But despite governmental propaganda, the war’s outcome marked an ominous turning point for the North Korean regime. While prior to the start of conflict the North Korean economy was clearly overtaking the South due to the Japanese colonial regime’s industrialization, afterwards South Korea grew rapidly and did not stray from its economic trajectory. North Korea would suffer greatly in subsequent years, with frequent food crises and a consistently low standard of living. Moreover, Kim Il-Sung’s greatest goal — reunifying the Korean peninsula under his government — would become nearly impossible. 

These consequences should not have surprised the North Korean government, considering South Korea’s superiority in military numbers and the already-faltering status of key economic policies at the time. Yet Kim chose to ignore the advice of North Korea’s greatest benefactor and source of foreign aid —  the Soviet Union — in favor of forcibly reunifying the peninsula (although the North Korean government continues to deny that they launched the first attack). Syngman Rhee likewise brought up forceful reunification continuously with the United States, only to have the latter reject any such proposals. Both leaders sought conflict with the other, seemingly with great confidence, while the great powers supporting them voiced strong opposition to the potentially larger-scale conflict that could occur. 

The above description of the war’s beginning and end implies two important questions: Why did Kim Il-Sung decide to cross the 38th parallel after multiple warnings against it? Why does the Korean War continue to have an important role in North Korean propaganda if it ended in failure? Although there are several plausible explanations, the perspective below is grounded in the idea that the Korean War was essential to North Korean nation-building. 

WAR MADE THE STATE AND THE NATION 

Charles Tilly’s famous claim that war makes states is extended by Nicholas Sambanis to also include nations in “Nation-Building through War.” Sambanis argues that war-making is connected to a country’s domestic conflicts and social identification; that a conflict can increase a state’s international status and thus prompt individuals in that state to increasingly identify with the nation. Leaders engage in conflicts they would not ordinarily because this national identification serves to reduce internal conflicts and increase a state’s capacity for future war-making. 

Sambanis’s theory incorporates social psychological effects typically absent in neorealist studies of war. But this model is well-suited for the Korean War, where the issue at stake concerned national unification. Kim Il-Sung frequently promised the North’s public that reunification was imminent and that his regime was the only legitimate power on the peninsula. His ascension to the North’s supreme leader also hinged on his reputation as an Anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter, another link between political power and nationalism in the state. 

Moreover, the prospect of reunification served to distract from domestic problems in the country. North Korea was already beginning to face economic difficulties that threatened the state’s control over society, in addition to rifts within the leadership. Although the state was ethnically homogeneous, Kim’s campaign against previous collaborators with the Japanese also stoked internal divisions as individuals were asked to defend their family’s actions during the Japanese occupation.

Thus Kim’s prioritization of forceful reunification can be understood by its domestic benefits. A positive result from a conflict between the North and South would have generated higher status for that state internationally, as that state would be recognized as the sole legitimate authority. It also would have “[induced] social cohesion through national identification” and thereby increase investments in national institutions. Conversely, we can assume that without these anticipated benefits of national identification that Kim would not have crossed the 38th parallel. 

WAR-MAKING AND MYTH-MAKING

Clearly, the Korean War did not end with Kim ruling over the entire peninsula. Yet despite this loss, the North Korean government continues to feature the conflict as an example of the nation’s victory over the imperial U.S. The anniversary of the war is usually celebrated in North Korea with mass rallies, while the war’s atrocities are collectively mourned as U.S. war crimes. These revisionist strategies can be partially explained by the war’s function as a nationalist myth. 

Miguel Centeno’s Blood and Debt focuses on war and the nation-state in Latin America, but offers a key analysis of the relationship between wars and myths. He asserts that warfare and state authority “helped create and were in turn shaped by particular forms of national allegiance.” War provided a path for group identity, where it might have been unavailable otherwise. Such military experiences also create a shared history for a nation, much like the American Revolution is the foundation of any U.S. history course. 

North Korea before the war did not lack a collective identity, but the issue of detangling a specifically “Northern” identity from the more general “Korean” identity remained. At the time, many families were separated between the two regions, and Kim Il-Sung struggled with encouraging anti-Southern sentiment. Furthermore, there were few historical events universally experienced by only North Koreans that could unify the nation — making the Korean War an attractive option later on.

Official state nationalism in North Korea — which promotes independence from imperial powers like the United States — is therefore substantiated by the Korean War. Not only did the conflict create a clearly identifiable external “other,” the war’s extensive destruction resulted in its collective preservation in the public’s memories. But where Centeno notes war was a limited source of nationalism in Latin America, North Korea capitalized on the Korean War as a source of nationalist myths. Unlike Latin America, North Korea’s precarious location next to its enemies created a need for national solidarity and its general homogeneity helped facilitate a national community. 

Nationalism as a political force is garnering increased attention in contemporary media, mostly due to the proliferation of extremist nationalist movements. But nationalism is not a particularly new or unique concept — not only is it embedded in our daily lives, it can be an explanatory factor for many historical developments. As we continue to analyze past military conflicts, understanding domestic considerations like nation-building and nationalist myths will be necessary. 

Works Cited

Centeno, Miguel Angel. 2002. Blood and Debt. War and the Nation-State in Latin America. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University.

Sambanis, Nicholas, Stergios Skaperdas, and William Wohlforth. 2015. “Nation-Building through War.” American Political Science Review, 109(2): 279-296.

After three years of conflict, the war in Yemen has not shown any signs of stopping, and it has  turned into one of the most severe humanitarian crises the international community faces today.

On Friday, February 22nd, the Yale International Relations Association and Students for Yemen hosted a panel discussion entitled “What Will it Take to End the War in Yemen?” The three panelists each brought a different perspective to this pressing issue, which has become even more relevant as the U.S. House of Representatives has voted to end U.S. funding of the war in Yemen.

Caught between the two opposing factions — the Houthi rebels and the Saudi-backed Yemeni government — are Yemen’s civilians. Around 22 million people are now in need of some sort of assistance and 6,000 have already been killed. The presence of additional foreign military involvement exacerbates the dangerous conflict. Most of the international community regard the war in Yemen as a proxy war, fought between Saudi Arabia, who backs the ousted Yemeni government, and Iran, who has been accused of supplying arms to the Houthis. More and more states have become involved with the conflict as well, resulting in even more crossfire for Yemeni citizens to be caught between. While the U.S. has not committed air or land forces to the Saudi-led coalition, like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have, the U.S. has contributed arms and logistical support. Militants from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have taken advantage of the chaos the war has caused as well, a target that U.S. officials often use to justify airstrikes in Yemen. Yet these airstrikes do not discriminate between would-be terrorists and innocent Yemeni people — according to the U.N. human rights office, thousands of civilians perish from these attacks. Despite vocal opposition from President Donald Trump — who continues to support Saudi Arabia even after its crown prince is implicated for the murder of reporter Jamal Khashoggi — there has been broad bipartisan support for H.J. Res. 37, which would remove U.S. armed forces from hostilities in Yemen without Congressional authorization.

The discussion began with a brief introduction of each panelist. Summer Nasser, chairperson of Yemen Aid, detailed her experiences from leading  an international humanitarian NGO. Some of the work her organization has done in Yemen include establishing an ambulance service similar to the emergency service 9-1-1 in the U.S. in order to create jobs and empowering women through health education.

Stanley Heller — chairperson and executive director of the Middle East Crisis Committee, a peace and human rights organization based in New Haven — continued the discussion by outlining his history of general activism in New Haven. After beginning his activist work in 1969 with the Vietnam War, he’s continued to this day and still believes in the power of grassroots movements.

As a Senior Lector of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at Yale, Muhammad Al-Aziz furthered the discussion by providing some context on Yemen’s political and religious history.  . Due to its remote location and rugged terrain, Yemen has historically been a divided country. Until the establishment of the Republic of Yemen in 1990, the country was split between the northern Yemen Arab Republic and the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Azis added that it was very difficult for an army to come and invade, so that many people, such as the Ottomans, had a strenuous time with the local people and “eventually left the country.”

During a part of the panel discussion pertaining to a plausible end to the current civil conflict, , Heller spoke from an activist point of view  about how he believes that religion is merely an excuse for many sides during civil wars. “Usually, a gang wants power and adds religion onto it,” he said.

According to Heller, the main objective should be to stop Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from launching airstrikes in Yemen and to stop the U.S. from helping them do so. “[The U.S. government] is there for one reason: to please the Saudis,” he said. “They buy our weapons, and Trump is happy to do anything he can for that.”

Heller described specific actions that U.S. citizens could take to affect change. He recommended calling congressmen, writing op-eds, or boycotting groups with ties to Saudi Arabia. He added that photo exhibits centered on Yemen can be particularly moving, considering its simplicity and emotional impact. Still, Heller advised that people interested in helping should be creative when thinking about what can be done.

Summer Nasser also emphasized that H.J. Res. 37, the legislation currently in Congress, is not necessarily about ending the war in Yemen but instead about “saving the reputation of the U.S.” She added that while important for the U.S. to exit the conflict, there is still an internal crisis within Yemen to contend with, and that once the U.S. steps away from involvement with the conflict, that “guarantees that no one will talk about Yemen again.”

Ultimately, the panel could not reach a consensus on what, exactly, it will take to end the war in Yemen. Each of the panelists acknowledged that the answer is not as simple as the legislation in Congress makes it appear,. Yemen’s citizens will be affected by its civil war for years to come, necessitating continual international humanitarian attention.