Did we learn nothing? Hitler utilized ethnocentric nationalism to unite the “Aryan” Germans against Jews based on their belief in racial superiority. This led to one of the most horrific genocides in the past century, drastically changing how countries approach international relations, human rights, and economic policy. Yet nearly a century later, Germany faces a disturbingly familiar pattern. So while the outward symbols have changed, the political mechanics, like exclusion and fear, are parallel. Germany’s far-right revival, brought by the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), demonstrates once again that history repeats itself.
History lessons are often remembered as abstract concepts, as if there is a physical barrier between the past and the present. Germany’s post-war constitution was designed to prevent another Hitler, yet nationalist rhetoric has crept back into mainstream politics. Today, the AfD capitalizes on the same conditions that once invigorated the Nazi Party: cultural anxieties, economic uncertainty, and mistrust in institutions. The resurgence of the far-right in Germany illustrates how ethnonationalist and populist rhetoric, which Hitler once weaponized, has returned to Germany in a new form. By exploiting citizens’ fear, social division, and political dissatisfaction, the AfD threatens the foundations of Germany’s post-war democratic stability.
To prevent history from repeating itself, it is imperative to understand Hitler’s rise. Many nationalists, such as Hitler, employed populist tactics to achieve their goals. Populist politics typically emerge as a reaction against globalization, and their proponents use straightforward inclusion and exclusion to reach their base and win electoral majorities. As noted by Harvard sociologist Bart Bonikowski, populism serves as a “discursive tool of political outsiders–usually elites themselves–who seek to gain power by eschewing mainstream politics.”1 This dynamic reflects a growing trend today “among political elites to channel public grievances into ethnoracial resentment and political distrust.”2
Furthermore, in political scientist Panayota Gounari’s words, fear politics utilize an ethnic, religious, linguistic, or political minority “as a scapegoat for most if not all current” problems of the country, subsequently construing the other group as dangerous and threatening.3 These explanations of nationalism and how it uses populism as its means perfectly align with the rise of the Nazi Party in the 1920s and 1930s. Following its defeat in World War I, Germany faced staggering economic hardship, in part due to the extensive monetary reparations required by the Treaty of Versailles. By framing Jewish people as responsible for Germany’s problems, Hitler was able to reach his white Germanic base around an imagined national purity and gain popularity. Today, similar forces are again shaping German politics.
The Alternative für Deutschland, or AfD, is a populist far-right political party in Germany that became the second-strongest party after receiving 20.8 percent of the vote in the 2025 federal election. The party initially started gaining traction after adopting xenophobic and Islamophobic positions following the refugee crisis in 2015, when almost one million asylum seekers settled in Germany. The crisis led to many political tensions, such as concerns over the strain on social services, the integration of refugees, and increased crime rates. While overall crime and total victimization rates actually declined, the AfD exploited this fear to gain support and create an ingroup as their base of power.
The party’s rhetoric portrays migrants and refugees as invaders who threaten German culture and security. In 2021, the leader of the AfD party in the state of Thuringia, Björn Höcke, concluded a political campaign speech with the words, “Everything for our homeland, everything for Saxony-Anhalt, and everything for Germany!” The last part of his speech is banned in Germany because it was the slogan associated with the Nazi Sturmabteilung stormtroopers, who played a key role in the Nazi Party’s rise to power. This slogan once again emphasizes cultural purity and exclusion. Further, in 2017, Björn Höcke referred to the Holocaust memorial in Berlin as a “monument of shame,” stating that the Germans’ mental state continues to be that of a “totally vanquished people.” Höcke’s remarks test the limits of democratic tolerance, which is the willingness to accept the civil rights and liberties of all citizens, regardless of their opinions. While this is central to any democracy, unlimited tolerance should be cautioned, however, because “it may lead to the disappearance of tolerance itself.” The Nazi movement has shown that when unlimited tolerance is extended to those who are intolerant, the tolerant will be destroyed. Höcke reframes national memory as something to be rejected instead of respected, dangerously telling Germans to ignore the lessons the past gives.
Germany’s post-war constitution specifically places limits on far-right and other extremist speech. Due to its increased radicalization, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), put AfD under surveillance as a potential threat to the constitution. The BfV concluded that the far-right wing of the AfD had “extremist intentions,” and that the AfD’s “vehement anti-migrant rhetoric online was leading to violence in the real world.” Furthermore, the BfV assessed that about one-third of the AfD party members are inclined towards right-wing extremist violence.
Along with anti-immigration stances, the AfD has also embraced anti-LBGTQ+, anti-environmental, and pro-Russian positions, among others. In Thuringia and Saxony, several wings and organizations of the party have even been deemed “a threat to the liberal democratic order.” The AfD party’s leaders consistently oppose support for Ukraine and refuse to label Putin a war criminal, claiming Russia is a victim of Western aggression. By aligning with Russia in the war, the AfD appeals to Germans skeptical of NATO and frustrated by Germany’s role in global conflicts.
Dr. Karl-Rudolf Korte of the North Rhine-Westphalia School of Governance explained that AfD mobilized as a “profiteer of fear,” and thrived because it filled in the emotional and ideological gaps left by traditional parties. Since June 2023, AfD has received more support from the German people in opinion polls than the ruling chancellor’s party, the Social Democrats (SPD). In June 2023, the AfD won its first county administrator post in a runoff election in Sonneberg in the eastern German state of Thuringia, where the AfD is classified as a “proven right-wing extremist” by the BfV.
AfD profits from fear and agitates resentment, passively collecting dissatisfied voters of other parties. Harmony, consistency, or agenda is irrelevant to AfD voters. AfD, rather than having a base of ideologically committed voters, “collects communities of disappointed and mistrustful voters from other parties.” AfD, as a sponge for resentment, benefits from fears that typically accompany societal modernization: the dissolution of traditional roles and the loss of security. This manifests in fears of downward social mobility, which is usually blamed on the influx of immigrants. These fears translate into a desire for a return to the ‘good old days,’ when German society was supposedly more homogeneous and stable. They try neither to convert nor lecture voters; instead, they mobilize on issues where other parties remain silent because they lack common positions, for instance in economic stances. Political scientist Achim Goerres has found that the economic preferences of AfD voters are very mixed, which leaves little potential for strategy blurring. Many AfD voters feel ostracized in Germany and find appeal in AfD’s stances. Any weakness of parties in the center becomes support for the AfD.
The aftermath of COVID-19 has led to feelings of social isolation, economic turmoil, and fatigue from constant change. This perceived instability creates a “breeding ground for authoritarian temptations that promise simple answers and idyllic worlds.” AfD’s appeal can be boiled down to those concerns: its promise to protect ‘ordinary people’ from globalization, immigration, and out-of-touch elites.
Support for the AfD is not evenly distributed across genders and demographics. Pew Research Center says in a 2024 report that “around one-in-five Germans (19%) see AfD favorably, but a large majority (79%) have a negative opinion of the party.” However, men “have more positive views of AfD than women do (26% vs. 11%), and the share of men holding this opinion has risen 10 points since 2022.”
This gender gap can be attributed to several factors. Economic instability has hit working-class men the hardest, particularly in more rural areas. As technology continues to develop, it changes the market and leads to a decline in traditional manufacturing jobs. Shifting social values have also led some men to lose the sense of identity and pride once tied to earlier social roles. This phenomenon has been called the “status threat” by Diana Mutz. The feeling of being left behind economically prompts a defensive reaction from those who believe that it’s been stolen from them.
The AfD taps into this alienation by insisting upon traditional masculinity, order, and national pride. By framing immigration and feminism as threats to the stability of Germany, AfD produces cultural resentment. This, combined with economic insecurity, pushes many men toward the far right.
The rise of AfD has already shifted the German political scene. AfD Party leaders Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla increasingly undermine trust in Germany’s democratic institutions by questioning election results, disparaging public broadcasters as “state propaganda,” and promoting conspiracy theories about migration. At AfD’s party conference to select candidates for the European Parliament, many party members were openly promoting theories such as the “Great Replacement,” which holds that political elites are “deliberately introducing non-white migrants into Europe to supplant the white race.”
These tactics gradually delegitimize democracy; as a result, voters lose trust in their government, the media, and elections, becoming more susceptible to authoritarian ideas. Further, in regions where AfD is the strongest, such as Saxony and Thuringia, hate crimes and political intimidation against refugees, journalists, and even public officials have increased. The normalization of extremist rhetoric and violence has also blurred the line between political discourse and hate speech.
The presence of AfD forces mainstream parties to adjust their rhetoric in turn; as a result, more centerist parties have adopted tougher stances on migration or national identity to avoid losing voters to AfD. This is one of the most dangerous signs of populist politics: when the center begins to echo extremism.
If populist politics feed on fear and disconnection, then overcoming it requires reestablishing trust and inclusion in democratic institutions. The AfD has a highly fluid voter base, especially in East Germany, where political disillusionment runs deep. Many voters choose AfD not out of firm ideological convictions, but because they feel ignored or unrepresented by mainstream politics and media. In a 2023 poll by DeutschlandTrend, “about two-thirds of those who supported AfD said they did so in protest of over other parties, rather than because they were convinced by the far right’s policies.” Increasing political polarization has caused many voters to avoid the center and vote instead for the far-left Greens party or for far-right AfD. A 2024 European Council on Foreign Relations public opinion poll highlighted immigration at the most important issue shaping how Germans look at their future. Centrist parties, however, have developed no clear approach to immigration, some “adopting populist and AfD-lite tactics and creating internal divisions.” Rather than uniting, this pushes voters already disillusioned with the centrist parties further towards the AfD, while AfD voters are not likely to won back by underdeveloped version of AfD’s policy stances.
Political scientist Teresa Völker finds in her study that “when mainstream parties mimic the anti-immigration rhetoric of the far right, they bring such ideas from the fringes into the mainstream debate,” thereby legitimizing the far-right’s demands. A study by Cambridge University in 2025 found that accommodating far-right agendas instead leads to more voters defecting to the radical right, with the effect being more pronounced when the far-right pary is more established.
Thus, this breakdown between the party in charge and the voters leads to voters turning to alternative media and the AfD. Echoing the American-German Institute (AGI), political success depends on seeking “proximity to the lives of citizens.” Centrist parties should address issues such as housing shortages, healthcare access, and local economic development, and not simply copy AfD’s stance as an attempt to win back voters. By focusing on practical results and distinct stances, democratic parties can regain credibility from the AfD. The AGI puts it best: “People vote for parties that get things done.”
Ultimately, democracy’s resilience depends on addressing conditions that make extremism attractive, rather than suppressing dissent. The past must be confronted, not as a history lesson in a textbook, but as a living reminder of how fragile democracy can be.
The rise in AfD’s popularity indicates that nationalism can never truly be eradicated; instead, it lies dormant, waiting for fear of change and social division to revitalize it. Germany’s history demonstrates to all of us how easily democratic institutions can break down when citizens lose trust in each other and their leaders. AfD’s capitalization on the swirling resentment and harkening to past traditional roles represents a test to Germany’s post-war constitution and its ability to prevent another far-right rise to power.
Yet history need not repeat itself. If Germany’s centrist and democratic forces can rebuild citizens’ trust, they can restore the promise of a society in which everyone, regardless of background or situation, is accepted. Beyond defeating AfD at the ballot box, Germany’s goal should be to address the conditions that allow its messages to take root with its citizens; democracy cannot endure through complacency.
Germany has faced this test before. The world is watching again to see if this time, it will pass.
- Bonikowski, Bart. 2016. “Background to Brexit: Populism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Resentment.” Epicenter: Harvard University. ↩︎
- Ibid. ↩︎
- Gournari, Panayota. 2018. “Authoritarianism, Discourse, and Social Media: Trump as the ‘American Agitator.” Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism, 207–228. ↩︎
Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: AfD, Image sourced from Heute | CC License, no changes made