For much of the past two decades, Argentina has enjoyed an outsized reputation among progressive audiences abroad. It was one of the first countries in the world to legalize same-sex marriage, a regional pioneer in transgender rights, and the birthplace of the Marea Verde, the feminist wave that helped normalize abortion rights across Latin America and beyond. Domestically, Argentina appeared as a rare case where democracy, redistribution, and social progress advanced together.

Its foreign policy, however, tells a more contradictory story.

Rather than a simple oscillation between Kirchnerist leftism and Javier Milei’s libertarian radicalism, Argentina’s international trajectory reflects a deeper structural problem: both projects attempted to organize foreign policy through populist logics in a world no longer governed by stable hegemonies. To understand why this strategy worked at home but failed abroad, it is necessary to examine how populist reasoning operates, and where its limits lie.

Why Populism Worked at Home

The Kirchnerist era is inseparable from the theoretical framework developed by Ernesto Laclau. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and later On Populist Reason Laclau argued that political identities are constructed through discourse rather than pre-existing social categories.^{1 2} A political “people” emerges by linking heterogeneous demands into a chain of equivalence, unified against a common antagonist.

This logic proved highly effective in Argentina’s domestic politics. Labor unions, human-rights organizations, feminist movements, and economically marginalized groups were articulated into a broad pueblo opposed to neoliberal elites and international financial institutions. Despite internal tensions, these actors shared a fundamental democratic baseline: elections, civil liberties, and constitutional legitimacy were not in dispute.

This shared normative ground is essential. Laclau’s populist logic presupposes a political arena where conflict occurs within democracy. Foreign policy does not operate under these conditions.

Exporting the Chain of Equivalence

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner sought to extend this domestic logic to the international arena by framing Argentina as part of a Global South coalition resisting U.S.-led liberal hegemony. As Pereyra Doval and Colalongo show, Kirchnerist foreign policy was explicitly constructed as counter-hegemonic, grounded in South–South cooperation and opposition to Western financial power.

China fits relatively smoothly into this framework. Beyond its diplomatic support for Argentina’s Malvinas claim, Beijing offered infrastructure investment and alternatives to Washington-based financial institutions, reinforcing its image as a credible counterweight to U.S. dominance. Russia played a similar symbolic role.

The contradictions emerged when the logic of equivalence was stretched beyond strategic balancing and into normative alignment.

Iran and the Moral Limits of Equivalence

The 2013 Memorandum of Understanding with Iran exposed the fragility of Kirchnerist foreign policy. Iran was not merely another state marginalized by the West; it was formally accused by Argentine prosecutors of orchestrating the 1994 AMIA bombing, the deadliest antisemitic attack in the country’s history.

By pursuing diplomatic normalization, the Kirchnerist government attempted to incorporate Iran into a broader anti-imperialist coalition. Yet this move collided sharply with Argentina’s post-dictatorship identity as a defender of human rights and judicial accountability. Critics argued that the agreement subordinated justice to geopolitical expediency, creating the appearance, if not the reality, of complicity.

From a Laclaunian perspective, this was not hypocrisy but conceptual overstretch. A chain of equivalence can unite heterogeneous actors only so long as their differences do not negate the values binding the chain together. Iran’s political system, grounded in religious law, gender inequality, and repression of dissent, could not be reconciled with Argentina’s progressive self-image. The chain snapped.

ALBA and the Democracy Problem

A similar contradiction emerged in Argentina’s alignment with ALBA governments such as Venezuela and Cuba. Framed as expressions of anti-imperialist solidarity, these partnerships associated Argentina with regimes that systematically eroded democratic institutions, repressed opposition, and restricted civil liberties.

As Colalongo and Sezek note, these alignments offered limited strategic benefit while imposing significant reputational costs. Domestically, Kirchnerism championed feminism, LGBTQ+ rights, and the memory politics of Nunca Más. Internationally, it defended governments that criminalized protest and dismantled judicial independence.

Here, the limits of populist foreign policy became evident. Foreign policy lacks the shared normative ground that allows populist equivalence to function domestically. Antagonism alone cannot substitute for institutional compatibility.

A Counter-Hegemonic Project, Now Closed

With the benefit of hindsight, Kirchnerist foreign policy can be understood as a completed cycle. Its counter-hegemonic ambition was coherent in intent but fragile in execution, and its limits cannot be explained simply by the external pressure of neoliberal globalization.

As Andrés Malamud and Federico Schenoni argue, Latin America’s declining relevance in world politics is best understood as a long-term structural trend, evidenced by the region’s diminishing share of global population, economic output, and diplomatic weight. In their Nueva Sociedad article, this marginality is not treated as the result of a single policy failure or ideological orientation, but as a sustained trajectory shaped by enduring systemic constraints and weak regional coordination. Their analysis thus describes a specific historical configuration in which Latin America’s international influence steadily eroded, regardless of shifts in domestic political orientation.

In a complementary argument developed in Foreign Policy, Malamud and Schenoni further contend that Latin America’s loss of visibility on the global stage was reinforced by the broader international context of the post-Cold War era: a period marked by U.S. unipolarity, limited strategic rivalry in the region, and the absence of issues that would make Latin America central to great-power competition. Within such a system, even ambitious foreign-policy projects faced narrow margins for success.

What has changed since, however, is not merely the orientation of Latin American governments, but the structure of the international system itself, raising new questions about whether the conditions that underpinned this earlier diagnosis of irrelevance continue to hold.

Milei and the Illusion of Restoration

Javier Milei’s foreign policy is often portrayed as a radical rupture, and ideologically it is. He rejects Global South solidarity and seeks explicit alignment with the United States and the Western liberal order, presenting Washington not as an imperial adversary but as a civilizational ally.

Yet this project unfolds in a world fundamentally different from the one Kirchnerism sought to resist. The era of neoliberal globalization as a stable hegemonic order has ended. The rise of explicit great-power competition, reflected in recent U.S. security doctrine, has altered the conditions that once sustained Latin America’s marginality.

This does not mean the region has become powerful or autonomous. Rather, its irrelevance can no longer be assumed.

Milei’s attempted realignment faces structural constraints: Argentina remains commercially tied to China, financially dependent on the IMF, and embedded in regional and institutional relationships that cannot be undone at will. His foreign policy therefore remains an open project, subject to adjustment rather than definitive evaluation.

Conclusion: Populism After Unipolarity

Argentina’s recent foreign policy history reveals a broader lesson about the limits of populism beyond ideology. Populist logics can successfully articulate heterogeneous democratic demands within a shared institutional framework. When projected onto the international system, however, those same logics falter.

Kirchnerism’s counter-hegemonic project collapsed under normative contradictions exposed by alliances with authoritarian regimes. Milei’s neoliberal realignment remains an unfinished reaction to the same structural transformation: the end of unipolarity and the fragmentation of global order.

Both projects sought ideological coherence in a world increasingly resistant to it. Argentina’s foreign policy dilemma, therefore, is not primarily ideological but structural. Resolving Argentina’s foreign policy dilemma will require abandoning the illusion that global politics can be organized through populist equivalence alone.

1. Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Repr. London: Verso, 1999. ↩︎
2. Laclau, Ernesto. On Populist Reason. London: Verso, 2005. ↩︎

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Javier Milei, Image sourced from Live and Let’s Fly | CC License, no changes made

Introduction 

Since its inception 80 years ago, German democracy has been largely dominated by two major political parties, the Christian Democratic/Socialist Union sister parties (Union) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The Union and SPD have since been in coalition either together or with a smaller partner like the Greens or Free Democratic Party (FDP). In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, given the discontent surrounding German bailouts for other European Union (EU) member states, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party formed, leeching voters from the Union who were discontent with continued EU Membership. The AfD didn’t start as a far-right party, but its trajectory shifted under Frauke Petry, who chaired the AfD from 2015 to 2017. Her leadership marked a pivot to hardline nationalism, defined by anti-immigrant rhetoric, pro-Kremlin sympathies, and echoes of antisemitism.

The AfD has had particular electoral success in the Bundesländer (Federal States) which used to be part of the Communist German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The reason behind such a split can largely be attributed to the perceived social cleavage, where the populace of the east has yet to feel properly integrated with the rest of the country. This social cleavage is reinforced by the continued economic disparity between the east and west, and the disproportionate impact of the migration crisis, among other crises, on eastern Germans.¹ The 2017 federal elections were the first in which the AfD surpassed the five percent electoral threshold required to enter into the German Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag). Since their entrance into the Bundestag, the AfD has attempted to erode the quality of German democracy, historically and contemporarily considered as one of the strongest worldwide. 

Since its explosive rise in 2015, the far-right AfD has reshaped German politics, not by taking power, but by pushing the boundaries of democratic norms. While the party has yet to enter government, its influence is undeniable. This piece turns back the clock to the pivotal years from 2015 to 2018, well before the pandemic and recent surges in far-right momentum, to trace how the AfD’s radicalization and entry into the Bundestag began testing the strength of Germany’s democratic foundations. Understanding this earlier phase is essential to grasping that today’s democratic vulnerabilities didn’t emerge overnight. Even in one of Europe’s most robust democracies, the AfD has been building for years.

To assess its impact, we draw on political scientist Leonardo Morlino’s five-dimensional framework for evaluating democratic quality: rule of law, accountability, freedom, equality, and responsiveness. Did the AfD’s actions already start to erode these pillars, or simply expose cracks that were already there? By breaking these dimensions into procedural substantive and outcome-based categories, we can better understand how a party on the fringe pressures a democracy to confront its own limits. 

1. Procedural Level: Rule of Law and Accountability 

According to Morlino’s article What is a Good Democracy, the procedural level of democracy is composed of two separate but related dimensions: rule of law and accountability. Accountability refers to the idea that citizens, independently rather than through a third party, are able to evaluate their satisfaction with the government’s attempts to meet their needs. In the case of Germany, and most other western liberal democracies, this would refer to the idea that citizens are able to vote for the parties which best match with their aligned interests without any interference. The rule of law is the idea that the law is above all else, so that no political actor may act in manners which would go against the fundamental laws of the land. Germany holds a rigid constitution and very strict bureaucratic procedures in order to prevent the repetition of the atrocities of the Second World War. Hence, the rule of law has been at the heart of the new Federal Republic ever since its inception, and reinforced during the reunification of the country. 

The rise of the AfD would be considered by some to be proof that there is in fact strong accountability within the political system. Since Petry came into power, the AfD’s pivot into the rhetoric of anti-immigration as a centerpiece policy, although controversial, has led to the electoral success of the AfD. These shifts were notable not just nationally, but also regionally as the AfD made significant gains in the regional parliaments, especially in those of former East German states. While the rise of the AfD reflects a troubling shift in German politics, it nonetheless confirms that German democracy permits and responds to electoral accountability, as voters dissatisfied with the status quo were able to express their discontent through proper institutional methods. 

While accountability may still be intact, within German democracy, the rule of law has been called into question several times since the rise and radicalisation of the AfD. A cornerstone of German law has been an intolerance to the denial of the Nazi government’s persecution of Jews during the Second World War, confirmed through many notable cases of jurisprudence. However, despite its criminalization under the penal code, leaders of the AfD have almost consistently denied the atrocities of the Holocaust. Beyond Holocaust denial, leaders of the AfD continue to use many of the same anti-semitic slogans and conspiracy theories which still remain illegal under German law. The AfD’s reshaping of history, including Holocaust denial, is one of its many dangerous tools used in an attempt to erode the rule of law. 

In some cases, the AfD has not only been behind attempts to erode the rule of law, but also attempts to overthrow it all together. While only recently uncovered, the Tag X or “X-Day” conspiracy, which attempted the overthrow of the German government through the creation of a paramilitary ‘shadow army,’ has been long underway and investigated since 2017. While an extreme example, the explicit participation of several AfD party members and close ties between the organization and prominent AfD members is a clear warning of the existential threat the AfD poses to the rule of law. While concerning, the revelations of the AfD’s attempts to undermine German democracy shouldn’t come as a surprise, given the messages propagated by members, along with their background in the Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist Underground, NSU), and other Neo-Nazi groups.

While the AfD may enhance procedural democracy through accountability, they also significantly deteriorate it through their active efforts to undermine the rule of law. The success of the AfD was due to its shift to solve the discontent of many East Germans towards mainstream parties, as well as Germans who were unhappy with Merkel’s open migration policy. Yet the antisemitism and proper attempt at the complete overthrowing of the state are indicative that the AfD does not respect the rule of law. While German democracy may be improved through the AfD’s response to the distresses of citizens usually ignored by mainstream parties, the existential threat which it poses to the rule of law would affirm the idea that the AfD negatively impacts democracy on the procedural level.

2. Substantive Level: Freedom and Equality 

The substantive level, according to Morlino, is also composed of two dimensions, those of freedom and equality. The former refers to the respect of citizen’s rights “that are expanded through the achievement of a range of freedoms.” The latter dimension refers to the pursuit of citizens’ political, social, and economic equality through progressive policies. These two dimensions are inherently intertwined in the European liberal democracy, as redistributive policies, such as social security, are embedded into the freedoms and rights which are guaranteed to all citizens. 

In terms of the rights and freedoms provided, the AfD is not particularly against the idea of these kinds of rights, but is instead a proponent of limiting its application to the people of Germany or Volk, excluding minorities and immigrants. The AfD constantly uses liberal democratic concepts, such as citizenry, to normalize its illiberal exclusion of groups who do not fit within their understanding of the German people. Minority rights exist as a fundamental part of German law, attempting to exclude certain people groups from the Volk inherently breaches this principle of German law. 

Not only does the AfD actively attempt to exclude oppressed groups from the freedoms entitled to citizens, but they go further by trying to deprive them of their fundamental rights. Most notable would be the use of ‘Christian values’ in order to justify the restriction of same-sex marriage, trans recognition, and a womans rights to abortion. While it is obvious how the rights of the LGBTQ+ minority might be targeted by the former two, it is not so obvious for the latter issue. From an intersectional gender perspective, actions targeted against women disproportionately affect women of color and other minorities due to the intersection of oppressive factors such as race, socioeconomic class, and sexual orientation. The pursuit of these anti-gender equality policies, which the AfD is attempting to carry out throughout the whole country, would be a major affront to the fundamental rights of women, especially those who do not form part of the Volk so idealized by the AfD. 

With the AfD so vocally against the rights of those who would not fit into the German Volk in their perspective, it could be assumed that they would think similarly for Morlino’s dimension of equality. German Marxist theorist Bernd Belina would argue that the AfD pursues a more radicalized approach to the “abstract equality,” which is pursued by most capitalist societies in the present day. The equality is abstract in the sense that it applies only to those who engage in the national economy, hence unemployed people should not be afforded equality. Similar to other new right–wing parties, the AfD is even further against the Marxist sense of equality, as it follows a contradictory combination of neoliberal and ‘anti-elitist’ economic ideology. The combination of these two ideologies results in an economic system which would end up benefiting those who are already privileged economically (Belina, 2017). An economy which benefits those who are already privileged would correlate to the ideology of the German economy only for the Volk, although in practice the benefits only extend to elites rather than the entire Volk. 

While the AfD, according to left-wing theorists, benefits only the elites through neoliberal policies, this would be counterintuitive given the rise of the AfD at the aforementioned expense of the left in former East Germany. In reality, the AfD must pursue a much more nuanced approach to equality due to their reliance on former voters of the left party as their electoral base. The term “Ordoliberal Chauvinism” was first coined by Arnaud Brennetot to describe the strategic positioning of the AfD regarding its policies in response to Belina’s work. The term encapsulates the conflicting interest groups which the AfD must appeal to, those in the East who feel disillusioned with the German state and those in the West who are upset at the seeming left-wing interventionist policies of the Union. Ultimately, due to the incompatibility of chauvinism and ordoliberalism, one of the ideologies must take precedence or the entire political project could be at risk of failure. The choice of either chauvinism or ordoliberalism would fundamentally impact the direction of the party in neglecting or outright opposing equality. 

The change in leadership of the AfD after the 2017 federal elections serves as an indicator that the party leadership chose Chauvinism, and so actively opposed equality. The start of Alice Weidel’s leadership in 2017 showed a shift of the AfD to pursue a more nativist and populist approach, prioritizing the Volk and demonizing Islam among others, in order to secure electoral support. While some might argue that AfD chauvinism since 2017 has pushed equality between the east and west of the country, the active exclusion of immigrants, racial minorities, LGBTQ+ groups, etc. from Germany would lend to the idea that the AfD on a societal level actively pursues less equality. 

3. Results Level: Responsiveness 

The final level of analysis in Morlino’s framework on the quality of democracy would be the results level, focusing on the characteristic of responsiveness. Responsiveness, according to Morlino, is very highly related to the idea of accountability, in that it refers to citizens’ perception of the legitimacy of the government. In a state with high levels of responsiveness, the citizens should ultimately be confirming their satisfaction with the current ongoings of the government. However, the rise of the AfD may be indicative of a current unsatisfactory state with the state of Germany’s democracy. 

The creation and rise of the AfD itself can be considered a testament to the strong responsiveness within Germany’s young democracy. Since reunification, voters in Eastern Germany have consistently felt underrepresented by mainstream parties, as evidenced by their persistently lower voter turnout, averaging 72.5% in 2017 compared to 76.2% in western states, as seen above. The swift entrance of the AfD into the parliaments of many Bundesländer in the east supported by former leftist or undecided voters is indicative of such. While support for the left party in the East may have been attributed to their status of successor of the East German communist party, their inability to address the needs of the eastern people facilitated their electoral punishment and the rise of the AfD. The change in strategy under Petry, becoming the party for ordinary East German citizens treated worse than predominantly Muslim immigrants, facilitated the rise of the AfD as the largest member of the opposition. At the expense of other parties, the rise of the AfD remains a testament to the strong accountability of German democracy towards the voting population. According to Morlino’s dimension of responsiveness, a high-quality democracy must reflect the preferences and demands of its citizens, even when those demands lead to political shifts that challenge the status quo. 

However, a largely contested issue within the German system remains the high scrutiny of the AfD party by institutions, seen as a method of preventing the change of the vote. The establishment in Germany has long pursued a strategy of containment, attempting to minimize the influence of extremist parties primarily on the right of the political spectrum. Containment in Germany, or Ausgrenzung has resulted in the German system as an outlier from others in Western Europe with a very minimal influence on the development of the political system. Given the historical context of Germany it would make sense as to why the population has supported the mainstream parties in their attempts to curb far-right extremism. Despite all the institutional attempts to freeze out the AfD as too extreme to be elected, the 2017 election was indicative that enough of the population was no longer content with the status quo. While the AfD may have entered the Bundestag as the largest member of the opposition party, many continuous attempts have been made to reduce their influence in the political process. 

The perceived apathy of large German political parties to the situation of ‘regular Germans’ was made evident numerous times since the Euro and migration crises. Many Russian-speaking or Volga Germans made their stance quite clear in the aftermath of the migration crisis their discontent with the continued immigration of Arab speakers. While often dismissed for their irony, immigrant-origin Germans voting against immigration would be indicative of a larger shift towards nativism in the German population. Volga Germans immigrated to Germany due to their national ties with the country after the dissolution of the USSR, hence the dismissiveness of the mainstream parties would only add legitimacy to the AfD as the champion of the interests of the German people. Far-right parties can, with justification, argue that they are being frozen out of the political system arbitrarily, thus blaming the issue of the quality of democracy on the current institutions and mainstream political establishment. 

However, when looking at the issue of far-right parties and their inclusion into the political system, one cannot overlook the profound impact of the Third Reich on shaping the political system of the present. Most importantly, the “Grundgesetz puts explicit limits on the freedom of association” banning extremist beliefs, halted funding for parties who express such beliefs, and permisive political non-cooperation or Ausgrenzung with such parties. The legal limits on the freedom of speech set out in the constitution set a legal expectation for the exclusion of the AfD from the political process. Hence, attempts by the established parties to freeze out the populist anti-immigrant AfD are in fact a strong sign of German democracy defending its constitutional values.

Conclusion 

While the AfD has yet to enter government, multiple scholars indicate that they are not a good sign for the long term quality of German democracy since the era of their radicalization in the aftermath of the migration crisis. Taking into account Morlino’s three levels on the quality of democracy, the AfD constantly attempts to undermine the quality of democracy on all levels. Procedurally, while the AfD may be indicative of a higher level of accountability, their constant violations of the rule of law, seen through Holocaust denial, extremist views, and attempts to subvert democratic institutions, are indicative that overall, the AfD is a threat to the democratic order established in the mid twentieth century. On the substantive level, the AfD through its restructuring into a nativist Volk oriented party, has only pushed to undermine the rights and freedoms of minority groups and thus create an inherently unequal society where only the members of the Volk are set to gain. It appears that the AfD contributes to the responsiveness of German democracy, through their representation of groups such as the Volga Germans, who have largely been ignored by mainstream parties. However, their attempts at responding to a perceived democratic deficit serve only to legitimize their illiberal agenda and so would rather weaken German democracy. 

Though many would argue that the rise of the AfD is a testament to the democratic resilience of Germany’s political system, the ability of the AfD to erode the democratic institutions upon their entrance is often overlooked. In a country in which education is mandatory regarding the horrors of the Third Reich, as a result of the National Socialist Party’s strategic co-optation of democratic institutions, the rise of the AfD is surprisingly not seen with as much concern. While German democracy may remain strong, the radicalization of the AfD around 2017 serves as a critical turning point for its future. It is therefore all the more important to remain vigilant against the AfD’s ongoing attempts to erode liberal democratic norms, so that ‘never again’ remains not only a reflection on Germany’s dark past, but also a safeguard for a democratic and hopeful future. Considering the AfD is now the second largest political force in Germany, it is ever more crucial to ensure the tradition of the firewall against extremism, Brandmauer, is respected so the AfD remains unable to erode German democracy from a position of institutional power.

1.  Merkel, Angela, and Baumann, Beate. Freiheit. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2024. ↩︎

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Frauke Petry, Image sourced from Heute | CC License, no changes made