In late September 2024, civil war erupted in the home of one of Mexico’s largest cartels––the Sinaloa cartel––after the abduction of two key leaders, Joaquín Guzmán López and Ismael Zambada. Following the incident, the city of Culiacán saw unprecedented levels of crime and bloody in-group warfare. Though, while many view the abductions as outliers, this instance was not one of isolated violence. Rather, it was a calculated result of years of bitter conflict and power struggle among competing groups and internal rivalries. In the early 1990s, lenient anti-drug campaigns saw a dramatic rise in cartel presence, one which did not go away even after the introduction of stricter enforcement policies such as militaristic intervention under former president Felipe Calderón, elected in 2006. These cartels not only competed for a lucrative market of illicit drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine but also controlled a significant portion of political and law enforcement officials, something only mediated years later following the electoral defeat of the largely cartel-controlled Institutional Revolutionary Party. Ultimately, the exponential rise in homicides heading into the 21st century and larger political changes within many Latin American countries marked an era of violence, fear, and conflict. But, the decision to fight for control of a market or territory is not a simple one; war has an incredibly high opportunity cost. Essentially, these “agency costs” are manifested in the money and resources funneled into the creation of private militias, planning of strategy, and possible risk of losing territory or vital funds. Nevertheless, data demonstrates that cartel violence is very much still a presence in Mexican society. Between 2015 and 2022 alone, there was an exponential increase in the deaths of both combatants and civilians fighting in non-state armed groups like cartels, reaching up to nearly 20,000 killed in a single year alone. But if violence is largely undesirable due to its unprofitability, what are the forces that drive cartels such as the Sinaloa toward conflict? Essentially, why do they engage in inter-cartel fighting in lieu of better options? This analysis seeks to use academic frameworks to better understand the factors contributing to cartel violence––namely, the logical underpinnings of violence––to better address the root causes of both internal and external fighting, and devise a path to possible solutions in the future.
As political scientist Christopher Blattman explains in his book Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Path to Peace, there are five principal reasons why conflict occurs: leader interests, reputational concerns, commitment problems, uncertainty, intangible incentives, and misperceptions. Cartels in Mexico seem to continuously face a combination of the first three. Because large cartels such as the Sinaloa obtain a large stream of income from the sale of illicit drugs, they become more sensitive to political and economic changes. If these groups feel as if they are being tapped out of the market, or something threatens their hegemonic hold on a particular territory––such as the city of Culiacán––they are more likely to believe that warring to attain possible benefits outweighs the potential risk of conflict. For instance, in the case of the Gulf Cartel, a paramilitary breakaway subgroup, the Zetas, triggered the cartel’s perceived decline in the early 2000s. The Zetas’ increasing monetary power and military influence over critical regions, combined with President Calderón’s harsh anti-drug campaign, left the Gulf Cartel feeling pushed out of the market. These frustrations led to violent reactions by the Gulf Cartel, prompting the beginning of infighting in 2010 when Zetas leader Heriberto Lazcano made a formal split as a result of tensions in the Northeastern region of Tamaulipas, which served as a significant trading route between Mexico and the United States, ultimately demonstrating the slippery slope leading economic insecurity to snowball into intercartel warfare.
Moreover, in Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley’s paper “Why Did Drug Cartels Go to War in Mexico?” greed and reputational concerns are cited as principal causes for group conflict. This is best realized in 2023, when more than 70 active armed groups vied for command over the top drug hubs. Notably, contentious areas such as Michoacán have been a recent battleground for skirmishes with the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, led by Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, who seeks to take territory from local criminal organizations who are blocking his expansion. To further this effort against rivals like the Sinaloa, Cervantes has strengthened presence in nearly 27 different territories, especially in contentious areas where there are challengers for control over drug-producing and trafficking routes. As leaders climb the ladder and get closer to controlling more of the profit, their desire for reputation––and the destruction of anyone who threatens it––continues to build. In this instance, intangible factors such as reputation and the ambitions of leaders seeking to dominate competitors and control resources play a significant role in understanding why cartels choose the unprofitability of war. But this occurs with nearly every member, not just those at the top.
These reputational concerns start young, when men from impoverished backgrounds, with lack of access to schooling and the traditional job market, take positions as cartel soldiers to boost their social status in their communities. For instance, a 2021 study from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography found that the majority of those imprisoned in Mexico––especially for drug-related activity––were men under the age of 29 who had previously experienced poverty, hunger, and unemployment. A lack of access to employment opportunities has led many young men to join cartels because they feel they have no other option to escape cyclical poverty. Moreover, they have a greater incentive to follow their leader because reputations of cartel members are so contingent on the success of the cartel, these leaders may decide to go to war to win hegemony over a particular market or geographic territory.
Another critical incentive is commitment problems; the inability to negotiate or secure agreements with opposing sides fosters a lack of faith within the negotiating cartel, ultimately resulting in fracturing and civil war. The most poignant example of such is the instance of splintering in the Zeta cartel following stricter anti-drug laws from former Mexican President Felipe Calderón. Because Calderón’s policies sought to drastically increase prosecution and militarization in response to cartel activity, there was larger pressure put on groups such as the Zetas. Given that many were already facing in-group struggles, this political pressure made it more difficult to bargain with each other and the government, resulting in groups choosing to fight. In “War as a Commitment Problem,” political theorist Robert Powell expands on this take, arguing that a party’s inability to fulfill inter-cartel agreements can create a vacuum of trust, where neither party feels confident about continuing their relationship. Given two rational actors, either one or both always believes that the other is trying to deceive them, especially if there are significant economic or social interests at play. These suspicions, intensifying under political and reputational pressures, drive cartels toward conflict. Notably, lack of communication between splintering cartel groups who seek to compete for hegemony or sign a concession agreement causes structural factions to deepen, limiting opportunities for peace.
Violence, or lack thereof, is surprisingly logical in many cases. But while groups such as rival cartels often make rational choices to go to war, they may also do the same in bargaining, serving as a deterrent to war. This can occur within cartels, or between cartels and third parties such as the government, NGOs or members of the Church. For instance, in February of 2024, four Roman Catholic bishops organized meetings with leaders of cartels in cities like MichoacanMinchoacan to bargain for a peace agreement following presidential approval, demonstrating that peace, just like war, according to Blattman and other political theorists, is a matter of strategic game theory, taking into account vast incentives of numerous actors. Essentially, bargaining can be a double-edged sword, either it falls victim to reputational concerns or commitment problems, or, it is able to prevail as a deterrent to violence. While there are many cases of violence occurring within conflicting groups, this does not tell the full story. Mexico is a burgeoning democracy, but despite its improvements in access to education and employment outcomes, much of the country still remains impoverished with a large amount of government corruption due to the hegemonic rule of cartels such as the Sinaloa and JNGC. This leads one to question: can sustained, perpetual peace be a true possibility, or is it just a fleeting goal?
It is critical for neighboring countries––especially those with significant power and resources such as the United States––to push for policy that may allow for the opportunity for in-group fighting to be ameliorated. Through the introduction of initiatives reducing the incentive for cartels to go to war, and decreasing incentives to join cartels in the first place (by reducing poverty and increasing access to education) as well as stronger controls to prevent civilian casualties and commitment problems, the bloody strife present in major drug trafficking zones such as Michoacan and Veracruz can face a continuous shift towards mutually beneficial concessions. While cartel violence is unlikely to go away entirely, and simple incentives are unlikely to be a solvent for the entire problem, they provide a good start to promote a pathway to peace.
Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Mexican Army in Tamaulipas, taken on Feb 19, 2024 | Image sourced from FMT | CC License, no changes made