The Trump Administration’s policies have had global ramifications for America’s place in preserving stability and peace. For many, these policies are destructive to America’s capacity to maintain peace and stability. However, for others, they highlight the cracks within the supposed liberal order and represent an opportunity for the world to do away with an American-backed global system. In this interview, Hal Brands discusses the state of American Grand Strategy under the second Trump administration. 

Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Professor Brands is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He specializes in the study of US foreign policy and defense strategy, and has previously worked as a lead writer for the National Defense Strategy Commission and a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

This interview was edited for length and clarity. 

Will Trinh: Thank you so much, Professor Brands. I wanted to first talk about the liberal international order in the context of the Trump administration. You briefly touched on this in July when you published a column in Bloomberg titled Three Ways that Trump Might End America’s World Order. The third potential reason that you mentioned in your article is that flouting the rules of the liberal international order and the ensuing hypocrisy could lead to the destruction of the global order. However, many argue that there have been many times when America has refused to comply with international rules. These include its refusal to abide by ICJ decisions in the Nicaragua case, its refusal to ratify UNCLOS, or the fact that it still uses weapons such as cluster bombs that are banned by the international community. My question is, why does Trump’s second administration uniquely pose a threat, considering that for the last 30 years, at least for some, America hasn’t been the most faithful to the international order it attempts to construct?

Hal Brands: Well, hypocrisy is always the prerogative of the hegemon, and there have certainly been times when the United States has decided that international law or the judgments of international institutions should not be binding upon it. I note, though, that at least one of the cases you mentioned, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, is more complicated than it sounds, because it’s true that the United States has not ratified it. However, it actually observes it. 

Nonetheless, what makes the second Trump administration potentially different, with the emphasis on potentially different, is that it’s hard for me to think of a time when the United States has fundamentally assaulted the central rules and norms of the post-1945 international order. And the most fundamental norm of the post-1945 international order is that you cannot conquer or extort territory by force and have that recognized by the international community. The norm exists because widespread disregard for it before World War II led the world down a very dark path. 

It’s potentially a departure because the Trump administration has talked a lot about acquiring or taking territory from Panama, Canada, and Denmark. It hasn’t brought that about, so we may look back on this period where the United States threatened some hazardous things but didn’t follow through. It’s also possible the Trump administration will come back to this at some point during Trump’s administration and pursue the agenda more seriously through harsher, coercive pressures and things like that, in which case, I do think we are in a different place regarding America’s relationship to the body of norms that it has tried chiefly to uphold since 1945.

Phoenix Boggs: Professor Brands, I wanted to ask about something you mentioned. You emphasize the potentiality of this instability and say that that potentiality rests on one factor in particular. Is there something that uniquely would enable us to be good or bad players in the international order moving forward? Do you think that factor is independent of Trump being in office?

Hal Brands: Well, good and evil is in the eye of the beholder; the international system has served America’s interests very well. As a general proposition, American policies that strengthen that system and make it harder for Russia, China, and other revisionary actors to disrupt it would be beneficial. That thickened cooperation between the United States and other countries, particularly other democracies that support that system, is good. 

All of that would be sort of favorable behavior from my perspective, and generally speaking, if the United States behaves in a way that is likely to disrupt or dismantle that system because it is pursuing its own revisionist projects, that, generally speaking, that would be bad. But it’s essential not to assume that everything about the existing international system suits America. Everything that changes or modifies it would be bad for America. That’s not the case, and there have been plenty of times in the past when the United States has decided that aspects of that system needed to be revised, reformed, or renegotiated. One example is when America dropped the gold standard in 1971; it seemed, for a time, that it might be a disaster for the international system, which was basically a Western system at that point. It unleashed this reinvention process, giving American leadership in the Western world a new lease on life. And so reform can sometimes be constructive, and the devil is in the details.

Will Trinh: On this topic of autocratic entities, I was actually very interested in a specific other autocratic entity, and you touched on this in an interview with Decoding Geopolitics podcast. You often mentioned that North Korea threatens global stability as part of this axis of resistance. I’m very curious because we frequently see North Korea in the news for its most recent nuclear weapons test or other provocative comments. Why is it the case that a country with one of the lowest levels of development and a GDP of less than $30 billion poses a significant threat to the liberal order?

Hal Brands: North Korea has traditionally posed two threats. One is to destabilize the region of Northeast Asia. It’s obviously a direct military threat to South Korea and Japan, both of whom are US allies. It has posed a larger challenge to the International Non-Proliferation regime, which is an American Non-Proliferation regime, and has played an essential role in keeping the number of nuclear powers in the world relatively small over the past 80 years. I think that the North Korean challenge has grown because of two or three factors. One is that North Korea either now has, or soon will have, pretty significant capabilities to hit the United States, with nuclear weapons delivered via missiles. And as it does that, and as that capability expands, it poses questions about the credibility of US security guarantees for South Korea. So the challenge of that alliance becomes more pronounced. 

The North Korean threat is also getting more significant because of the greater integration and cooperation it has pursued with global autocratic powers, particularly Russia. And it appears, based on published reports, that Russia is now aiding North Korea’s defense industrial base in essential ways. And then, last, don’t forget that North Korea has engaged in what we would call global power projection and sent upwards of 10,000 troops to fight in a war in Europe, which is something that I don’t think anybody had on their bingo card even two or three years ago.

Therefore, North Korea is not in the same category as China or Russia. In some ways, even Iran has been able to pursue a larger degree of regional influence. But it poses a real regional threat, and in many ways, the danger is getting worse as its partnerships and capabilities expand, right?

Will Trinh: I wanted to touch on nuclear non-proliferation briefly. You mentioned that nuclear non-proliferation has been a cornerstone of US foreign policy and grand strategy ever since the NPT was a treaty. When it comes to other atomic states that are more integrated within the international system, Israel and Pakistan come to mind. They may be more unstable due to terrorism within the region or because of other provocative statements that they have often made, which make them pariah states for the rest of the international community. Do these nuclear states also necessarily pose threats to the liberal order? Or do these atomic states pose the same, not necessarily the same danger, but a similar threat to global stability as North Korea does to international stability?

Hal Brands: Well, I mean, let’s put Israel and Pakistan in two very different categories. I know some people consider Israel a pariah state, but I don’t put myself in that category. I think it’s a democracy that is going through some challenges right now and faces challenging circumstances, that lives in a crazy neighborhood, and in many ways, has to deal with a set of challenges unlike those faced by pretty much any other democracy in the world. 

Pakistan, I think, is a different case. Pakistan has long been involved in supporting international terrorism and supporting our enemies like the Taliban, and I think those are the two very different types of geopolitical players. I don’t think either of them, and especially Israel, poses the same sort of international threat as North Korea. Still, North Korea is kind of the quintessential rogue regime; it is committed to the obstruction of the sovereignty of its neighbor, South Korea. It has a history of aggressive conduct. It defines the United States as an enemy, and so, from my perspective, as an American, nuclear weapons of that sort of power are far more dangerous than they are in the hands of a country like Israel. I would also just say in Pakistan’s case, it is a somewhat different challenge. And so yes, there is a possibility that the state of Pakistan might do something to destabilize the region while it possesses nuclear weapons. It was reported in the news late last year that Pakistan is trying to develop longer-range missiles that could potentially reach the United States. But the other part of the danger has always been that Pakistan would somehow lose control of its nuclear arsenal because of insider threats or internal instability. And again, I think that’s a different challenge than we face in other cases, right? 

Phoenix Boggs: I’m approaching this issue from an international environmental awards perspective. I’m curious about China’s evolving image in the world in the face of changes in the US’s role in the liberal order. The US almost allows China to be the good guy in the climate regime, particularly in the UNFCCC or the Paris Climate Accords. Is that a fair assessment? I’m concerned about how we’re elevating China almost at our own expense. And if that’s a fair assessment, does it extend to other international fields?

Hal Brands: In general, the Chinese government has been trying to position itself as a force for stability, moderation, and multilateralism, in contrast to the United States. The Chinese government’s position is that the United States is now engaged in bullying and coercion on a global scale. We can argue about the merits of that critique, and in many ways it’s hypocritical, and in many ways it’s exaggerated. 

Of course, it ignores all of the coercive and bullying behavior that China itself engages in the economic realm of the South China Sea, and in any number of other categories. But I think what the Chinese government accurately perceives is that American behavior is currently understood by large swaths of the world, particularly in the developing world, but not just in the developing world, to be destabilizing, to be somewhat damaging to the international trade system that other countries rely on, and to be a source of uncertainty and in some cases concern. 

Again, I don’t want to overstate that, but that is the perception in many other countries worldwide. And so China certainly believes that there is diplomatic money to be made by playing up those aspects of U.S. behavior, and trying to create a contrast. And China’s ability to do so is greater than before 2025, but it’s also limited by the unappealing aspects of China’s behavior, right? So China can talk about how it is a force for stability and multilateralism, but you know the countries it pushes around in the South China Sea know better, right?

Will Trinh: Early in September, Xi Jinping invited this access of resistance, alongside many other countries, to a military parade to celebrate the end of World War II. Do you believe this parade represents a symbolic show of resolve in solidarity among these states, or does it represent a firmer and more open relationship between these autocracies, either economically or militarily?

Hal Brands: It is symbolic, but the relationships are genuine. North Korea and Russia have a military alliance, which we’ve seen put into action when North Korea deployed troops to help fight against Ukraine. And Russia, North Korea, and China have a military alliance. It is a little bit more strained, and there are many ways in which North Korean behavior creates trouble for China, but it’s real nonetheless. There is a progressively tightening relationship, not quite an alliance, as Americans would understand it. 

Still, a deep strategic partnership between Russia and China has included a lot of economic and technological integration, which had been happening for a while, but really sped up due to the Ukraine war and Russia’s isolation from the West. It’s also happening in the military technological sphere. Suppose you look at some US officials’ statements about that military technological relationship. In that case, there are many areas in which China and Russia are developing capabilities together. They are increasingly operating and exercising together. They’re getting into some fairly sophisticated capabilities. And last year, the US Director of National Intelligence warned that Russia and China might operate together in a future crisis or conflict in the western Pacific. These things don’t look exactly like America’s alliances, but that’s not surprising because America’s alliances are unusual. They’re exceptional, and the cooperation between these countries is genuine, whatever label we affixed to the relationship.

Will Trinh: Right, but now I want to pivot slightly to Ukraine. As you just mentioned, North Korea has sent thousands of North Korean troops to the front lines of a European war. For the last three years of its grand strategy and foreign policy, the United States has made an effort to have firm commitments, either militarily or economically, to Ukraine. However, recently, the Trump administration, through multiple statements, has undermined this credible relationship that the United States would always be willing to defend Ukraine. I just wanted to ask, how do you believe the United States can reverse ship to counter this North Korean and Russian military alliance? Does this involve showing a firmer commitment to Ukraine, and what would that look like under a Trump administration?

Hal Brands: Well, the United States has not defended Ukraine. The United States has helped Ukraine protect itself by providing the things, whether weapons, intelligence, or money, that Ukraine uses to defend itself. The distinction is necessary because you don’t have American forces serving in Ukraine. 

This is not a direct war between the United States and Russia. It’s a war in which the United States provides some capabilities. Then Ukraine bears the burdens itself; that strategy has been pretty successful, if you think about the projections for how quickly Ukraine was supposed to fold after Russia was attacked. Here we are, three and a half years later, Ukraine still stands. The trajectory of US assistance to Ukraine was pointing downward at the end of the Biden administration, and it has continued to point downward under the Trump administration. The Trump administration hasn’t moved to deliver more support for Ukraine; it briefly shut off certain aspects of our support for Ukraine. 

However, there has still been a trickle of US weapons going to Ukraine over the past year, as well as intelligence support and some other things, which is likely enough to prevent Ukraine from losing the war. It’s not enough to help Ukraine win the war in the sense of conclusively kicking Russia out of its territory. And it’s not entirely clear that any amount of US assistance, short of direct involvement, would be sufficient to kick Russia out of Ukraine fully and to bring the war to a sustainable end. There have sometimes been hints that the Trump administration might pivot toward a more aggressive posture that’s meant to bring about a more limited objective, which is essentially a cease-fire or an end to war with Russia hanging in the balance for Ukraine. Doing so through harsher sanctions or by pursuing some of these partnerships with the Europeans would free up additional capabilities for Ukraine. The Trump administration has been reluctant to do so for a variety of reasons, but a lot of them are just that Trump doesn’t see this as his war. He always talks about this as Biden’s war and argues it would never have broken out if he had been President. So, he is reluctant to put himself in the position of making the war his own, as Biden did.

Will Trinh: You already mentioned that the United States has never directly put troops in Ukraine. But let’s say we live in this hypothetical world where US intervention would be necessary to solve further Russian annexation of Ukrainian sovereign territory. Do you believe that the United States, if it comes to it, should put troops on the ground? Or do you think this is a line in the sand that the United States should never cross?

Hal Brands: Well, I wouldn’t say that it should never cross that line in the sand, but you know, the bar for doing that should be pretty high, because we’re talking about military collision with a nuclear-armed country, so that should never be taken lightly. And I think it would depend on what it was meant to avert. If it’s meant to avert Russia taking the rest of Donetsk, do I think the US should do that? No, I don’t think so. Should the US consider intervening militarily to prevent Russia from overrunning all of Ukraine? If that were possible, I don’t think it is, but if it were possible, maybe because a Russian-dominated Ukraine would pretty fundamentally change the balance of power in Eastern Europe, and so that stake is significant enough that you should at least be willing to sort of have the conversation. But it’s, you know, a big move, and so it’s something you should only do, probably over fairly big stakes, right? Certainly a last resort. 

Phoenix Boggs: Thank you so much. It’s been wonderful having you here to discuss some of these questions. 

Image courtesy of the American Enterprise Institute

Introduction

The concept of smart power, first articulated by Joseph Nye in the early 2000s, has become a foundational framework for understanding how states navigate an increasingly complex global system. While traditional models of power focus either on coercive (military) or persuasive (soft power) mechanisms, smart power integrates both, combining military, economic, cultural, and diplomatic tools in a flexible, strategic approach to achieve state objectives. As the global order shifts toward multipolarity, the role of smart power becomes more critical. In a world shaped by hybrid threats, cyber warfare, and rapid technological advances, the ability to wield smart power is not just essential for global leadership but also for national resilience. 

This article explores the theoretical foundations of smart power, with a particular focus on the United States as the most successful example of its application. It critically assesses the U.S. approach and compares it with the strategies of other key global players, offering a comprehensive analysis of the strengths and limitations of each approach.

Theoretical Framework: Ingredients of Smart Power in International Relations

Smart power blends the foundational ideas of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Realists argue that coercive power—particularly military and economic strength—remains crucial for influence. Liberal institutionalists assert that states must build international cooperation through norms, laws, and institutional frameworks. Constructivists highlight the role of identity, legitimacy, and perceptions in shaping global interactions. Smart power synthesizes these theories, combining hard elements of coercion with soft tools of diplomacy, cultural influence, and multilateral cooperation, aiming to secure legitimacy for state actions.¹

The key ingredients of smart power include material power, diplomatic finesse, cultural diplomacy, narrative control, hybrid agility, and technological prowess. Together, these elements form a state’s ability to wield influence effectively and flexibly, engaging with both coercion and persuasion while adapting to the changing dynamics of international relations.

Smart Power in Practice: The United States

The United States has long exemplified the effective use of smart power, a strategic approach that integrates both hard power (military and economic coercion) and soft power (diplomatic, cultural, and normative influence) to pursue national interests. This model, as articulated by Joseph Nye, has been essential for the U.S. in navigating an increasingly multipolar world. The U.S. has leveraged its vast military capabilities, economic dominance, and cultural influence to shape the global order, but the efficacy of its smart power strategy has been contingent upon its ability to blend coercive force with the promotion of democratic values and multilateral cooperation.

Historically, the United States’ smart power strategy has hinged on a combination of hard and soft elements. The Marshall Plan of 1948, which provided economic aid to post-war Europe, is one of the most iconic examples of U.S. smart power in action.² By combining economic assistance with the promotion of democratic governance, the U.S. successfully shaped the post-war order and bolstered its influence over Western Europe.³ Similarly, during the Cold War, the U.S. demonstrated a masterful use of both military deterrence and diplomatic engagement, particularly in resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis through a delicate balance of threats and negotiations.⁴ These instances underscore the potential of smart power to integrate hard and soft elements in pursuit of long-term strategic objectives.

In recent decades, the U.S. has continued to adapt its smart power strategy to confront new geopolitical challenges. One of the most notable contemporary examples is the Pivot to Asia, which aimed to counter China’s rising influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This strategy combined increased diplomatic engagement with regional allies, economic partnerships through initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and military reinforcement through strategic alliances with countries such as Japan and South Korea.⁵ The Pivot to Asia highlighted the U.S.’s ability to use both soft power, through trade agreements and diplomatic outreach, and hard power, through military presence and security partnerships, to assert its influence in a changing global landscape.

Moreover, the United States’ cultural diplomacy has been a central pillar of its soft power. Institutions such as Hollywood, Silicon Valley, and prestigious universities have long been vehicles for projecting American values of freedom, innovation, and democracy worldwide. These institutions not only shape global perceptions of the U.S. but also provide a platform for fostering global networks of influence. A particularly significant example of U.S. soft power is the PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) initiative, which was launched in 2003. PEPFAR is one of the largest global health initiatives aimed at combating HIV/AIDS and has provided lifesaving treatment to millions of people, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. This initiative, blending humanitarian aid with diplomatic engagement, exemplifies the U.S. use of smart power to promote health, human rights, and global security, reinforcing its image as a leader in global health.

However, the U.S. has not been immune to criticisms of inconsistency and hypocrisy in its application of smart power, particularly when military interventions and economic sanctions have contradicted the values it promotes. The War on Terror, for instance, raised questions about the ethical limits of U.S. power, as its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan were seen by many as undermining its moral authority.⁶ Such contradictions reveal that the success of smart power is contingent upon maintaining a balance between coercion and legitimacy.

The rise of new technologies, such as cybersecurity and artificial intelligence (AI), has further transformed the U.S.’s approach to smart power. In the digital age, the U.S. has embraced the strategic use of information warfare, technological innovation, and digital diplomacy to assert its global influence. As a leader in both the development and regulation of emerging technologies, the U.S. has sought to shape the global rules of the digital economy, from data privacy laws to cybersecurity norms.⁷ This demonstrates the increasing importance of technological diplomacy as an extension of soft power, enabling the U.S. to project influence in the digital realm without resorting to traditional military force.

However, the deployment of smart power remains fraught with challenges. One significant concern is the legitimacy gap, where the use of coercion, such as economic sanctions or military interventions, undermines the credibility of U.S. values. For example, U.S. actions in the Middle East, framed as efforts to promote democracy, have often led to instability and human rights abuses, creating a disconnect between its professed values and its actions on the ground.⁸ Additionally, the rise of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which offers economic investments without the political conditionalities typically associated with Western aid, presents a challenge to the U.S.’s ability to use economic power as a tool of smart power.⁹ As China’s influence expands, the U.S. may need to recalibrate its smart power strategy to maintain its competitive edge in the face of alternative models of statecraft. 

The United States’ use of smart power remains one of the most sophisticated and adaptable strategies in international relations. By blending hard and soft power, the U.S. has managed to assert its global leadership while also responding to emerging threats and challenges. Yet, as the global order continues to evolve and new powers like China gain influence, the U.S. will need to refine its approach to smart power, ensuring that it remains a credible and ethical leader in a multipolar world. The future of smart power will depend on the U.S.’s ability to navigate the complexities of global diplomacy while maintaining the legitimacy and moral authority that have been central to its influence in the 21st century.

Comparative Analysis: Smart Power Beyond the U.S.

While the U.S. represents a case of comprehensive smart power deployment, other global players employ this strategy in different ways, shaped by their unique geopolitical positions and priorities.

China: China’s smart power strategy relies heavily on geoeconomic tactics. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks to build infrastructure and create economic linkages across Asia, Africa, and Europe, is a prime example of China’s use of economic influence to extend its power.¹⁰ The establishment of Confucius Institutes worldwide, aimed at promoting Chinese language and culture, further demonstrates the importance of soft power. However, China’s use of coercion in regional disputes—particularly in the South China Sea—and its “wolf warrior diplomacy” have often undermined its soft power, demonstrating the risks of overemphasizing hard power in a global context.^{11 12}

European Union: The EU exemplifies a form of soft power through its regulatory influence, particularly in areas such as data protection and environmental policies. The EU has been successful in shaping global standards, promoting human rights, and pushing for environmental sustainability.¹³ However, its lack of a unified military force and dependence on NATO for security reduce its strategic autonomy, limiting the EU’s ability to deploy smart power in a more balanced way.¹⁴ The EU’s role in managing the migration crisis and its regulatory leadership in technology—such as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)—have demonstrated the EU’s capacity to influence the global agenda.¹⁵

Japan: As a middle power, Japan has embraced technological diplomacy and soft power to increase its global influence. Innovations in robotics, green technology, and its leadership in multilateral diplomacy, particularly within the United Nations and World Trade Organization (WTO), elevate its global standing.¹⁶ However, Japan’s pacifist constitution and reliance on U.S. security agreements restrict its ability to project power independently, thus limiting its overall smart power strategy.¹⁷

South Korea: South Korea’s smart power strategy combines cultural diplomacy, particularly through the global popularity of K-pop, with robust digital diplomacy. Yet, South Korea’s reliance on the U.S. for security and its ongoing geopolitical tensions with North Korea restrict its flexibility, making its approach to smart power more reactive than proactive.¹⁸

Conclusion: The Future of Smart Power in a Multipolar World

As multipolarity increases and emerging powers such as China, Russia, and regional players gain influence, the importance of smart power will only grow. While the U.S. must evolve its strategy to maintain its leadership position, smaller states can use smart power to level the playing field and assert their influence in global affairs. The ability to combine hard and soft power—rooted in legitimacy and innovation—will determine success in contemporary statecraft.

1.  Nye, Joseph S. The Future of Power. PublicAffairs, 2011. ↩︎
2.  Nye, Joseph S. “Smart Power: The U.S. Experience.” Harvard University Press, 2015. ↩︎
3.  Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. PublicAffairs, 2004. ↩︎
4.  Kennedy, Robert F. “The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Memoir.” The New York Times, 1962. ↩︎
5. U.S. Department of State. “Pivot to Asia: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region.” 2011. ↩︎
6. Chomsky, Noam. “Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance.” Metropolitan Books, 2003 ↩︎
7. Friedman, Thomas. “Thank You for Being Late: An Optimist’s Guide to Thriving in the Age of Accelerations.” Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2017. ↩︎
8. Mearsheimer, John J., and Walt, Stephen M. “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007. ↩︎
9. Belt & Road Initiative. “A New Silk Road: The Economic Power of China.” 2013. ↩︎
10. Ibid. ↩︎
11. Li, Xiaoyang. “Confucius Institutes: A Tool of China’s Soft Power.” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2017. ↩︎
12. Callahan, David. “The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy.” Oxford University Press, 2020. ↩︎
13. Smith, Karen. “The European Union and the World: The External Relations of the European Union.” Oxford University Press, 2011. ↩︎
14. Keukeleire, Stephan, and Delreux, Tom. “The EU’s Foreign Policy: A Political Economy Approach.” Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. ↩︎
15. European Commission. “General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Impact and Regulations.” 2018. ↩︎
16. Shinoda, Tetsuro. “Japan’s Foreign Policy and Its Global Influence.” Japan Review of Political Science, 2016. ↩︎
17. Funabashi, Yoichi. “The Pacific Alliance and Japan’s Foreign Policy.” Asian Survey, 2015. ↩︎
18. Sung, Yoonhyuk. “South Korea’s Digital Diplomacy and the Role of K-Pop.” Journal of Korean Studies, 2020. ↩︎

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: U.S. Power, Image sourced from European Council on Foreign Relations | CC License, no changes made

Imagine a world where perpetrators of repeated human rights abuses can escape justice and sabotage the efforts of those who seek to hold them accountable. This is the reality that the International Criminal Court (ICC) faces in its mission to deter and prosecute international crimes. The ICC was primarily established with the promise of holding leaders accountable for human rights abuses. Yet, its record suggests that this promise often goes unfulfilled. Cases involving Sudan, Russia, and the U.S. in Afghanistan reveal how political influence and other pressures have repeatedly undercut the court’s authority and legitimacy. Drawing on political statements, news reports, court documents, and scholarly work, this article examines how the ICC has not only been sidestepped but actively weakened by the very powers it seeks to restrain. Renowned executives, such as the George Bush administration in the U.S., were able to directly interfere with investigation efforts through witness tampering or manipulating legal loopholes. In these cases, innate vulnerabilities were exposed, showing that the ICC can be rendered powerless against human rights abuses. 

The International Criminal Court stands as a beacon of hope for addressing grave violations of international law, primarily focusing on genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Established under the Rome Statute of 1998, the ICC aims to provide a global judicial mechanism to end impunity for perpetrators of these serious crimes. However, despite its noble intentions, the ICC’s effectiveness in deterring human rights abuses—especially those committed by political leaders—has been under intense scrutiny. While the ICC often finds itself rendered ineffective, largely due to the influence of political power and operational limitations, understanding the changing dynamics within these specific cases will ultimately allow for more comprehensive insight into its role in international justice, as well as its arguably underestimated potential for tangible deterrence. 

Overview of the ICC 

The ICC was created to establish a lasting framework in which individuals can be held accountable for the most egregious crimes recognized by international law. Proponents view this court as a significant advancement in the global fight against impunity for serious criminal acts, enabling a systematic approach to justice for victims of heinous offenses. Examining past ICC cases provides context for its effectiveness. The ICC has handled 32 cases, with varied outcomes: some had convictions, acquittals, dismissals, and withdrawals, while others even ended due to the defendant’s death, such as in Libya. 12 investigations remain ongoing, roughly 60 individuals have been indicted, and 11 convictions and 4 acquittals have occurred. Notably, the ICC has successfully prosecuted several high-ranking political and military leaders, demonstrating its prevailing capacity to hold individuals accountable for serious international crimes.

However, the ICC is not without its challenges. Despite its goals, it has faced mounting criticism from various governments, non-governmental organizations, and scholars. Key issues include debates around its jurisdiction, perceived biases, trial mechanisms, and the limitations associated with passive prosecution strategies. The court’s mandate is often questioned, particularly as political influences complicate its ability to function effectively. While Marchuk & Wanigasuriya suggest that regime change is often necessary for such prosecutions, Mueller argues that the ICC remains one of the few international bodies capable of trying high-level perpetrators. Gilligan also notes that the ICC’s presence can at least limit fugitives’ ability to seek asylum, which we will see hints of later on.

Justice Without Respect: The ICC’s Struggle with Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir 

The International Criminal Court (ICC) initiated an investigation into a situation in Darfur, Sudan, in June 2005, following a referral from the United Nations Security Council. This investigation focused on allegations of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity attributed to Sudanese government forces and their allied militias, known as the Janjaweed, as well as rebel groups involved in the ongoing conflict. The ICC subsequently issued arrest warrants for high-ranking Sudanese officials—including former President Omar al-Bashir— making him the first sitting head of state to be indicted by the ICC. He faced many charges, including five counts of crimes against humanity, two counts of war crimes, and three counts of genocide. 

Despite the gravity of these charges, the enforcement of the ICC’s arrest warrants encountered significant obstacles. Unlike the ICC’s challenges to be presented in Russia or the U.S., Sudan’s response extended beyond mere legal defiance, actively endangering humanitarian operations by demonizing UNAMID—a UN peacekeeping mission to bring stability to the region—of espionage, thereby politicizing aid and compounding human suffering. The Sudanese government directly demonstrated its distrust towards the ICC by accusing UNAMID of colluding with the court, which led to increased intimidation of humanitarian efforts in the region. Even more momentously, al-Bashir’s ability to travel to South Africa in June 2015 to attend an African Union summit without facing arrest underscored the ICC’s enforcement challenges. South Africa, a state party to the Rome Statute, was legally obligated to arrest al-Bashir but failed to do so, resulting in significant diplomatic controversy.

Following a military coup in April 2019, al-Bashir was eventually ousted from power and is currently detained in Sudan, where he has been convicted of corruption and money laundering by a domestic court. Despite his imprisonment, he remains wanted by the ICC, reflecting the ongoing difficulties in seeing the judicial process through at an international level. The case of Sudan illustrates not only the legal precedents set by the ICC regarding state obligations but also the tribunal’s struggles with political sovereignty and the complexities that arise when a state is unwilling to cooperate with international legal mandates. The ICC’s involvement in Sudan also revealed how non-cooperation from national governments can not only hinder justice but also escalate tensions with humanitarian actors like UNAMID. Overall, the ICC’s experience in Sudan underscores how political resistance can obstruct justice, especially when state hostility compromises both legal action and humanitarian aid.

Kremlin in the Shadows: Navigating the ICC’s Challenge with Russia’s Allegations 

Having examined the ICC’s actions and challenges regarding war crimes in Sudan, it becomes even more evident how complexities in jurisdiction and local governance can hinder the court’s effectiveness. This struggle for legitimate accountability is mirrored in the ICC’s ongoing investigation into Russia, where the specter of geopolitical power dynamics complicates efforts to enforce international law. Unlike Sudan, where the ICC faced localized obstruction and crises with humanitarian aid agencies, this case in Russia reveals how global powers can strategically delegitimize international law by framing it as politically biased and reshaping global discourse rather than merely evading justice. 

In 2023, the court issued an arrest warrant for President Vladimir Putin in connection with the ongoing aggression in Ukraine, specifically regarding child abduction. Despite the legitimacy of these charges, there has been minimal impact on Putin’s conduct or Russia’s actions on the global stage. Despite the ICC’s attempts to assert its authority, Putin’s administration has continued to dismiss and disregard the court’s legitimacy, similar to al-Bashir and his administration. Rooted in broader geopolitical calculations, the Kremlin has successfully maneuvered through both domestic and international political landscapes, effectively shaping narratives that legitimize its actions while discrediting ICC efforts. For example, Russia complied and followed through with returning some of the Ukrainian children abducted during their military campaigns, but not even close to all. This has illustrated a broader trend wherein powerful nations can reject international legal frameworks when it suits their interests and may offer just enough compliance to satisfy international courts, keeping tensions simmering without ever letting them boil over.

In the case of Russia, political dynamics create a situation where accountability through the ICC appears increasingly unlikely. For instance, despite international condemnation, the Russian government has continued its military operations in Ukraine without significant consequences, highlighting the limitations of the ICC in enforcing complete compliance with international justice norms. High-ranking officials can operate with relative impunity, shielded from the consequences of their actions by national interests. Furthermore, the case of Russia offers critical insights into the ICC’s jurisdictional constraints. The court can only prosecute actions committed within the territories of member states or by individuals from those nations. Since Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s jurisdiction over actions taken by Russian nationals is uniquely limited. Even Ukraine was not a member until January of this year. This permitted several legal loopholes to be exploited, effectively shielding violators from investigation and undermining the ICC’s deterrent effect on a global scale.

All hope is not lost in Russia’s case, though, particularly regarding indirect deterrence. As mentioned earlier, Omar al-Bashir’s unpunished visit to South Africa revealed enforcement challenges for the ICC. However, President Vladimir Putin’s decision to attend the 2023 BRICS conference virtually after his ICC arrest warrant was issued does reflect a noteworthy shift in response to the growing legitimacy of the Court. In contrast to al-Bashir, who flouted ICC arrest warrants through open international travel, Putin’s decision not to attend the 2023 BRICS summit in person suggests that ICC rulings, though unenforceable, may still exert a chilling diplomatic effect. This shift from defiance to calculated caution signals an emerging form of deterrence shaped by reputational risk and alliance pressure. This cautious behavior suggests that the ICC’s recent actions may even be fostering a heightened sense of legitimacy and apprehension among even the most powerful leaders, influencing how they navigate international engagements amidst outstanding arrest warrants. While Sudan’s obstruction was rooted in domestic authoritarian control and regional non-compliance, Russia’s challenge to the ICC strategically utilizes media framing, geopolitical alliances, and the leveraging of superpower status to nullify international norms.

Diplomatic Immunity? Avoiding Accountability for Afghanistan’s Black Sites 

While the ICC’s efforts to hold high-profile figures like Vladimir Putin accountable signify a crucial step toward reinforcing the legitimacy of international justice, the case against the U.S. regarding the war in Afghanistan presents another major setback. Here, the complexities of state sovereignty and the blatant lack of cooperation from the U.S. and Afghan authorities pose significant barriers to justice, especially considering Americans’ historically positive sentiment towards pro-rule-of-law institutions, which is unlike the other two cases. The ongoing investigation into alleged war crimes, including those committed by U.S. forces and their operatives at secret detention sites, underscores the challenges faced by the ICC in executing its mandate. Instead of cases of evasion, like in Russia or Sudan, the U.S. actively constructed contractual legal shields to preempt ICC authority, most notably through “Article 98 agreements,” a form of Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs). These are essentially diplomatic agreements between countries, designed to protect certain nationals, including but not limited to military members, from prosecution in international courts, particularly the ICC. In the case of the Bush administration, these agreements even included clauses threatening vulnerable trade partners with economic sanctions against testifying.

Afghanistan is also a pivotal case for the ICC due to numerous allegations of war crimes involving multiple high-profile parties, including the Taliban and various U.S. forces. The ICC reopened its investigation in March 2020 after overcoming initial resistance, focusing on claims of torture and mistreatment at CIA black sites and other locations in Afghanistan and Europe. The ICC once again faced significant hurdles throughout its efforts, including attempts to block evidence collection and hinder witness cooperation. These challenges were compounded by ongoing security concerns and U.S. unilateralism, particularly through the diversionary BIAs signed by over 100 countries under the Bush administration, many of which were host countries to black sites such as Thailand, Poland, Yemen, and even Afghanistan itself.

Unlike Sudan or Russia, which resisted ICC action after the fact, the U.S. used BIAs to legally immunize its citizens in advance, setting a precedent that could neuter the ICC’s ability to prosecute war crimes globally. This distinction is critical, and so I will repeat it: While Sudan and Russia sought to evade rulings once they were already under ICC scrutiny, the U.S. built an entire legal framework designed to prevent the court from ever exercising authority in the first place. In doing so, Washington shifted the burden of the Court from one of enforcement to one of institutional survival, undermining its mission at its structural core. In the Afghanistan case, these agreements continue to complicate ICC efforts to investigate any alleged war crimes committed by or merely intersecting with U.S. forces and CIA personnel, even into today, as they grant immunity to American nationals, compromising the court’s jurisdiction.

This legal wall was further fortified under the Trump administration, which escalated efforts by revoking then-ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s visa and threatening sanctions in response to her investigation into potential U.S. involvement in Afghanistan—demonstrating a coordinated campaign not just to evade, but to delegitimize and dismantle the court’s authority. While such actions may seem routine in 2025, at the time, this move was part of a broader strategy to resist accountability and shield U.S. personnel from international legal scrutiny. Despite these seemingly indomitable impediments, the ICC’s continued efforts at investigation underscore their genuine commitment to accountability and serve as a testament to the purity of their intentions, reflecting the court’s central role in the persevering global pursuit of justice, even against global superpowers. While Sudan denied its jurisdiction and Russia mocked its legitimacy, the U.S. took the most controversial step in deploying highly unethical policy tools to structurally erode the ICC’s capacity to act. This ultimately set a far-reaching precedent for powerful nations to carve out immunity through meticulous legal diplomacy, a system initially intended for the preservation of the rule of law.

Conclusion

The International Criminal Court’s role in deterring global human rights abuses undoubtedly presents an intricate dilemma that balances hope for justice against the stark realities of political power dynamics. Through the lens of Sudan, one of the ICC’s first cases, to the more recent cases with the U.S. and Russia, we must understand the limitations faced by the ICC in fulfilling its mandate. While there are instances, such as the finalized charges against Omar al-Bashir and small, yet important shifts in caution by Putin, that exemplify the potential for the ICC to hold individuals accountable, significant handicaps remain. The challenges posed by political influence and the limitations of jurisdiction severely undermine the ICC’s ability to act effectively and deter future violations, as seen in the case of the U.S., where powerful leaders operate with impunity while the ICC struggles to retain its authority. One could even argue that the U.S., under multiple administrations to this day, has strategically sought to keep not only the ICC’s hands tied, but also avoid international accountability in all forms, out of fear of what violations of both domestic and global law might be exposed if the courts acted without restraint.

The future of the ICC lies in navigating these complexities, addressing jurisdictional limitations, and asserting its authority in an increasingly politicized global landscape. For the court to become a truly formidable force in combating human rights abuses effectively, it must confront political challenges robustly and engage more strategically with local, potentially dissenting authorities. Ultimately, building these enduring and cooperative relationships with the frontline while seeking universal acknowledgment of and respect for its legitimacy will be vital for the ICC’s success in fulfilling its mission. The ongoing scrutiny of the ICC, if anything, further legitimizes the fundamental need for continuous reflection on the intersection of international law and sociopolitical realities, pushing for reforms or reinforcing local support to enhance its efficacy in ensuring justice for all. Even now, efforts to ‘discipline’ the Court for pursuing certain cases show how swiftly accountability can be recast as overreach. However, it is clear that while the journey has been and continues to be fraught with these challenges, a few persistent champions of justice remain, safeguarding the potential for meaningful progress toward a more honorable world.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: International Criminal Court, Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

The skies roared overhead as two Mi-17V5 helicopters cut through the air at the Independence Day Parades in New Delhi, one bearing the Indian tricolor, the other a banner declaring victory in Operation Sindhoor. For India, the operation was a decisive triumph in a decades-long rivalry rooted in ideology, religion, and fierce nationalism. For Pakistan, it was a stark reminder of its neighbor’s growing confidence and expanding geopolitical ambitions.

No matter how often these two nuclear-armed states find themselves on the brink of war, “peace” in South Asia rests not on reconciliation, but on the fragility of their rivalry. In this region, it is not the absence of conflict that preserves stability, but the constant, simmering threat of it. Skirmishes along the Line of Control, artillery exchanges, and fiery rhetoric from both capitals function less as preludes to war than as strategic reminders to the other side that the cost of escalation will be catastrophic.

When Pakistani military leaders, such as Field Marshal Asim Munir, boast that they “will take half the world down” with them, India dismisses it as mere saber rattling. When New Delhi issues its own warnings of swift and devastating retaliation, Islamabad responds with equal indignation. This cycle of provocation and counter-provocation is more than political theater; it is the South Asian iteration of an old doctrine: Mutually Assured Destruction.

During the Cold War, this doctrine kept the United States and the Soviet Union from annihilating each other. In South Asia, it plays out yet again between two nuclear powers. Pakistan’s democracy remains heavily influenced by its military, and its generals know that any unilateral attack on India would invite overwhelming retaliation, and perhaps even the destruction of the Pakistani state as we know it. India, meanwhile, has risen into the ranks of the world’s great powers, rivaling the U.S., China, and Russia in both diplomatic influence and military reach. Its expanding role in global politics has drawn the attention of major powers worldwide, but its ambitions remain constrained by its Achilles’ heel: a neighbor whose political volatility and nuclear arsenal cannot be ignored.

New Delhi understands that although it may outrank Pakistan in almost every measure of power, an all-out conflict could destabilize Pakistan’s nuclear command and control. Such a collapse could place atomic weapons in the hands of extremist networks, many of which have ties to Pakistan’s espionage agency and the highest echelons of Pakistan’s military diplomacy complex. That is a risk no Indian prime minister, including Narendra Modi, is willing to take.

This uneasy balance has held for more than two decades, even during moments of acute crisis. The 1999 Kargil War erupted just a year after both nations tested nuclear weapons. In 2019, India launched airstrikes in Balakot following the Pulwama terrorist attack that killed 40 paramilitary troops. Most recently, the April 2025 attacks against tourists in Kashmir, attributed to Pakistan-backed militants, triggered Operation Sindhoor, in which India struck terrorist infrastructure across Pakistan. In each case, both nations approached the brink of escalation but ultimately pulled back, aware that full-scale war could prove catastrophic.

The danger lies in mistaking this fragile peace for stability. A single miscalculation: an unverified intelligence report, a rogue strike, or a terrorist attack that spirals out of control could shatter the deterrent balance. The Cold War’s hair-trigger moments, like the Cuban Missile Crisis, have their South Asian equivalents. And unlike the Cold War superpowers, India and Pakistan share a border and a violent history oftentimes marred by the ideological battles of religious fervor, which magnifies the risk.

Still, for now, both nations appear to accept the grim reality: escalation could spell doom for both. Behind the public rhetoric, there is a tacit recognition on both sides that this precarious game of geopolitical chess is not just about their own survival; it has a role in ensuring the continuity of the broader international order.

In South Asia, war and peace are not opposites. They are two sides of the same coin, balanced uneasily within the region’s turbulent history and volatile geopolitics. And for better or worse, it is only through this controlled conflict that the region and perhaps the world continues to avoid catastrophe.

For the next generation of South Asians and global leaders, the India-Pakistan rivalry is more than a matter of history or headlines. It is the backdrop against which future diplomats, policymakers, and citizens will shape their identities and choices. Youth in both nations inherit not only the legacy of mistrust, but also the responsibility to imagine alternatives to perpetual conflict. Understanding the mechanics of this fragile peace is the first step toward influencing it, whether that means maintaining the balance, reshaping it, or finding the courage to replace it altogether. Achieving this will require sustained investment in crisis hotlines, Track II diplomacy, and confidence-building measures to ensure that the region’s fragile peace does not collapse into catastrophe.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Nuclear Plants, Image sourced from The Diplomatic Envoy | CC License, no changes made

In the once-packed streets of Surat, Gujarat, the dissonance of polishing machines and voices has lulled to a halt. A sign of life in the streets of the diamond capital of India has been replaced with an unsettling hum of hundreds of thousands’ uncertain futures. The cause? A hike in U.S. tariffs amounting to 50 percent under the Trump administration. Thousands of diamond cutters are now facing unemployment, a reminder of the inherently fragile scaffolding upon which India’s economy has historically relied. 

However, amidst the silence, there lies a story of the importance of legacy, perseverance and adaptation. India’s path from colonial constraints to being the fastest-growing major economy is riddled with periods of transformation, where adversity has often instigated innovative economic policies. Indeed, the challenges posed by these tariffs act as another catalyst for policymaking, shaping Modi’s ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ policy of self-reliance. Yet, with the diamond industry’s collapse, calls to reassess and dismantle the vulnerable foundations of such neglected industries become louder and louder. 

Surat’s diamond industry, which employs around 800,000 workers and sustains nearly 5 million livelihoods, has been a fundamental pillar of India’s exports. Polishing around 90% of the globe’s diamonds, this Indian city is where almost every diamond sold is cut and cleaned. It generates significant trade, with the U.S. serving as its single largest buyer, purchasing around $5 billion worth of stones in the last fiscal year. However, an apocalyptic wake has surfaced as the recent imposition of a 50% tariff on Indian gems has been placed: orders have been cancelled, factories are closing, workers are facing layoffs, and the beginning of a serious unemployment crisis shakes Gujarat, the home state of the current Prime Minister, Narendera Modi.

As opposition to Modi’s government grows from within the political nation, India struggles to form a united front during its shift towards an economic policy somewhat mirroring that of protectionism, when this is perhaps most needed. Since Trump’s “brokering” of a ceasefire between Pakistan and India in the long-disputed region of Kashmir in May earlier this year, the slogan “Narendra Surrender” has circulated. This slogan was spread by Rahul Gandhi, leader of the opposition in India’s parliament and grandson of the previous Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. Framed by the opposition, Modi is an incompetent victim of Trump’s bullying, whilst across the Pacific, Modi is the leader of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, with a White House Official referring to the situation in Ukraine as “Modi’s war.” 

It is precisely this rhetoric in the White House which has brought about these problematic tariffs. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, India has become Moscow’s largest oil buyer with about 2 million of the 5 million barrels of crude oil it imports per day arriving from Russia, amounting to $140 billion fed into Russian oil markets. The issue of India’s oil trade is that it indirectly finances Russia’s war against Ukraine, freezing the Indian government in a perplexing moment of decision-making. Do they stop or reduce Russian oil imports and diversify their oil trade with the hopes of America’s tariffs disappearing, or do they, like Indira Gandhi did, treat the U.S. “as a friend, not a boss” and stand stoic and firm in their trade decisions?

Either way the Modi government chose to act, it was not acting with full independent agency. Rather, this agency was overshadowed by the colonial legacy of India’s economy and its inherent issue of overreliance on exports and, particularly, certain heavy industries.

Divesting oil from Russia and elsewhere would create “a significant tightness into market,” potentially increasing the price of crude from current levels of around $67 a barrel to over $80, says Premasish Das, head of analysis of oil markets in Asia at S&P Global Commodity Insights. Continuing to trade with Russia at its current rates would result in the feared 50% tariffs, which would make exporting to the U.S. incredibly hard, diminishing trade with India’s largest export partner.

With the 50% tariffs imposed upon India on August 27, 2025, the world witnessed the Indian economy’s dependence on the stability of geopolitics. Thus, the diamond and textile sectors in particular exemplify the broader tension between historical legacies and modern realities. The recent escalation of U.S. tariffs exposes far more than a short-term economic setback; it reveals the structural fragilities that have long underpinned India’s global trade. It is the neglected industries, like the diamond trade, heavily dependent on American consumers, that illustrate these issues and the risks of overreliance on a few markets in a volatile geopolitical environment. The contradictions of Modi’s self-reliance agenda become clearer: while framed as a path to economic independence, it is in practice constrained by historically entrenched dependencies and the absence of market diversification.

Under British rule, India’s trade was cultivated to serve primarily the British economy, allowing for the gradual dissolution of India’s export trade altogether. As H.H. Wilson notes, the British manufacturer “employed the arm of political injustice to keep down and ultimately strangle a competitor with whom he could not have contended on equal terms.” This forced millions of artisans into deprivation, as policies redirected demands towards British imports, and polluted India’s previously flourishing textile work as part of the ‘Silk Road.’ By the nineteenth century, the colonial government had turned India into a supplier of raw materials and a chronic consumer of imported British goods.

 The East India Company, an English joint-stock company, was granted a royal order exempting the materials they purchased in India for export to Europe from inland duties, further limiting the success of local businessmen in their respective trades. In turn, this pushed such local artisans out of business and towards factory labour as a means to sustain their, and their families’, livelihoods. In 1813, Calcutta exported 2 million pounds of cotton goods to London, whereas by 1830, this trade dynamic was entirely reversed, with 2 million pounds of British cotton manufactures being imported into Calcutta. Romesh Dutt, in his ‘The Economic History of India, Under Early British Rule,’ identifies the methods used by the British Empire to establish a systematically dependent economy: “but England was unwilling…to become subservient to India in manufacturing industry. She strove for commercial supremacy.” 

India’s independence in 1947 is yet another reminder of the way in which economic pasts and futures are inherently harboured by geopolitics. Following this liberalisation, Indian policy was largely shaped to dismantle any methods of colonial rule over the economy, instead embracing import substitution and protectionism under the Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951. As state intervention became the way of navigating an unstable economy that remained detached from global trade (India’s trade deficit widening from $0.1 billion in 1948 to $6.3 billion in 1980), it became clear that the colonial legacy of India impacted more than just its culture, people, language and politics—it affected the capacity of the country to operate as a stable economy in the global market and the capacity of the local worker in a city like Surat to be prepared for the coming day. 

As the 1991 liberalisation reforms marked a re-entry into the international economy with trading of IT services, petroleum, pharmaceuticals and oil and steel, India demonstrated the dangers of an economic policy such as Modi’s current hope for ‘self-reliance.’ It seems that in a global order defined by volatility, the notion of economic self-reliance becomes a gamble, for no nation can shield itself from the adversities of international politics. Without trade ties, it risks isolation; with them, it remains vulnerable.

So what does this mean for Modi’s government and the current economy of India? 

Well, what has been made clear throughout studies of this nation’s economy is its irrevocable tendency to depend, whether that is on itself or on other nations. It is India’s colonial past that has permeated history and continues to define the path that economic policies undergo today. The creation of an economy dependent on Britain and robbed of artisanal businesses that did not provide success to the British Empire has moulded the Indian economy into that of a victim of colonialisation, chains it attempts to rid itself of to this day.

Surat’s current crisis is the product of a culmination of neglect and underinvestment in industries that were originally ignored more than a hundred years ago. What we see is the legacy of several structural vulnerabilities: over-reliance on single markets, lack of diversification, and labour market constraints. 

Yet, what Surat perhaps most significantly exposes is the sheer impact that decisions single international leaders place have on the most common and ordinary lives across the globe, regardless of sociogeographic or economic borders. In the apocalypse of Surat rests a glimmer of hope.

India’s government has, in some ways, acted upon this opportunity for retrospection and reform. It has extended cotton import duty exemptions to support the weakening textile industry and continues to explore new and more reliable trade partners, such as the UK and China, in hopes of divesting their economy’s dependence on the U.S. 

For India’s diamond industry, diversifying export markets and investing in technology and workforce development are necessary steps towards overcoming historical foundation issues. Surat’s craftsmen would benefit from specialised technical programmes designed to develop and spread their technical skills and adaptability in an increasingly competitive global market. 

The challenges posed by U.S. tariffs on India that affect the diamond and textile sectors are significant and have triggered the unemployment of thousands. The President of the Gujarat Diamond Workers Union predicts it to”completely destroy” their industry. However, these are overcomable. Through reflecting on its past economy, its colonial legacies and patterns that permeate it, India could consider implementing reforms tailored to supporting the local artisans to support the industry’s sustainability and protect them from turbulent geopolitics. 

In a moment of crisis, India is presented with an opportunity to transform its export economy whilst restructuring its colonial legacies from the foundations, policymaking starting with neglected industries at a grassroots level. Skills and training programmes, financial support in the form of low-interest loans, as well as health, accident and pension insurance for artisans and providing smaller cooperatives with the tools to negotiate more fairly within international trading systems, are all policies that would help the sustainability of such industries. They could incentivise small business owners to continue their trade as opposed to moving into what are viewed as more reliable industries that are currently untariffed, and prevent future impoverishment of local artisans as a result of such politics. Building a more secure diamond trade domestically, as part of the policy of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat,’ would further insulate cities like Surat.

The recent tariffs have exposed structural weaknesses in India’s economy that trace back to its colonial past, leaving artisans and small business owners at the mercy of geopolitical shifts far beyond their control. For the diamond cutter in Surat or the textile weaver in Varanasi, the consequences of decisions made in Washington or Paris are immediate and often devastating. To move beyond this inherited instability, India must redefine these historically neglected industries as foundations for a more resilient and secure economy. Until India breaks free from the legacies of its colonial economy, global politics will continue to write the fate of its most vulnerable.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Diamonds, Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

When the United States loses sight of its foreign policy goals, decisions that affect millions of people often devolve into emblematic gestures and political theater. With regards to Cuba, the U.S. has always sought to stand with its people while opposing their authoritarian oppressors. For over six decades, different administrations’ approaches have swung like a pendulum, switching between inflexible isolation and abrupt engagement, to no end. This cycle has left the Cuban people behind. It’s time the U.S. acts on its unique leverage and reaffirms its commitment to a free and democratic Cuba. 

Raúl Castro stepping down as Cuba’s President in 2018 and First Secretary of the Communist Party in 2021 marked an end to the decades-long Castro era. Many hoped this vacuum might spark a wave of political and economic reform that would finally end totalitarian rule. Glimpses of hope came with the drafting of Cuba’s 2019 constitution that included reforms such as the recognition of private property and imposition of presidential term limits. 

It soon became clear, however, that the Castros’ handpicked successor, Miguel Díaz-Canel, would not bring an end to the Cuban people’s plight. The regime’s totalitarian grip has been emboldened via brutal crackdowns on dissent and free expression. Failed economic reform and the mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic led to large-scale protests in July of 2021, which were met with the arbitrary detainment and horrific treatment of thousands of political prisoners, in addition to the harassment and persecution of journalists and activists. 

This isn’t anything new. Since Fidel Castro’s ascent in 1959, the Cuban government has ruled with an iron fist—imprisoning opponents, confiscating private property, suppressing free expression, and engaging in mass surveillance. In response to the seizure of American assets, alignment with the Soviet Union in the Cold War-era, and blatant human rights abuses, the United States imposed a trade embargo on Cuba beginning in 1960. The goal was clear: to pressure the regime to reform or, more optimistically, collapse. 

That was over six decades ago. 

The most serious criticisms of the embargo—outside of being a clear geopolitical failure—are its implications for human development. The embargo has isolated Cuba from the global market and stunted its economic growth. Yes, it ensured American capital hasn’t been used to embolden the Communist regime, but it undeniably left the economy stagnant and dragged the Cuban people down with it. 

Nowadays, and arguably more importantly of interest, the embargo has become political fuel for the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC): giving the regime an excuse for its own failures and oppressive behavior. Leaders use the embargo as a scapegoat for shortages and persistent poverty, all while rallying against it to boost nationalist fervor. 

The Trump Administration, spearheaded by Secretary of State Marco Rubio—the son of Cuban exiles—remains set on enforcing America’s hardline approach to Cuba. This strategy runs contrary to the pro-engagement efforts of the Biden and Obama eras. The U.S. has doubled down on sanctions on the Cuban regime and even reinstated Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. 

Taking a stand against the oppressive regime and standing with the country’s freedom fighters is admirable. The United States, leading with moral clarity, must take a stand to support a free Cuba. Simply lifting the embargo would send a message that would reward and reinforce the Cuban regime and similar authoritarian governments’ behavior; it’s nothing more than full-on capitulation. Furthermore, it would be a missed opportunity for the U.S. to give up the greatest piece of leverage it has over Cuba without guaranteeing any concessions. Yet, Cuba remains in desperate need of economic reform; blackouts plague the nation and the government, in the past few years, has even had to make pleas for American aid. 

It’s time for American policymakers to adopt a smarter, more dynamic strategy where leverage actually means change. The prospect of lifting the embargo and providing relief needs to be tied to guarantees of reform in Cuba. The 1996 Helms-Burton Act provides a framework for this proposal. It states that the embargo can only be lifted once Cuba legalizes all political activity, frees all political prisoners, ensures the protection of private property, and permits international observers to monitor elections and human rights protections, among other stipulations. 

To that end, the United States ought to approach both the Republic of Cuba and the international community with a proposal of conditional engagement. The agreement would combine an incremental easing of restrictions in exchange for steps toward democratization, market liberalization, and the institutionalization of the rule of law. Reforms must include: the release of all political prisoners; protections for free speech, a free press, an open civil society, and an unrestricted internet; the legalization of political parties that oppose the PCC; the scheduling of open elections under international scrutiny; guarantees of judicial independence; the implementation of anti-corruption measures within the government; and greater protections for private property. 

If Cuba meets these requirements, as verified by international observers from groups like the UN or Organization of American States (OAS), the U.S. would begin the easing of sanctions and restrictions: authorizing remittances, allowing tourism, diplomatic normalization, and permitting American economic activity with the Cuban private sector.

This approach ensures the pressure stays where it belongs: on the Cuban government. The embargo and its restrictions on Cuba’s access to the American market remain the U.S.’ greatest source of leverage over the island. Calls for an end to the embargo from Cuba and the UN can finally be answered. Any excuse for the PCC’s failures in governance would be gone. In offering a strategic bargain, Washington forces the Cuban regime’s hand. If they accept, it’s a victory for its people. If they refuse, the regime shows its populace and the world their true colors—it would rather maintain power than pursue progress, deepening dissent and internal pressure. 

So long as the Cuban regime embraces its people’s desires, the embargo will finally begin to be lifted. Power will return to the hands of the Cuban people. Polling data shows that Cubans overwhelmingly support greater private ownership, believe there is a necessary, growing dissent against the government, and hope to see regime change in the country. Rejecting appeasement and blind isolation while leveraging American influence ensures the U.S. actually stands with those it has claimed to defend for decades and offers a pathway to the future they demand. 

Ultimately, it’s time that purpose returns to prescribing the U.S.’ foreign policy. The Trump Administration has clearly laid out its posture of “promoting a stable, prosperous, and free Cuba” via a firm policy stance to hold the Cuban regime accountable. However, to truly advance that goal, symbolic toughness and blanket restrictions won’t be enough. America’s embargo on Cuba must no longer be the all-or-nothing litmus test of American politicians’ anti-Communist convictions. Rather, it should be tied to meaningful reforms that empower the Cuban people. 

The framework of America’s strategy towards Cuba should not be to simply punish the government for punishment’s sake. Rather, it’s time to create a transparent roadmap that provides hope to a distressed people while leaving their captors with little room to stall or spin. The pendulum must no longer swing. Via conditional engagement, the U.S. shifts its focus solely to the progress of Cuba’s people—creating a more stable and prosperous Latin America.

History supports this idea. In the late 1980s, under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union undertook perestroika (a policy of economic liberalization), glasnost (increasing political freedoms such as speech and the press), and electoral reforms including the country’s first semi-competitive election. Together, these reforms allowed for an open civil society that enabled the discourse and dissent that brought about the collapse of the Soviet regime. It’s a very real possibility Cuba goes down the same path under this proposal.

The Cuban people demand change. It’s time to set the stage for a future of prosperity.

America has the opportunity to use its unique and strategic leverage to stand with the people of Cuba. A freer and more just society can be built in the Pearl of the Antilles… it might just take a little bit of outside-the-box diplomacy.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Ukrainian Flag, Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has dominated contemporary strategic and war studies. Its territory has been mapped in detail, military operations scrutinized, and battles narrated in real time. Yet beneath the daily reporting lies an equally urgent, if less visible, struggle: Ukraine is not only fighting for its territory, but for its future minds. Millions of Ukraine’s active citizens, skilled workers, students, scholars, and emerging professionals have fled war and uncertainty, creating a quiet crisis that could shape the nation’s future for generations.

Ukraine’s wartime displacement has reached an unprecedented scale. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, 6.9 million Ukrainian refugees have been recorded worldwide—many of them women, children, and, most notably, young people. Around 1.3 million minors have EU temporary protection, and 700,000 attend EU schools, while over 85,000 Ukrainian university students study abroad. The issue is becoming increasingly pressing as the war shows no sign of ending. Polls conducted for the Center for Economic Strategy, a Ukrainian think tank, indicate that fewer than half of refugees plan to return while the share certain they will not return has risen from 10% to 34%. 

At first glance, these trends appear to seriously jeopardize the future of the Ukrainian nation and its capacity to recover after the war. They further deplete Ukraine’s already diminished scholarly and political elite, along with its high-skilled and educated workforce—groups essential for rebuilding and developing a country torn by war and facing prolonged strategic strain for the foreseeable future. Yet the question remains: is the picture truly as bleak as it appears, or can some opportunities still be found amid the crisis?

Ukraine’s wartime exodus has indeed drained its youth and talent, but it may paradoxically lay the groundwork for a new reformist elite while strengthening an already vast diaspora actively involved in the fight for Ukraine. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, millions of Ukrainians eager to contribute to their country’s struggle have joined established diaspora communities, quickly integrating into networks and structures devoted to advancing the Ukrainian cause. Many of Ukraine’s brightest minds have also gained unparalleled opportunities to pursue world-class education and training abroad, helping to cultivate the country’s future elite. Historical precedents show that even in times of upheaval, departing citizens continue to aid their homelands from abroad and later return to lead renewal when the moment is right. If effectively engaged, Ukraine’s globally connected generation could become one of Ukraine’s greatest strategic assets, driving its post-war recovery, reform, and integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

The Driving Force of Ukrainians Abroad

Ukraine has a solid and influential diaspora, with around twenty million Ukrainians and people of Ukrainian descent worldwide, largely concentrated in Europe, Canada, and the United States. Since February 2022, millions of newly displaced Ukrainians have joined this community, with many eager to support their country’s defense and contribute to its recovery. The Ukrainian diaspora has mobilized the country’s resources, skills, and connections on a scale unprecedented in the nation’s history in order to organize aid deliveries, lobby governments, counter Russian propaganda, and lay the groundwork for Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction. 

The powerful support from Ukrainians abroad has become a vital pillar of the country’s resilience. Ukrainian-led and allied organizations have delivered money, food, medication, clothing, and protective gear for soldiers, while others have focused on assisting displaced Ukrainians and rehabilitating wounded veterans. Equally vital has been the diaspora’s advocacy and lobbying in the international arena. Ukrainians abroad have been organizing mass demonstrations in EU capitals and the United States to demand increased military aid and press for accountability for Russian war crimes, hosting film screenings and public debates to counter Russian propaganda, and convening conferences dedicated to Ukraine’s recovery agenda. 

The scale, diversity, and determination of the Ukrainian diaspora make it an indispensable asset in the country’s struggle for survival and future recovery. Its members have reinforced Ukraine’s resilience on every front of the war. The networks, expertise, and global credibility they have built will remain a source of strength long after the fighting ends. When the hostilities end and Ukraine turns to reconstruction, these communities abroad—experienced in advocacy, resource mobilization, and cross-border collaboration—will be uniquely positioned to channel investment, transfer skills, and contribute to Ukraine’s post-war recovery.

The Pool of Ukraine’s Next Reformers

History offers examples of countries in turmoil where, once the right moment was seized, returning elites transformed the state. Georgia, Ukraine’s post-Soviet peer, saw such a shift after the 2003–2004 Rose Revolution. The new president, Mikheil Saakashvili—a Columbia Law graduate—drew a generation of Western-educated reformers back home. In just a few years, they implemented anti-corruption measures once thought impossible, from dismantling the corrupt traffic police to streamlining bureaucracy, making Georgia one of the easiest places in the world to do business. While the country still faces challenges, its transformation remains among the most striking in the post-Soviet space, serving as a reminder that even a small, well-prepared group of returnees can reshape a nation.

Just as Georgia’s transformation after the Rose Revolution was driven by a wave of Western-educated returnees, Ukraine today is positioned to harness a similar dynamic. With many of its most talented and promising people now educated at leading global universities, active in anti-war and development projects, and enriched by the experience of living, working, and embracing Western values, Ukraine has a strong chance of seeing a similar wave of transformative returnees after the end of the war. Even today, many of its young policymakers and social leaders hold prestigious Western education and training, positioning them to play a decisive role in shaping Ukraine’s post-war transformation. 

In the years ahead, Ukrainian returnees could form the backbone of a new reformist generation, leveraging global networks to attract investment, modernize institutions, and integrate the country more firmly into Euro-Atlantic structures. Their international credibility and familiarity with best governance practices will be vital in advancing judicial reform, digital transformation, and anti-corruption efforts—securing post-war recovery, accelerating EU integration, and building a more resilient, competitive, and democratic state. 

Turning Displacement into a Strategic Asset

While the wartime exodus has drained Ukraine’s population, it also holds untapped potential. Host countries have provided Ukrainian refugees with unprecedented opportunities to live, study, and work in stable, well-resourced environments. Programs such as the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive, the UK’s Homes for Ukraine, and the U.S. Uniting for Ukraine have offered legal status, housing, healthcare, education, and access to the labor market. These conditions enable displaced Ukrainians not only to survive but to build careers, gain advanced education, and develop global networks that can be reinvested in Ukraine’s future. 

The impact of this opportunity is already visible. Ukrainians abroad are applying their Western expertise, training, and resources to critical areas of national need. Diaspora economic and social entrepreneurs are contributing in fields where reconstruction must meet evolving global standards—particularly in the context of EU accession. Expertise from the Ukrainian community in the United Kingdom has helped design a roadmap to rebuild and decarbonize Ukraine’s steel sector in line with the EU Green Deal. Similarly, the Mykolaiv Water Hub has drawn on the Ukrainian diaspora in Germany to spearhead innovative water-related industries in southern Ukraine. Such initiatives demonstrate how skills gained abroad can directly accelerate reconstruction and modernization.

Beyond economic expertise, the large and engaged diaspora strengthens Ukraine’s political resilience. Communities abroad have proven adept at advocacy, coalition-building, and resource mobilization — organizing some of the largest pro-Ukraine rallies in European capitals and North America since the war began, securing meetings with top policymakers, and influencing sanctions and aid decisions. They have mobilized millions of euros in humanitarian and military support, and spearheaded global campaigns to counter Russian disinformation. These wartime achievements have built networks and reputations that will be invaluable in peacetime, facilitating investment, technology transfer, and integration with international markets and institutions.

Moreover, today’s generation of displaced Ukrainians is acquiring advanced skills and leadership experience that position them to play a decisive role in the country’s future. Education at leading universities, training in competitive industries, and work within democratic institutions abroad can provide the expertise to reform governance, modernize the economy, and strengthen the rule of law. Exposure to transparent decision-making, independent media, and effective public administration can help them embed these practices at home. Georgia’s post-Rose Revolution returnees brought comparable skills and ambitions, but Ukraine’s dispersed talent pool is larger, more globally embedded, and benefiting from a wider range of opportunities and resources provided by host countries. If effectively engaged and given clear avenues to participate in rebuilding, this cohort could become the backbone of a reformist elite—capable of transforming institutions, accelerating EU integration, and developing a resilient democracy in Ukraine.

Displacement is undeniably a loss—but it is also an investment. The challenge for Ukraine is to turn this moment of crisis into a strategic advantage, ensuring that the skills, networks, and vision gained abroad return home. If it succeeds, the country’s greatest wartime outflow could become the very force that rebuilds it stronger, more competitive, and more firmly rooted in the Euro-Atlantic community.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Ukrainian Flag, Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

This summer, the United States made history. On July 18, Congress signed into law the GENIUS Act, the first major crypto legislation in the nation. What makes this moment remarkable is how quickly the nation’s sentiment on cryptocurrencies has shifted, especially within government. In 2013, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed deep skepticism about Bitcoin, saying, “You really have to stretch your imagination to infer what the intrinsic value of Bitcoin is.” Today, by contrast, the sitting U.S. president is promising to make the United States the “crypto capital of the planet.”

This shift is not only visible in the United States. In 2024, the European Union implemented the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) framework, establishing rules for stablecoins, disclosures, and market practices across all member countries. These new legislative efforts represent a legitimization of cryptocurrencies in major economies around the world. Cryptocurrencies are no longer fringe, they are being integrated into the legal and financial infrastructure of the world’s largest economies.

But years before these efforts to regulate and integrate crypto, El Salvador made a far more radical move. In 2021, it became the first country in the world to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender. By 2024, however, this experiment was significantly scaled back through a $1.4 billion loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which included provisions that revoked Bitcoin’s official status for tax payments and made its use by businesses voluntary. As crypto becomes a serious policy issue for major nations, what lessons can be drawn from El Salvador’s high-risk, low-readiness experiment?

The Lead Up 

El Salvador’s young and bold president, Nayib Bukele, saw Bitcoin as a tool to modernize the economy and expand financial access. At the time, over 70 percent of Salvadorans lacked access to traditional banking services. Bitcoin was pitched as a solution to this gap, offering digital wallets and financial tools to those excluded from the banking system.

Another motivation was to lower remittance costs. In 2021, approximately 22 percent of El Salvador’s GDP came from remittances, largely sent from the United States. Bitcoin was seen as a way to reduce transfer fees, speed up transactions, and keep more money in the hands of recipients.

Beyond solving existing problems, Bukele envisioned building a tech-forward economy. He announced plans for Bitcoin City, a futuristic, tax-free city powered by geothermal energy from the Conchagua volcano. The city would attract foreign investment, support crypto startups, and issue “volcano bonds” to finance its development. 

What Went Wrong? 

The law was relatively easy to pass. Bukele’s party and its allies held a supermajority in the Legislative Assembly. The legislation was sweeping: all economic agents, unless lacking the necessary technology, were required to accept Bitcoin. Taxes could be paid in Bitcoin, and government subsidies were distributed in the cryptocurrency.

To support its rollout, the government introduced Chivo, a digital wallet app designed to make Bitcoin transactions accessible for everyday use. As an incentive, citizens who downloaded the app received $30 worth of Bitcoin. The government also installed hundreds of Bitcoin ATMs nationwide to make conversion into U.S. dollars easier. 

El Salvador experienced some early wins. In the first few months, crypto-based remittances rose, making up 4.5 percent of all inflows. However, this momentum did not last. By December 2024, cryptocurrency-linked remittances had declined to just 0.87 percent. Adoption of the Chivo wallet followed a similar trend. According to Bukele, three million people downloaded the app, roughly 46 percent of the population. But usage dropped significantly once the $30 bonus was spent. Fewer than 20 percent of users remained active. The average user made no Bitcoin transactions per month and only one U.S. dollar payment on average. 

Among those who chose not to download Chivo, the most common reasons were a preference for cash and a lack of trust in the system. Many users expressed concern over privacy and surveillance, saying Bitcoin transactions could be tracked, unlike cash. Others reported technical problems or feared volatility. 

These concerns were visible even before implementation. A poll conducted by Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas found that nearly 68 percent of Salvadorans opposed adopting Bitcoin as legal tender. Eight in ten said they did not trust the digital currency, and nine in ten said they did not fully understand it. This distrust was compounded by basic access issues: according to the World Bank, only 62 percent of Salvadorans were using the internet in 2021. The country’s rollout strategy did little to engage the public or prepare them for such a major shift. 

The IMF Deal and Rollback 

In 2024, the Salvadoran government secured a $1.4 billion loan agreement with the IMF, which came with significant policy conditions. These included changes to the Bitcoin Law: Bitcoin could no longer be used to pay taxes, and businesses were no longer required to accept it. These rollbacks marked a shift from mandatory, aggressive implementation to more voluntary and symbolic adoption. 

Still, the government has not entirely abandoned its crypto ambitions. President Bukele announced an $83 million profit from the country’s Bitcoin holdings, bolstered by market appreciation. Although the government has announced the sale of Chivo, Bitcoin ATMs remain in place, and the vision for Bitcoin City has not been officially abandoned.

What Can be Learned? 

El Salvador’s Bitcoin experiment underscores the challenges of adopting digital currencies without adequate public readiness, infrastructure, or trust. While the motivations behind the move, financial inclusion, remittance reform, and economic innovation, were valid and even admirable, the implementation was rapid and imposed from the top down. The disconnect between policy and public sentiment ultimately limited its impact. 

The United States and other major economies should take note. A 2023 Pew Research study found that 63 percent of Americans have “little to no confidence that current ways to invest in, trade, or use cryptocurrencies are reliable and safe,” and only 17 percent of adults report ever having used them. These figures suggest that public trust and understanding remain major hurdles, even in highly developed economies. 

If the United States truly aims to become the “crypto capital of the planet,” legislation alone will not be enough. Policymakers must also invest in public education, regulatory clarity, consumer protection, and infrastructure. Adoption should be careful, incremental, and democratic. 

El Salvador’s story should not be dismissed as a failure. It was a bold experiment that offered real lessons about timing, trust, and readiness. As the world moves further into the digital currency era, these lessons will only grow more relevant. 

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Bitcoin, Image sourced from The Central American Group | CC License, no changes made

In a Kyiv bomb shelter, a wartime president addresses his people via a smartphone. In London, thousands march with foreign flags, chanting in solidarity with a land under siege. In Tehran’s studios, state TV anchors broadcast messages across the Middle East. These scenes show that modern conflicts are fought not only with missiles, but also with narratives that leap across borders. Digital stories and images have become a strategic frontline. From a communications perspective, war is now “about perception, telling a story about who is the victim and who is the aggressor.” Across the world, this “correspondence of conflict”—the public narrative back-and-forth of war—is shaping alliances, foreign policy, and diplomacy.

Three conflict zones illustrate this trend and each case demonstrates how digital communication and international perception can sway the course of wars and the world’s response.

Ukraine: Zelensky’s War of Words and Images

From day one of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine fought on the information front. President Zelensky posted a defiant video from central Kyiv declaring, “We are here”—proof that he and his cabinet had not fled and would resist. That brief clip set the tone for a new kind of wartime leadership, harnessing social media to rally the nation and win support abroad.

Zelensky understood that winning the narrative was as crucial as winning battles. He turned communication into a strategic weapon, delivering daily addresses to rally Ukrainians and making personal appeals to international audiences. One public diplomacy expert noted that Zelensky uses every platform — from speeches to X — to press Ukraine’s case. Under his guidance, Ukraine offered a model for how a nation under attack can shape its image via digital media.

Equally remarkable was how Ukrainian society joined the effort. Government social-media accounts adopted memes and other humor to keep Ukraine in global headlines and counter Russian propaganda. Ordinary Ukrainians became citizen reporters, sharing raw videos of bombed neighborhoods, civilian resilience, and frontline heroics. “Every Ukrainian became a voice of the embattled country . . . an eyewitness of brave resistance,” observed one analysis. Unpolished clips of everyday bravery had a major impact, their authenticity cutting through Kremlin propaganda. Amplified by influencers and a volunteer “PR Army” of communication professionals, these real-time stories helped truth prevail over disinformation.

This digital people’s war paid off diplomatically. By winning hearts and minds abroad, Ukraine won unprecedented international support. Public opinion abroad pressured many governments to impose tough sanctions on Russia and send weapons to Kyiv. NATO and EU leaders that once hesitated became more unified behind Ukraine, reflecting how Zelensky’s media diplomacy translated into tangible aid. Even diplomatic forums became venues for Ukraine’s narrative: at a 2024 peace summit in Switzerland, Zelensky’s team ensured global media heard his call for a “just peace.” In short, strategic storytelling reinforced Ukraine’s physical defense by aligning the world’s support with the nation’s struggle.

Israel–Gaza: A War of Narratives and Global Reactions

On October 7, 2023, Hamas militants attacked Israel. Graphic videos of the assault spread online within hours, sparking global outrage and sympathy for Israel. Israel quickly cast the attack as “Israel’s 9/11” and launched a military response. But as Israeli bombs pounded Gaza, a parallel war of narratives unfolded over who was the victim and who was the aggressor. Analysts noted that the conflict was about perception, with civilian suffering becoming the center of gravity for international support.

In Gaza, Hamas and ordinary Palestinians flooded social media with images of destroyed buildings and wounded civilians to sway global opinion. In past Gaza wars, support for Israel “faded as sympathies turned toward the Palestinians” amid high civilian casualties, and 2023 followed that pattern. Hamas’s media wing effectively used such footage to change international opinion. Outrage over the suffering sparked protests from Istanbul to London, with demonstrators waving Palestinian flags and demanding an end to the bombardment. 

Israel, meanwhile, pushed its own narrative: officials emphasized Hamas’s brutality and use of human shields, and the Israel Defense Forces circulated videos of precision strikes to show efforts to minimize civilian harm. Both sides churned out reams of supporting footage and armies of online supporters around the world eagerly shared content echoing their side’s view.

The information war peaked with the Gaza hospital explosion. Within minutes of the blast, Hamas blamed an Israeli airstrike for the carnage, while Israel insisted a misfired Palestinian rocket was to blame. Social media lit up with competing claims long before any evidence emerged. “False assertions flew on the internet,” demonstrating how each side weaponized unverified information (later evidence pointed to a failed militant rocket, but by then each narrative had hardened). This episode epitomized “Truth Decay”—the collapse of shared facts as partisans embraced whatever fit their narrative.

As these narratives battled, governments felt the pressure. The mounting civilian toll in Gaza and the global outcry forced Israel’s allies to grapple with public demands for ceasefires or restraint. Western leaders supportive of Israel faced protests at home, prompting some to soften their stance. In international forums, debates often mirrored the dueling narratives seen online. Even firm alliances strained under public opinion. The Israel–Gaza war showed that controlling the story is now integral to war. Military operations ran hand-in-hand with messaging. And as chants of “Stop bombing Gaza” or “Stand with Israel” echoed worldwide, it became clear that public sentiment can sway diplomatic calculations—sometimes pushing leaders toward de-escalation.

Iran: The Public Diplomacy of Resistance

Iran demonstrates how a narrative campaign can be waged outside of active battle to build influence. Tehran’s theocratic regime uses public diplomacy as a strategic tool to shape regional opinion. It leans on a “menu of narratives” that appeal to Arab and Muslim sensibilities—anti-imperialism, Islamic unity, and support for the Palestinian cause. By casting itself as the champion of the oppressed and the chief opponent of U.S. and Israeli aggression, Iran seeks to win hearts and minds across the Middle East.

Tehran propagates its message through state-controlled media and cultural outreach. International outlets like Press TV (English) and Al-Alam (Arabic) broadcast Iran’s perspective globally, countering Western narratives. By using media as a diplomatic tool, Iran aims to shape its image and build sympathy abroad. 

The regime also runs cultural and religious programs—from conferences to schools—to reinforce its “resistance” narrative. On social media, Iranian leaders speak directly to foreign publics: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei operates official X accounts in multiple languages to spread his message internationally. Meanwhile, Tehran’s cyber proxies wage covert influence campaigns: investigators found Iranian-run accounts masquerading as locals online to push anti-Saudi and anti-Israel propaganda.

This narrative offensive has helped Iran punch above its weight. By hammering themes of Muslim solidarity and Western perfidy, Iran has stirred sympathy among segments of the Arab public. U.S. analysts admit that while Washington focused on sanctions and military pressure, Iran was busy winning the war on the Arab street. The United States effectively “ceded the battleground of public diplomacy,” one report concluded, allowing Iran’s narrative to go unchallenged. Thus, when Iran backs proxy militias in places like Lebanon or Iraq, it often frames that support not as interference but as solidarity in a common struggle—an image that resonates with many. By mastering the narrative, Tehran has managed to expand its influence even under sanctions and isolation, wielding soft power where hard power cannot openly go.

The New Battlefield of Narratives

In a hyper-connected age, the narrative battlefield is nearly as crucial as the physical battlefield. Alliances form or fray based on the stories that dominate social media and television. Leaders must recognize that a viral tweet or image can sway international action faster than diplomatic cables. But this new reality also means misinformation can cause chaos like a missile strike. With every smartphone a potential broadcast, truth and propaganda often blur. The challenge is to counter falsehoods even as we harness communication for good. As one commentator noted, engaging with the media can “contribute to a successful peacemaking process” and should not be overlooked by policymakers.

The cases of Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran show that public communication is now a critical front. A compelling narrative can rally supporters or pressure governments more than any negotiation. Ultimately, who prevails in a war may hinge on whose story the world believes. The pen and the camera have become mighty weapons – and wielding them effectively could help shape a peaceful future.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Address by President of the Republic of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

Think of a world where each click, each message you send, and each transaction you make creates a value, but not for you, or even for your own country. Rather, this data is mined, stored, and capitalized upon by distant corporations and foreign governments that only leave behind surveillance, dependency, and an empty promise of progress. This is not a dystopian future. It is already the truth of much of the Global South today, where the imperial desires of the past have morphed into a quieter, yet equally extractive, project: the colonization of the digital sphere.

The twenty-first century has been accompanied by a new empire established not by ships or armies, but algorithms, servers, and surveillance. So-called “digital colonialism” is the takeover of the digital infrastructure, platforms, and data of developing countries by strong corporations and states, largely based in the Global North, who extract enormous value from the digital lives of others while leaving behind little benefit and even less autonomy. As scholars have pointed out, data has become as valuable a resource as land or oil, and yet its governance, ownership, and profit streams remain concentrated in the hands of a few.

Asia, home to more than half of the world’s population and some of the fastest-growing economies is both the biggest battleground and the greatest prize in this contest for digital supremacy. From India and Indonesia to Malaysia and Pakistan, the region’s populations generate staggering amounts of data every second. Nevertheless, this information and the network that it travels through are controlled elsewhere. India, for example, saw the approval of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act in 2023 as a major step towards fighting data extractivism, an indication that India is becoming more aggressive in the defense of its citizens, as well as data localization. Yet critics have noted that the law also expanded the government’s surveillance powers, doing little to curb the market power of foreign Big Tech. 

Meanwhile, Indonesia banned TikTok’s shopping feature in 2023, citing concerns over the platform’s potential damage to local businesses and data sovereignty. Despite this, the country still remains deeply reliant on Chinese and American platforms for its digital economy. Even Malaysia and Pakistan, recipients of Chinese-funded smart city projects, have found themselves dependent on imported surveillance-heavy infrastructure that embeds foreign control into the very fabric of their urban spaces.

This asymmetry manifests itself everywhere. The information produced by Asian  countries is used to make money by Google, Meta, Amazon, and Microsoft in Silicon Valley or Tencent and Huawei in Shenzhen. Governments that store their most sensitive information on Amazon Web Services or Microsoft Azure effectively outsource a part of their sovereignty, relying on foreign corporations to guard their digital fortresses. Cultural content and algorithms optimized for Western audiences marginalize local languages, identities, and traditions. Public discourse, manipulated by opaque algorithms, threatens to distort democratic debate and undermine accountability. It is not merely a question of who owns the servers or collects the data, but who wields power over the lives of billions.

What is at stake, then, is nothing less than the right of nations and peoples to chart their futures in the digital age. The undermining of sovereignty, the extension of economic dependence, and the proliferation of surveillance and manipulation are all features of an unequal digital order. The Global South may have won its independence on paper, but a quiet colonization of cyberspace has begun in earnest.

Yet this story need not end in despair. Across Asia, movements for digital sovereignty are gathering strength. India’s creation of homegrown platforms like Aadhaar, UPI, and the Open Network for Digital Commerce represents an effort to build public digital infrastructure that serves citizens rather than shareholders. Southeast Asian nations are working through ASEAN to develop regional frameworks to protect privacy and regulate data flows more fairly. Activists and scholars are still advocating for the use of open-source solutions, networks owned by the community, and more restrictive legislation to rein in the influence of foreign platforms. These are the first steps in what can still turn into an existential battle over digital independence. Digital colonialism is not just an Asian or Southern problem. As more countries adopt exploitative and extractive practices modelled after the powerful, global norms risk shifting further away from democracy and equality, and toward surveillance and domination. The fight for digital sovereignty in Asia is a fight for everyone, everywhere, who believes in the possibility of a free and just internet.

Asia stands at a crossroads. Will it embrace a future dictated by the interests of others, or will it reclaim its place as a leader and defender of its destiny? Just as postcolonial movements once fought to wrest back land and resources, so too must the peoples of the Global South now fight to reclaim their data, their platforms, and their voices. 

The choices made today will determine whether the digital age becomes a new chapter in the story of freedom—or a darker sequel to the colonial subjugation of the past.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Data, Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made