The continent of Europe is seeing the rise of a new global war, not one characterized by trenches or tanks, but with gray zone conflict. With the start of Russia’s summer offensive in Ukraine, Moscow also increased its hybrid attacks in Europe. These attacks occur in the ‘gray zone,’ meaning that they fall just below the threshold of war. Hybrid attacks include weaponized migration, sabotage, cyber attacks, assassination attempts, and more, all of which Russia continues to direct at Europe and the United States. Hybrid attacks gained prominence in European security after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, where Russia used “little green men”—Russian operatives masquerading as independent defense groups. Many observers assumed the operatives were in fact Russian troops, but their lack of insignia, their operational security, and the Kremlin’s silence on the matter gave Moscow a degree of deniability that it successfully exploited. Similar hybrid attacks have happened throughout history, with increasing notice during the Cold War, as assassinations and sabotage were carried out by both the Soviet Union and Western countries in an effort to undermine one another. Using hybrid attacks and waging war within the gray-zone allow the perpetrating country cover to carry out these attacks, while also making the threat ambiguous in order to avoid further escalation. Hybrid warfare proves especially potent against democratic countries, which are often rigid in their policy structures, making it hard for the whole bureaucracy to respond quickly outside of a crisis.
Although Western nations have caught on to these Russian hybrid tactics, responding to them has become no less challenging. While NATO Secretary Generals Mark Rutte and Jens Stoltenberg condemned the attacks publicly, Russia continues to further escalate its sabotage campaign. With these attacks dramatically increasing in recent months, the West can no longer afford to sit back as Russian sabotage looks to undermine democracies in the West and weaken consensus in the EU and NATO.
While Russia’s motivations for sabotage in Europe are not immediately clear, some have suggested Russia conducts its hybrid operations in order to weaken the alliance’s support for Ukraine. This is highlighted by Russia’s clear focus on the defense sphere, with the targeting of defense storage centers and supply lines, as well as the assassination attempt on Arman Papperger, the CEO of German defense company Rheinmetall. However, hybrid warfare in Europe started long before the invasion of Ukraine. Both the USSR and the United States engaged in hybrid attacks during the Cold War, using political, economic, and clandestine means to weaken and undermine one another. Especially common on the part of the Soviets was the use of political assassinations. In recent years, it appears Moscow has re-embraced political killings as a tool of statecraft. For example, in 2019 Moscow ordered a hit on an ethnic Chechen in Berlin, and the U.S. and Germany foiled a Russian plot to kill the CEO of Rheinmetall, a German defense firm.
However, the hybrid threat facing Europe goes beyond assassinations to tactics like cutting undersea wires in the Baltic Sea and committing arson at defense factories across Europe. These operations allow Moscow to eliminate political enemies, while also minimizing cost and maximizing damage. In response, Western officials have tightened security around defense infrastructure. These costs are borne by each country individually, instead of being diffused across the alliance, stretching Europe’s resources in defending against and responding to these attacks. An example of this is Russia jamming signals in Europe. Security experts debate if this is a deliberate hybrid attack by Russia, or in Russia’s eyes, an unintended and happy consequence of their warfare in Ukraine, but nevertheless, the consequences to Northeastern Europe prove costly, with over 350 flights canceled a day, and severe economic losses forecasted. With the costs acute for individual nations, Russia can build up its military capabilities, while forcing western states to draw on their resources, giving Russia a greater advantage in a long confrontation with NATO.
In response to hybrid attacks from Russia, NATO continues to rely on a strategy of ambiguity. After the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the alliance anticipated more hybrid warfare and published a strategy for combating it. The strategy underlines strengthening intelligence sharing and NATO’s ability to “deter and defend” against these attacks, but not much beyond this. After the recent Washington Summit, the alliance re-emphasized that a hybrid attack could invoke NATO’s collective defense, but NATO still largely leaves it up to each ally to decide its response to hybrid attacks. The alliance faces other challenges as well. For example, defending against a covert attack on Russia proves difficult with the multiplicity of domains and the vast amounts of infrastructure Europe must defend. Additionally, the allies have often lacked political will to respond to these attacks. Some Transatlantic leaders fear publicly attributing these attacks to Russia will further escalate the situation and prefer to maintain ambiguity as part of an escalation management strategy. With a lack of large NATO or EU response to Russian hybrid operations, it is implied that NATO is either not strong enough to respond or attribute these attacks to Russia, or that the alliance is fractured and political consensus can not be reached, both of which further embolden Russia to continue these attacks.
Nonetheless, there are steps the West can take to respond more directly to these attacks and re-establish deterrence vis-a-vis Russia. For example, the United Kingdom recently revoked the accreditation of several Russian diplomats believed to be spies operating out of the Russian embassy in London under diplomatic cover. In 2018, an array of Western countries took part in a larger expulsion after the poisoning of a former Russian spy on English soil. Another way to limit the access of Russian agents is to limit their diplomatic freedom of movement. Poland pioneered this method in May by limiting Russian diplomatic agents’ accreditation to the territory they work in, thereby reducing the area in which Russian agents working under diplomatic cover could theoretically attack. The implementation of this strategy requires coordination through the European Union—although eight member states signed on to limit diplomatic movement, the EU will need to build greater political consensus to achieve a meaningful result.
Limiting diplomatic movement and accreditation can help reduce the opportunities available to saboteurs to carry out offensives, but NATO information campaigns also help combat hybrid attacks. An information campaign centered around NATO’s hybrid warfare strategy shows Russia that the alliance takes note of these attacks, and will respond, potentially strengthening deterrence without escalating the situation. In the case of hybrid attacks, information campaigns prove useful to help shore up political will to respond. NATO’s information campaign after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine was particularly successful. This U.S. campaign of publicizing intelligence lessened the political cost of sanctioning Russian gas for German leaders, whose country heavily relied on imported Russian gas.
Successful information campaigns like this one are only made possible through proactive alliance intelligence sharing. The alliance can serve as a facilitator of bilateral partnerships for intelligence gathering. Ukraine (although not a NATO member) and the United States proved the strength of this strategy. The CIA has been training and equipping Ukrainian agents since 2016 in a move beneficial for both countries. This gives the United States access to operatives fluent in Russian, and familiar with Russian culture with easy access into Russian espionage circles to collect intelligence while allowing Ukraine to perpetuate a shadow war in response to the Russian invasion. Similar partnerships could take place across the alliance with countries well equipped to train and equip operatives, with other countries whose citizens have strong linguistic and cultural ties to Russia, such as the Baltic states. These partnerships could help bring action to NATO’s statement of “defending and deterring against hybrid attacks” with states working together to collect intelligence and prevent any attacks.
Although Russia seeks to remain below the threshold of war, its increased aggression in Europe jeopardizes the security for countries in NATO and the EU. As with any relatively new security concept, NATO and the EU’s security strategy must adapt to adequately provide safety to its member states. Through more restrictive treatment of diplomats and the spies who hide among them, increased information campaigns, and intelligence gathering partnerships, the West can take concrete steps to thwart Russia’s hybrid war. Combating Russia’s shadow war requires NATO and the EU to revise their hybrid warfare strategy to build a safer Europe.
Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: 1st Council at new HQ, taken on May 9 2018 | Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made