ExxonMobil’s Expansion Plans in Guyana

Guyana’s offshore oil fields, discovered by ExxonMobil in 2015, have transformed the country into a burgeoning energy powerhouse. The Stabroek Block, operated by Exxon with partners Hess Corporation and China’s CNOOC, has become a crown jewel in the global oil industry. To date, approximately 11.6 billion barrels of oil and gas have been discovered in the block. Current production levels stand at around 391,000 barrels per day, with output expected to exceed 1.2 million barrels per day by mid-2027.

ExxonMobil, which owns a 45% stake in the Stabroek Block, is looking to further capitalize on Guyana’s oil wealth. In a recent arbitration, Exxon raised objections to Chevron’s $53 billion acquisition of Hess, claiming it has a right of first refusal to Hess’s 30% stake in the field under the Stabroek joint operating agreement. While ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods has emphasized the company’s contractual rights in the arbitration process, there is no confirmed public statement regarding a counter bid for Hess’s assets. The arbitration panel’s decision will significantly impact Exxon’s ability to expand control over the lucrative Guyana assets.

At the heart of this arbitration is whether Hess’s Guyana assets are so valuable that they warrant independent appraisal and a rethinking of the Chevron-Hess merger.  Analysts estimate that Hess’s share in the Stabroek Block accounts for 70% of the value of Chevron’s acquisition bid, underscoring the importance of this resource to global oil players.

The stakes are high for ExxonMobil. In 2023, ExxonMobil Guyana Limited reported a net profit of approximately GY$614.6 billion (US$2.9 billion), reflecting a GY$36.9 billion increase compared to 2022. 

Moreover, while ExxonMobil’s expansion might lead to short-term economic gains, the government must maintain strict oversight and transparency to prevent environmental degradation. Guyana’s rich biodiversity and role as a carbon sink must not be sacrificed in pursuit of oil profits. The decisions made today could have lasting consequences for future generations. The government and international partners must prioritize sustainable practices and ensure that the benefits of this newfound wealth are shared equitably among all Guyanese citizens. This is a pivotal moment for Guyana, and careful, ethical management of its resources will determine whether this chapter in its history becomes a success story or another cautionary tale of resource exploitation.

 Legal and Financial Stakes in Guyana’s Oil Riches

The stakes are high for ExxonMobil. In 2023, ExxonMobil Guyana Limited reported a net profit of approximately GY$614.6 billion (US$2.9 billion), reflecting a GY$36.9 billion increase compared to 2022 . The consortium, which includes Hess and CNOOC, collectively produced over 142 million barrels of oil in 2023. Guyana’s oil production is projected to exceed 1.3 million barrels per day by 2027, positioning it as a critical component of ExxonMobil’s long-term growth strategy.Gaining more control over these assets would bolster Exxon’s global standing and ensure a steady revenue stream for decades. Other companies involved in oil exploration and production in Guyana include Tullow Oil, CGX Energy Inc., and Repsol, alongside smaller operators focusing on blocks outside the Stabroek area.

Chevron and Hess maintain that the merger does not trigger a change of control under the terms of the Stabroek Block agreement, arguing that Hess will continue to operate its Guyana assets despite the corporate merger. The arbitration panel’s decision, expected to weigh heavily on the valuation of Hess’s assets, could set a legal precedent for future oil deals in emerging markets.

 Environmental Responsibility and Guyana’s Low Carbon Strategy

While ExxonMobil aggressively seeks to expand its oil operations in Guyana, President Dr. Irfaan Ali has emphasized the country’s commitment to environmental sustainability. In his recent interview at The New York Times Climate Forward event, Dr. Ali highlighted the importance of Guyana’s forests and biodiversity in global climate change efforts. He noted that Guyana’s forests, which store 19.5 gigatons of carbon and sequester 153 million tons annually, play a critical role in the planet’s ecological health.

Guyana’s Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS) aims to balance the country’s oil ambitions with environmental preservation. Under the LCDS, Guyana seeks to monetize its forests through the carbon credit market, generating revenue to support conservation efforts and community development initiatives. Separately, oil revenues are reinvested into sustainable development projects, such as infrastructure, healthcare, and education, with a particular focus on benefiting indigenous communities. Dr. Ali stressed that the strategy was developed through nationwide consultation, including with indigenous leaders, despite some groups’ concerns about the process’s transparency.

In the same breath, Dr. Ali defended Guyana’s right to exploit its oil resources to fund critical infrastructure and adaptation projects, such as sea defenses and drainage systems, as the country faces rising sea levels due to climate change. However, this approach underscores a paradox: the very oil production that contributes to global carbon emissions and accelerates climate change is being relied upon to fund solutions to mitigate its effects. Dr. Ali argued that oil will remain part of the global energy mix beyond 2050, but he also emphasized that Guyana’s carbon sink and low deforestation rate position it as one of the world’s least environmentally damaging oil producers.

ExxonMobil’s Expansion Amidst Environmental and Social Concerns

As ExxonMobil pushes to expand in Guyana, it must navigate a complex landscape of legal challenges and environmental responsibility. Critics argue that if not carefully managed, Guyana’s oil production could lead to environmental degradation and pose risks to local communities. There have already been concerns about potential oil spills and the adequacy of Guyana’s environmental oversight, with a recent court ruling calling the country’s Environmental Protection Agency “derelict” in its duties.

ExxonMobil’s efforts to expand in Guyana will require balancing these environmental concerns with its legal obligations, financial ambitions, and duty to maximize returns for its shareholders. The outcome of the arbitration with Chevron and Hess could allow Exxon to consolidate its control over the Stabroek Block, ensuring that it remains a key player in the global oil industry for years to come.

At the same time, under Dr. Ali’s leadership, Guyana’s government must manage the delicate task of leveraging its oil wealth to support sustainable development while protecting its invaluable environmental assets. How these dual priorities are managed will determine whether Guyana can become a model of responsible oil production in a world feeling the effects of climate change.

Conclusion

ExxonMobil’s expansion in Guyana is a defining moment for the company and the country. As the world moves toward renewable energy, Guyana’s oil wealth offers a rare opportunity for Exxon to strengthen its global position. However, the legal dispute over Hess’s assets and the broader environmental concerns expressed by President Dr. Irfaan Ali in his New York Times Climate Forward interview, present significant challenges. How ExxonMobil and Guyana navigate these competing interests will shape the future of the country’s oil industry and its role in the global energy landscape.

Exxon’s ambitions in Guyana are clear, but the path forward is fraught with legal, environmental, and social hurdles. The company’s ability to successfully secure greater control over Guyana’s oil assets, maintain profitability, and navigate its environmental responsibilities will depend not only on the outcome of its arbitration with Chevron and Hess but also on its ability to balance expansion with the environmental stewardship increasingly demanded by the global community.

Nonetheless, ExxonMobil’s expansion in Guyana should be viewed through a critical historical lens. Guyana should seek to buck the trend of resource extraction by foreign corporations, without adequate safeguards or reinvestment in the local economy, that has led to environmental degradation and economic inequality in many countries. Guyana, now poised to be a significant oil producer, must monitor and regulate this expansion to prevent such exploitation from reoccurring. The government and international stakeholders must prioritize transparency, environmental sustainability, and equitable sharing of profits to avoid repeating past mistakes. While the economic potential is significant, there is an urgent need for robust oversight to protect Guyana’s long-term interests, ensuring that its people and environment benefit from this wealth rather than being exploited by external forces. 

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: ExxonMobil Logo, taken on Dec 30, 2015 | Image sourced from FMT | CC License, no changes made

Although there was significant backlash brewing in Russia surrounding the ill precautions taken
before the event, the Russian President used this incident to his advantage as he has in the past to
show that he is a strong leader for Russia ahead of the Russian elections. Within the country,
there were numerous online accounts emerging that claimed “Ukrainians had called in false
reports of shootings in other locations around Moscow to disrupt the rescue effort.” These claims
worked to Putin’s advantage, both reprieving him of scrutiny from the massive security failure
and allowing him to maintain Russian support for the attacks in Ukraine as he worked to
convince the world that Kyiv was behind the Moscow attack.

The 2016 elections showed the world that Russia has no issues with using technology to their
advantage when it comes to political affairs. In fact, there have been numerous reported instances
of artificial intelligence (AI) being used in the war between Russia and Ukraine.
“In the months leading up to the invasion, the Ukrainian government warned of the potential for
Russia to employ a deepfake of Zelensky surrendering to the Russian government,” and although
the Kremlin has yet to publicly claim responsibility, that is exactly what happened. In technical
terms, a deepfake is a fake, artificially engineered photo or video of a real person. Deepfakes are
extremely dangerous and are often used for malicious intent, including for identity theft and for
generating fake pornographic images of real people. Numerous countries have come out with
new AI policies in an effort to regulate this behavior, but so far there is no clear solution. With
current legislation, access to deepfake technology is borderline unrestricted, blurring the lines
between truth and AI. Now more than ever, people are weary to trust what they see on the
internet, and for good reason.

On March 14, 2022, someone hacked a Ukrainian news site and displayed a deepfaked video of
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky surrendering Ukraine to Russia. On March 22, 2024, a
similarly implicating deepfaked video clip emerged on Russian television channel NTV of
Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council secretary Oleksiy Danilov making interesting
remarks about the attack on Moscow. He was alleged to have said “Is it fun in Moscow today? I
think it’s a lot of fun. I would like to believe that we will arrange such fun for them more often.”
The video has since been debunked as a fake, and then Secretary Danilov has since been
replaced.

Audio analysis was carried out on the clip for BBC Verify, and Ukraine’s Center for Countering
Disinformation “added that the video’s quality was not good and that Mr. Danilov’s facial
expressions and speech did not match.” While no one has come forward to claim responsibility
for the altered clip, it serves as a solemn reminder that, gone unregulated, deepfake technology
could continue to advance until humans do not possess the capability to tell the difference between what is altered and what is real. Had this incident occurred ten years from now, it’s possible that the AI used to generate the video could have been so believable that it would be hard to deny Russia’s claims of Ukrainian involvement, even with ISIS claiming responsibility for the attacks. Let this serve as a reminder of the detrimental implications that come with AI being used in military situations, and let the world continue to push for more AI regulation.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Winter in Moscow, taken on Feb 4, 2022 | Image sourced from Pexels | CC License, no changes made

The guardianship system in Saudi Arabia consisted of a set of legal norms that, until recently, restricted women’s liberties. Previously, a woman needed the consent of her male guardian (wali al amr) to engage in basic exercises of autonomy such as obtaining a passport, traveling, and registering the birth of her child. The guardian would usually be a woman’s father or husband; however, he could even be her son. In 2019, heeding the calls for modernization in the Kingdom, the Council of Ministers put an end to the system. Currently, all women over the age of 21 do not need male guardians and are viewed as fully autonomous under the law. [1] The policy changed due to a shift in the understanding of the rights of women in Islam. Saudi Arabia is currently undergoing a process of disentangling patriarchal culture from  true religion. While Islam is the absolute foundation of the country, culture is merely relative and subject to change. This is particularly true of oppressive cultural practices. 

Prevailing Western thought asserts that religion must be entirely divorced from the state in order for society to be just and free. However, a close examination of theocracy shows that religious law and justice are not mutually exclusive; in fact, in some societies, justice is defined by and can only be attained through the pathways of religious understanding. This article will analyze how religion functions in a theocracy, through the case of the recently repealed guardianship law in Saudi Arabia. Institutionalized religion can be analyzed on three levels: the validity of a religious society, the difference between religious knowledge and religion as such, and the relationship between religion and culture. 

Religious knowledge is the human interpretation of religious scripture by disciples. This understanding is tainted by the subjective perspectives of individuals, groups, cultures, or zeitgeists of a particular period. Therefore, these religious notions should not be regarded as absolute. Contrastingly, religion as such is the unalterable will of God. It transcends all contexts and remains consistent. While the theoretical distinction between these aspects of religion is clear, in practice the line between them is often ambiguous. 

In the case of the guardianship law, Saudi clerics claimed that the law was based on religion as such, rather than a normative interpretation of religion; however, this was not true. They cite a Qur’anic verse that they interpreted to mean that, “Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because God has given the one more strength than the other, and because they support them from their means.” [2] This translation presents the notion that God has endowed men with greater faculties which they are to employ to guide women. However, in the original Arabic, the meaning of this verse is much more obscure. Professor Azizah Al-Hibri, a scholar of Islamic feminism, contends that the more accurate translation of the verse is that, “Men are the advisors and guides of women in circumstances where God has given preferred distinctions to them over others and in circumstances where they spend of their own money [to support them].” [3] The distinction between the translations is two-fold. First, in the former men are “protectors”; however, in the latter men are “advisors”. The protective role assigned to men by the guardianship law has been its principal source of female oppression. The advisory role is a responsibility assigned to men that is not meant to encroach upon female autonomy. Second, the latter interpretation stipulates that a man would only be assigned the role of an advisor in cases where the woman is dependent on him and in situations where “God has given preferred distinctions to” him. Professor Al-Hibri argues that the advisory role of a man to a woman would manifest in the role of a father advising his daughter, specifically when she chooses a husband. However, the daughter would not have to submit to the will of her father. [4] This more accurate interpretation elucidates how previous understandings were tainted by social patriarchy. In the application of religion in society, injustices are often a function of wider social issues and not the religion itself. While it is often challenging to disentangle social bias from religious knowledge, it must be done to ensure that religion as such is protected. This shielding of religion from oppressive culture allows for theocracies to be true bastions of faith. 

The principle function of a theocracy is to uphold religion; therefore, culture cannot be regarded as a force of equal standing. Religion and culture are often perceived by secular thought as synonymous and of equal importance (or lack thereof ). However, the former, in its true sense, must be held to a higher degree of importance than the latter in a religious society. Moreover, religion must be employed to evaluate the legitimacy of cultural practices. Susan Moller Okin, a prominent liberal philosopher, in her analysis of women’s rights as they are affected by culture, claims that, “…most cultures have as one of their principal aims the control of women by men. Consider for example, the founding myths of Greek and Roman antiquity, and of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: they are rife with attempts to justify the control and subordination of women.” [5] Okin’s conclusion presents a stark analytical flaw: she equates culture to religion. This assessment sets a precedent that would be fundamentally oppressive to women in theocratic societies.

The guardianship law in Saudi Arabia was a function of culture, not religion. Saudi Arabian culture is patriarchal and in some cases does oppress women. However, the Islamic faith does not oppress women; in fact, the thrust of the religion is the equality of all before God. [6] Aside from the fact that Okin incorrectly characterized Islam, she would not make the distinction between Saudi culture and Islam. If the notion that culture and religion are one and of the same were to be applied to a theocratic society this would endow culture and cultural interpretations of religion with the same command as divine authority. In a theocracy, to say that culture is religion is to say that it is infallible. This would inhibit the vital process of disentangling culture from religion. Therefore, oppressive cultural practices would be perpetuated because religion would no longer be a superior framework used to evaluate the validity of culture. Okin would strip Saudi society of the mechanism (the process of disentangling culture from religion) that liberated Saudi women from oppressive culture. Okin intended for her rejection of religion and culture on equal bases to be a force for liberating women. However, her theory, when applied to a theocratic society, would only serve to further the subjugation of women. This reveals how external, secular thought cannot be applied to religious societies as they are often forces for oppression, not liberation. 

Legal reform in Saudi Arabia has resulted in tangible improvements in women’s employment opportunities. The World Bank, in their report “Women, Business, and the Law 2020,” stated that Saudi Arabia was the top reformer of the year. [7] Repealing the guardianship system established that a Saudi woman has the same rights to economic and literal mobility as a Saudi man. The latest labor market survey shows that,“women’s participation rose to 31.3 percent in the third quarter of 2020, up from 26 percent at the end of 2019.” [8] This substantial improvement occurred  despite the economic challenges posed by the pandemic. Saudi Arabia has now already surpassed its goal of 30 percent women’s labor force participation by 2030. The country is displaying that incremental, modernizing legal reforms are compatible with a religious society and lead to substantial improvements in social welfare. 

The fact that a society is religious does not preclude social progress or development. Saudi Arabia can look internally to its own theological basis to usher in reform. Religion is a steward of social change in that it provides a framework through which the status quo can be evaluated and judged. In this way, religion functions as a source of empowerment: only in a religious society can one demand the true extent of their religious rights. In Saudi Arabia religion has not been an oppressive force, culture has. It is through religion, more specifically through extracting religion as such from the abstractions of culture, that women have been liberated from domineering forces. These rights were not bestowed upon women by the government; rather, the rights that have always been outlined for them in Islam were recognized. Ending the guardianship law in Saudi Arabia did not mean that the country was becoming secular or Western; rather, Saudi Arabia became a more truly Islamic country. 

References

[1] Wagtendonk, Anya van. “Saudi Arabia Changed Its Guardianship Laws, but Activists Who Fought Them Remain Imprisoned.” Vox, Vox, 3 Aug. 2019, 

www.vox.com/world/2019/8/3/20752864/saudi-arabia-guardianship-laws-women-travel employment-mbs.

[2] Ali, Abdullah Yusuf. The Holy Quran. Idara Impex, 2012.

[3] Ali,  The Holy Quran.

[4] Al-Hibri, Azizah Y. An Introduction to Muslim Women’s Rights. 2000, karamah.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/An-Introduction-to-Muslim-Women%E2%80 %99s-Rights.pdf. 

[5] Okin, Susan Moller., et al. Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton University Press, 2011.

[6] Al-Hibri, An Introduction to Muslim Women’s Rights.

[7] “Saudi Women Rising up in Business in Line with Vision 2030.” World Bank, www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/03/11/saudi-women-rising-up-in-business-in-l ine-with-vision-2030. 

[8]Khojji, Zaynab. “Saudi Arabia’s Rising Female Labor Force Defies Global Pandemic Trend.” Arab News, Arabnews, 7 Mar. 2021, www.arabnews.com/node/1821396/business-economy.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Night view of City Riyadh from Hauptstadt Saudi Arabiens by Jack Soma on October 30, 2011 | Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

Lobbying on the whole is more expensive in the United States than in the European Union. Total lobbying expenses in 2022 topped $4.11 billion (€3.79 billion) in the former while only $110.56 million (€120 million) in the latter during the same period. The US registered 12,665 lobbyists in 2022 and the EU 12,425 respectively in the same year as well. Even adjusting for inflation, high profile legislation, and employment rates, lobbying expenditures in the US vastly outstrip those of the EU. This article examines the underlying factors that may contribute to this disparity, focusing on the skills demanded of lobbyists, the role of money in the process, the goals of lobbying structures, and the social environments in which they operate. Through a review of academic sources and legislative texts, this analysis seeks to uncover how these elements shape lobbying practices and regulatory frameworks on both sides of the Atlantic.

Before delving further, it is essential to first define what a lobbyist does. Most sources agree that a lobbyist is someone who lawfully acts to influence governmental policy in favor or against a certain position. Traditional interpretations point to these persons as brokers in transactions between policymakers and special interest groups, exchanging “money for favors,” “information for policies,” “costly access [i.e.] information,” and/or “legislative subsidies.” However, new research portrays lobbying as a complex ecosystem built on relationships where lobbyists act as intermediaries between various parties. The rise of commercial lobbying firms points to a web connecting “citizens, corporations or special interest groups[,] and policymakers” that is not as straightforward as previous models suggested. These intermediary services now include “direct advocacy [to government], legislative strategy advice, formation of coalitions and grass root organizations, legislative drafting for policymakers, legislative witness-hearing preparations, and public relations for both clients and policymakers.” The bulk of a lobbyist’s time must then be spent to “build, preserve, and then commodify these relationships.” A lobbyist will fill their days contacting government offices, going to government hearings/briefings/meetings, writing/reading reports, going to special interest groups briefings/meetings, and perhaps, occasionally, hosting a cocktail party or two. 

When this is put into practice, however, lobbyist’s strategies will differ between the United States and European Union. American style lobbying is often more direct and “aggressive” than across the Atlantic.¹ Lobbyists aim either to pass legislation favorable to their contractors or ensure unfavorable bills do not pass—reflecting the country’s “winner-takes-all” approach to legislation where not every bill gets signed into law.² Such urgency is fueled by rapid legislative turnover and constant election cycle pressures where someone is up for reelection every two years.³ An ever-fixated news cycle also pressures quick fixes, flashy action, and last minute earmarks—prompting winning lobbyists to be quick to speak up and slow to back down. 

Lobbying in the European Union, in contrast, is more subdued and “cooperative.”⁴ EU politics does not follow a “winner-takes-all” model nor the brisk pace of US elections. Politicians are more removed from immediate electoral pressure due to the “second-order election problem” where citizens are predisposed to prioritize national representatives over EU ones. (No allusion to the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ conundrum were made.) As a result, there is less urgency to pass or reject legislation quickly. EU lobbyists focus on compromise and technical expertise, recognizing that proposals will likely undergo modifications over several years. This is also what the EU bodies themselves prefer, as one researcher noted, because limited bureaucracy size meant that bureaucrats tended to “acknowledge the need for outside input as [they] lack technical capabilities in many policy areas for which [they are] responsible.”

When analyzed empirically, the breakdown between the United States and European Union is even more astounding. One study of 149 interviewed lobbyists across 47 policy—issues, with half in the US and half in the EU—reported that 43% of EU lobbyists attained success through compromise as opposed to 31% for the American ones.⁵ Or, by number of cases, 6 out of 21 American cases would end in compromise versus 12 of 26 European ones.⁶ On the whole, US lobbyists tended to act more “all-or-nothing,” reflective of the “winner-takes-all” approach,” with 46% attaining “none of their lobbying goals (39% for EU), and 23% “all of their lobbying goals (17% for EU).⁷ This difference highlights the varied lobbying styles: the US favors immediate, definitive results, while the EU values long-term relationships and cooperative knowledge. Or, in the words of one researcher, Americans use “gangster style” and Europeans “speak softly, softly.”⁸

The distinct legislative processes in the US and EU affect lobbying expenditures as well. In the US, where media scrutiny is intense and elections are frequent and expensive, lobbyists dedicate additional focus on providing the funds politicians need to stay in office. This campaign support is vital in both cultivating and sustaining relationships that can later be commodified amongst parties. Corporations, unions, and trade associations—with their generally deeper pockets—have the means to comply. In contrast, the EU’s lobbying efforts focus on informing technocrats and building external support for proposals within national governments. Political researchers do not mention lobbyists’ interests in campaign funding to say nothing of something to the scale of the United States’ enterprise. Perhaps this difference, one where Europeans are more concerned with “long term relationships and trusts over donations or pressure,” explains why money plays a less critical role in EU lobbying compared to the US.

Another source of discrepancy may simply come from the accountability methods in place across the regions. In the United States, lobbying is governed by several key regulations designed to promote transparency and accountability. The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995, later amended in 2022, requires lobbyists to register and report their activities, including financial expenditures. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) of 2007 further strengthened these requirements, imposing stricter disclosure rules and penalties for non-compliance. Indeed, fines run up to $200,000 (€184,270) for the LDA and $50,000 to $200,000 (€46,067.50 to €184,270) for the HLOGA. Corporations and organizations cannot donate directly and must jump over campaign finance hurdles by forming political action committees (PACs) to do so. These PACs are then subject to a bevy of scrutiny from the money, specific candidates, and specific platforms they support. 

In the EU, where lobbying is regulated primarily through the EU Transparency Register, a joint initiative by the European Commission, European Parliament, and Council of the European Union to record all entities who “carry out activities to influence EU policy.” This register—hanging precariously between mandatory and voluntary—encourages lobbyists i.e. “interest representatives” to disclose their activities and expenditures, promoting transparency and ethical lobbying practices. In practice, it includes a public website, a code of conduct, and a complaints mechanism that was beefed up in 2021 with the passage of the Interinstitutional Agreement on a Mandatory Transparency Register but where lobbyists opt to put in the information they desire—and whose website desperately needs data quality checks per the European Court of Auditors’ most recent report. 

The sustainability of the registrar is further tenuous considering that only the Commission mandatorily requires key information, ranging from “basic identification, interests represented, financial and human resources involved, sources of funding, clients, and associated organizations wherever applicable” (it remains optional for the Parliament and Council), and the Council continues to make publications of interactions optional (it is mandatory for the Parliament and Commission). Additionally, as a voluntary act, punitive fines are impossible and the only recourse is removal from the register by the Secretariat. The Code of Conduct for Interest Representatives, adopted in 2008, does not fare much better as it outlines the buzzwords, i.e. principles, that lobbyists must adhere to, including honesty, integrity, and respect for democratic institutions but no force to back it up. 

It is possible, of course, that some ‘lobbying discrepancies’ might be explained away due to a fallible accountability system. Qatargate, afterall, occurred after the 2021 register overhaul and registrants are routinely removed for failure to comply with checks by the Secretariat. Yet attributing such divergence in lobbying capital between the US and EU to deficient accountability is too neatly pessimistic and flippant of other underlying causes. Just because the register needs bolstering does not mean it is unserviceable. There must be more at play.

Perhaps, there truly is something ‘cultural’ to the difference of lobbying expenditures. The multi-national and multi-level governance structure of the EU adds complexity that the US model does not grapple with. While large multinational corporations and industry groups have significant lobbying power, they must navigate a more diverse and fragmented regulatory environment. Economic power is distributed across different member states, each with its own interests, priorities, procedures, and practices. Lobbyists must engage with multiple stakeholders, including the Commission, the Parliament, and member state governments repeatedly, consistently, and knowledgeably amongst high compartmentalization, and, in the case of the countries, periods of rapid electoral turnover. While the most extensive lobbying efforts will be directed towards the proposal-initiating Commission, this “institutional labyrinth” requires a great emphasis on consensus-building and might lead to accounting numbers being dispersed among many more areas than their American counterparts. 

Beyond the aforementioned symptom, however, researchers have a difficult time explaining how it is that ‘culture’ leads to monetary differences. One study starkly lambasted the idea that behind-the-scenes lobbying was for secret bribery and intimidation—which would clearly not be captured by the register and whose. Another ridiculed the concept that lobbying is simply more discreet and laissez-faire in the EU—arguing it is just as present and vital. One public watchdog reported on a country-led approach by lobbyists whose influenced state ministers would then influence the EU bodies in turn—which might explain a lower spending level for the top brass but appears quite case-specific. Claims that the EU is simply a newer institution than the United States prove interesting, but, once again, they fail to explain how that decreases lobbying spending. And on further comparison, Brussels lobbyists appear to be paid more and even employed more regularly than Washington D.C. ones much to the chagrin of a ‘simplistic explanation’ (1, 2, 3, 4). 

Indeed, at least three studies found no robust correlation between spending and influence while another found a limited link in issues with low news presence which is indeed interesting but not geared towards the question posed by this article. Yet another study⁹ found a positive link between the number of lobbying staff employed and lobbying influence—though its promise to this paper’s prompt appears limited due to the similar numbers registered lobbyists between the US and EU plus the relative pay grade of both. However, one study on 183 experts across 41 policy areas determined that the biggest correlation occurs between special interest groups with “higher levels of public congruence also hav[ing] a higher influence reputation.” The researchers further concluded that 

“economic resources are a vital component for developing effective lobbying campaigns” meaning “that interest groups with greater economic resources are more likely to reap the benefits of aligning with public opinion, as they have the means to cultivate expertise and generate pressure on policymakers, while policymakers will also be more receptive to their input due to their congruence with public opinion.”

Is this conclusion satisfying? Yes. But does it explain why spending is on the whole less in the EU than in the US? Not quite, although it might hint that the vapid attention of the US news media on national legislation might influence lobbying spending more than in the EU with its “second-order election problem.” It could also nod to the EU’s longer-term, cultivation approach which might send numbers lower per year as well. Finally, one might extrapolate that there is not as much overwhelming pressure to lobby within the highly technocratic EU system than in the US’ the ‘all-or-nothing,’ ‘winner-takes-all’ system. Nonetheless, the researchers themselves note that “[i]t would be valuable for future studies to test [their] findings in other contexts, such as the United States” and that “[t]he role of economic resources may be more pronounced in the United States, where financial donations to political candidates are more common.” Once again, differences in lobbying numbers must simply be a multitude of factors that, for better or worse, boils down to ‘je ne sais quoi’ to its non-citizens. 

The system refuses to offer a singular encapsulating explanation as to why spending discrepancies exist between the US and EU except to point towards pervasive cultural differences that influence actions. An analysis focusing on the skills demanded of lobbyists, the role of money in the process, the goals of lobbying structures, and the social environments in which they operate has concluded that campaign finance arrangements, differing accountability mechanisms,  multi-tiered governmental levels, a longer time frame for legislation, and a more diffused media focus might all factor into the financial discrepancy. Through a review of academic sources and legislative texts, lobbying frameworks and exigencies have been understood to differ greatly in the United States and European Union as well.

Overall, lobbying is an integral part of the political process: it is access and  accountability to the fabled annals of powers. Yet it is a double-edged sword especially with who wields it. Lobbying tends to be concentrated on those with the means—regardless of which side of the Atlantic one may find themselves in. Whether embroiled in a campaign finance arms race or an expertise-sharing initiative, awareness of how this power is acquired and utilized is vital to build more resilient, accessible institutions. As the US and EU navigate the complexities of the 21st century, the future of lobbying will be shaped by several emerging trends. The increasing role of technology and social media in political campaigns and advocacy efforts is transforming how information is shared and gathered. Digital lobbying strategies, including online grassroots mobilization and social media campaigns, are becoming more prominent, allowing interest groups to reach broader audiences and exert influence more effectively. Simultaneously, politics is becoming more divided, with populism, echo chambers, and targeted social media feeds increasing inflammatory pressures. Politics is truly the study of human action, and it is rapidly changing every day. Understanding the inherent differences between these powerful systems will prove crucial for addressing the democratic challenges associated with lobbying and the general use of power, ensuring a balanced approach to policy-making for decades to come.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Two travelers standing on path with flags of USA, European Union and China by Marco Verch | Image sourced from KostenLose Fotos | CC License, no changes made

1. Woll, C. The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison. Int Groups Adv 1, 193–214 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2012.10 ↩︎
2. Ibid. ↩︎
3. Ibid. ↩︎
4. Ibid. ↩︎
5. Mahoney C. Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union. Journal of Public Policy. 2007;27(1):35-56. doi:10.1017/S0143814X07000608 ↩︎
6. Ibid. ↩︎
7. Ibid. ↩︎
8. Woll, C. The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison. Int Groups Adv 1, 193–214 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2012.10 ↩︎
9. Woll, C. The brash and the soft-spoken: Lobbying styles in a transatlantic comparison. Int Groups Adv 1, 193–214 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2012.10 ↩︎

These measures, which offer lucrative tax breaks to individuals and corporations relocating to the island, aimed to stimulate economic growth, attract investment, and create jobs. More specifically, Act 20 ¹or the Export Services Act’s passage allowed corporations who exported services from the island to pay the 4% Puerto Rico tax rate for the exported services, receive a 60% reduction on municipal taxes, and enjoy a complete exemption on all earnings and profit dividends. The similarly-minded Act 22², the Individual Investors Act, extended this total exemption on earnings and profit dividends to individuals and added all capital gains to the list as well—as long as the person(s) established residency on the island. Consolidated in 2019 as Act 60, the policies have drawn mixed reactions. While they have increased interest in Puerto Rico, particularly from wealthy mainland Americans, critics argued that their benefits have been overstated. Far from catalyzing an economic transformation, the tax incentives have contributed to rising inequality, limited job creation, and speculative investment. Without significant reform, Puerto Rico risks entrenching its roles as a playground for affluent outsiders while failing to address the needs of its people. 

Acts 20 and 22 were originally heralded as catalysts for job creation. The logic was simple: wealthy individuals and companies would stimulate demand for local services and hire Puerto Rican workers. To some extent, this proved correct. By 2021, the incentives had reportedly created 33,740 jobs. Yet these numbers tell only part of the story. The island has experienced a year-on-year decrease in nonfarm employment every year in that period except 2018, 2019, and 2021 per data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. A simple calculation shows a net loss of roughly 49,000 jobs over that time. It is correct that the island’s 6.7% employment rate in December 2021 was an improvement from the 14.3% it was in December 2012, but the boon promised by the laws was not fully delivered. 

Even the Puerto Rican Department of Economic Development—original study’s researchers—admitted that these numbers were smaller than expected. A closer look reveals structural flaws: Act 60 requires businesses to employ a minimum of one full-time Puerto Rican worker, incentivizing companies to do the bare minimum. Loopholes allow business to claim benefits while moving only part of a services operation (though only the island-based part will apply for 4% corporate tax), establishing a residence as offices, and working around with stock selling. As a result, much of the anticipated economic transformation has failed to materialize. 

The types of jobs created further underscore the policy’s limitations. Employment growth has been concentrated in sectors like leisure, hospitality, and construction, while high-value fields such as finance and information technology have seen little change. A 2021 study by Pennsylvania State University found even less correlation based on 1990-2018 governmental data, finding no significant change in four major sectors analyzed. This lopsided growth perpetuates Puerto Rico’s dependence on low-wage service industries, offering few opportunities for upward mobility. As former gubernatorial candidate Rafael Bernabe observed, investors “will hire a few gardeners, [and] create jobs for a few more waiters” are essentially creating a “drop in the bucket.” While any job creation is laudable, the combination of Act 60 and growing interest in Puerto Rico as a tourist hub has funneled job growth into specific sectors. If the island does not work to expand other opportunities of growth, it risks furthering systematic unemployment and underemployment. 

Mediocre results also crop with island investments. Acts 20 and 22 were intended to spur significant investment in Puerto Rico’s economy. Yet private fixed investment has remained sluggish, contributing just 0.53% of the 4.0% GDP growth in 2021. From 2012 to 2017, investment increased by an average of only 3.2% annually—a figure that pales in comparison to the policy’s lofty ambitions. Part of the problem lies in lax enforcement. By 2020, only 30% of the individuals and business granted tax degrees had fulfilled their investment obligations. Real estate speculation has surged meanwhile, with beneficiaries of Act 60 driving up property prices. The Federal Housing Finance Agency has noted a 8.6% increase in all transactions between the first to second quarters of 2023. However, this “investment” often benefits wealthy outsiders more than local communities. Some of this may well be Puerto Ricans selling to Puerto Ricans, or, more probable, beneficiaries of Act 60 as at least 4,500 individuals and businesses had moved by 2021. Investment in Puerto Rico has ultimately proven varied throughout—not least because, as stated in one incendiary quote, “the profile of the Act 22 beneficiary changed from an executive in a tie to that of a tourist in beach wear.” 

To be clear, the collective acts are not without merit. Act 60 companies have imbued more than $210 million into the economy between 2015 and 2019. The increased attention on Puerto Rico has helped draw tourists and entrepreneurs alike. The one 2022 study found that for every 1,000 reservations on Airbnb and similar rentals, 17 employment opportunities and $330,000 in salaries and other forms of income were generated. Nonetheless, corruption, poor oversight, and insufficient regulatory mechanisms have undermined their potential. Both the IRS and Puerto Rican authorities have been criticized for failing to enforce compliance, allowing beneficials to exploit loopholes with little accountability. Members of Congress have called for increased oversight as late as July 2023. Policymakers would do well to consider steps to strengthen the act’s effects. From enforcing stricter job creation requirements, enforcing higher taxes on capital gains, and decoupling property investments property purchases from mandatory investments, action is necessary. Strengthened oversight, both locally and federally, is further essential to ensure that these policies serve Puerto Rico’s long-term interests rather than short-term profits of a privileged minority. 

Act 60 is not yet without hope. Perhaps the greatest realization is that Bad Bunny’s declaration “que se vayan ellos” in  “Apagón” (that they—the privately-owned, American transmissions company Luma, presumably—leave) will likely never occur. Beyond Luma, the American mainlanders are here to stay and so are the Puerto Ricans. The island stands at a crossroads with the opportunity to transform itself into a truly resilient economy. Yet it will be the role of both sides to come together and steer Puerto Rico true into 21st-century waters.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Puerto Rico, taken on Dec 30, 2006 | Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

1.  Nanavati, Jay R., and Mariana Gusdorf. “Puerto Rico’s Act 60 Tax Incentive Program Attracting Heightened IRS Scrutiny of Sourcing and Transfer Pricing.” Journal of Tax Practice and Procedure, vol. 25, no. 1, spring 2023, pp. 27+. Gale Academic OneFile, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A747409355/AONE?u=29002&sid=summon&xid=0fcc3693. Accessed 1 Nov. 2023. ↩︎
2. Ibid. ↩︎

However, for the growing number of Muslims drawn to Korea as a travel spot or even a place to live as a result of the widespread “Korean wave”, this aspect of the country’s culture is a barrier. In Islam, pork and alcohol consumption is forbidden, and beyond that, most Korean restaurants do not meet the halal standards required by the religion, which states, among other things, that products must be ethically sourced, with animals being slaughtered in specific, “lawful” ways. This poses a problem for the Korean government: South Korea is always trying to expand its tourism industry, but by not having halal food available for Muslim tourists, the country is denying itself of a key demographic of visitors. For Muslims who are permanent residents of Korea, the problem is even worse, with adults forced to refrain from social outings due to dietary restrictions and children unable to eat the food provided to them at school. To combat this issue, the South Korean government has in recent years moved to establish halal restaurants in South Korea, but as the halal restaurants grow in number, so has the backlash from the Korean Christian right.

The origins of hallyu (the Korean wave) are typically tied back to the late 1990s when then-South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung allocated millions of dollars to the international promotion of Korean popular culture. Initially, hallyu was mostly effective in other East Asian countries. But in 2008, another surge of interest in Korean culture occurred more broadly. This second wave hit the Middle East especially hard. In comparison to Western entertainment, mainstream Korean media is much less obscene, with little swearing and sexual content, making it more suitable to the Middle Eastern cultural context. Along with this increased interest in Korean media came an interest in Korean beauty and other Korean-made products, with $43 million worth of K-beauty imports to the United Arab Emirates in 2021 alone. With more people in the Middle East engaging with Korean pop culture, economic ties between South Korea and Middle Eastern countries have grown, as has the desire among Middle Easterns to speak Korean, travel to Korea, and even live in Korea. 

Given the enthusiasm for Korean culture in Middle Eastern countries (in which the vast majority of the population is Muslim) and the South Korean government’s desire to bolster its tourism industry, it makes sense why Korea is making an effort to expand food options for Muslim visitors and residents. For years, the issue of food accessibility for Muslims in Korea was barely considered, but after KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) released a docu-series in 2015 about halal food as an economic strategy, this issue suddenly became much more relevant in the minds of Korean politicians, who were worried about stagflation and willing to do anything to boost the economy. As a result, an effort began to establish halal restaurants in Korea. Daegu, one of the biggest cities in South Korea, created the “Halal Food Activation Project,” which aims to increase the number of halal restaurants in the city by tenfold, and the Korean Tourism Organization has created a variety of pamphlets and guides for Muslim tourists listing the halal food and cultural resources available to them in Korea. 

These efforts have already been successful in attracting more Muslim tourists to Korea, fostering intercultural connections, and building the country’s economy. Despite these benefits, however, there is significant backlash towards this progress from certain demographics, especially the Christian right. In South Korea, where less than 0.3% of the population identifies as Muslim, harmful stereotypes about Islam run rampant, with certain conservative groups propagating the idea that Muslims are inherently violent. Many are concerned that if Korea becomes more welcoming to Muslims, they will not only commit acts of violence but also evangelize, with halal acting as a Trojan horse to circulate Islamic ideals to the Korean population. This, some fear, would ultimately dilute Korean culture and bring so-called “evil” beliefs and practices into the country. 

While these views may seem somewhat insignificant against a broader landscape of government efforts to make Korea halal-friendly, they have had real impacts. In 2016, the Korean city of Iksan proposed an industrial zone to manufacture halal goods, but this proposal failed due to intense resistance from Christian groups. Similarly, when the governor of Gangwon Province announced his plan to establish halal food zones, he received strong opposition from protestors concerned about Islamic terrorists coming to Korea and was forced to scrap the initiative. Although these are just two examples of conservative groups successfully battling proposals to make Korea more accessible to Muslims, they are reflective of a larger, ongoing trend that shows that the power of this demographic cannot be underestimated.

However, this backlash hasn’t stopped all progress from being made — between 2022 and 2023, Muslim tourism to Korea went up by 33%. In order to maintain this growth, the government must continue to make sure the country’s facilities are accessible, expanding to new areas beyond food. In Korea, mosques and prayer rooms are few and far between, and Korean manufacturers still have a long way to go to ensure that all types of products, like cosmetics and leather, are halal. These efforts would not only grow the tourism industry but would also ease the burdens of Muslims who are permanent residents of Korea. To make these changes, Korea needs not only the right policies but also the right attitude, encouraging a broader culture of acceptance so that the country can be open to all opportunities for growth in the years to come.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Halal bulgogi beef, taken on Sep 10, 2013, Photo by Aiena Zahira | Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

In March, Mongolia was welcomed into the international space community by successfully sending two nanosatellites, Ondosat-Owl-1 and Ondosat-Owl-2, into space. While this was a significant feat for the developing nation, Mongolia hopes to leverage that momentum into a whole new frontier of space activity: a simulation site of Mars.

In 2019, the Mongolian Aerospace Research and Science Association (MARSA) launched the Mars V Project, an initiative to establish this simulation site in the Gobi Desert. Under the leadership of S. Erdenebold, the Mars V Project has presented this idea to the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), the European Space Agency (ESA), the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), and the Russian State Space Corporation Roscosmos. Furthermore, the Mars V Project has begun collaborations with 2 groups under NASA and hopes to work with private companies going forward. After completing a deal that allowed Mongolia to use Starlink, the Project has begun discussing Mars V collaboration with SpaceX magnate Elon Musk. Currently, the Project is being advised by former Mongolian cosmonaut Jügderdemidiin Gurragchaa.

Evidently, Mongolia is planning toward a future of scientific innovation and international collaboration. But does it have the standing and resources to implement them? This short piece hopes to address two questions: 1) what makes Mongolia’s space policy attractive to other space organizations, and 2) what is Mongolia’s vision for its future role in the international space industry?

Jumping on a Trend

Mongolia isn’t the first ‘geopolitical minnow’ to enter the international space race. Island nations such as New Zealand have leased lands at below-market rates and reduced corporate taxes for the construction of launching sites, Lithuania’s Aerospace Science Technology and Innovation Development Program has worked to bolster both research and economic incentives for space tech companies, and Luxembourg has allocated $110 million in funding to space mining startups. In addition, the UAE has invested in its own space policy program, financing Japanese-built hardware for both the Emirates Mars Mission, which sent the Hope Probe to Mars in 2021, and the Emirates Lunar Mission in 2023, which unsuccessfully saw the Rashid Rover crash into the moon.

Yet it is unusual for Mongolia to enter the space race for a few reasons. First, Mongolia has a per capita GDP of roughly $6,000 (IMF) – a significantly smaller fraction than other nations’. Second, Mongolia doesn’t have the talent pool to run the Mars V facilities and projects; most Mongolians graduating from universities earn degrees in business management and law, not subjects such as physics or engineering. Third, with concerns about national debt and a 2% GDP budget deficit, Mongolia doesn’t have the financial resources to launch the project at full scale. Fourth, Mongolia’s geographic location may leave it vulnerable to Chinese and Russian leverage.

So, why would major space organizations wish to endorse Mongolia?

Mongolia’s Marketability

There are five components that make Mongolia marketable as a partner in Mars exploration: 1) the Gobi’s unique environment and climate, 2) its geopolitical neutrality, 3) a clear focus on enhancing foreign investment, 4) a commitment to renewable energy, and 5) a nomadic culture.

Being one of the largest, coldest deserts, unused and untouched, the Mongolian Gobi would theoretically have both the environmental conditions and available space to construct a major project for simulating life on Mars. Its temperature conditions – a night-day temperature range of -42 ℃ to 45 ℃ — are similar to the 130-degree variation on Mars. Similarly, rather low precipitation, high wind speeds, and significant Ferum O₂ content in its soil also make the Gobi akin to Mars in  similar climate and soil composition. Although other deserts, such as Chile’s Atacama, have comparable conditions, the Gobi’s vast and uninhabited nature makes it a highly suitable space for both Mars research and the development of scientific facilities in the region.

Beyond having suitable physical landscapes, Mongolia also has a stable geopolitical landscape, making it a suitable partner for collaborative international projects. Mongolia’s policy of absolute neutrality has delivered a strong foundation for successful international collaboration — hosting international dialogues and conferences, entering and creating various multilateral organizations, hosting both South and North Korean embassies, and engaging in joint military training exercises with countries across the geopolitical gambit like China, India, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the US. Moreover, Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status and peacekeeping missions have earned it the goodwill of other nations and created a trust to collaborate in joint projects. Its policy of non-aggression also means that Mongolia has no hot adversary, ensuring that it could de-escalate tension between collaborating nations and prevent any from being barred or left behind. In short, Mongolia’s reputation as a successful center for multilateral cooperation would make an international Mars project in the Gobi attractive to participating nations.

Mongolia’s general openness to foreign investment and plans to create an economic free zone in the Gobi Region could also attract space agencies to invest in the project. Mongolia’s current Constitution and Foreign Investment Law ensure that its government “imposes no statutory or regulatory limits on foreign ownership and control of investments,” guaranteeing that a foreign investor has the same rights as a Mongolian investor. As regulated by the WTO, Mongolia’s Free Zone Law would allow agencies and tech startups to operate tax-free, including sales tax and real estate tax, duties, and VAT. Furthermore, land lease terms (formerly limited to five years with a one-year extension) would not apply in the Free Zone. In May of 2024, Mongolia revised the Law on Science and Technology to promote the development of science programs and research, and the Mars V Project has been officially included in Mongolia’s Vision 2050. The Mongolian government thus seems unanimously invested in creating legislation that encourages space agencies to participate.

Additionally, the country’s investment in improving renewable energy availability in the Mongolian Gobi could be a further reason for foreign space agencies to collaborate. Large-scale wind and solar farms built throughout the Gobi with South Korean and Japanese partners could theoretically provide all energy required to operate the Mars V facilities. This would be an important appeal to countries looking into long-term plans for carbon neutrality and energy security.

Beyond practical factors like location, stable project environment, and clean energy, Mongolians could use elements of their nomadic culture to contribute to space technology and innovation. As the envisioned version of life on Mars has clear similarities to a nomadic lifestyle, Mongolia has a head start in accommodating the unique living conditions required. Mars V developers have already created a concept of a reusable and portable Martian dome in the form of a Mongolian Ger. The engineering team has also laid out blueprints for a “Mars V Carrier,” adjusting tire designs and the lightweight body to match the environmental conditions of the rugged Gobi. These ideas could offer new perspectives on space innovation and would be considered a valuable contribution to any collaborating space agency, and one unique to Mongolia. 

The Mars V Plan

Mars V is a government-funded project to simulate conditions on Mars within Mongolia’s Gobi Desert. The project aims to become a hub for scientific research on planetary exploration, a major contributor towards a settlement on Mars, and a central initiative for peaceful international cooperation on space policy. The project envisions three interconnected institutions to fulfill those goals: 1) an international training academy for Mars exploration; 2) an international zone for Mars research; and 3) a space-themed tourist center.

To establish an academy for future Mars explorers, the project includes training programs focused on adapting to the environment, terrain navigation, and eventual settlement. These programs, led by foreign experts from major space agencies, would train the best astronauts from around the world and Mongolians responsible for day-to-day operations. The program would also support the growing space tourism industry, assuming space tourism eventually reaches Mars.

In addition to offering opportunities to aspiring astronauts, The Mars V Project also hopes to foster a cooperative network of researchers. The vision to set up an international zone for Mars-focused scientific and economic cooperation would include creating research opportunities and establishing an international think tank to share discoveries.  Participating national space agencies would be provided both the land and the facilities to conduct experiments, most specifically regarding soil composition and potential fertilizers. Contracts can also be negotiated with tech startups to test their surface vehicles, space suits, agricultural products, and robots in the Gobi. To encourage a sense of entrepreneurship, the Mars V Project includes a fast-track patent service and a platform for commercializing test results, research, and products for Mars exploration. On an international geopolitical level, creating an international think tank would stand as a gesture of goodwill supporting international cooperation in Mars research. By creating a grand database, the think tank would be a center of innovation for global leaders in Mars research.

Beyond focusing on space education and training, the Mars V Project also aspires to commercialize this space. With eco-tourism already an important segment of the Mongolian economy, the plan envisions creating a hospitality center, ‘Satellite City,’ to accommodate space tourists. The center would offer an opportunity for tourists to live in a space-themed capsule and experience Mars-like terrain as a makeshift astronaut. The City would simulate life on Mars and offer Mongolia an important pivot to higher-value tourism, populated with space enthusiasts and tourists alike.

How Would Mongolia Benefit?

The Mars V Project could be one of many pathways Mongolia uses to diversify its economy. Profits derived from land leasing, patent fees, and service charges could become new sources of income for the government, which Mongolia could either reinvest in the project or distribute to its citizens through other programs. Building and operating facilities such as the training center, the laboratory, and the Satellite City ‘hotel’ could also create more highly skilled jobs to address the high youth unemployment rate Mongolians face today. This would be a crucial diversification to parallel the mining industry, which has seen success in both wealth creation and cultivating local talent in mining operations and business management.

By attracting global space experts to the country, Mongolia will inspire a new generation of Mongolians to become planetary scientists or enter other STEM-related fields. As legislated by the WTO, agencies that operate in economic free zones can’t have more than 10% foreign workforce, therefore, there will be a growing demand from participating space agencies for Mongolian labor. In the short term, a Mongolian workforce within the project will be trained to learn the skills needed to operate complex facility machinery. As a result, Mongolian institutions would be established to educate this specialized labor force to Mars V and support other high-tech development. In the long term, Mongolia could export its talent to other national space agencies across the globe and advise on building and operating simulation facilities in other countries. In short, Mongolia will be able to cultivate high-tech talent similar to how it developed a specialized workforce for the mining industry, creating both a skilled worker base for future entrepreneurial innovation and an experienced corps of experts valuable to any space agency worldwide.

On an international geopolitical level, Mongolia has always dreamed of being an indispensable part of the global supply chain. The adoption of the space program at full speed could potentially integrate Mongolia into any nation’s space exploration program. By involving its space agencies in the Mars V Project, global players such as the US, Japan, India, and the European Union would have a vested interest in Mongolia’s geopolitical safety and serve as important moderators and insurance mechanisms for Mongolia in case of Russian and Chinese intervention.  Similarly, the exchange of peoples and ideas would not only bring an awareness of Mongolia’s political situation to academic communities worldwide but would also help young Mongolians connect in a new way to the outside world, through space innovation.

Lots of Work to Do

The Mars V Project is still a long way from implementation. For starters, the team hasn’t fully concluded its study on the Gobi’s soil composition, which could affect its marketability to major space agencies. In addition, the team has not fully calculated the cost to build (including importing high-level technology) and operate the facility (both in terms of money and energy), how long it is projected to build the facilities, or the pricing model for land use and development charges to space organizations, tourists, or tech startups.

Ecology, archaeological preservation, and mining may pose additional concerns. With recent discoveries of rare Saurolophus dinosaur bones and projected discoveries of critical mineral deposits in the Gobi, the Mars V Project would most likely have to collaborate with archeologists and mining entrepreneurs for land rights and allocation. However, these challenges should be resolvable, as the vast area of the Gobi would be more than sufficient to provide each the land they require.

Funding sources and rights to ownership for Mars V could turn into a political concern. Based on the current proposal that infrastructure and facility construction would be funded by foreign space agencies, the project could quickly turn into a bidding war for influence.  Significant investors would also demand priority access to the facilities creating leverage that might not be in Mongolia’s long-term interest. The battle for access could also create international political tensions, putting Mongolia in an even more difficult geopolitical position. To address those concerns, a project like Mars V should seek funding from international finance organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank instead, to ensure that no sources of funding come with political baggage or vested political interests.

Even if Mongolia could successfully launch the international think tank they envision as part of the Mars V Project, it will be difficult for Mongolia to benefit from the intellectual property created through that collaboration. National space agencies or tech startups will refuse to share the value of their intellectual property (IP) for the sake of their own national security or economic benefit. Likewise, Mongolia would be reluctant to share rights to any of its homegrown IPs. Therefore, any information shared within the international think tank would also be found in the public domain. In choosing between having a data center that shares information or a secret lab that protects innovation, Mars V can’t have both ways.    

Conclusion

Mars V has the potential to be an interesting high-tech addition to Mongolia’s economic and geopolitical evolution, but its leaders must be careful to establish a legal framework, economic incentives, and support from the Mongolian people. Perhaps most importantly, they will have to navigate complex international politics, a skill set in which Mongolia has proven to be adept.

On a macro-level, the Mars V Project reflects Mongolia’s Third Neighbor Policy, an initiative for Mongolia to reach out to nations beyond their landlocked neighbors, China and Russia, to immunize themselves from Russian and Chinese influence and leverage. Typically, Mongolia adheres to this initiative by creating and leading various multilateral organizations, winning support through their engagement in international organizations, and trading this goodwill for beneficial diplomatic relations with adversarial nations. Similarly, Mongolia’s mission to Mars is not solely for space exploration, but rather to create a center for international cooperation and innovation. The project reflects Mongolia’s greater geopolitical ambition, to assert its value as an important interlocutor for international dialogue and collaboration. By presenting itself as a uniquely positioned and non-threatening partner in space exploration, Mongolia can strengthen its geopolitical ‘insurance policy’ through cooperation, goodwill, and vested interests.

 Image sourced from AMR Photography | CC License, no changes made

Introduction

The notion of ethnic homogeneity has served a potent role in building modern nation-states. Governments have often used perceived ethnic homogeneity to unite their citizens, build a unified front against potential foreign enemies, and strengthen the nation-state. Certain tyrannical regimes, such as Nazi Germany, actively perpetuated the concept of ethnic homogeneity to justify totalitarian control. The development of modern Japanese state was no exception to propagating the vision of ethnic homogeneity. Writing in Education about Asia, John Lie notes that “Between 1952 and 1985, the Japanese government projected an ethno-racially homogeneous vision of Japanese society – one race, one ethnicity, one nation.”^[1] Even after 1985, the belief that Japan is a homogeneous society “remains a particularly powerful myth with enduring influence over the identity-formation of Japanese people.”^[2] Contrary to popular notions, however, ethnic minorities have long existed in Japan, including the Ainu in Hokkaido and the people of Okinawa. Motivated by colonial ambitions and ethno-nationalism, the Japanese government during the post-Meiji Reformation period subjugated these groups, suppressed their culture and language, and systematically encouraged them to assimilate into Japanese society. The ethnic minority status was only recently granted for the Ainu at the turn of the 21^st century. 

The Koreans are another ethnic minority group in Japan; until the past few years, recently, they were the largest group. Periodic waves of Korean migration occurred throughout history, such as the migration of the displaced people of Baekje to Kyushu after Baekje’s collapse in 660 and the kidnapping of Koreans after Japanese invasions of Korea from 1592 to 1598 (文禄の役, Bunroku no Eki).^[3] The contemporary Korean population in Japan, however, mainly consists of descendants of those who moved or were forcibly relocated to Japan during Japanese colonial rule of Korea (1910-1945). After Japanese defeat in World War II, the Koreans were progressively stripped away of their previous imperial citizenship and continued to be subjected to economic destitution and social discrimination. For instance, the Zai (在) included in the term used to denote Koreans in Japan, Zainichi Kankokujin (在日韓国人) or Zainichi Chosenjin (在日朝鮮人), “implies ‘temporary’ residence.”^[4] This means that Zainichi have been viewed as ‘non-Japanese’ and considered differently by the Japanese majority.⁵ The Zainichi Koreans were also legally classified as resident aliens, keeping them as “strangers in their native land.”⁶

The division of their homeland by Soviet and US forces also led to the ideological division of Korean society in Japan, between the DPRK-oriented General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, or Chongryon (在日本朝鮮人総聯合会), and the ROK-supported Korean Residents Union in Japan, or Mindan (在日本大韓民国民団). The two Korean governments used the Zainichi Koreans to compete against each other and to gain legitimacy as the true representative government in Korea. Without protection from the Japanese or the two Korean governments, this left the Zainichi Koreans vulnerable to discriminatory violence from some Japanese individuals.^[5] 

The advent of globalization within the last three decades brought about a massive exchange of people between faraway places. Japan is no exception to this global trend.^[6] With increasing immigration of Chinese, Indonesian, Filipino and Nikkeijin (日系人, foreigners of Japanese descent) workers, Japan has been slowly turning into a multicultural society (多文化社会, Ta bunka shakai). This “growing awareness of multi-ethnic Japan renders the recognition of Zainichi increasingly mainstream.”^[7] Indeed, numerous Zainichi Koreans have come to the forefront of Japanese society, including Masayoshi Son (손정의,^[8] 孫 正義), the founder and CEO of telecommunications company SoftBank. It thus begs the question: how did the Zainichi identity shift over time, which factors contributed to their higher social standing in Japan today, and what does that mean for greater Japanese society?

To explore these questions, this paper will first examine how the Zainichi identity was formed by delving into the historic background of Korean arrival in Japan, the social and legal discrimination against Zainichi Koreans pre- and post-World War II, and their subsequent isolation within Japanese society. It will then trace how both external factors and internal efforts led to greater acceptance of Zainichi Koreans by the Japanese people. Based on the data and the presented interviews, the paper will argue that the current Zainichi Koreans have created an independent Zainichi identity, not bound to a specific nation-state but situated within the mainstream Japanese society. It will then inquire into the opportunities and challenges the Zainichi Koreans present within a multicultural Japanese society. 

Historical Background

 The Japanese annexation of the Korean Empire in 1910 began a gradual influx of Koreans into Japan, where they were treated poorly. In the 1910s, most migrants were students who wished to “receive Japan’s modern education.”^[9]The labor shortage in the Japanese economy in the 1920s encouraged Koreans seeking better employment prospects to migrate to Japan, leading to a “rapid expansion of the ethnic Korean population in the main Japanese islands.”^[10] The majority of Korean workers became involved in “manual and menial work” such as construction work and mining, since most were “poorly educated and illiterate,” sharing jobs with social outcasts like Burakumin and Okinawans. Koreans usually received lower wages than the Japanese did and lived in “ghettoes because of poverty and discrimination.”^[11]Full-fledged discrimination induced the massacre of Koreans after the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. Japanese vigilantes murdered and raped innocent Koreans, swayed by rumours that Koreans were poisoning water wells, committing arson, and pillaging Japanese households, while the Japanese government turned a blind eye. Professor Sonia Ryang describes the extent of violence, comparing it to that suffered by African Americans under Jim Crow Laws:

Perhaps the worst moment for anyone to be a Korean in Japan came in 1923 in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake, when [a] pogrom-like hunt for Koreans spread across the scorched lands of Tokyo and its vicinity. Like the black bodies hanging from those southern trees, Korean bodies were on display without eyeballs, without nose, without breasts, their thighs and arms covered with lacerations and with very little skin surface intact.¹²

The beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 led to the enforced migration of Koreans. The Japanese government brought 700,000-800,000 Koreans to work in factories and mines and conscripted 200,000 Koreans into the Japanese military.¹³ The number of Koreans in Japan increased from 2,246 in 1910 to 300,000 in 1930 and 2 million in 1945.¹⁴

The Japanese defeat in World War II ended colonial rule but perpetuated the legal and social discrimination against Zainichi Koreans, forcing them to live impoverished lives. While most Koreans returned to Korea, “some 600,000 ethnic Koreans remained in Japan,” for they had achieved viable livelihoods, had married ethnic Japanese, or were “weary of the unrest and poverty in the Korean peninsula.”¹⁵ The Japanese government, however, considered Zainichi Koreans as foreigners. Theoretically speaking, the colonial hierarchy and postcolonial legacy transformed Zainichi Koreans into objects of “enmity and rejection” or of “hatred, denial of voting rights, and decline in social status.”¹⁶ They were stripped of their voting rights in 1945, relegated to alien status in 1947 through the Alien Registration Law, and were rendered stateless in 1952 after the Treaty of San Francisco.¹⁷ Moreover, Koreans were barred from employment in the public sector such as the railway and postal service, excluded from most social welfare services, and faced stronger discrimination from employment in the private sector.¹⁸ Zainichi Koreans were thus compelled to engage in “illegal or marginal economic activities such as illegal alcohol production, scrap recycling, and racketeering.”¹⁹ Under abject poverty with a low level of education and dismal living conditions, “deprived of their civil rights” and stable residential status, “Koreans hovered on the edges of Japanese society.”²⁰

 The competition between North and South Korea fractured the Zainichi community and complicated their identity. In the 1950s, Chongryon commanded the support of the majority of Zainichi Koreans by providing loans for ethnic Korean businesses and Korean language and culture education to Zainichi.²¹ Motivated by the desire to return to Korea and “the promise of paradise,” Chongryon launched a repatriation project, in which over 90,000 ethnic Koreans migrated to North Korea from 1959 to the 1970s.²² This was motivated by “perilous memories of a colonial past, as well as the abject living conditions and complete disenfranchisement from Japanese civic life.”²³ This trend was disrupted in 1965 with the normalization of diplomatic relationship between South Korea and Japan, which allowed Zainichi Koreans to obtain South Korean citizenship and receive permanent resident status from Japan, whose advantages included “freedom to travel and access to Japanese medical and welfare benefits.”²⁴ However, the South Korean government demanded that Zainichi who register as foreigners in Japan use the label of Kankoku (韓国), not Chosen (朝鮮).²⁵ Coupled with the fact that North Korea proclaimed anyone with the citizenship of “Chosen” to be North Korean citizens, the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea changed the meaning of the term “Chosen,” which used to mean imagined but reunified Korean peninsula.²⁶

At the same time, naturalization became considered taboo among Zainichi Koreans. The Japanese government advocated possessing Japanese citizenship to mean assuming Japanese ethnicity as well. Becoming Japanese further meant accepting the Japanese system of household registration (koseki), giving up the Korean system of lineage registry (jokbo), and adopting Japanese-sounding names.²⁷ For Zainichi who suffered colonial and historical discrimination at the hands of Japanese, these conditions were unacceptable and tantamount to “national betrayal” or treason.²⁸ This effectively set up a frameworkof “Chosen-seki (朝鮮籍)²⁹ =North Korea,” “Kankoku-seki (韓国籍)³⁰ =South Korea,”and “Nihon-seki (日本籍) =Traitor.” ³¹ The Zainichi became more isolated, shunning intermarriage between Koreans and Japanese people and resisting naturalization.³²

Towards Greater Integration

Fed up with systemic discrimination, Zainichi Koreans began to organise themselves to resist it. The second or third generations of Zainichi Koreans especially were frustrated that in spite of having been born in Japan and grown up under Japanese culture, they still experienced discrimination, exclusion, and violence.³³ Mobilisation began in 1970 with the Hitachi Case, in which Chong Sok Pak, a Zainichi Korean, sued Hitachi, one of Japan’s conglomerates. Pak had passed the company exam using his Japanese-sounding alias, but Hitachi withdrew its offer after discovering that Pak was Zainichi, openly stating that “We cannot hire a Korean.”³⁴ A group of Zainichi Koreans and Japanese supported Pak and condemned Hitachi, which argued in court that Pak “had falsified his resume by using a ‘false name.’”³⁵ After four years of trial, the Yokohama District Court ruled in favour of Pak:

The plaintiff wrote his alias in order to appear as if he were Japanese, but the motive that led to this fabrication deserves extraordinary sympathy on many points in light of the historical and social background of Koreans including the plaintiff as explained above, and in light of the reality that Koreans living in Japan are refused employment, particularly by big Japanese companies – except with special exceptions – for the sole reason that they are Korean.³⁶

The court’s sympathetic attitude towards Zainichi Koreans opened the way for a Zainichi civil rights movement. In 1977, the Japanese court struck down a clause which dictated that only Japanese citizens could become lawyers. In the 1980s, Chongsok Han, a Zainichi Tokyo resident, began the anti-fingerprinting movement, contending that “forced fingerprinting during alien registration was a violation of human rights and dignity” and wishing to “create a society that recognizes Zainichis as equal members of Japanese society.”³⁷ Zainichi Koreans refused to be fingerprinted despite threats of arrest, and more and more Japanese citizens began to recognize the discrimination Zainichi faced. Pressured by the Zainichi campaign, Japanese supporters, and the international community, the Japanese government eliminated the forced fingerprinting in 1993. The campaign to be recognised in public life continued in the 1990s with the inclusion of Zainichi in civil service positions and the expansion of local suffrage to Zainichi Koreans.³⁸ The Zainichi civil rights movement not only established the Zainichi’s own identity but also can be considered as part of their effort to live convivially with the Japanese.³⁹

 This internal mobilised resistance to discrimination was accompanied by the support of external events. The Japanese ratification of the International Covenants for Human Rights and UN Refugee Convention in the early 1980s required that Japan provide permanent resident status to Zainichi Koreans without South Korean citizenship.⁴⁰ They gained permanent residency in 1981 with the ability to easily acquire re-entry permits.⁴¹ In 1985, the Japanese citizenship law was amended so that children with Japanese mothers could also obtain Japanese citizenship; previously, only children with Japanese fathers were eligible for Japanese citizenship, per the 1950 law.⁴² This meant that half-Zainichi children with Japanese mothers could receive Japanese citizenship too. At the same time, Lie observes that the 1988 Seoul Olympics and 2002 World Cup positively changed the Japanese attitude about South Korea and that thus “occurred in tandem with the decline of ethnic discrimination.”⁴³ The gradual decrease in the influence of ethnic discrimination and the increase in ethnic recognition through the Zainichi civil rights movement and favourable external events brought the Zainichi closer to the main Japanese cultural and social life. 

Zainichi Today

Statistics shows that the Zainichi are becoming more assimilated into mainstream Japanese society. The number of Koreans living in Japan has decreased recently. In particular, the number of special residents, i.e. Zainichi Koreans, decreased from 471,756 in 2003 to 377,350 in 2012.⁴⁴ This can be attributed to the increasing number of Zainichi choosing to naturalize as Japanese nationals – 10,000 per year – and increasing rate of marriages between Zainichis and Japanese.⁴⁵ These trends are the opposite of phenomena observed until the 1960s with intermarriage shunned and naturalization viewed as taboo. They may also imply that Zainichi with Chosen-seki or Kankoku-seki citizenships will continue to decrease in number as time passes and become assimilated as Japanese citizens.⁴⁶

What is causing such assimilation of the Zainichi as Japanese citizens? An emerging, independent Zainichi identity may be encouraging Zainichi’s faster integration into Japanese society. The first facet of this new Zainichi identity is the recognition of their Korean roots. Hyun-Sun Kim, a sociologist focusing on the lives of Korean immigrants,conducted interviews with six second and third generation Zainichi Koreans living in Osaka from 2007 to 2008. Kim reveals that many of them felt “burdened” or “guilty” by using their Japanese alias instead of their Korean name.⁴⁷Myeong-Sun Park (朴明順) testifies that she “did not like living as a Japanese person” hiding her Korean ethnic identity, even though she hid her Korean roots because of the discrimination she would be subject to, an action she attributes to her “lack of ethnic character.”⁴⁸ Hae-Suk Bae (裵解淑) always questioned why she should continue using her Japanese alias even though she is Korean.⁴⁹ While living as Zainichi is difficult, using their Korean name clarifies their identity and autonomously raises their self-esteem.⁵⁰

The second facet of this emerging Zainichi identity is the co-existence of resistance (抵抗, teiko) against Japanese discrimination and symbiosis (共生, kyosei) between Zainichi Koreans and Japanese people. In a survey conducted in 2012 for 216 Zainichi Koreans living in the Kansai region in their 20s to 40s, 61% replied that Japan hurt Koreans the most throughout history, but 71% replied that “one should forgive but not forget” the painful history with Japan.⁵¹ This implies that while the younger generation of Zainichi Koreans are critical towards how Japan tried to eliminate Korean identity in the past, they are not willing to completely erase their Japanese identity. Moreover, Jong-Gon Kim, a proffessor at Konkuk University in Seoul who focueses on the identity of Zainichi Koreans, conducted interviews in 2014 with six young Zainichi Koreans living in Kansai region reveals that the majority of young Zainichi cannot accept hostility towards Japan and want to be part of Japanese society.⁵²

The final aspect of the new Zainichi identity is the flexibility of nationality. This is in contrast to the past when the nationality one held determined one’s allegiance to a particular nation, as seen with the earlier rigid framework of “Chosen-seki vs. Kankoku-seki vs. Nihon-seki.” Jong-Gon Kim points out that many Zainichi Koreans do not speak the Korean language or know Korean culture well.⁵³ Just because one’s passport is South Korean does not mean that they are considered Korean; the derogative term “banjjokbari” (쪽발이) alludes to the discrimination against Zainichi by Korean compatriots.⁵⁴ But it is this discrimination and exclusion due to the difference between Zainichi Koreans and peninsular Koreans that make Zainichi Koreans realize that nationality cannot convey their identity, leading them to think that “defining one’s identity by one’s nationality is unfair.”⁵⁵ Furthermore, for the newer generations of Zainichi Koreans, nationality is becoming more of a choice: one can thus choose nationality according to need and can also change it.⁵⁶

Opportunities and Challenges

What does this evolution of new Zainichi identity mean for Zainichi Koreans and a burgeoning multicultural Japanese society? Lie presents a positive outlook by stating that more Japanese people seek “mutual recognition and reconciliation” under the banner of conviviality (kyosei), and that modern Zainichi Korean identity and multicultural society “suggest one possible outcome” of Zainichi’s century-long struggle.⁵⁷ Moreover, the way Zainichi Koreans integrate into the mainstream Japanese society with pride in their Korean heritage may provide guidance for newer incoming minorities in Japan, such as the Nikkeijin, the Chinese, and South East Asian migrant workers, to cement the blooming multicultural Japanese society. 

However, the claim that there is no longer discrimination against Zainichi Koreans in Japan seems untenable. Moon and Aoki qualify that the instability of employment and the precarity from dissolution of traditional families and communities are fuelling “historical revisionism” and are provoking increasing instances of hate speech against Koreans and Zainichi Koreans.⁵⁸ Indeed, far-right groups like Zaitokukai (Association of Citizens against the Special Privileges of the Zainichi) frequently stage violent anti-Zainichi protests in Korean-majority neighbourhoods.⁵⁹ In the aforementioned survey of Kansai Zainichi Koreans, 66% of them have had experiences with discrimination. In addition, the development of the new Zainichi identity brings about a rift between the older and younger Zainichi generations. For instance, in Toichi Nakata’s 1994 documentary Osaka Story, Nakata’s Zainichi father disowns Nakata’s sister for marrying a Japanese man because the father felt that “Koreans and Japanese are different.”⁶⁰ How members of the older Zainichi generation can reconcile their past experiences with discrimination and the evolution of new Zainichi identity is yet to be seen. Thus, will the new Zainichi identity survive? Professor Sonia Ryang predicts:

Whether such a figure is able to retain his/her heritage with pride remains to be seen: the answer will hinge on the possibility of multicultural tolerance and acceptance on the part of Japanese society, resilience of Koreans in Japan, and taken together, possibility of coexistence of different peoples that were once unequivocally superior and inferior, the master and the subjugated.⁶¹

Conclusion

Zainichi Koreans have suffered systemic discrimination and violence since their first arrival a century ago. Until the 1960s, continued discrimination and exclusion from public life isolated the Zainichi community. Competition between North and South Korea complicated their identity and made the Zainichi more closed-off. However, the civil rights campaigns of the 1970s to 1990s and external events decreased instances of discrimination against Zainichi Koreans. Now, unlike in previous years, Zainichi are no longer bound by nationality, do recognise their Korean roots, and wish to succeed in the mainstream Japanese society. Whether this success can be sustained depends on multicultural tolerance of Japanese people and the perseverance of Zainichi Koreans, and for other minority groups in Japan, the impact of the Zainichi case remains to be seen. 

Works Cited

Fukuoka, Yasunori. “Introduction: ‘Japanese’ and ‘Non-Japanese’.” In Lives of Young Koreans in Japan, 1-12. Melbourne, Australia: Trans Pacific Press, 2000.

“Jjok-bari.” (쪽발이) Standard Korean Language Dictionary. Accessed December 6, 2017. http://krdic.naver.com/detail.nhn?docid=36450500.

Kim, Hyun-Sun. “An Analysis of Nationality and Identity of Koreans in Japan.” (국적과 재일 코리안의 정체성) Economy and Society 83 (2009): 313-341.

Kim, Jong Gon. “A Third-Generation Koreans-in-Japan’s Identity and Value-Oriented.” (재일’ & ‘조선인’으로서의 정체성과 가치지향성) The Journal of the Humanities for Unification 59 (2014): 31-57.

Lie, John. “Zainichi: The Korean Disaspora in Japan.” Education about Asia 14, no. 2 (2009): 16-21.

Moon, Gyeong-Su and Yoshiyuki Aoki. “Zainichi: Three Homelands and Three Eras.” (자이니치, 3개의 조국 그리고 3개의 시대) Shilcheon Munhak, August 2015.

Moon, Rennie. “Koreans in Japan.” Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education. Accessed November 16, 2017. http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/koreans_in_japan.

Nakata, Toichi, dir. Osaka Story. 1994; Beaconsfield, UK: National Film and Television School, 1995. DVD.

Okunuki, Hifumi. “Forty Years after Zainichi Labor Case Victory, Is Japan Turning Back the Clock?” The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan), Jan. 21, 2015. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2015/01/21/issues/forty-years-zainichi-labor-case-victory-japan-turning-back-clock/#.Wg2hFWjWw2x.

Ra, Gyeong-Su. “The Multiculturalism of Japan and Current State of Zainichi.” (일본의 다문화와 자이니치의 현재) Research Group for Global Korean Business and Culture 35 (2010): 75-85. Accessed November 16, 2017. http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE02089848

Ryang, Sonia. “The Rise and Fall of Chongryun—From Chōsenjin to Zainichi and beyond.” The Asia-Pacific Journal 14, no. 15 (2016): 1-16.

Son, Seung-Cheol. “Kidnapped Koreans during Imjin War.” (임진왜란피로인, 壬辰倭亂捕虜人) Encyclopedia of Korean Culture. Last modified January 22, 2015. http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Index.

Thorp, Vivien Kim. “February Issue: I am Zainichi.” KoreAm, February 2012. http://kore.am/february-issue-i-am-zainichi/

Yi, Ji-Ho. “Examining the Identity of Counter-Protesters against Anti-Korean Movement in Japan.” (일본의 反혐한 시위대, 그들의 정체를 알아보니..) The Chosun Ilbo (Seoul, Korea), Oct. 7, 2013. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/10/07/2013100701540.html?Dep0=twitter&d=2013100701540.

Yoo, Hyuck Soo. “Struggles and Challenges of the Zainichi Korean/Chosen Society: Focusing on the Relations between “Old” and “New” Comers.” (재일한국/조선인 사회의 갈등과 과제) Korean Journal of Japanese Studies 10 (2014): 308-329.

References

^[1] John Lie, “Zainichi: The Korean Disaspora in Japan.” Education about Asia 14, no. 2 (2009): 18.

^[2] Yasunori Fukuoka, “Introduction: ‘Japanese’ and ‘Non-Japanese’,” in Lives of Young Koreans in Japan, (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2000), 2.

^[3] Seung-Cheol Son, “Kidnapped Koreans during Imjin War,” (임진왜란피로인, 壬辰倭亂捕虜人) Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, last modified January 22, 2015, http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Index. Son notes that Japanese and Korean scholars disagree on the number of Koreans Japanese military kidnapped, from 20,000 to 400,000. 

^[4] Ibid., 12.

⁵ Lie, “Zainichi,” 16. Lie explains that while the term Zainichi “can refer to non-Koreans,” it “has become synonymous with the ethnic Korean population in Japan.” This paper will use both Zainichi and Zainichi Koreans interchangeably throughout. 

⁶ Vivien Kim Thorp, “February Issue: I am Zainichi,” KoreAm, February 2012, http://kore.am/february-issue-i-am-zainichi/

^[5] Jong Gon Kim, “A Third-Generation Koreans-in-Japan’s Identity and Value-Oriented,” (재일’ & ‘조선인’으로서의 정체성과 가치지향성) The Journal of the Humanities for Unification 59 (2014): 53. 

^[6] Gyeong-Su Ra, “The Multiculturalism of Japan and Current State of Zainichi,” (일본의 다문화와 자이니치의 현재) Research Group for Global Korean Business and Culture 35 (2010): 75, accessed November 16, 2017. http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE02089848.

^[7] Lie, “Zainichi,” 21. 

^[8] These are the Korean characters for Masayoshi Son’s Korean name, Son Jeong-ui. 

^[9] Ra, “The Multiculturalism,” 77.

^[10] Lie, “Zainichi,” 16.

^[11] Rennie Moon, “Koreans in Japan,” Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education, accessed November 16, 2017, http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/koreans_in_japan; Fukuoka, “Introduction,” 1. Burakumin are the “descendants of people defined as outcastes during the feudal Middle Ages.” They worked as executioners, butchers, and tanners: occupations that were considered impure. Burakumin were thus ostracized from the mainstream society and lived in enclaves;  Moon, “Koreans in Japan.”

¹² Sonia Ryang, “The Rise and Fall of Chongryun—From Chōsenjin to Zainichi and beyond,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 14, no. 15 (2016): 1. 

¹³ Moon, “Koreans in Japan.”

¹⁴ Ra, “The Multiculturalism,” 77. 

¹⁵ Lie, “Zainichi,” 16.

¹⁶ JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 37.

¹⁷ Moon, “Koreans in Japan.”

¹⁸ Gyeong-Su Moon and Yoshiyuki Aoki. “Zainichi: Three Homelands and Three Eras,” (자이니치, 3개의 조국 그리고 3개의 시대) Shilcheon Munhak, August 2015, 329.

¹⁹ Moon, “Koreans in Japan.”

²⁰ Ryang, “The Rise,” 7.

²¹ Lie, “Zainichi,” 16.

²² Ibid., 17; Ryang, “The Rise,” 7.

²³ Ibid., 8.

²⁴ Moon, “Koreans in Japan.”

²⁵ JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 44.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Lie, “Zainichi,” 18.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Chosen-seki (朝鮮籍). The Japanese government assigns this nationality to Zainichi Koreans who have neither Japanese nor South Korean citizenship.

³⁰ Kankoku-seki (韓国籍). This denotes South Korean citizenship.

³¹ Nihon-seki (日本籍). This denotes Japanese citizenship; JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 34.

³² Lie, “Zainichi,” 19.

³³ JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 38.

³⁴ Hifumi Okunuki, “Forty Years after Zainichi Labor Case Victory, Is Japan Turning Back the Clock?” The Japan Times (Tokyo, Japan), Jan. 21, 2015, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2015/01/21/issues/forty-years-zainichi-labor-case-victory-japan-turning-back-clock/#.Wg2hFWjWw2x.

³⁵ Ra, “The Multiculturalism,” 80; Okunuki, “Forty Years.”

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ra, “The Multiculturalism,” 80. Prior to the 1990s, Japanese alien registration law required Zainichi Koreans to be fingerprinted during alien registration; Lie, “Zainichi,” 20

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ra, “The Multiculturalism,” 80. 

⁴⁰ Ryang, “The Rise,” 8.

⁴¹ Ibid. 

⁴² Hyun-Sun Kim, “An Analysis of Nationality and Identity of Koreans in Japan,” (국적과 재일 코리안의 정체성) Economy and Society 83 (2009): 321.

⁴³ Lie, “Zainichi,” 20.

⁴⁴ H-S Kim, “An Analysis,” 320; Hyuck Soo Yoo, “Struggles and Challenges of the Zainichi Korean/Chosen Society: Focusing on the Relations between “Old” and “New” Comers,” (재일한국/조선인 사회의 갈등과 과제) Korean Journal of Japanese Studies 10 (2014): 312.

⁴⁵ H-S Kim, “An Analysis,” 321-322.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 329. It is difficult to estimate the proportion of Zainichi Koreans who opt to use Korean names. Using Korean names in public is still stigmatised, and it takes a lot of personal courage for individual Zainichi Koreans to ‘come out’ and start using their Korean names.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 327.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 328.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 329.

⁵¹ JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 40. 

⁵² Ibid., 41.

⁵³ Ibid., 47. 

⁵⁴ “Jjok-bari,” (쪽발이) Standard Korean Language Dictionary, accessed December 6, 2017, http://krdic.naver.com/detail.nhn?docid=36450500. “Ban” means half (半) while “jjokbari” is the Korean derogatory term for Japanese people. “Jjokbari” roughly translates to ‘split feet,’ which refers to the fact that the Japanese people traditionally wore the geta, which are wooden sandals that separate the big toe from other toes, akin to modern day flip-flops; JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 47.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 48. 

⁵⁶ H-S Kim, “An Analysis,” 338; JG Kim, “A Third Generation,” 49.

⁵⁷ Lie, “Zainichi,” 21. 

⁵⁸ Moon and Aoki, “Zainichi: Three,” 336. 

⁵⁹ Ji-Ho Yi, “Examining the Identity of Counter-Protesters against Anti-Korean Movement in Japan,” (일본의 反혐한 시위대, 그들의 정체를 알아보니..) The Chosun Ilbo (Seoul, Korea), Oct. 7, 2013. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/10/07/2013100701540.html?Dep0=twitter&d=2013100701540. 

⁶⁰ Osaka Story, directed by Toichi Nakata (1994; Beaconsfield, UK: National Film and Television School, 1995), DVD.

⁶¹ Ryang, “The Rise,” 14. 

To understand the gravity of the current situation, one must first look into the origins of China’s willingness to export advanced defense products to its Southern neighbors. Beginning in 2012, with the transfer of Ming-Class submarines to Bangladesh, arms sales rapidly expanded to include Pakistan and Myanmar within a decade. In addition to the export of diesel-electric submarines and frigates, China has also engaged in construction projects to help these nations support their newly acquired assets. These include submarine bases in Myanmar and Bangladesh, building a very low frequency (VLF) communications facility in Pakistan, and refitting Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KS&EW) in Pakistan. All of these efforts are critical to the operation of the strategic submarine force. They are also constructed to Chinese military standards. 

Some would argue that China is merely engaging in the international arms market, it is in reality another effort to exploit developing nations and further destabilize the region. The Chinese government has proved adept over the last semicentury at leveraging the country’s manufacturing capabilities to gain global influence. However, while overpriced railways to nowhere in Africa are of little concern to the United States, dual-use naval warfare facilities absolutely are. 

As of writing this, all vessels and facilities remain in the hands of their respective states. However, it is clear that these investments were just as much for Chinese gain as they were for their present operators. It can be no coincidence that the Myanmar base is located near India’s Rambilli nuclear submarine base, or that the VLF technology is identical to those that China uses to control its own submarines.  In the event of a conflict (or even gray zone operation), it would be easy for the Chinese to assume control of these facilities given their long tradition of weaponizing infrastructure projects. This could come in many forms: piggybacking off the Pakistani VLF facility, refusing entry to American ships at Burmese ports, or refitting their own submarine fleet at KS&EW. One thing is certain- these investments will put a massive strain on the ability of the United States and its regional allies to operate in the Indian Ocean. 

This is a massive problem because the Indian Ocean is essential to being able to prevail in a conflict with China. Currently, even with new bases, Chinese merchant vessels would find themselves vulnerable to interdiction. And with China being heavily export dependent such a move could cripple their economy. The Chinese government knows this and it has been one of its biggest motivations for expansion in the region. In order to counter these efforts, the United States must undertake the bureaucratically burdensome but practically possible task of defining a focus and pursuing a long-term strategy in the Indian Ocean––something we sorely lack. Additionally, to stem the tide of malicious investment coming from Beijing by leveraging existing institutions like the Development Finance Corporation and our dynamic private industrial base to compete toe-to-toe with Chinese firms who are often the only option for developing nations. Finally, there needs to be continued consequences for the authoritarian military governments in South Asia that choose to do business with China and an emphasis on the dangers of utilizing BRI funding. 

With tension rising in the Indo-Pacific seemingly daily, it is increasingly important for the United States to recognize, address, and contest the dual-use investment undertaken by the People’s Republic of China in South Asia. Recognizing the existential threat to freedom of navigation and setting an actionable policy will demonstrate a commitment to our allies in the region. Simply offering alternatives to Chinese investment in developing countries would convey a desire to cooperate with governments that believe in preserving global stability. The United States needs to pay attention to the Indian Ocean. With the region’s growing importance, it is an area in which we cannot afford a policy failure. 

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Chinese PLA Navy Sailors, taken on Sep 6, 2006, Photo by Joe Kane | Image sourced from NARA & DVIDS Public Domain Archive | CC License, no changes made

Conservatives and Reformists

Conservatives adhere to the ideological tenets of the Islamic Revolution. Pragmatic conservatives adhere to conservative principles but favor practical social and cultural reforms over ideological fervor. They also advocate for economic deregulation. The reformists represent the ideological left within the Iranian political system. They advocate for economic openness, liberalization, and rapprochement with the West (Mohebali 2016). However, regarding Middle Eastern interactions, reformers seek closer relations with other Middle Eastern countries. The significant principles of the republic are the same for both conservatives and reformists, but reformers are more open to using dialogues and negotiations. They also push to ease tensions and engage in regional cooperation. For instance, Rezaei (2017) demonstrated that the Dialogue of Civilizations by President Khatami (1997-2005), who was considered the godfather of the reformers, offered a complementary vision for a renewed commencement in Iran’s strained relations with the Middle East (Rezaei 2017). Additionally, the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) alleviated tensions with Western powers and diminished regional discord by indicating Iran’s readiness for peaceful negotiations, thus indirectly enhancing relations with neighboring countries such as Oman and Iraq (Javed and Ismail 2017). During this deal, Hassan Rouhani, another reformist, was the president of the Islamic republic. 

Reformists and Iraq

Historically, Iranian reformists have maintained distinct relationships with Iraqi parties, politicians, and groups, in contrast to those of the conservatives. In a recent interview, Alyasiri stated “Reformists in Iraq align more closely with moderate political forces. These forces are, to some extent, recognized and accepted by Western superpowers” (Alyasiry 2024). Conversely, the conservatives maintain closer ties with right-wing Iraqi powers that the West does not favor. The moderate powers in Iraq seek the stability of the country, recalling resolving conflicts through discussions. So, this Iranian-Iraqi moderate power could be a privilege for Iran to evaluate and reform its regional picture.

Reformist and The Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine)

As mentioned before, Iran’s major principles remain the same every time reformers take control. By way of illustration, Iran extended military and financial assistance to Hezbollah as a component of its plan to mitigate Israeli influence in the area during all reformist presidential periods (Rezaei 2017). Nevertheless, they have tried to maintain a new shape of interaction built on discussions and alliances. In May 2003, a memorandum of understanding about the potential establishment of a free trade area between the two countries was signed during Khatami’s visit to Damascus (Risseeuw 2018). Such agreements were established during reformers’ periods, which could explain their philosophy of how to deal with these countries.

Reformists and the GCC

Similarly, reformers have worked towards cooperation with GCC countries. In 1998, Khatami’s visit to Saudi Arabia represented a pivotal advancement in bilateral relations. This resulted in the 1999 Saudi-Iranian security accord, which aimed to mitigate terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime (Rezaei 2017). He also, through diplomatic efforts, tried to bridge differences between Iran and other Gulf countries like the UAE (Momeni 2021). In the same vein, nuclear diplomacy, GCC concerns, and the Hormoz peace initiative during Rouhani’s administration are good examples of reformist cooperative policy. 

Pezeshkian’s international stances and views before the presidency

Pezeshkian, like all reformists, does not debate the fundamental principles of the republic. In April 2019, when he was a parliament member, he denounced the Trump administration’s designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization (Alef 2019). In June 2019, he stated that “the IRGC has dealt a strong punch to the mouths of the United States with what it did in shooting down a highly advanced American drone in the Persian Gulf” (Alef 2019). However, we can infer that he is not internally in favor of the IRGC according to his statement later in June 2024 when he said, while wearing an IRGC uniform, “The IRCG is different from what we saw now” (Eslahatnews 2024). He criticized the Iranian government several times. In 2009, in a speech, he criticized the way that the government treated protesters by quoting Imam Ali, the first Imam of the Shia, “Do not kill people like animals” (Mehrabi 2024). Such stances could offer a clear understanding of Pezeshkian’s belief in the Iranian regime. On the international scale, during his election campaign, he underscored the reestablishment of diplomatic engagements with the West, the restoration of the JCPOA, and initiatives to alleviate sanctions. Pezeshkian contended, “With sanctions, one can perhaps survive, but one cannot progress.” He emphasized the necessity of de-escalating tensions with the West: “We seek good relations with Europe based on mutual respect and equality. The lack of political relations with the United States should not lead to costly tensions and conflict” (Azizi 2024). Furthermore, in his first electoral debate on June 25, 2024, He emphasized the significance of cultivating robust partnerships with neighboring nations as a fundamental aspect of his foreign policy. He also asserted that enhancing relations with neighboring countries is essential for regional stability and prosperity (PressTV 2024).

President Masoud Pezeshkian 

During his first official press conference, Pezeshkian said, “We are brothers with the Americans as well” (Radio Free Europe 2024). Although he asserted that this brotherhood depends on the Americans’ will to seek peace with Iran, his statement shocked many. Once Pezeshkian was elected, he started to move with his and the reformists’ philosophy. On September 10, he visited Iraq. He met with prominent Iraqi officials, including the Iraqi president Abdul Latif Rashid and the prime minister Mohammed Shia’ Alsudani. He also met with the Iraqi political parties’ leaders in the meeting hosted by Sayed Ammar Alhakim, president of the Al-Hikma National Movement, on September 11. In these meetings, he illustrated the importance of Iraq as a significant player in the region in the sense of regional interactions. He also stated, “Iraq remains a strategic priority for Iran.” As a result of this dialogue, Iraq and Iran signed agreements covering areas such as economic cooperation, infrastructure development, education, and security collaboration (ISPI 2024). In his address at the 79^th United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 2024, he expressed a willingness to reopen nuclear negotiations, which could represent a change in Iran’s diplomatic posture (AP News 2024). On the other hand, he denounced Israel’s military operations in Gaza and Lebanon as “atrocities.” He urged the reevaluation of regional strategies and underscored the necessity of sanctions relief while also advocating for the acknowledgment of Iran’s security concerns (AP News 2024). Additionally, the Arab neighbors of Iran are still skeptical about the new president’s capacity to moderate Iran’s foreign policy, particularly its support for militant factions throughout the Middle East. He also mentioned “Iran has consistently sought to improve relations with its Arab neighbors” (Haghirian 2024). 

Forecasting the future

According to Kamrava, it is probable that Iran will continue to develop its political and economic relations, and potentially even its security cooperation, with its neighbors. Raisi’s “Look East” policy and good neighborly relations have thus far succeeded in accomplishing several of their stated objectives (Kamrava 2024). In addition, the agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Iran and Egypt during Raisi’s era, despite the development in Iran’s relations with Qatar since 2017, can serve as a solid and fundamental base from which Pezeshkian can launch to create better relations. Furthermore, in the aftermath of Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination, officials from the GCC and Iran participated in multiple phone calls and bilateral consultations, including an emergency summit in August (Haghirian 2024). The recent stance of Saudi Arabia by crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman who stated “the Kingdom will not cease its diligent efforts to establish an independent Palestinian state” could strengthen the Iran-Saudi deal (Asem 2024). As a result, the Gaza crisis could be another important element to forging closer relations between some Arab countries and Iran.

Pezeshkian and Iraq 

Pezeshkian will be inclined towards moderate political forces in Iraq. This inclination will help to increase the level of stability in Iraq because these forces are more discussable. That would also give Iran more opportunities to enhance its relations with other Western and MENA countries by mediating these powers, such as the meditation of Alhakeem between Iran and Egypt during the Raisi era. 

Economy under Pezeshkian’s administration 

Pezeshkian is aware that one of his most important goals is economic recovery. He is seeking new economic cooperation with GCC countries, Turkey, China, and even the United States. In his first debate, he emphasized the necessity of economic cooperation with neighboring countries, suggesting that shared economic interests may underpin enhanced diplomatic relations (PressTV 2024). Presumably, he will manage good economic cooperation with GCC countries and other countries around the world. The American sanctions will remain, which could be a significant challenge for achieving his economic recovery goal.

Pezeshkian and Israel

Pursuing anti-Israel policies is one of Pezeshkian’s most fundamental principles. Regardless of what he really believes, he will likely remain committed to supporting this Islamic cause, providing assistance to Gaza, Lebanon, and others affected by the Israeli presence in the region, whether through humanitarian, economic, political, or even military means, according to Iran’s vision of support. Iran’s relationship with Israel is a hindrance in its evolving relations with many countries. 

Cultural impact under Pezeshkian administration

In all likelihood, Pezeshkian will try to spread cultural influence across different countries in the region. In this way, he will tie the regional public mind together. This could be reflected in the political interactions. He will also try to enhance the diplomatic envoys of Iran, giving them more space regardless of the former governments that depended on specific non-diplomatic actors to build Iran’s regional relations.

In conclusion, Iran’s presidential election resulted in the victory of reformer Masoud Pezeshkian, signifying a new phase in foreign relations. Reformists, embodying the intellectual left in the Iranian political framework, champion economic openness, liberalization, and reconciliation with the West. Reformers are more open to dialogues and negotiations, aiming to ease tensions and engage in regional cooperation. Iran’s reformists have maintained distinct relationships with Iraqi parties, politicians, and groups while maintaining ties with moderate political powers in the Levant. They have also built new cooperation with the GCC countries. However, Masoud Pezeshkian has criticized the Iranian regime and the IRGC but has also emphasized the importance of diplomatic engagements with the West and the restoration of the JCPOA. He has visited Iraq, signed agreements, and expressed a willingness to reopen nuclear negotiations. Pezeshkian has also urged the reevaluation of regional strategies and sanctions relief while acknowledging Iran’s security concerns. However, Arab neighbors of Iran remain skeptical about his ability to moderate Iran’s foreign policy, particularly its support for militant factions. Under Pezeshkian’s administration, Iran is expected to continue developing its political, economic, and security relations with its neighbors, as demonstrated by Raisi’s “Look East” policy and agreements with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Gaza crisis could also be a key factor in tying Arab countries with Iran. He also aims for economic recovery and seeks new economic cooperation with GCC countries, Turkey, China, and the US. He believes that shared economic interests can enhance diplomatic relations, but American sanctions may pose a challenge. Additionally, Pezeshkian will focus on supporting the Islamic cause and supporting Gaza and Lebanon, which could hinder Iran’s evaluation of relations with many countries. His cultural impact is likely to spread Iranian influence across different countries in the region, tying regional populations together and improving diplomatic ties. This could be reflected in political interactions and the expansion of diplomatic envoys despite the dependence on non-diplomatic actors in previous governments.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Pezeshkian, taken on July 6, 2024, Photo by AP | Image sourced from FMT | CC License, no changes made

2019. alef. April 7. Accessed September 25, 2024. https://www.alef.ir/news/3980118119.html.

Alef. 2019. Pezeshkian: The IRGC punched the US in the mouth/ The resonance of the slogan “Death to America” in the parliament. June. Accessed September 24, 2024. https://www.alef.ir/news/3980402045.html?show=text.

Alyasiry, Ali, interview by Alabbas F. Alsudani. 2024. Iranian reformists and Iraqi politicians (September 21).

AP News. 2024. “Iran’s president tells the UN that his country wants to play a ‘constructive role’ in world affairs.” AP News. September 25. https://apnews.com/article/un-general-assembly-iran-president-pezeshkian-bca11f4148e60d84a39f85cde78fa2bf.

Asem, Sondos. 2024. “Saudi crown prince says no normalization with Israel without Palestinian statehood.” Middle East Eye, September 17.

Azizi, Hamidreza. 2024. “European Leadership Network.” Can Pezeshkian fix Iran’s relations with the West? July 17. Accessed September 25, 2024. https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/can-pezeshkian-fix-irans-relations-with-the-west/.

Eslahatnews. 2024. June. Accessed September 24, 2024. https://eslahatnews.com/%d9%be%d8%b2%d8%b4%da%a9%db%8c%d8%a7%d9%86-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b2-%d9%87%d9%85-%d9%84%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b3-%d8%b3%d9%be%d8%a7%d9%87-%d9%85%db%8c%d9%be%d9%88%d8%b4%d9%85%d8%9b-%d8%b3/.

Haghirian, Mehran. 2024. “Constraints Facing GCC-Iran Diplomacy Under Pezeshkian.” Stimson. 

ISPI. 2024. “Strengthening Regional Bonds: Iran’s Priority is the Neighbourhood.” ISPI. September. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/strengthening-regional-bonds-irans-priority-is-the-neighbourhood-183723.

Javed, Hafez, and Muhammad Ismail. 2017. “Iran’s Nuclear Deal (JCPOA): Threats and Opportunities for the Regional Peace and Security.” Chinese Political Science Review 467-483.

Kamrava, Mehran. 2024. “Iran’s Neighborhood Policy: An Assessment.” Middle East Council on Global Affairs. 

Lyer, Sunit. 2024. “Ebrahim Raisi death conspiracy theories: Israel hand, missing weather data, man near chopper crash site & more.” Asiant newsable. 5 20. https://newsable.asianetnews.com/world/iran-president-ebrahim-raisi-death-conspiracy-theories-israel-hand-missing-weather-data-man-seen-near-chopper-crash-site-snt-sdscqm.

Mehrabi, Ehsan. 2024. “Who is Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s New President.” Iranwire. July 6. Accessed September 25, 2024. https://iranwire.com/en/politics/130417-who-is-masoud-pezeshkian-irans-new-president/#.

Mohebali, Pupak. 2016. “Iranian Hardliners vs. Reformists: The Future of the JCPOA.” Lobelog foreign policy 1-2.

Momeni, Azadeh. 2021. The Role of Khatami’s Belief System in Changing Iranian. Carleton University.

PressTv. 2024. Highlights: First debate in the 2024 Iran presidential election. June 17. https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/06/17/727662/First-debate-in-2024-Iran-presidential-election.

Radio Free Europe. 2024. “Iran’s Pezeshkian Claims No Transfer Of Weapons To Russia Since He Took Office.” Radio Free Europe. September 16. https://www.rferl.org/a/pezeshkian-iran-russia-weapons-nuclear/33122205.html.

Rasana. 2024. “Raisi’s Death: Significations and Consequences.” International Institute for Iranian Studies 8.

Rezaei, Farhad. 2017. “Khatami’s Dialogue among Civilizations and the Nuclear “Disappearance Act.” In Iran’s Nuclear Program, by Farhad Rezaei, 77. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Risseeuw, Rafke. 2018. “The Syrian-Iranian Nexus: a Historical .” Brussels international center for research and human rights 12.