Unity of Command or Unity of Effort? Humanitarian civil-military cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction


The inception of the Global War on Terror after the Sept. 11 attacks ushered in a new era of humanitarian civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were accompanied by a strategic shift in American military policy, which led to the prioritization of post-conflict reconstruction. The shift in the locus of conflict from actual combat to post-conflict competition for the loyalty of the population motivated the US military to convert humanitarian aid into a tool of military operations, employed to “win the hearts and minds” of locals. In an effort to gain control of humanitarian action in these new conflict theaters, the military attempted to integrate humanitarianism into the military chain of command. This “unity of command” model evolved over the course of the war in Afghanistan, shifting from an external, NGO-based structure to an internal structure for control of humanitarian action. In both forms, it had disastrous results for both the local population and for humanitarian civil-military relations during and after the war. As the US military moves forward from its engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is essential to assess the failures of the “unity of command” model and attempt to generate a replacement framework for humanitarian CIMIC.


Unity of Command: The Military Model for Humanitarian Action

As the prevalence of conventional, interstate warfare has waned, the US military has shifted to prepare for irregular security environments, counterinsurgency, and operations other than war. These new mission priorities have brought post-conflict reconstruction, and its accompanying humanitarian imperatives, to the forefront of military planning.[1] The military’s new priorities were first articulated in Nov. 2005, when the Department of Defense (DoD) published Directive 3000.05, elevating stability operations to the status of “core US military missions” with “priority comparable to combat operations.”[2] In other words, the post-conflict phase of military operations is now considered the “decisive phase” of engagement, perhaps even more vital to victory than actual combat. Such post-conflict reconstruction projects have historically been the purview of civilian institutions, like the United States Agency for International Development and the Department of State, international organizations, like the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Humanitarian aid, especially, has been delivered by NGOs independently of military operations or objectives. The US military’s undertaking of this role has shifted the balance of humanitarian aid delivery, and both US military and NGOs have struggled to adjust to the resultant overlap of military and humanitarian spheres.

The DoD has adjusted to its new focus by attempting to achieve “unity of command” by integrating NGOs and humanitarian action into the military chain of command (COC).[3] Military doctrine places humanitarian CIMIC under the broad heading of Civil-Military Operations (CMO), which is defined as, “activities…that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions” and “coordinate the integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations.”[4] Under this definition, the purpose of CMO, including CIMIC, is explicitly in support of the military and its goals.[5] In other words, humanitarian action is subordinated to military objectives, such as “winning the hearts and minds” or gaining mission acceptance from the population. The Bush administration’s rhetoric echoed the belief that NGOs and humanitarian aid are tools of the military: NGOs are often referred to as a “force multiplier” and a component of the military mission.[6] The military has tried to integrate humanitarian aid into its own command structure via two mechanisms: attempting to subsume humanitarian NGOs into its command structure, and attempting to develop the internal capacity to deliver humanitarian aid itself.

When the military tries to use humanitarian aid or NGOs as part of “a commander’s range of tools for waging war,” it does so in defiance of fundamental humanitarian principles and norms.[7] First and foremost, military action is definitionally excluded from the realm of humanitarian aid. Humanitarianism is based on the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. As a party to hostilities, the military cannot neutrally and impartially deliver aid to its adversaries; as a subordinate unit of the US government, it cannot be independent from American political and military goals.[8] In the words of the ICRC, “Measures are humanitarian if they meet the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Aid measures that do not do this are not humanitarian, regardless of any well-meaning intentions and their effectiveness.”[9] Therefore, the military cannot be considered a humanitarian actor.

Second, the military does not have the requisite skill set to carry out humanitarian action. The military’s hierarchical structure and specific training make soldiers hard-pressed to conduct long-term humanitarian projects that are tailored to local contexts. Structurally, the rigid COC makes it difficult for the military to respond to the nuances of localized requirements: orders sent down the COC stress universal, not local, models. Additionally, military personnel are trained to operate in “low context culture,” or environments in which they lack intelligence on their environment, thus relying on directives, specific orders, and a standard operation procedure (SOP) send down the COC. This form of training is inappropriate for the “high context” cultural and operational requirements of post-conflict reconstruction, where local communities place a high degree of significance on family or tribal status, age, gender, ethnicity, and social roles and expectations.[10] Insensitivity to such factors can potentially derail the provision of aid by alienating locals from the planning and execution process. Reconstruction “requires a thorough intercultural understanding and an enduring commitment” that the US military fundamentally lacks, making it an ineffective provider of humanitarian aid.[11]

Finally, the militarization of humanitarianism has translated into increased encroachment on humanitarian space.[12] By undermining the perception of humanitarian neutrality in the local population, military humanitarianism jeopardizes the safety and effectiveness of actual humanitarian actors. The blurred lines of military and humanitarian action lead hostile forces to associate humanitarian workers with the occupying military. As such, militants are less likely to respect humanitarian neutrality, and more likely to target aid workers as a perceived extension of their military opponent.

No period in US military history has blurred the lines between military and humanitarian action more than the Global War on Terror, beginning with the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. During this period, all three of these obstacles to so-called military humanitarianism emerged during post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Although the US military implemented both models for unity of command, drawing NGOs into the military COC and developing humanitarian capabilities within the military, neither model was successful. The incompatibility between the military and humanitarian action derailed reconstruction in Afghanistan, and set a dangerous precedent for the future of humanitarian CIMIC.


Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Unity of Command Failure in Afghanistan

Military leaders stressed CIMIC from the outset of US operations in Afghanistan, and even invited humanitarian NGOs to participate in the Coalition Governing Council at US Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, FL. General Tommy Franks, CENTCOM Combatant Commander, set the tone for American military priorities in Afghanistan by describing a two-pillared model for military success: (1) “kill the bad guys,” and (2) “demonstrate to the Afghan people that they had the support of the international community.”[13] Military leaders believed that they could accomplish the latter objective by harnessing the power of humanitarian aid to gain the trust of the Afghan public. To establish unity of command with humanitarian actors, the military initially tried to integrate NGOs into the military command structure via the Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF); following the failure of that endeavor, the military tried to carry out humanitarian action itself via Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Both tactics demonstrated the three primary flaws of the unity of command model for humanitarian civil-military coordination: the illegitimacy of the military as a humanitarian actor, the inability of the military to deliver humanitarian aid effectively, and the danger that the militarization of humanitarianism poses to humanitarians themselves.

CJCMOTF was established immediately after the collapse of the Taliban regime to spearhead the delivery of humanitarian aid and begin post-conflict reconstruction. Its eventual failure was emblematic of the flaws in the military’s unity of command model for humanitarian CIMIC. CJCMOTF had three primary functions in Afghanistan: to “win hearts and minds” and prevent the reemergence of hostilities, to “show the benign face of the Coalition” to the Afghan people, and to provide “access to relief and reconstruction resources for those local officials who supported the Afghan Interim Administration.”[14] The third function overtly violated core humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality by prescribing the use of humanitarian and reconstruction aid to reward local officials who supported the interim Afghan government. By displaying such blatant bias in the provision of aid, CJCMOTF’s fundamental political nature became apparent and was obviously unsuited to the label of humanitarianism.

The military initially invited NGOs, including the umbrella NGO InterAction, to attend CJCMOTF meetings at CENTCOM and contribute to the shape of military reconstruction efforts. Thus, all parties in the reconstruction effort and provision of humanitarian aid would be centralized under CENTCOM authority and direction, establishing unity of command.[15], [16]  NGO representatives offered two predeployment recommendations for military action in support of humanitarian aims: providing security on the ground and repairing large-scale infrastructure that the Coalition had destroyed in battle. NGO representatives believed that these initiatives would allow NGO staff to maximize effective aid delivery, by establishing a safe humanitarian space for NGO operations and helping them transport supplies, but avoiding infringing on the NGOs’ principles by demanding too much involvement in traditional humanitarian projects.[17]

CJCMOTF failed to implement both NGO recommendations, as did its operational units on the ground, the Coalition Humanitarian Cells (CHLCs). Their limited budget, which came from the DoD’s Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OCHDACA), was insufficient to repair major infrastructure, build police stations, or train or equip security forces.[18] Additionally, the CHLCs were confined to urban centers, preventing them from establishing security for NGOs operating in the provinces. The only projects that the CHLCs had both the funds and authorization to undertake were “quick-impact” reconstruction projects, such as drilling wells and building schools and clinics. The quick-impact projects duplicated NGO efforts in secure areas. NGO representatives who had initially hoped to establish a constructive relationship with the military were alienated by the military’s disregard for their input.[19] Additionally, the CHLCs introduced new threats to NGO staff, since CHLC personnel commonly wore civilian clothes and traveled in unmarked vehicles. Thus, the military’s humanitarian efforts put NGO workers’ lives in danger by enacting identical projects and appearing in civilian attire, thus curtailing humanitarian space in Afghanistan by creating the perception of overlap between humanitarian and military actors. As a result of these tensions, NGOs rejected invitations to attend weekly CJCMOTF meetings or participate in the reconstruction planning process from within the military COC.[20]

Following the CJCMOTF failure, the military switched strategies and attempted to achieve unity of command by conducting humanitarian action independently from NGOs operating in the country. The first PRTs were established in Gardez in 2003, with the mission of “extending the influence of the central government outside the capital, providing a security umbrella for [NGOs] to operate… and carrying out small-scale reconstruction projects based on concise needs assessments and local consultations.”[21] Despite commendation from the Bush administration during the war, the retrospective analysis of the PRTs’ performance is overwhelmingly negative: “Inconsistent mission statements, unclear roles and responsibilities, ad hoc preparation, and… limited resources have confused potential partners and prevented PRTs from having a greater effect on Afghanistan’s future.”[22] Humanitarian NGOs criticized the PRTs for their ambiguous mandate, lack of constructive project implementation, and role in jeopardizing the safety of aid workers.

Like their predecessor, CJCMOTF, the PRTs were inexorably tied to American political objectives, invalidating them as humanitarian actors. They often used humanitarian aid as an incentive for local leaders to provide intelligence to US forces and cooperate with the US-backed interim Afghan government in Kabul. On May 12, 2004, the international NGO Medicins San Frontiers (MSF) issued a condemnation of the PRT practice of distributing leaflets in southern Afghanistan to inform the population that the delivery of aid was contingent on the provision of information on Taliban and al-Qaeda activities in the region.[23] Most NGOs operating in Afghanistan at the time expressed the view that the instrumentalization of aid to manipulate the actions of the local population was contrary to every humanitarian value and “incompatible” with a cooperative relationship between NGOs and military forces.[24]

The PRTs also remained focused on quick-impact projects, despite NGO criticism. Funding constraints from OHDACA continued to prevent the PRTs from establishing adequate security through consistent patrols and combat missions, and similarly impeded the reconstruction of large-scale infrastructure.[25] Nevertheless, the quick-impact projects continued to infringe on and duplicate NGO operations. For example, in Kunduz, a PRT decided to take control of a hospital that had previously been part of the ICRC’s medical network. As a result, the ICRC withdrew from the hospital, ceding authority to Coalition forces. However, after the PRT’s deployment ended, their replacements decided that the program “no longer fitted in with its objectives or financing.” The new PRT dropped the hospital, necessitating renewed ICRC support.[26] Similar blunders led Paul Barker and Paul O’Brien of CARE Intl. criticize the PRTs as “little more than a distraction from more serious discussions about country-wide security,” since they “have neither the resources nor the mandate to engage seriously in either reconstruction or security.”[27]

Finally, the PRTs continued the trend of securitization of aid, as the military absorbed more and more aid work into its normal duties.[28] This behavior put NGOs at risk by causing militants to devalue their neutrality and conflate civilian aid workers with military forces. Aid worker violence escalated rapidly in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the invasion. The shooting of five MSF aid workers in 2004 triggered that organization’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, citing intolerable security conditions. MSF cited military action for the deteriorating security situation and narrowing humanitarian space, saying, “in Afghanistan [these conditions] were due in large part to the US military forces assumption of the humanitarian mantle, traveling in unmarked vehicles in civilian clothes, carrying concealed weapons, and identifying themselves as humanitarians or ‘on a humanitarian mission.’”[29] MSF did not return to Afghanistan until 2009.[30]

Figure 1: Trends in aid worker violence in Afghanistan after 9/11[31]









Notably, there was wide variation in the performance of PRTs based on their national affiliation. The US PRT model received particularly scathing NGO criticism because of its focus on small-scale quick impact projects, tendency to operate out of uniform, use of aid conditionality, and failure to deliver aid impartially.[32] The UK PRT model, on the other hand, had a security-centric orientation and a more precise “concept of operations,” according to a 2004 report by Save the Children UK.[33] According to a statement from the UK-led PRT in Mazar e-Sharif,  “Our concept of operations and development priorities are primarily concerned with: a. Government Institution Building and b. Security Sector Reform.”[34] By emphasizing these efforts rather than school and clinic construction or food and water aid, the UK PRT model infringed less on traditional NGO / humanitarian areas of operation and avoided blurring the lines between military and humanitarian actors.

The failures of the unity of command models in Afghanistan caused extreme damage to humanitarian civil-military relations, and led to animosity between the military and humanitarian NGOs. Many, including MSF, now promote a “traditionalist” approach to humanitarianism that emphasizes the distance between humanitarian actors and the dialogue on politics and peacebuilding. Representing the “most narrowly defined scope of humanitarian action,” this approach precludes any cooperation with military forces.[35] The military has also become more hostile to NGOs, and has adopted a “with us or against us” rhetoric that reveals a fundamental lack of understanding of NGO principles. US Commander of Operation Enduring Freedom, Lt. General David Barno, criticized NGOs for trying to preserve neutrality in the theater: “They probably have to… realize that they are now operating in a different world.”[36] The trend of increased estrangement is tragic, especially because cooperation is both critical and feasible. In the aftermath of Iraq and Afghanistan, the military has shown no signs of deviating from its focus on reconstruction and associated humanitarian components. NGOs will be forced to coexist with the military in complex emergencies around the world as US forces pursue stabilization and reconstruction objectives. If the two groups remain unable to cooperate, current trends in military efforts, such as duplication of NGO projects and infringements on humanitarian space, are likely to continue. Additionally, cooperation remains feasible: in the long-term, civilian humanitarian NGOs and military actors share the goal of helping societies scarred by conflict transition back to peace and stability. That goal can best be achieved through coordinated effort.


Unity of Effort: A Model for Cooperation

The realities of the contemporary security environment demand that militaries and humanitarian NGOs cooperate in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The failures of that cooperation in Afghanistan, however, demonstrate that humanitarianism cannot be integrated into the military COC. Attempts at military domination of the humanitarian effort produced violations of humanitarian principles, ineffective humanitarian action, and a depleted humanitarian space. Instead of seeking to subordinate humanitarianism to military objectives, the military should construct a model of cooperation based on unity of effort. Unity of effort requires coordination and dialogue, but maintains independence, thus reestablishing the distinction between military and humanitarian action while allowing both actors to work towards their common goal of reconstruction. The unity of effort model is based on three factors: preserving humanitarian space, acting in accordance with comparative advantage, and promoting better understanding between NGOs and the military.

The military’s primary role in the humanitarian civil-military relationship should be safeguarding the humanitarian space. By prioritizing security, the military can create a protected bubble in an unstable post-conflict environment that can be filled with neutral assistance efforts conducted by NGOs.[37] The military can also help NGOs reinforce that space through a variety of support tasks, including rebuilding infrastructure to enable supply transportation, restoring lines of communication and air traffic control, and facilitating logistics such as the transportation of NGO assets and relief supplies. While conducting these support tasks, the military must emphasize its distinct nature to avoid the “blurred lines” phenomenon observed in Afghanistan. Personnel should be in uniform at all times, military vehicles should be clearly identifiable, and military personnel must not identify themselves as humanitarian workers or as “engaged in a humanitarian mission.” By reestablishing the separation between humanitarians and military forces, the military will reduce the risk to civilian aid workers and arrest the securitization of aid.

In order to properly allocate tasks between the military and humanitarian NGOs, the two groups should examine their comparative advantages. The military should focus on tasks that benefit from its hierarchy and efficient structure, while simultaneously not threatening the humanitarian projects enacted by NGOs. These tasks include creating security and providing protection for the relief effort, rebuilding infrastructure, and security-related support tasks including the demobilization of fighters and demining operations. As the CIMIC experience in Afghanistan demonstrates, the military is often ill equipped for traditional humanitarian efforts, such as health, education, water, and food aid. As such, those tasks should be allocated to NGOs to conduct independently of military oversight. This separation of tasks should be consistently enforced and overridden only in the case of extreme emergency, such as a humanitarian crisis in the midst of a security situation that prohibits NGO operation.

Finally, the US military and NGOs should work towards a greater understanding of their respective cultures, values, and roles in post-conflict reconstruction. The military has historically struggled to grasp the importance of humanitarian principles, and must gain a greater respect for the fundamental tenants of humanitarian action in order to facilitate a functional working relationship and check the impulse to violate those principles. Respect will stem from a two-way dialogue between humanitarian actors and military personnel, channeled through horizontal relationships and low-level interfacing. These relationships can be encouraged by both the military and NGOs. Military training should include internships, staff exchanges, and joint conferences with representatives from the NGO community. The military should also institutionalize the position of Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD), a senior Foreign Service Officer with CIMIC experience who could advise the Combatant Commander on best practices. NGOs might consider emulating the ICRC’s Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces, a group of military and police specialists who conduct “dissemination” efforts and work to make the role and identity of the ICRC known to armed forces worldwide.[38] By increasing mutual respect, the US military and humanitarian NGOs will be able to more effectively cooperate in complex security environments without the destruction of humanitarian space.



The disaster of humanitarian CIMIC in Afghanistan demonstrated the dysfunctionality of the unity of command model that the US military has pursued since the inception of the Global War on Terror. The model is crippled by the military’s illegitimacy as a humanitarian actor, its inability to effectively deliver humanitarian aid, and the damage that the militarization of aid does to the humanitarian space. Subsequent animosity on both sides of the relationship, with the “traditionalist” trend among NGOs on one hand and the military’s apparent disregard for humanitarian principles on the other, is equally destructive in the contemporary security environment. The rising importance of irregular warfare and post-conflict reconstruction demands that the military and NGOs work in concert toward their shared goal: a stable and peaceful society in the aftermath of war.

By abandoning the competition for superiority and control engendered in the unity of command model, and adopting a cooperative but independent dialogue-based model for relations, the military and humanitarian NGOs can rebuild the humanitarian space and prepare for future challenges. Under the unity of effort model, the US military and humanitarian NGOs can acknowledge that they share similar objectives and benefit from cooperation, as long as that cooperation is based on mutual respect, comparative advantage, and well-defined boundaries. In the context of ongoing wars in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere, a “reset” in humanitarian civil-military relationships is critical to post-conflict reconstruction. The US military and international NGOs should reexamine their relationships and set aside the collective hostility of the past 15 years of the Global War on Terror in order to open the door for more successful resolutions to current and ongoing crises.



Works Cited

“Afghanistan: A return to humanitarian action.” MSF. Mar. 12, 2010. http://www.msf.org/article/afghanistan-return-humanitarian-action.

Bishop, James K. “Combat role strains relations between America’s military and its NGOs.” Humanitarian Response at Interaction. 2003. 29.

Brzoska, Michael and Hans-Georg Ehrhart. “Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction.” Development and Peace Foundation. Nov. 2008. 6. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260410studyehrhart_/sede260410studyehrhart_en.pdf.

Currey, Craig J. Lt.Col. USA. “A New Model for Military / Nongovernmental Organization Relations in Post- Conflict Operations.” (Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, 2003): 5.

DOD Directive 3000.05: “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.” Nov. 28, 2005. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf.

Fields, Kimberly, Maj. USA. “Civil-Military Relations: A Military Civil Affairs Perspective.” Harvard Kennedy School. Unpublished. 2. https://www.hitpages.com/doc/6004911888138240/1#pageTop.

Franke, Volker. “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations.” International Journal of Peace Studies. 11, 2 (2006): 19. http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol11_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf.

James, Eric. “Two Steps Back: Relearning the Humanitarian-Military Lessons Learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Journal of Humanitarian Action. 2003. http://www.jha.ac/articles/a125.htm.

Joint Publication 3-57: Civil-Military Operations. Sept. 11, 2013. ix. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_57.pdf.

McNerney, Michael J. “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters. Winter 2005-06. 36.

Metcalfe, Victoria, Simone Haysom, and Stuart Gordon. “Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination.” Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper. May 2012. 6. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7679.pdf.

Rana, Raj. “Contemporary challenges in the civil-military relationship: Complementarity or incompatibility?” International Review of the Red Cross. 855 (2004): 571.

Sedra, Mark. “The Provincial Reconstruction Team: The Future of Civil Military Relations?” Foreign Policy Research Division, Foreign Affairs Canada. 4. http://www.marksedra.com/Mark_Sedras_Site/Publications_Archive_files/Mark%20Sedra%20-%20Civil-Miltary%20Relations,%20March%202005.pdf.

Stoddard, Abby and Adele Harmer. “Room to Manoeuver: Challenges of Linking Humanitarian Action and Post-Conflict Recovery in the New Global Security Environment.” UN Human Development Report Office (2005): 13.

Weinberger, “Civil-Military Coordination in Peacebuilding: The Challenge in Afghanistan.” Journal of International Affairs. 50, 2 (2002): 262. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24358170?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.




[1] Volker Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” International Journal of Peace Studies 11, no. 2 (2006): 19.

[2] DOD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations,” Nov. 28, 2005.

[3] Craig J. Currey, Lt. Col., USA, “A New Model for Military / Nongovernmental Organization Relations in Post-Conflict Operations,” Strategy Research Project, US Army War College (2003): 5.

[4] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-57: Civil-Military Operations, Sept. 11, 2013, ix, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_57.pdf.

[5] Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma,” 8.

[6] Abby Stoddard and Adele Harmer, “Room to Manoeuver: Challenges of Linking Humanitarian Action and Post-Conflict Recovery in the New Global Security Environment,” UN Human Development Report Office (2005): 13.

[7] Raj Rana, “Contemporary challenges in the civil-military relationship: Complementarity or incompatibility?” International Review of the Red Cross, 855 (2004): 571.

[8] Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma,” 17.

[9] Ibid., 16.

[10] Ibid., 14.

[11] Ibid., 15.

[12] Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom, and Stuart Gordon, “Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination,” Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, May 2012, 6.

[13] Kimberly Fields, Maj. USA, “Civil-Military Relations: A Military Civil Affairs Perspective,” Harvard Kennedy School, 2, https://www.hitpages.com/doc/6004911888138240/1#pageTop.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma,” 10.

[16] Weinberger, “Civil-Military Coordination in Peacebuilding: The Challenge in Afghanistan,” Journal of International Affairs, 50, no. 2 (2002): 262, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24358170?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

[17] Eric James, “Two Steps Back: Relearning the Humanitarian-Military Lessons Learned in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Journal of Humanitarian Action, 2003, http://www.jha.ac/articles/a125.htm.

[18] Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters, Winter 2005-06, 36.

[19] Fields, “Civil-Military Relations,” 2-3.

[20] Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma,” 11.

[21] Ibid.

[22] McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction…” 33

[23] Rana, “Contemporary challenges…” 570

[24] Ibid., 578.

[25] James K. Bishop, “Combat role strains relations between America’s military and its NGOs,” Humanitarian Response at Interaction, 2003, 29.

[26] Rana, “Contemporary challenges,” 576.

[27] Mark Sedra, “The Provincial Reconstruction Team: The Future of Civil Military Relations?” Foreign Policy Research Division, Foreign Affairs Canada, 4.

[28] Stoddard, Harmer, “Room to Manoeuvre,” 13.

[29] Ibid., 14.

[30] “Afghanistan: A return to humanitarian action.” MSF. Mar. 12, 2010, http://www.msf.org/article/afghanistan-return-humanitarian-action.

[31] Stoddard, Harmer, “Room to Manoeuvre,” 30.

[32] Sedra, “The Provincial Reconstruction Team,” 4.

[33] Ibid., 5.

[34] McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction,” 38-39.

[35] Stoddard, Harmer, “Room to Manoeuvre,” 17-18.

[36] Rana, “Contemporary challenges,” 578.

[37] Michael Brzoska and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction,” Development and Peace Foundation, Nov. 2008, 6.

[38] Rana, “Contemporary challenges,” 583.


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