part for civilian workers. The default of non-interference may not be enough when the state has a dismal human rights record in the first place.[50] For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, China exports the largest proportion of copper from the Katanga region, which has been shamed by international organizations for the abuses of child labor in the mines.[2] [51] While this problem exists with or without China exporting copper, China’s non-interference policy makes it so that they absolve themselves of all responsibility when it comes to enforcing ethics standards. If China wants to step into the international donor arena, it is reasonable that they will have to adopt some level of ethical norms.

Conclusion

            Through studying the patterns of local employment as a result of conflicting interests, it reveals the different competing institutions that are involved in the China-Africa relationship. It reorients China’s behavior as a more flexible entity, allowing the actions and non-actions of African nations to take a centered role in analysis. Employment of local labor in two countries is a rather small area to cover in the greater China-Africa relationship, but this same framework of negotiation and bargaining could perhaps be applied to other aspects in these international relations.

Moreover, in the process of answering my limited research questions, larger issues surrounding China’s place as an international donor, and principles of development finance, can be seen conflicting at this micro-scale. As China ventures further into the world of traditional international donors with the One Belt One Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, will China need to better articulate human rights norms? Where does the trade-off between respecting state autonomy and political intervention exist for countries with less than ideal political situations? Essentially, who gets left behind in the race for development, and does that then become the lender’s responsibility? These are pertinent questions that could not be addressed within the scope of this project, but they are important not only for China’s policy moving forward, but for the actors of international development finance as a whole. When one takes away the novelty of China as an international donor, it becomes clear that many of the problems that arise in the face of the Beijing Consensus are universal and generalizable. In fact, they are questions that have been plaguing the international community with respect to development long before China stepped into the arena. Looking at the relationships of Chinese development finance, we can see how it does offer an alternative model, but the heart of the issue is continuing and a question of effective development.

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[1] Herculano Coroado and Joe Brock, “Angolans resentful as China tightens its grip,” Reuters, 9 July 2015.

[2] Bräutigam, Deborah. The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 56.

[3] Chris Alden, China in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2007) 93-119.

[4] Coroado, “Angolans resentful as China tightens its grip.”

[5] Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, 131-157.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa (London: Penguin, 2009).

[10] Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, 131-157.

[11] Jeffrey Henderson, “China and Global Development: Towards a Global Asian Era?” Contemporary Politics, 14, no. 4 (2008): 375–92.

[12] Yaroslav Trofimov, “New Management: In Africa China’s Expansion Begins to Stir Resentment: Investment Boom Fuels Colonialism Charges; a Tragedy in Zambia,” The Wall Street Journal, 2 February 2007, p A1.

Richard Manning, “Will ‘Emerging Donors’ Change the Face of International Cooperation?” Development Policy Review 24, no. 4 (2006): 371–85.

[13] French, Howard. China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa (New York: Random House, 2014).

[14] Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa.

[15] Padraig Carmody and Ian Taylor, “Flexigemony and Force in China’s Geoeconomic Strategy in Africa: Sudan and Zambia Compared,” Geopolitics 15, no. 3 (2010): 495–515.

[16] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Best Practices in Investment for Development: Case Studies in FDI,” Investment Advisory Series B, no. 6 (2011).

[17] Ibid.

[18] Julian Kirchherr, Tim Disselhoff, and Katrina Charles, “Safeguards, financing, and employment in Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa: the case of Ghana’s Bui Dam,” Waterlines 35, no. 1 (2016): 37-58.

[19] Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, 228.

[20] Gordon White, “Civil society, democratization and development (I): Clearing the analytical ground,” Democratization 1, no. 2 (1994): 375-390.

[21] Alden, China in Africa, 93-119.

Worldwide Governance Indicators (www.govindicators.org)

[22] Giles Mohan, “China in Africa: Impacts and Prospects for Accountable Development.” In The Politics of Inclusive Development: Interrogating the Evidence, edited by Sam Hickey, Kunal Sen, and Badru Bukenya (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[23] Deborah Bräutigam, China-Africa Contracts Data, 2018, distributed by China Africa Research Initiative at John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

[24] Deborah Bräutigam, Chinese Loans to African Governments, 2000-2017, 2017, distributed by China Africa Research Initiative at John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

[25] Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, 186.

[26] Benoit Faucon and Sherry Su, “Hostility Toward Workers Cools Angola-China Relationship,” The Wall Street Journal, 10 August 2010.

[27] Coroado, “Angolans resentful as China tightens its grip.”

[28] Deborah Bräutigam, China-Africa Labor Data by Country, 2018, distributed by China Africa Research Initiative at John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

[29] Faucon et al., “Hostility Toward Workers Cools Angola-China Relationship.”

[30] Coroado, “Angolans resentful as China tightens its grip.”

[31] Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, 131-157.

[32] Marcus Power, “Angola 2025: The Future of the World’s Richest Poor Country as Seen through a Chinese Rear-view Mirror,” Antipode 44, no. 3 (2011): 993–1014.

Ian Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa,” International Affairs 82, no. 5 ): 937–59.

[33] Paula Cristina Roque, “Angola: Parallel governments, oil and neopatrimonial system reproduction,” Institute for Security Studies, 6 June 2011.

[34] Richard Aidoo and Steve Hess, “Non-Interference 2.0: China’s Evolving Foreign Policy towards a Changing Africa,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 44, no. 1 (March 2015): 107–39.

[35] Roque, “Angola: Parallel governments, oil and neopatrimonial system reproduction.”

[36] Coroado, “Angolans resentful as China tightens its grip.”

[37] Bräutigam, Chinese Loans to African Governments, 2000-2017, 2017.

Bräutigam, China-Africa Labor Data by Country, 2018.

[38] Kwabena Nyarko Otoo, Nina Ulbrich, and Prince Asafu-Adjaye, “Unions Can Make a Difference: Ghanaian Workers in a Chinese Construction Firm at Bui Dam Site,” Labour Research & Policy Institute, 2013.

[39] Kirchherr et al., “Safeguards, financing, and employment in Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa: the case of Ghana’s Bui Dam,” 37-58.

[40] Otoo et al., “Unions Can Make a Difference: Ghanaian Workers in a Chinese Construction Firm at Bui Dam Site.”

[41] Kirchherr et al., “Safeguards, financing, and employment in Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa: the case of Ghana’s Bui Dam,” 37-58.

[42] Otoo et al., “Unions Can Make a Difference: Ghanaian Workers in a Chinese Construction Firm at Bui Dam Site.”

[43] Kirchherr et al., “Safeguards, financing, and employment in Chinese infrastructure projects in Africa: the case of Ghana’s Bui Dam,” 37-58.

[44] Aidoo et al., “Non-Interference 2.0: China’s Evolving Foreign Policy towards a Changing Africa.”

[45] Ben Lampert, and Giles Mohan, “Sino-African Encounters in Ghana and Nigeria: From Conflict to Conviviality and Mutual Benefit,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 43, no. 1 (2014): 9–39.

[46] Aidoo et al., “Non-Interference 2.0: China’s Evolving Foreign Policy towards a Changing Africa.”

[47] Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, 131-157.

[48] Bräutigam, Chinese Loans to African Governments, 2000-2017, 2017.

[49] Bräutigam, China-Africa Labor Data by Country, 2018.

[50] Carmody et al., “Flexigemony and Force in China’s Geoeconomic Strategy in Africa: Sudan and Zambia Compared.”

[51] Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, 146-147.


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