At 2:03am on the 26th of September, 2022, the Geological Survey of Denmark recorded a 2.3 magnitude tremor originating from the depths of the Baltic Sea; but the seismic activity was characteristic of an underwater explosion, not a tectonic movement. Exactly seven hours later, a second tremor was recorded [1]. These events were confirmed by seismographs as far as Germany [2], where officials for the Nord Stream pipeline declared a simultaneous loss of pressure in both Nord Stream 1 and 2.

Denmark, Sweden, and Germany all started individual investigations, initially refusing Russian demands of inclusion (as well as each other’s, citing concerns over state secrets). Fingers were immediately raised, but those pointed at Russia were promptly lowered. Nord Stream 2, a natural gas pipeline complex carrying Russian natural gas into the heart of Europe, was filled with liquefied natural gas and set to be open two days after the explosion. Russian gas, making up nearly half of all gas imports in Europe, is one of the country’s strongest levers in making the EU more dependent on Moscow. At first, this seems to suggest the Kremlin as the prime suspect, especially since cutting supplies to the EU has been one of the Kremlin’s strategies of choice. However, sabotaging the pipeline would provide no benefits over simply turning the valves off and carries many more risks [3]. As Russia quietly inquired about repair costs, The Washington Post admitted that after months of investigation, there was no clear evidence that the country was behind the attack [4].

The clearest beneficiary of this attack is the United States. Even Secretary of State Anthony Blinken pronounced that it is “a tremendous opportunity to once and for all remove dependence on Russian energy.” [5] The disabling of the Nord Stream pipelines fits neatly within the American foreign policy agenda, and its European allies stand to lose. U.S. media almost completely ignored the incident until Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh published a report challenging Western media, which had stopped insisting on Russian responsibility but failed to put forth any alternatives. Hersh detailed an American and Norwegian sabotage that had allegedly taken place during NATO maritime exercises [6]. Though the report is based on the comments of a single anonymous source, Hersh has published similar reports throughout a long and daring career in journalism, notably exposing the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and torture at Abu Ghraib prison. 

The Rand Corporation, a think tank established in 1948 and funded in great part by the Department of Defense, acts as the policy research arm of the United States Armed Forces. In a report called “Extending Russia,” the nonprofit finds that the most efficient way to counter Russia’s influence is in the economic domain. In the second measure of its economic program, the report details Russia’s tight connection with Europe through natural gas and recommends “stopping Nord Stream 2.” [7] The US has attempted to stop the construction of the pipeline through sanctions for years, but they have been inefficient overall [8].

The Russian economy is disproportionately reliant on fossil fuel exports, which fund 45% of the federal budget [9]. Nord Stream transports 30% of all natural gas coming from Russia, second only to pipelines crossing Ukraine [10]. Sabotaging Nord Stream represents a considerable blow to Russian capacity to generate revenue in a time of great need. The Ukraine War has become one war of attrition, so depriving Russia of much-needed revenues now could be crucial to NATO’s war goals. 

However, the immediate economic losses are not the most significant impact for Russia’s economic position in the European stage. An important part of American foreign policy to overcome Russia has been, as former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained during a 2014 interview with Welt N24, a German news outlet, “[…] to change the structure of energy dependence” to a “North American platform.”  The same day of the Nord Stream explosions, a new pipeline taking Norwegian oil to the European mainland was triumphantly unveiled. “You don’t want to have pipelines running through Russia and Ukraine,” she added. The Baltic Pipe, as the project is called, had a similar endpoint to Nord Stream, and transferred the dominance of the Nordic natural gas market away from Russia to Norway, Denmark, and Poland, the owners of the project. 

Most importantly, American natural gas exports have shot up massively since the beginning of the Ukraine War. In the face of shut pipelines, Europe has had to rely more heavily on American imports, even though the price is considerably higher [11]. The back-and-forth of natural gas as an object of leverage in the European continent in recent years, especially since the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, has now turned to benefit the United States. This year, 74% of its natural gas exports were directed to Europe, up from 34% last year. It has also enjoyed an 8.6% year over year increase in overall gas exports. European powers, constrained by their roles in NATO but deeply frustrated by being casualties in energy disputes, have spoken out. Germany firmly opposed U.S. sanctions on the Nord Stream project and carried out the contract for the project with Russia until recently [12]. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas denounced the United States for meddling in European Energy policy [13], and French President Emmanuel Macron lamented that American producers were charging high prices, saying, “I don’t think that’s friendly” [14].

The United States’ energy skirmishes against Russia collide with the larger geopolitical ambitions of other EU countries. At stake in these events is Europe’s cooperation and interdependence with Russia. The United States needs a European political community resolutely against all Russian influence. Through diminishing it, the United States gains ground in Europe against China, its main contender. But European powers like France are losing interest in the United States grand strategic vision, and instead have their own plans. Seeing how Beijing’s and Washington’s collision course will continue to drag Europe into costly trade wars (or worse), France has pushed for strategic autonomy of the region that will maintain its American allies but will separate Europe from further confrontation with China. This plan involves drawing the European Union into an alternative pole of power that is also militarily competent. Interdependence with Russia, even from afar, would allow the EU to decouple from American goals. Though ambitious, it may also delink the Russia-China bloc, further disengaging the EU from China. 

Even though it fits American foreign policy (both in theory and in practice), at a particular as well as at a global level, the White House cannot admit that it perpetrated the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage. Such a significant attack on energy infrastructure is an act of war against Russia. Both the United States and Norway have vehemently pushed back at accusations of the attack, and key investigators like Sweden have shut their findings behind doors of state secrecy. 

Recent theories that a pro-Ukranian group was behind the attack were as highly publicized as they were quickly discredited. The reason why there was so much press coverage could have to do with a waning interest of Washington to maintain Ukraine’s reputation combined with an eagerness to close the Nord Stream case. Disabling the pipeline and shifting the structure of energy dependence in Europe might prove more efficient in the United States’ goals of economic attrition against Russia—at any rate, this is just speculation. Whether by accident or design, the United States has overtaken Russia on the energy front by standing on the back of its European allies. It treads a fine line between keeping its enemies at bay and keeping its friends close. 

“To be an enemy of America can be dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal.”

–Henry Kissinger.

References

[1] GEUS har registreret rystelser i Østersøen. (2022, September 27). GEUS. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from https://www.geus.dk/om-geus/nyheder/nyhedsarkiv/2022/sep/seismologi

[2] Scandinavian seismic stations register explosions near pipelines, raising fears of sabotage. (2022, September 27). PBS. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/scandinavian-seismic-stations-register-explosions-near-pipelines-raising-fears-of-sabotage

[3] Streichholz, Josef. (2023, February 13). Conscious uncoupling: Europeans’ Russian gas challenge in 2023 – European Council on Foreign Relations. European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from https://ecfr.eu/article/conscious-uncoupling-europeans-russian-gas-challenge-in-2023/

[4] Harris, Shane, Hudson, John, & Birnbaum, Michael. (2022, December 21). No conclusive evidence Russia is behind Nord Stream attack. The Washington Post. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/12/21/russia-nord-stream-explosions/

[5] Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly At a Joint Press Availability – United States Department of State. (2022, September 30). State Department. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-canadian-foreign-minister-melanie-joly-at-a-joint-press-availability/

[6] Hersh, Seymour. (2023, February 8). How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline. Substack. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/how-america-took-out-the-nord-stream

[7] Dobbins, James, & Cohen, R. S. (2019, April 24). Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground | RAND. RAND Corporation. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3063.html

[8] Mason, Jason (2022, February 23). U.S. slaps sanctions on company building Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Reuters. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-plans-sanctions-company-building-russias-nord-stream-2-pipeline-cnn-2022-02-23/

[9] Energy Fact Sheet: Why does Russian oil and gas matter? – Analysis. (2022, March 21). IEA. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from https://www.iea.org/articles/energy-fact-sheet-why-does-russian-oil-and-gas-matter

[10] Extending Russia, April 24, 2019.

[11] Hernandez, America. (2022, November 15). Why cheap US gas costs a fortune in Europe. POLITICO. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from https://www.politico.eu/article/cheap-us-gas-cost-fortune-europe-russia-ukraine-energy/

[12]Ray, Siladitya. (2022, February 22). Germany Stops Approval Of $11 Billion Nord Stream 2 Pipeline With Russia. Forbes. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2022/02/22/germany-stops-approval-of-11-billion-nord-stream-2-pipeline-with-russia/?sh=2946f8533726

[13] US Senate approves German pipeline sanctions – DW – 12/17/2019. (2019, December 17). DW. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from https://www.dw.com/en/us-senate-approves-nord-stream-2-russia-germany-pipeline-sanctions/a-51711980

[14] cheap US gas, November 15.

On January 1^st of this year, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was inaugurated as Brazil’s 39th president after an unprecedentedly close race against Jair Bolsonaro, beating him by only 0.9% of nearly 119 million votes cast  [1]. Few days after his initial address, groups of Bolsonaro’s supporters stormed the Supreme Court, the presidential palace, and the Congress. The latter has an opposition majority, forcing Mr. Lula to compromise heavily on his anti-austerity measures in one of the countries hit hardest by Covid [2], and narrowing his already tight space for maneuvering around rising inflation, as well as economic slowdowns in the US and China.

He is not the only one facing hardship. The wave of newly elected left-leaning presidents in Latin America face a region devastated by the pandemic. The daunting challenges they face in rebuilding their respective countries, like reestablishing educational standards and restarting growth, are on many leaders’ agendas. The true size of the effects is still unknown, but governments must not wait to invest in social programs and infrastructure, as the World Bank suggests [3].

In fact, the problems have affected the region so deeply and comprehensively that effective solutions may only come from joint action. It is urgent for Latin America to commit to efficient collaboration. It may be the way to break the endemic cycles that riddle the region with seemingly insurmountable problems. Isolationist narratives do not help to construct comprehensive solutions to transnational issues. Though these are never complete transformations, the trend seems to indicate that the region is poised to re-engage regional cooperation in a renewed way. Hopefully a new type of undertaking is achieved through a renewed commitment: it may be the only way for Latin America to turn its fate around. 

Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s new president, is the newest member of the “Pink Wave” of democratically-elected left-leaning presidents across Latin America. It includes six of the largest economies in the region. All throughout the continent, different styles of left have risen to power over the last decade, most notably since 2018 with Mexico’s Andrés Manuel López Obrador. These ideological differences run deep, however. Newer electees, like Mr. Boric and Mr. Petro, have more internationalist views, with a strong emphasis on social justice and environmentalism. Others, like Peru’s Pedro Castillo and Bolivia’s Evo Morales, are heavy-handed leaders with an isolationist focus on nationalization. The latter includes dictatorships, such as Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, and former Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa [4]. 

There is not a real dichotomy between the two groups. Mr. Obrador has shown enthusiasm for fossil fuels, as has Brazil’s former president (and now poll-leading candidate) [5]. The latter’s views on abortion have been forced by the Evangelical voter base to be considerably more cautious than his progressive counterpart in Chile. Other differences include the degree at which constitutional reforms are applied, from a potential power-grab in Peru to the meticulous Lula ex-presidency. 

All these differences make for a fragmented region in a time when cooperation is of utmost importance. Latin America has been constantly assailed by social, economic, and political crises, all of which were exacerbated with the effects of the coronavirus pandemic, being one of the most affected regions. This overlaps with two other crises: economic contractions and a continuous degradation of democratic institutions [6]. 

Trouble in Regional Organizations

Discord runs high in the region’s foremost cooperation agency, the Organization of American States (OAS). Poor leadership, rampant attacks on the organization’s most prestigious branches, as Venezuela’s and Honduras’s assault on the human rights commission, and hesitant support from other members in upholding the institution have caused one of the worst institutional crises in the OAS’s history. Rattled by opportunism and political antagonism, genuine interest in regional cooperation has been fragmented into a plethora of blocs that has rendered chances of cooperation null [7]. 

These issues are not products of simple miscommunication. Nationalist agendas in key countries such as Mexico and Brazil hamper efforts to build significant relations beyond simple market accords. As social unhappiness grows, countries are keen on deflecting blame to their neighbors, and have been negligent in being inflammatory during times of domestic unrest, which has been rampant throughout the region. Tension caused by approaches to pandemic contention created yet another point of difficulty [8]. All these are further increased as public support falls apart, with an already low trust in institutions. 

Transnational Issues 

Historically, Latin America has had an insidious problem of external debt. The events leading up to the infamous “lost decade” and its catastrophic subsequent restructurings have solidified a vicious cycle where an inability to develop industry, and the dependence on extractive industries, cause a need to have a deficit trading balance [9].  As long as there are more imports than exports, the region will maintain an external debt, and its monetary debilitation means that debts are harder to pay [10]. 

A variety of trading blocs have been cropped up in the last decades, like Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, which focus on intraregional liberalization of both goods and people. Other organizations, like FEALAC and CELAC, have served as vehicles of interregional engagement [11]. Though these are proof of a degree of cooperation, they are not stalwart in their operation, and are quick to be paralyzed in the face of crisis and disagreement, resulting in disjointed periods of interest with little continuing goals [12].

Economic integration makes part of a complex array of transnational phenomena that has manifested in immense challenges for each individual leadership. Evidently, these can only be comprehensively approached transnationally. Migration is a destabilizing agent and an unpredictable force. Rebuilding a resilient health system is another challenge, especially in the light of migration and the pandemic. Security, as well as democracy and human rights, will be high on the priority lists as steep increases in violent crime undo the decrease of political violence, and as the responsible actors operate across borders. Economic integration, both within themselves and in the context of larger geopolitical actors like China , intrinsically needs to be addressed transnationally. Finally, the challenge to American hegemony in the region with China’s increased interest –and welcoming– in Latin America [13] will looming above all presidential offices, including Washington. 

Going Forward 

Not all hope is lost, however. With all its shortcomings, the bases for cooperation are set in most relevant areas for regional integration: jurisdiction, trade, health, and security. Organizations in these areas have a long history of successful cooperation, both in achieving larger economic ends and in defusing tensions within the region, and countries have followed a trend of coming to increasingly shared goals by which depolarization can happen. 

Though historically quarrelsome among themselves, the Latin American countries have a much greater sense of cultural unity than elsewhere. Traditions usually transcend borders, with an Incan past painting large swathes of the Andean states and a vast majority of Roman Catholics (up to 90% of the Latin American population) [14]. This is true in a historical sense too: South American countries, for example, share a Bolivarian independentist root, a cause that has bound the nations together. 

Despite their many deficiencies, what is most encouraging about these organizations is that they show that the groundwork for a heightened stable connection exists. All the relevant areas of regional integration have established commissions: trade, security, health, and politics. 

New leaders show enthusiasm to work with others in the region. Mr. Obrador has shown a break from his cold relations with Latin American leaders as Mr. Boric and Mr. Petro have expressed looking forward to working together with him [15]. Furthermore, ideologically different leaders such as Mr. Castillo and Bolivia’s Luis Arce were included in these statements, showing promise for amendments in the region’s fragmented face [16].

Prospects

Streamlining the operations of organizations like CELAC will help alleviate the region’s pressures in many ways, among them increasing reliance among neighboring countries and taking load out of domestic policy and relations with other foreign powers. This is particularly important in the midst of a change of the international order, and as Latin American countries are being forced to choose between spheres of influence. 

Moreover, being on the same page can provide the opportunity to show a more cohesive interest towards the larger international community. It can increase the weight of Latin American countries’ demands when setting multilateral agreements, like NAFTA, such that they represent their comparative advantages more accurately. 

Cooperation is a key tool for Latin American countries to face up to a renewed set of challenges. Establishing diplomatic synergy has proved difficult in the past, but perhaps the Pink Wave will reposition the continent more favorably. It is necessary that countries overcome narratives of isolation to break the economically unhealthy cycles that have been worsened by the pandemic. It may even be the case that opportunities to emerge arise from this: times of crisis are times of extra possibility. 

References

[1] Person, & Brian Ellsworth, L. P. (2022, October 31). Lula narrowly defeats Bolsonaro to win Brazil presidency again. Reuters. Retrieved February 3, 2023, from https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-votes-heated-bolsonaro-vs-lula-presidential-runoff-2022-10-30/ 

[2] Acosta-Ormaechea, Santiago, Ilan Goldfajn, and Jorge Róldos. “Latin America Faces Unusually High Risks.” IMF Blog. International Monetary Fund, April 26, 2022. https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/04/26/blog-latin-america-faces-unusually-high-risks

[3] Latin America and Caribbean Overview: Development news, research, data. (2022, October 7). World Bank. Retrieved February 3, 2023, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/overview

[4] “A New Group of Left-Wing Presidents Takes over in Latin America.” The Economist. March 12, 2022. https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2022/03/12/a-new-group-of-left-wing-presidents-takes-over-in-latin-america. 

[5] The Economist. “Left-Wing Presidents.” 

[6] Merke, Federico, Oliver Stuenkel, and Andreas E. Feldmann. “Reimagining Regional Governance in Latin America.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 24, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/24/reimagining-regional-governance-in-latin-america-pub-84813. 

[7] Merke et al., “Regional Governance.”

[8] Merke et al., “Regional Governance.”

[9] Sims, Jocelyn. “Latin American Debt Crisis of the 1980s.” United States Federal Reserve System. November 22, 2013. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/latin-american-debt-crisis. 

[10] Jaramillo, Carlos Felipe, and Marcelo Estevão. “Latin America Isn’t at Risk of a 1980s-Style Crisis (but an Era of Missed Opportunities Looms).” World Bank. August 29, 2022. https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/latin-america-isnt-risk-1980s-style-crisis-era-missed-opportunities-looms. 

[11] “Latin American and Caribbean Regional Organisations.” Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Accessed October 23, 2022. https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/regional-architecture/latin-american-regional-organisations#community. 

[12] Merke et al., “Regional Governance.”

[13] Merke et al., “Regional Governance.”

[14] “Christians,” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project, Pew Research Center. 18 December, 2022.

[15] Torrado, Santiago, and Manetto, Francesco. “El Triunfo De Gustavo Petro En Colombia Afianza El Camino De La Nueva Izquierda Latinoamericana.” El País Colombia. June 19, 2022. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/elecciones-presidenciales/2022-06-19/el-triunfo-de-gustavo-petro-en-colombia-afianza-el-camino-de-la-nueva-izquierda-latinoamericana.html. 

[16] The Economist. “Left-Wing Presidents.”