The fall of Assad’s regime came as a surprise, but Russia’s swift abandonment of one of its closest allies was even more unexpected. While Russia had previously intervened in the Syrian civil war in 2015 when the regime’s survival was uncertain, its response to the November 27th Syrian rebel offensive was only limited to inconsequential airstrikes.
This is not the first time Russia has distanced itself from an ally. During the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Russia refrained from assisting its CSTO ally, Armenia, in stark contrast to its decisive support during the First Karabakh War in the early 1990s, which ultimately secured Armenia’s victory over Azerbaijan.
However, there is a critical distinction between the cases of Russia’s disengagement from Armenia and Syria. While Russia’s indifference towards Armenia is usually seen as symbolic punishment for Yerevan’s democratic revolution in 2018, its withdrawal from Syria signals a change in strategy — prioritizing the war effort in Ukraine over assisting its allies.
This shift therefore raises urgent concerns for Russia’s other allies which depend on it for security, particularly Abkhazia and “South Ossetia”, the pro-Russian separatist regions of Georgia. Each region maintains a small force of 2,200-2,500 men, while each of the two Russian military bases in these territories houses over 4,000 troops — making Moscow’s presence nearly twice as strong as local forces. With their security and financial stability largely reliant on Russian support, the growing reluctance of Moscow to intervene and assist its allies places these separatist regions in an increasingly precarious position.
The excessive reliance on Russia raises concerns about whether it will provide support if the Georgian government attempts to retake these regions by force. Even if the current Georgian government seems reluctant to use force against the breakaway regions, the ongoing political crisis might bring about a new government with a new approach, and will actively try to regain the separatist regions. How will the separatist leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia adapt to ensure their security? Currently, the two separatist regions of Georgia are faced with two possibilities: further integration with Russia or self-reliance and diversification.
Since Russian assistance is crucial to the security of separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia can mitigate the risk of abandonment by increasing their strategic value to Moscow. By aligning more closely with Russian interests, they can strengthen their position and ensure continued support. The logic is simple — the more geopolitically valuable the region presents itself, the greater the incentive for Russia to maintain its protection over them.
Strengthening economic ties between Russia and the separatist states presents a key strategy for ensuring their stability and security. Encouraging more investments in natural resource industries could create the necessary economic incentives for Russia to protect its business interests in the region. One such plan includes establishing a car factory and beginning oil extraction. However, a more effective strategy for economic integration may lie in the expansion of the region’s tourism industry amid the ongoing war in Ukraine. As currently Russian citizens have significant problems going abroad for holidays, separatist regions of Georgia could be viable substitutes. The region’s affordability, use of the ruble, and widespread Russian language proficiency create a strong incentive for Russian tourists, fostering economic ties and strengthening social connections between the populations. This growing interdependence generates public pressure within Russia to maintain security in the separatist regions. Another option could be the relocation of some industries in the separatist regions by Russia. As the two breakaway regions of Georgia are less advanced economically, their populations might be willing to work for a lower wage for the same work. Setting up new industries would help to develop the economies of the separatist regions and provide more jobs for the population. Relocation of relatively simple military industries away from the range of Ukrainian drone strikes could also be advantageous for the Russian defense industry.
Another option is political integration which could lead to a view that the regions are “basically parts of Russia” and therefore should be defended in case of an attack. Of course, this approach could include joining the Russian Federation altogether. This could be more of an option for “South Ossetia”, as uniting with the Russian Federation is a common populist rhetoric voiced by the region’s leadership before the elections to gain political support from the population. Therefore, the separatist government can use the populist narrative to integrate more closely with Russia without risking any nationalistic opposition in the population over the loss of “sovereignty”. In other words, “South Ossetian” leaders can prioritize preventing Georgian control of the territory over independent governance.
Military cooperation can be another direction of further integration. “South Ossetia” could deploy military personnel to the frontlines in Ukraine as a demonstration of loyalty to Moscow. Given Russia’s urgent need for reinforcements, this gesture of goodwill could serve as a strong bargaining chip for securing long-term Russian protection. By assisting Russia in a critical moment, “South Ossetia” may strengthen its strategic value, increasing the likelihood of Russian support in the event of a future military conflict. Additionally, participation in Ukraine would provide “South Ossetian” forces with valuable combat experience, further enhancing their military capabilities.
However, establishing even closer relations with Russia does not seem to be an option for Abkhazia, as Abkhazians harbor more nationalistic sentiments compared to the Ossetians, and generally do not support joining the Russian Federation. Proposals to further integration with Russia even sparked a serious protest in Abkhazia last year, which resulted in the resignation of the “President”. This also means that the separatist region risks abandonment from Russia in a similar way to Armenia, as democratically electing a more nationalistic leadership that is less keen on further cooperation with Russia risks retaliation from Russia. The other alternative to further integration with Russia would be to try and become more self-reliant and avoid putting all eggs in one Russian basket. This would include the formulation of a more flexible foreign policy instead of becoming overly dependent on Russia.
The backbone of the new approach would be to manage playing with both the Russian and the Georgian sides in order to retain the “independence” of the separatist region. The goal of the approach would be to ensure a limited Russian presence in the region while establishing relations with Georgia in order to avoid military confrontation in the case Russia withdraws completely. However, this new foreign policy contains significant risks, as it must not strain relations with Russia before establishing the desired level of relations with Georgia. In other words, Abkhazia must also not rely too much and too quickly on the Georgian side, as establishing too deep of ties with Georgia runs at a risk of a Russian retaliation which could include reducing financial assistance which would undermine the function of the separatist government altogether. Reconciliation with Georgia could also bring about a risk of losing support from the local nationalistically minded population. Thus, the leadership of the separatist region has to ensure a balanced approach.
One of the aspects of this solution could be to strike deals with the Georgian government. Negotiating the return of a limited number of up to 250,000 Georgian refugees, or improved conditions of the Georgians currently living in Abkhazia in exchange for, ideally, a guarantee of non-aggression could be one such deal. Another field where an agreement can be made is the supply of electricity. As Abkhazia is going through winter with a limited supply of electricity, a deal that would ensure a stable supply of electricity from Georgia for a respectable price could be one of the agreements that would build trust and assurance between the two parties. This would also make retaliation from Russia less severe, as there would be less leverage that Russia can pull against Abkhazia. Any such deal would mean a significant compromise from the Abkhazian part, of course, but this will be much easier to do with the political party “Georgian Dream” currently in charge of the Georgian government, as one of their principal talking points is a critique of the previous government, according to which “it threw the separatist regions into flames of war in 2008”. Even if the current Georgian government seems unwilling to threaten the separatist regions, an ongoing political crisis might produce a new government with a different approach.
In conclusion, Russia’s recent involvement in Ukraine has led its leadership to shift its strategy and abandon its allies in support of pouring more and more resources into its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This puts Russian allies in the Caucasus, the separatist regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” in a very tough spot. As they depend on Russian troops for security, recent shifts in Russia’s geopolitical strategy have left them vulnerable to potential Georgian reclamation. Therefore, these separatist regions must adapt and find new security strategies. This leaves them with two options. One option is further integration with Russia, which seems more beneficial for “South Ossetia”. The other option is to engage in talks with Georgia and try to formulate a more independent and self-reliant foreign policy, which seems to be the path for Abkhazia. However, it is not only Russian allies in the Caucasus that are keeping an eye on the changes in Russian strategy. Russian obsession with Ukraine should raise questions for all Russian allies, including not only other breakaway, separatist regions like Transnistria but more important players like North Korea, Iran, and China as well.
Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Syrians celebrate the Fall of Assad | Image sourced from FMT | CC License, no changes made