In The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia, James C. Scott proposes a paradigm shift in the historical understanding of populations living outside state control–from the view embedded in the historical records written primarily by early agrarian lowland states, colonial governments, and modern nation-states, to a more nuanced one examining populations historically outside of state control through these populations’ internal transformations and their own views of the state, and with an eye towards their own agency. Scott examines populations long thought by states to be primordial barbarians yet to be brought into the fold of state control, for the most part ones who resisted incorporation into the state, presumptively based on ignorance of its merits.
Actually, suggests Scott, most non-state populations consist of individuals who intentionally chose to flee state control and their descendants. Thus, “upland societies, far from being the original, primal ‘stuff’ from which states and ‘civilizations’ were crafted, are, rather, largely a reflexive product of state-making designed to be as unappealing as possible as a site of appropriation.”[1] This is especially true for the region he examines–the highlands of Southeast Asia, which for thousands of years have been a refuge for those fleeing slavery, conscription, disease, and taxes in lowland states. Scott opines that most of the “inhabitants of the ungoverned margins are not remnants of an earlier social formation, left be-hind, or, as some lowland folk accounts in Southeast Asia have it, ‘our living Ancestors’”; rather, “they are ‘barbarians by design.’”[2]
Scott refers to this upland region of Southeast Asia as “Zomia”[3] and suggests that many of the processes he has researched in the region are likely to be mirrored in the experiences of mountainous peoples around the world. Drawing from Scott’s research, his own acknowledgement of New World zomias,[4] and the historical record for colonial and post-colonial Jamaica, this paper will show that many of the same processes Scott examines in upland Southeast Asia have played out in a similar or closely parallel manner in the Caribbean. These include: successive waves of runaway slaves fleeing to the mountains; mountain populations’ use of the geographic features of the areas they have settled to thwart larger state armies; ethnogenesis in the hills; the complex ways hill peoples avoid incorporation into lowland states, while, at the same time, participating in trade with, and production for, lowland markets; millennial religious movements and other religious distinctions between hill and lowland peoples; and state use of people outside state control to capture and enslave other non-state populations. In addition, this paper will look, beyond the time frame examined by Scott, at the extent to which such populations have been incorporated into, or otherwise played a role in, the mainstream political and cultural history of 20th century Jamaica, including the period since independence.
Jamaican Maroons and the Colonial State
In the Caribbean and throughout the New World, enslaved Africans often found refuge in mountainous environments where they established autonomous Maroon communities that resisted colonial forces.[5] The tradition goes back to the landing of the first slave ship to the New World in 1502, from which some escaped slaves joined indigenous communities.[6] Conflicts with colonial states, and later with their nation-state successors, have continued well into the modern era, perhaps most infamously in the 1986 war between the Surinamese government and the country’s Maroons.[7]
While the history of the Maroons may appear to be a phenomenon unique to the New World and the conditions of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, their story actually fits into a global historical narrative. From what we know, most if not all of humanity’s early states were slave societies,[8] including ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia.[9] Fleeing taxation, conscription, corvée labor and slavery, many of their subjects chose to do exactly as these Africans would do in the New World–they ran away.[10] We can infer that mountainous terrain facilitated that choice since, for example, Maroon communities in the Caribbean are scattered across the region’s mountains. Conversely, where there were no mountains, such as in Barbados where the highest peak is only 1,000 feet about sea level, there were no Maroons.[11]
The history of mountainous Jamaica is a very different story. Beginning with the Spanish invasion, indigenous populations took refuge in the hills where they could wage guerilla war.[12] When the English took the island from the Spanish in the 17th century, there were already self-sufficient Maroon settlements of runaway African slaves in the mountains as well.[13] When the English invaded in 1655 with thirty-eight ships and 8,000 troops,[14] more African slaves took to the hills, this time with their Spanish masters.[15] Both the Spanish and the English courted the allegiance of existing Maroon communities.[16] As the Spanish began withdrawing from the island, their former slaves remained in the woods, forming the roots of the Maroon tribes[17] and beginning a century of military conflict with the British.[18]
All mountainous parts of the island had Maroon communities by the end of the 1650s. Some were concentrated in the mountains of Clarendon under a chief named Juan de Bolas.[19] Those who had fought alongside the Spanish established communities in the hills on the north side,[20] where it is not clear whether they had communication with Juan de Bolas’ Maroons.[21] Thus began a century of various incidents resulting in a continuous flight of slaves to the hills. Each successive wave impacted the communities already there, either by increasing a particular Maroon settlement’s manpower or by forming a new mountain community. This would fit the “shatter zone” model developed in analysis of flights to the hills by state-fleeing peoples in Southeast Asia.[22]
Juan de Bolas’ Maroons were quickly subdued by the British and forced to sign a treaty.[23] Before long, however, more slave revolts were sparking flights to the hills. There was a slave uprising in 1673,[24] then four more[25] until the 1690 slave revolt in Clarendon,[26] in which over 500 former slaves[27] re-populated the area left by Juan de Bolas’ subdued Maroons.[28] While communication was maintained between these new Maroons and lowland slaves, there was little connection with the original Maroons of Clarendon or those in the Northeast.[29]
At first, Maroon communities were usually small bands carrying out raids on British planters and subsisting in the hills. But when plantation owners asked the British to send the army, the Maroons faced an existential threat and began organizing into larger groups. At some point in the early 18th century, Chief Kojo[30] was elected chief of the Leeward Maroons, [31] forming the Kromantis tribe with its own autonomous government.[32] By reviving the tradition of African chieftaincy,[33] the Maroons adopted new identities for their lives as free people–ones separate from their identities as slaves on the plantations. Maroons practiced African traditions in political, social and economic organization.[34]
In some cases, leadership was elected democratically, as in Chief Kojo’s case, mirroring patterns in Maroon communities in other parts of the New World, such as King Ganga Zumba’s election as King of the Palmares Maroons in Brazil.[35] However, democracy not always being a recipe for peaceful interactions with a community’s neighbors, Kojo, after consolidating support among his own Maroons,[36] subjugated the “Madagascar Maroons” and killed their leader.[37]
While Kojo had power in the military sphere, Kojo’s community was not a state and was not designed to become a state. While they could compete with other groups, have disputes with them, and even fight them, the members were free to join or leave afterwards.[38] In the case of the Madagascars, they maintained their own separate community within Kojo’s tribe, and continued speaking their own accent of patois.[39] Other Maroons could join simply by moving there, such as when the Cottawoods faction cut through the interior to join Kojo.[40] The loose social structure suggests that these Maroons really did set up their communities to prevent state formation. In Scott’s analysis, the social structure of communities in Zomia was also designed to protect autonomy, ward off political subordination, and prevent state formation among them.[41] Similarly, British records describe the Windward Maroons’ chiefdoms as having no public revenue and “no army to maintain, though the whole formed a military body,” with most towns consisting of just a few families under a chief.[42]
Not only were social and political structures established by the Maroons in such a way as to thwart state formation, their ethnicities were similarly constructed. This mirrors the process of ethnogenesis described by Scott: “The perspective adopted and elaborated here is a radical constructionist one: that ethnic identities in the hills are politically crafted and designed to position a group vis-à-vis others in competition for power and resources.”[43] The Maroons had many different origins in Africa, but were mixed together by the processes of the transatlantic slave trade.[44] In Jamaica, each community took a new identity and all members claimed descent from a particular African civilization–be it the Ibo, the Ashanti, or the Mandigo.[45] We know these were not actual lineages from Africa. Consider the Madagascars, whose name denotes an island from which no slaves came to Jamaica.[46] However, over time they began to be seen as a new ethnicity in Jamaica, with British records describing them as really dark, with slightly “less African” hair[47] and shorter stature. [48]
Generally, the Leeward Maroons had a common identity as Kromantis[49] and claimed descent from the Ashanti Empire.[50] Individuals who may even have been ethnic rivals in Africa found a new unifying ethnic identity as Kromanti.[51] In the North, there were the “Spanish Maroons.”[52] Windward Maroon communities were smaller and more independent, but did interact with each other.[53] There was also cooperation, intermarriage, and occasional conflict with the dwindling Arawak indigenous population in the hills.[54] Descendants of these communities today maintain these identities with their last names, such as the Cottawoods, or the last name Kencussees for many of the descendants of Kojo’s Maroons.[55]
A slave could become a Maroon by moving to the mountains.[56] However, not all movement was from the lowlands to the highlands. Maroons also came down from the mountains to join the slaves on large plantations, gather intelligence, and trade weapons for rum and food.[57] However, while Maroons could form their own bands, join other bands, or go into the lowlands as spies, if they actually made plans to leave Maroon life behind and return to life on the plantations, other Maroons would execute them.[58] There was also movement deeper into the mountains where Maroons could always retreat when they faced military defeat. For instance, when the Maroon settlement in Nanny Town was raided in 1734, the Maroons did just that,[59] retreating deeper into the mountains to Guy’s Town.[60]
Maroons took advantage of the rough terrain to resist state control.[61] In “Cockpit Country,” where many of the Windward Maroons settled, the terrain consists of large rifts enclosed by rocks and nearly perpendicular mountains connected by glens that narrow out to small entrances between steep hillsides.[62] Parallel lines of such “cockpits” cover the area, dividing it up into small parcels of land perfectly suited to guerrilla warfare,[63] especially given the Maroon’s use of ambush tactics and camouflage.[64] Over half of Jamaica is hills and plateaus of white limestone rock formations. Rainwater causes limestone to erode into countless sinkholes and underground caverns.[65]
In addition to using the mountainous terrain to their advantage in battling the British, the Maroons managed to subsist on it too. Even the English were impressed by the Maroons’ ability to cultivate such difficult terrain, encountering small hoed terraces and tiny plots along ridges and in crevices.[66] The cooler temperature of the hills allowed various fruits, roots, and herbs from Europe to flourish,[67] as well as native crops.[68] Maroons of Cockpit Country had very little drinking water but were able to drink water from water-holding pines on military expeditions,[69] demonstrating knowledge of local flora.
To fight the Maroons, the British set up mountain outposts, and in 1737[70] hired Blackshot[71] and Mosquito Indians from Central America, the latter numbering some 200,[72] to track down Kojo’s forces.[73] In 1738, the British came to a stalemate with Kojo’s Maroons and managed to get them to sign the Articles of Pacification with the Maroons of Trelawny Town, known as the Trelawny Town Treaty.[74] This treaty allowed the Maroons to try to punish their own community members[75] and gave them the right to sue in colonial courts but also stipulated that a Maroon could be punished in the colonial courts if he hurt a colonist.[76] The treaty required that the Maroons capture or kill any new runaways[77] and that they help the British in the event of a foreign invasion.[78] It gave the Maroons some measure of autonomy, but it was a false autonomy that allowed further encroachment of the state.[79] It also turned the Maroons, themselves formerly rebel slaves taking refuge in the mountains, into fugitive hunters. [80] With hopes to make the territory more accessible to British soldiers and trade, the treaty provided that the Maroons were to blaze trails in the mountains.[81]
The Trelawny Town Treaty also guaranteed hog hunting rights for the Maroons.[82] This shows that Maroons supplemented their diet by hunting hogs. The very presence in the Jamaican hills of wild hogs, themselves originally runaway domesticated pigs brought by colonizers, suggests a process mirroring the highland animal zomia suggested by Scott.[83] Animals wishing to escape domestication, at least in Jamaica, took to the hills as well, where they became a source of bush meat for the Maroons.
The Treaty reflected the sort of divide-and-rule tactic used by colonial authorities to pit Maroons against slaves,[84] in similar fashion to colonial tactics in Southeast Asia. The Treaty, however, did give the Maroons some sovereignty,[85] and legitimized their self-rule.[86] In 1739, the British signed a similar treaty with the most powerful of the Windward Maroon chiefs, Chief Quao.[87] The British saw the Maroon way of life, which supplemented small scale agriculture and herding with hunting,[88] as primitive “indulgence in wandering from place to place” and laziness.[89] Doubtless, the treaties were partially an effort to exert more state control in the mountains even if it meant giving certain concessions to the Maroons.
The Trelawny Town Treaty with the Leeward Maroons stipulated that the British could leave two White men to live with the Maroons,[90] and in 1791 they decided to leave a Major John James with the Leeward Maroons as the “governor” of the territory.[91] The Maroons were amiable enough to James, though; as he thought his salary was too low, he spent much of his time managing his settlement twenty-five miles away in order to make money.[92] He was removed from office and replaced with another governor, Captain Craskell,[93] who infuriated the Maroons by having two of them flogged.[94] The Maroons drove him from town[95] and started the rebellion of 1795.[96]
This time the British found the Maroons to be very resilient and feared their insurrection would spark rebellions on the plantations.[97] To fight the Maroons, they brought 36 large dogs from Cuba and 12 Spanish Chasseurs,[98] as well as indigenous warriors, free persons of color, and mercenaries from the Accompong Maroons.[99] The failure to subdue the mountain Maroons became a cause of great concern after the Haitian Revolution, which the British also feared would inspire slave revolts on the plantations.[100] The Maroons usually won skirmishes in the mountains because of their use of ambush tactics. For instance, British records document one skirmish in which twenty-two British soldiers died though it appears not even a single Maroon may have been killed.[101] The Maroons raided the lowland plantations, liberated slaves,[102] and targeted British offices.[103] However, eventually the rebels lacked even the water they could get from pine leaves and were forced by the dryness of the very terrain whose ruggedness had protected them to come to a ceasefire with the British.[104]
The Maroons and the Modern Jamaican State
While the original Maroon communities were able to maintain some degree of autonomy through the 19th and into the 20th century, they have fared poorly in the post-colonial era as government policies have undermined their economies, driving Maroon youth to the cities and abroad to work.[105] Some policies have had their origins in pressures applied to the Jamaican government by the United States, Spain and Great Britain’s successor as the dominant superpower in the region. Anti-regulatory neoliberal economic policies have hurt many sectors of the island’s economy and society as a whole.[106] American pressures were also behind the post-colonial government’s burning of the Maroons’ ganja fields since the 1980’s, further undermining the economic viability of the Maroon communities and prompting more of the mountain youth to migrate.[107]
However, the gradual incorporation of Jamaica’s Maroon communities into the control of the modern nation state offers only one facet of the highland struggle against post-colonial states as it played out in the 20th century. To better understand such processes, it may be worthwhile to look at a related phenomenon–the interactions between the early Rastafarian communes, also set up in Jamaica’s mountains, and both the late colonial and post-colonial Jamaican states.
Early Rastafarian Communes in the Colonial and Post-Colonial States
Jamaica in the 20th century can add to an understanding of how mountains have afforded refuge from the control of dominant lowland states and allowed refugees to maintain some measure of economic, political, and even cultural autonomy. As Scott suggests, mountainous terrain is not only a place of political resistance but also a zone of cultural and religious refusal.[108] When hill people do embrace the dominant religion of their valley neighbors, “they are likely to do so with a degree of heterodoxy and millenarian fervor that valley elites find more threatening than reassuring.”[109]
Historian E. J. Hobsbawm described millennial movements, including millennial religious movements,[110] as a form of archaic social rebellion with certain characteristics, including “a profound and total rejection of the present, evil world, and a passionate longing for another and better one; in word, revolution.”[111] Millennial movements are also characterized by utopianism. “Utopianism can become such a social device because revolutionary movements and revolutions appear to prove that almost no change is beyond their reach.”[112] The early Rastafarian communes were the starting points of a new millennial religion.
The Rastafarian Movement was started by a man named Leonard Howell as what can be described as a millennial movement centered on Marcus Garvey’s principles of self-awareness and self-reliance, with beliefs that Marcus Garvey had predicted the coronation of the last Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie and that Haile Selassie was the reincarnation of Jesus.[113] The movement rejected colonialism, capitalism, and nationalism.[114] Howell led his followers up into the mountains of Sligoville and built a commune called The Pinnacle,[115] which at its founding in 1934 stood on 300 acres and had around 1,800 inhabitants.[116]
The early commune had resembled Maroon communities and as government pressure mounted, the commune became increasingly Maroon-like in response. During a 1954 raid, the colonial government destroyed Howell’s commune and arrested Howell.[117] After his release from prison, he rebuilt the commune, equipped it with a Maroon-style army of dreadlocked sentries who called themselves Ethiopian warriors, and protected his mountain settlement with a complex alarm system[118] to announce the arrival of intruders using gongs,[119] a system reminiscent of the ones the Maroons had created, with lookouts on mountain peaks who communicated to one another through abeng horns.[120]
The commune also resembled Jamaican Maroon villages in that the residents grew tomatoes, ganja, and yams[121] and raised goats[122] for the market, while maintaining a good measure of political and religious autonomy under Howell’s leadership.[123] These economic ties between highland and lowland forged by the early Rastafarian communes resemble those established by the Maroons and those in the Southeast Asian context about which Scott writes. In the Trelawny Town Treaty, the British granted the Maroons amnesty, autonomy, and 1,500 acres of mountain land in which they had the “liberty” to plant coffee, cocoa, ginger, tobacco, and cotton, as well as the “liberty” to raise cattle, hogs, and goats, all of which the treaty encouraged the Maroons to bring to the lowland markets.[124] Both the Maroons and the Rastafarians were given temporary autonomy by colonial officials and both were allowed (and in the case of the Maroons actively encouraged) to produce commodities, such as coffee and goat meat, which were easy to produce in the mountains and would add to the lowland economies.
This fits patterns observed by Scott in Asia, namely that while highland people wanted to evade state control, they usually did not want to be completely isolated from the lowlands. Meanwhile, lowland states often strongly desired what those outside their control in the hills could bring to market. This is because hills and valleys are often “complementary as agro-ecological niches”[125]–an analysis that holds true as much for coffee production in a Jamaican Maroon village as it does for opium production in a highland Hmong village.
Nonetheless, economic interconnectedness and political autonomy are not mutually exclusive, and Howell’s community survived a succession of government arrests and raids until 1960, when 39 Rastafarians were accused of an alleged plot to overthrow the British and blamed for a letter to Castro asking him to invade Jamaica.[126] The government soon declared that the movements’ members could not hold meetings with more than two people. The movement received help from sympathetic University of the West Indies professors, who came to study the movement and wrote to the government with their conclusion that the movement was not a threat.[127] The University even got the government to pay for ten Rastafarians to travel to Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone as cultural ambassadors.[128]
These relatively favorable relations with the government fell apart in 1963 when six Rastafarians in Coral Gardens were accused of murder, three of whom were then killed.[129] In the subsequent days, thousands were arrested and an unknown number killed in a government crackdown under Prime Minister Bustamante.[130] Interestingly, the post-colonial state’s only distinguishing feature seems to be the intensity and violence with which it continued the earlier policies. In this, the post-independence regime continued the exploitation and oppression of the colonial state, much as the colonial state itself had found ways to continue exploitative and oppressive relationships with the general population after the abolition of slavery.[131]
Although the Rastafarian movement is a religious movement, its rejection of the colonial and post-colonial state[132] and its tendency to advocate for the poor have always made the state uncomfortable.[133] The earliest leaders of the movement were all staunch anti-imperialists and were all imprisoned at one time or another on sedition charges.[134] The Rastafarians were continuing a tradition of religious autonomy and rebellion dating back to earlier Maroons, who rejected attempts to Christianize them and mostly practiced traditional African religions.[135] Furthermore, the Maroons’ rebellions usually invoked traditional African religious practices.[136] Thus, the Rastafarians continued a tradition of religious rebellion under the post-colonial regime, which would take four decades to recognize the religion.[137]
Conclusion
Slavery in the New World belongs to a history of slave-based states and economies which goes back to the earliest lowland agrarian states, such as ancient Periclean Athens where slaves outnumbered free people five to one, and continued, as in the case of some Southeast Asian states, into the 20th century.[138] By examining the case of Jamaica, where we know mountain communities were formed by those fleeing state control in the lowlands and are not vestiges of primordial cultures, we can infer that the similarities in the Southeast Asian context and elsewhere are likely the result of the same processes. Therefore, studying the relatively recent and well-documented cases of the Maroons and the Rastafarians lends further evidence to support Scott’s theories about Zomia in Asia.
However, certain differences should be noted, including the absence of transnational and trans-empirical borders in the Jamaican hinterlands and racial differences between the Maroons and the European settlers that make this New World zomia somewhat unique. Nevertheless, in all other respects–social organization, the “shatter zone” produced by successive waves of flight to the hills, the use of the terrain, the economic and political dealings with lowland colonial states, the process of ethnogenesis, and the process of religious differentiation between themselves and the lowland population–the similarities between the Maroon hill populations in Jamaica and their counterparts in Southeast Asia are often striking. Other worthwhile comparisons could be drawn which were not touched upon here, such as the use of oral history.[139]
The formation of Rastafarian communes in the hills in the 20th century suggests that hills have remained something of a “zone of cultural refusal” even in the modern era. Nonetheless, the eventual destruction of Rastafarian communes and the effects of economic decay and youth migration and emigration from the remaining Maroon communities indicate that whatever autonomy hill people maintained in the post-colonial era has been severely curtailed by the encroachment (political, military, and commercial) of the dominant lowland society.
More research could be done examining how hill communities with roots in zomiesque flight, in the Caribbean, in Asia, and elsewhere, have seen their autonomy lessened or destroyed in the past century and the extent to which they have managed to hold on to some measure of autonomy. Also of interest would be additional research on the extent to which Maroon populations have influenced modern Caribbean history. For instance, when the communists first arrived in Cuba, they made for the Maroon communities of the Sierra Meastra Mountains in southeastern Cuba[140] where they held out against Batista’s forces and eventually launched an attack on the capital.[141] Haiti’s unique history, where slave revolts in a mountainous terrain produced a state capable of conscripting corvée labor,[142] also offers opportunities for related research.
In conclusion, while much more research could be done comparing New World zomias with Asian hill communities, this look at the Jamaican Maroons and Howell’s commune hopefully sheds some light on the intersections of slavery, statelessness, mountains, ethnicities, economies, and religion in the New World. The comparisons with Scott’s analysis in particular may prove useful, and shed more light on the universals of state evasion in the hills.
This essay was awarded 2nd Place in the 2013 Acheson Prize.
Emanuel L. Marshack (’13) is an East Asian Studies major in Branford College.
[1] James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 327.
[2] Ibid., 8.
[3] Comprising the highland regions of Laos, Vietnam, Southwest China, Thailand, Burma, and Cambodia.
[4] Ibid., 25.
[5] Werner Zips, Black Rebels: African-Caribbean Freedom Fighters in Jamaica, trans. Shelley L. Frisch (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1999), 5.
[6] Ibid, 8.
[7] Ibid, 10.
[8] Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 7.
[9] Ibid, 6.
[10] Ibid, 7.
[11] Jerome S. Handler and Frederick W. Langem, Plantation Slavery in Barbados: An Archaeological and Historical Investigation (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1978), 9.
[12] R.C. Dallas, The History of the Maroons From Their Origin to the Establishment of Their Chief Tribe At Sierra Leone: Including the Expedition to Cuba for the Purpose of Procuring Spanish Chasseurs and The State of the Island of Jamaica For The Last Ten Years: With a Succinct History of the Island Previous to That Period. Vol. I. and II. (London: A. Strahan, 1803), 4.
[13] Zips, Black Rebels, 52.
[14] Carey Robinson, The Fighting Maroons of Jamaica (Great Britain: William Collins and Sangster (Jamaica) Ltd.,1969), 16.
[15] Ibid., 17.
[16] Dallas, Vol. I, xxxviii.
[17] Ibid., xxxix.
[18] Robinson, The Fighting Maroons, 29.
[19] Dallas, Vol. I, 25.
[20] Ibid., 24.
[21] Ibid., 25.
[22] James C. Scott, Lecture: “Agrarian Societies,” November 12, 2012.
[23] Dallas, Vol. I, 26.
[24] Zips, Black Rebels, 54.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Dallas, Vol. I, 26.
[27] Zips, Black Rebels, 54.
[28] Dallas, Vol. I, 26.
[29] Ibid., 27.
[30] Spelled Cudjoe in the original records. Here, I go with the spelling usually found in the historical literature, Kojo. This is the rule applied for all person and community names in this paper.
[31] Ibid., 28
[32] Zips, Black Rebels, 54.
[33] Ibid., 132.
[34] Ibid., 43.
[35] Ibid., 133.
[36] Dallas, Vol. I, 46.
[37] Zips, Black Rebels, 133.
[38] Dallas, Vol. I, 33.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Robinson, The Fighting Maroons, 38.
[41] Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 23.
[42] Dallas, Vol. I, 94.
[43] Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 244.
[44] Zips, Black Rebels, 43.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Dallas, Vol. I, 32.
[47] Ibid., 31.
[48] Ibid., 32.
[49] Zips, Black Rebels, 59.
[50] Ibid., 56.
[51] Ibid., 57.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid., 59.
[54] Ibid., 60-61.
[55] Robinson, The Fighting Maroons, 38.
[56] Zips, Black Rebels, 109.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Richard Price, Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas, (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 17.
[59] Robinson, The Fighting Maroons, 5.
[60] Zips, Black Rebels, 57.
[61] Ibid., 81.
[62] Dallas, Vol. I, 39.
[63] Ibid., 40.
[64] Ibid., 41.
[65] Carey Robinson, The Iron Thorn: The Defeat of the British by the Jamaican Maroons (Kingston, Jamaica: Kingston Publishers Limited, 1993), 81.
[66] Dallas, Vol. I, lxxiv.
[67] Ibid., lxxv.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid., 115.
[70] Price, Maroon Societies, 235.
[71] Robinson, The Iron Thorn, 80.
[72] Price, Maroon Societies, 235.
[73] Dallas, Vol. I, 38.
[74] Ibid., 58.
[75] Ibid., 63.
[76] Ibid., 62.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Robinson, The Fighting Maroons, 51.
[80] Ibid., 9.
[81] Dallas, Vol. I, 64.
[82] Ibid., 61.
[83] Scott, “Agrarian Societies.”
[84] Zips, Black Rebels, 111.
[85] Ibid., 131.
[86] Ibid., 130.
[87] Dallas, Vol. I, 6.
[88] Ibid., 93.
[89] Ibid., 127.
[90] Ibid., 64.
[91] Ibid., 135.
[92] Ibid., 135.
[93] Ibid., 138.
[94] Ibid., 145.
[95] Ibid., 143.
[96] Ibid., 145.
[97] Dallas, Vol. II, 2.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid., 296.
[100] Ibid., 291.
[101] Bryan Edwards, Esq., An Account of the Maroon Negroes of the Island of Jamaica; And a History of the War in the West Indies in 1793 and 1794 (London: John Stockdale, 1801), 338.
[102] Ibid., 347.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid., 338.
[105] Zips, Black Rebels, 145.
[106] Stephanie Black, Life and Debt (United States: New Yorker Films, 2001).
[107] Zips, Black Rebels, 145.
[108] Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 20.
[109] Ibid, 21.
[110] Eric J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959), 65.
[111] Ibid., 58.
[112] Ibid., 61.
[113] Ishmahil Blagrove Jr., Roaring Lion, (Rice N Peas Films, 2002).
[114] Ibid.
[115] Zips, Black Rebels, 215.
[116] Blagrove, Roaring Lion.
[117] Zips, Black Rebels, 216.
[118] Ibid., 215.
[119] Ibid., 216.
[120] Robinson, The Iron Thorn, 164.
[121] Zips, Black Rebels, 215.
[122] Blagrove, Roaring Lion.
[123] Zips, Black Rebels, 215.
[124] Dallas, Vol. I, 59.
[125] James C. Scott, “Agrarian Societies.”
[126] Blagrove, Roaring Lion.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Zips, Black Rebels, 209.
[132] E.S.P. McPherson, Rastafari and Politics: Sixty Year of a Developing Culture Ideology: A Sociology of Development Perspective (Clarendon, Jamaica: Black International Iyahbinghi Press, 1991), 265.
[133] Ibid., 263.
[134] Ibid., 264.
[135] Dallas, Vol. I, 96.
[136] Zips, Black Rebels, 46.
[137] Blagrove, Roaring Lion.
[138] Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 24.
[139] Zips, Black Rebels, 15.
[140] Ernesto Che Guevara, Episodes of the Cuban Revolutionary War: 1956-58 (New York: Pathfinder, 1996), 44.
[141] Carlos Franqui, Diary of the Cuban Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1980), 133-134.
[142] Henry Louis Gates Jr., Black in Latin America (New York and London: New York University Press, 2011) 170-72.
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