On November 11th, Iraqi citizens will elect a new Council of Representatives, the 329-seat unicameral legislature of Iraq, with every seat up for election. Fewer than half of Iraq’s voting-age population has registered to vote, which is nothing new for a country whose young republic has long struggled to encourage high voter turnout. This persistent apathy is indicative of Iraq’s many systemic problems and the futility that many Iraqis associate with elections.
Regardless of the outcome of the federal elections, Iraq remains in a precarious position due to political norms established after the 2003 collapse of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime and continued influence of both the United States and Iran. Elections in Iraq have consistently produced only minimal change, unable to address the deeply ingrained issues the country faces.
Iraq’s political system, designed to prevent the dominance of one ethnic group as seen during Hussein’s Sunni Arab-supremacist government, has instead further increased divisions and hindered the formation of a unified movement capable of change. After the 2003 invasion, Iraqi officials, with the encouragement of the occupying U.S. forces, established a confessional system of government similar to those of Lebanon or Northern Ireland, intended to divide political power among Iraq’s different ethnic and religious groups. The system, known as muhassa, while ensuring representation across numerous ethno-religious groups, has also encouraged people to vote based on sectarian identity and has further alienated members of different groups.
Around half of Iraq’s population identifies more with their ethnic or religious group than with the Iraqi identity, a number that has consistently declined since the defeat of Islamist forces in the region. Iraq’s media landscape, fragmented across outlets aligned with one of the 38 political parties contesting the elections, often inflames sectarian tensions to pander for votes, a trend that has risen due to the elections, according to Iraq’s Independent High Commission. Most parties remain ideologically bankrupt and rely more on political messaging and top-down personality-driven leadership than on a political manifesto.
Even political actors from the same identity groups are not immune to infighting. The incumbent prime minister, Muhammed Shia’ Al-Sudani, and former prime minister, Nouri Al-Maliki, experienced a falling out that split their once-successful pan-Shia Coordination Framework, a coalition that had previously served as a bulwark against hardline Shia nationalist groups. Its collapse into multiple lists is an ominous sign for a country already struggling to maintain political continuity and stability, both prerequisites for any meaningful systemic reform.
A further consequence of the muhassa system is that complicated governing system that results from a parliament full of a spectrum of political parties unable to govern alone. Instead of implementing a unified vision, parties use a mix of populism and patronage to remain in power. This has led to the constant inflation of public sector salaries, which is a significant drain on Iraq’s budget and a barrier to increasing investment in necessary infrastructure. Even when particular politicians fall out of favor due to poor policies or political plunder, the same parties stay relevant, turning elections into a shuffling of seats rather than a vehicle for any real change.
Iraq’s dependence on oil (92% of Iraq’s budget comes from oil revenues) has long been considered a vulnerability by both domestic and foreign observers, leaving Iraq highly susceptible to fluctuations in global oil prices. However, domestic parties lack either the will or the ability to diversify Iraq’s economy, as the patronage system means that every dollar spent on investments in the economy is a dollar not being used to retain a party’s foothold amongst its supporters. As a result, successive Iraqi governments have devoted the majority of the budget to social welfare and government salaries at the expense of the temporarily painful but necessary investments in other sectors. While Al-Sudani has initiated economic reforms, his commitment to slow and deliberate reform means Iraq remains far from achieving genuine economic diversification.
Popular discontent with the corrupt and ineffective political system has fueled the rise of reform candidates advocating for asmandani, an Iraqi civic identity that transcends religious and ethnic affiliation. Despite widespread calls for change throughout Iraq’s general populace, reform politicians have accomplished very little success, both due to low voter turnout (only 41% of Iraq’s eligible population voted in the last federal election) and political elites determined to retain the power of the entrenched parties. The 2019–2021 Tishreen protests, which erupted as a result of anger over corruption and political stagnation, brought little tangible change. Their most significant achievement, electoral reform meant to help smaller parties and independent candidates through a district-based first-past-the-post voting system, was quickly reversed in 2023.
Given the inability of reform candidates to build an electoral base large enough to propel them into government, Iraq’s most realistic prospects likely will come from already-established elites who are willing to make some concessions towards reforming Iraq. Al-Sudani’s newly formed electoral alliance, the Reconstruction and Development Coalition, created in the aftermath of the collapse of the Coordination Framework, presents itself as a technocratic and centrist coalition. By appealing to Iraq’s emerging middle class through promises of a pragmatic vision of governance, Al-Sudani hopes to achieve a second term in office, a feat that has not been achieved since 2010. His investments in energy infrastructure, land distribution, and smaller-scale economic projects in agriculture and pharmaceuticals appear to be a boon for his electoral favorability. However, his inclusion of the National Coalition, the leader of which is also the leader of a pro-Iran semi-independent militia, may reduce his favorability among Iraq’s sizable Sunni minority. It remains to be seen whether Al-Sudani’s slow and reconciliatory approach will be enough for him to secure a second term and sustain Iraq’s modest path of reform.
Another vital element ahead of the elections is the role of foreign powers, namely the United States and Iran. Iran, reeling from the sound defeat of its proxies in Lebanon as well as the collapse of the allied Assad regime in Syria, will attempt to preserve its influence in the region by ensuring its Iraq-backed militias retain their influence in parliament. Meanwhile, the U.S. has threatened sanctions on Iraq if the country fails to curb the power of the same militias, setting the stage for another proxy confrontation between the United States and Iran.
The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a functionally independent military force comprising hundreds of thousands of soldiers, remains one of Iran’s most reliable footholds in Iraq. While the PMF was instrumental to the fight against terrorism in Iraq, it has engaged in illicit financial operations on behalf of the Iranian government. In August, the U.S. government was able to convince the Iraqi parliament to table a bill that would have formally institutionalized the PMF’s independence. However, dismantling the group entirely will prove more difficult as the PMF is unlikely to peacefully accept dissolution, which places the Iraqi government in a serious dilemma ahead of the new election.
While Al Sudani has taken steps to shift Iraq away from Iran’s influence through relationship-building with the Gulf States and Turkey, his electoral alliance with the head of the PMF could jeopardize Iraq’s relationship with the United States and constrain future partnershıp in the region. True reform will require Iraq’s collaboration with external actors, but its inability to fully sever the influence of pro-Iran militias may prove a significant roadblock. Al-Sudani has stressed the importance of pragmatism and an “Iraq First” foreign policy, citing Iraq’s noninvolvement in the brief war between Israel and Iran as a success of his administration’s approach to geopolitics. However, what exactly this means for the future of Iraq’s diplomatic efforts remains uncertain as Iraq refuses to align itself with either Washington or the Iranian government.
All things considered, with the prospect of deep institutional change looking unlikely and the inability of established political elites to garner enough political capital to reduce Iraq’s reliance on oil as well as on foreign countries, the Iraqi elections seem to bring little less than a slightly revised version of the status quo, as genuine, fundamental change in foreign and domestic policy looks improbable.
Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Iraqi Flag, Image sourced from Flickr | CC License