“Investing in Growth, Innovating for Sustainability”

Typed in sleek white ink, these six words headline a 230-page document complete with modern visuals and trendy environmental buzzwords. They would fit right in at the top of a UN climate report or ecological manifesto, but instead they headline a report from Aramco—the Saudi-owned behemoth of the fossil fuels industry.

While it may seem counterintuitive for the world’s single largest polluter[1] to include net-zero goals and sustainability pledges in its 2022 annual report, Aramco’s climate-conscious rebranding is part of a larger trend within the fossil fuels industry. This tactic (often dubbed “greenwashing”) has been increasingly employed by serial polluters to erect an eco-friendly façade which masks their fundamentally unsustainable business model.

But it wasn’t always this way. As much as Aramco officials like to claim their “journey toward sustainability” began in the 1970’s,[2] a closer look at the company’s past PR causes this narrative to fall apart. During much of the company’s earlier years, Aramco’s branding lacked much of the environmental messaging seen today. Public comments scarcely mentioned “sustainability,” much less in the ecological context Aramco now suggests. The companies’ statements instead remained largely production oriented. In a 1974 article for The New York Times, then Aramco chairman Frank Jungers even boasted about the company’s capacity for sustained oil production stating, “what we have is large reserves‐156 billion barrels of probable reserves and 93 billion barrels of proven reserves, which clearly could support 20 million barrels a day in production on out through the end of the century without any problem at all.”[3]

While talks of increased oil production may not be as popular today, the oil crisis of 1973 left many Americans concerned about the nation’s energy supplies. In 1978, Harris polling found that as many as 79% of Americans thought the US energy shortage would be very or somewhat serious in 10 years’ time.[4] Post-1973 conditions also meant less opportunities to trade with a stagnant Soviet economy.[5] As such, Aramco was eager to market its oil to a Western market that itself was eager to buy.

The most obvious explanation for Aramco’s environmental disregard, however, is also the simplest: climate change wasn’t a mainstream issue until the late 80’s. That all changed in 1988 when after a record-breakingly hot summer, NASA scientist James Hansen delivered a testimony to Congress. His models predicted the existence of global warming with 99% certainty,[6] a fact that shifted public perception and catapulted global warming into the national spotlight. Likely because of this, Aramco’s (and by extension Saudi Arabia’s) strategy during the late 80’s and early 90’s pivoted from feigned ignorance to systematic obstruction.

When the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was first established in 1988, Saudi delegates worked in conjunction with Western oil interests to adopt as little action as possible, as late as possible. During the 1995 IPCC meeting in Madrid for instance, these representatives fought tirelessly to reword scientific reports with the goal of emphasizing the uncertainty of climate change. “Convincing evidence” was replaced with “some preliminary evidence”; “discernible human influence on global climate” was altered to “appreciable human influence on global climate.”[7] Other efforts at opposition were more blatant such as when then Saudi oil official, Mohammad Al-Sabban, confronted climate scientists claiming the science on humans’ influence on the climate was not settled.[8]

Today though, Saudi Arabia’s (and by extension Aramco’s) opposition to climate change legislation lacks much of the ham-handed antagonism of the early 90’s. A major factor for this was BP’s announcement in 1997 that it would support international greenhouse gas regulation.[9] What followed was a massive paradigm in the oil industry with Shell and several other oil producers following suit. Even the oil-producing Saudi Government jumped on the bandwagon. In 2005, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia officially ratified the Kyoto Protocol s—the same climate change protocols the country had tried to strike down a decade earlier.[10]

Aramco probably deserves some credit where it’s due. In recent years, the company has invested substantial amounts of capital into solar, wind and carbon capture technologies.[11] However, the problem with Aramco’s eco-friendly marketing strategy is not what it promises but rather how it frames those promises. Take Aramco’s headline-grabbing net-zero strategy for instance. While the company has vowed to take steps towards reaching “net-zero emissions” by 2050, Aramco’s definition of net-zero only encompasses the CO2 released during production. This narrative is particularly problematic as it lets the company off the hook for much of its ecological footprint. Even if operational emissions were to reach 0, that doesn’t account for the other 85% of emissions released at the point of consumption.[12] “You can’t decarbonize oil because of the fundamental end-use emissions,” stated former BP geologist, Michael Coffin, in an interview with the Financial Times. “It’s a myth.”[13]

What’s not a myth is the real and pressing danger that climate change poses, especially to countries like Saudi Arabia which have already been dealing with record breaking heat waves.[14] MENA countries are not the only ones who will suffer either. According to a recent UN report, the planet is on track to reach between 2.1 and 2.9 degrees of warming from pre-industrial levels. Not only does this eclipse the Paris Agreement goal of 1.5°C, it could also lead to what some scientists call a “climate breakdown.”[15] Aramco claims to understand this reality in public documents, it fails to recognize to that the decarbonizing fundamentally entails decommissioning (or at least scaling back production). Instead, the company is continuing to scale crude oil production capacity.[16]

We live in an age where young consumers are increasingly concerned about the core-values of the brands they’re buying from.[17] Combine that with our fast-paced, sensationalistic social media culture and it’s easy for serial polluters like Aramco to take advantage. It’s why Aramco’s most recent annual report mentions “sustainability” a staggering 205 times. It’s also why the company is so desperate to brand itself as “net-zero” while simultaneously ramping up production. The way we spend our money matters but for “ethical consumption” to work, we need to first distinguish between real environmental justice and profitable corporate action. Only then can we effectively demand accountability.

References

[1] Webb, Samuel. “Oil Giant Dubbed World’s Worst Polluter Is Now World’s Biggest Company.” The Independent, 12 May 2022, www.independent.co.uk/climate-change/oil-apple-saudi-aramco-climate-pollution-b2077408.html.

[2] “Aramco Started Journey toward Sustainability in 1970s, Says Official.” Arab News, 22 May 2022, www.arabnews.com/node/2087056/business-economy. Accessed 14 May 2023.

[3] Smith, William. “Aramco Adds to Capacity despite Oil Restrictions; Slower Pace Conceded.” The New York Times, 29 Jan. 1974, timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1974/01/29/81859410.html?pageNumber=39. Accessed 14 May 2023.

[4] Fusso, Thomas E. “The Polls: The Energy Crisis in Perspective.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 42, no. 1 (1978): 127–36. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2748098.

[5] Lawson, Fred H. “Review Article: KEYS TO THE KINGDOM: CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP ON SAUDI ARABIA.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no. 4 (2011): 737–47. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41308755.

[6] History.com Editors. “Climate Change History.” HISTORY, 6 Oct. 2017, www.history.com/topics/natural-disasters-and-environment/history-of-climate-change#. Accessed 14 May 2023.

[7] Houghton, John. “Madrid 1995: Diagnosing Climate Change.” Nature, vol. 455, no. 7214, Oct. 2008, pp. 737–738, https://doi.org/10.1038/455737a. Accessed 10 Oct. 2019.

[8] Chemnick, Jean. “Oil Kingdom and a “High Priest” Stall Action for 30 Years.” E&E News, 29 Oct. 2018, www.eenews.net/articles/oil-kingdom-and-a-high-priest-stall-action-for-30-years/. Accessed 14 May 2023.

[9] PULVER, SIMONE. “MAKING SENSE OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM: An Environmental Contestation Approach to Analyzing the Causes and Consequences of the Climate Change Policy Split in the Oil Industry.” Organization & Environment 20, no. 1 (2007): 44–83. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26162029.

[10] Al-Sarihi, Aisha. “Saudi Arabia and Climate Change: From Systematic Obstructionism to Conditional Acceptance.” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 31 Aug. 2018, agsiw.org/saudi-arabia-and-climate-change-from-systematic-obstructionism-to-conditional-acceptance/.

[11] Ugal, Nishant. “Saudi Aramco Poised to Tender Huge Carbon Capture Project Targeting Multiple Gas Plants.” Upstream Online | Latest Oil and Gas News, 19 Jan. 2023, www.upstreamonline.com/exclusive/saudi-aramco-poised-to-tender-huge-carbon-capture-project-targeting-multiple-gas-plants/2-1-1389566?zephr_sso_ott=odr2ic. Accessed 14 May 2023.

[12] O’Connor, Maeve. “Oil Giant Aramco Still Doing Minimum to Tackle Emissions.” Carbon Tracker Initiative, 13 July 2022, carbontracker.org/oil-giant-aramco-still-doing-minimum-to-tackle-emissions/.

[13] “Saudi Aramco Bets on Being the Last Oil Major Standing.” Financial Times, 12 Jan. 2023, www.ft.com/content/513b770b-836b-472b-a058-3e4a95437c69.

[14] Hansen, Kathryn. “Heatwave Scorches the Middle East.” Earthobservatory.nasa.gov, 11 June 2021, earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/148430/heatwave-scorches-the-middle-east.

[15] Leffer, Lauren. “These Numbers Are All Wrong.” Gizmodo, 26 Oct. 2022, gizmodo.com/un-report-climate-change-2-degrees-warming-1849704926.

[16] Saudi Aramco. Annual Report 2022.

[17] Kitterman, Ted. “Report: 83% of Millennials Want Brands to Align with Them on Values – PR Daily.” PR Daily, 18 Feb. 2020, www.prdaily.com/report-83-of-millennials-want-brands-to-align-with-them-on-values/.

On September 13, 22-year-old Jina “Mahsa” Amini was detained by Iran’s morality police. The accusation? Wearing her hijab in a way that made some of her hair visible[1]. Three days later she was found dead. In the wake of the political aftermath, US politicians were quick to show solidarity with the Iranians protesting Amini’s killing. Just six days after her death, Secretary of State Anthony Blinked tweeted, “Mahsa Amini should be alive today. Instead, the United States and the Iranian people mourn her. We call on the Iranian government to end its systemic persecution of women and to allow peaceful protest.”

Yet decades of US-MENA foreign policy have shown a profound willingness to contradict this message of human rights for all. A kaleidoscopic array of alliances with human rights abusers have not only undermined American foreign policy but have also fueled anti-US sentiment across the globe. As world politics becomes increasingly multipolar, it’s critical that American foreign policy adapts. Teamwork can no longer be simplified through the traditional lenses of East vs West; Communist vs Capitalist; or us vs them. As such, it’s a good time for the United States to reconsider its role in the Middle East—not to mention a few alliances that are long-overdue for a retirement.

A good place for Washington to start would be with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). The country is ruled by the House of Saud—a family who can’t seem to quit their opulent spending sprees. Widespread corruption allows the royal elite to plunder the country’s natural resources all while splurging on yachts, private planes, designer goods, and exclusive hotels^[2].

For a country that seeks to portray itself as a beacon of democracy, backing an absolute monarchy already isn’t a good look. But more troubling for the US is Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud’s blatant and repeated disregard for international human rights law. Under MBS, the Kingdom has witnessed the torture and execution of prisoners, religious minorities, political dissidents, and human rights whistleblowers^[3]. Furthermore, the country’s relentless crackdown on peaceful activists, journalists, and academics is in direct violation of the UN’s Universal Declaration on Human Rights^[4].

The brutality of the Saudi regime is no secret, but can they really foot all the blame? While many Western countries have expressed alarm at the KSA’s laundry list of offenses, the behavior of the US and its allies has been at best wishy-washy and at worst complicit. This lack of accountability has been particularly salient following the 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. During his campaign, President Biden vowed to make the KSA “pay the price” for their assignation of the Washington Post contributor. His proposed halt on selling weapons to Saudi Arabia would have marked an abrupt departure from the multi-billion-dollar arms sales of the Trump and Obama administrations^[5].

But with gas prices soaring and the global energy crisis in full effect, Biden has seemingly reverted to the pro-Saudi policies of his predecessors. In response to an OPEC agreement to cut oil production, Joe Biden met with MBS breaking from his promise to limit relations with the Kingdom. Furthermore, the current administration has already moved to grant the crown prince full immunity. Officials argue that the prince’s official standing exempts him from the lawsuit filed by Khashoggi’s fiancée citing sovereign immunity^[6]. In response, many human rights advocates have scrutinized the administration’s hypocrisy. Sarah Leah Whitson, the head of a pro-democracy nonprofit called DAWN, stated, “It’s beyond ironic that President Biden has single-handedly assured MBS can escape accountability when it was President Biden who promised the American people he would do everything to hold him accountable.”

The consequences of the United States’ uncritical alliance with Saudi Arabia extend far beyond a photo op. Clandestine military support for the KSA has fueled humanitarian crisises across the middle east—most notably in Yemen. Since the US-backed, Saudi invasion of Yemen began in 2014, nearly 15,000 civilians have already been killed in the crossfire^[7]. Yemen’s humanitarian crisis has only been worsened by the political response from the US and allied nations which has been riddled with diplomatic double talk and inaction.

Fundamental to Saudi Arabia’s invasion of Yemen is its weaponization of starvation against the Yemeni people—a tactic which violates UN human rights law. Published in 2018, UN Security Council Resolution 2417 on the protection of civilians in wartime specifically clearly reiterates this principle stating, “using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare may constitute a war crime^[8].” Yet when Saudi warships block crucial supplies of energy, food, and medicine from reaching Yemen^[9], US officials look the other way. Take Hudaydah for example. The city’s port is a lifeline for Yemen, bringing in food and humanitarian assistance. Since 2015, the Saudi-led blockade has restricted access to these critical supplies—a fact corroborated by UN data^[10]. In a May 2021 CNN interview however, a State Department spokesperson claimed that “there is no blockade” of Hudaydah, saying that it “remains open and commercial imports of food and other commodities are moving through the port at normal or above average rates, along with goods imported for humanitarian assistance purposes.”

Biden has stated he wants to “end U.S. support for offensive operations in Yemen^[11],” but it is first critical to recognize that Saudi Arabia bombing and blockading a sovereign country is offensive by nature. Yemenis should not need to seek permission from a foreign entity to gain access to basic necessities. By applying fundamental standards of human rights unequally, the word has lost much of its political gravity. “Human rights” are treated as any other tool in the US diplomatic arsenal with which to attack its enemies and defend its allies.

This desensitization has allowed leaders around the world to reframe issues of civil liberties as battle against a hypocritical Western elite. Recently, FIFA president Gianni Infantino has dismissed Western concerns for migrant workers citing similar behavior among foreign corporations. In a news conference, Infantino remarked, “How many of these European or Western business companies, who earned millions and millions from Qatar and other countries in the region–billions every year–how many of them addressed the rights of migrant workers with the authorities^[12]?”

In addition to spurning Western influence, many Arab countries have now turned to America’s authoritarian rivals for political refuge. Ironically, this list includes Saudi Arabia which has been accused of helping Russia fund its invasion of Ukraine by pushing up oil revenues^[13]. Overall, five MENA countries either voted to abstain from or vote against the UN resolution to condemn Russia including Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, and Syria^[14].

China has also been eager to present itself as a defender of the Muslim world by contrasting its record with that of the United States. In particular, the West’s refusal to condemn Israel’s 11-day aerial bombardment of Gaza has provided China with a strategic opportunity to grow its influence. While Western nations continued to shield Israel from criticism, China urged the UN Security Council and the international community to support an immediate ceasefire^[15]. As such, Beijing has positioned itself as a superpower that is more sympathetic towards Muslim nations^[16]—a shift that should alarm Western policy makers.

To counter this opportunism the United States needs to maintain a consistent standard on human rights. For too long, US partners such as Saudi Arabia have escaped criticism on the grounds of their strategic importance. But with international allegiances shifting and OPEC demonstrating its willingness to side with Putin and Xi, it’s time for the US to ask the question: are these alliances still worth the cost?

Of course, this doesn’t mean treating these countries like enemies. But for the US to undertake an open and honest dialogue on human rights, it needs to confront the contradictions within its current approach. China’s detention of Uyghurs, Iran’s treatment of women, and Russia’s actions in the Donbass are just some of the current crises facing the international community. And to resolve these, Washington needs to realize that its ability to uphold universal freedoms begins and ends with the standards it sets for itself and its allies. Vague concerns and unspecified “consequences” are no longer enough. As the de facto team captain of the developed world, it’s time the US lead by example and make one thing clear: alliances are conditional but human rights aren’t.

References

[1] Miller, Joshua Rhett. “How the Police-Custody Death of Mahsa Amini Became Iran’s ‘George Floyd Moment’.” New York Post. New York Post, December 2, 2022. https://nypost.com/2022/11/23/how-police-custody-death-of-mahsa-amini-became-irans-george-floyd-moment/.

[2] “In Gilded Saudi Royal Circles, Corruption Has Long Been a Way of Life.” Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2017. https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-saudi-corruption-20171108-story.html.

[3] “Saudi Arabia: 10 Things You Need to Know about a Kingdom of Cruelty: Amnistia Internacional: Venezuela.” amnistia.org. Accessed January 2, 2023. https://www.amnistia.org/ve/noticias/2019/04/10204/saudi-arabia-10-things-you-need-to-know-about-a-kingdom-of-cruelty.

[4]“Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed January 2, 2023. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights#:~:text=Article%2019,media%20and%20regardless%20of%20frontiers.

[5] Emmons, Alex, Aída Chávez, and Akela Lacy. “At Debate, Joe Biden Says He Would Make Saudi Arabia a ‘Pariah.’” The Intercept. The Intercept, November 21, 2019. https://theintercept.com/2019/11/21/democratic-debate-joe-biden-saudi-arabia/.

[6] “U.S. Moves to Shield Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman in Khashoggi Killing.” CNBC. CNBC, November 18, 2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/18/us-moves-to-shield-saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-in-khashoggi-killing.html.

[7] “10 Conflicts to Worry about in 2022: Yemen.” ACLED, August 15, 2022. https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/yemen/#:~:text=ACLED%20now%20estimates%20that%20more,civilians%20killed%20in%20targeted%20attacks.

[8] “Adopting Resolution 2417 (2018), Security Council Strongly Condemns Starving of Civilians, Unlawfully Denying Humanitarian Access as Warfare Tactics | UN Press.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed January 2, 2023. https://press.un.org/en/2018/sc13354.doc.htm.

[9] Reports, Special. “Saudi De Facto Blockade Starves Yemen of Food and Medicine.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, October 11, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/yemen-saudi-blockade/.

[10] “Saudi-Led Coalition Clears Fuel Ships to Dock at Yemen’s Hodeidah Port.” Middle East Eye. Accessed January 2, 2023. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-war-saudi-coalition-clears-fuel-ships-dock-hodeidah-port.

[11] Knickmeyer, Ellen. “Biden Ending US Support for Saudi-Led Offensive in Yemen.” AP NEWS. Associated Press, February 5, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/biden-end-support-saudi-offenseive-yemen-b68f58493dbfc530b9fcfdb80a13098f.

[12] Mohamed, Hamza. “FIFA President Slams Western ‘Hypocrisy’ over Qatar Criticism.” Qatar World Cup 2022 News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, November 19, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/19/fifa-president-slams-the-west-of-hypocrisy-over-qatar-criticism.

[13] Northam, Jackie. “The White House Accuses Saudi Arabia of Aiding Russia and Coercing OPEC Oil Producers.” NPR. NPR, October 13, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/10/13/1128523146/saudi-arabia-russia-opec-oil-cut-biden-congress-washington.

[14] “The UN Resolution on Ukraine: How Did the Middle East Vote?” The Washington Institute. Accessed January 2, 2023. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/un-resolution-ukraine-how-did-middle-east-vote.

[15] “China Backs Calls for Immediate Ceasefire in Gaza.” South China Morning Post, November 20, 2012. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1086728/china-backs-calls-immediate-ceasefire-gaza.

[16] Heydarian, Richard Javad. “China Is Exploiting Western Hypocrisy in the Middle East.” Opinions | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, June 10, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/6/10/china-is-exploiting-western-hypocrisy-in-the-middle-east.

“Je ne connais pas l’arabe”—I don’t speak Arabic. While the former Moroccan education minister didn’t realize it at the time, these seemingly innocuous words would catapult the nation into a linguistic firestorm. The minister in question, Rachid Belmokhtar, was on a France24 interview when he sarcastically claimed not to know Arabic—the language spoken by over 92% of the country.^[1] Many Moroccans, however, did not take kindly to the joke. Within days, the National Coalition of Protection of the Arabic Language had already issued a statement urging for his resignation on the grounds of “threatening the educational and the linguistic security of the Moroccan people.” Others on social media went as far as to claim Belmokhtar was “illiterate.”^[2]

These criticisms likely would have persisted scandal or not. Belmokhtar’s numerous pro-French education reforms had already made him deeply unpopular with the country’s hardline arabisants.^[3] But regardless, this reaction illustrates the sheer contentiousness surrounding Morocco’s language divide—a divide representing the culmination of colonial rule, economic inequality, and cultural identity.

Despite only being spoken fluently by 13.5% of the population,^[4] the continuation of French as a prestige language is the product of several historical factors. Namely, French colonial policy as well as the Moroccan elite’s collaboration with France both during and after occupation. In theory, France’s guiding colonial doctrine was one of “assimilation.” While the British worked behind the scenes to manipulate existing structures of power, the French worked much more closely with the accepted traditional African elite.^[5] This often meant providing the rich a French education and some political leverage. Not only was this policy justified on account of its cheapness, but it was also seen as more efficient. Because Morocco’s pre-colonial sultanate had no separation of powers, administrators exploited the highly centralized governmental structure by legislating directly through the dominant executive branch—thereby avoiding bureaucracy in Paris.^[6] Thus, being able to speak French and communicate with the administrators implied substantial political benefits.

However, while the practice of “assimilation” was popular in theory, its implementation was met with numerous logistical hurdles. The stated aim of assimilation was to transform Africans in the French colonies into black French men and women.^[7] Not only was this effort confronted with strong cultural resistance in Muslim North Africa, this also would have entailed an enormous expenditure on education.^[8] Thus, several compromises were made. Most notably, efforts at widespread education were abandoned in favor of educating a small elite group. The result of this was a progressive class separation between the Frenchified elite and the rest of the country which had been much less favored in its access to education.^[9]

This filial relationship between the traditional African ruling class and French administrators has gone on to shape relations throughout the colonies even after independence. The sociopolitical pact is so strong, in fact, that scholars have coined a term for France’s sphere of influence—Françafrique. For Morocco in particular, French influence has led to security sharing agreements, military aid, and bilateral foreign direct investment.^[10] The political and economic incentives to learning French are very real. Still, the average working-class Moroccan has little means of accessing the economic benefits of Morocco and France’s international partnership. While most Moroccan children attend under-resourced public schools, the elite continue to bypass the system they created by sending their kids to wealthy private/international schools. This overwhelming educational disparity is particularly visible in language instruction. A recent government study found that only 9% of Moroccan public-school children end middle school with a satisfactory level in French compared to 62% of private-school children.^[11]

This poses a problem when considering that bilinguals statistically go on to occupy higher positions, most of which are inaccessible to public school graduates.^[12] As such, parents who can afford foreign language instruction are able to secure opportunities for future generations, while the country’s poor get left behind—unable to find footing in an increasingly globalized economy. These cycles of poverty and wealth are reflected in the Global Social Mobility Index which ranks Morocco 73 out of 82 in terms of intergenerational socioeconomic mobility.^[13] Thus, one must ask whether Morocco has ever truly escaped its colonial past. While the rhetoric surrounding national identity has changed, the reality for most Moroccans remains the same. Good jobs and opportunities are gated behind fluency in French and English. Yet even today, only a select few are provided with sufficient linguistic education to overcome such barriers.

While recognizing this disparity is important, it is only one half of the equation. Equally important is learning from the failures of past reforms. After gaining independence, Morocco adopted an official policy of Arabization which sought to promote the use of Arabic in its education system. The goal was to unify Moroccans under a common language and distance the country from its colonial past.^[14] While initially popular, these reforms arguably worsened the language divide by crippling the public school system and marginalizing native languages.

Because Arabization was heavily rooted in religious and nationalistic dogma, much of its implementation was ill-planned and ideologically driven. Attempts at reform often ignored the linguistic realities of the country in favor of total Arabization which was deemed more “authentic.” Nationalist lawmakers pushed for the complete removal of French from the Moroccan education system before Arabic curricula had fully been developed.^[15] In addition to political problems, Morocco’s Arabization reforms suffered from critical flaws in implementation. A lack of domestic professionals forced the country to rely on teachers from other Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Sudan. However, when Morocco broke diplomatic ties with Egypt during the Sand War, 350 Egyptian teachers were expelled from Moroccan schools.^[16] This crippled the country’s attempts at Arabic education. Blunders such as these have crippled the nation’s public school system and drastically undermined public confidence in language education.

Morocco’s Arabization reforms have also marginalized heritage languages such as Darija (dialectical Arabic) and Amazigh. During colonial occupation, the French allowed rural Amazigh tribes to retain customary law instead of following Islamic law. To the nationalists, this policy was seen as an attempt to “divide and rule” by subverting national and religious unity.^[17] Whether true or not, this impression has led many Moroccans to associate Amazigh identity with French sympathies. As such, these communities have historically been the targets of discrimination. Even today, findings show that the Amazigh do not have equitable access to national resources and public jobs.^[18] Again, this disparity poses a serious problem for a country that seeks to modernize. For Morocco to overcome its history of linguistic discrimination, it needs to first reconcile with its past. And although there have been reforms in recent years to promote Amazigh, these conversations are only just beginning.

In devising an equitable solution, it is critical to learn from the past. Prior reforms illustrate the dangers of mixing ideology with education. Historical analysis of French colonialism reveals how language inequality isn’t just a product of the system but a fundamental part of it. Morocco’s language divide is highly nuanced and we can’t expect a panacea. But should the country reconsider its cultural heritage and welcome all voices to the table, perhaps a solution—however imperfect—is closer than we think.

References

[1] “Démographie – Maroc.” RGPH 2014. Accessed October 20, 2022. http://rgphentableaux.hcp.ma/Default1/.

[2] Al Arabiya English. “Moroccan Minister Says of Course He Knows Arabic.” Al Arabiya English. Al Arabiya English, May 20, 2020. https://english.alarabiya.net/variety/2015/02/27/Moroccan-minister-claims-not-to-speak-Arabic-stirs-uproar-.

[3] “Standard Arabic, Darija, French or English?” New Age | The Most Popular Outspoken English Daily in Bangladesh. Accessed October 22, 2022. https://www.newagebd.net/article/180632/standard-arabic-darija-french-or-english.

[4] “La Francophonie Dans Le Monde.” archive.org. Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, September 28, 2022. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/francophonie/index.aspx?lang=eng.

[5] Subramaniam, V. “Why Are the French-Speaking African Elite Different?” Economic and Political Weekly 7, no. 4 (1972): 146–48. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4360976.

[6] Knight, M. M. “French Colonial Policy–the Decline of ‘Association.’” The Journal of Modern History 5, no. 2 (1933): 208–24. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1875341.

[7] “Colonial Policy.” Colonial Policy – an overview. Science Direct. Accessed October 24, 2022. https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/colonial-policy#:~:text=France%20had%20a%20grand%20assimilationist,all%20Africans%20into%20French%20culture.

[8] Subramaniam, V. “Why Are the French-Speaking African Elite Different?” Economic and Political Weekly 7, no. 4 (1972): 146–48. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4360976.

[9] LABOURET, HENRI. “France’s Colonial Policy in africa1.” African Affairs XXXIX, no. CLIV (January 1940): 22–35. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a100972.

[10] Saad Eddine Lamzouwaq – Morocco World News. “Moroccan-French Relations under Macron: What to Expect?” https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/. Accessed October 23, 2022. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/05/216038/moroccan-french-relations-macron.

[11] Issam Toutate – Morocco World News. “Study Found Overwhelming Gap between Public and Private Schools.” https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/, December 1, 2021. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2021/12/345810/pnea-survey-shows-low-schooling-level-in-moroccan-public-schools.

[12] Alalou, Ali. “Language and Ideology in the Maghreb: Francophonie and Other Languages.” The French Review 80, no. 2 (2006): 408–21. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25480661.

[13] “Global Social Mobility Report – World Economic Forum.” weforum. World Economic Forum, January 2020. https://www3.weforum.org/docs/Global_Social_Mobility_Report.pdf.

[14] Smail 2017 Reporting Fellow, Gareth. “An Eye to Modernizing: Morocco Replaces Arabic with French in High School Courses.” Pulitzer Center, December 6, 2017. https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/eye-modernizing-morocco-replaces-arabic-french-high-school-courses#:~:text=%22Arabization%22%20of%20Moroccan%20education%20had,French%20in%20the%20late%201980s.

[15] Hannouchi, Said. “Multilingual Education in Morocco: Back to the Future?” hkspublications. Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy, February 21, 2018. https://jmepp.hkspublications.org/2018/01/19/multilingual-education-in-morocco-back-to-the-future/#:~:text=Postcolonial%20Language%20Policy&text=Arabization%20sought%20to%20make%20Standard,caught%20between%20ideals%20and%20realities.

[16] Stephen Hughes, Morocco under King Hassan , Reading, UK, Ithaca, 2001, p. 138

[17] Hoffman, Katherine E. “Berber Law by French Means: Customary Courts in the Moroccan Hinterlands, 1930–1956.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 52, no. 4 (2010): 851–80. doi:10.1017/S0010417510000484.

[18] “International Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” tbinternet. United Nations, September 2015. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CESCR/Shared%20Documents/MAR/INT_CESCR_CSS_MAR_21119_E.pdf.