Nature-based solutions (NBS) use natural landscapes to address environmental challenges. Instead of piping rainwater away, NBS implementations in cities like Rotterdam in the Netherlands, aims to “turn the city into a sponge” that absorbs and stores water. These can include creating open spaces – like parks and plazas – that flood temporarily, using green roofs and walls to catch runoff, and creating or restoring wetlands to act as reservoirs during intense rain. These solutions serve to mitigate the effects of heavy rainfall while integrating greenery that decorates the existing urban landscape. Restoring natural waterways and incorporating permeable pavements and soils into existing and future urban infrastructures can also help to curb the effects of flooding with high payoff. For instance, studies conducted on the effects of restoring floodplains show that for every euro invested in restoration, four euros are avoided in damages. These solutions serve a dual purpose: managing water and improving urban life. European cities implementing NBS are planning ahead, redesigning cityscapes to work with natural water cycles instead of against them. 

Spanish cities have taken great strides in promoting nature-based solutions as preventative flood measures. In Madrid, an urban project transformed a section of highway into a prolific green urban park along the Manzanares River that spans an area over 7.5 kilometers. This Madrid Río project provided the city with lawns, trees, bike paths, and playgrounds which all sit over giant stormwater containers that collect excess water, prevent overflow from potential flood events, and even help cool the city during intense heat waves. This park has become one of Madrid’s most popular spots and serves to bring the nearby community together. However, the project cost about 4 billion euros and faced skepticism and political pressure at its outset. Madrid provides a great example of integrating a flexible flood buffer – a green riverpark that can soak up stormwater and return to hosting picnics and soccer games. 

With climate change bringing heavier downpours, cities are finding new ways to adapt beyond barriers and surge barriers. As a Dutch port city, Rotterdam has embraced a shift in perspective – living with the water by making the urban landscape itself part of the solution. Under its “Rotterdam Climate Proof” program, the city has spent roughly 100 million euros on climate adaptation, pioneering innovative measures to manage excess rainfall. In 2013, Rotterdam opened Benthemplein Water Square, a public plaza that can retain almost 2 million liters of rainwater when heavy rains hit. Benthemplein fills up like a pond and gradually drains after the storm, a concept so successful that it has since been adapted in cities worldwide. Rotterdam has also tested out multi-use water storage systems, other blue-green schoolyards and parks, dual-purpose waterways, green roofs, and floating architecture to combat sea-level rise. Rotterdam’s success with all of these innovative techniques has attracted attention around the globe, from New York to Tokyo. For cities, especially those like Rotterdam that are below sea-level, Rotterdam’s innovations may provide key insights to keep cities dry and afloat.

Europe’s densest major city, Paris, has relatively few natural areas, increasing the impact of oscillating heat waves and major flooding. In response, Paris is pursuing a greening strategy, including the Paris Climate Action Plan and the “Soil & Rainwater Plan”, which plan to adapt the urban environment to better handle water. This includes ridding the city of excess asphalt, planting more trees, and mandating green roofs on new buildings. They have also developed initiatives like the “Oasis schoolyards” program, which adds green spaces and gardens to schools in order to reduce runoff and increase permeability and water storage. Paris has primarily sought to add parks, urban forests, and green roofs into the urban landscape, infusing nature wherever possible. The city has sought to make the green infrastructure a legal requirement and guide new projects to include NBS and biodiversity considerations. Paris’ developments help demonstrate how developed and populated cities can adapt to flooding or climate change concerns through implementation of NBS initiatives to contribute to a safer, more sustainable urban landscape. 

Nature-based urban flood solutions come with major barriers to implementation, the first of which is funding. Green infrastructure often requires significant up-front investment, and while it may be cheaper in the long run, finding the money initially can be difficult. Madrid’s project cost about €4 billion, and even smaller projects like Rotterdam’s water squares or Paris’s schoolyard greenery need steady financing. Cities may be able to seek EU funds, climate resilience grants, or public-private partnerships to fund these sustainable ventures. Some cities are even exploring innovative funding solutions — charging new development fees to fund flood mitigation parks or using insurance savings to invest in nature-based features.  

Another challenge is finding space in dense cities where urban land is expensive and contested. Converting a street into a bioswale or a parking lot into a pond may face harsh resistance. It takes political courage and community support to reclaim land for NBS projects. Strong leadership and public engagement are crucial to overcoming the short-term disruptions that the construction of these projects can bring. By informing the public on the benefits of NBS projects, they may be more willing to take on the costs and inconveniences associated with their implementation. 

Cities must also ensure equity in climate adaptation, given the risk that creating green amenities will inadvertently fuel “green gentrification”, raising property values and pushing out lower-income residents. This has been observed in North American and European cities where new parks have led to higher rents in surrounding areas. To counter this, planners in major cities strive to distribute nature-based projects to all neighborhoods, alongside affordable housing policies. Combining this with community involvement — such as Rotterdam co-designing water squares with local students and church members — can help ensure projects meet local needs and that residents welcome the change. The implementation of these nature-based solutions must be administered equitably to ensure that the benefits of these greener streets are not merely shared among the affluent. 

Some other general considerations are maintenance, performance, and large-scale implementation into urban design. When implementing these solutions, cities must budget for long-term care just as they would for pipes and pumps. Trees grow and die, parks need maintenance, and bioswales can clog if not maintained. There is also a learning curve in city agencies which will only improve as more cities embark on NBS projects, providing more data to validate their effectiveness and provide insights into the best strategies for efficient implementation and upkeep. Even cities such as Valencia — which undertook NBS projects but continues to face flooding concerns — provide key opportunities to learn from and improve these sustainable urban practices. Additionally, to truly counter escalating flood risks, these approaches must move from small isolated demonstrations to standard practice in urban design. Collective action must be taken to successfully integrate these projects through a coordinated strategy to maximize impact and benefits systemically. 

European cities have a choice to make: reinforce their fortress mentality with higher barriers and larger sewers, or reinvent themselves to align with nature. The cases above help portray what the latter path can achieve — beautifying cities, improving health, and bringing people together. Going forward, city leaders should incorporate the lessons from these pioneers, incorporating new developments or renovations into urban infrastructure — whether a small park or permeable parking lane. Ambitious targets help set the intention, but clear policies and incentives are necessary to achieve them. Cities may start by updating zoning and building codes but should also include larger-scale planning, collaborating beyond city limits — restoring upstream wetlands for instance — to effectively reduce flooding. The EU and national governments can accelerate progress by funding innovation and implementation within nature-based solutions and facilitating knowledge exchange. 

The implementation of these solutions are more robust than some may realize and provide quantifiable benefits as we factor in the severity of the global climate crisis. A recent European Commission study found that combinations of NBS measures could help Europe maintain future flood impacts at today’s levels even under a 3°C warming scenario. Investing in resilience helps avoid disaster losses and results in additional benefits like tourism, recreation, and improved public health. It is also important to make the distinction in sustainable design that grey and green infrastructure are complements. Smart cities will utilize hybrid solutions, pairing grey infrastructure such as a necessary stormwater tunnel or a seawall with green infrastructure such as new parks or restored wetlands. Tying these practices together can help protect cities from floods and diversify the urban landscape in ways that bring unparalleled improvements to cities. 

All in all, the battle against urban flooding in Europe is creating a new type of city. A city with tree-lined streets, plazas that welcome water, and rivers reconnected to their floodplains. A city that treats nature as an ally to be woven into its fabric. From Madrid’s revitalized Manzanares to Rotterdam’s sponge-like neighborhoods and Paris’s green schoolyards, we are seeing the blueprint of how to build flood-resilient cities that are also healthier, happier places to live. European cities should continue to scale up these nature-based solutions, sharing successes and learning from setbacks. As climate pressures mount, the choice is clear: embrace nature as part of urban infrastructure, or risk being overwhelmed by future storms. The water will come one way or another – better to work with it, than to fight a losing battle against it.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Floods in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made     

Achievements of Made in China 2025

Made in China 2025 aimed to boost quality, innovation, productivity, and the integration of industrialization and informatization. It identified ten sectors for breakthrough development: Information Technology (IT), robotics, aviation and aerospace equipment, offshore engineering equipment and high-tech ships, rail transportation, new energy vehicles, electrical equipment, agricultural machinery, biotech, pharma, and medical devices, and emerging technologies. 

By 2023, China led global research in 37 out of 44 critical technologies, as identified by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Critical Technology Tracker, highlighting how China is achieving the goal of breakthrough development. Among these critical technologies, nanoscale materials, 5G and 6G technologies, machine learning, aircraft engines, electric batteries, biological manufacturing, Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms, and autonomous systems particularly demonstrate enhanced capabilities in several of the targeted sectors.

Apart from these ten sectors, the plan emphasized strategic priorities which included manufacturing innovation, integration of informatization and industrialization, industrial capabilities, brand-building, green manufacturing, service-oriented production, and internationalization. Today, China is reported to be among the leading countries in the global innovation race, demonstrating rapid progress in innovative capabilities in robotics, nuclear power, electric vehicles, biopharma, and AI, among others.

Considering the priority of integrating informatization and industrialization, China’s industrial internet was reported to have witnessed an 8.7 percent year-on-year growth in 2022, reaching an output of USD 167.7 billion in 2023. Recently, Beijing has been upgrading its industrial internet with 5G technology, launching a pilot project for this purpose in November 2024. On March 7, a national political adviser confirmed full sectoral coverage in all key industrial sectors. 

In terms of industrial capabilities, a report by the UN Industrial Development Organization highlights that in the first quarter of 2024, China performed best among all industrial economies in the manufacturing sector, recording a 1.3 percent growth.  Another report by UNIDO projects China to hold a 45 percent share in global industrial production by 2030, while the United States’ share is projected to shrink to 11 percent.   

Chinese brands have also made great strides in improving quality standards and going global, following the fourth strategic priority. Fifty Chinese brands featured on the World Brand Lab’s World’s 500 Most Influential Brands ranking in 2024 and 69 in Brand Finance’s Global 500 2025 report. Chinese brands have been expanding their reach most rapidly in the fast-expanding economies of the global south, having increased their sales in these countries fourfold between 2016 and 2024. 

In the green manufacturing objective, progress has been more limited, with only three Chinese companies making it on TIME’s World’s Most Sustainable Companies of 2024 list. However, some progress has still been made, with thirteen out of sixteen targets for green development set for 2020 having been met. Beijing aims to peak carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. 

These facts indicate that China has been substantially successful in achieving most of its 2025 targets. According to the Flanders-China Chamber of Commerce, over 86 percent of the goals of Made in China 2025 have been met, a claim supported by the indicators above. Given the relative success of this plan, China’s goals for the next ten years provide a roadmap for projecting China’s growth by 2035.

China’s Vision for 2035

Based on the success of the targets set for 2025 and their impact on changing the global manufacturing dynamics, it can be projected that China may attain similar success in its next ten-year plan. By 2035, Beijing aims to become a manufacturing powerhouse with a high capacity for innovation, a leader in global standard-setting, and an economic superpower, as laid out in its Vision 2035 and the China Standards 2035 plan. As part of Vision 2035, the 14th Five-Year Plan, released in 2020, laid out the long-term goal of doubling the size of the economy by 2035. A companion initiative, China Standards 2035, outlines Beijing’s intent to shape global standards for critical emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, information and communications technology, renewable energy, and biotechnology. 

In the economic domain, China’s GDP grew from USD 15.45 trillion in 2020 to USD 18.80 trillion in 2024. Doubling the economy from 2020 and reaching USD 31 trillion requires an annual growth of 4.8 percent, but forecasts predict a slowdown that drops annual growth to 3.3 percent by 2029 and below 3 percent after. However, that does not mean China’s growth will be insignificant. With GDP projected at USD 22.73 trillion by 2029, even a growth rate of below 2 percent could still achieve over 80 percent of the target by 2035. 

In the technology sector, Beijing is becoming increasingly active in international standard-setting, particularly in critical emerging technologies. In September 2024, the UN’s International Telecommunications Union approved three new standards for 6G mobile technology developed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences. As of February, Beijing had signed 108 agreements for standards cooperation and mutual recognition with various regional, national, and private partners. Furthermore, the Digital Silk Road under the Belt and Road Initiative also contributes to exporting Chinese standards of technology to partner countries. With Beijing already emerging as a major player in standard-setting, it can be anticipated to have substantially reduced the United States and its allies’ dominance in international standards-setting a decade from today, therefore acquiring considerable control over emerging technologies and their markets.

In 2023, President Xi highlighted “new quality productive forces” as the foundation for future technology-driven economic growth, based on three critical industries – electric vehicles (EVs), lithium-ion batteries, and solar photovoltaics (PV). This focus is reflected in China’s growth, with Beijing leading the world in innovation, production, and export in all three industries. Such progress in innovation can translate to a leading position on global standard-setting in these industries, enabling China to consolidate dominance in these markets.

Challenges on the Path to 2035

China’s path towards 2035 will not be one without obstacles threatening its pace of progress. The most pressing of these challenges will be efforts from the United States to prevent the attainment of goals that threaten American economic and technological dominance. Economic decoupling through tariffs, first initiated under President Trump in 2018, is accelerating again through the imposition of heightened tariffs under his second administration. A report on the effects of the 2018 trade war discovered that weak market substitution constrained Chinese exporters’ ability to offset the impact of tariff hikes through diversion to alternate foreign markets, an effect likely to reappear as the United States was China’s second-largest export market in 2024. However, the severity of this impact can be expected to be comparatively lower as China’s trade with other countries has been rising more rapidly than with the U.S. and its Western allies, with ASEAN remaining the largest trading partner and trade with BRI partners constituting over half the total trade in 2024.

Heightening instability in the international system, with increasing pockets of conflict and geopolitical tensions, will also continue undermining global economic growth, including that of China. In Southeast Asia, tensions over the South China Sea – particularly with the Philippines and Taiwan – threaten regional trade. Increasing assertiveness in these disputes by China has been accompanied by growing bilateral partnerships between the U.S. and these regional states. Taiwan, in particular, remains a potential flashpoint, evidenced by increasing Chinese military activity around the island, growing arms transfers from Washington to Taipei, and a softening of Washington’s stance against Taiwanese independence.

In the technology sector, the tech war with the U.S. will hinder Beijing’s efforts for technological dominance. Washington’s efforts to choke China’s access to semiconductor chips through Taiwan have remained a major obstacle in China’s technological growth, as evidenced by Beijing’s recent investigation into the impact of U.S. government subsidies in this sector. However, the DeepSeek upset to the U.S.-dominated AI industry has highlighted China’s ability to innovate despite these restrictions.

Conclusion

China’s growth towards its goals for 2035 will be constrained by these challenges, and the realization of these goals in their entirety cannot be expected to materialize. However, Beijing’s demonstrated ability to innovate and its efforts to expand the pool of its economic partners will bolster growth despite these challenges, making a success rate similar to that of ‘Made in China 2025’ plausible. This projected estimate of success for the 2035 goals would directly contribute to enhancing China’s economic might and technological dominance.

Significant changes in the international system can be expected as China continues on this projected growth trajectory, as the United States and its allies would have to double down against growing Chinese influence in order to protect the ideological dominance of the rule-based order. With this in mind, the next decade can be anticipated to be an important and turbulent one, as the degree of China’s success in achieving its goals for 2035 will impact the severity of its challenge to the dominance of the U.S.-led international political and economic order.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Tech Technology Factory Zuhai China, Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made     

The youth generation in North Korea may just be the biggest threat to the North Korean regime. Unlike their relatives who grew up in the still stable 60s and 70s, millennials and Gen Z have no recollection of a prospering North Korea free of the poverty sweeping the state today. Officially referred to as the ‘marketplace generation’ in North Korea, young North Koreans have learned how to provide for themselves through the advancement of black markets and technology, securing access not only to living essentials but also to contraband like foreign media and fashion. As the primary drivers of foreign items in the state-wide black markets, the youth of North Korea are more aware of the promise of freedom outside of the regime than older generations. As the proportion of youth defectors increases, it is time to challenge the prevailing notion that North Korean citizens are blindly following the regime and focus instead on what is motivating the youth to challenge it.

Perceptions about North Koreans in the West tend towards the sensational. North Koreans are often portrayed as brainwashed and undyingly loyal to the regime, perpetuating the narrative that they cannot think for themselves. These perceptions not only make it difficult to empathize with the real stories of North Korean people but also make the situation on the Korean peninsula seem hopeless. After nearly 80 years spent divided, greater awareness of the capabilities of the North Korean people is necessary to figure out the path to reunification.

First, it is important to understand how North Korean youth engage with the outside world. Foreign media within North Korea usually originates from South Korea, China, or the United States, and includes TV shows, music, and magazines. Digital media is smuggled into the country on CD disks and USB sticks before being sold or rented out by black marketeers, who more often than not are youth. USB sticks are covertly exchanged after viewing at schools and other youth gathering places. At home, youth secretly watch dramas hidden under the covers or behind closed curtains. 

Foreign fashions are just as popular among the black market youth. Fashion items like blue jeans have been banned by the regime in recent years because of their salience as symbols of “Western imperialism” and cultural change. Youth caught wearing foreign fashions face punishments ranging from losing workplace advancement opportunities to public doxxing on the country’s propaganda radio program, Third Broadcast. However, despite the threat of consequences, youth still find ways to follow the trends of the actors and actresses they see in their contraband dramas, with many “true fashionistas” skipping the physical markets to buy banned items directly from black marketeers selling items like Western makeup and blue jeans directly out of their homes.  

Take Kang Jihyun, who defected in 2009. Defecting because of her dream to become a fashion designer, Kang’s story represents a growing trend of young North Koreans who defect for career opportunities and personal freedom. Kang’s journey to South Korea started with a simple pair of ripped blue jeans. After seeing a foreign tourist wearing the pair of ripped jeans, Kang became curious about all kinds of foreign fashions that seemed strange within North Korea’s strict clothing restrictions. Kang’s interest in fashion continued to grow despite “social and academic barriers” within North Korea, leading her to engage with any foreign media she could find in order to view the extensive fashion styles featured within.

Kang’s story highlights a growing push for freedom by North Korean youth—a “quiet information revolution.” As access to foreign items within North Korea increases, so does the public’s perception of freedom outside of North Korea. Of North Korean citizens’ foreign media viewing habits, researcher Sunny Yoon said: “The viewing patterns of foreign media in people’s daily lives may be one of a few indicators of social change in North Korea”. The youth population comprise nearly a quarter of the entire North Korean population and are the ones most often interacting with foreign materials. With this in mind, the role of the North Korean youth will “naturally eclipse” the role of the older generations in the future of North Korea, especially as youth become more connected with the outside world through technology and black markets. 

It is this increasing connection with the outside world that allows the generational traits of young people in North Korea to be understood through the lens of youth worldwide. In interviewing 120 American Generation Z (Gen Z) youth and parsing through nearly 70 million online writing samples from Gen Z authors, Stanford researchers found that compared to older generations, Gen Z are more likely to “question rules and authority”, especially when those rules concern issues of truthfulness. This matches existing perceptions of the generation, which often characterize Gen Z as more “individualistic” than their older counterparts, with a significant focus on “authenticity” and “self-expression”.

North Korean youth, most of whom are now Gen Z, display these same general trends of individualism as their Western counterparts. When asked about the meaning of freedom, a young North Korean defector responded that freedom is “‘being able to work in a certain place if you want and not if you don’t want, being able to do your own business if you want, living where you want and being able to go where you want’,” illustrating young North Koreans’ belief that freedom is based in choice and expression.  In the case of Yu Hyuk, who made the journey to South Korea alone at just 12 years old, music has become an outlet for authentic self-expression. Now 25, Yu is pursuing a career as a KPOP idol in the group 1VERSE . “‘Seeing that even North Koreans can have big dreams, I hope that other marginalized people can also have big dreams as they live their lives,’” Yu expressed while in an interview with the Wall Street Journal.

Generational differences surrounding the value of authenticity also show in how North Korean youth interact with sanctioned state media and propaganda. Interviews of young North Koreans resettled in South Korea suggest that when North Korean youth watch state media, they watch with a conscious effort to resist the propaganda messaging. Interviewed defectors said of watching North Korean state media that it appeared “‘unreal’”, and that conversely, South Korean media depicted a “genuine life story.” In interacting with foreign media, North Korean youth are finding freedom in engaging with authentic accounts of self-expression, fighting the propaganda messaging implicit in North Korea’s state-sponsored television and music. The difficult choice made by many young North Korean defectors to seek freedom outside of North Korea is underpinned by generational ideas of individualism and the importance of authenticity. 

Going forward, people outside of North Korea can support the growing movement of young defectors in a multitude of ways. South Korean citizens can express support for better readjustment programs for resettled North Koreans in South Korea, with a specific focus on breaking down educational barriers to success. Additionally, organizations like Liberty in North Korea (LiNK) and  People for Successful COrean REunification (PSCORE) fund everything from grassroots movements to increased access to foreign media in North Korea, paying for North Korean citizens to defect and educational programs for resettled defectors in both South Korea and in the US. 

Any effort to change perceptions of North Korean citizens may help usher in a brighter and freer future. North Korea’s youth will continue to fight for opportunities to defect and achieve the freedom they glimpse on the horizon. In their interactions with foreign and state media, there is no doubt that this generation will be the biggest threat to the North Korean regime in the coming years.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: North Korean Students, Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

The fascination between America and China did not begin with Nixon’s visit but rather with desperation—the purest kind of fascination. In 1784, Robert Morris sailed the Empress of China, laden with spirits and silver, from the fledgling United States to Guangzhou. This voyage was not merely an act of trade but a defiance against British imperialism. The ship was glutted with 30 tons of ginseng, highly valued by the Chinese, and returned to New York Harbor with a profit equivalent to nearly $1 million in today’s money, along with silk, tea, and exotic spices, all symbols of China’s mystique.

The voyage of the Empress of China carried “the hopes of a newly independent nation” with backers who were “all the signatories of the Independence agreement,” making it once a private enterprise but a national priority.” When the ship returned in May 1785 with 800 chests of tea, 20,000 pairs of nankeen trousers, and porcelain, Congress responded with “a peculiar satisfaction in the successful issue of this first effort of the citizens of America to establish a direct trade with China.”

This fascination was not limited to commerce; it extended into cultural admiration. To Philip Freneau, a poet of the American Revolution, the very act of trade with China represented lashing out against British dominance. Nowhere is this unique relationship more apparent than in the story of American women in China. In the 19th century, American women were afforded education yet were relegated to homemakers. They would paradoxically find freedom in China, a country where women’s rights were far less developed. But that was precisely the case for Adele Field. In May 1865, she was a widow in a wedding gown, sobbing on the shores of a strange land. She had traveled 149 days from New York to be married in Hong Kong, only to find her husband, a Baptist missionary, dead of typhoid fever. For most, this heartbreak would have been the defining moment of their life. But for Adele Field, it was merely a footnote. 

Born in 1839 in upstate New York, she had already established herself as a principal of a girls’ school by 25 and was later hired by the Northern Baptist church as one of the first single women missionaries. Such women missionaries occupied a fascinating cultural position, coming to China in a period of cultural turmoil to help Chinese women become Christian, find a nice Chinese Christian husband, and settle into a life of Christian domesticity. Yet to Field, this was only the beginning of her education for her students, who would be remembered in history as “Bible women.” She taught her students hygiene, childcare, basic medical skills, and geography, unprecedented knowledge to a country still beginning to realize the harms of footbinding. And as Adele Field defied the norms set upon her by American womanhood, her defiance became contagious. Adele’s students, who eventually became the first graduating class of Jinling Women’s University, an American-funded institution in Nanjing, all took vows never to marry.

Adele’s story is but one of American missionary women who helped build up women’s rights in China. Such missionaries pushed for the unbinding of women’s feet in China, “freeing Chinese women literally to move up in the world,” while also campaigning against female infanticide by placing baskets on the side of Chinese lakes where babies would be thrown with the message “put your babies here.” Their impact lives on. Today, it is the same metaphorical baskets that exist, not as cruel, but only now in the form of countless American parents coming to adopt an influx of Chinese children. Yet perhaps the greatest reflection today of the legacy of women’s rights was Hillary Clinton’s 1995 speech at the UN International Women’s Conference in Beijing. She had been labeled a failure in America with her high-profile efforts to reform the nation’s health care system.

It is no coincidence that, following the footsteps of Adele Field and so many female missionaries before her, Clinton found her voice by inspiring Chinese womanhood. Clinton’s declaration that “women’s rights are human rights” marked a political turning point after difficult years as First Lady and inspired Chinese women to pursue freedom and equality. More than two decades later, that 21-minute speech lived on, standing out as a moment when Clinton began to forge an identity as a public figure on the world stage apart from her husband.

Yet, it isn’t accurate to think of this fascination as one-sided. Yung Wing, the first Chinese graduate from Yale University in 1854, envisioned a program where young Chinese boys would study Western science and engineering to modernize China. The Chinese Educational Mission (CEM) brought 120 boys to Hartford between 1872 and 1881. These students, some as young as eight or nine years old, lived with American families, attended local schools, and played baseball on weekends.

However, from the start, this exchange was fraught with tension. The Americanization of the boys alarmed Chinese officials in fear that they were neglecting their heritage. When some students began attending church with their American host families, Chinese officials pressured the emperor to shut the program down. Ultimately, the program was terminated in 1881, leaving behind both hope for modernization and disappointment over its abrupt end.  The lost opportunity became immortalized in the poem of influential official Huang Zunxian, who wrote, “A decade’s effort in training youths / Will lay the foundation for a century’s wealth and strength.” Despite its premature end, many students later returned to China and significantly contributed to China’s civil services, engineering, and the sciences. Yet their legacy lives on; how many overseas Chinese students remained scattered across America, the blossoming flowers of the seeds scattered more than a century ago.

Yet it is equally ignorant to view the history of the countries illuminated in the warm light of nostalgia. The tension today is nothing new. In the spring of 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed by Congress and signed by President Chester A. Arthur. This act slapped a 10-year ban on Chinese laborers immigrating to the United States. For the first time, federal law prohibited the entry of an ethnic working group because it endangered the good order of certain regions. Following the expiration of the Exclusion Act in 1892, Congress extended it for 10 more years in the form of the Geary Act, requiring each Chinese resident to register and obtain a certificate of residence. Without a certificate, they faced deportation.

More than a century later, Florida passed SB 264 in 2023, banning Chinese immigrants from buying a home in large swaths of the state. The law singles out people from China for especially draconian restrictions and harsher criminal penalties, including up to five years in prison for the person trying to buy a home. Ironically, the same country was built by “Chinese capital, funneled through Boston investment banks,” a vital funding source for the Industrial Revolution in the early 1800s. John Forbes, an ancestor of former Secretary of State John Forbes Kerry, made millions in Guangzhou and returned to America with not only his silver “but also the silver of many of his Chinese colleagues,” which funded railroad construction from the East Coast to Chicago.

Furthermore, more than “half of the transcontinental railroad” was built by Chinese immigrants under brutal conditions. Between 1863 and 1869, an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Chinese migrants laid the tracks of the western half of the railroad. Those workers pounded on solid rock from sunrise to sunset, hung off steep mountain cliffs in woven reed baskets, and withstood the harshest winters on record in the Sierra Nevada. Around 90% of the railroad workforce was Chinese at the height of construction. In an infamous bet made between Charles Crocker of the Central Pacific and Thomas Durant of the Union Pacific, Crocker proclaimed that his mostly Chinese crew could build 10 miles of track in one day in Utah. Between 7:00 am and 7:00 pm, the workers completed the ten miles and an extra 56 feet, laying nearly one mile of track per hour- a construction feat matched only today in the age of machines.

Americans know theirs is a country built upon law, but less is known about the Chinese’s helping to build America in this regard. Wong Kim Ark was born in the United States and regularly visited family in China. On returning from one trip, immigration officers barred his entry because of his ethnicity. Wong asserted his right to enter as a U.S. citizen and dared to challenge the Immigration Bureau. The result was the Supreme Court case United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), birthing the precedent that any person born in the United States is a citizen by birth. Despite enduring significant humiliation and mistreatment during the Chinese Exclusion Movement of 1882, Chinese immigrants utilized American law as a courageous means to combat racial discrimination. In the first decade of the Chinese Exclusion Act alone, Chinese Americans fought more than 7000 court cases, most of which they won.

Bitterness can only last so long. Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 thawed diplomatic channels that had been frozen throughout the Cold War.  The visit was a visual spectacle for the U.S. President, his entourage, and the rest of the world, who watched with bated breath as the leader of the free world traveled to the largest Communist nation. A whirlwind tour through three of China’s major cities brought Nixon to several famed historical sites and cultural performances and face-to-face with many senior Chinese leaders. A few weeks later, the Shanghai Communiqué established the “One China” policy and set the stage for normalized relations. However, it also revealed fundamental misunderstandings between the two sides. While the U.S. believed engagement would mold China into a democratic ally, Mao Zedong still clung to his mistrust, viewing America as “both a huge opportunity and a huge threat.”

Those words might be the greatest summary of the relationship today. In 2015, China’s education minister demanded “a ban on textbooks promoting Western values in all of China’s schools.” The government has ordered artists and architects to “serve socialism” and renamed housing developments that had been given Western names like “Yosemite” or “Manhattan Golden Dream Village.” The number of Chinese students coming to study in the U.S. has also declined, reflecting a significant shift in both policy and public perception as many Chinese students reconsider their educational options.

The relationship between America and China is akin to Buddhist reincarnation or the spinning tires of a Ford Mustang- a cycle of enchantment followed by hope, disappointment, bitterness, and renewed fascination. As both nations rise on parallel trajectories toward global power, their intertwined histories offer lessons for navigating future challenges. The contradictory ways Americans approach China, as both threat and opportunity, with fear and benevolence, are “hardwired in America’s DNA.” Similarly, China remains conflicted about America, seeking its technology and education while fearing its cultural and political influence.

This relationship has become “the most consequential relationship between any two countries in the world.” To move forward constructively requires acknowledging shared contributions while addressing ideological differences. Whether through scientific collaboration or cultural exchange programs like those pioneered by Yung Wing or Adele Field centuries ago, the wheel must continue turning toward mutual understanding rather than conflict. In observing this wheel’s revolution across 250 years, from Robert Morris’ voyage on the Empress of China to today’s geopolitical tensions, we find that history offers not only cautionary tales but also reasons for optimism. China and America are entangled, and understanding our shared past is essential for navigating this complex relationship in the years to come.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: American Paddle Steamer ‘Willamette’ at Canton (Guangzhou), Image sourced from Picryl | CC License, no changes made

Private Military Firms (PMFs) are an emerging branch of actors in postmodern military conflict. While the use of ‘mercenaries’ goes back centuries, the corporatization and intricate governmental infiltration by private contractors has shifted the control that sovereign states have over levels of violence in their foreign conflicts. Modern definitions of PMF groups distinguish private military companies (PMCs) from private security companies (PSCs) and draw further distinctions from mercenaries, the latter of whom bear the negative, decades-old connotation of soldiers for hire. For this assessment of private contracting during the United States occupation of Iraq following 9/11, I employ PMFs as the collective term for these groups. The proliferation of the private sector and military contracting in foreign conflicts necessitates an exploration of the effectiveness of PMFs in counterinsurgency practices; PMFs’ relationship to international law; and the extent to which indiscriminate violence by PMFs is controlled. 

Implications of PMFs in world conflicts are understudied; although mercenaries have been used historically, increased privatization of today’s conflicts in the age of weapons of mass destruction poses a wider threat of anarchy and calls into question the strength of conventional rules of engagement. Counterinsurgency (COIN) itself is an emerging field of military study, with only recent proliferation into the world of academia in light of the U.S.’ “forever wars” and resulting COIN practices. Limited information is known about the efficacy of parallel COIN practices when they are executed by a paramilitary force. Further, the general lack of transparency in the private military firm sector prevents immediate examination of applicable cases. Only now, when broader accounts of PMF actions have been recorded and publicized, can some scholarly assessment be produced. 

Several complications arise when analyzing the role and conduct of PMFs. There is not one standard type of private military company; operations by these groups vary significantly, as demonstrated in a number of cases including Sierra Leone (PMF: Executive Outcomes), Afghanistan (PMF: Blackwater), Iraq (PMF: Blackwater), and Sudan (PMF: Wagner). Operational variations include PMFs’ interactions with civilian populations along the way and the success of the operations. Even within a given company, operational goals vary from humanitarian and domestic support (i.e., Blackwater post-Hurricane Katrina) to support for American counterinsurgency support (i.e., Blackwater during the War on Terror). 

In this paper, I examine the dangers and advantages of private contractors, with a specific focus on Blackwater—now Constellis, hired for military operations in U.S. foreign operations. I begin by outlining the notable role of Blackwater, a private military company, in Iraq during the early 2000s U.S. COIN efforts against Islamist insurgents. I pay special attention to the prevalent and unfettered use of indiscriminate violence in Blackwater operations, as well as the perceived advantages of using private companies for special military operations. Indiscriminate violence describes the collective targeting of combatant and civilian populations without credible distinguishability between the two. Then, I explicate the backlash effects of Blackwater operations on U.S. troops. The following section of this paper deals with the lack of accountability that companies such as Blackwater enjoy in the context of both domestic and international law. Finally, I demonstrate that private military companies’ subversive behaviors negatively impact U.S. COIN operations. Addressing claims of brutal efficacy, I show that the advantages of operating outside sovereign state rules of law not only violate any semblance of just war, but also further motivate the grievances of host nation populations (such as Iraq in 2004) due to the denial of atrocities committed. I find that Blackwater’s indiscriminate practices in Iraq bred Iraqi distrust, incited reprisals, and represented greater oversights of contractor accountability within the U.S. government. I contend that the ethical failings of these practices decreased counterinsurgent success. 

I assert that the foreign policy effects of private contracting groups can be generalized, regardless of the purported goals of the groups (offensive, defensive, etc.) due to their “out-group” status. Context for this paper’s examination of Blackwater during the Iraq War stems from the faltering of U.S. national troops in forming an adequate “coalition of the willing” during the initial invasion into Iraq. 

Literature Review 

PMFs broadly commit acts of indiscriminate violence outside of the rule of law, thereby alienating the host population and decreasing the effectiveness of state or private COIN forces. I aim to advance current schools of thought regarding causes and effects of PMF ineffectiveness. Theorists posit that in the event of indiscriminate violence, free riders—in this case, the persuadable population who are civilians at the start of a conflict—will seek sanctuary with rebels. This drive to the rebels presents a solution to the insurgent collective action problem, wherein insurgent groups face the challenge of convincing a neutral populace to risk death in going against the state and its COIN forces. Defined by “rough” selection criteria and “targeting everyone . . . with no effort to determine guilt or innocence,” populations facing indiscriminate violence have no reason to choose to aid COIN or state forces since they are fundamentally vulnerable and the costs of joining an insurgency are reduced. As evidence from the U.S.–Vietnam war suggests, indiscriminate counterinsurgency fueled insurgents by prompting the emergence of weaker local governance structures and lowering the at-large population’s civic engagement. The American counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam asserted that enemy-centric firepower was to come first, and population-centric “hearts and minds” would follow. Due to resultant findings indicating the adverse effects of indiscriminate firepower during the Vietnam War, U.S. Army/ Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 was drafted to provide an updated view of modern COIN strategy as predominantly a population-centric approach spearheaded by General David Petraeus. Findings from spatial discontinuity studies of bombing during the Vietnam War then illustrated that “overwhelming firepower” instigated increased militant activity and weakened governance structures. In fact, assessments of indiscriminate violence across various cases concludes that indiscriminate violence is “at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive.”

PMFs are seen as profit-maximizing businesses operating with little regard for human or moral consequences; their soldiers operate primarily for personal gain.  Consistently, PMFs have outbid each other, leading to undersupplied and manned missions creating circumstances necessary for events like the Blackwater in Fallujah crisis. Further, PMFs face little accountability from state governments who bear responsibility for “private security forces acting on [their] behalf through government contracts and cannot delegate this responsibility.” Consequently, many of the crimes alleged to have been committed by PMFs are never acknowledged by the firms themselves (simply businesses trying to achieve quarterly growth) or by their contractually-bound governments, who prefer to sweep unfortunate incidents out of public view. 

A second school of thought alleges that PMFs provide significant outside backing for military conflicts and increase the effectiveness of their operations by operating outside the constraints of public opinion since the ethics and illegality of indiscriminate violence are not a hindrance. Further, domestic policy greatly influences the extent to which states can conduct public COIN operations. Narratives generated by the American public’s notion that liberal order must be restored abroad heavily dictate the leeway afforded to American politicians during foreign military operations. In Chechnya, indiscriminate violence perpetrated by a government unconstrained by public opinion and studied through a difference-in-difference model was found to successfully deter insurgency operations as long as geographic and population sizes were sufficiently limited.

Proponents and critics of PMFs acknowledge a concrete advantage of acting outside national institutions: private companies can act quickly, avoid bureaucratic red tape, accomplish goals at any cost, and disregard public opinion at the expense of losing political power. As O’Brien mentions, “The U.S. Government did not have to undergo the political risk associated with sending national armed forces into security situations which are little understood or supported domestically.” As was the case in Croatia, private contractors enabled the U.S. to covertly support a cause without fairing public discourse and disapproval. However, the covert nature of these activities also engendered a lack of accountability for actions that angered local or civilian populations, hindering future COIN operations. 

A summary perspective follows that while PMFs initially displayed shortcomings on the battlefield, their eventual integration into the U.S. military structure effectively employed these paramilitary troops and overcame initial shortcomings. This hypothesis is structured around the idea that when private military firms first emerged, their incursion into the sovereign state system was unexpected and therefore presented a significant shortcoming with regard to a chain of command conflict. The argument posits that by 2008, PMFs had increased their coordination with national militaries rather than vying for control over a system (theoretically evidenced by friendly fire decreases between contractors and national forces). Since PMF contractors are still not explicitly classified as combatants, mercenaries, or civilians under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), there remains a question as to the level of control or coordination exerted by the U.S. over its contracted employees. 

The second shortcoming mentioned is the “cowboy argument,” which argues that PMF participation alienates host populations through their inherent aggressive practices. Only after the damage done by the Nisour Square Massacre of 2007 did the Department of Defense outline specific measures permitting the use of deadly force. Even so, proponents of these guidelines call them “futile if there are no corresponding measures in place to detect and to sanction violations.” 

The final shortcoming this argument addresses is the impunity argument. Previously discussed, this argument addresses a lack of accountability mechanism built into the government. Even those who argue that increased oversight over time has increased accountability note that despite the expiration of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 17, a military order implemented by the COIN coalition which provided immunity for government contractors in Iraq, three firms are still exempt from Iraqi jurisdiction: Blackwater, Triple Canopy, and Dyncorp. New legislation was then implemented, but nonetheless, “ . . . a strong minority of 30 percent deemed [the statement that “armed contractors are given free reign to misbehave with little accountability”] as “typically true.”  These expert accounts provide significant anecdotal reports that governmental oversight is lacking. 

Argument 

Studying the effects of indiscriminate violence committed by paramilitary groups on the broader insurgency within a given area, I posit that the Blackwater’s subversive and unethical indiscriminate violence operations, characteristic of PMFs, led to an increase in Iraqi population backlash, ineffective counterinsurgency, and a hardening of Iraqi opinions to the U.S. through mechanisms of distrust and humiliation. I contend that Blackwater repeatedly conducted operations in Iraq using techniques of indiscriminate violence without regard for sovereign U.S. or international law. As such, they broke principles governing conduct before and in the midst of formal conflict outlined in Just War Theory, since Blackwater truly acted in an anarchical manner. These lawless yet goal-oriented techniques prevented the U.S. from wanting to or being able to hold Blackwater accountable for its actions. Thus, Blackwater continued to systemically prioritize profits over human life. 

Blackwater’s indiscriminate practices hurt the U.S. counterinsurgency effort by sabotaging their “hearts and minds” approach, in direct contrast to ideals outlined by the U.S.’ Army/ Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24. Not only did this sabotage create direct Iraqi reprisals in the form of resistance, but it also led to hardened ideologies and ideological uprising against the West (evidenced by the ideologically-driven Mahdi Army who drove collective Iraqi action against U.S. troops). Denials of Blackwater actions piled on top of existing Iraqi humiliation generated lingering distrust among the Iraqi population. One philosophy proposes that PMFs filled a necessary gap in troop shortage at the beginning of the Iraq War. However, I postulate that the supposed gap filled by PMFs became a feedback loop in which further U.S. forces defected from national militaries to PMFs in order to seek additional profit. Regulations placed upon PMFs prior to Blackwater’s rise to such monopolistic power could have prevented their marketization of the conflict labor market. While PMFs may have been necessary to some components of the war effort, their gross overreach and ethical breaches outweigh the positive support they provided to counterinsurgency efforts. 

Method of Evaluation 

To demonstrate key failures of the use of PMFs, the Iraq War offers plenty of recorded interactions between contractors and the host country, as well as ineffective and effective phases of U.S. and PMF counterinsurgency. The generalizability of this case is questionable, although many comparisons can be made to ethnically divided and rough terrain civil conflicts on the African continent, where foreign intervention by PMFs is prevalent and rising. 

Why Iraq? Private security contractors in Iraq had been assigned more expansive roles than previously assigned to American contractors such as transporting supplies, escorting convoys, and interrogating prisoners. The Iraq War itself presents an intrinsically important case as it concerns an ethno-religious conflict that contributed to a broader divide between the ideological East and West, the developing and developed world. The Blackwater case study presents a poignant reflection on what many consider an infamous example of private contractors in counterinsurgency. Headed by a right-wing, ideologically-extreme figure, Erik Prince, Blackwater became synonymous with military contracting during the Iraq and Afghan Wars due to the publicity generated by a variety of controversial incidents. The company’s notoriety presents a unique opportunity to examine information about more of its activities; further, several of the largest contracts awarded in the Iraq War were won by Blackwater and its numerous subsidiaries. Blackwater developed a reputation as the “leading mercenary of the U.S. occupation” in Iraq. 

I will include evidence of recorded casualties of PMF personnel during these wars as well as deployed personnel. I will also assess levels of violence during COIN operations within the recent Iraq invasion. I examine specific events of indiscriminate violence by the U.S. military and by Blackwater to qualify reasons for PMF failure. Through qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources, I aim to form an argument regarding the effects of private military company and external force punitive strategies on insurgent response to collective violence, as well as the ethics of PMFs left at their current level of regulation. 

Evaluation of Evidence 

Blackwater conducted operations indiscriminately in Iraq. Embedded in Field Manual 3-24, indiscriminate violence contradicts practices of limited or selective violence. The following acts mark a systemic pattern of indiscriminate violence where either noncombatant deaths were not avoided, or Blackwater operatives preemptively employed mass killing methods: 

On December 24, 2006, a drunk contractor named Moonen shot the bodyguard to the Iraqi Vice President in the Green Zone of Baghdad. Rather than being held accountable, he was simply billed for his plane ticket home. 

February of 2007 saw the Iraqi Media Network shooting where a Blackwater sniper shot and killed three guards at a state funded facility “without any provocation,” although Blackwater claimed self-defense with little evidentiary support. 

Three months later, Blackwater forces killed a civilian driver of an Iraqi vehicle and engaged in an armed standoff with Iraqi officials, refusing to acknowledge their role in the incident the day after killing at least four Iraqis in an unrelated standoff.

In September 2007, Blackwater committed the Al Wathbah Square killings, killing five Iraqi civilians “without justification.” 

One week later, Blackwater came under fire for its most famous incident. A group of fighters in Nisour Square gunned down 17 civilians with no direct prompting, creating a “terrifying scene of indiscriminate shooting.” Lack of coordination even presented through infighting of Blackwater guards, with two reportedly pulling weapons on each other. 

To amplify the brutal image of these fighters, Blackwater “deployed scores of Chilean mercenaries, some of whom trained and served under . . . Augusto Pinochet.” Pinochet’s dictatorship was largely known for orchestrating indiscriminate disappearances, and these skills seemed to “fit” Blackwater’s approach in Iraq. 

An Iraqi traffic policeman noted, “Two weeks ago, guards of a convoy opened fire randomly that led to the killing of two policemen … I swear they are Mossad,” he said.” This unpublicized incident and its perception within the country as random contributes to the reputation contractors developed locally as mercenaries indistinguishable from the overall U.S. military effort. 

Blackwater did not follow or care to follow U.S. and international regulations regarding either warfare or international justice. The U.S. government follows standard operating procedures (SOPs) set forth by its top generals and publicly debated about in military discourse. Written in part by John Nagl and General Petraeus, key operators in Iraq, Field Manual 3-24 explicates components of so-called ‘good governance.’ As Hazelton describes in “The Fallacy of Hearts and Minds,” discriminate force that can win over the “hearts and minds” of civilians is an essential intervening variable of good governance because indiscriminate and civilian harm fuels insurgencies. However, Hazelton argues that the use of force is beneficial in violent statebuilding. Using a case study of Malay, she recalls that after a shift from Briggs’ indiscriminate “New Villages” plan, implementation of more discriminate force led to greater development of informants, cooperation with elites, and eventual success.

Blackwater, in contrast, operates without the oversight of government conduct manuals in order to achieve their bottom line.In fact, Erik Prince has publicly stated that Blackwater functions under the Department of Defense rules for contractors and not for U.S. national soldiers; he emphasizes this distinction when discussing the legality of actions attributed to Blackwater operatives. As noted, “Blackwater operated in a legal gray zone, seemingly outside the scope of both U.S. civilian and military law and immune from Iraqi law.” U.S. military officials also cite national service inexperience for failing to “prepare adequately for the use of contractors” and noting a lack of trained oversight personnel. While various justice processes and civilian lawsuits in the wake of the Nisour Square Massacre and the U.S.’ shift to more “liberal narratives” have reversed this trend, Blackwater had openly declared its forces above the law during their deployment to Iraq. 

The U.S. government did not and could not hold Blackwater accountable. Across both sides of the political aisle, American lawmakers found it difficult to formally disapprove of Blackwater’s actions during an era where they were protected by these very companies when traveling abroad. Blackwater had gained notoriety in the “summer of 2003, after receiving a $27 million no bid contract to provide security for Ambassador Paul Bremer, who headed the Coalition Provisional Authority from May 2003 to June 2004.” Their fame grew throughout their tenure of protecting Bremer, who became a highly wanted and “hated” figure in Iraq. “Even staunch critics of Blackwater/Xe therefore find general disapproval difficult to articulate.”  These so-called staunch critics included powerful Democrats Diane Feinstein and Barack Obama; despite having moral objections to the extraneous effects of these companies, they recognized their utility in providing effective diplomatic security at any cost. Thus, Blackwater’s cycle of firing at will continued. 

Powerful national military officials were even incorporated into this partnership: General Petraeus was famously guarded by Blackwater contractors in Iraq, as they were known for their aggressive “defense” tactics (as evidenced in their self-defense assertions regarding the Nisour Square Massacre, which were later overturned). Even on the legal front, Blackwater enjoyed the protections of Bremer’s power and favor in the passage of Order 17, which provided immunity for U.S. contractors operating in Iraq. Order 17 equipped Blackwater with the shield it needed to maintain an extrajudicial presence in Iraq: it legally solidified the U.S.’ inability and ultimate unwillingness to hold contractors to the same legal standards as  U.S. soldiers, who would have been swiftly court-martialed at the first hint of untoward behavior. 

A notable example of this phenomenon is the widely publicized horror committed at Abu Ghraib prison. U.S. interrogators and soldiers involved in the dehumanization, humiliation, and torture of Iraqi prisoners were court-martialed for their crimes shortly after the incident; none of the private contractors named in the U.S. Army investigation reports had been charged, prosecuted or punished until this year. For other crimes, Human Rights Watch found in 2023, “no evidence the U.S. government had paid any compensation or other redress to victims of detainee abuse in Iraq, issued any individual apologies or other amends, or opened any pathways to permit those who alleged they were tortured to have their cases heard.” 

Blackwater, having no incentive to do otherwise, prioritized profits over human life, which bolstered their indiscriminate practices. A key component of Blackwater’s practices involves their competitors. Blackwater, simply a business conglomerate, must outcompete other private military firms and even national armies to sustain its profits. Exemplified when Blackwater wrested control of kitchenware contracts from ESS (a dining services contractor) and deployed four Blackwater security contractors to their deaths in Fallujah with no backup and little protective weaponry, their bottom line of profit remained the most important. As the conflict in Iraq waged forth, Blackwater decided to hire Chilean forces after Jose Miguel “Mike” Pizarro lobbied for his Pinochet-era fighters. These brutal, albeit effective, Blackwater fighters were swiftly replaced by cheaper Jordanian alternatives after Pizarro insulted Blackwater executives by signing a contract with their direct competitor, Triple Canopy. Purely a business decision, Pizarro notes the degradation of Blackwater’s fighting capacity after switching to cheaper forces. In an Iraqi civilian lawsuit against Blackwater for indiscriminate practices, the plaintiffs assert, “Blackwater benefits financially from its willingness to kill innocent bystanders.” 

Consequently, Blackwater hurt U.S. national counterinsurgency practices. Blackwater changed U.S. COIN practices through more than just theory, opinion, or attitude. Indiscriminate actions and public snafus “forced policymakers to jettison strategies designed to win the counterinsurgency on multiple occasions, before they even had a chance to succeed” including the “U.S. Marine plan for counterinsurgency in the Sunni Triangle” which was never enacted due to “uncoordinated contractor decisions in 2004 that helped turn Fallujah into a rallying point of the insurgency.” Singer goes on to name the Blackwater contractor incident as a hindrance to proceeding with U.S.-Iraqi cooperation on “post-[troop] ‘surge’ political benchmarks.” While COIN strategies in Iraq posed many difficulties, proponents of indiscriminate violence in certain insurgency cases posit that “the Sunni population is probably too numerous for indiscriminate violence to do anything but backfire and produce further anger.” 

U.S. military officials had first-hand negative reactions to Blackwater’s COIN practices. Retired Army officer Ralph Peters said, “Armed contractors do harm COIN—counterinsurgency efforts. Just ask the troops in Iraq.” In more strategy oriented terms echoing the tenets of Field Manual 3-24, Colonel Thomas Hammes said, “Blackwater’s high-profile conduct in guarding Bremer broke the ‘first rule’ of fighting an insurgency: ‘You don’t make any more enemies’” and that their lack of constraints were “. . . ‘hurting our counterinsurgency effort.’” 

Blackwater’s indiscriminate use of violence led to Iraqi backlash. Causal logic can trace specific Blackwater events of indiscriminate violence to Iraqi incidents of violence. Iraqi civilians sued Blackwater in 2007 in response to the Nisour Square Massacre, where graphic evidence showed women and children fleeing gunfire. 

A more notable instance of backlash occurred earlier in the war involving the Mahdi Army. The Mahdi Army, or JAM, was a Shi’a militia led by Muqtada al-Sadr, an ideological entrepreneur who fostered psychological commitments to the group through effective messaging. While Iraqis grew more and more discontent with U.S. reactions to Iraqi killings, Sadr blamed the U.S. and Iraqi governments for failing to provide security and service while gaining credibility through payoff to families of fallen Sadrists. In response to the indiscriminate killing of fifteen Iraqis and the arrest of Sadr’s deputy, the leader urged a rebellion. The resultant uprising led to a standoff in Najaf, where Blackwater contractors gave commands to U.S. national forces and fired thousands of rounds into a Mahdi crowd; accounts over which side fired the first shot are contested. As a product of the Najaf firefight, Sadr ordered widespread rebellion, which then led to 8 U.S. soldier deaths in the ensuant clashes; visual evidence showed tanks crushing Iraqi civilian cars. 

Blackwater’s denial of atrocities led to an increased distrust between Iraq and the West; distrust mobilized the neutral populace against Coalition forces due to honor and humiliation. According to “Apologies in International Politics,” denial of atrocities committed fuels adversaries. Evidenced through reactions of South Koreans to Japanese erasure of World War II-era crimes against Korean women, refusal to acknowledge criminal behaviors against a state leads to higher levels of distrust in the affected population. Applied to the case of Blackwater in Iraq, the company’s blanket refusal to acknowledge multiple cases of wrongdoing against the Iraqi populace spurred reactionary movements against Western forces. In previously discussed cases such as that of the Moonen shooting, Blackwater offered either little or no compensation to families of the deceased. When they did offer compensation, it was often arbitrary or Iraqis viewed the amount proffered as a direct insult.In light of CPA Order #1: DeBaathification, in which members in the first three rungs of Saddam Hussein’s Baath party were stripped of their employment (which included civilians working local roles like principals of public schools), many Iraqis were unable to provide for their family’s wellbeing. Already humiliated by the American incursion upon their lives, Iraqis’ senses of honor (sharaf, interim, and ird) were progressively subdued. 

A common generalization made of Coalition forces was, “I was not going to help make of Iraq a puppet regime for their interests and that of the Jews in the region.” Blackwater forces were perceived similarly, if not overwhelmingly against regional interests, “As it was, many ordinary people in Iraq believed private security contractors to be Mossad or CIA… ‘To us, the Americans are just like the Israelis.’” And if those perceptions created any doubt of the widespread distrust of these plainclothes, mysterious foreign occupiers, contractors had developed a known reputation among Iraqis as mercenaries “shooting down innocent Iraqis with total impunity.” The U.S.’ inability to create long lasting security further humiliated Iraqis, who were left with another failed state security crisis and lingering distrust. 

Blackwater’s for-profit model and welcome cooperation with the U.S. government created a feedback loop further incentivizing the use of PMFs in U.S. conflicts. Blackwater’s business model did provide several advantages to the U.S. federal budget. However, pitfalls of contractors included the possibility of refusal to perform, which could not occur in the national army. Additionally, Blackwater’s pay grades meant that “[national] soldiers sought more lucrative posts with private companies,” especially upon their transition to civilian life. The spillover effects of these shorter-term, higher-paid contracting roles depleted national forces. 

Ethical concerns over other national forces employed in Iraq arose as South African mercenaries banned from fighting in South Africa due to anti-apartheid laws found refuge fighting in Iraq. Brookings Institutions’ Peter Singer reported that Aegis, a firm similar to Blackwater but British and run by Tim Spicer, won a contract in Iraq. This, in turn, rewarded companies that simply spent more, leading to abuse and inefficiency. Blackwater and other private military contracts followed suit. Private contracting was especially active in Iraq as, “of summer, 2007, there were more “private contractors” deployed on the U.S. government payroll in Iraq (180,000) than there were actual soldiers (160,000). Even today, following eventual prosecutions of Blackwater contractors for the Nisour Square massacre and other atrocities in 2007, the simple rebranding of Blackwater to “Xe Services,” “Academi,” and eventually “Constellis,” provided sufficient cover for the U.S. government to hire the company as military guards in Afghanistan. From a globalized perspective, “economic and political crises are fueling demand beyond the sector itself,” meaning that the pure revenue-based success of these PMFs continues to attract the state military labor market. 

The growing use of PMFs operates in direct opposition to Just War Theory, providing little justification for Bush’s assertion that Iraq was in fact, a just war of counterterrorism. A core tenet of Just War Theory asserts that the actors must be sovereign states. While terrorism as a category of conflict calls into question the general applicability of Just War Theory to counterterrorism cases, PMFs clearly and egregiously violate this point. PMFs, acknowledged to operate outside sovereign state government control (and thus not subject to their justice systems) represent a clear shift to an anarchical system. Delineated through the series of indiscriminate attacks questionably initiated by Blackwater forces, jus ad bellum ideals (principles guiding when states should initiate force, including war as the last resort and avoidance of gratuitous violence) were clearly disregarded during the Iraq War. As Crawford notes in her analysis of Just War Theory in the context of counterterrorism, discrimination in warfare has been complicated by postmodern counterterror. As shown in the Iraq War, U.S. targeting has engendered violence feedback loops: Crawford describes the Taliban’s transformation from a community defense force to terrorism due to U.S. targeting over Al Qaeda interactions.  The implications of this egregiously unethical warfare therefore call into question Crawford’s support of Bush in his assertions that Iraq and its counterterrorism was just, as well as how paramilitary groups can justify their actions in the future. 

Conclusion 

Examining the role of Blackwater in the Iraq conflict elucidates the cooperation of sovereign militaries with their private counterparts. While some states contract with PMFs to avoid domestic political consequences, the effectiveness of the COIN operations, or lack thereof, should guide governments on structuring the nature of their joint efforts. Through an examination of Blackwater in Iraq alongside U.S. national forces, I conclude that Blackwater decreased counterinsurgent success in Iraq through repeated and systemic indiscriminate practices enabled by a lack of state control or accountability. 

I contend that Blackwater forces bred distrust through their numerous indiscriminate killing practices; lack of accountability or government oversight along with sheer denial of indiscriminate practices prove the argument of denial and backlash with the Mahdi Army reprisal. There are no mechanisms for making amends after PMF warfare, encouraging dangerous reprisals in foreign occupations and lowering the likelihood of future cooperation. Given this distrust and violations of just war principles, PMF practices as they stand in counterinsurgency are inherently unethical and cannot be defended by Just War Theory. 

In addition to ethical concerns, the for-profit business model, feedback loop of violence, and growing U.S. dependence on PMFs is cause for alarm. Considering the government’s inability to provide adequate oversight and Blackwater’s history of detrimental incursions into Iraq, a growing reliance on these firms and potential for host populace backlash must be anticipated with strict regulation. 

A potential counterpoint questions what the U.S. would have done without PMFs in these conflicts. Given the long and continuing history of PMF groups, perhaps the more pertinent counterfactual to consider is what enforcement mechanisms must be put in place to avoid indiscriminate violence and other aforementioned pitfalls. The ineffectiveness of indiscriminate violence would necessitate greater efforts by both international institutions and sovereign governments to place limits on PMFs. With some increased accountability and regulation today, PMFs remain covertly used in several foreign occupations. PMFs are a prevalent aid in conflicts considering their range of utility, but many negative implications of Blackwater’s counterinsurgency actions persist: for example, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) cited Blackwater and Abu Ghraib abuses in its release of the “Revived Caliphate.” To suppose that actions perpetrated decades ago carry few implications for terrorism and counterterrorism today would be a naive assumption, and our policies today must acknowledge the U.S.’ faltering of PMF regulation. Future research questions addressing PMF practices in postmodern warfare should consider the extent to which PMFs employing selective violence contribute positively to counterinsurgency operations, as well as compare the effectiveness of PMF and foreign military interventions in reducing insurgent violence.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Soldiers during the Iraq War, Image sourced from Rawpixel | CC License, no changes made

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When Nigeria gained its independence in 1960, many wondered what the long-lasting implications of colonization would be. There have been several decolonialist and postcolonialism theories about how the effects are physical, psychological, and sociocultural. This paper will compare and apply some of these theories to responses from 5 Nigerian youths (recorded through interviews). Through the analysis, the effects and impacts of colonization on how Nigerian youths in the 21st century view their language and culture are assessed, and the following is concluded: Colonization has made Nigerian youths desire to cling to their language and culture as it is so integral to their identity.

Introduction 

Identity is not simply a concept but a series of questions. How does one define their identity? Can one define their identity? Or do we merely have to look at the characteristics, the pieces given or earned, and solve the puzzle ourselves? An easy piece would be nationality, and the culture found within it. From culture comes norms, values, languages, and other means of expression. Nigeria is a culturally rich land, brimming with hundreds of ethnicities and tribes. The British formed the nation referred to as Nigeria, so what effect does that have today? 

The British colonization of Nigeria had several effects. Many argue that it kickstarted the economy or established Nigeria as an influential African nation. I contend that the colonization of Nigeria coincides with an overall diminished view and utilization of Nigerian culture and languages, but the importance of the culture as a part of one’s identity. First, this paper will briefly explain the history of Nigeria, then reference some important decolonial and post-colonial theories, and finally link them to the interviews of 5 Nigerian youths. In this paper, the youth will be examined to assess the extent to which Western opinions on certain indigenous cultures have been internalized.

Introduction to Nigerian History 

What had formerly been a collection of empires selling their people to British and European slave traders would have fallen under British colonial rule by the mid-19th century. In 1885, the Berlin Conference marked the distribution of Africa to colonial powers Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, and even Belgium. 6 years later, Lagos was an official British colony. This would kickstart the commercialization of Nigeria, as Lagos would become one of Africa’s most important ports. 

Mindsets and Agenda 

The mindset that the British had when claiming Nigeria as a colony was to introduce ‘civilization’ to a land without it. As Nigeria had been an integral source for the slave trade, and the British were rapidly shifting to anti-slavery outreaches, it was an ideal area for the British to expand in. Their ‘civilization’ included bringing Christianity to the land, and Christian missionaries headed this project. It is important to remember that these missionaries were restricted to Southern Nigeria, meaning that the religion could spread there. Northern Nigeria was still very much Muslim, and these disparate sides being eventually pushed together would proceed to cause tensions and conflicts. 

‘Civilization’ also included a transformation of the economic system. The British aimed to expand commerce. They began by setting up an import and export system: exporting raw materials (Nigeria was especially rich in these) and importing finished goods. This required some sort of infrastructure, and the British built roads, railways, ports, etc. They introduced a material/ cash currency that matched that of the UK. The final step of their economic domination was conditional on Nigerians working for the currency. Toyin Falola describes it as an economic policy that “resulted in the growing dependence of Nigerians on an export economy dominated by European firms with which Indigenous Nigerian enterprise could not compete and which conducted business primarily with a view towards European profitability at the expense of Nigerian producers.” Everything was for their gain, as one can assume. As the British remained in control of two of the most important aspects of a nation’s identity – religion and economy – it is not difficult to see how they remained in a position of superiority. 

In the context of this paper, the most fundamental part of colonization and civilization was the implementation of language. In schools, the government, the church, and commerce, English was enforced. It became the language of the nation, and in turn, the language of prestige, and a signal of education and wealth. 

Independence 

The colonization of Nigeria benefitted very few, namely, and predominantly, the British. The realization of this exploitation sparked the formation of nationalist movements. Yet, to be nationalist, there had to be one nation, and Nigeria was still as divided as they come. Different ethnic groups were forced together, given a name, and suddenly expected to have similar goals, values, norms, and beliefs. There was no emblem of a national identity. Western-educated Nigerians began to comprehend the British rule as “arbitrary and illegitimate” and banded together to form what would be known as the first Nigerian nationalists. The World Wars would rekindle education, and more and more Nigerians would become literate. 

Driven by movements like the Nigerian National Democratic Party, National Independence Movement, Aba’s Women Revolt, and with frontrunners and leaders such as Herbert Macaulay, Obafemi Awolowo, and Nnamdi Azikiwe (who would become the first Nigerian president), Nigeria achieved independence in 1960. There were still many problems that would eventually turn into political crises, such as the ethnic conflicts in the region and the dominant hand that Great Britain would still play in the economy, but as for now, Nigerians were ‘free’. The potential for Nigeria was immense, but the results, lacking. 

The Aftermath of Colonization: A Theoretical Overview 

To fully analyze the extent to which colonization has been internalized through language and culture, we must first explore the different post-colonialist theories of scholars, especially in the context of the question. We need to be able to interpret the discourse to apply it. These theories will help us draw the line between the responses and colonization, as they might not be as explicit. Many of the works are written through the lens of Africans or people of non-Western countries with a Western education. This is intentional, so it can be applied to the Nigerian youth – who are Africans, all of them with some form of Western Education. Western Education increases the potential for internalization: of values, narratives, and norms, so it would be important to see how different facets of life bleed into their identity. 

The West and The Rest: Discourse and Power, Stuart Hall 

In his book, Hall differentiates the terms ‘West’ and ‘Rest’. Hall posits that the West is not simply a geographical area but a concept – a method to explain differences in advancement or a manner of classification. There is a connotation that, with Western nations or Western things, comes progress, development, and modernity. Hall explains that if it is not of the ‘West’, it is the ‘Rest’. Therefore, the terms associated with the Rest will be the antithesis of those associated with the ‘West’, i.e., underdevelopment or undesirability. With these seemingly harmless, ostensibly geographical terms, a bias is implicitly crafted. Hall insists that this division between the West and the Rest plays a vital part in today’s social and political hierarchies.

Western discourse is often more accessible, and within this, there is a constant reaffirmation of inferiority for the ‘Rest’ category; these power dynamics are continuously strengthened through actions and statements. When Nigerian youth see their nations under the ‘Rest’ umbrella, there will be certain concepts they immediately associate with the nation. Seeing the ‘Rest’ as undesirable and disfavored will explain why some will distance themselves from ideas of the land, including its languages and culture. 

Orientalism, Edward Said 

In his 1978 book Orientalism, Edward Said argued that many colonial states colonized with the mindset and belief that they were inherently and innately superior. England believes they are superior, France believes they are superior, Spain believes they are superior, Portugal believes they are superior, Germany believes they are superior: therefore, it is their job – their responsibility – to ‘help’ these supposedly inferior nations. This inferiority is, of course, exaggerated, outdated, and stretched to fit certain agendas. By agendas, I am referring to the desire to be seen as superior, more knowledgeable, and more civilized. 

Said elaborates by establishing the link between knowledge and power. In simple terms, he explains that those with knowledge have power. Those with power have access to knowledge and the ability to create knowledge, so the cycle continues. The nations and states that had power created knowledge about the places they colonized. The truth was irrelevant. Broken stereotypes were extrinsic. They produced the knowledge through the perspective that, ultimately, colonization was bringing hope, commerce, and most importantly, civilization to lands without them. 

It is important to keep this in mind when analyzing the responses of the Nigerian youths. The knowledge we are often fed about formerly colonized states (in the past and now) is often a fabrication, exaggeration, or assumption. However, when this knowledge is highly regarded and publicized, it is not at all shocking when this is internalized.

Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon 

Fanon’s book, Chapter 1 specifically, introduces us to the depth of internalization of colonial language that occurs in the peoples of formerly colonized nations. Through the lens of the “Negro of the Antilles,” Fanon explains the change in personality and mindset that one undergoes after an interaction with the ‘mother country’. Particularly, he says, “The Negro who knows the mother country is a demigod.” Simply put, those with exposure, interaction, and connections to the French(or whatever motherland) have access, power, influence, and positioning for more. 

This will lend a key hand in how people view their cultures. Today, the motherland can be interpreted through nations that are in positions of power. Anything of these nations is typically given more value; the farther one gets from these nations, the less value is given to one’s culture. Depending on how people view their cultures, whether similarly to or drastically different from those deemed more valuable, their perception of their own will change. 

The Colonizer and the Colonized, Albert Memmi 

Part 2: Portrait of the Colonized – the section titled, Mythical Portrait of the Colonized – of Memmi’s book aims to express the rhetorical picture that has been painted of the colonized. The colonizer will put the colonized into brackets of “destitution” and “indolence”; even and especially when these traits are historically proven to be inaccurate, the colonizer will speak with conviction that the image they hold is the right one. The image is usually non-sensical and more times than not, contradictory, but this is irrelevant. 

Memmi also stresses the intention behind the grammar used by the colonizer in texts, letters, and travel documents. The wording of the colonizer is meant to dehumanize the colonized and justify the colonizer’s actions. This is why the colonizer will speak in the plural, as in ‘they do…’ or “they are this…” This not only casts vast generalizations over the colonized, but Memmi explains that it also removes any element of individualization. Individualization means individuals, humans – people. The whole point is to discard the idea of sensing any form of humanity in the colonized. 

Behind this lies the sociological concept of self-fulfilling prophecies. As certain identities are imposed on us, predominantly by those wielding more power, we begin to believe them and, consequently, begin to act in ways that reinforce these identities. Therefore, if the colonizer says that the colonized are “lazy,” display “wretchedness,” and “useless” and imposes this on them, they will indeed start to believe so and act accordingly. Therefore, outsiders frequently perceive cultures through a colonial perspective, causing colonized cultures to internalize this image and adapt their behavior accordingly. This can lead to a distortion in how cultures are truly understood by others and result in subtle cultural adjustments to align with these perceptions. 

Decolonizing the mind, Ngũgĩ wa Thiongʼo 

Ngũgĩ wa Thiongʼo describes the way colonial powers degraded African languages and cultures. Colonization was not merely physical and economic but also psychological and mental. Language was, is, and will always be an integral part of societies and how they interact internally and externally. Colonizers did not simply integrate European languages into African societies. They placed them in areas of high prestige and significance, i.e., the education system and the government. This way, European languages were in closer proximity to power. Thiongo’o explains how students were punished for not speaking English in school. This is worsened when this prestige extends from language to ethnicity and culture. For example, certain alms of the government disallowed native Kenyan people from participating, even if their level of English was proficient, displaying how not only certain languages were privileged over others but also how ethnic groups were differentiated. 

Language and culture are essentially inseparable. The attempts by colonizer countries to undermine indigenous languages in Africa by imposing their language and institutionalizing them through means such as education, government, and the arts were largely successful. The proof of this lies in the fact that there are 54 African countries, of which 47 have official languages of English, French, or Portuguese. 

Thiongʼo said, “It is the final triumph of a system of domination when the dominated start singing its virtues.” When the people of a land start to value another’s language and culture more than theirs, the colonizer has succeeded. Exploring the views and perceptions of Nigerian youths will allow us to understand the depth of this success. 

Racial identity and language: exploring the Afro-Brazilian experience through the lens of DuBois’ double consciousness theory – Asha Layne, Erin Miles 

W.E.B Dubois’ double consciousness theory explains the dichotomy of the identity of the African-American: where they have a self they present in white-dominated societies and another with their own. Additionally, they tended to perceive themselves through the white gaze, so they would have one self-image when among African-Americans and a different self-image when 

among white Americans. There is often a conflict or battle between the two as they attempt to navigate which side of them is truly them. Although this paper is applied in the context of Afro-Brazilians, we can apply it to the broader context of Africans, specifically Nigerians. The persona that appears in white-dominated societies involves the formation of colonial identities. English in Nigeria, especially when more American or British accented, is associated with prestige, a higher economic class and is generally considered more advantageous. At the same time, many Nigerian youths seem to be proud of their heritage. There seems to be an internal competition between the pressure to conform to Western norms and expectations and the desire to stay true and connected to their roots. 

Self-Defeating Prophecies: When Sociology Really Matters, Lorenzo Sabetta 

Albert Memmi’s Mythical Portrait of the Colonized is enforced by the sociological concept of self-fulfilling prophecies. Lorenzo Sabetta counters this with self-defeating prophecies. To comprehend the idea of self-defeating prophecies, we must understand that of the self-fulfilling prophecy, a theory and name drafted by Robert Merton. Essentially, Merton defines the phenomenon as “a false definition of the situation evoking a behavior which makes the originally false conception come true,” meaning that when a certain image, narrative, or definition is pushed, it will most likely be the outcome of an event. When one believes in something, they will tend to perform in ways that make said belief come true. This prophecy reveals itself in several settings, from relationships to education (See the Pygmalion Effect experiment, Jenkins and Deno). Sabbata chooses to write about the opposite effect: a self-defeating behavior as a result of the self-fulfilling prophecy. A self-defeating behavior is defined as a situation eventually becoming false due to the behaviors as a result of its acceptance. He highlights the general undesirability of self-defeating prophecies in the social sciences but how they should be considered to have generally desirable outcomes. 

Self-fulfilling prophecies at their core, Sabbeta says, are driven by fear, hope, and misconception. He claims that self-defeating behaviors take not only determination but voluntariness and awareness to undo the power that self-fulfilling prophecies tend to have. Once an ‘actor’, a person in a situation that has been predicted to have certain results/outcomes, realizes and is aware of the analysis or prediction, that is when they have the power to falsify the prophecy. 

Once Africans, Nigerians specifically, or any other ostracized group of people, are aware of the stereotypes, narratives, and images painted of them, that is when they have the power to act in ways that falsify the forecast and, in many ways, undo it. As we will soon see through the interviews, Nigerians have countered stereotypes by upholding opposing values and passing them down through generations. In many ways, these values have become intertwined and representative of Nigerian culture.

Interviewing Nigerian Youths 

The decision to interview Nigerian youths was a conscious one. The task at hand is to assess how internalized colonization has become. The true test of internalization is to see how it has been passed down through generations; have certain biases, narratives, and beliefs been inherited? Additionally, many of the works published about the internalization of colonization are often by scholars: the majority are older than 25. These interviews attempt to give a platform to those who do not usually have the opportunity to speak about topics like these in a professional setting. 

All 5 Nigerian youths intentionally chosen have been educated in Western countries and/or Western-curriculum schools. I myself would find myself a part of this group if I was not the one to conduct the study. Therefore, they are embedded into a part of the system that has previously dominated Nigerian society and culture. 

In this sample, there are 5 Nigerians between the ages of 13 and 25: 3 female, 2 male. The females are Temi Soboyejo, 22; Anjola Mogaji, 17; and Somkenechukwu Ebinum, 13. The males are Ayokunle Yoade, 15; and Ayoola Lanipekun, 18. These ages are based on the times when these interviews were conducted. While this sample is not representative of the overall Nigerian youth population, particular assumptions can be made or denied. The questions asked are as follows: 

• To what extent do you use English at home? To what extent do you use Yoruba/ Hausa/ Igbo/other indigenous languages? 
• If you’re expressing any emotions verbally, what language would you use?
• What language do you view media (movies, TV shows, videos) in?
• How would you feel if this media was subtitled/dubbed to Yoruba/ Hausa/ Igbo/other indigenous languages?
• How comfortable do you feel when speaking an indigenous language? – How comfortable do you feel when speaking English?
• What images do you think non-Nigerians hold of Nigerians?
• What values do you associate with Nigeria and being Nigerian?
• What do you think it means to be Nigerian? Are you proud to be Nigerian?

In the nature of any interview, questions may be asked allowing participants to further elaborate, but these acted as the central framework. 

The interviews revealed much, but I was able to identify 3 common themes. The first was the struggle with identity and specifically choosing what part of oneself to display. The second was the constant battle against Nigerian stereotypes and stereotypes that are typically applied to Black or African people in general. The final is the growing fear that eventually, the very thing that makes one Nigerian would be lost, and with that, a piece of them is lost as well. 

Navigating Identity: Choosing which part to reveal 

The difficulty in answering the question ‘Who am I?’ lies in the idea of an ever-changing self. An ode to the Ship of Theseus, parts of us are constantly changing and evolving, leaving us wondering who we truly are. Are we a makeup of our hobbies? Or perhaps, who we are is found in our family and friends? Could it simply be genetics: where we are from? This question is one 

people spend their whole lives trying to figure out. In the case of our interviewees, the struggle to decipher who you are is worsened when there is a tendency to present two different personas. The double consciousness theory, coined by W.E. DuBois, has taken full effect. 

The first place the two-persona-identity seems to cause a problem is through accents. Accents, according to the Cambridge Dictionary, are defined as the way in which people in a particular area, country, or social group pronounce words. Anjola Mogaji claimed, “When you’re around your people, you talk how you normally talk.” Temi Soboyejo explained this with the statement, “There’s just a certain level of comfort with your people.” Normal and comfort refer to an established familiarity. These statements will imply that there is an alternative, that the said level of comfort is non-existent, or that you don’t talk normally with other people. The ‘normal talk,’ in this case, is a Nigerian accent. Usually accompanied by Nigerian Pidgin – an English-based creole language that is widely spoken throughout Nigeria – the Nigerian accent is distinguishable from Western English accents, such as American or British. For fear of sticking out, the interviewees adopted an American/Canadian or British accent. A switch occurs with a different audience. For some, the switch is more drastic with two separate accents, for others, only a slight change. 

Regardless, all of the interviewees have identified different manners of English when they are with different people, from accents to terminologies and codes. There is nothing wrong with this; the problem arises when they are scared of a “slip-up.” To the interviewees who spent more time in Nigeria, the other accent can seem unnatural at times, one that, as Mogaji described it, “doesn’t quite roll off the tongue.” While many seemed to have accepted this, some have expressed a fear of exposing the fact that they don’t speak the same “English as everyone else.” Integrated into Western societies, there might be a tendency to prove that you’re similar to avoid unwanted and oftentimes negative attention. The idea that there might be something different from the norm often seems to attract this, and disguising the “normal talk” that one utilizes around “their people” has been a tactic to bypass the notoriety. 

Another significant problem with the two-persona-identity presents is a cultural clash. Interviewees identified distinct values that they associate with Nigerians. All 5 emphasized respect and hard work – Mogaji saying, “We’re big on respect in Nigerian culture” – but most stressed the differences they tend to see in the values. Mogaji reasoned that living in the US showed her that what she defined as common sense “really isn’t common.” Ayokunle Yoade explained that looking at the people around him reinforces how different his values are, saying that what might be normal to an American “doesn’t look normal” to him. There is a very obvious disparity between the values presented in Western societies and Nigerian ones. Now, none of the interviewees elaborated on the values they find more prevalent in Western societies, except for maybe the lack of respect, but they did identify a difference, moreover, a clash. Ayo Lanipekun expresses that the cultural aspects gained from his family “occasionally clash.” This cultural clash implies that these youths must choose what values to present at a given moment. In addition to a clash, an established level of relatability is seen in displays of cultures. Somie Ebinum stresses that when watching American TV shows, she “can’t really relate to it” because it seems “weird.” Yet, when presented with TV shows that depict other Nigerian girls and their families, she feels “a lot more” acquainted with that. When terms such as “isn’t common,” “doesn’t look normal,” “clash,” and “can’t relate” arise in the responses of these youths, one has to wonder if there is any comfort at all in adopting Western values. Do they want to? Are they forced to, in order to fit in? As most expressed that the values are disparate, it seems as if it would have to be a choice between one or the other; a synthesis has the potential to result in an internal conflict. The question of identity extends deeper into ‘What culture should I represent?’ and even a bit more blunt to say, ‘What culture do I represent?’. 

The final problem with the two-persona identity shown by the interviewees’ responses is the struggle with a label. A label is defined as a word or phrase that is used to describe the characteristics or qualities of people, activities, or things. In this case, the characteristic or quality would be nationality. An incredibly important part of one’s identity is the place where one feels one belongs, a nationality, and this belonging can either be attributed to origin or familiarity. When there are two personas, defined by different nations, the line of priority blurs. Lanipekun voiced his internal conflict on this, saying that while his parents are British citizens, they consider themselves to be “Nigerian-British”; “Nigerian comes first.” His parents seem to protect this particular part of their identity, drawing the lines in the sand and clearly establishing the nation they feel represents them more as the more important one, in the context of their identity. Lanipekun, on the other hand, claims that he hasn’t “fully figured it out yet.” The question of “Where are you from?”, seemingly simplistic, requires a reflection of self – a decision on a nation, and consequentially, its history, values, beliefs, and culture. 

W.E.B. DuBois’s theory seems to perpetuate identity regarding speech, value system, and belonging. Fanon reinforces this perspective in Black Skin, White Masks. He writes about the notion that individuals of Black descent often find themselves compelled to embrace the cultural norms and values of the prevailing white society. This can often result in a diminishing connection to their cultural identity and detachment from their historical heritage and traditions. Fanon asserts that this is due to colonization, deeming that the “self-division is a direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond question.” We see that our interviewees are more and more inclined to adopt value systems, accents, and labels. While an interviewee claimed that they don’t “see the need to play a character,” these characters are mostly interchanged inconspicuously, so this is easier said than done. 

Confronting the Stereotypes 

The stereotype is an old abstract. Derived from the Greek words, stereos meaning firm/solid/set, and typos meaning impression, a stereotype is defined as a set idea about what a particular type of person is like. These set ideas originate from pictures and narratives painted about an experience or a group of people. For these pictures and narratives to catch fire, the painter must be in a position of power that dominates those being painted. Albert Memmi says, “The existence of a colonizer requires that an image of the colonized be suggested.” To justify the domination, there must be a ‘truth’ that indicates some type of inferiority. Memmi refers to the image that colonizers painted of the colonized as lazy. Our interviewees have indicated some evolution in these portraits. 

The overall theme that persists through all the stereotypes that the youths identified is that Africans, Nigerians specifically, are not as developed. It could be a lack of evolutionary development, where people believe that Nigerians “live in trees” or “use spears to fight tigers.” It could be a lack of emotional development where Nigerians (and black people in general) are “angry and aggressive.” It could even be a lack of social development in which Nigerians are “stingy” and “think they run the world.” These stereotypes are vague, untrue, and have been applied to a large group of people. Memmi poses the question, “Can one accuse an entire people…”. It seems absurd to believe so, but these stereotypes have been so perpetuated, so internalized, that many find it difficult to believe otherwise. 

As these stereotypes are so widely believed, many try to distance themselves from Africans and Nigerians, as well as the ideas that are associated with them. Mogaji expresses how many Black Americans she has interacted with, separate slavery from Africa, never wanting to associate themselves with any “African roots.” An attempt to separate from Africa has also been revealed in Mogaji, saying that when she first arrived in America, she would say she was “from Atlanta” or “Jamaican” because there was the notion that “being African was something you were going to be made fun of.” A widespread avoidance of African/Nigerian concepts has endured – even by those whose genetics can be traced back to the very continent – because, in turn, you were distancing yourself from the shame and negative connotations tied to them. 

To what extent has this avoidance been internalized? Although one interviewee admitted to previously hiding that Nigerian part of them, the others reflected on how the opposite of the narratives seems to be the true trend. They described Nigerians as “generally successful,” “very hardworking,” “strong-willed,” and the most stressed of all of them, “respectful.” Lanipekun brought up the idea of the Brain Drain. Based on the Merriam-Webster dictionary, Brain Drain is the departure of educated or professional people from one country, economic sector, or field for another, usually for better pay or living conditions. While this concept is mostly unrelated as it is relevant mostly in the healthcare field, he addresses the success that tends to follow Nigerian immigrants. Lanipekun sees this migration as a “screening process,” believing that most Nigerians in other countries are “genuinely quite skilled and talented.” 

We begin to see the presence of self-defeating prophecies. To prove the preexisting narratives of Nigerians wrong, many Nigerians will act positively in defiance of them. It appears as if the permanence of Nigeria being under the ‘Rest’ umbrella, as Hall alluded to in the West and Rest discourse, has inspired Nigerians to try to prove their way out of it. On an individual level, there is frustration in being lumped into a pile of undesirability and inferiority. Whilst trying to get a better life than the one Nigeria currently offers, most Nigerians prove themselves in Western societies. They counter many of the narratives, biases, and stereotypes that usually follow them. To what point has colonization been internalized? To the point where Nigerian youths and people are disputing and contradicting them. 

The youths identify values such as respect, hard work, and success to be integral to Nigerian culture. As this seems to counter many narratives told, one has to question the validity of the portraits that have been painted about the ‘Rest’. Memmi has written on the blatant contradiction of these portraits painted by the colonizer and, sadly, the tendency for certain groups to accept them. Fortifying the sentiment of self-fulfilling prophecies, Memmi says, “the colonized is forced to accept being colonized.” The reality of the situation is that stereotypes will always exist. It is a natural psychological phenomenon. Unfortunately, most stereotypes are negative and are swiftly followed up by acts of discrimination, hate, and ostracization. Attacking cultures, languages, and descents is extremely common, so how do people combat this? Yoade remarks he doesn’t “shut up” when presented with a false stereotype – he refuses to let the stereotype spread and get worse. Soboyejo declares, “Stereotypes will exist, regardless of what I think. It just depends on whether or not I let them control the way I act. I’m going to be who I am and act how I do, despite the stereotypes other people might have for me.” 

Fearing the Erosion of The Nigerian Identity 

When asked to define what it meant to be Nigerian, a long pause was consistent in all 5 interviews. They must have had inquiries. How does one answer a purposely vague question, one with answers both mechanic and philosophical? Then came the answers, to be Nigerian was to uphold the heritage “and have had somebody teach the culture to you.” The connection to the culture was accentuated; 13-year-old Ebinum claimed that it was “keeping in touch with the food, the clothes, the mentality, the morals”: values were once again mentioned to be the core of a Nigerian. Regardless of the eloquence of their answers and regardless of their definitions, one thing was clear. They were proud to be Nigerian. While I cannot deny or doubt this pride, the act of being proud of a part of oneself is far more complex than it seems. Pride can be expressed in different ways and dampened by certain actions. The change of accents or code may be interpreted as a way to reduce that Nigerian part of them – even if that is not what they intend to depict. When we consider pride for something or someone, do we consider moments where that notion is unconsciously denied? Or do we view pride as an emotion that may temporarily, but not permanently, wane? Nonetheless, when the conversation drifted to pride for the nation, the replies were as follows. 

“Very proud. It’s just kind of upsetting, seeing other Nigerians not want to keep their heritage and not being proud of where they come from. That’s why I want to be proud and stand my ground, saying, ‘Yes, I am Nigerian.’” 

“Being Nigerian comes with so many levels that I love. I wouldn’t want to be anything else.” 

“When people ask where I’m from, I’m proud to tell them, ‘I’m Nigerian.’ I don’t like to hide it.”

“I love telling people I’m Nigerian. I am so proud of that part of me.” This, in particular, is quite interesting, as it was the same Mogaji who hid this part of her when she was younger and newer to Western society. To these youths, the very act of being Nigerian is essential to their identity. Because nationalities tend to be such a relatively easy element to add to our identities, it is so much more common to see people clinging to these. With this attachment to a nation comes the fear that the thing that aligns them with Nigeria will eventually fade away.

Kenyan scholar and writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o described language as a “carrier of the culture.” He especially stressed the concept of language, explaining how when the British came to Kenya, they dismantled the prevailing lingual system and put English at the top. The same thing happened in Nigeria. Positions of power were granted primarily to the English and, secondly, to people who spoke English. In government and education, these profiles of prestige and influence were regarded strictly for English speakers and the English people. On the lingual hierarchy, indigenous languages such as Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa, etc., were slid into lower rungs of the ladder. These languages began to be viewed as ultimately useless as they could not provide money, prestige, or social mobility. They did remain as the vernacular, but as the official languages in Africa display, their global identity became rooted in English; Nigeria is an Anglophone nation. 

All 5 Nigerian youths said they speak English more than any indigenous language. The sentiment they echoed was how they would like to learn more of their indigenous language. To stay connected to their culture, many of them are spiteful that they didn’t try harder. With statements such as “Yoruba is so close to home,” they reflect on the connection between the culture and the language. Many of them displayed how they feel as if they carry on less of the culture and the fear that accompanies this. Ebinum notes that she is “terrified” of losing the little Igbo language she knows. She alludes that if she loses this, she “fades into almost everybody else.” Note the individuality found in speaking a language not widely broadcasted outside of West Africa. It separates her from the people around her. 

Soboyejo thinks ahead. As an African girl growing up in a community where she was the “only black girl till ninth grade,” she admits to struggling to speak Yoruba, as there was no one to make her “feel comfortable speaking it.” Now, she wishes she had found this comfort as she worries about the future generation. She says, “I worry that my future kids, or even my brother’s kids, won’t really have that aspect of them the way we did.” We start to see a long-term approach to losing language. Does the lack of being able to carry over the language reinforce a lack of ability to carry the culture? Does this mean she has failed her duty of being a Nigerian? 

Parents are an important part of the thought of carrying a language to carry the culture. Some of the interviewees wished their parents had pushed them more to learn the language. Some view their parents as their link back to their motherland/ place of origin. Yoade is one of these, saying, “With my parents, it seems like, no matter where we are, they’re always still the same. Whenever I come home, I always get reminded that I’m Nigerian.” 

Nationality is a part of identity that is easy to identify. Nonetheless, the 5 interviewees reveal there’s more to simply carrying the label ‘Nigerian’. To fully be Nigerian, you need to carry the culture. The fear of losing something one has, whether inherent, earned, or given, is an experience many, if not all, are familiar with. When this loss can lead to a missing piece in the grand scheme of identity, the fear can be crippling.

Looking Within 

For several years, Asians, Middle Easterners, Latin Americans, Pacific Islanders, and Africans have been written as objects of knowledge – those that are written about, as opposed to written for. Since the colonial nations have put themselves into certain levels of superiority, those of colonized nations have automatically been seen as inferior and, in many cases, have started to believe so. For several years, scholars of colonized nations writing about their culture, class, or country have been seen as inferior. For an object of knowledge to write about themselves or a group they belong to is a clear conflict of interest. They cannot write objectively. They are subject to bias. They are crafting wrong narratives or wrong ideas, possibly a wrong history. I am an object of knowledge writing about a group I belong to. 

To write this paper, as a female Nigerian youth, is to subject myself to the critique that there are certain biases I hold. To interview Nigerian youths is to subject them to the same. For how long has the status quo remained like this? The cycle of knowledge and power dominated by the colonizer, to justify the acts of the colonizer, remains. In a society that more readily accepts older scholars, scholars closer to Western curricula and societies, and often white male scholars, this paper aims to create a space for voices without platforms to be heard. How often does one usually refer to the opinion of Nigerian youth to explain the effects of colonization on their language and their culture in the 21st century? 

I will not say that with this paper, I give a voice to the voiceless. This term holds an outdated concept, one that infers there are people without a voice. All people have voices, some simply are not heard. Some lack the resources, the platform, and the audience to reveal their voices. While this paper does not magically rectify that situation, it does lay a brick in the bridge.

The process of interviewing these 5 Nigerian youths unlocked a great amount of introspection. Many of my responses matched what the 5 said. There tend to be 2 parts of me, changing with the racial group I find myself surrounded in, that occasionally clash culturally. There are stereotypes, narratives, and beliefs thrown at me that I combat with the values and norms that have been ingrained into me from birth. There is a rapid loss of language that I am grasping at straws to hinder, to not disconnect myself from my roots. There is an inherent fear, one that grows the more I distance myself from the place I was born, that I will lose the very thing that makes me Nigerian. I will always be Nigerian, that much is true: from my heritage to my name. But will I always carry the culture? Will I always carry the language? This is something one must strive to do, to protect origins. After all, a story is not complete without a beginning – in fact, it cannot exist. Similarly, an identity is not complete without an origin – truth be told, it cannot exist.

Conclusion 

The question at hand is, to what extent has colonization impacted the way Nigerian youths view their culture and indigenous language? In many ways, this question has not one answer. Because a psychological impact is unquantifiable, we must assess the different sides of one’s identity that were formed as a result of colonization. The first of these would be the act of being Nigerian itself. As established from the history of Nigeria, Nigeria did not always exist. There was no Nigerian identity. The mere homogenization of thousands of tribes, languages, and dialects into a singular nation is a result of colonization. Colonization impacted the way Nigeran youths view their indigenous language and culture because now they recognize Nigeria as one. This recognition has been a ‘truth’ for 63 years. While one can be Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa, Edo, Fulani, or a member of any other tribe, they are Nigerian first. There is the notion that ‘we have been subjected to the same thing’/‘we know each other’s struggle’, and this informs how people fight back. 

The values associated with Nigerian culture are another result of colonization. Once independence was gained, an effort was made to establish Nigeria as an African superpower. This paper is not written with the intent to gauge the success of said effort. But the efforts are what crafted the values upheld today. To demonstrate how Nigeria could stand on its own, they had to display hard work. To stay in good books with the British (as there was still some economic reliance) but also build a national identity that encouraged community, they had to display overall respect. Success was important for Nigeria coming out of colonization, and this has filtered down to the current generations who try to set themselves up for a good life, many of them finding this in their ventures outside of Nigeria. The refusal to return to how we were once viewed as captured and ruled-over people is the reason why stereotypes and narratives are fought against with these values. 

This refusal to lose the values, in a way, reinforces the fear of losing the language. As they – culture and language – are inseparable, does losing the language mean losing the culture? Does this mean that their ancestors fought in vain to gain that national identity? Identity is a quest that the human race is constantly on. The questions, who am I, and what am I here to do, are sentiments that will linger until dying breaths. One’s language and culture are meant to be pieces to easily slot into the puzzle of identity: by answering Where am I from, one already has “values, beliefs, and customs” instilled in them. Maybe through these values, beliefs, and customs, one knows how to act. Maybe these actions will instill a sense of belonging in different communities and groups. And maybe, just maybe, if one has a strong sense of origin, a strong sense of belonging, and a strong sense of purpose, then perhaps the pieces of identity, that have always appeared mismatched, fractured, and distant, will start to fit together; the pieces that may just as well been scattered around the world find themselves and answer the question, Who am I?

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: People Marching in Nigeria, Image sourced from Pexels  | CC License, no changes made

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General Introduction 

The goal of this research is to understand the role of international non-governmental organizations, INGOs for short, in Rwanda’s reconstruction efforts after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. It aims to also examine the opinion of these organizations held by the Rwandan people. This research will discuss how the massive failures of the “international community,” particularly Western powers, impacted the attitude towards INGOs among the Rwandan population post genocide. The paper will furthermore discuss the current role of international organizations in Rwanda and the legal and social framework in which they exist. 

Background of Study 

In the pre-colonial period, Rwanda was “organized as a unitary state, hierarchically well structured and with political entities comparable to those found in modern states.” Following the 1919 Treaty of Versailles at the close of the first World War, the Belgian government took over as the colonial authority in charge. Belgium remained in control of the country until 1962, during which time its government instituted extremely harsh and highly divisive ethnic lines between the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. The creation of these divisive ethnic lines was supported, encouraged and organized in no small part by the international powers present in the country at the time. 

These groups, during the pre-colonial period, had been purely economic statuses, which one could move freely between. The Tutsi were cow breeders, the Hutu were agriculturalists and the Twa were hunters and gatherers. The Belgian authorities turned these into ethnic lines using the deeply faulty Hamitic myth. In the 1930s, a census was carried out which prescribed that all those who had ten or more cows would be identified as Tutsi, all those who had less than ten cows would be identified as Hutu, and those with no cows would be identified as Twa. Following this, identity cards were issued to the population clearly listing their ethnic status. The Hamitic myth, or “the assertion that African ‘civilization’ was due to racially distinct Caucasoid invaders from the north/north-east of Africa,” was then used by the colonizers to place the Tutsi in positions of power in the country, claiming that because they had more stereotypically European features and lighter skin tones they had the intelligence and predisposition to rule. 

Rwanda eventually gained its independence from Belgium in 1962, following waves of violence against the Tutsi in 1959 which happened as a result of a rumor that a Hutu politician had been killed by Tutsis. In 1962, the country was incredibly divided with very little solidarity among citizens, largely because of the divisions between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. The following First and Second Republics of Rwanda only became more entrenched within ethnic lines and tensions, and the international players who were present offered little assistance. 

Habyarimana, international players became key in the decline towards the 1994 genocide. The governments of France and the United States are especially culpable in this. General Roméo Dallaire, the commander of United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), sent his now infamous “Genocide Fax,” in January of 1994, to the headquarters of the United Nations in New York warning them he suspected a possible impending genocide. This fax stated that a “top level trainer” in the Interahamwe, the Hutu paramilitary organization which was later responsible for a majority of the killings during the genocide, claimed that he had been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. Furthermore he warned Dallaire that “he suspects it is for their extermination” and that “in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1,000 Tutsi.” The fax also warned that Dallaire suspected the existence of arms cachés and a plot to kill Belgian Peacekeepers in Rwanda. The US government, in addition to the UN leadership in New York, fresh off of the catastrophe in Mogadishu in October of 1993, decided to do nothing with this information. UN leadership stated that because UNAMIR was present in Rwanda under a Chapter VI mandate, which prevents any military intervention, Dallaire would have to stand down. Dallaire’s request for the authority to raid these arms cachés was denied, and just under three months later the genocide of the Tutsis began. 

INGOs present in the country at that time were also culpable in not helping to prevent or lessen the genocide against the Tutsi. Storey writes that “the pressures of relief work may mean that there is little time or energy to develop an informed view of the country.” However, there 

were some INGOs which did as much as they could to help the situation. Some “took care to ensure that their recruitment and business practices did not lend support to the old regime’s adherents” while others “wrote an internal memorandum, recommending that continued assistance to the displaced be made conditional on action being taken to facilitate the arrest of leading criminals.” Despite these endeavours, none of the actions undertaken by INGOs or their representatives in Rwanda were able to significantly mitigate the extent of the genocide against the Tutsi. 

When the genocide broke out following the successful attack on Habyarimana’s presidential plane on 6 April 1994, the response of the international community focused only on the withdrawal of their own foreign nationals from the country. The Peacekeepers remaining in the country under the egis of UNAMIR after their withdrawal numbered only 450, who were incredibly ill equipped besides. The genocide was eventually brought to a stop only because of the efforts of the RPF, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, who chased many of the genocidaires into the neighbouring DRC. 

Towards the end of the 1994 genocide, the French government set up the Zone Turquoise under UN Security Council Resultion 929 with the intention of “contributing to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk…until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength.” Instead, the Zone Turquoise “allowed leaders responsible for massacres to escape clandestinely,” especially members of the Interahamwe, the Hutu-backed paramilitary 

group which carried out much of the killings. It was only in 2021 that the French government wrote the Dulcert Report, a 1,000 page document outlining France’s role in the genocide against the Tutsi. This report concluded that “nothing … examined demonstrates” that France was an accomplice to the genocide. However, it did conclude that France was responsible for not adequately preventing the genocide and helping the guilty escape. 

Chapter II: Research Problem and Relevance 

Research Problem 

The betrayal of the people of Rwanda by international communities and governments who were present in the years leading up to and during the genocide against the Tutsi is clear. These governments and organizations arguably had the power and the knowledge to do something to stop or significantly lessen the magnitude of the genocide in 1994, but did next to nothing. The UN headquarters in New York ordered the extraction of a majority of the UNAMIR peacekeepers, leaving only 450 behind. Many Western governments, particularly those with permanent positions on the UN Security Council, had advanced knowledge of the genocide thanks to General Dallaire’s “Genocide Fax” and did not make moves to stop it. Instead embassies were shut down immediately and the evacuation of all non-Rwandans happened within days. Human rights activist Monique Mujawamariya, after being labeled as a target by the government-sponsored radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), managed to flee to the United States. While there, she repeatedly attempted to convince the Clinton administration to send help to Rwanda, but was instead told that Rwanda was outside of the interest of the United States government. 

Rwanda now is an effective example of how a country can come back from unbelievable  atrocity and function as a peaceful and reintegrated nation. There is an immense amount of pride among the Rwandan people for being able to so quickly and effectively create a strong, peaceful and stable society. This is emblematic of what Kamatali refers to as “the totality of the social organization” which existed in Rwanda during the pre-colonial period. Many of these achievements were made possible because of the highly effective transitional justice system, known as the Gacaca court system. Some members of the international community, particularly INGOs, donated funds to support the logistics and training of Gacaca judges, but most of this system came from Rwandan tradition and homegrown solutions. All 19 prisons in Rwanda at the end of 1994 were operating at over 200% capacity, and even then there were still many genocidaires who were not imprisoned.

Additionally, some Rwandans regard the United Nations’ International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the ICTR, as a completely useless and exorbitantly expensive process that only served to indict 93 people. To make matters worse, only 62 of those indicted were sentenced. The ICTR also took place in Arusha, Tanzania, and not Rwanda, which posed many logistical struggles for the victims and witnesses who had to travel a long distance to testify. To add insult to injury, Rwandans to this day still do not have access to the full records of the ICTR trials. Dr. Robert Kayinumura, the Deputy Permanent Representative and Political Coordinator to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Rwanda to the United Nations in New York, said in a statement to the UN General Assembly on 16 October 2024 that “first, and certainly our most important request, is of the relocation of ICTR/Mechanism archives to Rwanda.” This request has not yet been granted. 

Given all the many ways in which the international community the Rwandan people during the genocide, it makes sense that there would be a permanent sense of distrust that could make international collaboration difficult. It is also entirely understandable that the Rwandan populace would be unwilling to accept help or cooperation from international parties, especially considering that the homegrown solutions that were established after the genocide worked significantly better than any internationally established solutions. Further complicating the issue is the fact that international governments who did not offer any support to the Rwandan people during the genocide against the Tutsi have not made any efforts to apologize or attempt to make restitutions for the actions committed that resulted in the deaths of so many. Even still, there are just over two hundred INGO’s operating in Rwanda in 2024. They operate in many different sectors of the Rwandan milieu, and are all approved by the Rwanda Governance Board, which oversees and promotes “good governance principles” in both the private and public sectors.¹ 

Research Relevance, Purpose and Objectives 

This research is very relevant in the world of international relations, particularly relationships between the global north and the global south. The era of international aid and peacekeeping the way it was established after the close of the second World War and especially after the Cold War is coming to an end. Perhaps what is needed now is a more individual country-centric approach, rather than having massive powerhouse countries dictate the way the global community functions. The example of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda can be used as a very effective tool to highlight the idea that the previous status quo for the ways in which powerful countries intervene in other areas of the world is no longer, or perhaps never was, effective. This indicates the potential need for a rethinking of the role of the “international community” in global governance. 

Furthermore, as stated by Stephen and Zürn, “a multilayered system of overlapping and differentiated institutions and actors has emerged [on the world stage] that goes beyond the traditional world of governments and interstate diplomacy.” Many of these actors are NGOs and INGOs. Recent research and publications have indicated that NGOs are becoming increasingly important players in world governance, which implies the need for more expansive research on the subject. The relationship between NGOs and post-colonial countries is also particularly salient in this research, given that many major INGOs have originated in the West, such as CARE International, Amnesty International, Oxfam and Doctors Without Borders. Evidently, there is a certain role that is played by the international community through these INGOs, and this paper seeks to elaborate on what that role is and what the general opinion among Rwandans is about the effectiveness and overall presence of these organizations. Beyond this goal, the specific objectives for this study are: 

– To establish which kinds of INGOs operate in Rwanda and what their role is in the post-genocide reconstruction process 

– To understand how the presence and purpose of INGOs in Rwanda has changed between the immediate aftermath of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi and the present day 

– To establish what the general opinion of these INGOs is among the Rwandan population, 30 years after the genocide against the Tutsi

Chapter III: Literature Review and Definition of Key Concepts 

A General Overview of INGOs 

To begin, it is important to accurately define what an INGO is and how it operates. Murdie defines INGOs as “organizations…made up of groups of actors, typically individuals, that purposely structure their interactions to reflect some basic rules…most formalize these rules in charters or mission statements, and many have a formal headquarter location.”¹⁹. 

The existence of both NGOs and INGOs in world governance is nothing new. Organizations, whose raison d’être can vary widely, which do not have an official government capacity but rather operate outside of state control, have existed since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 

At its most basic level, the essential motivation and purpose of many INGOs can be defined as “trying to change how states and transnational actors behave…basic to this process is the attempt to change understandings of appropriate behavior and identity.” Interestingly, Anthony Judge writes in a 1995 article on NGOs in civil society that “early thinking amongst intergovernmental development agencies, notably the World Bank, UNDP and OECD, discounted NGOs as of marginal significance to national development, [which] reinforced national government biases.” Judge furthermore explains that “international NGOs, when studied at all, tend to be viewed through a very limited number of fashionable case studies, notably those on the Red Cross.” However, these international NGOs are increasingly becoming more prominent and respected on the world stage. The post-WWII and post-Cold War era of international intervention arising out of the Washington Consensus and the neoliberal development paradigm is arguably ending. INGOs are quite possibly the next big thing, and as such deserves the publication of a more dedicated scholarship on the subject. 

INGOs in Africa: A Post-Colonial Understanding 

Given that this research operates in an African country, the establishment of some kind of framework outlining the role and presence of INGOs in that context is also greatly important. According to Cullen, McCorriston and Thompson, the “rapid expansion of non-governmental activity promoting aid and development occurred along-side, and was fundamentally affected by, the collapse of European colonial rule.” Their 2022 study delved into the history of INGOs that originated in former colonial countries and operated in former colonies. These results are intrinsically tied to this research and as such worth mentioning in some detail here. Less than half of the INGOs operating in Africa in 1967, for example, were “cases of former colonial powers operating in former colonies.” In fact, 54 percent of these INGOs originated in countries without a history of exerting colonial power in Africa. 

They also found that “the presence of non-governmental organizations from countries without a history of formal colonialism in Africa increased far more rapidly” than the presence of NGOs originating from former colonial powers. Cullen, McCorriston and Thompson also argue that this increase in non-former colonialist INGO presence in African countries was directly tied to the increase in competition between the West (particularly the United States) and the former Soviet Union. Thus, many NGOs operating in Africa were driven by “the need to promote the values of liberty, democracy and free markets.” 

Fundamentally, the collapse of Western colonial power was intrinsically linked to the emergence of NGO and INGO power, further complicating a history which is at present deeply mired in issues of neocolonial influence. It is important therefore to also emphasize the danger and potential harm that is carried by certain NGOs and INGOs in post-colonial countries. Some researchers have found that “the role played by NGOs in helping Western ‘development’ agencies to ‘get around’ uncooperative national governments” is a distinct possibility, particularly in attempting to implement more Western systems of knowledge and infrastructure. The neocolonial nature of certain NGOs and INGOs must not be ignored in the execution of this research. 

INGOs in Post-Genocide Rwanda 

Following the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, the presence of NGOs, both international and not, has skyrocketed. A former commissioner of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission stated in an interview that “the beneficiaries down at the grassroots were quite happy that there were so many NGOs coming” in the period between 1994 and 2000. Because so much of Rwanda’s infrastructure and government systems had been totally destroyed after the 1994 genocide, many INGOs were needed in order to rebuild and reestablish the country. In this emergency period, most INGOs were supplying basic survival services, such as food, water and shelter. They also focused their efforts on helping those who were most at risk and most in need. 

Furthermore, RGB states that “in the framework of inclusive governance the Government of Rwanda has committed to strengthening partnerships between government and civil society actors to fast track national development and people-centered prosperity.” To give a specific example, Golan and Gal argue that “a number of international NGOs are involved not only in bringing together and training journalists from conflict areas but actually producing conflict resolution programs.” One such INGO, Search for Common Ground, actively makes efforts to go against the anti-Tutsi propaganda which still exists in the neighboring DRC, and is aided by the Burundian radio station Ijambo, meaning “wise words.” The organization targets an anti-Tutsi Congolese pirate radio station by emphasizing that “Hutu and Tutsi can live together, and that the shooting should stop.” 

According to a Rwandan law ratified on 17 February 2012, an INGO is considered “an organization that was established in accordance with foreign laws and the objective of which is related to public interests.” As mentioned briefly in the statement of problem section, all NGOs and INGOs in Rwanda must be approved by the Rwanda Governance Board, or RGB, in order to be allowed to operate. The official RGB website states that it “is mandated to register and monitor the functioning of national non-governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs) and political organizations (POs).” Every single INGO, NGO, FBO and PO in Rwanda is registered and monitored annually through RGB’s e-Imiryango system, which also has the capability to receive and process applications for new organizations. For INGOs, the requirements for registration include a signed proof of funding form, a budget and action plan, a notarized statute from the country of origin, and a payment of 300,000 Rwandan francs which is roughly 215 US dollars. The full explanation of the registration, maintenance and closure process for INGOs in Rwanda is listed in Appendix B of this paper. Once an INGO is officially registered the RGB continues to monitor it consistently to ensure compliance with government policy and good governance principles. 

Beyond this mandate to monitor the various organizations in the country, RGB also performs extensive research “on governance in Rwanda to regularly…gauge citizens’ perception with service delivery and governance.” Two of these research methods are the Rwanda Governance Scorecard (RGS) and the Rwanda Civil Society Barometer (RCSB). The goal of the RGS, which is usually published annually, is to “to generate credible and reliable data on governance, and serve as an evidence-based source to inform policy, decision making and implementation.” The RCSB, which is on its fourth edition, exists in order to assess “the status of Non-Governmental Organisations in Rwanda.” These reports give statistical evidence of various important indices in Rwandan society. These indices include citizen satisfaction rates with various government services and anti-corruption indicators, and the reports also conclude with an analysis of how these indices have improved since years prior and by giving recommendations for how to even further improve upon government and civil society services. The RCSB is of particular interest for this research, and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter IV of this report. 

Furthermore, the Prime Minister of Rwanda also established the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) in 2015, which is a “platform comprised of representatives from the public sector, private sector and civil society…put in place to facilitate and promote full participation of citizens in the decentralized and participatory governance and improve service provision processes.” Members of JADF include both local and international NGOs, FBOs and POs, and also any other development partners which might be present in each district of Rwanda, which can include UN agencies and individual government agencies, such as USAID. All members of JADF meet twice a year at the district level to discuss issues that have come up and to make new decisions and recommendations for ways to improve the functioning of all the various organizations and institutions operating in that area. 

JADF is also responsible for submitting “quarterly reports of JADF activities to the Rwanda Governance Board” which contains the action plan decided on in each JADF meeting and also highlights the budget that is reported by each organization and agency.  Ideally, JADF ensures that there is a high level of accountability and anti-corruption in all non-governmental organizations and also attempts to mitigate any issues that arise in the community. Another reason why JADF was organized is to ensure that there is no double work being done in each district. Each district in Rwanda has many different CSOs working in various sectors, as well as various government institutions, health care organizations, law enforcement, etc. The JADF meetings keep track of the actions of every public, private and civil organization in the district to make sure that there are no two organizations doing the same thing. For example, if an INGO was working in a certain district to distribute medical supplies, JADF would keep track of that and if there was another INGO that wanted to come in with the goal of distributing medicine, they would be sent elsewhere because that need is already being met. 

Chapter IV: Presentation and Analysis of Data 

Over the course of one month, multiple interviews were conducted with various members of the NGO and INGO community in Rwanda. The interviews were conducted with three different categories of people: employees of various INGOs currently working in Rwanda, members of various government institutions which deal with the functioning of INGOs and employees of local Rwandan NGOs which receive some kind of support, either financially or materially, from INGOs. The interview questions (which are listed fully in Appendix A of this paper) were ordered in two distinct sections: the role of INGOs in Rwanda immediately after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, and their role in the present day. The various responses to the interview questions, in addition to secondary research performed in government archives and online databases, will be analyzed in the following six subsections: 

– INGOs in the Immediate Aftermath of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi 

– INGOs in the Present Day 

– The Role of the Government 

– Government Research 

– Room for Improvement 

– Looking Into the Future 

INGOs in the Immediate Aftermath of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi 

The participants unanimously stated that in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the presence of international NGOs was invaluable. They ensured that adequate resources and survival materials were available to those in the country at the time, and aided in the establishment of local NGOs which then continued with similar work on their own. Because the entire infrastructure of Rwanda had been utterly decimated by the 1994 genocide, it was necessary to use and implement the resources that were supplied by INGOs in order to effectively restart the country. One participant stated that:

As a country that we are coming from the atrocities that we had, we needed really the international support from government organizations, from some international NGOs, from other countries to support Rwanda, and we can really say that they played a big role. 

while another stated that:

international NGOs came with skills and capacities like at that time there were no strategies no nothing…so it was really starting from zero, I don’t think if there were no international organizations it was possible for the government to work. 

The responses from all three categories of participants were relatively similar, if for different reasons. The employees of INGOs stated that they were overall satisfied with the role of their organizations in the immediate aftermath of the genocide because they felt that they were able to function effectively with the help of the government, and because they were able to achieve the goals they had. The government employees stated that they believed the relationship between their offices and INGOs to be good because they were able to effectively follow the policy that had been laid out by the government. The employees of local NGOs were satisfied because they received a lot of helpful funding, resources and training from INGOs which allowed them to better establish their own organizations. They also emphasized that much of the resources and training they received from INGOs in the immediate aftermath of the genocide are still being used by them today, and even that they are now capable of training new employees themselves, thus making them entirely self-sufficient. 

Interestingly, it was mentioned by more than half of the participants that some INGOs present in the immediate aftermath of the genocide were kicked out of the country by the government. These participants gave different reasons for why these organizations were removed from the country, which included the following: 

after genocide, some INGOs were closed because of not providing sufficient support or because they didn’t have clear projects and clear programs, so the government chose to stop them. 

by the period around 1997-98, some of the NGOs were kicked out by the government, because they said we are seeing a lot of stuff without much action, and some of them were even suspected of spying on the government…we had other people who weren’t so satisfied with the performance of some NGOs, and we even have some who weren’t satisfied because they were corrupt and they wanted to just grab or just get a hand on the money

some of them actually were kicked out for good reasons, because they started just going to the population and kind of siding with this side of the population or that side of the population, and the government wasn’t so happy about that kind of approach, which as a matter of fact goes against the policies of the government in terms of unity and reconciliation.

some of them actually were kicked out for good reasons, because they started just going to the population and kind of siding with this side of the population or that side of the population, and the government wasn’t so happy about that kind of approach, which as a matter of fact goes against the policies of the government in terms of unity and reconciliation. 

The policy in Rwanda concerning the removal of an INGO is very highly organized. The law mentioned in Chapter III of this report is also very clear on the ways and circumstances under which INGOs get shut down or are suspended. This law stipulates that the authority in charge of INGO monitoring, in this case the RGB, may at any time ask an INGO “to conduct an 

internal audit on its activities and finances.” This audit must be returned within 90 days, and if the organization is found at fault, it will be issued a warning and receive a suspension of three months. If the fault has not been resolved at the end of these three months, the organization will be permanently shut down. Reasons for being shut down can include mishandling of finances and situations in which “the organisation jeopardizes security, public order, health, morals and human rights.” 

INGOs in the Present Day 

The current role of INGOs in Rwanda is in some ways very different from how it was in 1994-1995, but very similar in others. The emergency resources that were desperately needed in the immediate aftermath of the genocide are clearly no longer needed. What is still needed, however, is the huge amounts of money that INGOs supply. Many participants indicated that INGOs in Rwanda now mainly serve the purpose of funding various projects which are designed and controlled by either the government of Rwanda or local NGOs. A member of a local Rwandan NGO which focuses on helping genocide survivors and their children to process their trauma and PTSD explained that: 

the majority of them (INGOs) partner, there is no INGO implementing directly in the community, they normally partner or go through a local NGO, because they understand [it is important] for sustainability, for the context in the country. 

This was also corroborated by a different participant, who explained that: 

The policy in Rwanda requires international organizations to work with the local organizations, not go directly to implement some activities, but work with the local NGOs to capacitate them and to implement the activities at field level. 

This sentiment is also reflected in a subsequent quote from the same participant in which it was explained that: 

I think when you respect the rules and regulations of Rwanda, you don’t have any issue because there is accountability structure, there is zero tolerance to corruption and embezzlement…I can say that when there is that kind of willingness to the side of the government, and working together with international organizations, I think the result is tremendous, is very good. 

This idea is also reflected in the official policy governing INGOs in Rwanda, which enshrines the right to propose policy and new initiatives to the government. The official wording is that INGOs have the right “to put forward views on national policies and suggest recommendations relating to the national policy designing and legislation related to its activities [and] to advocate within its activities.” There is, however, no guarantee that these proposed policies or advocacy routes will be accepted or allowed by the government.

Another role played by INGOs in the present day is mobilization and capacity building. Multiple participants who were members of local NGOs indicated that their organizations had received training from various international organizations in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 genocide, which they then used to train others. Their organizations now are entirely independent of international actors, but many of those in leadership positions within local NGOs cite the capacity building given to them by INGOs as one of the many reasons why their organizations became successful. One participant mentioned that: 

most of the time I can say that they [INGOs] are specialized in mobilization, informing the population about peace and through those programs, those reconciliation programs, joining together ex-convict and survivors, but also with the rest of the community, not only the survivors but also others, because we are aiming at not dividing individuals into those two categories. 

The Role of the Government 

According to the participants, one of the most significant reasons for the success of INGOs in Rwanda was the government policy that dictates and controls  the functioning of all civil society organizations in the country. The majority of participants explained that the government understands the areas in the country where the need is greatest, and can therefore direct the resources of INGOs down the best possible avenues. An employee at PFR stated that: 

we can say that international organizations played a role in rebuilding, restoring the community relations, even building peace within the Rwandan community, but with the support and the goodwill of the government of Rwanda. Without their good initiatives and good policies, this shouldn’t be possible. But with that support, moral support, even financial support from the government institutions we can say that we are part of, as an international organization, we are part of actors to build peace and stability in Rwanda. 

This sentiment was echoed by many other participants. The general consensus was that INGOs in Rwanda have been successful and well received because the government has implemented sound policies that have guided the actions of these organizations. This participant continued to point out that 

International organizations, as we work together with the UN agencies, with many organizations here, they play a big role, but this is because the government of Rwanda is able to manage that support and to orient it to where it has to go. Otherwise we can say in many other African countries, the support comes but it finishes in the pocket of some people, some leaders, and doesn’t play or yield results in the community. So in Rwanda we have structures that support every coin that come to support the community. 

Government Research 

This research has shown that the government of Rwanda is highly involved in even the non-governmental sphere of Rwandan life. The government performs extensive research each year on the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) each year and publishes this research annually in their Civil Society Barometer (CSB). The most recent barometer publication, which includes data from 2023 suggests that there is a very high level of satisfaction in the Rwandan population concerning the role of CSOs in various fields, which is displayed in the graph below.

The data used to achieve the results of the above graph was collected using surveys from any Rwandan citizen aged 18 or older in all 30 districts who had interacted with any CSO (both INGOs and NGOs) over the three years prior. Furthermore, data was also collected from representatives of all the NGOs and INGOs examined. As can be seen in the above graph, the vast majority of those citizens whose opinions were used in this study indicated that they were satisfied with the contribution of CSOs in the Rwandan government. The only moderately negative result came from the perception of quality of service delivery in CSOs, while the most positive perception of CSOs came from their promotion of human rights. This slightly lower view of the delivery of quality service was also reflected in an interview with a member of a local NGO, who explained that this is the challenge that our government is facing: implementation, to put into practice the policies and the roles. 

Another important source of government research is the Rwanda Governance Scorecard, or RGS. This is a report published by RGB which uses data from the RCSB in addition to the CRC (Citizen Report Card), and the SDMR (Service Delivery Monitoring Report) and data from original surveys to analyze the state of governance in Rwanda and identify areas for improvement. This report encompasses all areas of governance, including the work of CSOs, under which INGOs fall. There are two data points of interest to this research that will be discussed further. 

Firstly, under the report’s section concerning citizen participation and inclusiveness in government, which refers to “citizens’ involvement in public decision-making at the same time ensuring that no one is left behind in the national social, political and economic development,” it is indicated that the scores for CSOs are quite high. 

As can be seen above, the participation of CSOs in Rwandan governance overall is at 76.10 percent, which indicates that these organizations have a high level of involvement in governmental systems and proceedings. What is not shown in this graph is that this score is up from the previous edition of the RGS, which scored overall participation and inclusiveness in government at 74.23 percent. The current number for overall participation and inclusiveness is 84.04 percent. The other significant mention of CSOs in this report is concerning relationships between CSOs and individual districts in Rwanda. This data is listed under the chapter of the report concerning investment in human and social development. 

This finding indicates that only 40.00 percent of CSOs participate in formal partnerships between districts in Rwanda when it comes to social protection. This number is much lower than other scores in this chapter, which consistently rank between 70 and 100 percent. This number is also consistent with findings from interviews. One participant mentioned that 

in terms of evaluating NGOs we should go beyond just having used a lot of money, or having distributed water tanks or whatever, and say actually you have been here but has the mindset of the people changed, are they moving towards self sustainability? 

This sentiment was a common one in many interviews. While participants were generally very happy with the role of INGOs in Rwanda, they did mention that there are times when they came in without fully understanding the cultural context in which they find themselves. This has been somewhat aided by the new policy which ensures that INGOs must work with local NGOs in some way, but many participants mention that this issue also extends to whether or not they get support. An employee at a local NGO helping orphans highlighted that: 

they [INGOs] may come and dictate what to do, and I accept because of money, because of funding, however, they should come and learn because I have something to start on…sometimes, the INGOs come, I may say sometimes they are subjective, they are not objective in choosing their partners, they come, they love you, so they help you and give you money, not based on what you are doing or your work…they [agencies like the UN] refuse us money because they give money to international NGOs because they speak the same language. 

Room for Improvement 

While all of the interviews conducted gave an overwhelmingly positive view of INGOs in Rwandan society, both in the immediate aftermath of the genocide and in the present day, it is important to also highlight that there are some dissenting voices to this narrative. A 2011 commentary written by a Rwandese person in response to a report made by Human Rights Watch (HRW) claimed in relation to the work of INGOs in Rwanda that “the action of a Western or affiliated civil society, is negatively influenced by the stand taken against political options which are not to their taste nor in harmony with their culture, and in accordance with the absolute freedoms dogma and western model tyranny, their action is unlimited and unrestrained…this behaviour often makes of NGOs more of enemies than collaborators of the state.” The report went on to say that “the struggle between NGOs and Rwanda for population control began early,” especially in jockeying for control of those internally displaced persons and refugee camps, and that “immediately after the genocide…the Rwanda Government cut a sorry figure 

beside the flourishing splendor of the NGO” 

While participants explained that INGOs which did not follow government policy or did not manage money correctly were removed, this commentary suggests that there was also a possibility that INGOs in Rwanda in the immediate aftermath of the genocide were, either purposefully or not, promoting a very deeply Westernized ideology and system of knowledge. Indeed, Roger Riddell suggests that “it is far from easy for them (INGOs) to raise searching questions about, to challenge and to call for fundamental change to, a system of which they are a part, and from which they benefit, both directly and indirectly.” This indicates the need for further research into the long lasting impacts of INGO intervention, particularly those INGOs which originate and receive a majority of funding from Western countries. This issue is furthermore complicated by the fact that “NGOS have often been as guilty as official aid agencies in suggesting, in their informational literature, a far greater lasting impact of their own aid projects and programmes than the evidence would support.” 

A few participants also suggested that INGOs sometimes lack nuance and cultural understanding when coming into Rwanda. An employee at a local NGO mentioned that:

maybe international NGOs will say I come to give you water, while maybe the client needs food, but it gives water and goes back, for us [local NGOs] we advocate, we do whatever we want to meet the needs of that client. 

This sentiment was further corroborated by a member of the Ministry of National Unity and Civic Engagement, who explained that INGOs sometimes have programs that do not match the needs of the community and as such become unnecessary. This participant also explained that:

another issue is that INGOs are independent somehow, they don’t follow their plan and their budget to see whether what they have planned has really been implemented, because they are fully independent we don’t really know the projects we are partnering on because they are fully independent…the main issue is that what they are doing sometimes is not matching the needs of the community, nor the national policy. 

This participant did however go on to say that sometimes 

some of them change their programs when arriving here, because after learning the needs of the community they comply with it. 

Looking Into the Future 

Although the legacy of Westernization in the work of INGOs is a very complicated one with an often painful history, there are those who work in the field of NGOs who are trying to come up with new ways to interact with the global south. Riddell argues that “a growing number of NGOS, both secular and religious, are now articulating the way they work, and how they interact with poor people and poor communities, through a rights-based perspective, with some additionally emphasizing the importance to their work of aiming to enhance human dignity.” This concept works well with the previously mentioned Rwandan policy on the functioning of INGOs in Rwanda, which emphasizes that any organization in the country which does not support or goes against what the government defines as human rights and morality will receive a warning and possibly be removed from the country. 

A former Commissioner at the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission explained that he thought that the government needed to be even more involved in the running of INGOs. He stated that 

I would rather see more exchange between the government and the NGOs than I see now, because they tend to be enjoying too much independence…for instance, if you look at projects funded by the USAID, or the DFID or the European Union, very often they prefer to channel their money through NGOs, which means the government should have a kind of close control on how the money is used because…I don’t mean to say the government should go and maybe take the money or what, but they should be at least holding the people accountable for their results in terms of what they do with the population. 

Another area which was identified by participants for improvement was the prestige of local NGOs. Many participants who were members of these local organizations said that they at times felt marginalized or ignored because they had less money. These participants explained that they were the ones who had the most knowledge about the area and the community, but that sometimes this was overlooked in favor of the huge amounts of money that could be brought in by massive INGOs. One participant in particular explained that frequently at JADF meetings, he was told to sit down and not speak, giving more time to representatives of INGOs. He explained that 

I may say that local NGOs, they may be best in mastering the reality of the community, and the government may be second, and then the international: NGOs…local NGOs play a very big role in the community, I think they need to be considered, this is the motivation, and also they need means, they need funding…national organizations, they need support from the government, moral support, and financial support, this is actually the main challenge.

Chapter V: Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 

The role of INGOs in Rwanda is a fascinating example of how international forces can both help and hinder the process of reconstruction and peacebuilding. The majority of responses from participants, as explained in Chapter IV, indicated that the general opinion of INGOs in Rwanda from people in various areas of Rwandan life is a positive one. People were overall happy with how INGOs function in the country, and especially happy with the government policy that guides their presence. There does not seem to be a huge amount of lingering resentment towards international organizations on behalf of the Rwandese people, just given the results of the interviews. In fact, one participant stated that 

even when I speak of some INGOs that were kicked out, they weren’t kicked out by the population, the population is totally ignorant about some of those issues that happen, so it’s mainly some of the administrative units that do that, but otherwise the population has no problem with the INGOs. 

Furthermore, even when there is some resentment towards international presences in Rwanda, the participants made it clear that they see the success of these organizations as a government achievement. They view the government as being the constraining factor that ensures that INGOs do the work they were intended to do, and that they do it correctly. There is a sense of security among the population that suggests that even if there is an international organization in the country with bad intentions, the government will be there to fix it. 

This does not mean that there are no problems that exist between INGOs and the population of Rwanda, but the general consensus of the participants was that they viewed the presence of INGOs in their country as a good thing, holding them separate from the events of the 1994 genocide. To be more specific, the participants had a very positive view of INGOs in 

Rwanda by and large because of the government policy that guides them. The idea conveyed was that in large part the population of Rwanda is happy with INGOs and does not hold lingering resentments, but that is because the Rwandan government has done, in their view, such a good job with organizing their presence. 

There were a few main issues identified by participants in this study. The first was that INGOs coming into Rwanda sometimes lack  adequate understanding of the cultural context in Rwanda, and as such, they attempt to implement strategies which are not fit for the community. One such example was given by a participant who explained that certain INGOs in the country stay on only the paved roads, so their aid does not really reach the areas where it is needed most. This participant also elaborated that sometimes, INGOs focus on bringing aid into the countryside of Rwanda, but forget that there are also pockets of poverty in the big cities, mostly Kigali, that also need their assistance. The second big issue identified was that INGOs sometimes partner with local organizations which they already know of, and don’t make attempts to reach out to other organizations. The participants also suggested that this issue can also apply to international donors, who often prefer to make donations to Western organizations, rather than donating directly to local NGOs who have a much better understanding of the cultural context in the area and therefore can more effectively say exactly what kind of help is needed. The third issue identified by participants was that while government policy towards INGOs in Rwanda is generally perceived in a very positive light, there are some issues with implementation. This point was made especially by those participants who were affiliated with local NGOs. One participant stated that 

it’s as if the international NGOs, when they go with the policies of the government it’s ok and it works very well, however what we need is to look at the policies of the government and how it can be adapted to the reality of the country. 

This is of particular concern for local NGOs which get significantly less attention and funding than big INGOs. In fact, “the rapid growth in the income of larger national and international NGOs means that in terms of overall NGO aid funds, a relatively small number of (big) NGOs dominate the expenditure of NGO development and humanitarian aid projects and programmes…an educated guess would be that the largest 500 national and international NGOs are probably responsible for over 90 percent of total NGO aid expenditure.” 

This research is of particular interest to those studying the ways in which areas that have recently been devastated by conflict can rebuild in a sustainable manner. It is also particularly interesting for those looking at the ways in which INGOs interact with local governments. What has been demonstrated here is that the government of Rwanda has a very high level of control and knowledge about the goings-on of INGOs in the country, and that there are very strict laws dictating what these international organizations can and cannot do. Further investigation is definitely needed in this area, because during the course of this process it was not possible to organize an interview with any representative of RGB. As mentioned frequently above, RGB is the most important government institution to take into account when it comes to studying the role of INGOs in Rwanda. Frequent attempts were made to get in contact with any representative of RGB, but these went unanswered. Further research, given a longer time frame, would benefit greatly from the input of a member of this government institution. 

Further research on this topic would be highly recommended. Global conflicts currently are on the rise, and studying the ways in which INGOs can help to either mitigate these conflicts or assist in the reconstruction afterwards is of the utmost importance. Of even more significance is the possible role INGOs can play in peacebuilding. The world order as has been the norm for the past half a century is changing rapidly, and the existing research on this topic has generally come to the conclusion that the new big thing is going to be INGOs. Given that INGOs have only existed on the world stage for about forty years, it would be highly advisable that more in depth research on the ground in areas where INGO intervention is the most impactful is done. Particularly now that AI and other technologies (such as expanding internet access) are booming, in addition to the global crisis that is climate change, are becoming massive issues, more knowledge on the field of international non-governmental intervention and aid is deeply important.

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Appendices 

Appendix A: Interview Questions 

Interview questions are divided into two different themes: INGOs in immediate aftermath of the genocide, and the current role of INGOs in Rwandan society 

Immediate Aftermath 

a. What was the role of INGOs in Rwanda in the immediate aftermath of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi? 

b. Do you think that INGOs helped to facilitate the reconstruction process? If so, how? 

c. Do you think that INGOs helped to facilitate the peacebuilding process? If so, how? 

d. What is your opinion of the role played by INGOs in the immediate aftermath of the genocide? 

e. How do you feel about INGO intervention in Rwanda immediately post genocide, as opposed to the intervention of local organizations? 

Current Role of INGOs 

a. What are your thoughts and feelings about INGOs in Rwanda currently? b. How do you see INGOs interacting with local organizations now? 

c. Are there any issues in your opinion facing the role of INGOs in Rwanda at the moment? 

d. Do you think Rwandese people hold remaining resentments against international organizations as a result of the genocide? 

e. What do you think the value of INGOs is in Rwandan society, as opposed to local NGOs? 

f. How do INGOs in Rwanda interact with the government and its policy? 

Appendix B: e-Imiryango Registration Requirements for INGOs in Rwanda International Non-Governmental Organisation Registration Requirements FIRST REGISTRATION 

● To present a power of attorney from the Head Office assigning a representative of new INGO applying for registration in Rwanda. However, this is not applied to the founder/ CEO of the INGO 

● Application letter addressed to the CEO (RGB) requesting to register the organization 

● Annual action plan and budget (clearly indicate administrative/office expenditures and activities budget) 

● Notarized Statute in accordance with laws, issued by competent Authority from the country where that organization Head Office is located 

● Signed proof of funding or a commitment letter from the donor or INGO Head Office 

● Valid Memorandum of Understanding from the partnering line Ministry ● The organizational structure of the office in Rwanda 

● Proof of payment of a non-refundable fees of 300.000 frw 

RENEWAL OF REGISTRATION 

● Application Letter addressed to the CEO (RGB) 

“Welcome to e-Imiryango,” RGB, accessed 28 November 2024, https://e-imiryango.rgb.rw/#/home. 

● Annual activity report 

● Annual Action plan and budget for the fiscal year (clearly indicate administrative/office expenditures and activities budget) 

● Signed proof of funding or a commitment letter from the donor or INGO head office 

● A Valid Memorandum of Understanding from the partnering line Ministry where necessary 

● Fees for Renewal registration:200,000 Frw 

REGISTRATION FOR MORE THAN 1 YEAR TO 5 YEARS (only granted for already registered INGOs) 

● Application Letter addressed to the CEO (RGB). 

● Strategic plan of activities for more than one year, showing its budget execution and performance indicators endorsed by the Line Ministry. 

● Annual Action plan and budget for the current fiscal year. 

● Signed proof / a commitment letter by the donor / head office of the INGO. ● A Memorandum of Understanding with the line Ministry, covering the period applied for. 

● Fees for renewal registration for 1 year up to 5 years: 500.000 Frw CHANGING THE NAME OF THE ORGANISATION 

● Application Letter addressed to the CEO (RGB) explaining the reason(s) of changing the INGO name. 

● Notarized By-laws or statute bearing amended articles showing the new name acquired. It should be certified by competent authority in the Country where that Head Office is located. 

● A valid copy of registration certificate issued by the competent Authority. CLOSING OF OPERATIONS 

● Application Letter addressed to the CEO (RGB) with a copy to the partnering line ministry and the District explaining the reasons for closure. 

● Notify the Rwanda Governance Board 90 days before closing. 

● Consult RGB for orientation especially on the transfer of assets. ● Annual activity report. 

● Financial statement for the previous fiscal year showing planned budget and used budget. 

● Proof of Rwanda Revenue Authority Tax Clearance. 

● Proof of Social Security Fund of Rwanda Employee Payment clearance. ● Proposal of assets transfer plan to three (3) registered national NGOs op- erating in similar domain that has been existing at least for three years. 

● An INGO closing out its activities in Rwanda will advertise the closure in three (3) widely read newspapers twice in three (3) months before it closes out its operations in the country. 

● An INGO shall close operations upon reception of an official closing certificate from the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB). ● Fees for closing certificate: 200,000 Frw

To be clear, M23 offensives since January have seriously worsened an already dire security situation in the Eastern part of the DRC. In the last four months, rebel fighters have captured Goma and Bukavu, the two largest cities in the region, as well as valuable gold and coltan mines. Thousands have been killed by both sides and hundreds of thousands displaced. 1.6 million children are out of school, and sexual violence has spiked in recent months. However, it is misleading to attribute these atrocities directly to M23 when patterns of violence often point towards the Congolese government. Bukavu and Goma were ravaged in the days before M23 troops arrived, and the mining hub of Walikale was recently looted by government militias after M23 withdrew. On the battlefield, M23 has proven to be a professional and efficient fighting force, with summary executions being the primary complaints lodged towards them. Instead, it is the Congolese army commonly known as FARDC that seems to resemble a ragtag militia, plagued with graft, desertion, and accusations of abuse. Furthermore, since 2023, the capital Kinshasa has increasingly relied on loosely organized and notoriously brutal local militias known as Wazalendo, as well as former Rwandan genocide perpetrators known as FDLR. Perhaps it is less surprising, then, that M23 columns often march into towns and villages to locals cheering in the streets.

Of course, Rwanda’s illegal meddling in the DRC is sincerely problematic. Though never explicitly admitted, it is a well established fact that Rwandan soldiers are supporting (if not outnumbering) M23 fighters in the Eastern DRC. Logistical, armament, and training support from the Rwandan Defence Force are also likely why M23 has proven so professional in the field. In return, M23 facilitates the smuggling of precious minerals across the border, including nearly 280 tons of coltan that was recently exposed in a Luxembourg commodity scandal. Additionally, Rwanda’s largest net export by far is gold, which at $885 million in 2023 dwarfs any possible domestic production. Along with neighboring Uganda, which exported over $2.2 billion in likely-smuggled gold in the same year, Rwanda has benefited substantially from the looting of resources from the DRC. However, OEC data reveals that net Rwandan gold exports grew mostly in the years between 2014 ($10 million) and 2018 ($709 million)—years when M23 was not active—implying that such illegal profiteering may not be linked to military intervention. If anything, rising resource smuggling can be viewed as a product of the Congolese state’s receding control over its eastern provinces at large, and M23’s influence only a streamlining of already-established black market trade routes. While this data does not absolve Rwandan culpability, it does expose crucial inconsistencies in the narrative that Rwandan intervention is driven primarily by capitalist greed.

Fundamentally, ending Congo’s cycle of physical and economic injustice is more complicated than curtailing Rwandan involvement not least because the fates of these two nations have been interconnected for decades. As Kagame’s ethnic Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front advanced through Rwanda in spring 1994 to clear out the murderous bands that killed 800,000 Tutsi in 100 days, thousands of genocide perpetrators and nearly a million ethnic Hutu civilians fled into neighboring Congo, formerly Zaire. Hosted by then Congolese president Mobutu Sese Seko and abetted by the French military, the now-infamous Interahamwe began planning a counter invasion—something the post-genocide Rwandan government could not accept. When Mobutu refused to hand perpetrators over, RPF soldiers invaded Zaire, killing an estimated 25,000 to 45,000 refugees and fomenting rebellion in the process. In decades since, continued conflict has convinced successive Congolese governments to consistently incorporate Hutu genocidaires into the national army whilst excluding Tutsi from citizenship rights. The M23 movement is merely the latest manifestation of this exclusion, named after a March 23rd, 2009 peace agreement which the rebels claim has been violated by the government. So although most genocide perpetrators have long since hung up their weapons, anti-Tutsi sentiment in the Congo is as strong as ever. As such, Rwandan interference in Congolese affairs, while likely disproportionate, can not be quickly dismissed for the security of both Rwandans and Congolese Tutsis.

Ultimately, the conflict can best be understood internally. Viewed as a threat to political power, the Mobutu and Kabila regimes kept FARDC as weak and ineffectual as possible for decades. Watching the state retreat from every aspect of governance except resource extraction left peripheral regions in the East a tinderbox of discontent. When sectarian violence overflowed into the region from Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s, armed groups sprung up by the dozen; most of them were fighting against the government until M23’s recent offensives. In fact, of the seven million displaced persons in the Congo, six were displaced in the years when M23 was dormant. Moreover, UNICEF complaints about M23 forcing children out of school are arguably voided by the fact that the Congolese government hasn’t funded such public services since the Cold War. Indeed, when Congo’s current president Felix Tshisekedi took office in 2019, he practically inherited a failed state. 

Unfortunately for Congolese citizens, Tshisekedi’s leadership has been equally disastrous. He only won the presidency by striking a deal with outgoing despot Joseph Kabila to rig the election, compromising what little legitimacy the longtime Belgian resident had to begin with. Until 2024, his choice for deputy minister of defense had spent more time imprisoned in the Hague than in domestic politics. Other cabinet positions are filled with business partners and cronies alike, leading to widespread criticism from NGOs such as Amnesty International. Tshisekedi was slowly becoming an international pariah, that is, until M23 overran Goma in January. 

Since then, the pendulum of criticism has swung completely and unjustifiably towards Rwanda. Groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have abandoned criticism of Tshisekedi and called for overwhelming international pressure against the alleged invaders. Western media has demonized M23 as public enemy number one in the Congo despite the presence of Islamic State groups and continued activities of Hutu genocidaires. The Economist went so far as to compare Kagame’s policies to Putin’s irredentist ambitions in Ukraine—a laughable analogy for anyone familiar with a map. The very humanitarians so eager to point out the Goma prison fire and mass rape that occurred during fighting between M23 and the army forget to mention that a nearly identical incident occurred in a Kinshasa prison months earlier and has become an epicemic across the country. Moreover, in deriding Rwanda’s appalling human rights and press freedom records, journalists conveniently gloss over the fact that the DRC consistently ranks lower on every index. And for all the valid criticism of Rwanda plundering Congolese minerals, Tshisekedi’s solution has been to offer those same minerals to Western companies at even more exploitative terms. In fact, the president has seemingly spent more time lobbying congress and the EU than governing. Thus far, the results of lobbying have been mixed, but it is frankly pathetic that the largest Western proponent of sanctions against Rwanda is the very entity responsible for murdering Patrice Lumumba, inciting ethnic divisions in Rwanda, and genociding millions in the Congo Free State.

Thus, even if one were to generously acknowledge all of Rwanda’s wrongdoings, international media should have equal if not more qualms with the Congolese government. None of M23 and Rwanda’s exploitation, abuse, or misinformation compares to Tshisekedi’s shamelessly advertised persecution complex. Indeed, global sympathy and plump aid cheques have made conflict a handsomely profitable endeavor for his regime, perhaps explaining his refusal to engage in talks with M23 until April. Tshisekedi is a corporatist despot who has consistently failed to deliver on promises, and at a certain point, the West must recognize his scapegoating behavior for what it is. This conflict is not a question of Rwandan exploitation or Congolese peace but exploitation from which direction, and the sitting Congolese president has proven himself willing to exploit his own people to the maximum.

Ultimately, long-term prospects for recovery depend entirely on the ability for the state to govern effectively. It remains to be seen how well M23 can govern its territory, but early signs imply a harsh but efficient and stable administration. On the other hand, the current regime in Kinshasa is an unmitigated disaster in statecraft. At the current rate, a Rwandan withdrawal will do nothing but line the pockets of Kinshasa elites. As the Africa Center for Strategic Studies recognizes, until Tshisekedi and the current government are replaced by genuine reform and national dialogue, conflict in the Congo will likely never abate. Any media analysis of the region should recognize this reality.Why, then, has Western media seemingly accepted Kinshasa’s ruse? Revisiting Fayulu and Smith’s article in Foreign Policy points towards a possible cause for such widespread defamation of Rwanda: self interest. Milain Fayulu’s father happens to be Martin Fayulu, an opposition politician in the DRC who delusionally blames Rwanda for his 2018 electoral loss (as mentioned above, outgoing president Joseph Kabila helped Tshisekedi rig that election). Jeffrey Smith is the founder of Vanguard Africa, a prominent backer of Rwanda’s long-discredited and genocide-questioning opposition figure Victoire Ingabire. Yet an abundance of overzealous Rwanda critics should not be allowed to distort the fact that the Congo conflict is a fundamentally internal problem. For all of Kagame’s faults, the real arsonist is Congolese president Felix Tshisekedi, and he has built a career masquerading as a firefighter.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Members of the M23 rebel group provide security for their leaders during a public walkabout in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo, Image sourced from EPA Images | CC License, no changes made

Its reach is expansive, yet despite its vast implications, AI governance remains largely concentrated in the hands of senior policymakers, corporate leaders, and technocrats. The voices of the next generation—those who will inherit and advance this technology—are still notably absent from the global policy table. Youth Leaders Davos (YLD), a powerful initiative founded and led by the visionary global educator and entrepreneur April Swando Hu (Yale ’84), provided a unique platform to address this critical gap during the 2025 World Economic Forum week in Davos, Switzerland. In Davos, I joined youth leaders from across the globe to confront one of the most urgent challenges of our time: ethical and inclusive AI governance. This catalytic incubator of ideas, conceived by Ms. Hu’s commitment to fostering future-oriented leadership, transformed abstract interests into actionable conviction.

Participating in a specialized forum on the ethical implications of AI in healthcare diagnostics and a simulation exercise on international cooperation in regulating large language models served as critical launchpads for understanding the complexities and urgency of youth involvement in these crucial conversations. These experiences underscored how the future of global governance will be inextricably linked to the governance of artificial intelligence, demanding the inclusion of diverse perspectives to navigate its profound societal implications.

Global institutions have begun to respond: UNESCO introduced a global ethical framework for AI, the OECD offers AI policy observatories, and the EU’s AI Act marks a regulatory landmark. While these frameworks represent important progress, there remains an opportunity to integrate more diverse, youth-driven perspectives—especially from the Global South. Young people, who are both at the forefront of technological innovation and among those most impacted by its outcomes, bring vital insights that can complement the expertise of established policymakers and technocrats.   

This generational gap became clear during discussions where senior leaders contributed deep expertise on the technical and geopolitical dimensions of AI, while our cohort brought complementary perspectives rooted in ethical urgency, lived experience, and future-oriented thinking. We questioned how AI could reinforce structural inequities if left unchecked, and how algorithmic opacity might deepen divisions along socioeconomic and racial lines. Far from being idealistic, these concerns reflected a grounded understanding of how power and technology intersect.

International institutions can embed fairness, transparency, and sustainability into digital systems by adopting inclusive, human-centered design standards that prioritize equity across socioeconomic and cultural contexts. Fairness begins with representative data: AI systems must be trained on diverse, de-biased datasets that reflect global populations, not just data from dominant regions or demographics. To ensure transparency, institutions should advocate for algorithmic explainability—requiring developers to disclose decision-making processes and enabling public audits of AI tools deployed in high-stakes areas like healthcare and finance. Sustainability, meanwhile, demands regulatory alignment between technological innovation and environmental stewardship; this includes incentivizing energy-efficient AI models and embedding climate risk assessments into digital infrastructure development. Only through such principled and coordinated action can international institutions ensure that AI development aligns with the broader goals of equity, accountability, and long-term global well-being.

History offers precedents. Youth-led advocacy has long shaped global discourse—from the anti-apartheid movement to climate activism. More recently, figures like Greta Thunberg and Malala Yousafzai have challenged international bodies to rethink who gets to speak and what solutions are prioritized. Yet when it comes to emerging technologies like AI, young voices are often sidelined in favor of corporate interests or state security agendas.   

What would a more inclusive model of AI governance look like? It would involve intergenerational collaboration, yes, but also concrete policy mechanisms: youth representation in multilateral AI forums, funding for grassroots AI education in underrepresented regions, and a global youth assembly to propose digital rights frameworks. Just as the Paris Agreement was shaped by civil society and indigenous voices, the future of AI demands broad-based legitimacy grounded in ethical pluralism.

Three key principles should guide international AI governance moving forward. First, self-aware leadership. Before we can regulate machines, we must interrogate our own values. Leadership development grounded in self-reflection, empathy, and humility is critical to resisting the technocratic temptation to govern from above. Second, cross-cultural intelligence. AI systems are trained on data, but values are shaped by culture. Building ethical AI requires deep, cross-cultural engagement that prioritizes local contexts and historically marginalized communities. Third, purpose-driven innovation. Innovation must serve people, not just markets. As the tech sector becomes increasingly globalized, international bodies must align AI development with public goods—healthcare, education, and climate resilience—rather than profit maximization.   

The principles of self-awareness, cross-cultural intelligence, and purpose-driven innovation, underscored during my time with Youth Leaders Davos during the 2025 World Economic Forum week, offer a vital framework for how the next generation can and must contribute to shaping the ethical trajectory of AI on a global scale. Given the profound and multifaceted impact of AI on the international order, the inclusion of youth perspectives in its governance is not merely desirable but an imperative for a future that is both technologically advanced and ethically sound.

Artificial intelligence does not represent an inevitable trajectory, but rather a domain shaped by intentional design. The principles and values that guide its development today will fundamentally influence the international order and societal structures of tomorrow. The insights gained at Youth Leaders Davos highlight the urgent need to empower young leaders in this critical endeavor.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Annual Meeting Davos: Aerial photograph of Davos, Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

Section One: Introduction 

Donald Trump’s recent announcement of “Iron Dome for America”—now referred to as a “Golden” Dome—upends established precedent in nuclear politics, and while it may not violate direct aspects of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the New START, other countries have already expressed their discomfort with the program. The Iron Dome may cause other states to violate the aforementioned treaties and expand their nuclear arsenals, causing issues within international politics and nuclear deterrence that have persisted since 1945. President Trump puts the United States and other nuclear powers in uncomfortable and unprecedented positions by signing an executive order to create drastically more intense missile defense mechanisms for the U.S, calling into question nuclear treaties that the U.S. has ratified, and potentially catalyzing a resurgence in the global nuclear arms race. 

Section Two: Background

Since his first term in office, President Trump has had a volatile and contentious history with nuclear power and relationships with other states’ nuclear programs. In his first term, it was unclear whether President Trump would renew the key non-proliferation agreement between the U.S. and Russia, the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). He encouraged powers such as Iran to resume the development of nuclear weapons and only recently restored pressure on Iran’s capacity to obtain a nuclear weapon by signing the National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM), calling Iran out for violations of the NPT and saying, “A radical regime like this can never be allowed to acquire or develop nuclear weapons.” There have also been discussions of the U.S. restarting nuclear testing for the first time since 1992, which would be an entirely political move to “demonstrate strength” and is not necessary for actual nuclear testing. Generally, President Trump has been problematic and unpredictable regarding nuclear politics, which raises the question of what his defense goals are for the next four years, and whether they will be permissible under the NPT. 

The NPT, created in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, is a treaty that exists with the aim of expanding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty was created by a UN-sponsored committee focusing on disarmament. According to the United Nations, “the NPT has been the cornerstone of [the] global nuclear non-proliferation regime.” In line with experts such as Scott Sagan, the creators of the NPT contend that the way to prevent nuclear warfare is to regulate and decrease the dissemination of nuclear weapons as much as possible. The design of the NPT relies on the cooperation of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. The basis of the treaty is that non-nuclear weapon states should renounce their development or acquisition of nuclear weapons in exchange for nuclear weapon states sharing their nuclear technology for

peaceful purposes, such as energy production. The cornerstone of the treaty is an understanding between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. 

Historically, the U.S.’s role in the NPT has been important to conflict resolution and international law more generally. While the NPT has not altogether halted nuclear proliferation, it has greatly slowed the spread of nuclear weapons and set precedents for foreign cooperation regarding nuclear weapons, which, during the Cold War, was an extreme concern. In recent developments, President Trump has signed an executive order calling for an “Iron Dome for America.” 

Ironically, the Iron Dome for America project shares a name with a defense project that exists in Israel, the original “Iron Dome” system. This defense system was created to defend from short-range rockets, shells, and mortars in 2008. The U.S. based a missile defense shield on Israel’s “Iron Dome” project, known as the SkyHunter missile defense system. These systems are, as they presently exist, not inherently problematic on a world-political stage because they prevent small weapons. Since the 1980s, the missile defense system that has existed within the U.S. has only been large enough to prevent missiles from nations such as North Korea or Iran. The U.S. purposefully elected not to scale these defense frameworks to a degree that would be able to defend the nation from a state such as Russia. This is because, in regard to nuclear theory, “mutually assured destruction” is an extreme deterrent for the use of nuclear weapons. China will not choose to send nuclear weapons to the U.S. because they know that the nuclear weapons will greatly harm the U.S., and the U.S., as a nuclear power with secure second-strike capabilities, will have no choice but to strike China back. This will eventually lead to mutually assured destruction between the two powers.

However, President Trump’s “Iron Dome for America” plan aims to not just deter small missile or rocket attacks. Rather, on January 27th, he prompted Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to create new plans for “Defense […] against ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks from peer, near-peer, and rogue adversaries” within 60 days. The creation of this defense technology would largely impact the delicate balance between nuclear powers that currently exist: it could cause the U.S. to “dominate the deterrence spectrum.” Suppose Russia suspects that the potential impact of their nuclear weapons has been reduced. Will they feel more comfortable striking the U.S. or other states with their weapons because there may no longer be clear, mutually assured destruction? More importantly, will this trigger Russia to try and scale up its nuclear programs to innovate around U.S. protection technologies and gain back the power and security nuclear weapons gave them? 

The Iron Dome for America plan has already prompted a response from Russia, with a foreign official claiming it would target the ability of Russia and China to exercise nuclear deterrence. She went on to say that it would “hinder the prospects for talks on nuclear arms control” and that “the indicated U.S. approaches will not contribute to reducing tensions or improving the situation in the strategic sphere.” Furthermore, this has left Russia potentially in a place where they may feel as though they have to violate the New START and increase their nuclear arsenal. Even if Russia elects not to violate the treaty, the New START is due for renewal in 2026, and it is possible that if Russia feels threatened, they opt not to renew the treaty, or attempt to negotiate to drastically change the treaty’s terms. 

While there are few direct historical examples of a nation’s missile defense policy promoting adversaries to expand their nuclear arsenals, there are certainly examples of nuclear arms races or, more broadly, general defense system development competition. One example is the “shipbuilding arms race” between Germany and the United Kingdom before WWI. A more famous example of a nuclear arms race is the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the Cold War. There was explicit competition in the development of nuclear arsenals, which was only encouraged by the opposing state furthering their development. There was a constant fear that either party would “bolt out of the blue” and strike the other state first just to have a first-strike advantage, catalyzing even more of an emphasis on nuclear development. 

Because the advancement of missile defense systems has similar implications for deterrence or the effectiveness of a nation’s nuclear system, it is clear that rapid nuclearization or development of nuclear protection systems are both strategically destabilizing. As a policy brief in Stimson states, “If one nation learns that a rival is rapidly developing systems that could overwhelm or defeat its defenses, a realist response dictates that that nation must do the same to offset any strategic advantage its rival might gain.” 

Furthermore, the U.S. aimed to create a missile defense program reminiscent of the Iron Dome during the Reagan Administration. In 1983, President Reagan announced his plans for the “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI). The program ended a mere ten years later when President Clinton was elected; however, it prompted similar discomfort from the USSR. A recently declassified paper from the CIA’s internal journal, Studies in Intelligence, states that, “In response to the SDI, Moscow threatened a variety of military countermeasures in lieu of developing a parallel missile defense system.” Additionally, the Soviet General Secretary at the time considered “increasing the number of missiles, reinforcing missile silos to increase their survivability, [and] developing and deploying an underwater missile that would not be affected by the space-based missile shield,” according to the paper. It is clear that the development of the SDI triggered a state of alarm from the USSR, and the whole situation is largely comparable to the present Iron Dome in America. 

Section Three: Examination and Application of International Law 

Momentarily ignoring the question of the feasibility of the “Iron Dome,” which some argue may prove to be a problem, what are the possible implications for international law, specifically looking at U.S. nuclear treaties? As established earlier, the NPT has been one of the most successful international efforts to prevent the global spread of nuclear weapons. 191 states adhere to the treaty, including five “nuclear-weapon states.” The NPT emphasizes nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is worth acknowledging that there are also four known nuclear weapon states that do not adhere to the NPT: India, Pakistan, North Korea, who pulled out of the NPT in 2003, and Israel, who does not acknowledge their possession of nuclear weapons, maintaining a policy of deliberate ambiguity. 

The U.S.’s expansion of defense mechanisms is not technically in violation of their NPT agreement to “develop” or “acquire” nuclear weapons. However, it indirectly may trigger other nations to do so because it threatens deterrence and a nuclear balance. This can be seen in the strained relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Although the U.S.’s actions did not directly violate the New START, they are upending a balance that has existed since the Cold War by making a drastic change that could jeopardize nuclear deterrence between the two states, forcing Russia to violate the New START and increasing their nuclear arsenal. Russia’s potential response would be based on strategic necessity rather than a legal requirement. That being said, the legalities are slightly more complicated than stating that the U.S. is outright not in violation of the New START.

Although the New START states that “Current and planned U.S. missile defense programs are not constrained by New START,” this statement is conditional on more information. The treaty’s preamble acknowledges the “interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms” but goes on to establish that “current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.” This means that the treaty is contingent on the fact that the strategic defensive arms are not effective enough to defend from large military powers and realign interpolitical military dynamics. The U.S.’s plan to develop weapons that would undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties is an entirely different question, and it could be inferred from the treaty that this development is not permitted. It is unclear whether the U.S. is presently in violation of the New START. Because they currently only intend to develop these systems and have not actually done so, it may be true that they have not yet violated the New START. However, because other states, such as Russia, have begun to feel threatened and anticipate the U.S.’s capabilities to undermine the viability of their weapons’ efficacy, the U.S. may be violating the treaty. Overall, it is clear that the U.S. is certainly disrupting the international order and has the potential to be violating treaties. 

Section Four: Discussion of the Legal Question 

All this information prompts the question, would there be any way to utilize international law to prevent the U.S. from going forward with this defense expansion, preventing other states from feeling as though they must expand their nuclear arsenals to keep up? 

There is a lack of a formal enforcing body within the NPT. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) exists as a “safeguards system,” meaning that they independently “verify a State’s legal obligation that nuclear facilities are not misused and nuclear material is no diverted from peaceful uses.” Furthermore, part of the NPT is a conference that occurs twice every decade to review the treaty’s effectiveness. Preparations are currently being made for the next conference in 2026. However, the U.S. has not technically violated any aspect of the NPT with the Iron Dome. While it may disrupt international nuclear dealings, it may not fall under the NPT to deal with their actions. 

Furthermore, it is worth asking if the question of nuclear weapons falls under customary international law at all. Customary international law contains two main prongs: state practice and opinio juris. For a practice to qualify as an opinio juris and therefore fall under the rule of customary international law, states must follow the practice from a sense of legal obligations. According to a comment on the 1987 Third Restatement in the International Law, Eighth Edition textbook by Allen S. Weiner and Chimène Keitner, “a practice that is generally followed but which states feel legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary international law.” The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the dispute resolution body for the UN, was called upon by the UN General Assembly to examine whether nuclear weapons qualified as an opinio juris. Some states referenced the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 as a legal acknowledgment by nuclear weapon states. However, other states claimed that the use of nuclear weapons is legal in certain cases, such as cases of self-defense. Overall, the court said it could not find that there is an opinio juris in relation to nuclear weapons because there was such stark disagreement, meaning that nuclear war as a broad topic is not covered by customary international law. The International Law, Eighth Edition book echoed a similar sentiment, quoting from the ICJ: “There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such.” 

That being said, many existing treaties regulate the usage of nuclear weapons, such as the following listed in the book: Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (1976), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996) – not entered into force. 

In addition to the existence of an opinio juris, the court went on to give an opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in the aforementioned case. The court concluded that it would have jurisdiction to comment on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons and thought to apply use of force laws to the question. The court specifically noted the fact that nuclear weapons cannot distinguish between civilian and military targets. Ultimately, the ICJ ruled that “[it] cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.” The court additionally noted that NPT member states were obligated to “pursue in good faith and to conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” Importantly, the ICJ was wary of the potential for its decision to tamper with nuclear deterrence and the delicate international balance. 

Given these rulings, the ICJ has not made effective rulings regarding the NPT and would be unlikely to create any kind of enforceable ruling if nuclear violations were to occur, partially out of fear of impacting the deterrence balance that exists. It is far more likely that a treaty, such as the New START, be more effective at enforcing nuclear non-proliferation than the ICJ. But, in the case that the ICJ is called on to make a ruling regarding nuclear weapons, the UN Security Council would hypothetically be able to take action. The Security Council is able to take action to restore international peace in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter and does so to enforce the ICJ’s rulings with recourse, such as establishing sanctions.

Other organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), have also posed questions regarding the validity of nuclear weapon usage. In the case of the WHO, they asked whether nuclear weapons would breach their constitution due to the potential effects on health. The ICJ ruled once more in this case that they could not give an advisory opinion on this case because it left the scope of the WHO and encroached on the question of the general legality of the use of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the court stated that because the WHO was a specialized organization, this was exiting the organization’s “principle of specialty.” 

Another potential method of mediation for nuclear disputes could be through general diplomatic efforts. This has been the most effective instrument of dispute resolution so far, simply given the fact that we have not yet experienced all-out nuclear warfare. Diplomacy is largely effective because of the stakes between nations when dealing with nuclear weapon negotiations. However, one of the prime locations for such diplomacy, the NPT Review Conference that occurs once every five years, proves a difficult environment to get things accomplished. The conference largely exists to hold the five nuclear weapon states that have signed the NPT accountable for fulfilling their treaty obligations. Likely because there is so much sensitivity regarding nuclear weapons, it is rare for a final outcome document to be adopted, even when the final document does not propose any dramatic changes. The Review Conference has not had an agreed outcome in over a decade, demonstrating its ineffectiveness as an arbitration mechanism. 

Section Five: Policy Recommendations 

In the coming weeks, it will be important to see what specifically Defense Secretary Hegseth comes up with during his “60-day” time period to create a more specific plan. The 60-day period expires at the end of March. It will be interesting to see whether the Trump

Administration’s plan will be at all feasible in regard to the technology and funding required, especially while the new Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) is attempting to cut down on unnecessary costs. Nuclear and defense research is infamously expensive, but the DOGE likely will not target the defense budget, so this may not be a concern. Furthermore, the NPT has been indefinitely extended since 1995, but it will be fascinating to see if these changes in missile defense technology impact the conversation at the NPT Review Conference in 2026 or the negotiations of treaties such as the New START, which is also due for renewal next year. These details will most likely play a role in what any international dispute resolution body is able to do and what the reactions of other states will be. 

Furthermore, I would remind U.S. policymakers that there is an extremely delicate balance that exists between nuclear weapon states, and a wrong move could be detrimental on a global scale. Although this discussion is not about expanding the U.S.’s nuclear arsenal, their current discussions could catalyze other states to do so, and it will be important for the U.S. to maintain strategic stability and prevent escalation, prioritizing values that are highlighted in international law. 

For other states, I recommend that they begin to look towards potential solutions of international law, primarily through the aforementioned treaties, although it is unclear whether the Trump Administration would choose to listen to any solutions given by international courts, organizations, or treaties. Most importantly, even if the U.S. chooses to go through with the “Iron Dome for America,” I believe it is of the utmost consequence that other states do not begin violating their nuclear treaties and expanding their arsenals, as that will trigger extreme international issues and potentially a new era of nuclear arms races.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: A Medium Extended Air Defense System Missile is Launched, Image sourced from NARA & DVIDS Public Domain Archive | CC License, no changes made