The year is 2023 and artificial intelligence, one of the most salivating issues for American and European legislators, is picking up steam in legal chambers. While Microsoft, Alphabet, and Oracle battle the competition in stock exchanges and software development rooms, legions of lowly infantrymen fight to stave off the encroaching threat of government regulation. Meet AI’s wiliest defender: the lobbyist. AI lobbying to Congress surged by 7,567% from 2016 to 2024 with companies such as Microsoft and Alphabet spending $2.4 million (€2.21 million) and $3.4 million (€3.13 million) respectively in the first quarter of 2023 alone. A collective 123 companies, universities, and trade associations spent roughly $94 million (€86.6 million) during the same period. In contrast, the entire lobbying efforts of the European Union’s tech sector totaled $122.65 million (€113 million) in 2023—a 16% increase from 2021 due to push by big tech companies in response to the then-in-the-works AI Act. By June 2024, the EU legislators had an approved Artificial Intelligence Act, and the US had nothing to show for its efforts—even after lobbyists ostensibly favored some form of regulation. What was the difference? And why did the money vary so drastically across the Atlantic?
Lobbying on the whole is more expensive in the United States than in the European Union. Total lobbying expenses in 2022 topped $4.11 billion (€3.79 billion) in the former while only $110.56 million (€120 million) in the latter during the same period. The US registered 12,665 lobbyists in 2022 and the EU 12,425 respectively in the same year as well. Even adjusting for inflation, high profile legislation, and employment rates, lobbying expenditures in the US vastly outstrip those of the EU. This article examines the underlying factors that may contribute to this disparity, focusing on the skills demanded of lobbyists, the role of money in the process, the goals of lobbying structures, and the social environments in which they operate. Through a review of academic sources and legislative texts, this analysis seeks to uncover how these elements shape lobbying practices and regulatory frameworks on both sides of the Atlantic.
Before delving further, it is essential to first define what a lobbyist does. Most sources agree that a lobbyist is someone who lawfully acts to influence governmental policy in favor or against a certain position. Traditional interpretations point to these persons as brokers in transactions between policymakers and special interest groups, exchanging “money for favors,” “information for policies,” “costly access [i.e.] information,” and/or “legislative subsidies.” However, new research portrays lobbying as a complex ecosystem built on relationships where lobbyists act as intermediaries between various parties. The rise of commercial lobbying firms points to a web connecting “citizens, corporations or special interest groups[,] and policymakers” that is not as straightforward as previous models suggested. These intermediary services now include “direct advocacy [to government], legislative strategy advice, formation of coalitions and grass root organizations, legislative drafting for policymakers, legislative witness-hearing preparations, and public relations for both clients and policymakers.” The bulk of a lobbyist’s time must then be spent to “build, preserve, and then commodify these relationships.” A lobbyist will fill their days contacting government offices, going to government hearings/briefings/meetings, writing/reading reports, going to special interest groups briefings/meetings, and perhaps, occasionally, hosting a cocktail party or two.
When this is put into practice, however, lobbyist’s strategies will differ between the United States and European Union. American style lobbying is often more direct and “aggressive” than across the Atlantic.1 Lobbyists aim either to pass legislation favorable to their contractors or ensure unfavorable bills do not pass—reflecting the country’s “winner-takes-all” approach to legislation where not every bill gets signed into law.2 Such urgency is fueled by rapid legislative turnover and constant election cycle pressures where someone is up for reelection every two years.3 An ever-fixated news cycle also pressures quick fixes, flashy action, and last minute earmarks—prompting winning lobbyists to be quick to speak up and slow to back down.
Lobbying in the European Union, in contrast, is more subdued and “cooperative.”4 EU politics does not follow a “winner-takes-all” model nor the brisk pace of US elections. Politicians are more removed from immediate electoral pressure due to the “second-order election problem” where citizens are predisposed to prioritize national representatives over EU ones. (No allusion to the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ conundrum were made.) As a result, there is less urgency to pass or reject legislation quickly. EU lobbyists focus on compromise and technical expertise, recognizing that proposals will likely undergo modifications over several years. This is also what the EU bodies themselves prefer, as one researcher noted, because limited bureaucracy size meant that bureaucrats tended to “acknowledge the need for outside input as [they] lack technical capabilities in many policy areas for which [they are] responsible.”
When analyzed empirically, the breakdown between the United States and European Union is even more astounding. One study of 149 interviewed lobbyists across 47 policy—issues, with half in the US and half in the EU—reported that 43% of EU lobbyists attained success through compromise as opposed to 31% for the American ones.5 Or, by number of cases, 6 out of 21 American cases would end in compromise versus 12 of 26 European ones.6 On the whole, US lobbyists tended to act more “all-or-nothing,” reflective of the “winner-takes-all” approach,” with 46% attaining “none of their lobbying goals (39% for EU), and 23% “all of their lobbying goals (17% for EU).7 This difference highlights the varied lobbying styles: the US favors immediate, definitive results, while the EU values long-term relationships and cooperative knowledge. Or, in the words of one researcher, Americans use “gangster style” and Europeans “speak softly, softly.”8
The distinct legislative processes in the US and EU affect lobbying expenditures as well. In the US, where media scrutiny is intense and elections are frequent and expensive, lobbyists dedicate additional focus on providing the funds politicians need to stay in office. This campaign support is vital in both cultivating and sustaining relationships that can later be commodified amongst parties. Corporations, unions, and trade associations—with their generally deeper pockets—have the means to comply. In contrast, the EU’s lobbying efforts focus on informing technocrats and building external support for proposals within national governments. Political researchers do not mention lobbyists’ interests in campaign funding to say nothing of something to the scale of the United States’ enterprise. Perhaps this difference, one where Europeans are more concerned with “long term relationships and trusts over donations or pressure,” explains why money plays a less critical role in EU lobbying compared to the US.
Another source of discrepancy may simply come from the accountability methods in place across the regions. In the United States, lobbying is governed by several key regulations designed to promote transparency and accountability. The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995, later amended in 2022, requires lobbyists to register and report their activities, including financial expenditures. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) of 2007 further strengthened these requirements, imposing stricter disclosure rules and penalties for non-compliance. Indeed, fines run up to $200,000 (€184,270) for the LDA and $50,000 to $200,000 (€46,067.50 to €184,270) for the HLOGA. Corporations and organizations cannot donate directly and must jump over campaign finance hurdles by forming political action committees (PACs) to do so. These PACs are then subject to a bevy of scrutiny from the money, specific candidates, and specific platforms they support.
In the EU, where lobbying is regulated primarily through the EU Transparency Register, a joint initiative by the European Commission, European Parliament, and Council of the European Union to record all entities who “carry out activities to influence EU policy.” This register—hanging precariously between mandatory and voluntary—encourages lobbyists i.e. “interest representatives” to disclose their activities and expenditures, promoting transparency and ethical lobbying practices. In practice, it includes a public website, a code of conduct, and a complaints mechanism that was beefed up in 2021 with the passage of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a Mandatory Transparency Register but where lobbyists opt to put in the information they desire—and whose website desperately needs data quality checks per the European Court of Auditors’ most recent report.
The sustainability of the registrar is further tenuous considering that only the Commission mandatorily requires key information, ranging from “basic identification, interests represented, financial and human resources involved, sources of funding, clients, and associated organizations wherever applicable” (it remains optional for the Parliament and Council), and the Council continues to make publications of interactions optional (it is mandatory for the Parliament and Commission). Additionally, as a voluntary act, punitive fines are impossible and the only recourse is removal from the register by the Secretariat. The Code of Conduct for Interest Representatives, adopted in 2008, does not fare much better as it outlines the buzzwords, i.e. principles, that lobbyists must adhere to, including honesty, integrity, and respect for democratic institutions but no force to back it up.
It is possible, of course, that some ‘lobbying discrepancies’ might be explained away due to a fallible accountability system. Qatargate, afterall, occurred after the 2021 register overhaul and registrants are routinely removed for failure to comply with checks by the Secretariat. Yet attributing such divergence in lobbying capital between the US and EU to deficient accountability is too neatly pessimistic and flippant of other underlying causes. Just because the register needs bolstering does not mean it is unserviceable. There must be more at play.
Perhaps, there truly is something ‘cultural’ to the difference of lobbying expenditures. The multi-national and multi-level governance structure of the EU adds complexity that the US model does not grapple with. While large multinational corporations and industry groups have significant lobbying power, they must navigate a more diverse and fragmented regulatory environment. Economic power is distributed across different member states, each with its own interests, priorities, procedures, and practices. Lobbyists must engage with multiple stakeholders, including the Commission, the Parliament, and member state governments repeatedly, consistently, and knowledgeably amongst high compartmentalization, and, in the case of the countries, periods of rapid electoral turnover. While the most extensive lobbying efforts will be directed towards the proposal-initiating Commission, this “institutional labyrinth” requires a great emphasis on consensus-building and might lead to accounting numbers being dispersed among many more areas than their American counterparts.
Beyond the aforementioned symptom, however, researchers have a difficult time explaining how it is that ‘culture’ leads to monetary differences. One study starkly lambasted the idea that behind-the-scenes lobbying was for secret bribery and intimidation—which would clearly not be captured by the register and whose. Another ridiculed the concept that lobbying is simply more discreet and laissez-faire in the EU—arguing it is just as present and vital. One public watchdog reported on a country-led approach by lobbyists whose influenced state ministers would then influence the EU bodies in turn—which might explain a lower spending level for the top brass but appears quite case-specific. Claims that the EU is simply a newer institution than the United States prove interesting, but, once again, they fail to explain how that decreases lobbying spending. And on further comparison, Brussels lobbyists appear to be paid more and even employed more regularly than Washington D.C. ones much to the chagrin of a ‘simplistic explanation’ (1, 2, 3, 4).
Indeed, at least three studies found no robust correlation between spending and influence while another found a limited link in issues with low news presence which is indeed interesting but not geared towards the question posed by this article. Yet another study9 found a positive link between the number of lobbying staff employed and lobbying influence—though its promise to this paper’s prompt appears limited due to the similar numbers registered lobbyists between the US and EU plus the relative pay grade of both. However, one study on 183 experts across 41 policy areas determined that the biggest correlation occurs between special interest groups with “higher levels of public congruence also hav[ing] a higher influence reputation.” The researchers further concluded that
“economic resources are a vital component for developing effective lobbying campaigns” meaning “that interest groups with greater economic resources are more likely to reap the benefits of aligning with public opinion, as they have the means to cultivate expertise and generate pressure on policymakers, while policymakers will also be more receptive to their input due to their congruence with public opinion.”
Is this conclusion satisfying? Yes. But does it explain why spending is on the whole less in the EU than in the US? Not quite, although it might hint that the vapid attention of the US news media on national legislation might influence lobbying spending more than in the EU with its “second-order election problem.” It could also nod to the EU’s longer-term, cultivation approach which might send numbers lower per year as well. Finally, one might extrapolate that there is not as much overwhelming pressure to lobby within the highly technocratic EU system than in the US’ the ‘all-or-nothing,’ ‘winner-takes-all’ system. Nonetheless, the researchers themselves note that “[i]t would be valuable for future studies to test [their] findings in other contexts, such as the United States” and that “[t]he role of economic resources may be more pronounced in the United States, where financial donations to political candidates are more common.” Once again, differences in lobbying numbers must simply be a multitude of factors that, for better or worse, boils down to ‘je ne sais quoi’ to its non-citizens.
The system refuses to offer a singular encapsulating explanation as to why spending discrepancies exist between the US and EU except to point towards pervasive cultural differences that influence actions. An analysis focusing on the skills demanded of lobbyists, the role of money in the process, the goals of lobbying structures, and the social environments in which they operate has concluded that campaign finance arrangements, differing accountability mechanisms, multi-tiered governmental levels, a longer time frame for legislation, and a more diffused media focus might all factor into the financial discrepancy. Through a review of academic sources and legislative texts, lobbying frameworks and exigencies have been understood to differ greatly in the United States and European Union as well.
Overall, lobbying is an integral part of the political process: it is access and accountability to the fabled annals of powers. Yet it is a double-edged sword especially with who wields it. Lobbying tends to be concentrated on those with the means—regardless of which side of the Atlantic one may find themselves in. Whether embroiled in a campaign finance arms race or an expertise-sharing initiative, awareness of how this power is acquired and utilized is vital to build more resilient, accessible institutions. As the US and EU navigate the complexities of the 21st century, the future of lobbying will be shaped by several emerging trends. The increasing role of technology and social media in political campaigns and advocacy efforts is transforming how information is shared and gathered. Digital lobbying strategies, including online grassroots mobilization and social media campaigns, are becoming more prominent, allowing interest groups to reach broader audiences and exert influence more effectively. Simultaneously, politics is becoming more divided, with populism, echo chambers, and targeted social media feeds increasing inflammatory pressures. Politics is truly the study of human action, and it is rapidly changing every day. Understanding the inherent differences between these powerful systems will prove crucial for addressing the democratic challenges associated with lobbying and the general use of power, ensuring a balanced approach to policy-making for decades to come.
Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Two travelers standing on path with flags of USA, European Union and China by Marco Verch | Image sourced from KostenLose Fotos | CC License, no changes made
- Woll, C. The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison. Int Groups Adv 1, 193–214 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2012.10 ↩︎
- Ibid. ↩︎
- Ibid. ↩︎
- Ibid. ↩︎
- Mahoney C. Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union. Journal of Public Policy. 2007;27(1):35-56. doi:10.1017/S0143814X07000608 ↩︎
- Ibid. ↩︎
- Ibid. ↩︎
- Woll, C. The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison. Int Groups Adv 1, 193–214 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2012.10 ↩︎
- Woll, C. The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison. Int Groups Adv 1, 193–214 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2012.10 ↩︎