This is not the first time Russia has distanced itself from an ally. During the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Russia refrained from assisting its CSTO ally, Armenia, in stark contrast to its decisive support during the First Karabakh War in the early 1990s, which ultimately secured Armenia’s victory over Azerbaijan.

However, there is a critical distinction between the cases of Russia’s disengagement from Armenia and Syria. While Russia’s indifference towards Armenia is usually seen as symbolic punishment for Yerevan’s democratic revolution in 2018, its withdrawal from Syria signals a change in strategy — prioritizing the war effort in Ukraine over assisting its allies.

This shift therefore raises urgent concerns for Russia’s other allies which depend on it for security, particularly Abkhazia and “South Ossetia”, the pro-Russian separatist regions of Georgia. Each region maintains a small force of 2,200-2,500 men, while each of the two Russian military bases in these territories houses over 4,000 troops — making Moscow’s presence nearly twice as strong as local forces. With their security and financial stability largely reliant on Russian support, the growing reluctance of Moscow to intervene and assist its allies places these separatist regions in an increasingly precarious position. 

The excessive reliance on Russia raises concerns about whether it will provide support if the Georgian government attempts to retake these regions by force. Even if the current Georgian government seems reluctant to use force against the breakaway regions, the ongoing political crisis might bring about a new government with a new approach, and will actively try to regain the separatist regions. How will the separatist leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia adapt to ensure their security? Currently, the two separatist regions of Georgia are faced with two possibilities: further integration with Russia or self-reliance and diversification.

Since Russian assistance is crucial to the security of separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia can mitigate the risk of abandonment by increasing their strategic value to Moscow. By aligning more closely with Russian interests, they can strengthen their position and ensure continued support. The logic is simple — the more geopolitically valuable the region presents itself, the greater the incentive for Russia to maintain its protection over them.

Strengthening economic ties between Russia and the separatist states presents a key strategy for ensuring their stability and security. Encouraging more investments in natural resource industries could create the necessary economic incentives for Russia to protect its business interests in the region. One such plan includes establishing a car factory and beginning oil extraction. However, a more effective strategy for economic integration may lie in the expansion of the region’s tourism industry amid the ongoing war in Ukraine. As currently Russian citizens have significant problems going abroad for holidays, separatist regions of Georgia could be viable substitutes. The region’s affordability, use of the ruble, and widespread Russian language proficiency create a strong incentive for Russian tourists, fostering economic ties and strengthening social connections between the populations. This growing interdependence generates public pressure within Russia to maintain security in the separatist regions. Another option could be the relocation of some industries in the separatist regions by Russia. As the two breakaway regions of Georgia are less advanced economically, their populations might be willing to work for a lower wage for the same work. Setting up new industries would help to develop the economies of the separatist regions and provide more jobs for the population. Relocation of relatively simple military industries away from the range of Ukrainian drone strikes could also be advantageous for the Russian defense industry.

Another option is political integration which could lead to a view that the regions are “basically parts of Russia” and therefore should be defended in case of an attack. Of course, this approach could include joining the Russian Federation altogether. This could be more of an option for “South Ossetia”, as uniting with the Russian Federation is a common populist rhetoric voiced by the region’s leadership before the elections to gain political support from the population. Therefore, the separatist government can use the populist narrative to integrate more closely with Russia without risking any nationalistic opposition in the population over the loss of “sovereignty”. In other words, “South Ossetian” leaders can prioritize preventing Georgian control of the territory over independent governance. 

Military cooperation can be another direction of further integration. “South Ossetia” could deploy military personnel to the frontlines in Ukraine as a demonstration of loyalty to Moscow. Given Russia’s urgent need for reinforcements, this gesture of goodwill could serve as a strong bargaining chip for securing long-term Russian protection. By assisting Russia in a critical moment, “South Ossetia” may strengthen its strategic value, increasing the likelihood of Russian support in the event of a future military conflict. Additionally, participation in Ukraine would provide “South Ossetian” forces with valuable combat experience, further enhancing their military capabilities.

However, establishing even closer relations with Russia does not seem to be an option for Abkhazia, as Abkhazians harbor more nationalistic sentiments compared to the Ossetians, and generally do not support joining the Russian Federation. Proposals to further integration with Russia even sparked a serious protest in Abkhazia last year, which resulted in the resignation of the “President”. This also means that the separatist region risks abandonment from Russia in a similar way to Armenia, as democratically electing a more nationalistic leadership that is less keen on further cooperation with Russia risks retaliation from Russia. The other alternative to further integration with Russia would be to try and become more self-reliant and avoid putting all eggs in one Russian basket. This would include the formulation of a more flexible foreign policy instead of becoming overly dependent on Russia.

The backbone of the new approach would be to manage playing with both the Russian and the Georgian sides in order to retain the “independence” of the separatist region. The goal of the approach would be to ensure a limited Russian presence in the region while establishing relations with Georgia in order to avoid military confrontation in the case Russia withdraws completely. However, this new foreign policy contains significant risks, as it must not strain relations with Russia before establishing the desired level of relations with Georgia. In other words, Abkhazia must also not rely too much and too quickly on the Georgian side, as establishing too deep of ties with Georgia runs at a risk of a Russian retaliation which could include reducing financial assistance which would undermine the function of the separatist government altogether. Reconciliation with Georgia could also bring about a risk of losing support from the local nationalistically minded population. Thus, the leadership of the separatist region has to ensure a balanced approach.

One of the aspects of this solution could be to strike deals with the Georgian government. Negotiating the return of a limited number of up to 250,000 Georgian refugees, or improved conditions of the Georgians currently living in Abkhazia in exchange for, ideally, a guarantee of non-aggression could be one such deal. Another field where an agreement can be made is the supply of electricity. As Abkhazia is going through winter with a limited supply of electricity, a deal that would ensure a stable supply of electricity from Georgia for a respectable price could be one of the agreements that would build trust and assurance between the two parties. This would also make retaliation from Russia less severe, as there would be less leverage that Russia can pull against Abkhazia. Any such deal would mean a significant compromise from the Abkhazian part, of course, but this will be much easier to do with the political party “Georgian Dream” currently in charge of the Georgian government, as one of their principal talking points is a critique of the previous government, according to which “it threw the separatist regions into flames of war in 2008”.  Even if the current Georgian government seems unwilling to threaten the separatist regions, an ongoing political crisis might produce a new government with a different approach.

In conclusion, Russia’s recent involvement in Ukraine has led its leadership to shift its strategy and abandon its allies in support of pouring more and more resources into its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This puts Russian allies in the Caucasus, the separatist regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and “South Ossetia” in a very tough spot. As they depend on Russian troops for security, recent shifts in Russia’s geopolitical strategy have left them vulnerable to potential Georgian reclamation. Therefore, these separatist regions must adapt and find new security strategies. This leaves them with two options. One option is further integration with Russia, which seems more beneficial for “South Ossetia”. The other option is to engage in talks with Georgia and try to formulate a more independent and self-reliant foreign policy, which seems to be the path for Abkhazia. However, it is not only Russian allies in the Caucasus that are keeping an eye on the changes in Russian strategy. Russian obsession with Ukraine should raise questions for all Russian allies, including not only other breakaway, separatist regions like Transnistria but more important players like North Korea, Iran, and China as well.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Syrians celebrate the Fall of Assad | Image sourced from FMT | CC License, no changes made

As part of a series of conversations with the 2024 Class of the Maurice R. Greenberg World Fellows Program, Abla Abdulkadir, Sarah Jeddy, and Owen Haywood of the YRIS Interviews and Events team sat down to interview the founder and Group CEO of Affinity Africa, Dr. Tarek Mouganie. Affinity Africa is a digital bank that specializes in providing banking services to underbanked populations in Africa, as well as lending for small businesses and micro-enterprises that otherwise struggle to access credit.

Mouganie discussed his journey from childhood in Ghana to the founding of Affinity Africa, during which time he obtained a PhD in physics from Cambridge and worked for eight years as a director at a hedge fund. Mouganie has sought to apply his financial experience towards his goal of African socioeconomic development by focusing Affinity Africa’s efforts on providing banking services that are more readily accessible in Africa. During the interview, Mouganie also shared his love for science, triathlons, and Afrobeats, as well as his advice for students looking to the start of their careers: “not to take things too seriously.” Mouganie’s desire to apply his talents to make a positive impact on the area of socioeconomic development shines through as an example for any student looking to make a difference in their career.

You can listen to the full interview linked above, or read selected quotes from our discussion with Dr. Tarek Mouganie below. All quotes have been edited for length and clarity.

Abla Abdulkadir: Could you go into depth on what Affinity Africa is, your role at the company, and what led you to found it? I am also interested in how your scientific background and interest in exploration and design shaped your ideas for Affinity Africa.

Tarek Mouganie: I was sort of obsessed with this idea of investing in Africa and the knock-on socioeconomic implications. After spending all this time at this hedge fund, I decided to get up one day and I quit my job, thanks to my mom. She was the catalyst. She said I was intolerable working for this fund, “What have they done to you, quit your job and come back home.” I quit my job, moved back to Ghana, and started focusing on this idea of getting investments into the continent, and in particular, supporting small businesses. I became obsessed with that idea. After trying to figure out how to build a fund that would invest in African startups and African small businesses, I then had this sort of aha moment. I had all this guilt of, like, eight years working for a hedge fund. “What did I do? Why did I waste my time, my life? Why was I there for so long?” And then I kind of paused, and I thought to myself, “I understand banking because of these eight years.” All the pieces just clicked, you know? And I was like, that’s what I’m gonna do. I’m gonna start a bank. And that was it. 

The first thing that I did, getting back to your question on informed design, is I tried to figure out why banking has failed Africa. Just to throw out the statistics, looking at Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, only 42% of adults have a bank account. It’s crazy. I mean, the start of your financial freedom, financial journey is to actually be included in financial services. Even worse than that, less than 10% of businesses have access to credit. How can you grow without a loan? You have an idea. You want to start a business. You might be able to survive on the revenue that you generate in the cash flow, but to unlock your full potential, you need access to credit.

I realized that banking was invented and developed in the Global North, right? So it assumes, like all of us here who have a bank account in a country from the Global North, it assumes you’re formalized. It assumes you have a formal ID, you have an address, and you can prove that you have the address, too. You probably are formally employed and getting a check or at university, and you have to show that. So as a result, those are the three kinds of documentation that you need to actually go into a bank here in the US and actually open an account. Well, guess what? The majority of Africans, 87% of Africans, don’t have that information. So we had to try and understand, using informed design, how we could reinvent banking for the masses. 

And it wasn’t easy. We had a lot of stages of iteration…We actually only launched in January this year with a product in the market that we’re happy with. In March, we put out a product that we’re super happy with, and since then, we’ve actually onboarded 40,000 customers – and almost 10,000 accounts in the last six weeks alone. So it’s going like gangbusters. 62% of our customers are women, which is awesome. And almost 90% of our customers were opening their first ever bank account, which is pretty cool.

…

Sarah Jeddy: What makes small businesses so important for economic development?

Tarek Mouganie: I often use the comparison between OECD countries and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  So small businesses and micro enterprises are the drivers of social and economic growth. It’s crazy, you know. In the US and UK, they are actually 99.9% of registered businesses and they employ over 60% of the population. We have a highly informal sector in Ghana and in Africa in general. By creating companies that employ in the formal sector you actually unlock that potential. It’s crucial because there’s a huge opportunity in our part of the world. By 2050 one out of four people will be African, and one out of three young people will live in Africa as well. The Global North is shrinking. The global majority is growing, and Africa has a huge potential to unlock its human capital so job creation needs to follow through as well too. That’s the first thing I wanted to say. 

The second thing is, if you take a look at OECD countries the tax-to-GDP ratio is around 36%. If you take a look at countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, it’s 18% – and if you take a look at countries like Ghana, Nigeria, and any of the countries that have extractive economies like Angola, South Africa, it’s as low as 6%. Our governments make money from extractives. They sell extractives. For example, if you have a chocolate bar, the cocoa probably comes from Ghana. Gold, oil are other examples. But what’s very important is diversifying that revenue for governments. Our taxpayer base is very, very, very narrow, so part of additional revenue is generated by generating and supporting small businesses. They are the drivers of revenue for the government. We’re talking corporate tax, we’re talking income tax, we’re talking VAT [value-added tax], we’re talking everything that is collected through those small businesses. 

The other thing that’s super important about this tax, the thing that I’m kind of obsessed with, which forms the majority of that OECD 36% tax-to-GDP ratio that I talked about, is that it creates accountability between civilians and their governments. If I buy a bottle of water and I’m poor, I’m rich, I’m paying the same amount of VAT. It’s indirect and it’s regressive, right? But if I’m earning an income or I’m a small business owner and I pay tax, there is a fiscal contract between me and my government. I’m paying money to you, for you, to provide you with a service that doesn’t really exist in that part of the world, because of the hugely informal sector. So if we see an element of formalization, and I don’t know what that looks like, and I’m not here to villainize the informal sector, you know, or romanticize them, but they’re a huge part of our economy. But over time, if we see an element, basically, of formalization and an increase in the taxpayer base, and an increase in direct taxation as well, too. I would like to think that there would be more civilian accountability to leaders in the continent as a result.

…

Owen Haywood: How have you worked to bridge your diverse array of interests and experiences throughout your career?

Tarek Mouganie: I guess my life and my career only makes sense now looking backwards and trying to connect the dots – I think Steve Jobs said that, right? But in the middle of it all, I wasn’t really thinking. I knew I wanted to work in investment management. It was actually a friend from university that said, “Oh, I work for this company. Why don’t you consider joining?” And I thought, “hey, sounds great. I’ll give it a shot.” You know, what’s the worst that could happen? I would fail. I would move on with my life. And then when I left, the idea of starting a bank was out of coincidence, because I’d spent all this time, even though it wasn’t intentional, working in financial services, investing in banks, and understanding banking strategy. I think it only makes sense looking backwards at it.

The only kind of advice that I can give is not to take things too seriously. I’ve had a lot of students reach out to me here [to network], which is somewhat disappointing. Like 20 years ago, when I did my undergrad degree, everyone would go into investment banking and work for like a consultancy firm. I thought those days were over. surely there are other options out there, you know. And I’m not saying that there’s anything wrong with being an investment banker or, you know, or working for a consultancy firm. I did in the past, too. But don’t be afraid to make mistakes in the early stages of your career. You have chances to mess up and correct them later in your career, and when you make a mistake earlier, it’s a lot less grave than it is in the later stages of career. 

But what I wanted to say is stay curious, don’t lose that. Think to yourself, “What is your North Star?” If you want to fix health care, if you want to fix inclusion, if you want to work in the field of climate justice or whatever, why do you care about that? Which part of the value chain do you care about as well, too? And how do you start thinking through how to get to a situation where you think you can maximize your impact. Whether it’s working for a consultancy firm, fine, as long as you’re aware of that and getting the right skill set. Whether it’s working for an established startup where you get a ton of exposure because you want to be an entrepreneur yourself, or whether it’s working for a corporation that has a department in there that looks at sustainability, is also another option. Just make sure that you have all the options laid out to stay curious and always question everything.on, if you want to work in the field of climate justice or whatever, why do you care about that? Which part of the value chain do you care about as well, too? And how do you start thinking through how to get to a situation where you think you can maximize your impact. Whether it’s working for a consultancy firm, fine, as long as you’re aware of that and getting the right skill set. Whether it’s working for an established startup where you get a ton of exposure because you want to be an entrepreneur yourself, or whether it’s working for a corporation that has a department in there that looks at sustainability, is also another option. Just make sure that you have all the options laid out to stay curious and always question everything.

Image courtesy of the Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs

–John Marshall

Imagine a society where every step is tracked, every conversation is being watched, and all your actions are analyzed by artificial intelligence and other digital systems in an effort to control everything you do. This dystopian reality is taking shape in many authoritarian states today. It is increasingly common for authoritarian regimes to leverage digital technologies in efforts to surveil, repress, and manipulate their citizens. Among these regimes, China, Russia, and Iran are prominent examples of states employing digital authoritarianism — the utilization of digital technologies to censor, manipulate, and surveil their populations. It is important to consider the distinct strategies used by these three authoritarian powers when exploring the consequences of digital authoritarianism.

China

 In China, digital authoritarianism emerged during the late 1990’s with their “Great Firewall”,  a nation wide system that prevents Chinese citizens from accessing many foreign sites. The “Great Firewall” employs many different types of censorship across the Cchinese- based internet. Although a massive phenomenon, the limits of the firewall have not been clearly defined due to the inability of researchers to find a viable amount of clients to “test connectivity.” China was the origin of digital age censorship with its “Great Firewall” and high-tech suppression recently implemented in Xinjiang, where a combination of digital technologies, such as artificial intelligence and facial recognition, were used to surveil, manipulate, and control the population in the area. 

China has also advanced the censorship of the Chinese population with their social credit system, which has the ability to sanction and publicly shame individuals for not subscribing to the Chinese Communist Party’s political ideology. 

Due to Beijing’s extensive experience using digital tools for domestic censorship and surveillance, they have become the main supplier for several authoritarian regimes looking to build their own surveillance system, exporting surveillance and monitoring systems to at least 18 countries. The growing export of new technologies and development of new methodologies by China signals a global shift, one in which authoritarian regimes are leveraging digital tools to suppress the voice of individuals and shape global norms in their favor.

China’s relationship with digital authoritarianism is expansive and influential, as the country has implemented measures not only domestically, but also internationally to keep its population under control. Through the use of facial recognition, artificial intelligence, and implementing strategic authoritarian measures on their population, China has created a surveillance system of massive scale. As the originator of digital authoritarianism, China is a distinct model of digital authoritarianism and supplier of surveillance technologies for other authoritarian regimes

Russia

Russia’s engagement with digital authoritarianism began in the early 2000s with adaptations of Soviet-era surveillance technologies for the digital age. Just as the Chinese government made efforts to control their  population, Russia followed similar footsteps. In 2014, Russia began making both legal and technical moves to establish a so-called ‘sovereign internet,’ modeled after China’s approach. If successful, the Russian government would be able to, at least partially, isolate the Russian internet from the rest of the world. 

Beyond censorship, Russian companies export surveillance and hacking technologies, especially to post-Soviet states. Russia’s exportation of digital surveillance goods can diminish and suppress the voices of citizens that speak negatively about the Russian government. Although there is a need for further study into the government’s direct involvement in this export of surveillance technologies, the exportation of technology used for digital authoritarian measures poses a threat to democracy because it enables other governments to engage in digital authoritarianism and censorship. 

In conjunction with China, the Russian exportation of digital surveillance technologies shines a light on a troubling global trend. As new governments adopt these digital authoritarian practices, democratic ideals erode in global society. This creates a world in which freedoms are undermined rather than promoted to consolidate power. This connection between China and Russia signals a growing challenge to democratic norms on a global scale, potentially creating a future where government-based digital control is normal.

Iran

Following revolutionary turmoil in 1979 and war against Iraq, Iran’s Islamic republic was established. This regime is openly authoritarian, as shown by the blatant repression and imposition of constraints on civil liberties. Iran’s adoption of digital surveillance methods emerged with the rise of the internet during the 2000s as part of its broader strategy of political repression. Iran has a past riddled with censorship and repressing human rights activists and journalists. Iran’s security agencies rely on rudimentary technical expertise and human information gathering to track political activities both within and beyond their borders, enabling them to plan retaliatory or preventive actions. While not all tactics in this repressive toolkit are new, digital surveillance increases the impact and reach of potential threats against “transnational activists and their networks”.

When Iran enhanced its capacities for internet control in 2009, protests ignited by digital media caused the regime to take steps to censor and control the population. Authorities began blocking websites and arresting critical bloggers as early as the early 2000s. As circumvention and anonymization tools evolved, the Iranian government adopted more aggressive tactics, such as deep packet inspection, hacking opposition media, and conducting targeted surveillance. The Other online communities who are considered to transgress official norms were also targeted. In 2014, for instance, six young Iranians were detained for circulating a home-made music video with an interpretation of Pharrell Williams’ song “Happy”. These efforts were aimed at controlling the population and suppressing dissent through digital authoritarianism. 

Impact on Global Democracy and Human Rights 

Digital authoritarianism obviously impacts democracy and human rights. Countries that implement digital authoritarianism do not only limit their citizens’ freedom but can also impact other nations directly or indirectly. In addition to consolidating power, digital authoritarianism allows authoritarian regimes to undermine democratic institutions, engage in malicious cyber activity, and export misinformation, harming global security. This threatens the national security of the United States and other democratic nations, especially those with less digital infrastructure and security which gives rise to vulnerability to external manipulation through digital technologies. As digital authoritarianism practices spread globally, they risk shifting the global norms away from democratic ideals, making it important to oppose and reject such practices wherever they emerge. 

Future Outlook

As we look to the future with an optimistic eye, it is important to consider the real and probable advancements in technology. With modern internet applications and social media, the fundamental principles essential to democracy—trust, informed dialogue, a shared sense of reality, mutual consent, and participation—are being tested.  Facebook is becoming the world’s largest news source; 44% of people across 26 countries surveyed say they use it for news. Staggering statistics like this give credence to the claims that social media could act as a gateway to digital authoritarianism ideals. 

With the suspicious business model of social media platforms to capture a massive amount of attention and monetize it, these platforms can have an impact on public discourse and civil debate. This, along with the fact that more people are relying on social media for information and expression, shows how digital authoritarianism practices could be carried out through these platforms. Social media’s issue of misinformation is especially prominent in political discourse. For example, political ads during the 2016 election season on social media were extremely divisive and often contained messages that were manufactured to spark uncivil discourse. The thousands of ads did not refer to a specific candidate but merely discussed topics that had potential to ignite communication that undermines democratic ideals. For example, one sponsored ad was promoted to ignite divide through text and a graphic that portrayed law enforcement in such a way to spark uncivil racial discourse. This kind of manipulation threatens to reshape political engagement in a way that benefits authoritarian practices and promotes authoritarian ideals. 

Artificial Intelligence is another important development we must consider with respect to digital authoritarianism. The rise of digital artificial intelligence raises numerous questions to be put forward. With recent AI developments, digital authoritarianism could be progressed even further in certain regimes. Artificial intelligence poses an existential threat to democracy due to the sheer amount of misinformation and propaganda that it can produce. This could undermine efforts put forth by government officials which threatens democratic values and could harm the citizens by reducing political accountability. Specifically, AI could manipulate public opinion polls in the future through the use of unique communication tools. Since democracy requires the citizens to hold their government accountable through free and fair election processes, AI manipulating public opinion would in turn threaten electoral integrity. 

The further development of generative AI is dangerous and a threat to democracy due to its potential for extreme microtargeting outlook; for example, AI could generate false content that caters to specific audiences and even individuals, in turn spreading misinformation efficiently to specific constituencies. This could lead to a new era of digital authoritarianism, with regimes such as China, Russia, Iran, or other nations using AI to manipulate their citizens and stifle dissent on an unprecedented scale. This use of AI in digital authoritarianism could involve new surveillance systems, election manipulation, and widespread propaganda. 

Action is needed at this moment to put up technological safeguards, to limit AI’s ability to generate anti-democratic content for malicious use, and to pass political policy to prevent digital attacks and the distribution of authoritarian ideals. With democratic values and world peace on the line, now is the time for politicians and citizens alike, to take action to limit digital authoritarianism.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: General Photos: Protest, Taken on January 4, 2019, Photo by Richard | Image sourced from Flickr | Attribution License, no changes made

As political scientist Christopher Blattman explains in his book Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Path to Peace, there are five principal reasons why conflict occurs: leader interests, reputational concerns, commitment problems, uncertainty, intangible incentives, and misperceptions. Cartels in Mexico seem to continuously face a combination of the first three. Because large cartels such as the Sinaloa obtain a large stream of income from the sale of illicit drugs, they become more sensitive to political and economic changes. If these groups feel as if they are being tapped out of the market, or something threatens their hegemonic hold on a particular territory––such as the city of Culiacán––they are more likely to believe that warring to attain possible benefits outweighs the potential risk of conflict. For instance, in the case of the Gulf Cartel, a paramilitary breakaway subgroup, the Zetas, triggered the cartel’s perceived decline in the early 2000s. The Zetas’ increasing monetary power and military influence over critical regions, combined with President Calderón’s harsh anti-drug campaign, left the Gulf Cartel feeling pushed out of the market. These frustrations led to violent reactions by the Gulf Cartel, prompting the beginning of infighting in 2010 when Zetas leader Heriberto Lazcano made a formal split as a result of tensions in the Northeastern region of Tamaulipas, which served as a significant trading route between Mexico and the United States, ultimately demonstrating the slippery slope leading economic insecurity to snowball into intercartel warfare. 

Moreover, in Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley’s paper “Why Did Drug Cartels Go to War in Mexico?” greed and reputational concerns are cited as principal causes for group conflict. This is best realized in 2023, when more than 70 active armed groups vied for command over the top drug hubs. Notably, contentious areas such as Michoacán have been a recent battleground for skirmishes with the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, led by Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, who seeks to take territory from local criminal organizations who are blocking his expansion. To further this effort against rivals like the Sinaloa, Cervantes has strengthened presence in nearly 27 different territories, especially in contentious areas where there are challengers for control over drug-producing and trafficking routes. As leaders climb the ladder and get closer to controlling more of the profit, their desire for reputation––and the destruction of anyone who threatens it––continues to build. In this instance, intangible factors such as reputation and the ambitions of leaders seeking to dominate competitors and control resources play a significant role in understanding why cartels choose the unprofitability of war.  But this occurs with nearly every member, not just those at the top. 

These reputational concerns start young, when men from impoverished backgrounds, with lack of access to schooling and the traditional job market, take positions as cartel soldiers to boost their social status in their communities. For instance, a 2021 study from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography found that the majority of those imprisoned in Mexico––especially for drug-related activity––were men under the age of 29 who had previously experienced poverty, hunger, and unemployment. A lack of access to employment opportunities has led many young men to join cartels because they feel they have no other option to escape cyclical poverty. Moreover, they have a greater incentive to follow their leader because reputations of cartel members are so contingent on the success of the cartel, these leaders may decide to go to war to win hegemony over a particular market or geographic territory. 

Another critical incentive is commitment problems; the inability to negotiate or secure agreements with opposing sides fosters a lack of faith within the negotiating cartel, ultimately resulting in fracturing and civil war. The most poignant example of such is the instance of splintering in the Zeta cartel following stricter anti-drug laws from former Mexican President Felipe Calderón. Because Calderón’s policies sought to drastically increase prosecution and militarization in response to cartel activity, there was larger pressure put on groups such as the Zetas. Given that many were already facing in-group struggles, this political pressure made it more difficult to bargain with each other and the government, resulting in groups choosing to fight.  In “War as a Commitment Problem,” political theorist Robert Powell expands on this take, arguing that a party’s inability to fulfill inter-cartel agreements can create a vacuum of trust, where neither party feels confident about continuing their relationship. Given two rational actors, either one or both always believes that the other is trying to deceive them, especially if there are significant economic or social interests at play. These suspicions, intensifying under political and reputational pressures, drive cartels toward conflict. Notably, lack of communication between splintering cartel groups who seek to compete for hegemony or sign a concession agreement causes structural factions to deepen, limiting opportunities for peace.

Violence, or lack thereof, is surprisingly logical in many cases. But while groups such as rival cartels often make rational choices to go to war, they may also do the same in bargaining, serving as a deterrent to war. This can occur within cartels, or between cartels and third parties such as the government, NGOs or members of the Church. For instance, in February of 2024, four Roman Catholic bishops organized meetings with leaders of cartels in cities like MichoacanMinchoacan to bargain for a peace agreement following presidential approval, demonstrating that peace, just like war, according to Blattman and other political theorists, is a matter of strategic game theory, taking into account vast incentives of numerous actors. Essentially, bargaining can be a double-edged sword, either it falls victim to reputational concerns or commitment problems, or, it is able to prevail as a deterrent to violence. While there are many cases of violence occurring within conflicting groups, this does not tell the full story. Mexico is a burgeoning democracy, but despite its improvements in access to education and employment outcomes, much of the country still remains impoverished with a large amount of government corruption due to the hegemonic rule of cartels such as the Sinaloa and JNGC. This leads one to question: can sustained, perpetual peace be a true possibility, or is it just a fleeting goal? 

It is critical for neighboring countries––especially those with significant power and resources such as the United States––to push for policy that may allow for the opportunity for in-group fighting to be ameliorated. Through the introduction of initiatives reducing the incentive for cartels to go to war, and decreasing incentives to join cartels in the first place (by reducing poverty and increasing access to education) as well as stronger controls to prevent civilian casualties and commitment problems, the bloody strife present in major drug trafficking zones such as Michoacan and Veracruz can face a continuous shift towards mutually beneficial concessions. While cartel violence is unlikely to go away entirely, and simple incentives are unlikely to be a solvent for the entire problem, they provide a good start to promote a pathway to peace.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Mexican Army in Tamaulipas, taken on Feb 19, 2024 | Image sourced from FMT | CC License, no changes made

Although Western nations have caught on to these Russian hybrid tactics, responding to them has become no less challenging. While NATO Secretary Generals Mark Rutte and Jens Stoltenberg condemned the attacks publicly, Russia continues to further escalate its sabotage campaign. With these attacks dramatically increasing in recent months, the West can no longer afford to sit back as Russian sabotage looks to undermine democracies in the West and weaken consensus in the EU and NATO.

While Russia’s motivations for sabotage in Europe are not immediately clear, some have suggested Russia conducts its hybrid operations in order to weaken the alliance’s support for Ukraine. This is highlighted by Russia’s clear focus on the defense sphere, with the targeting of defense storage centers and supply lines, as well as the assassination attempt on Arman Papperger, the CEO of German defense company Rheinmetall. However, hybrid warfare in Europe started long before the invasion of Ukraine. Both the USSR and the United States engaged in hybrid attacks during the Cold War, using political, economic, and clandestine means to weaken and undermine one another. Especially common on the part of the Soviets was the use of political assassinations. In recent years, it appears Moscow has re-embraced political killings as a tool of statecraft. For example, in 2019 Moscow ordered a hit on an ethnic Chechen in Berlin, and the U.S. and Germany foiled a Russian plot to kill the CEO of Rheinmetall, a German defense firm. 

However, the hybrid threat facing Europe goes beyond assassinations to tactics like cutting undersea wires in the Baltic Sea and committing arson at defense factories across Europe. These operations allow Moscow to eliminate political enemies, while also minimizing cost and maximizing damage. In response, Western officials have tightened security around defense infrastructure. These costs are borne by each country individually, instead of being diffused across the alliance, stretching Europe’s resources in defending against and responding to these attacks. An example of this is Russia jamming signals in Europe. Security experts debate if this is a deliberate hybrid attack by Russia, or in Russia’s eyes, an unintended and happy consequence of their warfare in Ukraine, but nevertheless, the consequences to Northeastern Europe prove costly, with over 350 flights canceled a day, and severe economic losses forecasted. With the costs acute for individual nations, Russia can build up its military capabilities, while forcing western states to draw on their resources, giving Russia a greater advantage in a long confrontation with NATO. 

In response to hybrid attacks from Russia, NATO continues to rely on a strategy of ambiguity. After the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the alliance anticipated more hybrid warfare and published a strategy for combating it. The strategy underlines strengthening intelligence sharing and NATO’s ability to “deter and defend” against these attacks, but not much beyond this. After the recent Washington Summit, the alliance re-emphasized that a hybrid attack could invoke NATO’s collective defense, but NATO still largely leaves it up to each ally to decide its response to hybrid attacks. The alliance faces other challenges as well. For example, defending against a covert attack on Russia proves difficult with the multiplicity of domains and the vast amounts of infrastructure Europe must defend. Additionally, the allies have often lacked political will to respond to these attacks. Some Transatlantic leaders fear publicly attributing these attacks to Russia will further escalate the situation and prefer to maintain ambiguity as part of an escalation management strategy. With a lack of large NATO or EU response to Russian hybrid operations, it is implied that NATO is either not strong enough to respond or attribute these attacks to Russia, or that the alliance is fractured and political consensus can not be reached, both of which further embolden Russia to continue these attacks.

Nonetheless, there are steps the West can take to respond more directly to these attacks and re-establish deterrence vis-a-vis Russia. For example, the United Kingdom recently revoked the accreditation of several Russian diplomats believed to be spies operating out of the Russian embassy in London under diplomatic cover. In 2018, an array of Western countries took part in a larger expulsion after the poisoning of a former Russian spy on English soil. Another way to limit the access of Russian agents is to limit their diplomatic freedom of movement. Poland pioneered this method in May by limiting Russian diplomatic agents’ accreditation to the territory they work in, thereby reducing the area in which Russian agents working under diplomatic cover could theoretically attack. The implementation of this strategy requires coordination through the European Union—although eight member states signed on to limit diplomatic movement, the EU will need to build greater political consensus to achieve a meaningful result. 

Limiting diplomatic movement and accreditation can help reduce the opportunities available to saboteurs to carry out offensives, but NATO information campaigns also help combat hybrid attacks. An information campaign centered around NATO’s hybrid warfare strategy shows Russia that the alliance takes note of these attacks, and will respond, potentially strengthening deterrence without escalating the situation. In the case of hybrid attacks, information campaigns prove useful to help shore up political will to respond. NATO’s information campaign after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine was particularly successful. This U.S. campaign of publicizing intelligence lessened the political cost of sanctioning Russian gas for German leaders, whose country heavily relied on imported Russian gas. 

Successful information campaigns like this one are only made possible through proactive alliance intelligence sharing. The alliance can serve as a facilitator of bilateral partnerships for intelligence gathering. Ukraine (although not a NATO member) and the United States proved the strength of this strategy. The CIA has been training and equipping Ukrainian agents since 2016 in a move beneficial for both countries. This gives the United States access to operatives fluent in Russian, and familiar with Russian culture with easy access into Russian espionage circles to collect intelligence while allowing Ukraine to perpetuate a shadow war in response to the Russian invasion. Similar partnerships could take place across the alliance with countries well equipped to train and equip operatives, with other countries whose citizens have strong linguistic and cultural ties to Russia, such as the Baltic states. These partnerships could help bring action to NATO’s statement of “defending and deterring against hybrid attacks” with states working together to collect intelligence and prevent any attacks. 

Although Russia seeks to remain below the threshold of war, its increased aggression in Europe jeopardizes the security for countries in NATO and the EU. As with any relatively new security concept, NATO and the EU’s security strategy must adapt to adequately provide safety to its member states. Through more restrictive treatment of diplomats and the spies who hide among them, increased information campaigns, and intelligence gathering partnerships, the West can take concrete steps to thwart Russia’s hybrid war. Combating Russia’s shadow war requires NATO and the EU to revise their hybrid warfare strategy to build a safer Europe.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: 1st Council at new HQ, taken on May 9 2018 | Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

Though ballet originated in Italy and France, it was at the Imperial Russian Ballet in St. Petersburg in the late 19th century that it truly developed. Since then, Russia has continued to have a significant influence on ballet around the world. Two of the world’s most prestigious companies, the Mariinsky Ballet and the Bolshoi Ballet, are located in Russia.

Ballet’s role during the Cold War era first came to light in 1954, when President Eisenhower established the President’s Emergency Fund for International Affairs. Part of this fund included $2,250,000 allocated to the State Department to put on art and sports presentations abroad. In 1958, the Lacy-Zarubin agreement was reached. This outlined a two-year plan of reciprocal exchange of art, science, media, and education between the US and the Soviet Union. Initiatives to use ballet for cultural diplomacy were being directly funded by both nations.

In 1960, the United States launched one of its first big initiatives in using ballet for cultural diplomacy: American Ballet Theater’s (ABT’s) Tour of the Soviet Union. Starting in Moscow on September 13, the company performed at the Stanislavsky Theater, rather than the more renowned Bolshoi Theater. This did not, however, prevent their performances from selling out. Influential figures, such as Nikita S. Khrushchev and prima ballerinas Galina Ulanova and Maya Plisetskaya, attended the company’s opening night. After this start in Moscow, ABT then went on to perform in Tbilisi, Georgia and in Leningrad, returning to Moscow on October 21st to conclude their tour. After the final performance, Premier Khrushchev invited ABT to return to the USSR.

Two years later, New York City Ballet (NYCB) followed in ABT’s footsteps, but in an even more complicated context. A week after NYCB’s arrival in Moscow to begin its eight-week tour, funded by the US Department of State, US reconnaissance planes discovered Soviet missiles in Cuba, triggering the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite the rising tensions between the US and the USSR, NYCB’s performances were met with enthusiasm from Soviet audiences. At one performance, the audience cheered for an encore, leading principal dancer Edward Villella to perform his solo a second time to a standing ovation, even though company policy forbade encores.

NYCB’s tour was especially notable because of the company’s artistic director, George Balanchine. George Balanchine was a Georgian-American ballet choreographer born in Russia, who co-founded NYCB with Lincoln Kirstein in 1948. When the company went to Georgia as part of its USSR tour, few people knew Balanchine by his Georgian last name (Balanchivadze), but his fame had spread from the US to Georgia. He was perfectly positioned to serve as “an artistic U.S. public diplomat.” While the US and USSR each tried to insert their cultural values into their ballets, people in Georgia viewed Balanchine not as an outsider from the other side of the Iron Curtain, but rather as someone who had worked hard to achieve his dreams in a free country. For Balanchine, personally, this was his first time visiting his home country, an experience that both allowed him to connect with his heritage and become inspired by Georgian folk dances for his future choreography.

Stylistically, Balanchine’s choreography was classified as “neoclassical abstract ballet,” something the US feared would not be well received in the Soviet Union, where ballets were typically more traditional. However, Soviet audiences did enjoy these performances. The US had failed to realize that after the death of Stalin, a new generation of artists arose in the USSR, leading to the development of choreographic symphonism. This new type of dance focused on the connection between dance and music, rather than the earlier focus on that between dance, theater, and literature. Choreographic symphonism and Balanchine’s neoclassicism both developed from changes in early 20th-century Russian ballet, revealing similarities between American and Soviet ballet. The successful reception of NYCB in the USSR would later lead to NYCB completing a second tour in the Soviet Union in 1972.

Like the US, the USSR also sent its own ballet companies on tours abroad. In 1959 and 1962, the Bolshoi Ballet toured the US and was received warmly, with performance tickets being resold for the equivalent of $830 in 2018 dollars. In 1957, a year after the Bolshoi Ballet visited the UK, British ballerina Beryl Grey became the first Western dancer to guest with the Soviet company. These exchanges, though they certainly helped humanize both countries, did not come without misunderstandings. The Bolshoi Ballet’s performance of “Spartacus” was not successful amongst American audiences. They did not view it as ballet since dancers wore Roman sandals, instead of pointe shoes. They much preferred to go see the new Hollywood movie called “Spartacus” that had just been released. On the other hand, American choreographers worried that Soviet audiences would be offended by abstract ballets like Balanchine’s “Agon,” not understanding that this neoclassical style was already similar to the Russian creation of choreographic symphonism.

Despite some misunderstandings, these cultural exchanges also ended up providing an unintended opportunity for USSR dancers to defect. In 1961, ballet dancer and choreographer Rudolf Nureyev was one of the first to defect. He was followed by Natalia Makarova in 1970 and Mikhail Baryshnikov in 1974. All three of these dancers were from St. Petersburg—a region in which dancers were far less controlled than in Moscow. In Moscow, teachers were paid to report on dancers, and families were practically held as collateral. One dancer from Moscow’s Bolshoi Ballet who did manage to defect was Alexander Godunov. In 1985, the USSR released a film called “Flight 222” that was connected to his defection.

With today’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine by Russia, many Russian dancers have defected, similar to the Soviet dancers who did so during the Cold War. Most notably, former Bolshoi Ballet soloist Olga Smirnova left Russia ten days after the start of the invasion of Ukraine. When the invasion began, Smirnova wrote, “I’ve always been proud of the talent of the Russian people, of our cultural and sporting achievements. But today, a line has been crossed.” Smirnova is now a prima ballerina with the Dutch National Ballet in Amsterdam.

As with during the Cold War, the ballet community has also had a role in, or at least a reaction to, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In March of 2022, international ballet stars took part in a charity gala in London to raise funds for people in Ukraine. This project was led by Ukrainian ballet dancer Ivan Putrov and Romanian ballerina Alina Cojocaru. The organization Youth America Grand Prix, which organizes one of the biggest ballet competitions, has helped almost 100 Ukrainian dance students find placements throughout Europe to continue studying ballet in safer settings. The war also led to the end of any pre-existing partnerships between the US and Russia. For example, the US National Security Language Initiative for Youth program previously had a partnership with the Bolshoi Ballet Academy. In this program, American ballet students had the opportunity to train in Russia, while gaining proficiency in Russian, a language that the US considers critical to its national security. In addition to the loss of US partnerships, the UK tours of the Bolshoi Ballet and the Russian State Ballet of Siberia were canceled when Russia invaded Ukraine.

While it is difficult to see how much of a tangible effect ballet had on political policies, especially that of the USSR, it’s difficult to deny that the art form did help humanize both sides. By seeing Soviet dancers on stage performing just like American dancers, the Soviet Union became less distant to American audiences and likewise to Soviet audiences. These Cold War artistic exchanges helped increase intercultural exchange overall between the US and USSR, something that was able to persist until the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although cultural exchange between Russia and the United States has decreased recently, ballet still plays a role in other international relations. Ballet has become a universal language that helps build bridges across different cultures, contributing to the formation of positive relations.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: A group of ballet dancers performing on a stage. Ballet performance don quixote, beauty fashion  | Image sourced from Pixabay | CC License, no changes made

In 1910, the Korean Peninsula was officially colonized by Japan. During the colonial period, all expression of Korean culture was stamped out in favor of Japanese culture, and many Koreans moved to Japan, both by choice and by force. By the time colonization ended in 1945, there were over two million Koreans living in Japan, and while many of them returned to their home country, hundreds of thousands stayed. These Zainichi Koreans affiliated themselves with one of two organizations – Mindan, which backed South Korea, and Choren, which backed North Korea. While Japan ultimately banned Choren and all other North Korean organizations in 1952, they quickly reformed under different names. Chongryon soon became the most prominent North Korean organization in Japan, operating money-generating institutions from banks to pachinko parlors. Its influence persists to this day, with around 25% of Zainichi Koreans affiliating themselves with the group.

A common goal that unites both Chongryon and Mindan is the promotion of Korean ethnic schools. Following World War II, discrimination against Koreans in Japan was (and continues to be) a fact of life for many, and Zainichi Koreans wanted schools where their children would be accepted and could connect to their cultural background. As a result, both Mindan and Chongryon established schools across Japan. Although both systems teach fundamentals like math, science, and history, there are key differences that set these institutions apart.

The few Mindan schools that exist use Japanese as their official language, offering Korean only as an elective course, while Chongryon schools stick to Korean for all classroom activities. Chongryon curriculum also includes pro-North Korea messaging. In every Chongryon classroom, portraits of former Supreme Leaders Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il are displayed, North Korea is referred to as “The Fatherland,” and maps of the Korean Peninsula show a united Korea with a capital of Pyongyang. Many Chongyron schools even have field trips to North Korea where students are made to feel welcomed by the country. This continuous propaganda is not simply a product of individual supporters of North Korea–the curriculum is shaped by the North Korean government itself. In 2021, the North Korean government released a statement that indicated it had spent around 500 billion won (about $350 million) on Chongryon and its schools in the 66 years since the organization was established.

In the late 1950s the Chongryon schools played a key role in North Korea’s “Return to Paradise” campaign in which nearly 100,000 Zainichi Koreans were repatriated to North Korea. During this time, North Korea’s economy was stronger than that of the South, and with the consistent propaganda disseminated by Chongryon and its schools, many Zainichi Koreans truly believed that by going to North Korea, they could live a better life. Most, however, were disappointed by what they saw upon their arrival on the shores of the North. Around 200 people involved in this movement ultimately defected from North Korea and returned to Japan. 

This repatriation campaign was a clear marker of Chongryon’s influence at the time, but since then, the pervasiveness of Chongryon schools in Japan has declined. More and more Zainichi Koreans align themselves with South Korea, and due to negative perceptions of North Korea in Japanese society, going to a Chongryon school can place children at a disadvantage when applying for jobs or further education. Furthermore, because the Chongryon schools are legally categorized as “miscellaneous schools” instead of “regular schools,” students at these institutions cannot get the same student benefits as others in Japan. The Japanese government has also taken steps to restrict these schools–while the government originally gave limited funding to Chongryon schools, in recent years this aid has significantly diminished, and in some prefectures, been completely cut off.

Despite these issues, it makes sense why many parents choose to send their children to Chongryon schools. Students explain that being surrounded by fellow Koreans allows them to be themselves in a way they cannot in other spaces, and because Chongryon schools operate in Korean, unlike Mindan schools, they are a better option for those who want to connect with their Korean heritage. Chongryon schools are also far more accessible. Mindan only operates four schools in Japan, but Chongryon runs dozens of schools across the country. It seems that for some, Chongryon schools provide an additional benefit of inadvertently teaching critical thinking–while some students may be blindly loyal to North Korea, others see this unique education as an opportunity to compare ideas and learn from different perspectives. 

While the heyday of Chongryon schools has come and gone, they are still a key part of the lives of thousands of Zainichi Koreans, for better and for worse. These schools are unquestionably major sources of propaganda, but parents who send their children to this education system shouldn’t immediately be villainized as North Korean sympathizers. By establishing more Mindan schools and implementing the Korean language into their core curricula, the Japanese government could at least partially resolve the dilemma of Chongryon schools, giving Zainichi Korean children accessible opportunities to connect with their culture without pro-North Korean indoctrination. As North Korea continues to dominate current events, the anxiety surrounding these schools will likely spike, and only time will tell how the Japanese government will tackle this complicated issue.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Kim Jong II Study Case, taken by Stefan Krasowski  | Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

Last month, the YRIS Interview and Events Team sat down with Babra Ontibile Bhebe, a member of the 2024 Maurice R. Greenberg World Fellows Program. A native Zimbabwean, Dr. Bhebe has been at the forefront of democratic and civil society activism in Zimbabwe and across Africa throughout her career. She has experience working in numerous organizations in the governance and human rights sectors. This includes her current role as Executive Director of the Election Resource Centre.

The YRIS Interviews and Events Team discussed a range of issues with Dr. Bhebe, from her motivation to work as an advocate for civil and political rights and her career experience to her thoughts on American democracy and advice for how young leaders can support global democratic activism. Dr. Bhebe’s open passion for political rights and compassion for her fellow humans was made clear throughout the interview. At a time when democratic backsliding is a major concern across Africa and the world, Dr. Bhebe’s optimistic, diligent, and thoughtful approach to addressing this problem offers a compelling model for anyone looking to make a difference in the fight for civil and political rights.

You can listen to the full interview linked above, or read selected quotes from our discussion with Dr. Bhebe below. All quotes have been edited for length and clarity.

Owen Haywood: Can you briefly introduce yourself and explain your background?

Babra Bhebe: Sure. My name is Babra Ontibile Bhebe. I am a Zimbabwean. I was born and raised in Bulawayo, which is the second-largest city in Zimbabwe.  I started having an interest in human rights and governance work because of the environment that I grew up in, an environment where I witnessed a lot of poverty around me. When I was growing up, I interacted with some families who were struggling to send their children to school. For a long time, I tried to help these children to get access education by paying their fees, buying their school uniforms, and giving them all the material support that they needed

Then, after high school, I decided to do temporary teaching. This is where you go to a school and teach for a few months before you start university in Zimbabwe. I started teaching at a school in one of the marginalized areas in Zimbabwe that is called Binga. What I saw in that community was quite striking for me. Some of the students were coming to school barefooted, and without warm clothes when it was cold. That really touched my heart. I started helping again, paying for shoes and uniforms. 

When I went to university, the same thing happened. I began to interact with children that were in the same situation, and I started doing the same thing – paying fees, tutoring students.. I also started asking other students to join me. We started an initiative called Little Souls Foundation to help take care of these children. But after college, we all went in different directions. It became difficult for me to continue to support these children.

That was when it dawned on me that the problems that were facing the different communities in my country were bigger than me and that I needed to join a movement or an institution that was directly influencing policies around anti-corruption or accountability. Policies that were going to help ensure that the government becomes more accountable and more responsible in terms of supporting communities and addressing the root causes of these problems. I realized that just paying fees and buying shoes wasn’t going to be enough because more and more children kept coming. 

Most of the work that I’m doing currently is more related to civil and political rights, but that I do that work because of my desire to see the socioeconomic rights of the citizens in Zimbabwe being realized. I do not see you know the disconnection between the two sets of rights. I think civil and political rights are connected to the rights that have to do with people’s lived experiences, in terms of whether they have something to eat or whether the children are accessing education, amongst other things.

…

Hailey Seo: How can the global community do better to support pro-democracy movements and electoral transparency in Africa?

Babra Bhebe: There are many things that the global community can do to support our work – not just the Election Resource Centre’s work, but the work of citizen election observer groups across the continent. The first thing is to support the work of independent election observer mission groups. Deploying that work requires financial resources, but it is helpful in getting more independent views on how an election was held.  

However, I think there is a need to support the work of election organizations between election cycles. Funders must not just give to organizations when there’s an election, leave, and then come back only when there’s another election. The work of citizen election observer groups must be supported in between elections because that is where electoral processes are shaped. That is when you work on electoral reforms that are necessary for free, fair, and credible elections. That is when you get the first-time voter registrants to register to vote. That is when you get citizens to understand electoral processes and get them to decide on whether they are going to participate or not. That’s when you advocate for different things that you want to change, including some of the administrative processes that may need to be changed to make the environment more conducive. That work is critical between the elections; elections are not just an event.

… 

Ben Plana Trajtenberg: How do you view the state of American democracy?

Babra Bhebe: Let me say this with a disclaimer. I am not really an expert on American politics, so my comment is going to be based on what I’ve read. …  I must say that the interesting thing with America is that while democracy is under attack, we’ve also seen elements of resistance, elements that try to ensure that democracy is protected. We’ve seen how strong institutions enable resisting autocracy or resisting attacks on democracy. About 725 people who were involved in the January 6 attack on the Capitol were arrested afterward. I think that shows that the rule of law is still respected in this country. When I look at America what I’ve learned is that democracy will always be under attack. There are always forces that do not want democracy to thrive. However, there are others that want democracy to survive. And it is the institutions that are set up in a country that enable democracy to withstand attacks and not to fall.

…

Ben Plana Trajtenberg: What advice do you have for young leaders who are looking to make an impact on the future of democracy but feel like the issue is out of their control?

Babra Bhebe: Young people have an opportunity now to take the stage and say, “This is our time.” Now is the time for young people to stand and support democracy. You can join an organization that’s dealing with issues that you are passionate about. If it’s elections, you can join an organization like the Election Resource Centre.  You can join either as a volunteer, or you can apply for a job.  But there are other organizations, some that are way bigger than the Election Resource Centre, that are doing work in different parts of Africa, or globally, that you can join. Join these organizations and join the group of people who are making an impact.

Secondly, you can also find a way of helping these organizations to think about how they can harness technology to advance democracy. Do research on that. Some are working with technology, or are even developing new technology, that can be tested in different contexts to improve the civic sphere. There are more innovative ways that we need to employ in doing work in civil society as it pertains to civic engagement. Young people have an opportunity to do things in a different way. You cannot join the movement and still do things the same way. You need to bring in innovation from past [methods].

…

I think you should also write a lot. Follow events. Write. Get your voices to be known. Get your opinions about democracy known. The internet and technology are both a force for good and for evil. So we need more people, more voices that are going to speak the same language, and that are going to say we need a more equal society, we need a more just society.  And I’m hoping that you all are going to be amongst that group of people.

Image courtesy of the Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs

In the lead up to the Tokyo Olympics, large-scale building and manufacturing projects, in addition to wide range of service sectors, required an enormous influx of additional labor. To fulfill this need, Japan recruited hundreds of thousands of migrant workers; notably, the government expanded the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) in order to accomplish this. Initially introduced as a program to transfer ‘technical skills and knowledge’ to less developed countries in the region, the TITP has instead become an opportunity for Japan to access disposable low-wage workers. As one executive working with intern support explained, “only around 10% of interns continue the same job after they go back home.” Instead, this person continued, “the main purpose for the interns is to make money […] [and] ‘international cooperation’ is just a rationale for the policy.”

Notably, TITP has garnered wide-scale criticism over reports of its numerous forms of abuse. These include “excessive overtime work hours, unpaid or underpaid wages, coercive salary withholding under the name of ‘mandatory savings’, passport confiscation, and habitual forms of verbal and physical violence.” Unlike other Japanese workers, technical interns do not have the right to freely association or collectively bargaining. Thus, many technical interns and foreign workers exist in a state of de facto labor-servitude due to penalties restricting employment transfers, economic responsibility for family members, and large debts from pre-departure fees.

The extent of this malpractice in preparing for the Olympics was showcased in a 2019 report by International Federation of Building and Wood Workers. Almost half of the workers consulted on Olympic sites did not have formal employment contracts, the study noted, and many were underpaid in addition to the majority being critically overworked. According to the Japanese Labour Ministry, there were twenty-one deaths due to Karoshi (suicide due to overwork) in the construction sector, the second highest of all sectors in Japan. Among these was a 23 year old man who worked 190 hours of overtime at the Olympic stadium in the month preceding his death. In preparation for the games, workers at the Olympic Village reported working 28 days in a row and workers at the New National Stadium reported working 26 days in a row. As a result of collective pressure, TITP interns are legally required to be paid the minimum wage—though their wages are two-thirds less than other Japanese construction workers on average. Problems continue with migrant workers interviewed by BWI further explaining that there were no translated safety materials or procedures on site. Today, the mortality rate of foreign technical interns in the construction sector is twice the rate of other Japanese workers in the industry.

Since the 2020 Olympics, the Japanese government has implemented a number of policies to improve conditions for foreign technical interns. These includes, for example, a provision allowing interns to transfer employment to sectors beyond their original assignments—a step towards combating exploitative practices. Additionally, the government has expanded the category of “Specific Skills Workers I” (SSWI) and “Specific Skills Workers II” (SSWII) to attract qualified foreign labor in specialized sectors including construction. Workers that fit the skill criteria of SSWI are allowed to stay in Japan for up to five years, and, upon passing a specialized industry exam, can attain the type SSWII visa—which offers additional benefits such as permanent residency and allowances for bringing family members to the country. Toshihiro Menju, an executive at the Japan Center for International Exchange, described these expansions as “the full-scale start of long-term settlement for more blue-collar workers.” In reality, however, these changes have been significantly smaller in scope than first anticipated. As of March 2023 per the Justice Ministry, only eleven people held SSWII visas, despite over 154,800 eligible SSWI workers living in Japan today. It is significant that a Justice Ministry panel, examining the prevalence of human rights abuses surrounding the TITP, recommended the abolition of the current system and the establishment of a new program promoting stronger support and protections for migrant workers. Change must occur.

As Japan faces a new stage in its history, questions of foreign labor and immigration will only become more essential to nation’s future. By 2070, Japan’s population is estimated to reach 87 million people—38% of which will be over the age of 65 and 10% will be of foreign origin. Temporary measures to access immediate labor such as the Technical Intern Training or Special Skilled Workers programs will not solve Japan’s labor and demographic crises, however. The mistreatment of foreign technical interns during the 2020 Tokyo Olympics exposed a critical mistake made by Japanese government as the country moves towards this new era: its representation of immigrant labor. Immigrants are not the disposable sources of labor that they have been treated as, but are instead humans who must become an integral part of Japan for its own economic and social future. Japan cannot continue to expand pathways for foreign workers as temporary labor without understanding the deeper issues as well—such as systemic issues of race in the country—it continues into a more resilient, expansive future.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation:新国立競技場, taken by 江戸村のとく– Own work | Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

This article argues that ASEAN should coordinate a regional individual transferable quota (ITQ) system within the exclusive economic zones of Southeast Asia. An ITQ regime under ASEAN avoids the economic and political transaction costs of policies in the status quo and is the framework that optimizes the macroeconomic, microeconomic, and environmental conditions of Southeast Asia. To pursue this argument, this article employs the paradigm of institutional economics—the study of how institutions influence economic outcomes and behavior—using a counterfactual outcome assessment methodology between the ITQ, open-access, and command-and-control policy frameworks.

This article is subsequently divided into four parts. The first part is an evaluation of the causes of the current overfishing crisis and academic consensus. The second is a study on the feasibility of ASEAN to coordinate an ITQ system between its member states. The third is a comparative analysis of the economic and environmental benefits of an ITQ system to Southeast Asia to the open-access and regulatory alternatives. The fourth part is a conclusion that synthesizes the article’s argument and articulates its unique contribution to scholarship.

Hooked on Inaction—The Political and Economic Barriers to Overfishing Solutions

Southeast Asia’s overfishing crisis continues due to the prohibitive transaction costs of regulatory enforcement, requiring a reevaluation of academic recommendations of command-and-control interventionist policies. Despite the existential challenge of declining fish populations, overfishing in Southeast Asia has accelerated: regional fish production nearly doubled in the last twenty years and total fish stocks have decreased by up to 95%. Overfishing is due in part to how unpopular sustainable fishing policies remain in ASEAN countries, as demonstrated in the toppling of Thailand’s Prime Minister.⁴ As the fishing sector produces $67 billion for Southeast Asian communities, governments grapple with the complex effects of potential regulatory interventions—risking economic downturns, mass unemployment, and poverty.⁵ As a result, Southeast Asia cannot enact command-and-control regulations on fish production because of its high political and economic transaction costs.

Nonetheless, academic literature continues to erroneously recommend command-and-control regulatory interventions to solve international overfishing issues: Gaurav N. Lanjewar and fellow authors advocate for fishing bans; Takashi Fritz Matsuishi argues for the promotion of multispecies fisheries; ​​Ca-Van Pham and co-authors recommend bans on fish trawling.^{6 7 8} This contemporary scholarship on overfishing in Southeast Asia largely ignores the coordination problems that prevent the implementation of command-and-control interventions. Politicians are incentivized to oppose short-term production restrictions for re-election.⁹ Institutional consumers, such as the hospitality sector, are often incentivized to ignore regulations due to their upward pressures on input costs. Southeast Asian fish producers are incentivized to oppose regulations because they decrease profits.¹⁰ Therefore, many stakeholders in Southeast Asia are dissuaded from implementing such frequently discussed recommendations in academia. 

Academic scholarship therefore requires a fundamental reimagining of the policy solutions to the overfishing crisis in Southeast Asia. Individual transferable quotas, a type of market-based fishing management policy, are one such solution used in over 20 countries worldwide.¹¹ Governments establish the annual allowable catch of a fish species and divide it between local producers in the form of individual quotas, after which, producers can purchase, sell, or loan these quotas in the private sector for the right to harvest fish.¹² ITQ systems are economically and environmentally effective due to their ability to achieve multiple stakeholder aims: fish producers prioritize short-term profits while governments emphasize the need for sustainable fishing practices. For fish producers, quotas are government-allocated assets that increase their relative wealth and production to non-quota holders.^{13 14} For governments, annual catch limits ensure the regeneration of a species. The enforcement costs of ITQ systems are minimal because they are self-actualizing: producers are vested in the long-term value of their quotas and aim to become stewards of their ecosystems.¹⁵ ITQ systems are successful because they align the respective economic and ecological incentives of private and public stakeholders. ASEAN should implement a regional ITQ system in Southeast Asia because it is feasible and economically and environmentally superior to the open access and command-and-control policy alternatives. 

Reeling in Reform—ASEAN’s Feasibility for a Regional ITQ System

ASEAN can realistically implement a regional ITQ system due to its diplomatic consensus, precedence in environmental projects, and industrial capacities. ASEAN can coordinate a regional ITQ system due to its alignment on reforms on sustainable fishing: the ASEAN Ministers on Agriculture and Forestry enacted the “Resolution and Plan of Action on Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security for the ASEAN Region Towards 2030” in 2020, which enacted regional cooperation on sustainable fish production. This agreement, currently in effect, shares the burden of responsibility of fishing reform among Southeast Asian states and reduces the political capital required for ASEAN to enact an ITQ system. ASEAN can coordinate a regional ITQ system due to this explicit consensus towards sustainable fishing. 

ASEAN could further coordinate an ITQ system due to its precedence in coordinating binding resolutions on multinational ecological projects. Scholarship discusses the organizational norm of the ‘ASEAN Way’ that forbids international intervention in domestic affairs due to historic unease over colonization.^{16 17 18} Nonetheless, the organization has previously instituted two legally binding multilateral agreements on ecological protection: the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (1985) and the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (2002).¹⁹ These agreements demonstrate a willingness for the group to work under shared legal regulations for mutual environmental benefit. Pramudianto discusses the success of these resolutions for regional environmental protection.²⁰ The bloc can similarly implement an ITQ to meet its sustainability goals. ASEAN can organize a regional ITQ system due to its precedent of implementing similar multilateral environmental agreements.

ASEAN fulfills the institutional scientific, commercial, and legal criteria to feasibly implement an ITQ system. The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center compiles annual information on over 800 aquatic species in every ASEAN state. Markets are bullish on government securities from Southeast Asia, and ASEAN has established effective institutions, such as the Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, to address maritime crime.²¹ ASEAN is well-positioned to implement an ITQ system because it satisfies its technical, financial, and enforcement requirements.

Market Tides—Economic Resilience Through ITQ Fishing

ASEAN should implement an ITQ system not only because it can, but because it should. An ASEAN-led ITQ system in Southeast Asia has superior macroeconomic, microeconomic, and competitive benefits than the open-access and command-and-control fishing arrangements. It preserves the strength of Southeast Asian macroeconomies by averting the projected loss of up to $15 billion of economic output and 10 million livelihoods in the open-access status quo. An ITQ system maintains capital flows that support local fishing enterprises, unlike command-and-control regulations such as marine protected areas, which impose structural adjustment costs, reduce capital investment, and exacerbate the relative effects of supply-side shocks.^{22 23} ASEAN should coordinate an ITQ system in Southeast Asia because it preserves the strength of regional macroeconomies compared to the open-access and regulatory alternatives

On a more granular basis, an ITQ system improves the conditions of fishing sectors in Southeast Asia. The status quo of fish production in the South China Sea is the current open-access ‘race to fish’ model, where producers maximally harvest fish in minimal timeframes.²⁴ Unlike an ITQ system, this framework provides no safeguards for the long-term sustainability of fish populations.²⁵ Under an ITQ system, fishers can decide when to produce, such as to avoid adverse weather conditions, minimizing inter-annual variability in production rates.²⁶ Stable supply chains minimize operational losses for downstream market actors.²⁷ Additionally, compared to conventional regulatory interventions that halt economic activity, ITQ systems encourage optimized fish production: efficient producers purchase quotas from inefficient producers, reducing costs and increasing profitability.²⁸ ASEAN should implement an ITQ system in Southeast Asia, providing a more sustainable and productive alternative to the open-access and command-and-control policy approaches.

A regional ITQ system improves the competitiveness of regional fishing sectors more than the open-access and interventionist scenarios. ITQ fisheries can integrate upper limits on quota acquisitions to prevent monopolistic markets.²⁹ This arrangement is an improvement over the status quo of the open-access model, where the lack of de facto maritime regulation causes companies to crowd out small-scale subsistence and indigenous producers, eroding market competitiveness and economic equity.³⁰ Moreover, conventional regulations are economically regressive: compliance costs are relatively higher for small-scale producers than for large ones.³¹ To countervail this effect, under an ITQ system, individual quotas are collateral for small-scale producers to enter credit and insurance markets. ASEAN should implement an ITQ system in Southeast Asia to promote a more equitable and prosperous fishing market in the South China Sea.

Anchoring Biodiversity—Conservation Through Governance

Beyond its economic benefits, ASEAN should implement an ITQ system in Southeast Asia because of its environmental advantages over the open-access and command-and-control policy frameworks. Christopher Costello and co-authors compiled data for 11,135 global fisheries and concluded that fish population collapses are half as likely to occur in ITQ fisheries than in non-ITQ fisheries.³² This result is due to two inherent qualities of ITQ-managed fisheries: adaptive management and trophic conservation. In contrast to the unvarying nature of most policy interventions, governments can adjust individual quota distributions to new scientific and ecological circumstances such as climate change. These adjustments create ecological resilience.³³ Additionally, ITQ systems preserve the trophic hierarchy of ecosystems. In comparison to most fishing regulations which are species-agnostic, ITQ systems regulate catch limits per species. This precision that integrates ecological dynamics is necessary to support complex multi-species fisheries.³⁴ Fish producers are incentivized to support this ecological composition to maintain the value of their quotas, reducing the use of ecologically unsustainable traditional fishing methods in Southeast Asia, such as poison and blast fishing.³⁵ ASEAN should implement an ITQ system in the South China Sea to prevent ecological collapse in the region’s fisheries.

Conclusion

ASEAN should implement a regional ITQ system because it is superior to the open-access and interventionist scenarios, economically and environmentally. Economically, ITQ systems maintain national output, increase sectoral profits, and counter market monopolies. Environmentally, an ITQ system enables policy adjustments to future scientific and ecological conditions while preserving biodiversity. This article demonstrates that a regional ITQ system organized by ASEAN prevents the collapse of fish stocks in the South China Sea with optimal economic and environmental results.

This article, which argues for ASEAN to implement an ITQ system, contributes to scholarship by analyzing the implications of market-based systems for socio-economic goals in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. The current body of scholarship focuses on regulatory practices as a basis for the global sustainability of fish stocks. In contrast, this article argues how free market principles through an ITQ system limit overfishing and increase economic growth. Ultimately, this work further paves the way for future empirical investigations of ITQ initiatives in small-scale fisheries in Southeast Asia for insights on methods for regional scalability and sustainability as well.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: A Fishing Village Near Mui Ne, On the South China Sea in Vietnam, taken by Kent MacElwee | Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

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