I. Introduction
The Indian state and academic analysis often adopt – unintentionally or otherwise – Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s global theoretical framework of greed and grievance when addressing the Naxalite insurgency. This framework argues that such rebel insurgencies are motivated by individual greed and personal interests instead of more systemic grievances. This treats Naxalites as terrorist factions rather than political insurgents and that the government’s counterinsurgency strategy should treat them as such and be primarily based on military repression.[1] Epstein, for instance, posits that “the Naxalite insurgency amounts to an existential crisis for the nation”, using the same approach of security and terrorism over acknowledging that there may be valid political grievances.[2]
In this paper, I argue against an overreliance on this theoretical framework which defines political and academic discourse on the Naxalite insurgencies and conflict resolution. The paper argues that analysis of the Naxalite conflict through the theoretical lens of “new” civil wars which sees greed and grievance as a binary and a result of the resource curse, is inadequate and lead to ineffective governmental counterinsurgency policies of repression and military action which have failed to resolve the conflict thus far. The paper does this by fully contextualizing the Naxalite conflict to emphasize what greed and grievance ignore, contrasting this theoretical lens with more expansive frameworks seen in Kalyvas’ ontology of political violence, which emphasizes the importance of looking at the particularities. This adds nuance pertaining to the Naxalite conflict, by ejecting binaries and recognizing political violence as “complex and ambiguous processes that foster the “joint” action” of different actors which results in violence that reflects the multifaceted goals of these actors. Furthermore, that when it comes to policy decisions, this nuance is necessary to resolve such a longstanding conflict.[3]
With relation to Naxalite insurgencies, a key supporting argument is paying close attention to the historical and political relationship between Naxal grievances, or interests, and those of corporations, and the state. That in many parts of the country, the Naxalites have been pushed via warfare into remote parts of the forest, barely subsisting, and yet continuing to resist the state or give up (Roy 2010).[4] One may argue that if this were a question of greed, the incentive for warfare would have already diminished, and yet, it continues, likely pointing to a need to address years of underdevelopment in Naxalite regions.[5] The aspect of the conflict that is particularly puzzling and reflects the “complex and ambiguous processes” and socio-historical interaction between private and public interests, is its simultaneously persistent and distant nature. That whilst the Naxalite conflict strongly exists in Indian public imagination, few have encountered it.[6] [7] Despite this relative invisibility of the insurgents and their lack of instruments of war, they are labeled as the biggest internal threat to the nation-state.[8] The resulting tension is thus between private industrial interests in local resources and Naxalite/Maoist sovereignty over their ancestral land.[9] This defines the conflict along lines of political ideology as well as ethnic identity, as most Naxalites are either lower-caste of Adivasi (tribal) communities, who are enfranchised in theory according to the constitution but disenfranchised in practice due to corporate interest in their land.[10] [11] On the other hand, there is evidence that a more sympathetic approach that actually addresses poverty and grievances reduces violence. These policies that address development are compatible with the framework of the ontology of political violence but not when greed takes precedence over grievance.
In terms of structure, the paper will address the different theoretical frameworks in the context of the Naxalite insurgencies in India, and how that informs policy and conflict resolution. The first part will analyze the Naxalite insurgency from the perspective of greed and grievance and resource curse and look at how the theories’ suggestion of personal gain leads to military action, governmental neglect, and a lack of empathy when it comes to policies derived from it. This is seen in India as a state’s approach in viewing Naxalite grievances as a façade for terrorist interests and practicing both negligence and counterterrorism as policy.[12] The paper will also address a counterargument that argues for a need to disregard empathy and put state sovereignty first; I refute this by pointing out that repressive means of state consolidation do not promote peace, but an active engagement with Naxalites might allow for joint consolidation. In this vein, the paper will provide the contrasting framework of recognizing nuance as presented by Kalyvas and making room for addressing grievances stemming from systemic underdevelopment.[13] This approach may inform more rehabilitative policy decisions such as using the instruments of developmental programs and education which have – in their limited adoption – proven more effective in reducing Naxalite insurgent violence.
II. Socio-Historical Context to Modern Naxalism
The Naxalite problem refers to a Maoist insurgency and peasant movement known to have originated from the namesake village of Naxalbari in West Bengal in the 1960s, where a Maoist agrarian revolution attempted to repossess land from zamindars (landowners) and the state.[14] This revolution was localized but then spread across India’s industrial belt over recent decades, which is also known as the Red Corridor because of its abundant Naxalite presence.[15] Today, it is estimated that about a fifth of India’s dense forests are within Naxal control.[16]
India’s former Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, referred to the lingering Naxalite insurgency as the “single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by [the] country”.[17] This response typifies the Indian state’s approach to the Naxalite insurgency, treating it as a terrorism or an internal security problem, without even considering socio-historical and political grievances of the tribes and agrarian peoples who are labeled as Naxalites. Political violence has taken place by both warring parties, the Naxalites and the government of India, with casualties on both ends.[18] Rural Maoist/Naxalite animosity towards the state apparatus is so strong that they boycott elections, engage in booth-capturing, and blame the government for both social and environmental neglect and exploitation of the region.[19]
The Indian state has dealt with the “internal…challenge” of Maoist insurgencies ever since its independence and establishment as a postcolonial nation-state.[20] Having said this, the Indian state apparatus’ interaction with the mineral-rich Red Corridor has colonial roots which far predate modern India as we know it. This so-called corridor is home to some of India’s densest forests, most difficult terrain, and most ancient and prominent indigenous, or “tribal”, communities who have consistently resisted both the imposition of colonial rule on their terrain as well as that of the modern Indian state.[21] The lower-caste and indigenous communities (referred to as adivasis) in India played a prominent role in pre-independence resistance, especially early resistance towards colonial rule at a time when the Indian elite was sympathetic to colonial presence.[22] The massive role of peasant and indigenous movements in catalyzing Indian resistance to the British is rarely acknowledged. It includes, but is not limited to, the Indigo revolution, several boycotts of British products as well as farmer’s revolts and indigenous insurgencies.[23]
Below, Table 1. Demonstrates that the main demographics involved in Naxalite insurgencies are indigenous, lower caste, and other marginalized communities. This is important to keep in mind throughout because it points to this conflict being more layered than just agrarian and communist; it is rooted in India’s historical and systemic structural inequalities which have ignored and exploited these populations. This predates colonialism but was formalized within the bureaucratic apparatus of the British and carried forward into modern India.[24]
Table 1. The demographic and ideological mapping of Naxal presence (Misra 2002)
Moreover, the most significant periods of conflict can be demarcated as having occurred through the following years: 1948-1951, 1969-1971, 1990-1994, 1996-2012, and 2015-present day.[25] The periodization reveals how blurred the line is between India’s structural tensions with its indigenous populations and the antagonization of Naxalism as a rebel movement. This is because it recognizes the insurgencies of 1948-1951 as existing before the original Naxal uprising in 1969.[26] [27] The regions with the largest Naxal bases include Bihar, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh.[28] [29]
Therefore, it is clear that there existed an antagonistic relationship between the organs of the state, as manufactured by the British and consolidated in modern India, and the indigenous populations’ interests in sovereignty and freedom from exploitation.[30] [31] This historical antagonism has been carried into modern India and has manifested itself through Adivasi adoption of Maoist philosophy and modern-day Naxalism. The conflict is therefore endemic to the very structure of the Indian state as an entity and as a project. As stated above, Naxalism as we know it today began as an offshoot to the agrarian Communist movement in West Bengal from the namesake village of Naxalbari.[32] Given this, modern-day Naxalism cannot be effectively studied without keeping this complex historical and structural context in mind.
Yet, the vast majority of policy-centric research on this subject tends to treat Naxalism as an isolated rebellion, situated within the context of its own binary bubble of either greed or grievance, and is coded in the language of both elimination and state consolidation. There is rarely mention of actually addressing Naxalite concerns, where Indian military strategists are in line with the Western model of not negotiating with terrorists.[33] [34] This language of rebellion and terrorism is challenged if the conflict is situated in its full socio-historical context. There is academic literature that points to the nuanced nature of the relationship between the nation-state and Naxalite uprisings. Curiously, however, this analysis exists more prominently in the fields of Anthropology, Postcolonial Literary Theory and Women and Gender Studies, which are all adjacent to the study of political violence, rather than in research specifically on peacemaking and conflict resolution.[35] [36] The unfortunate implication of this is that full contextualization of Naxalite conflict currently exists in fields that do not directly inform policy decisions. In part, this paper works to address this and bridge this gap in contextualization which naturally challenges the current state response of repression, often unlawful vigilantism, and overall dismissal of the Naxalite cause.[37] [38]
III. Situating the Central Theoretical Frameworks
In order to understand the Naxalite insurgencies in India both theoretically and empirically, it is important to situate the conflict with relation to the frameworks interrogated in this paper. The three key theoretical lenses this paper interrogates and engages with are: the theory of greed vs. grievance, necropolitics and policy, and the ontology of political violence.[39] [40] [41] Through the case study of Naxalites in India, the paper interrogates not only the adequacy of greed and grievance as a framework for analyzing conflict but crucially, the demonstrably reductive effects of basing policy on this theoretical understanding.[42] [43] Secondly, the paper examines these effects through a necropolitical lens, arguing that greed and grievance end up justifying necropolitical policy decisions, characterized by a strategy and accepted rhetoric of elimination and removal.[44] Lastly, the essay engages with Kalyvas’ more nuanced ontology of political violence, suggesting that full attention to the interaction of private and public contextual factors will help address the disenfranchisement of Naxalites as a way forward for peace.[45] This paper’s engagement with these theories is introduced below:
- Greed and Grievance
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s theory posits that insurgent motives may be analyzed on a binary of greed and grievance. Their modeling, which forms the empirical basis of their theory, suggests that in most cases greed, or “a model that focuses on the opportunities for rebellion performs well” as compared to grievance, which has “little explanatory power”.[46] The use of this understanding within the context of Naxalite insurgencies implies that they are motivated by opportunistic individuals interested in profiting from the abundance of natural resources present within India’s forests in the Red Corridor. This framework leans towards the neoliberal understanding that as rational beings, even rebels are unlikely to get involved in civil war, or the guerrilla-like warfare of Naxalism unless there is personal profit in doing so.[47] [48] In many ways, this idea that potential profits from that “primary commodity exports substantially increase civil war risk” is both complementary and foundational to the resource curse explanation of rebel violence.[49]
2. Necropolitics
The lack of “explanatory power” apparently demonstrated by grievances then paves the way for counterinsurgency tactics that are repressive, bound by a logic of elimination, often unlawful, and largely unwilling to engage with the demands and concerns of the insurgents.[50] [51] [52] [53] Not to mention that this response has been largely ineffective.[54] I posit that the governmental response in India, which has been shaped by the binary logic of greed being more likely than grievance, takes on a necropolitical character. This paper understands necropolitics as coined and defined by Achille Mbembe, who reworks our understanding of the state through the lens of its power over both bodies and life.[55] Specifically, he extends Michel Foucault’s theorizing of biopolitics, where state power is mediated through control of living bodies.[56] To extend this, Mbembe defines necropolitics as the primary mode of state sovereignty, where “to exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power”.[57] In simpler terms, that the sovereignty of the state lies in “the power and capacity to dictate who may live and who must die”.[58] Given this, necropolitical state policies refer to policies and responses to citizenries needs aimed at reducing their life chances and privileging certain populations over others to the point where the government seeks to disregard and eliminate the segment of the population which disturbs the state.[59] One might argue that structurally, the Indian state’s relationship with its indigenous communities is one inherited from British colonialism and has always been necropolitical.[60] I further this by suggesting that within the context of the persistent Naxalite threat to the Indian state, the logic of greed vs. grievance ends up justifying the necropolitics of the state. Therefore, necropolitical counterinsurgency tactics are the mechanism derived from the understanding of greed and grievance as motivating political violence, which is reductive and crucially, has proved ineffective in abating violence.
3. The Ontology of Political Violence
Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of the ontology of political violence is one that aims to look beyond the binary of greed and grievance and further, to look outside of the lens of individual rationality and sentiment as being the key motivators of political violence.[61] This theory broadens the scope for understanding the nature of political violence, looking at it instead as a complex “joint” interaction between private and public variables.[62] This expansive theorizing is a good starting point in remedying the counterinsurgency tactics that arise from an individualistic understanding of violence. Applying this framework onto Naxalite violence accommodates structural, historical, and individual factors, where Naxalism can be understood through its historically complex relationship to the very activity of state-building itself. Moreover, that such an understanding, in contrast to the greed vs. grievance binary, makes necropolitical counterinsurgency unjustifiable, implicates the state’s inaction in the condition of the Naxalites and indigenous communities in India, and likely allows for policy that is rehabilitative and rooted in engagement with these communities rather than refusing to do so.[63] [64]
IV. Addressing the Key Counterargument: State Consolidation by Any Means Necessary
It has been regularly noted that India’s compatibility with the Westphalian nation-state and its status as a legitimate state were precarious from its very beginnings; that India’s diversity and vastness made the consolidation of power, let alone democracy, a monumental task that onlookers were skeptical about at its independence.[65] When India first became independent in 1947, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru faced the extraordinarily difficult and unprecedented tasks of consolidating India as a democracy by making sure its liberal institutions were sound and established and secondly, of consolidating state power and ensuring sovereignty over its vast territories.[66] This task was especially difficult given India’s diverse and fragmented geography which is historically made up of independent regions, princely states, colonies, and parts of empires such as the Mughals.[67] On top of this, India’s immediate geopolitical situation, with the partition into West Pakistan and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and border disputes with both Nepal and China, made internal state consolidation crucial maintaining the legitimacy of India as an infant state and democracy.
The counterargument presents itself within this context, of the sovereignty of the Indian state, which must be continually asserted in order to be maintained and where both external and internal threats must be neutralized by any means necessary.[68] [69] This is the argument presented as a justification for India’s counterinsurgency tactics towards Naxalites, as far as the military and state are concerned, neutralizing the threat presented by them is paramount and an attempt to understand grievances, for instance, is the misleading action of a weak state.[70]
This argument is most clearly presented in direct discussion of military tactics, specifically as recorded by Colonel. JK Achuthan in his piece “Tackling Maoists: The Andhra Paradigm,” which was notably published in the Indian Defense Review.[71] Colonel. Achuthan criticizes the central government’s current approach to counterinsurgency as being “sporadic and piecemeal”, arguing instead for a more sustained and aggressive deployment of paramilitary forces aimed at defeating “the Maoist menace”.[72] [73] The premise of his argument lies in the notion that Naxalite/Maoist insurgencies in India are working to usurp power from the Indian state and in doing so, threaten its existence and legitimacy. It is explicitly stated that states without an aggressive enough approach at immediate removal of Naxalites have “abdicated their authority over vast regions”, linking Indian sovereignty and consolidation of power with Naxalite insurgents.[74] Crucially, this policy perspective draws from the centrality of greed as a key motivator over grievance, asserting that “the Maoists have clearly played upon the sentiments and decades of developmental neglect experienced by poor people in remote regions, to build up a strong base of sympathizers”, suggesting that the grievances of the poor are being co-opted by self-interested Maoists who are “prepared to split India in order to seize power”.[75] This is the argument of asserting sovereignty by any means necessary, where the means by default disregard insurgents, and use violent, admittedly ineffective, tactics of repression. It is ironic that the article making this argument has in its epigraph a quote by Leon Trotsky asserting that “the armed threat from within is more dangerous than any external threats”.[76]
This essay agrees with the fact that the maintenance of legitimacy of the Indian state is important, especially given its fragmented and precarious design, and that Naxalite violence does have a destabilizing effect on this. However, the any means necessary approach, which prescribes heightened military intervention in order to escalate existing efforts to weed out Naxalites is misguided and goes against the idea of India, which was from its inception, premised upon “unity in diversity”.[77] This is because the above approach, even if it is effective, asserts its sovereignty by disenfranchising India’s indigenous citizens. To further nullify the above counterargument, this essay recognizes some crucial discrepancies in this line of thought. First, this essay established that the distinction made between “Maoists” and “poor people in remote regions” – a euphemistic, and vague way of referring to indigenous, Adivasi communities – is false because they refer to the same group. But the logic of greed and grievance creates this binary separation between those who function on greed exploiting those with real grievances.[78] [79]
Instead, I would rebut that this method may consolidate power, but it does not create peace, as can be seen in the continuous resurgence of Naxalite violence even after bouts of governmental counterinsurgency.[80] [81] I have argued instead that a better form of state consolidation which fosters peace and legitimacy is by recognizing the complex relationship between Naxals, the indigenous, and the state apparatus, which should aim to address their concerns regarding land and exploitation and invest in their development.[82] [83] [84] That promoting a strategy of violent counterinsurgency and disregard just represses tensions and leaves them unaddressed yet simmering under the surface.
V. Indian Counterinsurgency Tactics: How Greed and Grievance Ignores Complex Intra-State Relationships and Justifies Ineffective, Necropolitical Policy
The Indian government recognizes all Naxalite activity as criminal activity, and its counterinsurgency tactics are informed by this categorization.[85] [86] As stated before, these counterinsurgency methods involve a policy of non-negotiation, increased neglect, and heavy militarization.[87] These repressive methods have only increased the spread of guerrilla warfare from just West Bengal in the 1960s, to 13 out of India’s 26 states by 2013.[88] However, there is an immediate contradiction in the fact that the government also recognizes that a lot of the conflict stems from neglect, underdevelopment, and the routine disenfranchisement of India’s rural communities.[89]
These two contradictory beliefs can be held because of the logic presented by the binary of greed vs. grievance, which acts as a shortcut, or bridge between these two lines of thinking, allowing policymakers to ignore the contextual nuance of Naxalite warfare. Firstly, the notion that greed is a more rational explanation for motives for political violence supports the categorization of Maoists/Naxalites as one-dimensional terrorists and criminal actors interested in personal gain.[90] [91] [92] Secondly, that grievances and ideological bases for engaging in such conflict are used to “[play] upon the sentiments” of the truly poor and disenfranchised who are recruited into the violence by these greedy actors.[93] This theory therefore promotes the idea that greed coopts grievance and any violence is therefore criminal and must be fought without engagement or negotiation. Furthermore, this logic erases grievances and allows the state to ignore the structural inequalities that may produce conditions for such left-wing uprisings. A framework of greed versus grievance allows the government to ignore the fact that the adoption of the Maoist ideology is reactionary to sustained subjugation under Indian landlords, exploitation of indigenous land for capitalistic purposes, and the colonial legacy embedded within the state apparatus.[94] Even more so, that (excluding petty theft) the Naxalites have stood to make no profit off of their resource-rich land for the decades in which they have fought against the state (Roy 2010).[95] If anything, they have been pushed further into the forests, living in harsher, more militarized conditions where one might see no incentive for the kind of greed as suggested in the theory (Roy 2010).[96] The question becomes, why then do they continue to resist? And in this question, it is difficult to ignore the structural realities of the relationship between the Indian state and its systemic neglect of lower caste and indigenous populations.[97] [98]
In the case of the Naxalite conflict, the resulting effect of adopting the framework as prescribed by greed and grievance is that of ineffectual, necropolitical policies of counterinsurgency. India’s counterinsurgency strategy against Naxalite violence over the last several decades has been so simultaneously hostile and misguided, that it has led to a proliferation of Naxalite presence across India. These tactics include increased militarization, deliberate neglect and underdevelopment, torture, state-sponsored vigilantism, and even witch hunts.[99] [100] Below, I look at how these tactics – guided by the logic of greed vs. grievance – have proved ineffective. Moreover, that these policies reveal the state’s necropolitical character and intentions.
- Increased Militarization
The Indian government is known to have established a military presence in the form of their paramilitary forces in the key states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, and most with the most recent insurgencies, of the late 2000s and 2010s, in the state of Chhattisgarh.[101] [102] The military efforts of former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have been continued and accelerated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi since he came into power in 2014 but have largely been unsuccessful given the difficult terrain of Indian jungles have prompted increases in guerrilla warfare since the 1980s onwards.[103] This military not only targets Naxalites but anyone potentially associated with them; it has pushed them deeper into the forest and forced retaliation which has proliferated violence instead of abating it.[104]
2. Deliberate Neglect and Underdevelopment
The underdevelopment of tribal and indigenous parts of the country has long been a feature of the Indian state, but it has been significantly exacerbated since indigenous communities in what are considered Naxalite territories are especially targeted and neglected as a means to disincentivize the movement.[105] Part of this may be traced back to British colonialism, where indigenous resistance was routinely punished with neglect, crop destruction, and drought (Bose & Jalal).[106] The same tactics of induced famine have been used by the state in rural areas that do not benefit the state and are thus deemed Naxalite.[107] This is a clear example of necropolitics, where the state apparatus reduces the life chances of entire populations through neglect, removal of access to food for its own political aims.
3. Torture
Perhaps one of the most well-documented state abuses has been the use of torture to interrogate those though to be associated with the Naxalite insurgency. The horrific techniques of physical torture, sexual abuse, and indefinite, unlawful imprisonment used by police departments across India have been recorded in oral and written personal histories and are a testament to the internal antagonism that exists between the Indian state and its indigenous peoples’ wish for autonomy over their ancestral land.[108] The illegal use of torture has been condemned by organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International for violating fundamental human rights in both, the Indian Constitution as well as international law.[109] [110] This further points to the shortcomings of an any means necessary approach arrived at from perceptions of greed, which leads to ineffective, unlawful counterinsurgency.
4. State-sponsored Vigilantism
Another unlawful activity that the state has been involved in is in supporting and promoting the growth of vigilante groups as a counterinsurgency method, most notably Sulwa Judum, which largely recruits urban youth to fight the Naxalites.[111] One of the main vigilante activities has been the emptying out of villages to stop them from being used by Naxalites as their territory and to stop more Maoist recruitment.[112] This has led to the displacement of near 100,000 villagers in 2007 alone, without significant improvement on the frontline with Maoist rebels.[113]
5. Witch Hunts
In more absurd counterinsurgency, increased antagonism towards India’s indigenous because of their association with the Naxalite movement includes a police endeavor to track down supposed witchcraft. In “Anti ‘anti-witchcraft’ and the Maoist insurgency in rural Maharashtra, India” (2009), Amit Desai explores the strange interaction between the state, villagers, and the public imagination of Maoists in producing a witch hunt.[114] This points to the way in which the state’s counterinsurgency methods have interacted with rural populations to produce medieval outcomes against tribal peoples and perceived Maoists.
Overall, these policies have not only proven ineffective, but they have also put the lives of entire populations, tribes, and communities at risk of elimination and displacement. This targeted violence towards an internal population through the different instruments of the state, both legal and illegal, is inherently necropolitical as it ignores the humanity of the rebelling actors. In this sense, the state actually increases internal hostility and proliferates violence instead of consolidating its legitimacy due to this dynamic of resistance and repression.
VI. Applying the Ontology of Political Violence to Understand and Resolve Structural Tensions.
The theory of greed vs. grievance isolates insurgencies, like the Naxalite insurgency, out of the structural contexts from which they stem from; ignoring the tensions that have long existed between the indigenous and tribal populations of India and the capitalist class which was previously aligned with the British. Adopting Kalyvas’ ontology of political violence means considering the interaction between the private and structural factors and recognizing that today’s Naxalite insurgency in modern India is a larger manifestation of this historically and socially persistent tension now carried forward into the present as persistent political violence and conflict which remains unresolved.[115] [116]
Independent India has seen several, relatively distinct, periods of Naxalite insurgencies in opposition to state practices over issues not limited to mining, agriculture, underdevelopment, and land-based industry.[117] Recognizing nuance means accepting that this violence need not be understood in isolation but recognized within the context of the interaction between the tribal and the state. India has a long and historically complex relationship between tribal land, forests, indigenous agrarian society, and the bureaucratic instruments of the state. These interactions between state mechanisms and local populations have been a source of conflict predating the existence of the modern Indian state. Historians Guha and Gadgil point to the “great variety of property relations” inherent to India, and specifically those between state forestry and social conflict as being a major concern for British rule. India’s history of agrarian resistance and conflict is simultaneous with the creation of the modern state and its prioritization of capitalist private enterprise over tribal and agrarian interests.[118] [119]
This essay has repeatedly reckoned with this history, but what is important to note is that within the framework of the ontology of political violence, the key mechanism is in this very interaction between the core and the periphery.[120] This interaction can be hostile and one of conflict, like in the Naxal case, and according to this theory, overcoming it is a question of reconciliation of the core tensions: underdevelopment, neglect, sovereignty over ancestral land.
In terms of structural underdevelopment, there is evidence that rehabilitative approaches are successful in reducing violence. This is seen through the labor market program adopted by the Indian government in some regions called MGNREGS (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme) the implementation of which coincided with a reduction in Naxalite/Maoist violence, pointing to the importance of good governance and development as a strategy to reduce conflict.[121] This reduction in conflict has also been more sustained than the temporary reduction that takes place from paramilitary intervention.[122]
There has been little attempt to help develop Naxal regions or attend to their concerns, but what has been established through over 70 years of violence is that military counterinsurgency proves ineffective. If the state does invest in these underdeveloped regions and attends to the concerns of Naxalites instead of assuming their greed, there may be a way out of this deadlock and into a peaceful consolidation of Indian state power.
Conclusion
The way in which greed and grievance are limited is that it fails to recognize the complexity of rebel motives. It is important to interrogate the language of rebels and greed and grievance rather than looking at the structural barriers. I argue that using the theoretical framework of greed and grievance empirically allows the state to mobilize itself in ways that are fundamentally necropolitical in its pursuit of the consolidation of power. I address the counterargument that this consolidation of power, prompted by greed and grievance, is necessary by pointing to the inefficacy of aggressive methods the state has taken in order to assert its power and by looking at how the minimal use of development programs have helped reduce violence. This stresses a need to address the inequities at the premise of the state in order to resolve the conflict at its roots and promote peace rather than more repression which has proved only to proliferate violence.
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[2] Daniel Epstein , “ East of Mumbai: Naxalism and the Future of India.” Harvard International Review 36 no.1: 26-28.
[3] Kalyvas, Stathis N, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.” Perspectives on Politics 1 no.3: 475
[4] Roy, Arundhati. “Walking with the Comrades.” Outlook India.
[5] Khanna and Zimmerman, “Development For Peace: The Decline Of Naxalite Violence in India.”.
[6] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.”, 475.
[7] Roy, “Walking with the Comrades”.
[8] Epstein, “East of Mumbai: Naxalism and the Future of India.”, 26.
[9] Kar, Priyadarshi, “Naxal Movement and Issues of Tribal Development in Odisha (1960 – 2010).” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 76: 953-61.
[10] Ibid, 953
[11] Kennedy, Jonathan, and Sunil Purushotham, “ Beyond Naxalbari: A Comparative Analysis of Maoist Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Independent India.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 54 no.4: 832-62.
[12] Judge, Paramjit S, “Deconstructing Maoism in India: Development, Democracy, and Human Rights.” Sociological Bulletin, 64 no.2: 240-50.
[13] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.”.
[14] Goswami, Namrata, and Jason Miklian, “India’s Violent Internal Dissent, 2008.” Economic and Political Weekly, 43 no.21: 21-22.
[15] Epstein, “East of Mumbai: Naxalism and the Future of India.”.
[16] Ibid, 27
[17] Ibid.
[18] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.” Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/14/being-neutral-our-biggest-crime/government-vigilante-and-naxalite-abuses-indias.
[19] Roy, “Walking with the Comrades”.
[20] Epstein, “East of Mumbai: Naxalism and the Future of India.”, 26.
[21] Bose, Sugata, and Jalal, Ayesha, “Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy.” Florence: Taylor & Francis Group.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Peace Research Institute Oslo, “India.” PRIO. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2020. https://www.prio.org/Data/Conflicts/Conflict/?x=29.
[26] Jaffrelot, Christophe, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.” Les études du Centre d’études et de recherches internationales, Centre de recherches internationales de Sciences Po (CERI): 1-38.
[27] Brass, Paul R., “Political Aspects of Agricultural Change.” The Politics of India since Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 303-367.
[28] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.”
[29] Jaffrelot, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”, 1-38
[30] Bose and Jalal, “Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy.”.
[31] Jaffrelot, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”, 1-38
[32] Ibid.
[33] Epstein, “East of Mumbai: Naxalism and the Future of India.”.
[34] Achuthan, JK. “Tackling Maoists: the Andhra Paradigm.” Indian Defense Review,http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/tackling-maoists-the-andhra-paradigm/.
[35] Shah, Alpa, and Judith Pettigrew, “Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in South Asia.” Dialectical Anthropology 33, no. 3: 225-51.
[36] Roy, Mallarika Sinha. “During West Bengal’s Naxalbari Movement, Women Were Not Merely in the Background.” The Wire, https://thewire.in/women/west-bengalnaxalbari movement-women.
[37] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.
[38] Jaffrelot, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”, 1-38.
[39] Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.” Oxford Economic Papers, 56 no.4 563–595.
[40] Mbembe, J-A, “Necropolitics.” Public Culture 15, no.1: 11-40.
[41] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.”.
[42] Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.”, 563.
[43] Jaffrelot, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”, 1-38.
[44] Mbembe, “Necropolitics.”.
[45] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.”.
[46] Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.”, 587-88.
[47] Jaffrelot, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”, 1-38.
[48] Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.”, 587-88.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Jaffrelot, “ The State and the Maoist Challenge in India.”, 1-38.
[52] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.
[53] Roy, Mallarika Sinha. “During West Bengal’s Naxalbari Movement, Women Were Not Merely in the Background.”.
[54] Jaffrelot, Christophe. “Forests of the Night.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/07/29/forests-of-night-pub-52519.
[55] Mbembe, “Necropolitics.”.
[56]
[57] Mbembe, “Necropolitics.”, 12.
[58] Ibid, 11.
[59] Ibid, 12-14.
[60] Sen, Uditi, “Developing Terra Nullius: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Indigeneity in the Andaman Islands.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 59, no. 4 (September 29, 2017): 944–73.
[61] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil
Wars.”.
[62] Ibid, 457.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.
[65] Drèze, Jean, and Amartya Sen. An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions.
(Pinceton: Princeton University Press, 2013).
[66] Bose and Jalal, “Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political
Economy.”.
[67] Bose and Jalal, “Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political
Economy.”.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Achuthan, “Tackling Maoists: the Andhra Paradigm.”.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Corbridge, Stuart and John Harriss. Reinventing India: Liberalisation, Hindu nationalism and Popular Democracy. (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).
[78] Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.”, 587-88.
[79] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil
Wars.”.
[80] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.
[81] Peace Research Institute Oslo, “India.”.
[82] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.”
[83] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.
[84] Khanna and Zimmerman, “Development For Peace: The Decline Of Naxalite Violence in India.”.
[85] Epstein, “East of Mumbai: Naxalism and the Future of India.”, 26.
[86] Brass, “Political Aspects of Agricultural Change.”, 303-367.
[87] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.”
[90] Ibid.
[91] Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.”, 587-88.
[92] Achuthan, “Tackling Maoists: the Andhra Paradigm.”.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.
[95] Roy, “Walking with the Comrades”.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.”
[101] Ibid.
[102] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.
[103] Routray, Bibhu Prasad, “ Left Wing Extremism: 3 Years of the Modi Government.”
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies no.1: 5-7.
[104] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.
[105]
[106] Bose and Jalal, “Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political
Economy.”.
[107] Roy, “Walking with the Comrades”.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Human Rights Watch, “ ‘Being Neutral Is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante, And Naxalite Abuses In India’s Chhattisgarh State”.”
[110] Amnesty International. “India: Archana Guha: 16 Years Awaiting Justice: The Lack of
Speedy And Effective Redress Mechanisms For Torture Victims”March 1, 1994.https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/184000/asa200081994en.pdf
[111] Jaffrelot, “Forests of the Night.”.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Goswami and Miklian, “India’s Violent Internal Dissent, 2008.”, 21-22.
[114] Desai, Amit, “Anti-‘anti-witchcraft’ and the Maoist Insurgency in Rural Maharashtra,
India.” Dialectical Anthropology 33, no. 3/4 (2009): 423-39.
[115] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil
Wars.”, 475.
[116] Brass, “Political Aspects of Agricultural Change.”, 303-367.
[117] Kennedy and Purushotham, “Beyond Naxalbari: A Comparative Analysis of Maoist Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Independent India.”, 832-62.
[118] Brass, “Political Aspects of Agricultural Change.”, 303-367.
[119] Guha, Ramachandra, and Madhav Gadgil, “State Forestry and Social Conflict in British
India.” Past & Present, 123: 141-77.
[120] Kalyvas, “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil
Wars.”, 475.
[121] Khanna and Zimmerman, “Development For Peace: The Decline Of Naxalite Violence in India.”.
[122] Ibid.
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