With the end of the Cold War and the fall of Communism in Europe, many Central and Eastern European countries underwent a radical political and economic reconfiguration. Many countries pushed to transform their governments into democratic systems in the hope of acquiring membership to the European Union (EU) to gain access to the common market and to expand their economies. Amongst the list of candidates, Hungary appeared as a strong contender and was accepted into the Union in 2004^[1]. The criteria for accession were that the countries were stable, liberal democracies that recognized and espoused the values and norms associated with European Union nations. In recent years, however, the EU has experienced a rise in extreme political parties, which have allowed for anti-democratic forces to grow in individual Member States. This democratic backsliding is felt most intently in Hungary under the leadership of Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party. They have steered the country into a direction many scholars have dubbed “Competitive Authoritarianism;” which consists of a hybrid form of governance in which the authority remains outwardly loyal to democratic practices but maintains power through illiberal mechanisms, like arresting opponents and shutting down independent media^[2]. This governance structure poses a significant threat to the normative power of the EU and its political leverage as a democratic polity. Normative power and appeal require consistent ‘exportable’ values^[3]. Without a clear political narrative that binds the EU Member States together, its efforts and credibility both internally and externally may be undermined. Particularly in the case of Hungary, its overt departure from the democratic principles required of Member States puts into question the authority of the EU’s normative power and legitimacy. 

From its inception, the EU has always remained committed to democracy. Although initially founded as primarily an economic union, it eventually made its political stance official when setting the criteria for membership. The 1993 Copenhagen Criteria explicitly stipulates that qualifying candidates must have “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”^[4]. The EU is committed to diversity and does not impose a universal democratic model, but it does hold Member States accountable to EU treaties. These require countries to uphold certain collective values, including “democracy, pluralism, and the rule of law”^[5]. They also created a mechanism to sanction Member States that break away and fail to preserve the EU’s democratic values in their country^[6]. Recently, there has been compelling evidence of ‘democratic backsliding’ in countries like Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovenia, amongst others, that appear to be reneging on the democratic duties articulated in EU treaties. In 2018, the EU attempted to sanction Hungary for its blatant breaches of EU established values. Although its efforts were unsuccessful, it highlighted the role that the EU has in defending democracy and the rule of law amongst its Member States^[7].  

Despite the EU’s official commitment to democracy, it has allowed for the emergence of many ‘Competitive Authoritarian’ or ‘Illiberal Democracies’ to retain power and exist in the Union. Viktor Orbán and the governing Fidesz party have, for the past nine years, tried to line up the Hungarian executive, legislative and judicial power to consolidate their control over the state. In doing so, they have managed to undermine many liberal institutions, like checks and balances, by concentrating power in the executive branch and unilaterally changing the Constitution. They also took over ownership of significant news agencies to control the information broadcasted to the Hungarian public^[8]. Hungary’s Fidesz party has made essential changes to the system to keep itself in power. The government under Orbán has passed laws allowing for the appointment of judges on the constitutional Court without approval from the opposition. Subsequently, it packed the Court with Fidesz loyalists by expanding the number of judges on the Constitutional Court. In response to continued resistance by the Court to many of his ordinances, Orbán amended the Constitution to curtail the Court’s power^[9]. The new Constitution granted constitutional status to several of the laws the Court had overturned and gave more significant control over the judiciary to the head of the National Judicial Office, a government appointee. These moves were followed by a raft of other changes such as an overhaul of the electoral system to favor Fidesz and a reorganization of numerous public bodies, which might serve as checks on the government^[10]. Orbán also aims to polarize and divide the country by spreading erroneous information, like false immigration statistics, to rally voters while remodeling institutions to fit his party’s needs. More recently, President Orbán took advantage of the state of emergency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic to enact a law on March 30^th, 2020, declaring that he can rule by decree, i.e., giving him the liberty to bypass the Parliament and suspend or establish new laws, which created a lot of public outcry^[11]. In light of all these apparent breaches of power, the question of Hungary’s democratic legitimacy and the credibility of their procedural discourse has become increasingly contested in recent years.  

Hungary reflects a worldwide rollback of liberalism across Central and Eastern Europe. Scholars have cautioned against the threat of populism and the consequences of allowing autocratic regimes like Hungary to take root. With extreme parties now competing on moral grounds centered around identity rather than economics, the EU faces an ‘existential’ challenge as a supranational institution meant to unify diverse Member States^[12]. Because the EU already has existing and seemingly growing ‘Eurosceptic’ challenges internally, such obvious mismatches concerning core EU values only risks further highlighting the current divisions. For instance, scholars like Daniel Kelemen^[13] referred to these autocratic insurgencies as “Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit” and Sophie Meunier and Matilda Vachudova caution that “ideological convergence around liberal values”^[14] can no longer be taken for granted as a natural byproduct of membership to liberal institutions, which can have significant consequences for the EU’s position as a global power.

The erosion of democracy in Hungary has reached comparatively extreme heights and has been repeatedly rebuked by international organizations, scholars, and media outlets alike. The European Parliament in 2018 invoked the TEU’s Article 7 on Hungary and called on the Council of the EU to act against the country because they perceived it to pose a “systemic threat to the Union’s founding value…which are enshrined in EU Treaty Article 2 and reflected in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights [which] include respect for democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights”^[15].Hungary also became the first EU Member State ever to be demoted in status to only ‘partly free’ by Freedom House^[16]. The question then becomes, what will the existence of illiberal democracies in a Union committed to democratic core values mean for its normative power?  

The concept of normative power can take shape in two distinct ways; one is material and the other ideational. The European Union has developed both types to varying degrees. For instance, EU Member States developed their material power by creating a significant capacity to coordinate collectively in the realm of foreign and security policy through the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)^[17].  However, the EU’s primary source of power is ideational. Richard Rosecrance points out that “Europe’s attainment is normative rather than empirical… It is perhaps a paradox to note that the continent which once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms.” Following Rosecrance’s observation, Ian Manners sought to refocus the debate of power in the EU not in civilian and military terms but rather through its ideational impact. The notion of a ‘Normative Power Europe’ has its roots in the power of ideas, or idée forceas a way of conceptualizing the EU’s international identity^[18]. According to Manners, it is the shared principles and beliefs that members must abide by in the EU that allows it to lead by example. These values are enshrined in the acquis communautaire (the EU’s body of law) and stipulated in the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria and the founding treaties, which assert that “in international relations, the Union should be guided by and would seek to spread the values upon which it is founded – democracy, human rights and the rule of law”^[19]. They also have four minor norms: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance. The European Council also decided at the Cologne summit in 1999 that they should draft a human rights charter because “protection of fundamental rights is a founding principle of the Union and an indispensable prerequisite for her legitimacy”^[20]. The ethical standards required of each of its Member States in the general principles of community law signify the founding and legislative basis of the EU, and serves as a desired facet of its international identity. Additionally, when trading with third countries, the EU specifies conditionality clauses that bind the country to practice ethical human rights, as stipulated in the European Convention on Human Rights^[21].  Therefore, it is clear that the EU relies heavily on its ideational power as well as material power. 

The EU has made great strides to officially establish itself as a polity governed by shared principles and values. To evaluate the sustainability of the EU’s normative power, Manners conceptualized a criterion of analysis that links its professed values with the corresponding actions, followed by its desired impact, in order to asses its performance. The normative power of its values is seen as legitimate primarily through the principles it is pushing and endorsing. The ethics of the principles promoted generally come from its consistency with previously established conventions, treaties, and agreements, like the tenets of the United Nations (UN). The second part of its legitimacy comes from the “extent to which differing principles can be seen as sound and non-contradictory… and practices to promote them are uniform both within and without the promoting entity, and are applied uniformly”^[22]. The actions should be perceived as persuasive in the efforts to promote the principles. For normative justification to be convincing, it must “involve persuasion, argumentation, and the conferral of prestige or shame”^[23]. In the case of the EU, its normative power is derived from its structural capacities, such as its accession criteria and Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, which allows for suspending a Member State’s voting rights. Lastly, its impact must be socializing, i.e., ideational power requires ‘normative justification,’ which is understandable to others and is ‘sustainable’ into future generations.^[24]

In Hungary’s case, we will look at it from two perspectives. First, by examining how it undermines the normative power of the EU from inside the European Union by acting outside the purview of its democratic principles, particularly by looking at its stance on immigration and its performance during the refugee crisis. Secondly, tracing Hungary’s development from when it was admitted to the EU in 2004 as part of the Eastern Enlargement Project. Since the Eastern enlargement was devised as a mechanism to push the EU’s normative power and consolidate democracy, recent events in Hungary underscore the critical limitations of the EU’s supranational community in regulating political troubles within the Union.

The European Migrant Crisis that hit Europe posed a considerable threat to the EU. The wave of refugees that entered Europe in 2015 catalyzed right-wing radical populist parties. In Hungary, the erosion of democracy and nativist rhetoric predated the crisis in 2015 but was exploited to stimulate support for the Fidesz regime. Viktor Orbán leveraged the public’s fear of refugees and migrants to bolster his support^[25]. The refugee crisis reveals some of the most apparent mismatches between the EU and Hungary.  

The EU made numerous requests for member nations to relieve Italy and Greece of their large numbers of refugees coming from Syria, North Africa, or other parts of the Middle East. In September 2015, EU nations voted to bring in 160,000 refugees from Greece and Italy, with Germany and France taking in the most significant number of people. Together, nine Central and Eastern European countries were asked to shelter a total of 15,000 refugees. Although four nations, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, voted against the agreement, they were still obliged to comply with the majority decree^[26]. 

Orbán immediately began a series of campaigns to prevent the refugees from entering the country. First, he built a fence along Hungary’s southern border. He then started a series of “Information Campaigns” to undermine the EU. In 2017, the Hungarian government spent about US$250 million to build billboards, leaflets, television ads, and mass mailings to undermine and criticize the EU for forcing them to admit refugees^[27]. Perhaps the most dramatic move they took was changing the Constitution, making it illegal to accept refugees in Hungary, and making it a crime to assist a refugee. 

 In retaliation, the European Union launched a formal “infringement procedure” against Hungary and two other member nations—the Czech Republic and Poland—for failing to comply with the 2015 agreement to harbor asylum-seekers. The European Executive took the matter to the European Court of Justice for adjudication. The Court recently released its decision claiming Hungary to be in breach of European Union law by not taking in refugees and would be subject to financial penalties^[28]. 

The mismatch between the EU’s expectations of its Member States and the policies enacted by some of those States poses a fundamental challenge to the EU’s values. It reveals shortcomings in the policies of the EU to enforce its normative power. Tanya Börzel and Thomas Risse argue that right-wing political parties in the various Member States successfully mobilized nativist sentiment and anti-immigrant stances by politicizing the asylum and migration topic. It is this politicization that prevented the successful formulation of a European response to the refugee flows^[29]. Instead, what emerged was a normative narrative often at odds with policies in place.  

Part of the normative power of the EU is established through its procedural diffusion to third parties. This can be achieved in the EU’s case through, for instance, legally binding cooperation agreements, trading conditionality clauses, and the enlargement of the EU itself^[30]. The EU offered admittance into the Union to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEE) on the condition that they suppress nationalist policies and promote democracy^[31]. However, The EU also importantly sought to help with the consolidation of these new liberal democratic systems in these countries to “prevent any future backsliding on democratic reforms, and a reversion to some form of authoritarian rule”^[32]. Now that these countries have been admitted into the Union, the EU faces significant challenges with the rise of the far-right autocratic leaders, particularly in Hungary and Poland, because it has inadequate mechanisms to sanction States for infringing EU Treaties or Laws.

Viktor Orbán’s undemocratic changes in Hungary are a blatant attempt to secure his grip on power following initial electoral defeats, which made him realize the fragility of his appeal to the electorate. He was elected to a seat in Parliament in 1990, which he retained until 1993. In 1998 he won the national election with 42% of the vote and became Prime Minister by forming a coalition with two other parties^[33]. Once in office, he immediately began making reforms that drew much opposition. Despite these changes, Fidesz lost its majority in the 2002 election. This experience anchored the Fidesz’s shift from liberalism to nationalism. Throughout the 2000s, the party garnered much of its popularity by espousing xenophobic and exclusionary policies and rhetoric. When the party won again in 2012, its popularity largely stemmed from its Christian values and identity politics^[34]. Throughout Orbán’s time in office, he has been an open supporter of ‘illiberal democracies.’ He has been aggressively dismantling the country’s democratic institutions, suppressing the freedom of the press, undermining the education system, and restricting the power of the judiciary. These anti-democratic developments have hardly gone unnoticed by the international community and the international media. There have been several calls for greater action on the EU’s part to contain and act on these developments, but the EU has not successfully managed to curb these autocratic insurgencies. Judith Sargentini, the Dutch Greens lawmaker, steered a proposal, which garnered an overwhelming majority in the EU Parliament, to trigger Article 7 against Hungary condemned “Viktor Orbán’s government [for} leading the charge against European values by silencing independent media, replacing critical judges, and putting academia on a leash”^[35]. Despite the support for triggering Article 7, the motion failed when it came up for a vote. The reality is that the EU’s inaction can in part be accounted for by the lack of tools at its disposal to control the situation. 

The bloc cannot expel a member from the Union once they accepted in the union. The most it can do is suspend its voting rights under Article 7 of the Treaty of Lisbon if the country is in “serious and persistent breach” of the EU’s fundamental values^[36]. However, Article 7 can only be enacted if the EU Council members unanimously agree.  The EU runs into problems with unanimous voting because, as mentioned earlier, the autocratic regimes are far from contained exclusively in Hungary. Poland, under the Law and Justice Party, reflects many of the same anti-democratic developments that have occurred in Hungary under the Fidesz regime. Poland began implementing undemocratic reforms, undermining the judiciary and the public media, as soon as it was elected. The party’s leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, has dismissed the massive protests within the country and the criticism by the EU of their actions. Article 7 of the TEU will likely never be successful in the immediate future because Poland and Hungary continue to mutually shield each other from any possible EU punitive measure. We saw this relationship play out on two different occasions. The European Commission initiated an Article 7 procedure against Poland on the 20^th of December 2017 and less than a year later on the 12^th of September 2018 against Hungary. On both occasions, the motions were defeated because both countries shielded the other by voting against the proposal.^[37]

The other option at the EU’s disposal is to limit funding through the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which passed at the end of 2020. In theory, this would be a powerful option because Hungary’s gross domestic product (GDP) is heavily dependent on money from the European Union. Between 2009 and 2016, such funding constituted nearly 4 percent of Hungarian G.D.P. per year^[38]. However, the European Commission does not have the necessary powers to withhold funding unilaterally. It requires the support of the EU heads of state and the European Parliament. The MFF is a long-term spending plan, allowing the EU to plan and invest in long-term projects. 

 For the budget to be accepted, it must first be proposed by the European Commission and adopted by the Council (requiring the unanimous approval of every Member State) with the assent of the European Parliament. In 2018 the European Commission presented a proposal coined the ‘Rule of Law’ clause, which is a regulation aimed at protecting the Union’s budget “in cases of generalized deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States”^[39]. The aim of this mechanism was to provide more leverage for the commission by creating an avenue by which it can financially sanction member states in breach of the EU rule of law. In 2019, three hundred and ninety-seven Parliament members voted in favor of a report on the proposal^[40]. However, because a unanimous vote is necessary in the council for the MFF to be ratified, the entire seven-year plan can be derailed by the objection of a single Member State. We saw this very scenario play out when both Hungary and Poland unsurprisingly vetoed the original budget proposal over issues regarding the ‘rule of law’ clause^[41]. 

The EU, Hungary, and Poland ultimately reached a compromise on December 11 of last year and passed the 2021-2027 MFF. The budget includes almost 1.1 trillion and a €750 billion recovery fund to tackle the economic fallout caused by the Covid-19 pandemic^[42]. Although the ‘rule of law’ clause will remain intact, the EU qualified the terms of the budget by adding a text to its conclusion, which offers certain political assurances to Hungary and Poland. They emphasized that this mechanism would be initiated in a fair and non-discriminitory way; but the main concession is that the council (country leaders) have asked the European Commission not to actually implement this rule of law mechanism until the European Court of Jusice has ruled over its legality. The plan, therefore, is for Hungary and Poland to challenge this regulation in court, and try to annul the entire project. Regardless of the eventual outcome, this would create significant delay in the implementation of this law because the commission would be legally obliged to hold off cutting funds while the court case is still under review.^[43]

How the ‘Rule of Law’ clause will eventually be implemented is still largely uncertain because of the unprecedented circumstances and the novelty of the mechanism. However, there are some key features that are interesting to note. Firstly,  the commission cannot unilaterally withhold funding from any member state. The commission would be making a recommendation to cut funds by showcasing how the rule of law breaches negatively impact the financial interests of the union. Once that is established, the council, acting by a qualified majority, would vote to actually impose the sanctions. Therefore, the power behind this mechanism is dependent on that of the member states, not the commission. Additionally, the text explicitly states that “the mere finding that a breach of the rule of law has taken place does not suffice to trigger the mechanism,” rather, the commission must establish that the violations pose “negative consequences on the Union’s financial interests.”^[44] This could leave open potential legal maneuvering, as the breach in the rule of law needs to be linked the economics of the union as whole, not just an independent political defiance.

It is too early to say how law will play out, but some experts have critisized the agreement because they claim the delay means that a lot of the money will have already been spent by the time the ECJ can rule on it. A lot of the recovery fund is meant to be spent quickly. Much of the money is for EU Member States to mitigate the effects of the shutdowns and economic consequences that have resulted from the pandemic. This would afford countries like Hungary a lot of financial flexibility before ever facing any potential penalties. This has also raised a lot of concerns because Orbán’s reelection is set for 2022, meaning that any delay would reduce the chances of Hungary being financially penalized before next year; especially considering the Covid-19 situation, many suspect the ECJ court rulling could take up to two years. ^[45]

Regardless of how the rule of law conditionality plays out, this serves as another situation which showcases how the EU can be derailed by some of its member sates. The unanimous vote in the council forced the commission to make concessions, and waterdown its power to impose sanctions on non-compliant states. While the most severe rule-of-law problems appear in Hungary and Poland, the problem has certainly spread to other states, and the obvious compromising with Warsaw and Budapest might enable more infringements in the future.^[46]  

 A last option for the EU is to begin infringement proceedings against Hungary at the European Court of Justice for its democratic violations. This is a procedure independent of the budget and is meant to put certain policies on trial that are considered in breach of EU values. The ECJ, if it finds Hungary to be guilty, can impose financial penalties. In the past, fines have amounted to roughly 100,000 euros^[47]. The major problem is that the system is inefficient and takes a long time. Although it can have some impact, by the time the decrees are released, it is often too late. 

It becomes evident that the EU lacks some critical mechanisms to ensure that the liberal principles required to become a member state are sustainable into future generations, a criterion that Manners says is necessary for normative power. The current democratic crises in Hungary underscores the lack of accountability for democratic norms in the EU. The union lacks some important procedural protocols to enforce its normative power amongst its member states. These structural shortcomings are important to better understand how political developments in countries like Hungary were able to take root and gain such momentum over the years.  

The refugee crisis exemplifies the lack of normative power the EU has in steering the Hungarian government to act in conjunction with the EU. Looking back at Manners’ criterion for normative power, The EU suffers in terms of its legitimacy because it cannot offer “coherent principles … that can be [promoted] in a sound and non-contradictory way”^[48].  As seen by the accession period of 1998 to 2004, the carrot of membership into the EU was a sufficient incentive to shape and change the political climates of Hungary in the short term, which allowed it to gain membership into the EU in 2004. Without a mechanism to expel members from the Union, and the need for unanimous voting in the Council to invoke Article 7, the EU finds itself at political crossroads. It has established itself as a Union bounded by certain key principles enumerated in treaties and the acquis communautaire; however, it has countries in its Union that are disturbingly at odds with its professed principles. With few tools to mobilize change and punish deviation from EU norms, coupled with an ever-growing problem of democratic backsliding particularly in CEE countries, the EU risks exposing its lack of political leverage without the carrot of membership to promote its political objectives^[49].  

There is clearly a significant mismatch between Hungary’s government and the core democratic values of the EU. This discrepancy poses a considerable threat to the EU’s normative power because it does not appear consistent in its international policies, as seen through the refugee crisis. Additionally, the EU lacks the structural mechanisms necessary to sanction the Hungarian government and is therefore stuck in a gridlock with countries at odds with its qualifying democratic principles but very few options to change it. 

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References:

^[1]Toomey, Michael. “The Normative Disconnect: European Union Enlargement, Normative Power, and Democratization in Hungary and the Czech Republic.” PhD diss-, 2015, 25.

^[2] Levitsky, Steven. “The New Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy, January 2020, 52.

^[3] Manners, Ian. “The Concept of Normative Power in World Politics.” Danish Institute for International Studies, May/June 2009, 4. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13211

^[4] “Accession Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria).” European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague.html.

^[5] Kelemen, Daniel R. “Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union.” Cambridge University Press, January 9, 2017, 212.

^[6] “Consolidated Version of the Treaty On European Union (Article 7 TEU).” European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M007.

^[7] Kelemen, “Europe’s Other,” 217.

^[8] Kreko, Peter, and Zsolt Enyedi. “Orban’s Laboratory of Illiberalism.” Journal of Democracy, January 2018, 42

^[9] Kelemen, Daniel R., and Mitchell Orenstein. “Europe’s Autocracy Problem.” Foreign Affairs, February 7, 2016. 

^[10] Ancygier, Andrzej. “Poland’s Law and Justice party is losing its lustre.” Euractiv, January 19, 2016.

^[11] Zerofsky, Elisabeth. “How Viktor Orbán Used the Coronavirus to Seize More Power.” The New Yorker, April 9, 2020. 

^[12] Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017.

^[13] Kelemen, “Europe’s Other,” 212.

^[14] Meunier, Sophie, and Matilda Anna Vachuduva. “Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Illiberalism and the Potential Superpower of the European Union.” JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies, September 2018, 1632.

^[15] “Rule of law in Hungary: Parliament calls on the EU to act.” News: European Parliament. Last modified September 9, 2018. 

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^[17] Bickerton, Chris J. “Towards a Social Theory of EU Foreign and Security Policy.” Journal of Common Market Studies, 2010. 

^[18] Manners, Ian . “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies, December 16, 2002.

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^[20] “Cologne European Council 3 – 4 June 1999.” European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol2_en.htm.

^[21] Meissner, Katharina, and McKenzie Lachlan. “The Paradox of Human Rights Conditionality in EU Trade Policy: when Strategic Interests Drive Policy Outcomes.” Journal of European Public Policy, 2018, 9.

^[22] Manners, “The Concept,” 6.

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^[25] Grzymala-Busse, Anna. “The Failure of Europe’s Mainstream Parties.” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4 (2019).

^[26] Grzymala-Busse, “The Failure,” [38].

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^[29] Borzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. “From the Euro to the Schengen Crises: European Integration Theories, Politicization, and Identity Politics.” Journal of European Public Policy, April 28, 2017.

^[30] Manners, “The Concept,” 6

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^[34] “How Viktor,” Economist.

^[35] BBC News. “EU Parliament Votes to Punish Hungary Over ‘breaches’ of Core Values.” September 12, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45498514.

^[36] “Consolidated Version of the Treaty On European Union (Article 7 TEU).” European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M007.

^[37] Kelemen and Orenstein, “Europe’s Autocracy,” 4.

^[38] How Viktor,” Economist.

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regards the rule of law in the Member States, 2018.

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^[45]Verfassungsblog on Matters Constitutional. Last modified December 13, 2020. https://verfassungsblog.de.

^[46]Novak, Benjamin. “E.U. Reaches Deal on Major Budget and Stimulus Package.” New York Times, December 10, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/10/world/europe/eu-deal-poland-hungary.html.

^[47]Serhan, Yasmeen. “The EU Watches as Hungary Kills Democracy.” The Atlantic, April 2, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/04/europe-hungary-viktor-orban-coronavirus-covid19-democracy/609313/.

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Winter Issue 2019

Written by: Dalya Soffer, Boston University

Following Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014, the EU presented an unexpectedly strong and unified front, especially when compared to its muted reaction to Russia’s invasion of Georgia and annexation of Abkhazia in 2008. The uncharacteristically rapid mobilization by the EU and the imposition of sanctions took the international community by surprise, including Russia. On the surface, it may appear as if the EU is unified on this issue; in reality, it is more a reflection of a shift in the German government’s policy towards Russia. This consensus masks deep and long-standing divisions amongst Union Member States on the issue of how to deal with Russia as well as a fundamental flaw in the Union’s foreign policy structure which makes it difficult for the EU to develop and maintain a united foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia. According to Mitchell Orenstein and Daniel Kelemen, for a federal, or quasi-federal, entity to have a successful foreign policy, it must not only be in a position to formulate a common foreign policy, but it must also be able to prohibit its member states from simultaneously pursuing their own independent policies^[i]. However, when the EU developed its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), it only completed half of the equation ^[ii]. These policies do provide a means for the EU to articulate a common foreign and security policy, but they do not prohibit Member States from developing and maintaining their own, at times contradictory, foreign policies. This has created an opportunity for Russian President Vladimir Putin to exploit internal divisions within the EU by cultivating bilateral relationships with individual Member States and thereby undermining, from within, the EU’s position against Russia. This paper will demonstrate how this flaw in the CFSP has given supranational actors, such as Germany, an outsized role in shaping EU foreign policy and illustrate how the current system is self-destructive.

The relationship with Russia is particularly susceptible to revealing the fissures which exist in the EU’s foreign policy. Historically, the divergent views of the Member States have thwarted efforts to adopt a unified policy vis-à-vis Russia. It was the egregious nature of the annexation of Crimea, which galvanized EU member states into recognizing the threat Russia posed and propelled them into adopting a unified policy. However, the policy itself will be difficult to implement due to external and internal factors. In March of 2016 the EU foreign ministers and Frederica Mogherini, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, reached an agreement on five guiding principles for EU-Russia relations: “full implementation of the Minsk agreements before the lifting of sanctions; closer ties with Russia’s former Soviet neighbors; strengthening EU resilience to Russian threats; selective engagement with Russia on certain issues such as counter-terrorism; and support for people-to-people contact.” One difficulty in implementing the policy is that the EU cannot control the instability amongst Russia’s neighbors, and it is powerless to control the repressive legislation inside Russia which will make maintaining people-to-people engagement with Russian citizens extremely difficult^[iii]. Another significant hurdle for the implementation of the policy will be the lack of cohesion amongst its members. This tension is made evident by the increasingly loud and consistent efforts by some Member States to lift the sanctions without the implementation of the Minsk agreements^[iv]. Similarly reducing the EU’s dependence on Russian energy will be very difficult to achieve because Member States are pursuing independent foreign policy agendas and entering into bilateral deals with Russia on the energy front^[v]. In order to better understand the tensions at play, it is useful to examine the EU’s history when dealing with Russia which illustrates how the Member States have been pursuing their own foreign policies outside of the one established by the EU.

Adopting a unified strategy towards Russia was a major shift for the EU who until then had been sharply divided on the issue. The traditional East-West divide of Europe has strongly influenced individual members’ perception of their easternmost neighbor. The Eastern European countries, which have a long history as vassal states of the Soviet Union, view Russia in a more cynical light and see it as a threat to regional security. Consequently, they have long favored the adoption by the EU of a strong stance against Russia^[vi] [vii]. Whereas the Western European nations have tended to view Russia as a strategic partner and believed that there was an opportunity to establish positive and stable relations with their neighbor through economic integration^{[viii] [ix] [x]}. For these countries, economic ties with Russia have been viewed as an asset to be exploited. Germany, in particular, has pursued, since 1969, a foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia, dubbed Ostpolitik, whose stated goal “was to achieve positive change through rapprochement.” This was to be achieved by developing strong economic ties with Russia in particular in the energy sector through pipeline and nuclear projects^[xi]. The Eastern European countries, however, have always viewed their dependence on Russian goods as a form of continued dominance by their previous overlord^[xii]. This is especially true because Eastern European countries tend to be very reliant on Russian trade, in particular, its gas which Russia has used as a weapon on two occasions, in 2006-2007, against Ukraine by withholding gas deliveries to obtain political and financial gains^[xiii].

The Baltic nations have also had repeated clashes with Russia on other issues, which has only increased their distrust in their neighbor. There is an ongoing crisis between Estonia and Russia over the issue of Russian minorities and a territorial dispute over the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Poland has also clashed with Russia over the development of its anti-missile shield^[xiv]. Because of their geographic proximity to Russia, these countries felt the destabilizing effects of Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 much more keenly than their Western partners did.  Due to these tensions, the Central and Eastern States have advocated, unsuccessfully, for many years for the EU to adopt a stronger stance against Russia and to give more importance to human rights and democratic values when dealing with the Russian government^[xv].  

These countries have repeatedly been thwarted in their efforts to get the EU to adopt a harsh foreign policy towards Russia by Germany and other large Member States. For instance, Germany opposed the EU’s efforts to develop the Nabucco natural gas pipeline, an alternative gas supply intended to reduce its dependence on Russia by transporting natural gas from the Caspian region and the Middle East instead of Russia. Berlin promptly reached an agreement with Gazprom, Russia’s energy supplier, to develop a pipeline known as the Southern Stream. Gerhard Schröder, who was Chancellor at the time, negotiated the NordStream pipeline deal directly with Russia bypassing regular EU channels and over the vociferous opposition of the Polish government^[xvi]. Similarly, it was Germany, along with other big Member States like Italy, France, and Spain, who defeated the proposal to have Georgia and Ukraine join NATO in order to avoid offending Russian sensibilities despite the support for the idea from the other Member States^[xvii].

Germany’s status as an economic powerhouse within the EU has given it the leverage to dictate the direction of the European Union’s foreign policy towards Russia^[xviii]. It has been described as “Russia’s strategic partner or even Russia’s advocate in Europe.” Germany has been a strong advocate for Russia due to the strong economic ties between the two countries, and this has remained the case during Angela Merkel’s term as chancellor. So much so that initially the rapprochement between the two countries worried foreign analysts and politicians alike. Philip Stephens reported in the Financial Times that several of US President Obama’s aides felt she was “…too soft on Russia.” The principle of Ostpolitik has played an essential role in shaping the relationship between the two countries and after 50 years of close economic cooperation, they are very closely linked, which is a critical consideration for German policymakers^[xix]. Eurostat finds that in 2017, Germany accounted for 30% of all EU exports to Russia. It was the largest importer (€29 billion) and exporter of goods (€ 26 billion) with Russia^[xx]. Germany’s foreign policy has, therefore, remained relatively stable regarding Russia primarily because of the intense lobbying efforts of German industry^[xxi]. BASF/Wintershall and E.ON Ruhrgas, German energy companies, each holds 20% of the Nord Stream AG project company^{[xxii] [xxiii]}. German industries are also involved in other joint ventures, such as WINGAS and WIEH, with their Russian counterparts^[xxiv]. The interests of the energy sector in Germany are so strong that they are taken into account by policymakers, even if they are not expressly stated^[xxv].

Because Russia has been able to cultivate separate relationships with individual Member States, it took internal negotiations and political pressure to reach a consensus on imposing sanctions on Russia after the invasion of Crimea^[xxvi]. While regional countries and major EU countries supported the initial imposition of sanctions, many countries had to be pressured into voting for them. The only reason Greece, who publicly opposed the sanctions, voted for them was because of its reliance on the EU for the financing of its bailout loan. Hungary’s government was also opposed to the sanctions but ultimately voted for them because it needed the support of the European People’s Party.  Italy had also voiced opposition but decided, under pressure, to ‘toe the line’ in the end^[xxvii]. Maintaining the sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia isn’t automatic; every six months, the Council must vote to reimpose them. Keeping all the members united on this issue is becoming increasingly difficult due to Member States’ respective domestic priorities. Smaller countries that are more sympathetic to Russia have tried to extract side payments from the EU in exchange for agreeing to support the EU’s policy on Russia while simultaneously seeking to obtain other benefits from Russia in exchange for promises that they will promote Russia’s interests in the EU^[xxviii].

These tensions within the EU are a major reason why the sanctions have not led to the withdrawal of Russia from Crimea. This is especially true because Germany, the de facto leader, has been ambivalent in its attitude towards Russia from the outset. The EU has been only marginally involved in trying to resolve the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. In some ways, it could be argued that Germany led the EU’s foreign policy on the Ukraine crisis just as it has done with previous EU foreign policy positions towards Russia^[xxix]. It was Merkel who spearheaded all of the diplomatic peace efforts, be they the Normandy Group (which included Germany, Russia, Ukraine, and France), the Weimar triangle (with France and Poland), or the shuttle diplomacy she conducted in 2015 which led to the Minsk II^[1] agreement^{[xxx] [xxxi]}. The EU did not pass sanctions on Russia until Merkel failed at resolving the issue through negotiations. At this point, Merkel took the lead in imposing sanctions which led to the EU passing the necessary resolutions^[xxxii]. It has been clear from the outset that the EU’s foreign policy on Russia, including the way it deals with the Ukrainian crisis, has been entirely under the control of Germany and that any sanctions imposed will only go as far as Merkel is willing to take them^[xxxiii], which makes domestic politics in Germany an important aspect of the EU-Russia policy.

In Germany, most politicians and business leaders have been paying lip service to the need for sanctions^[xxxiv]. However, Merkel has been facing domestic political pressure from all sides to end the sanctions from the outset^[xxxv]. Foreign Minister Steinmeier immediately expressed his disagreement over the exclusion of Russia from the G8. While he eventually came around to expressing support for Merkel’s position, he continued to make comments arguing for ways to accommodate Russia.  In December of 2014, he argued against new sanctions because bringing Russia to its knees would be destabilizing. In June of 2015, before the G7 meeting, he once again advocated for reintegrating Russia into the G8^[xxxvi]. The leader of the SPD and Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, Sigmar Gabriel, meanwhile, advocated for a solution that would accommodate Russia’s position even after the Malaysian passenger plane MH17 was downed by Russian backed rebels^[xxxvii]. Several prominent former politicians, such as Chancellor Schroder, Helmut Schmidt, and Klaus von Dohnanyi, defended Russia and criticized the West. Not only did they claim that the sanctions were useless, but some went so far as to argue that the entire conflict was the fault of the United States for trying to integrate Ukraine into NATO^[xxxviii]. Overall there has been consistent and widespread criticism in Germany from the right, left and populist parties as well as industry leaders against the imposition of sanctions and in support of Russia’s position in Ukraine^[xxxix]. These voices have been growing louder and after Merkel’s many recent election defeats it is becoming harder for her to ignore these points of view^[xl]. This could eventually affect the EU’s attitude towards Russia’s invasion of Crimea.

There is evidence of this already in the way Merkel has dealt with the crisis up until now. While she advocated for imposing sanctions, she repeatedly made it clear that despite her criticisms of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, the “fundamentals of Ostpolitik had not changed,” and that Germany, both in the medium and long-term, would continue to seek a partnership with Russia^{[xli] [xlii]}. Merkel insisted that the only way to resolve the conflict was through sanctions. However, she resisted imposing heavier sanctions despite continued breaches of the Minsk Agreement, and she rejected the idea of delivering lethal weapons to Ukraine. At the 2015 Munich Security Conference Merkel criticized Russia for violating international law, but she once again emphasized the need for patience to end the conflict^[xliii]. She was the only European leader who went to Moscow to attend the ceremony commemorating the 70^th anniversary of the end of WWII, even if she eschewed the military parade held on May 9^th [xliv]. Perhaps the most significant show of ambivalence on her part came in the summer of 2015 when E.ON and Wintershall renewed their cooperation with Gazprom by entering into new joint ventures^{[xlv] [xlvi]}.

It is Merkel’s more conciliatory policy towards Russia, rather than the uncompromising stance taken by the EU, which was adopted by other member states in the wake of the crisis. Royal Dutch Shell, French ENGIE, and Austria’s ÖMV also entered into business agreements with Gazprom that same summer. These companies agreed to an expansion of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, increasing Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas despite criticism from several Central and Eastern European nations and against stated EU energy policy^[xlvii]. Merkel has defended these actions by claiming that this deal is a purely economic move with no political significance. However, it sends a strong signal to Putin that Europe is willing to ignore Ukraine’s interests to pursue its economic interests and continue to deal with Russia^[xlviii]. Despite their disagreements on how to resolve the crisis, Putin’s willingness to speak primarily with her also makes it clear that he considers her the only legitimate interlocutor^[xlix]. Therefore, the fact that Merkel has been navigating a delicate balancing act trying not to push Russia too much has led Putin to believe that the West isn’t resolute on this issue, thereby undermining the EU’s credibility. Had the EU been able to present a strong, unified front and made a greater commitment to put pressure on Russia, we might have had a different outcome to this crisis by now. 

The current system of requiring unanimity to adopt a foreign policy position gives even smaller Member States significant leverage to affect policy outcomes. This, therefore, gives Russia a strong incentive to ignore Brussels and establish bilateral relations with European countries who can block any legislation which would harm their national interest and Russia’s as well. Greece has long been one of Russia’s most reliable advocates in the EU because it gets approximately 75% of its gas from the Russians and buys much of its weapons from them as well^[l] [li]. This explains why Greece, in 2007, stopped the EU from continuing the mandate of the EU Border Support Team in Georgia to include the area of Abkhazia which Russia had just annexed^[lii]. On another occasion, France, Germany, and Italy signed separate bilateral deals with Russia to allow visa-free travel between their countries. These deals were later declared in violation of the Schengen rules, which immediately forced the entire EU to negotiate a visa-free travel deal with Russia^[liii]. Poland, in 2007, single-handedly vetoed giving the EU a mandate to renegotiate the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement^[liv]. This underscores the influence these bilateral deals can have. Each of the economic deals Russia enters into with an EU Member State has consequences beyond the immediate economic benefits to the parties involved; it affects EU foreign policy as a whole. Russia has entered into many different deals with individual European nations. Currently, Italy, Germany, France, and the Dutch are deeply involved in Russian energy production. Cyprus is a major offshore destination for Russian firms and a significant investor in Russia^[lv]. Greece, which has recently had a contentious relationship with the EU due to its financial bailout, signed a preliminary deal to import gas from Russia^[lvi]. Putin recently went to Budapest and signed a nuclear power and natural gas deal with Prime Minister Viktor Orban^[lvii]. The Cypriot gave access to its ports to Russian Naval vessels^[lviii]. Each of these deals potentially is an obstacle to the EU’s ability to reach a consensus on its foreign policy towards Russia in the CFSP.

Another tactic Russia has been cultivating in order to further divisions between EU countries is the propagation of disinformation through cyber warfare and traditional media outlets. Russia has been supporting financially and online anti-EU political parties in many European countries. For instance, in France during the last presidential campaign, Emmanuel Macron, who has been a vocal supporter of the EU, identified attempts by the Russian’s to hack into the servers of his campaign headquarters^[lix].  The Front National, and its leader Marine Le Pen, have long advocated for France to withdraw from the EU and Le Pen frequently speaks in favor of a more pro-Russian foreign policy. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that she received a 40-million-euro loan from a Kremlin-backed bank to support her political campaign for the French presidency^[lx]. There are reports that the Kremlin has provided financial support to other extremist political organizations such as Ataka in Bulgaria, Jobbik in Hungary, Golden Dawn in Greece, and Linke in Germany^[lxi]. Another means for spreading disinformation is through its state-sponsored news channel, Russia Today, which is diffused throughout Europe and the US. Changing domestic political views can have an impact not only on trying to get pro-Russian parties elected in a given Member State but it can also sway public opinion and put pressure on local politicians who may not be favorably disposed towards Russia. The goal of these campaigns according to analysts is to “weaken and destabilise the West, by exploiting existing divisions or creating artificial new ones” specifically “between EU Member States.” 

The debate over whether or not the EU has a common policy towards Russia rages on amongst scholars, politicians, and political analysts^[lxii].  Some view the fact that the EU has maintained sanctions on Russia since 2014 as a sign that it does have a common policy while others see fissures and disunity in the rhetoric, the bilateral deals and the lack of cohesion in the reaction to the poisoning of ex-Russian agent Sergei Skripal in Salisbury^[lxiii]. What seems evident, however, is that the current structure of EU foreign policy incentivizes nations, such as Russia, to bypass the EU and attempt to influence countries directly. This makes it very difficult for the EU to have a unified and cohesive foreign policy robbing it of much of its power on the international stage and vis-à-vis Russia in particular. This paper has illustrated that the EU’s current foreign policy structure has created a specific and internal flaw that not only makes having a united foreign policy almost impossible, but it destabilizes the Union as a whole. This is why some scholars like Avner Greif and David Laitin have identified the EU’s foreign policy as unstable and unsustainable^[lxiv]. If Peter Mandelson, the ex-EU Commissioner of Trade, is correct that “This is a failure of Europe as a whole, not any member state in particular,”^[lxv] then the problem can only be resolved at the EU level by altering the current system. 

Bio:

Dalya is a student at Boston University studying International Relations. Her area of research is Economic Integration and regional politics in the European Union.   

Endnotes:

^[1] The first Minsk agreement was a peace deal brokered by Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande to cease the fighting in September of 2014. When the deal broke down in January of 2015 it was followed by Minsk II in February of 2015 as a way to revive the first peace deal and stop the fighting in the Donbas region of Ukraine. 

Works Cited

^[i] Mitchell A. Orenstein and R. Daniel Kelemen, “Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies 55, no. 1 (January 2017): 88, accessed December 10, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12441.

^[ii] Kathleen McNamara, European Foreign Policy (n.p.: Oxford, 2017), 141.

^[iii] European Parliamentary Research Service, The EU’s, 3 & 7.

^[iv] Tuomas Frosberg, “From Ostpolitik to ‘frostpolitic’? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy toward Russia,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (2016): 31-33, accessed December 10, 2018, https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.bu.edu/doi/epdf/10.1111/1468-2346.12505.

^[v] European Parliamentary Research Service, The EU’s, 5.

^[vi] Caterina Carta and Stefano Braghiroli, “Measuring Russia’s Snag on the Fabric of the EU’s International Society,” Journal of Contemporary European Research 7, no. 2 (2011): 261, accessed December 11, 2018, http://www.jcer.net/ojs/index.php/jcer/article/view/344/278.

^[vii] Frosberg, “From Ostpolitik,” 24.

^[viii] Carta and Braghiroli, “Measuring Russia’s,” 262.

^[ix] Frosberg, “From Ostpolitik,” 24.

^[x] Judy Dempsey, “Judy Asks: Does Europe Have a Russia Policy?,” Carnegie Europe, last modified March 28, 2018, accessed December 14, 2018, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75924.

^[xi] Frosberg, “From Ostpolitik,” 21.

^[xii] Carta and Braghiroli, “Measuring Russia’s,” 269.

^[xiii] Emma C. Verhoeff and Arne Niemann, “National Preferences and the European Presidency: The Case of German Energy Policy towards Russia,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 6 (2011): 1279, accessed December 10, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02198.x.

^[xiv] Carta and Braghiroli, “Measuring Russia’s,” 273.

^[xv]  Iris Kempe, “Economic and Regional Topics for a Strategic Partnership Notes from the 5th Roundtable,” Partnership with Russia in Europe: Economic and Regional Topics for a Strategic Partnership, June 2007, 9, accessed December 10, 2018, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04688.pdf.

^[xvi] Orenstein and Kelemen, “Trojan Horses,” 92.

^[xvii] Carta and Braghiroli, “Measuring Russia’s,” 269.

^[xviii] Verhoeff and Niemann, “National Preferences,” 1277.

^[xix] Christopher Bickerton, From Nation States to Member States in European Union Foreign Policy (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013), 258, digital file.

^[xx] Eurostat, “EU Imports of Energy Products – Recent Developments,” Statistics Explained, last modified June 11, 2018, accessed December 10, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_recent_developments#Member_States.27_trade_in_petroleum_oils_and_natural_gas.

^[xxi] Verhoeff and Niemann, “National Preferences,” 1279 & 1281.

^[xxii] Verhoeff and Niemann, “National Preferences,” 1279.

^[xxiii] Nina Chestney, “Nordstream 2 Gas Pipeline Important for Europe: German Energy Minister,” Reuters (London), October 1, 2018, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nordstream-germany/nordstream-2-gas-pipeline-important-for-europe-german-energy-minister-idUSKCN1MB25V.

^[xxiv] Mike Sander, “A Strategic Relationship? The German Policy of Energy Security within the EU and the Importance of Russia,” in “Dealing with Dependency: The European Union’s Quest for a Common Energy Policy,” ed. M. Overhaus, H. Maull, and S. Harnish, special issue, Foreign Policy in Dialogue 8, no. 20 (2007): accessed December 12, 2018.

^[xxv] Verhoeff and Niemann, “National Preferences,” 1280.

^[xxvi] McNamara, European Foreign, 160.

^[xxvii] Orenstein and Kelemen, “Trojan Horses,” 97.

^[xxviii] Orenstein and Kelemen, “Trojan Horses,” 89.

^[xxix] Orenstein and Kelemen, “Trojan Horses,” 96.

^[xxx] Wouter Zweers, “The State of EU Relations with Russia and the Eastern Neighborhood,” in Cligendael State of the Union 2018: Towards Better European Integration (n.p.: Netherland’s Institute of Foreign Relations, 2018), 61, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/clingendael-state-union-2018-report.

^[xxxi] Marco Siddi, “German Foreign Policy towards Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis: A New Ostpolitik?,” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 4 (June 3, 2016): 665, accessed December 10, 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1173879.

^[xxxii] Siddi, “German Foreign,” 668.

^[xxxiii] Stephen Szabo, Germany, Russia and the Rise of Geo-Economics (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 129, accessed December 10, 2018, http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472596352.ch-001.

^[xxxiv] Siddi, “German Foreign,” 669.

^[xxxv] Szabo, Germany, Russia, 35-38.

^[xxxvi] Frosberg, “From Ostpolitik,” 31.

^[xxxvii] Frosberg, “From Ostpolitik,” 32.

^[xxxviii] Frosberg, “From Ostpolitik,” 32-33.

^[xxxix] Frosberg, “From Ostpolitik,” 33-35.

^[xl] Zweers, “The State,” 61.

^[xli] Frosberg, “From Ostpolitik,” 28.

^[xlii] Siddi, “German Foreign,” 666 & 668.

^[xliii] Frosberg, “From Ostpolitik,” 30.

^[xliv] Siddi, “German Foreign,” 670.

^[xlv] Siddi, “German Foreign,” 671.

^[xlvi] Chestney, “Nordstream 2 Gas Pipeline,”

^[xlvii] Siddi, “German Foreign,” 671.

^[xlviii] Siddi, “German Foreign,” 671.

^[xlix] Frosberg, “From Ostpolitik,” 30.

^[l] European Council On Foreign Relations, A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations, by Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu (London, 2007), 29, accessed December 10, 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/a_power_audit_of_eu_russia_relations.

^[li] Eurostat, “EU Imports,” Statistics Explained.

^[lii] European Council On Foreign Relations, A Power, 16.

^[liii] European Council On Foreign Relations, A Power, 16.

^[liv] Kempe, “Economic and Regional,” 7.

^[lv] European Council On Foreign Relations, A Power, 30.

^[lvi] Orenstein and Kelemen, “Trojan Horses,” 93 & 97.

^[lvii] Daniel McLaughlin, “Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orban Hail Ties and Discuss Energy and Finance,” Irish Times, September 18, 2018, [Page #], accessed December 9, 2018, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/vladimir-putin-and-viktor-orban-hail-ties-and-discuss-energy-and-finance-1.3633439.

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^[lxi] Orenstein and Kelemen, “Trojan Horses,” 93,

^[lxii] Dempsey, “Judy Asks,” Carnegie Europe.

^[lxiii] Dempsey, “Judy Asks,” Carnegie Europe.

^[lxiv] Avner Greif and David D. Laitin, “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 4 (November 2004): 634, accessed December 12, 2018, https://web.stanford.edu/~avner/Greif_Papers/2004%20A%20Theory%20of%20Endogenous%20Instituitonal%20Change.pdf.

^[lxv] European Council On Foreign Relations, A Power, 16