Barack Obama recently announced his nomination of Janet Yellen as the next chairman of the Federal Reserve. Though the Fed chair has always wielded extensive power, Yellen will enter the post at a particularly pivotal time in the Fed’s history: quantitative easing continues unabated, and interest rates have rested near zero for years. She will face tough policy decisions, and because of the increasing interconnectedness of the global economy, her choices will resonate far beyond the United States.

Given Yellen’s open support of Benjamin Bernanke during his tenure as Fed chair, it is likely that her policies will be similar to his. Though of course Bernanke’s primary focus was on ensuring the health of the American economy, he frequently referenced the health of the global economy, asserting that his policies simultaneously worked to ‘support’ global and domestic stability. Yellen, similarly, will not hesitate to make dramatic decisions that will impact the global economy if she believes they will stabilize the United States. 

That said, Yellen, because of her academic background and her gender, is also uniquely positioned to influence international economics – as well as other fields – more broadly. In contrast to previous Fed chairs, Yellen has a deep academic interest in foreign economies. She is known for her expertise in labor markets, but one of her most influential papers focused not on domestic markets, but on the economic history of German unification. Within this influential study, she demonstrated how workers in the eastern half of the country were priced out of jobs under the terms of the reunification. This research undoubtedly augments her understanding of Germany’s current economic situation and likely also influences her view of the current struggles of peripheral Eurozone countries, who face similar basic challenges, including a loss in competitiveness and high unemployment. Thus, Yellen’s specialization may help her to more deeply understand the intricacies of foreign economics, which may in turn affect her domestic economic policies.

Yellen’s academic specialization may be of particular help to her in her relationship with another prominent female world leader, Angela Merkel, though the positions of two women also draw attention to another aspect of Yellen’s biography. If appointed Fed chair, Yellen will become a member of a newly empowered class of female political leaders, joining the ranks of such women as Karnit Flug of Israel, Elvira Nabiullina of Russia, and Christine Lagarde of the IMF, all of whom hold positions of power in a historically male-dominated field. While these three women differ greatly on matters of policy, the very fact of their holding the positions they do could inspire more countries to consider women for top economic jobs and more young girls to pursue economics as a career. Currently, at the top 100 universities, women account for just 28 percent of economics majors, with recent studies conducted at these schools attributing these statistics in part to the lack of strong female role models.

Ultimately, an understanding of the significance of Yellen’s appointment should take into account her knowledge of European economic history and her gender, both of which suggest that she is poised to have an event greater impact than just her prospective title would suggest.

Allison Lazarus (’14) is a History major in Jonathan Edwards College.

The United States has committed to withdrawing from Afghanistan by 2014.  Given the sheer amount of equipment and number of personnel currently on the ground, the logistics of this departure promise to be challenging. Though aircraft are an option for withdrawing the 120,000 containers worth of supplies on site from remote areas, ground-based transportation remains most cost-effective. Thus the military will seek to use a land route to transport at least a significant percentage of this equipment.[i] In planning the evacuation, the same political calculus that plagued past planners’ mapping of a potential supply route will remain essential. The exodus will likely follow an ill-defined path crossing Central Asia and known informally as the Northern Distribution Network (NDN).   The NDN winds through some of the most politically volatile countries in the world – and American dependence on it may indirectly harm relations with Russia and prop up authoritarian regimes.

During the early stages of the war, the US primarily brought in supplies through western Pakistan. However, in 2009, Pentagon strategists drew an alternate network of routes, including the NDN, which includes Latvia, Russia and much of Central Asia. Its main artery ends in Uzbekistan (because of its central location and advanced railway system) before crossing the border into Afghanistan at Termez. Though the route has some natural advantages, it is made all the more attractive in that it avoids the turbulent western border provinces of Pakistan.[ii]

By the end of 2011, over 50% of non-lethal goods destined for NATO troops were passing through the NDN, and if relations with Pakistan remain strained, an even higher percentage will presumably follow the route as they leave in 2014.[iii] Obviously, the monetary and political advantages of participation for any country hosting a portion of the NDN are huge, and as a result several Central Asian countries have jockeyed for a greater role in the network.

So far, the United States has stood by Uzbekistan’s efforts to maintain it’s central position. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake’s August 12-18 visit to Uzbekistan underscores the country’s current strategic importance to American withdrawal. To facilitate Uzbek cooperation, American criticism of human rights abuses committed by President Islam Karimov’s administration has declined precipitously since the NDN opened.

But besides this relief from criticism, what does Karimov want for his support of the NDN? Perhaps, on a basic level, the actual American equipment. Many American planners have suggested that some of the non-lethal supplies could be sold cheaply to the countries that this equipment would otherwise be passing through. Additionally, the payment accrued through transit fees, as well as the revenues from shipping contracts and subcontracts are not insubstantial. The cost of shipping one container through the NDN is 2.5 times as high as shipping through Pakistan because of increased distance, more difficult conditions, and tariffs levied by Central Asian governments.[iv]  Most broadly, welcoming American business and cultivating US government support allows Karimov to balance against Russia’s overbearing influence within Uzbekistan.

Every Central Asian country plays this delicate diplomatic game, but the obvious importance of the NDN to American strategy seems to have emboldened participating countries in their interactions with Moscow. Uzbekistan’s recent withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), for example, seems to have been due largely to President Karimov’s desire to position Uzbekistan as a leading independent player in the logistics of the NDN. Similarly, Tajik President Emomali Rahmonov has delayed agreeing to host Russian military bases, which some analysts claim results from his desire to profit from the NDN transit deal.[v]

This ongoing tug-of-war between Russian and US spheres of influence explains the tolerance the US has recently shown for the NDN’s inefficiencies.  It seems almost incredible, for instance, that America accepted (on November 17, 2011) both greatly increased shipping rates and more layers of dysfunctional bureaucracy in negotiations with Uzbekistan instead of searching for a new route. The federal government has explicitly recognized this unique inefficiency, notifying outside contractors earlier this year that any consequences of shipping through Uzbekistan would be their own fault. [vi]

Thus, expected inefficiency within Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states will be tolerated because American engagement there serves both to get materials home and to challenge an increasingly influential Russia. However, even though Central Asian states occasionally get up to diplomatic mischief, the Kremlin is still far closer than the White House, and still has many tools to make disobedient leaders regret their pivot toward the US. Further, the obvious American need to withdraw a large amount of supplies on a set timeline will allow Russia to use its own continued cooperation on the NDN as a bargaining chip in future negotiation. Regionally, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will both hold elections in 2013 and 2015, respectively, and these countries’ leaders will certainly use their special rapport with the US to advance their own political ends. The NDN, then, may expose America to increased criticism of its support of human rights offenders.

In exploring other options for withdrawal, a route through Turkey, and another through Siberia have been suggested. However, the all-important railway connection through Uzbekistan and Central Asia will not be easy to pass up, despite the political complications implicit in using the NDN.