Scholars on white saviorism criticize volunteer tourism by alleging that the primary motivation of the practice is often for the tourist to construct a benevolent image of herself, while the actual effects of the volunteer activities are secondary or even harmful.[2] Thereby, volunteer tourists, who are mostly white, implicitly portray themselves as the developed saviors of the radicalized non-white people that supposedly need the help of the white volunteers to develop. This binary that contrasts active, Western volunteers against passive locals is apparent on some volunteer tourism organization’s websites. There, the locals are sometimes presented as “needy” and without agency of their own.[3] Some activities of volunteer tourism organizations further reinforce that binary. Andrea Freidus, who is an anthropologist at the University of North Carolina, found a particularly illustrative example in her research on a volunteer tourism project in Malawi. In the project, tourists oversee the distribution of food to poor locals, while the food is wholly paid for by local initiatives.[4] The problem with these acts is that they render locals as passive and allow voluntourists to believe that their external help is needed for local communities to develop.[5]

Can uncovering logics of white saviorism help those local communities? I argue that it can and that spreading awareness about white saviorism in volunteer tourism is helpful for several reasons. Firstly, when current and future volunteer tourists learn about the concept of white saviorism, they are forced to think about the historical origins of the idea of benevolent white saviors versus dependent communities in the Global South. For instance, European colonialism was partly justified based on the claim that non-Europeans were underdeveloped and needed to be educated and developed by the white rulers.[6] Furthermore, by questioning the dichotomy of the white helpers versus passive locals, white saviorism confronts voluntourists with their own biases. Questioning their stereotypes is needed for volunteer tourists to accept the locals as independent, active actors with whom together cross-cultural cooperation can occur.[7]

Once the stereotype of locals, who need Western help to develop, is questioned, a discussion on whether and how voluntourists really aid the locals can emerge. There is evidence that many voluntourism projects focus on the tourist’s desires before the needs and desires of the host community. Volunteer tourism projects are mostly run for-profit, which means that the customers’ interests are frequently prioritized before local needs.[8] For instance, studies show that many children in orphanages have living parents.[9] But instead of trying to support their parents, volunteer tourism projects incentivize families to send their children to orphanages, where volunteers pay to help the children. This is deeply problematic because voluntourists often have limited skills and only stay at the projects for a short time, which results in them hindering work progress and completing unsatisfactory work.[10] There are certainly many voluntourism projects that are well thought out and help local communities develop by providing additional resources and skills. But the concept of white saviorism is important by highlighting that volunteer tourist projects often focus primarily on the volunteers’ needs instead of the local’s needs. In that way, those projects can harm rather than help local communities.

To tackle the issue of white saviourism, it is crucial to pressure the volunteer tourism organisations to educate their participants about the history and contemporary issues in the host country. Andrea Freidus, for instance, argues that pre-departure workshops on the local society can go a long way in keeping volunteer tourists from reinforcing white saviour dynamics and help tourists find intercultural understanding. [11] The Global Brigades, a sustainable development organisation, already has such pre-departure information courses in place and requires its volunteers to read about white saviourism.[12] To ensure that their projects are helpful, volunteer organisations should also make sure to better match volunteers’ skills with the local community’s needs.[13]

In sum, this article is not meant to imply that volunteer tourism in general reinforces white saviourism. There are many organisations and volunteer tourists that help local communities develop and do so with the right intentions. Yet, there is considerable evidence that some organisations and volunteer tourists implicitly reinforce binaries of Western, white saviours and dependent communities in the Global South. It is crucial to uncover these implicit logics in order for volunteer tourists to recognise local communities in the Global South as independent actors. Hopefully, uncovering the logics will lead to better cross-cultural understanding and volunteer tourism projects that primarily serve the needs of the locals and not the volunteers.

Works Cited

Bandyopadhyay, R., & Patil, V. (2017). ‘The white woman’s burden’ – the racialized, gendered politics of volunteer tourism. Tourism Geographies, 19(4), 644-657.

Freidus, A. L. (2017). Unanticipated outcomes of voluntourism among Malawi’s orphans. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 25(9), 1306-1321.

Guttentag, D. A. (2009). The possible negative impacts of volunteer tourism. International journal of tourism research, 11(6), 537-551.

Kawas, R. & Colbert, S. (2020). We Are Not The Saviors of This Story: Addressing White Saviorism Together. Retrieved from https://blog.globalbrigades.org/addressing-white-saviorism/

Rosenberg, T. (2018). The business of voluntourism: do western do-gooders actually do harm? The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/sep/13/the-business-of-voluntourism-do-western-do-gooders-actually-do-harm

Wearing, S., Mostafanezhad, M., Nguyen, N., Nguyen, T., Than Nguyen, & McDonald, M. (2018). ‘Poor children on Tinder and their Barbie Saviours: towards a feminist political economy of volunteer tourism. Leisure Studies, 37(5), 500-514.

Zeddies, M., & Millei, Z. (2015). “It takes a global village”: Troubling discourses of global citizenship in United Planet’s voluntourism. Global Studies of Childhood, 5(1), 100- 111.

References

[1] Bandyopadhyay, Patil, “Volunteer tourism and ‘The White Man’s Burden’”, 645.

[2] Bandyopadhyay, Patil, “Volunteer tourism and ‘The White Man’s Burden’”, 650.

[3] Zeddies, Millei, “Troubling discourses in United Planet’s voluntourism”, 105.

[4] Freidus, “Unanticipated outcomes of voluntourism”, 1313.

[5] Wearing et al., “Towards a feminist political economy of volunteer tourism”, 503.

[6] Bandyopadhyay, Patil, “the racialized, gendered politics of volunteer tourism”, 650.

[7] Freidus, “Unanticipated outcomes of voluntourism”, 1319.

[8] Guttentag, “The possible negative impacts of volunteer tourism”, 541.

[9] Rosenberg, “The business of volunturism.”

[10] Guttentag, “The possible negative impacts of volunteer tourism”, 541.

[11] Freidus, “Unanticipated outcomes of voluntourism”, 1318-1319.

[12] Kawa, Colbert, “Addressing White Saviorism Together.”

[13] Guttentag, “The possible negative impacts of volunteer tourism”, 548.

The current geopolitical situation is the product of a July 1974 coup d’état in which the Greek government deposed Cypriot President Makarios III, a clergyman who had resisted Greek attempts at unification with Cyprus, and replaced him with Nikos Sampson, a Greek nationalist and irridentist. Greece aimed with the coup to annex Cyprus as a Greek territory. Turkey responded by invading Cyprus five days later and eventually captured around a third of the island. Makarios retook control of the Republic of Cyprus later that year but failed to unify the island, and the Turkish-controlled region, Northern Cyprus, declared statehood and independence in 1983.

Most negotiations in the last four decades have sought to reunify Northern Cyprus with the rest of the island.[1] But the most recent attempts at reunification failed in 2017, and the October 2020 election of Northern Cypriot President Ersin Tatar, a Turkish nationalist and supporter of Erdoğan, makes reunification unlikely.[2] Observers expect Tatar to reject any talks of reunification and to encourage Erdoğan and Turkey to play a more active role in Northern Cypriot domestic politics going forward.[3]

Officially, Turkey supports a two-state solution in Cyprus on the grounds that Northern Cypriots should have sovereignty and self-rule. Hami Aksoy, a spokesperson from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, said in a statement last week that “a fair, lasting and sustainable settlement is only possible if it is based on the will of the two peoples who are the co-owners of the island.”[4] Aksoy added that Turkey does not see reunification as an acceptable outcome in Cyprus “because the Greek Cypriot side does not consider the Turkish Cypriot people as an equal partner and does not want to share the power and wealth [of Cyprus with them].”[5]

But some Northern Cypriots resent Turkish interference in the country, which they see as subverting Northern Cyprus’ sovereignty and independence.[6] Hundreds of Northern Cypriots protested Erdoğan’s visit to the country last week, calling for “no interference” and “freedom for all.”[7] In spite of some internal opposition to Turkish interventions in the country, Northern Cyprus seems set to cede some of its sovereignty to Turkey in the aftermath of Tatar’s election as president.[8]

Turkey has a strong strategic incentive to create a sovereign, internationally recognized Northern Cypriot state. Turkey hopes to lay claim to the substantial hydrocarbon deposits found near the coast of Cyprus.[9] Its attempts to do so by launching natural gas exploration missions to the Cypriot coast have drawn backlash and sanctions from the EU, which sees those Turkish missions as illegal.[10] The Republic of Cyprus claims that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entitles it to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) over the hydrocarbon deposits.[11] Northern Cyprus disputes that claim,[12] and if it became a sovereign state UNCLOS would likely entitle it some drilling rights in the region. As Northern Cyprus cedes parts of its sovereignty to Turkey, Turkey could exploit those drilling rights for its own gain.

The situation in Cyprus comes with the backdrop of Turkey’s continued attempts to join the EU. Turkey first applied for EU membership in 1987 and the EU recognized its candidacy in 1999. Negotiations for Turkish accession to the EU began in 2005 but have stalled in recent years in part because of Turkey’s continued support for a sovereign Northern Cypriot state. The EU sees Northern Cyprus as a territory of the Republic of Cyprus that is illegally occupied by the Turkish military.[13]

Erdoğan said on November 22 that Turkey still hopes to accede to the EU and called on the body to grant Turkey full membership. But Turkey’s continued support for a two-state solution in Cyprus makes its membership bid unlikely to succeed. Because Turkey has a strategic incentive to back Northern Cypriot sovereignty and win a claim to the hydrocarbon deposits off the Cypriot coast, it seems unlikely that Turkey will renounce its support for a two-state solution and accede to the EU in the near future.

References

[1] Al Jazeera, “Turkey’s Erdogan says Cyprus should aim for ‘two separate states,’” November 15, 2020.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Nektaria Stamouli, “Erdoğan calls for ‘two-state’ solution for Cyprus,” Politico, November 15, 2020.

[4] Ekathimerini, “Turkey slams EU over Cyprus,” November 16, 2020.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Al Jazeera, “Turkey’s Erdogan says.”

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Deutsche Welle, “Turkey’s Erdogan calls for ‘two-state solution’ in Cyprus,” November 15, 2020.

[10] Deutsche Welle, “Turkey, Cyprus and gas deposits: What you need to know,” July 16, 2019.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] James Ker-Lindsay et al., An Island in Europe: The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).

Written by: Will Waddingham, Saybrook ’22

The Spanish Supreme Court ruled Saturday that several prominent Catalonian seperatist leaders would face up to fifteen years in prison for their role in Catalan’s independence movement.^[1] The leaders were convicted of sedition and of misusing public funds. They were found not guilty of the higher charge of rebellion.^[2]

The Spanish government is hoping that the Supreme Court decision will help the country move on from the political crises of the last two years. Catalan declared independence on October 27, 2017.^[3] The declaration came a month after a divisive federal election that was marred by police brutality, and triggered the most intense political crisis in Spain since the death of former dictator Francisco Franco in 1975.^[4] The leaders of Catalan’s independent government were arrested shortly after they declared independence, and have been held in pretrial detention since their arrest.

Prosecutors sought a twenty five year sentence for Oriol Junqueras, the former deputy leader of Catalan’s independent government.^[5] Junqueras instead received a 13-15 year sentence, as prosecutors were unable to prove that he had instigated violent rebellion.^[6] The defense maintained throughout the trial that the actions of the separatists were peaceful and nonviolent. The eight other leaders currently held in jail will receive lighter sentences.^[7] Three others were found guilty of disobedience, an offense that does not incur jail time.

Catalan is Spain’s most important economic region, as well as its wealthiest. The Spanish government hopes that the conclusion of the trial will facilitate better dialogue between Catalonian leaders and the federal government.

It is not immediately clear whether Saturday’s ruling will calm tensions or inflame them. The Spanish government deployed riot police to Catalan in anticipation of the expected guilty verdict.^[8] Independence leaders, who see the seperatist leaders as “political prisoners,”^[9] have pledged that Saturday’s guilty verdict will only spark greater dissent and fuel activism towards independence.^[10] Several rallies are planned for the coming days. It is thus unclear if Saturday’s decision will mark the conclusion of the recent independence movement, or if it will only open a new chapter in the push for separatism. 

Works Cited:

^[1] Joan Faus, “Catalan separatist leaders to get up to 15 years in jail: judicial source,” Reuters, October 12, 2019.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] The Local, “Spain braces for verdict in Catalan separatist leaders’ case,” October 12, 2019.

^[4] Ibid.

^[5] Al Jazeera, “Spain: Catalan separatist leaders to get ‘up to 15 years in jail,’” October 12, 2019.

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] Faus, “Judicial Source.”

^[8] The Local, “Spain Braces.”

^[9] Al Jazeera, “Spain: Catalan”

^[10] The Local, “Spain Braces.”