Introduction:

“The care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only legitimate object of good government” (Jefferson 1809). The critical analysis of the degree, characteristics, and sustainability of countries’ achievements or ‘objects’, has been the subject of political academia for many years, with several pieces of scholarship being written on the concept. Less discussed in political circles, but just as imperative to realising political scholarship’s aim to specify and expand upon “legitimate object(s) of good government,” (Jefferson 1809), are the influences on government behaviour, and to what extent they inform and determine a government’s achievements. The most prolific of these ‘influences’ are the goals a government pursues, the structure of the state, and the power of organised interests within the country, and this essay will aim to analyse which of these influences is more imperative in determining what governments achieve. The context through which these concepts will be assessed and compared is that of the present South African government and state. This choice was made in order to provide a case study with which to observe the real-life application of these concepts, so as to provide a deeper understanding of the degree of their effect on governments, as well as to offer more literature in areas where this essay’s analysis of the government influences seemed academically lacking (for example, the ‘goals’ a government pursues is entirely dependent on the government itself, so there appears to be a shortage of academia that provide specific parameters for this concept). Before delving into the main argument, it is important to note that the frequently used term ‘government achievements’ will for the purposes of this essay, broadly be defined as ‘all behaviour of government, as well as all its interactions with the political environment it exists in’; policymaking, government programmes, strategy implementation, to name but a few examples.

The goals a government pursues:

To clarify exactly what the ‘goals a government pursues’ refers to, it can be classified as any situation, state, or statistic a country aims to achieve or obtain. As stated above, the goals a country’s government pursues are dictated by the specific political characteristics of the country and government itself. It is reasonable to assume that there might be general goals that all governments should strive towards, for example a developing country might aim to achieve goals in the field of economic growth, redistribution of income, and employment rates (Chand 2018), but not the existence of strict codes or guidelines.  

Ideally, the goals a government sets should be the ultimate dictator of what they achieve, as the former sets the theoretical parameters with which the latter is measured against. In practice though, governments’ goals act only as a façade of capability and competence, and often offer little to no guarantee of delivering progress or development in any of the aspects of society addressed. There exist several exemplary futile illustrations of these goal strategies in South Africa. The outcomes approach, the government’s plan to address five priority areas identified in the socio-economic landscape of South Africa, “decent work and sustainable livelihoods, education, health, rural development, food security and land reform and the fight against crime and corruption,” (South African Government 2019), within the period of 2014 to 2019. From the time of writing, all five areas of need identified within this framework, have seen little to no improvement, with food security substantially decreasing to the lowest it has been since the birth of the South African democracy (IPC 2020). Similar examples are present in more times, perhaps the most prevalent of them being the National Development Plan 2030. Implemented in 2013, it details a step-by-step approach to the grandiose goal of completely “eliminating poverty and reducing inequality” (South African Government  2013) by the year 2030. Eight years after the NDP’s initial formation, South Africa’s former statistician-general Dr. Pali Lehohla is quoted as having said “The NDP was never implemented; it was left on the shelves” (Sibanyoni 2021). This serves to prove that goal setting, in a South African context, has no effect on what the government achieves, and rather acts as a projection of the potential intentions of government, as opposed to committed promises and guarantees.

The structure of the state:

State structure can be defined as “the organizational form of the state, i.e. the distribution of power among agencies, the working of these agencies, and the underlying self-perception influencing the exchange between these agencies as well as between the government and society at large” (Cante 2016). The formation of the state directly informs the power dynamic between state agencies, the processes of accountability state agencies are liable to, and finally the relationship between state agencies themselves (Cante 2016). The government, being one of the aforementioned ‘state players’ is therefore directly affected the state structure.

There are different types of state structures, that each inform the dynamic between the state agencies in their own unique manner. The United States of America, for example, employs federalism, a state structure that dictates the national government and the state government be two individual sovereign powers, for the purpose of creating a distinct separation of powers (Norton 2020). Similarly, South Africa organises its state into the legislative branch, the judicial branch, and the executive branch, also to broaden the spread of power (South African Government 2021).  The legislative authority controls the creation of legislation, and is presented as the South African parliament system, the exectuive authority, who are in charge of implementation of legislation and governance and who are represented as the President, his Deputy and Minisiters, and finally the judicial authority, who enforce the compliance with the country’s laws both on an individual and state agency level and who are represented by the South African court systems (South African Government 2021). There are also several more separate state institutions in South Africa, whose main aim is to support and enforce democratic practices, such as the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, the Commission for Gender Equality, the Auditor-General of South Africa, and the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (South African Government 2021). All of the aforementioned branches of state power and state institutions, act as state agencies and thus interact with other state agencies, i.e. the government. It would be then reasonable to conclude, that the structure of the state has the most considerable and substantial affect on what a government achieves (out of the list provided by this essay), purely based on the number of state agencies with a considerable, if not, an equal amount of power in the South African political landscape. For example, the public protector has been integral in exposing the corruption of the South African government and its involvement with the infamous Gupta family, and the judicial and executive branches of state power went at a figurative ‘head-to-head’ when the constitutional court sentenced former president Jacob Zuma to jail, earlier this year.

Power of organised interests in South Africa:

Interest groups are defined as “any association of individuals or organizations, usually formally organized, that, on the basis of one or more shared concerns, attempts to influence public policy in its favour,” (Thomas 2021). The extent to which interest groups influence government behaviour depends equally on the strength of the interest group, as well as the willingness of the government in question. The National Rifle Association for example, an interest group in the United States of America, has been so successful in its attempts to affect public policy to represent its own ethics and affiliations, that despite having one of the highest rates of gun violence in the world, the NRA has successfully defeated every single attempt at institutionalising even the most basic gun control, with an unprecedented level of influence of the American government (Hammer 2010).

While South Africa possesses no interest group with that level of influence and power currently, there are a few that certainly have become a strong political entity in their own right. COSATU, or the Congress of South African Trade Unions, is perhaps the most prevalent example of a powerful interest group within South Africa. A congress of trade unions that include mine workers, teachers, policemen and allied health workers, it has played both a significant role in South Africa’s history and current times, being both instrumental in mobilising black workers in the Apartheid era, as well as currently fighting and negotiating with the government on behalf of the workers it represents (most often the mine and public service workers) (COSATU 2021). While there is a certain amount of government influence employed by COSATU,  it does not exist in any extreme degrees, and is therefore not as consequential as other influences this essay has tackled. 

Conclusion:

This essay aimed to critically analyse three possible sources of government influence, the goals a government pursues, the structure of the state, and the power of organised interests, through the perspective of South Africa’s complex socio-political climate, to identify which of these concepts had the greatest affect on what the government achieves/how it behaves in South Africa. It has concluded that, in South Africa, the structure of the state has the most affect on what a government achieves, with the power of organised interests coming second, and the goals a government pursues ranking having the least influence on what the South African government achieves.

Works Cited:

South African Government . 2019. The Outcomes Approach. Johannesburg: South African Government .

Cante, F. 2016. Handbook of Research on Transitional Justice and Peace Building in Turbulent Regions. Colombia : Universidad del Rosario.

Chand, S. 2018. “5 Main Aims of Government for Economy Development – Discussed.” Your Article Library , January 3: 1.

COSATU. 2021. “Congress of South African Trade Unions .” Johannesburg .

Hammer, S. 2010. Interest groups in the USA – The National Rifle Association. Washington: Martin Luther University .

IPC. 2020. South Africa: Acute Food Insecurity Situation September – December 2020 and Projection for January – March 2021. Cape Town: IPC analysis portal .

Jefferson, T. 1809. Thomas Jefferson to the Republicans of Washington County, Maryland, 31 March 1809. Washington : Maryland Herald .

Norton, W. 2020 . Federalism and the separation of powers . Chicago : Norton and Company .

Sibanyoni, M. 2021. NDP 2030 Targets: SA’s targets vs reality. Cape Town: SABC.

South African Government . 2013. The National Development Plan 2030. Pretoria : South African Government .

South African Government . 2021. The South African Government structure and functions . South African Government .

Thomas, C. 2021. Britannica. Accessed November 1, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/topic/interest-group.

Introduction:

Robert Michels, a German sociologist with renowned political distinction, first put forth the idea of ‘The Iron Law of the Oligarchy’ in academic circles over seventy years ago. Michels was of the opinion that all organizations, regardless of their political ideologies or their position on the political spectrum, were nothing more than masquerading oligarchies. He placed particular emphasis on institutions that made claims to be ‘democratic’ in their intentions, saying that “The notion of the representation of popular interests, a notion to which the great majority of democrats cleave with so much tenacity and confidence, is an illusion engendered by a false illumination,”  (Summers 1984 ). The very nature of democratic organizations, such as political parties or trade unions, lend themselves to bureaucratic tendencies (Summers 1984 ). It is this perspective, this identification of a conceptual dissonance in politics, that ‘democratic’ systems and organizations create environments that allow characteristically undemocratic/oligarchy-esque practices and behavior to flourish, that creates the basis of the argument presented in this essay. While it almost exclusively occurs in ‘democratic’ states, the system of one-party dominance is definitively undemocratic/oligarchy-esque, and poses more harm to a country’s politics than good. This essay will aim to prove this, through a careful analysis of the advantages and disadvantages this one party-dominant system has had in the context of a post-Apartheid South Africa.

Theoretical preliminaries: Factors that enhance South African one party dominance

The preliminaries of this argument against one party dominance, involve firstly defining one party dominance for the purpose of this essay. One party dominance can be defined as “a country where the political landscape is perpetually overshadowed by a single dominant political party that wins consecutive elections and governs for a prolonged period” (Khambuhle 2019). In the South African context, this definition makes reference to the African National Congress Party, as it has won six national elections at the time of this essay, and each time was won with the overwhelming majority of votes, and has been the ruling party for over twenty-five years  (Khambuhle 2019).  For the sake of contextualization, it is important to briefly analyze the political history that lead to the ANC’s political dominance in South Africa, as well the political environment in which the ANC exercises its dominance presently.

The political period before South African democracy, and the ANC in power, was called ‘Apartheid’, which referred to the institutionalization and inclusion of discriminatory and racist policies into the very fabric of South African politics (Endoh 2015). This horrificly racist ideology subjugated black persons in South Africa for centuries, before the ANC, along with other activist parties, fought for and achieved the first democratic elections in 1994, as well as a complete eradication of all Apartheid laws (Endoh 2015). This piece of South African history is important to the content of this essay, because it explains the position the ANC plays, not only in South Africa’s political landscape, but in the cultural and social fabric of the country as well. This equation of the ANC to the end of Apartheid is an integral part of why they have achieved and maintained such political dominance in South Africa, and these unique circumstances influence the way one party dominance is presented in the South African political environment. This link is integral in forming and contextualizing the main argument of this essay: why this dominance is ultimately damaging to South Africa.

The advantages of one party dominance:

In the interest of remaining objective, and providing a balanced commentary on the subject matter, it is important to explore the various benefits that exist as a result of one party dominance, with a special interest in analyzing how these advantages present themselves in the South African political landscape. The generalized advantages of one party dominance include: quick decision making (theoretically, the party in power acts as homogenous entity in decision making, employing the unification of ideals to make political decisions quickly and easily, a characteristic that is undeniably useful to developing countries, which often do not have the benefit of time when the need for a decision arises) (De Jager 2009); centralized decision-making (because the decisions are coming from one source, i.e. the ruling party, the decisions made are more focused and direct, implying a better rate of success) (De Jager 2009); and finally its unique applicability to developing countries (it is often suggested that developing countries, while in the process of ‘developing’, are more suited to unified control that the one party dominant system employs, and that more parties and political voices would only lengthen the period in which a country stayed ‘developing’) (Monyani 2018 ).

To analyze whether or not these ‘advantages’ are present in South African one party dominance, is to take a closer look at its current political climate. It could be said that the ANC is ‘quick’ to make decisions for the country, having effective and well developed strategies for crises. For example, the vaccine rollout strategy to combat the Covid-19 pandemic was developed quite quickly  (Diseases 2021), though the ANC seemed unable to act upon it; South Africa has an exceptionally low rate of vaccines at the time of this essay (37.50%  of all adults, according to the latest vaccines statistics) (Government 2021). This inability to adhere to the time constraints and goals set forth in their plans, as illustrated in the Covid-19 example, can be characterized as an ongoing problem for the ANC, with factors such as corruption, mismanagement, or insufficient resources heavily affecting the degree to which their strategies are implemented. Centralized decision making and the unification of ideals also do not apply to the ANC, as their party has already had two major divisions that resulted in party splits, within their short period of power. The first took place in 2008 and resulted in the formation of the Congress of the People party, and the second took place in 2013, that resulted in the formation of the Economic Freedom Fighters party  (Khambuhle 2019). And finally, to address the idea that an one-party dominant system supports the quicker development of a third-world country, within the period of time that the ANC has been in power, South Africa’s development has made no substantial progress, even being rated as ‘non-investment grade’ or ‘junk status’ by the Standard & Global Rating system in 2020  (Wasserman 2020). To summarize, whatever perceived ‘advantages’ there are to a one party dominant system, they are not present in the South African political environment.

The disadvantages of one party dominance:

There are many disadvantages to the one party dominance, but this paragraph will only offer those that are most prevalent in the current political environment of South Africa. While one party dominant systems occur in democracies, more specifically countries with democracies that are in the process of consolidation, this system gives rise to characteristics that seem, at worst, undemocratic, and at best, heavily affecting the quality of democracy  (De Jager 2009). Examples of this include: lack of accountability (a democracy is maintained through agents of accountability, which include prominent opposition parties, of which the ANC has none) (De Jager 2009); limiting the scope of political and civil society; and the exchange of civil and political liberties for the provision of basic necessities  (De Jager 2009), which is exceptionally prevalent in South Africa, as proven by a recent survey that suggests a significant percentage of participants were willing to “sacrifice democratic procedures for the promise of law and order and improved services” (Lanegran 2001). Furthermore, it acts as a highly effective breeding ground for corruption, (as a result of the lack of agents of accountability), a problem that has been plaguing the South African political environment for years, as is illustrated by the exceptionally high ranking South Africa has achieved in the Corruption Perceptions Index (44^th out of 195 countries)  (Transparency International 2020). The one party dominance system of politics does more harm than good to the country it operates in and entails many disadvantages in South Africa since the ANC’s rise to power.

Conclusion:

This essay’s main aim was to prove that the political system of one party dominance carries more disadvantages than advantages for its host country, through the context of a post-Apartheid South Africa. It analyzed whether or not the theoretical benefits of the one party dominant system were illustrated in present day South Africa, determining that they are not. In addition, it explored all of the harm the one party dominant system has done to the South African political climate, and posed questions for South Africa’s future as a political entity.

Works Cited

De Jager, N. 2009. “Voice and accountability in one party dominant systems .” The University Of Pretoria 74 (12): 93.

Diseases, The National Institute for Communicable. 2021. The Covid-19 vaccine rollout strategy . Johannesburg: NICD.

Endoh, T. 2015. “Democratic constitutionalism in post-apartheid South Africa.” Africa Review 67 (79): 4-5.

Government, South African. 2021. SA Corona virus . Accessed October 16, 2021. https://sacoronavirus.co.za/latest-vaccine-statistics/.

Khambuhle, I. 2019. “Coexistence as a Strategy for Opposition Parties in Challenging the African National Congress’ One party Dominance .” South African Journal of Political Studies 46 (4): 1.

Lanegran, K. 2001. “South Africa’s 1999 Election: Consolidating a Dominant Party System.” Indiana University Press 48 (2): 2.

Monyani, M. 2018 . “One Party State: Is It Good or Bad for Governance?” E-International Relations , May 25: 2-5.

Summers, W. 1984 . “Democracy in a One-Party State.” Maryland Law Review 43 (1): 2-3.

Transparency International . 2020. The Corruption Perceptions Index . Transparency International .

Wasserman, H. 2020. “South Africa is ‘junk’ – here’s what that means to you.” Business Insider, March 30: 1-8.

People gather at the site of a suicide attack at a Market in Konduga outside Maiduguri, Nigeria Wednesday, Aug. 16, 2017. Suicide bombers attacked a camp for internally displaced people and a nearby market in a northeastern Nigeria village, a local official said Tuesday. (AP Photo/ Jossy Ola)

Violence and conflict in the Sahel region have significantly worsened over the past few years. As the number of violent attacks have increased by three-fold in the Lake Chad basin since 2015, and worse still, eight-fold in the Central Sahel region in the same time period,[1] more than 2 million Sahelians have found themselves internally displaced, with another 850,000 seeking cross-border refuge in the past one and a half years alone.[2]

The tension in the region has been exacerbated by the southward expansion of Islamic jihadist militant activities into sub-Saharan Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, and Nigeria.[3] Besides fighting state-led counter-terrorism forces, violence has also simultaneously erupted between the rival jihadist factions of al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam wa’l Muslimin (JNIM) and the ISIS affiliate Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), as they vie over competing ideological principles and new territorial footholds in the region. As a result, counter-terrorism forces have been building up in the Sahel, with the French-led Takuba Task Force being the latest addition to the existing G5 Sahel and French-led Operation Barkhane counter-terrorism efforts,[4] creating what experts are now calling a “traffic jam of military forces” in the region.[5]

Yet, despite beefing up counter-terrorism forces, the Sahel has experienced a five-fold intensification of jihadist attacks and inter-ethnic violence since 2016,[6] evidently indicating that the counter-terrorism strategy has been largely ineffective in rooting out instability in the region. [7] A key explanation for the ineffectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts is that terrorist militant activities are, in fact, symptomatic of the multi-faceted issue of food shortages (and hence food insecurity), high unemployment, and the lack of basic services available to the local rural populations. With the state largely absent in providing food, lodging, and security due to its inability to penetrate infrastructurally into the outskirts of the rural regions, rural groups have turned towards armed forces for services.[8]

Part of the problem is also driven by climate change. As a semi-arid region heavily reliant on rainfed agriculture, the Sahel is experiencing the world’s most critical crisis of food insecurity of the day as about 80% of its farmland has been degraded by extreme droughts in the past few decades.[9] Additionally, its desertification has not been helped by its rising temperatures—rapidly increasing at 1.5 times the global average—which would take its current average temperature of 35°C up by at least 3-5°C by 2050.[10] With its arable land and water resources literally drying up, new inter-communal conflicts have thus been kindled while forced migration has been intensified in the Sahel, according to Inga Rhonda King, the President of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UN ECOSOC). [11]

Moreover, food insecurity and the lack of job opportunities are further exacerbated by the increasing population pressure exerted by an expanding Sahelian population. Due to the high fertility rates between 4.1 and 7.6 children per woman on average in the region, demographic growth rates have continued unabatedly between 2.5 percent to about 4 percent per annum. In fact, the United Nations estimates conservatively that the region’s population will explode from 135 million in 2015 to 330 million by 2050, assuming that fertility rates (unrealistically) taper down to a medium level over time.[12] With a ballooning population, it is therefore unsurprising that competition over already scarce food, resources, and job opportunities have intensified, and will continue to intensify in the Sahel over the next few decades.

The void left behind by the Sahelian governments’ inability to address these systemic core issues thus provides fertile ground for terrorist groups like the JNIM and the ISGS to take root in the region. In the face of evaporating food supply as a result of extreme climate conditions, Sahelians like 17-year old Younoussa find themselves having to choose between joining an armed terrorist or insurgent group in which they would be vastly underpaid and exploited, or slowly starving to their deaths.[13] Acutely aware of the Hobson’s choice that many Sahelians face, shrewd terrorist and insurgent armed groups deliberately exploit this difficult dilemma to forcibly recruit many Sahelians into their armed movements, often against the wishes of the latter.[14] Younoussa, for instance, was visibly saddened that he had to join an armed group in order to survive; he said in an interview with BBC correspondents, “I don’t want to be with an armed group. I want to be with my family again and get a job.”[15] Yet, Younoussa’s circumstances and sentiments are not unique, as many Sahelians find themselves increasingly lured by the prospect of joining armed groups for survival as their livelihood options continue to evaporate rapidly amid an increasingly vulnerable state of existence.[16]

It is within this context that we ought to re-evaluate our approach in the Sahel. With millions of Sahelians trapped in a vicious cycle of conflict-induced vulnerability and climate-induced conflict exacerbation, it is clear that the short-term measures of urgent humanitarian action and counter-terrorism efforts remain an important priority. Yet, these short-term measures are merely symptom-management measures that do not effectively treat the root cause of instability in the region—which is low state capacity and ineffective governance especially in the rural regions. Indeed, with all ten Sahelian countries ranking at the very bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index,[17] the greatest imperative for the Sahel in the long-term would be to promote better governance. This improvement may look like ramping up state capacity and infrastructure through major investments in education, healthcare, population control, and improving food security. It may also come through combating corruption and hosting inter-communal conciliatory dialogues with armed groups in search of a permanent cessation of hostilities, and hopefully, a long-lasting peace. As the rest of the world has pursued their own progress and development, the Sahel has been a perennially conflict-ridden and severely underdeveloped region, leaving Sahelians behind in a state of extreme poverty, violent conflict, underdevelopment, and vulnerability as they struggle to carve out an existence for themselves.

References

[1] UNICEF, “Sahel Crisis: 29 Million Sahelians Need Humanitarian Assistance and Protection,” April 27, 2021, https://www.unicef.org/wca/press-releases/sahel-crisis-29-million-sahelians-need-humanitarian-assistance-and-protection.

[2] UNHCR, “Grim Milestone as Sahel Violence Displaces 2 Million Inside Their Countries,” UNHCR, January 22, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2021/1/600a92e4125/grim-milestone-sahel-violence-displaces-2-million-inside-countries.html.

[3] Frank Gardner, “Is Africa Overtaking the Middle East as the New Jihadist Battleground?,” BBC, December 3, 2020.

[4] Judd Devermont and Marielle Harris, “Rethinking Crisis Responses in the Sahel,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 22, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/rethinking-crisis-responses-sahel.

[5] Naz Modirzadeh, Richard Atwood, and Jean-Hervé Jezequel, “The War in the Sahel,” Crisis Group, February 25, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/war-sahel.

[6] Crisis Group, “A Course Correction for the Sahel Stabilisation Strategy,” Crisis Group, February 1, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/299-course-correction-sahel-stabilisation-strategy.

[7] Devermont and Harris, “Rethinking Crisis Responses in the Sahel”.

[8] Richard Skretteberg, “Sahel: The World’s Most Neglected and Conflict-Ridden Region,” accessed May 10, 2021.

[9] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “The Magnitude of the Problem,” accessed May 11, 2021, http://www.fao.org/3/X5318E/x5318e02.htm.

[10] Skretteberg, “Sahel: The World’s Most Neglected and Conflict-Ridden Region”.

[11] United Nations, “Building Climate Resilience and Peace Go Hand in Hand for Africa’s Sahel – UN Forum,” November 13, 2018, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/11/1025671.

[12] John F. May, Jean-Pierre Guengant, and Thomas R. Brooke, “Demographic Challenges of the Sahel,” Population Reference Bureau, January 14, 2015, https://www.prb.org/sahel-demographics/.

[13] Lyse Doucet, “The Battle on the Frontline of Climate Change in Mali,” BBC, January 22, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/the-reporters-46921487.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Robert Muggah and José Luengo Cabrera, “The Sahel Is Engulfed by Violence. Climate Change, Food Insecurity and Extremists Are Largely to Blame,” World Economic Forum, January 23, 2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/all-the-warning-signs-are-showing-in-the-sahel-we-must-act-now/.

[17] United Nations Development Programme, “Latest Human Development Index Ranking (2020),” December 15, 2020, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/latest-human-development-index-ranking.

Escalating violence between the national army and those loyal to the northern Tigray region has brought the threat of civil war to Ethiopia and instability to the whole Horn of Africa.

The recent violence is the culmination of a history marked by rising tensions. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was a coalition made up of different ethnically based political parties, namely Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) and Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM).¹

Under this ruling coalition, TPLF became the dominant party in 1991 and controlled the Ethiopian government for almost three decades, ushering in “stultifying, iron-fisted rule.”² However, this control came to an end when Abiy Ahmed was elected as a “young reformer” in 2018.³ Ahmed, the first Oromo Prime Minister, removed many TPLF members from their positions in the central government.⁴ Seeing its influence wane, the TPLF turned their attention and influence to the Tigray region, where they have since been operating.

Then, in September 2020, Tigray held regional elections in defiance of the federal government, which had canceled elections due to the pandemic.⁵ The national government called the Tigray election “illegal.”⁶ 

The TPLF, which lacks the power it once had in Ethiopian politics, has made veiled threats of succession.⁷ Relations further soured when, in early October, the upper house of parliament voted to suspend budget aid to Tigray.

The situation between the regional state and the federal government erupted on Nov. 4, when Ahmed sent troops into Tigray, claiming the TPLF had attacked a federal military installation in the Tigray region.⁸ Both sides readied for conflict. 

It came quickly and violently: since the fighting began on Nov. 4, hundreds of people have reportedly been killed on both sides and thousands have fled into neighboring Sudan.⁹ On Nov. 13, Tigray launched rockets at airports in Amhara Province.¹⁰ Then, in a major escalation, Tigray fired a rocket at neighboring Eritrea on Nov. 14. No casualties or damage have been reported.¹¹ 

Debretsion Gebremichael, Tigray’s president, said he ordered this attack because Asmara, Eritrea’s capital, had sided with Ahmed’s government.¹²

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for ending the 20-year border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, denied that Eritrea has aided his government during the conflict with Tigray.¹³ Gebremichael, on the other hand, said Eritrean forces have crossed into Ethiopia at three border towns in the northern region.¹⁴

“As long as troops are here fighting, we will take any legitimate military target and we will fire,” Gebremichael told the Associated Press.¹⁵

This move brings Eritrea into the conflict, threatening the stability in the Horn of Africa. The Tigray region in particular is essential to peace at the Ethipian-Eritrean border, since the government in Tigray administers the area.¹⁶ The United States condemned the TPLF’s “unjustifiable attacks against Eritrea…  and its efforts to internationalize the conflict in Tigray.”¹⁷

Not only has the conflict threatened international peace, it has also exacerbated ethnic divisions in Ethiopia to such an extent that there is threat of civil war. Ethiopia contains 10 regions, and these ethnic strongholds have historically vied for power.¹⁸ 

When Ahmed came to power, he promised to heal a deeply divided country. His approach was to build a unitary style government, and in 2019, he merged together the multi-ethnic parties of the EPRDF and created the Prosperity Party (PP).¹⁹ The TPLF did not participate in this merger, claiming it would divide the country.²⁰ 

However, Ahmed’s unitary approach did not always go far enough to satisfy the demands of ethno-nationalist movements such as the “Oromo struggle for greater autonomy and recognition.”²¹ Indeed, since Ahmend took power, Ethiopia has seen a rise in ethnic divisions, including massive displacements along ethnic lines and an increased call for self-governance from ethnic communities.²² In the past year, there have been a string of violent altercations between rival ethnic groups like the Oromo, Amhara, Tigray and Somali.²³ 

Among this political climate of regional disputes, Tigray is emblematic of a larger movement that seeks greater autonomy for Ethiopia’s regions.²⁴ Thus, this conflict will be essential in answering the question of whether Ethiopia can continue to coexist as a multi-ethnic nation.

“Everyone saw this coming,” said Kjetil Tronvoll, a scholar of Ethiopian politics.²⁵ “Both sides felt insecure and started to mobilize troops. It was a clear signal of a civil war in the making.”

Despite the repercussions of the Tigray conflict, which some are worried may include ethnic cleansing and even genocide, Ahmed has ignored international calls for de-escalation.²⁶ Instead, the violence has only increased, leading the United Nations to warn of a looming humanitarian disaster.²⁷ 

With phone and internet lines cut off, communication with the Tigray region is limited.²⁸ However, the harshest fighting has been in western Tigray. Already, some 25,000 Ethiopian refugees have fled into Sudan. This number is expected to balloon, with Sudan preparing for up to 200,000 refugees. 

Both sides have been accused of war crimes. Amnesty International said it confirmed the massacre of dozens of villagers, many of them in Amhara, possibly by pro-Tigray militiamen.²⁹

Ahmed predicts the war will be over soon, but few experts agree.³⁰ The TPLF has elusive leaders and a large military force — 250,000 armed men, by some estimates. As such, this conflict could drag on, spilling into neighboring countries and displacing thousands of people during a global pandemic.³¹ 

Works Cited

1. Gebremedhin, Desta. “Tigray Crisis: Why There Are Fears of Civil War in Ethiopia.” BBC News. BBC, November 13, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54826875?utm_source=YIRA+Subscribers+%28last+updated+Sept+2018%29. 
2. Walsh, Declan, and Simon Marks. “They Once Ruled Ethiopia. Now They Are Fighting Its Government.” The New York Times. The New York Times, November 15, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/15/world/africa/ethiopia-abiy-tigray.html. 
3. Tesfaye, Beza. “The Violence in Ethiopia.” Africa Is a Country, September 14, 2020. https://africasacountry.com/2020/09/the-violence-in-ethiopia. 
4. Gebremedhin, “Tigray Crisis.”
5. Walsh, “They Once Ruled Ethiopia”
6. Gebremedhin, “Tigray Crisis.”
7. Ibid.
8. Walsh, “They Once Ruled Ethiopia”
9. Wroughton, Lesley. “Rebel Tigrayans Fire Rockets at Neighboring Eritrea in Escalation of Ethiopia Conflict.” The Washington Post. WP Company, November 15, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/rebel-tigrayans-fire-rockets-at-neighboring-eritrea-in-escalation-of-ethiopia-conflict/2020/11/15/651855c4-273b-11eb-9c21-3cc501d0981f_story.html
10. Walsh, “They Once Ruled Ethiopia”
11. Wroughton, “Rebel Tigrayans”
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Reuters, and Eoin McSweeney. “Forces from Ethiopia’s Tigray Region Bombed Eritrean Capital, Tigray Leader Says.” CNN. Cable News Network, November 15, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/15/africa/eritrea-tigray-bombing-intl/index.html.
15. Wroughton, “Rebel Tigrayans”
16. Gebremedhin, “Tigray Crisis.”
17. Wroughton, “Rebel Tigrayans”
18. Walsh, “They Once Ruled Ethiopia”
19. Gebremedhin, “Tigray Crisis.”
20. Sileshi, Ephream. “Exclusive: Third Day EPRDF EC Discussing ‘Prosperity Party’ Regulation. Find the Draft Copy Obtained by AS.” Addis Standard, November 18, 2019. https://addisstandard.com/exclusive-third-day-eprdf-ec-discussing-prosperity-party-regulation-find-the-draft-copy-obtained-by-as/. 
21. Tesfaye, “The Violence in Ethiopia”
22. Gebremedhin, “Tigray Crisis.”
23. Walsh, “They Once Ruled Ethiopia”
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27.  Anna, Cara. “Ethiopia’s Tigray Leader Confirms Firing Missiles at Eritrea.” AP NEWS. Associated Press, November 15, 2020. https://apnews.com/article/international-news-eritrea-ethiopia-asmara-kenya-33b9aea59b4c984562eaa86d8547c6dd. 
28. Walsh, “They Once Ruled Ethiopia”
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Gebremedhin, “Tigray Crisis.”

On October 11, 2020, the Nigerian police force announced the dissolution of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad, a corrupt police unit known as SARS. The announcement follows protests spearheaded by young Nigerians, whose challenge to the Nigerian government has gained worldwide attention. Despite the dissolution of SARS, protesters aren’t satisfied. 

To understand the October protests, it is important to trace the history of SARS. In 1992, Israel Ridnam, a colonel of the Nigerian Army, was extrajudicially killed by police officers after stepping out of his car to discover the cause of a traffic jam.^[1][2] In retaliation, the army searched Lagos for police officers, causing many members of the police to physically withdraw from the city. This vacuum, which lasted for two weeks, caused a surge in both crime and the power held by armed robbers.^[1] Simeon Danladi Midenda told the Nigerian news site Vanguard he was tasked to found SARS “to make sure robbers were dislodged from Lagos.”

Despite the stated reason for the creation of SARS, Nigerian citizens say it carries out illegal acts against them, especially targeting well-dressed young people.^[4] Motolani Alake wrote on a popular Nigerian news platform that SARS became a force against “Nigerian youth with dreadlocks, piercings, cars, expensive phones and risque means of expression.”^[3]Amnesty International published in June of 2020 that it found 82 cases of brutality by SARS in the past three years, including “extortion, torture and ill treatment.”^[5] 

These human rights violations led to the creation of a campaign tagged #EndSARS in late 2017. This movement, made up largely by young Nigerians, advocated for change through multiple avenues: protesters marched across major Nigerian cities and shared content on social media platforms to raise awareness.^[5] Although the Federal Government of Nigeria has repeatedly promised reform (such as when the Vice President “ordered an immediate reform of SARS” on August 14, 2018) the Nigerian police has failed to hold SARS accountable or end the human rights violations. 

In October of 2020, the End SARS movement swelled to a breaking point after police attacked a young man and took his luxury jeep.^[6] Thousands of protesters demonstrated in the streets of Nigeria to call the government to disband SARS.^[7] Videos sharing stories about brutality were posted on the internet en masse.^[8] Nigerian celebrities brought further attention to the topic, and the #EndSARS hashtag spread internationally.^[9]

Following these protests, the Nigerian Police Force issued a statement on October 11, 2020 announcing the dissolution of SARS. Additionally, a spokesman said that the officers of SARS were redeployed, a replacement policing arrangement had been evolved, and a team had been created to investigate the allegations of human rights violations.^[7] 

Although celebrations emerged following the police force’s statement, protests did not end. 

For one, concerns were voiced against the decision to keep SARS officers within the police department. Protesters who want to see members of SARS fired and prosecuted say the government is holding back from actually fixing the problem by reassigning officers. Additionally, those against SARS note how similar promises have been made in the past to calm down the public but all failed to address the situation.

These concerns have led to the continuation of protests, which turned deadly on October 20 when soldiers fired on a crowd of protesters.^[10] An anonymous police officer said the death toll was 11, but the report has not yet been corroborated. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari remained silent on the military attack against peaceful protestors, instead instructing the young people to end their street demonstrations.^[6] 

In response to Buhari’s speech, the End SARS movement has stopped physical protests and concentrated on online agitation.^[6] The use of social media has been important throughout the movement; the #EndSARS hashtag has accumulated around 28 million tweets on Twitter alone.^[11]

While the decentralized movement may be suspending its in-person protests, End SARS continues to be a way for young Nigerians to be heard. It has important implications for Nigeria, where half the population is under 19.^[12] “The protests have started to morph into a much larger critique about Nigeria, everything from police reform to security to extrajudicial killings,” said Judd Devermont, director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.^[13]

The movement shares similarities with the 2020 demonstrations in the United States; both are decentralized and were incited by a history of police brutality. However, Mr. Devermont said an important difference is that the Nigerian protesters are not demanding a defunding of the police.^[9] Instead, he said, they want more resources devoted to helping improve policing in their country.

The Nigerian government’s history of promising police reform and subsequently failing forecasts a bleak future for the ending of SARS, especially since officers of the disbanded unit are going to remain within the police force. However, the End SARS movement has shown young Nigerians the power social media has in amplifying their voice, and ultimately provides a stage for future protests against the government. As one of the protestors, who wanted to be known as CM, told CNN: “the movement is not ended.”^[6]

Works Cited

1. Nnadozie, Emma. “How I Founded SARS in the Police – RTD CP Midenda.” Vanguard News. Vanguard Media, December 23, 2017. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/12/founded-sars-police-rtd-cp-midenda/. 
2. Nwanze, Cheta. “On SARS.” TheCable. Cable Newspaper Ltd, October 10, 2020. https://www.thecable.ng/on-sars. 
3. Alake, Motolani. “#EndSARS: What Exactly Is the Status of SARS?” Pulse Nigeria, January 23, 2019. https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/endsars-what-exactly-is-the-status-of-sars/fsret4e. 
4. Lawal, Shola, and Adenike Olanrewaju. “Nigerians Demand End to Police Squad Known for Brutalizing the Young.” The New York Times. The New York Times, October 12, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/world/africa/nigeria-protests-police-sars.html. 
5. Amnesty International. Rep. Nigeria: Time to End Impunity: Torture and Other Human Rights Violations by Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS). Abuja, Nigeria: Amnesty International Nigeria, 2020. 
6. Busari, Stephanie. “Nigeria’s Youth Finds Its Voice with the EndSARS Protest Movement.” CNN. Cable News Network, October 25, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/25/africa/nigeria-end-sars-protests-analysis-intl/index.html. 
7. Paquette, Danielle. “Nigeria Abolishes Special Police Squad After Nationwide Protests.” The Washington Post. WP Company, October 11, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/nigeria-sars-police-robbery-end-sars/2020/10/10/999e2400-0a48-11eb-991c-be6ead8c4018_story.html. 
8. Akinwotu, Emmanuel. “Outcry in Nigeria over Footage of Shooting by Notorious Police Unit.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, October 6, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/06/video-of-nigerian-police-shooting-man-in-street-sparks-outcry. 
9. Gladstone, Rick, and Megan Specia. “Why Nigeria Is Now Erupting.” The New York Times. The New York Times, October 26, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/article/sars-nigeria-police.html. 
10. Lawal, Shola. “Nigerian Forces Fire on Protesters.” The New York Times. The New York Times, October 20, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/20/world/africa/Nigeria-protests-shooting.html.
11. Kazeem, Yomi. “How a Youth-Led Digital Movement Is Driving Nigeria’s Largest Protests in a Decade.” Quartz Africa. Quartz, October 13, 2020. https://qz.com/africa/1916319/how-nigerians-use-social-media-to-organize-endsars-protests/. 
12.  Varrella, Simona. “Nigeria: Age Distribution of Population, by Gender 2019.” Statista. Ströer Media, September 4, 2020. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1121317/age-distribution-of-population-in-nigeria-by-gender/. 
13. “Judd Devermont.” Judd Devermont | Center for Strategic and International Studies. Accessed November 4, 2020. https://www.csis.org/people/judd-devermont.