The word “Bauhaus” literally translates from German to “house of building.” Originally, the Bauhaus was a school of design, architecture, and applied arts in Germany that emerged in response to the rapid social and technological changes following World War I. Its founder, architect Walter Gropius, sought to end the schism between art and technical craftsmanship by fusing functionality with aesthetics. In 2020, the European Union launched the New European Bauhaus (NEB) as part of the European Green Deal to bridge climate action with culture and creativity. Though the initiative draws on a legacy now a century old, it arrives at a moment of urgent relevance. The 1920s Bauhaus movement embodied a wider intellectual undertaking aimed at societal transformation. Today, the NEB continues this legacy, with a special focus on environmental protection, social justice, and urban regeneration. Yet while the NEB successfully revives the Bauhaus spirit of uniting design with social purpose, its revolutionary potential is undermined by structural barriers in implementation, persistent inequalities in access, and a funding model that privileges execution over imagination.

The NEB is an EU policy and funding program designed to make the green transition in the built environment “attractive and convenient for all.”  Its functioning includes grassroots-level engagement, tools and guidance for tailor-made solutions, the incorporation of stakeholders’ views, and a focus on people and social inclusion whilst maintaining strategic economic policies. The NEB follows a bottom-up approach, inviting citizens, stakeholders, and professionals to share perspectives to co-create solutions for their respective neighborhoods. Prizes were first awarded in 2021 in what has since become a well-established annual competition. In total, more than 5,700 applications have been received, and over €2 million has been awarded across the two competition strands: one for existing and completed projects and one for new concepts. 

Many NEB projects have been qualified successes. The NEB has been widely referred to as the “soul” of the European Green Deal, adding cultural and social aspects to ecological targets to ensure community values are part of the collective climate response. It has also inspired a range of innovative local and grassroots projects. In the Champions’ strand—recognizing existing, completed work—Spain’s Green Axes and Squares reclaims streets for the public and greenery, Austria’s cooperative die HausWirtschaft combines affordable housing with shared work and childcare, and Ukraine’s Promprylad transforms a former factory into a cooperative center of innovation and social investment. In the Rising Stars’ strand for new concepts, Barcelona’s Superblock project is recognized as an exceptional pilot that addresses green space shortages, climate change, air and noise pollution, road safety, and the rehabilitation of degraded urban areas through a single systemic framework. Outside individual projects, the NEB’s co-design process drew more than 2,000 contributors from over 85 countries, indicating the breadth of its ambition.

However, the NEB encounters serious impediments to long-term transformation. The project, CoolCo’s—Cooling Corners and Corridors, in Budapest, Hungary, serves as an example of a case where execution falls short. CoolCo’s was a small-scale urban heat adaptation installed in the summer of 2023 in the dense, socioeconomically vulnerable neighborhood of Józefváros. Following the engagement of community residents in the design and prototyping process, modular shaded seating structures, plants, water features, and information panels were installed in public spaces. However, the project failed to account for the friction between their need for rapid decision-making and the slow, procedurally rigid municipal systems, resulting in significant delays. Further, the co-design process at the beginning of the project was a one-off engagement that failed to establish an ongoing relationship, thus leaving gaps in long-term communal ownership. This was compounded by the generalized distrust of public institutions in the neighborhood, complicating participation efforts. Ultimately, the NEB principles supplied useful guiding ideals but offered little practical guidance for handling the realities of small, bottom-up, and community-driven projects. 

The NEB’s funding model, however, presents the most fundamental tension. While the initiative claims to privilege creativity and interdisciplinary experimentation, the distribution of prize money and financial support tends to favor already established, implementation-ready projects over early-stage or speculative ideas. The Champions strand winner receives €30,000—double the €15,000 award of the Rising Stars’ strand winner. The logic is understandable: completed projects have demonstrated results and offer higher potential for replication. But this creates a structural imbalance. Projects with existing institutional backing, technical maturity, or proven feasibility are far better positioned to secure meaningful funding, while more radical or untested concepts receive comparatively less support. 

This pattern matters because revolutionary design ideas often emerge from high-risk conceptual exploration as opposed to incremental refinements to present models. By allocating significantly less funding to new ideas, the NEB risks narrowing the scope of innovation to what is already scalable and administratively viable within existing EU frameworks. In effect, the NEB initiative privileges execution over imagination, contradicting what they claim to foster. This can also discourage participation from smaller actors, such as independent designers and undersourced municipalities, who may lack the capacity to develop fully realized proposals without substantial upfront investment. The result is a feedback loop where established actors continue to dominate, and even the NEB’s stated pledge to inclusion and co-creation is quietly undermined. If the initiative genuinely intends to inspire a completely new design paradigm, it must invest more heavily in the uncertain, conceptual stages of innovation. Otherwise, it risks becoming a showcase for polished projects rather than a generator of fundamentally new ones. 

The history of the original Bauhaus yields a cautionary precedent. Throughout its short life, the school endured rising political pressure from conservative forces in Weimar Germany, forcing it to relocate twice before the Nazis shut it down in 1933. Despite Walter Gropius’s repeated attempts to depoliticize the institution, its avant-garde, anti-bourgeois ideals made it structurally vulnerable not only to external hostility but also to internal tensions. The Bauhaus did not fail for a lack of vision. It failed because visionary institutions, without structural protection and political durability, cannot survive on ideas alone. 

The NEB, too, has a powerful vision and a constrained execution. To fulfill its potential, it needs dedicated funding streams, equity-focused criteria, and a willingness to invest in ideas that have not yet proven themselves. The deeper question the NEB raises is whether the design-led policy can drive genuine societal transformation, or whether institutional logic will always tame the radical impulse that makes such movements worth launching in the first place. The original Bauhaus changed how the world thinks about design. Whether the New European Bauhaus can do the same or will be undone by the same tensions that closed its predecessor remains to be seen. 

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: “Dessau-Bauhaus,” Image Sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

Over 10,200 miles from Paris in the South Pacific Ocean lies the French overseas territory of New Caledonia. The archipelago currently sits at the center of one of the world’s most complex decolonization and self-determination debates. Shaped by a long history of colonization, indigenous marginalization, and decades of negotiation over sovereignty, the territory has recently entered a new era of political uncertainty following French parliamentary votes that may have just opened the door to independence. In this article, I will examine the historical and political development of New Caledonia under French rule, the long-term marginalization of the indigenous Kanak population, and the recent political crisis surrounding independence movements and constitutional reform. New Caledonia is closer to independence than at any other point in its modern history, as recent constitutional crises, contested reforms, and shifting political alliances have exposed the fragility of French authority over the territory. 

Melanesian peoples first settled the islands around 3000 BC, whose descendants are now known as the Kanak population. Their societies developed complex social and political systems rooted in land, kinship, and clan identity. European contact began in the late 18th century when British explorer James Cook visited the region. Despite early British contact and the islands’ later naming after Scotland, France formally annexed the territory in 1853. However, colonial rule quickly created tension as land was confiscated, taxes were imposed, and Kanak sovereignty was dismantled. Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Kanak resistance movements repeatedly challenged French authority.

Following the suppression of these uprisings, colonial policy deliberately attempted to reshape the islands’ demographic structure. French policies encouraged European settlement and the development of plantation agriculture, primarily around coffee. Indentured laborers from Asia and nearby Pacific islands were also introduced, further transforming the population. Over time, these demographic changes reduced the Kanak population to a minority within their own territory. Even though the Kanaks were granted French citizenship in 1946, along with the right to vote, structural inequality and land dispossession continued to limit their political influence. Gradually, frustration surrounding marginalization strengthened a unified Kanak identity.

Another major economic, political, and social transformation occurred during the nickel boom between 1967 and 1972. Today, nickel accounts for roughly 90% of the territory’s exports and 10% of its GDP. Driven by rising global demand for stainless steel and industrial metals, New Caledonia’s vast nickel reserves became central to French economic interests in the Pacific. Rapid industrial expansion followed, as new mining operations increased production and attracted significant investment from the French government and multinational firms. As a result, immigration surged as labor demand grew, which further reshaped the demographic balance of the island. These developments intensified feelings of marginalization among the Kanak population, particularly as open-pit mining operations destroyed their historic homeland. Nickel soon became the backbone of the territory’s economy, but its dominance also deepened political tensions between pro-independence groups and loyalist factions.

Tensions reached a breaking point after the 1984 establishment of Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS), a major pro-independence political party. Violence emerged as independence activists clashed with French and right wing loyalist settlers. While the Matignon Agreements of 1988 ended the immediate conflict, it wasn’t until the Nouméa Accord of 1998 that a long-term framework was established. The Nouméa Accord outlined a twenty year gradual transition plan aimed to end colonization, enhance infrastructure and education, and organize future independence referendums. A key provision also restricted electoral eligibility to long-term residents and their descendants, which intended to protect Kanak political influence. Despite these measures, tensions over sovereignty remained unresolved.

In 2024, tensions escalated again when the French government proposed a controversial electoral reform to expand voting rights to more recent residents of New Caledonia. While supporters described the bill as democratic modernization, many Kanak leaders viewed it as a deliberate attempt to dilute their electoral influence. The proposal triggered widespread protests that quickly developed into violent unrest. As a result, mistrust between pro-independence groups and the French state deepened significantly. With key industries, including nickel mining, disrupted and widespread property damage occurring, the French government responded with emergency measures, which included security crackdowns and restrictions on social media platforms such as TikTok. Many critics argued that these actions violated freedom of expression, but supporters of these measures claimed they were necessary to restore order and prevent further violence. By the end of the unrest, fourteen people had been killed and economic losses exceeded $2.4 billion.

Following the protests, France and New Caledonian political factions entered renewed negotiations. However, these discussions exposed deep internal divisions within New Caledonia itself. The territory has long been divided on the issue of independence. For example, in the 2020 independence referendum, 53.26% of voters wished to remain a part of France while 46.74% sought independence. With a voter turnout of 85.6%, the 2020 referendum truly captures the narrow split between New Caledonian residents. Many who support remaining within France are descendants of European settlers, known as Caldoches. Meanwhile, the independence movement is largely supported by the Kanak population, who make up approximately 41% of the territory. Although Kanak communities represent a significant ethnic group, they continue to experience significantly higher levels of poverty and unemployment, along with reduced access to education and housing. Caldoche wealth is primarily rooted in New Caledonia’s colonialist history, which is reflected by their dominant ownership of businesses, industry, and wealth. These economic and political divisions have produced competing visions for the territory’s future, and weakened the independence movement’s ability to act as a truly unified force. 

Negotiations between French and New Caledonian representatives culminated in the 2025 Bougival Accord, which proposed to redefine New Caledonia’s political status. Instead of remaining an overseas territory, New Caledonia would be elevated to the level of statehood. The agreement granted expanded autonomy, formal recognition of Kanak identity, and the possibility of a distinct New Caledonian nationality alongside French citizenship. It also included commitments to further institutional reform and a future referendum on the proposed arrangement. Pro-independence groups agreed to expand voter eligibility and adjust the number of seats in Congress for two majority Kanak areas. Meanwhile, loyalist factions agreed to provisions for dual nationality and future consultation on political status. In accordance with the Bougival Accord, the Elysée-Oudinot Accord was signed in January of 2026 to formalize economic, cultural, and institutional arrangements. However, implementation quickly stalled. 

Three months after the signing of the Elysée-Oudinot Accord, New Caledonian pro-independence MP Emmanuel Tijbaou introduced a motion to reject the proposed constitutional bill required to enshrine the both accords into the French Constitution. His motion successfully passed 190 votes to 107. Tijbaou’s motion blocked the ratification of the accords from being ratified into French law. Despite FLNKS previously signing the agreements, many within the movement supported the rejection. FLNKS members believed the reforms constrained meaningful self-determination and over-expanded voting rights. Subsequent talks between French PM Sébastien Lecornu, FLNKS leaders, and anti-independence factions have produced little progress, as disagreements centered on voting rights and the scope of future sovereignty. At the same time, the recent rejection also exposed divisions within French politics regarding the extent of decentralization and decolonization, resulting in a political stalemate.

Despite persistent internal divisions, recent political developments suggest that New Caledonia is closer to independence than ever before. Repeated failures to implement constitutional reforms have weakened confidence in France’s ability to manage a stable long-term relationship with New Caledonia. As debates over electoral rules and Kanak representation remain unresolved, each new cycle of negotiation has intensified skepticism among pro-independence groups. Many, such as the FLNKS, view French proposals as incremental extensions of control rather than genuine steps toward sovereignty. Although the independence movement is not united and French political resistance remains strong, the accumulation of political crises has shifted the debate away from whether change will occur toward how and when it might happen. Additionally, an independence referendum has not occurred in over five years, so current public opinion is uncertain. It is possible, however, that the 2024 protests along with the ongoing disagreements between France and New Caledonian political factions may have shifted attitudes toward independence. 

New Caledonia now stands at a crossroads of competing visions of identity, governance, and sovereignty. At the heart of the issue lies a fundamental question regarding who has the authority to define membership in the territory’s future state. Equally important and unresolved is the meaning of self-determination, and whether it can exist within a French framework. While no outcome is guaranteed, the recent patterns of unrest, stalled reforms, fractured negotiations, and French hesitance have transformed independence from a distant aspiration into a tangible and increasingly plausible outcome.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: “Flag Map of New Caledonia using their second official flag and pro-independence flag,” Image Sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

On May 11, 2025, members of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Musileen (JNIM) entered the northern town of Djibo in Burkina Faso. Over the next eleven hours, JNIM insurgents killed more than one hundred people and destroyed homes, businesses, and roads. Shortly after, JNIM seized the city of Diapaga, setting buildings, vehicles, and governmental infrastructure ablaze. Oddly, JNIM remained in the town for two additional days, departing from their typical pattern of rapid assault, loot, and withdrawal. The prolonged occupation has marked a new phase in insurgent strategy, indicating an ambition to control.  

Over time, attacks by Islamist insurgent groups, like JNIM, have intensified in both frequency and devastation. Across Burkina Faso’s northern border, Mali has also been crippled by the devastating attacks of the JNIM. On November 6th, JNIM surrounded the capital city of Bamako, inciting panic, causing gas shortages, and power was severed. The JNIM and other Islamist insurgent groups appear to be focused on tightening their rule over captured areas rather than merely destabilizing them. Meanwhile, the Burkinabé government has struggled to effectively respond to these groups. In this article, I will examine the recent political history of Burkina Faso, the effects of Islamist insurgents on the state, and how President Ibrahim Traoré has used the threat of extremism to justify his authoritarian regime. I argue that the rise of Islamist insurgents in Burkina Faso is inseparable from the country’s political instability, which has been intensified by decades of Western intervention, and that Traoré has exploited this crisis to consolidate his own power. 

Since gaining independence from France in 1960, Burkina Faso has faced many crises of governance. Coups, single-party rule, and authoritarianism have eroded the government’s stability and public trust. Moreover, foreign intervention from France and the United States has exacerbated these problems. French counterterrorism operations, particularly Operation Barkhane and Serval, placed a militarized foreign presence in Burkina Faso. Burkinabé saw France’s military presence as a neo-colonial effort that violated Burkina Faso’s national sovereignty. These foreign interventions do not establish stability, but empower military elites and foster resentment among civilians who view outside involvement as a continuation of neo-colonial governance. 

In 2022, Burkina Faso experienced two military coups within just nine months. The latter, orchestrated by Ibrahim Traoré, installed the current regime. Many onlookers optimistically envisioned Traoré as a successor to the revolutionary leader Thomas Sankara,who governed from 1983 to 1987. He sought to break the country from dependency on the West, promoting anti-imperialist reform, women’s rights, environmental activism, education, healthcare, and social welfare programs. His 1987 assassination, supported by foreign intelligence networks and executed by his close ally Blaise Compaoré, symbolized the fragility of Burkinabé politics and anti-imperialist movements. Compaoré’s subsequent 27 year rule ingrained corruption into the government and intensified the repression of political and civil rights. Following Compaoré’s ousting in 2014, Burkina Faso experienced eight leaders in eight years. By the time Traoré seized power in 2022, the state had been severely undermined by instability, internal conflict, foreign interference, and authoritarian rule. 

Ibrahim Traoré has since established his own authoritarian regime, promising to restore national sovereignty. Instead, Traoré has escalated the anti-democratic policies put into motion by Colonel Damiba, who disbanded the nation’s elected parliament and dissolved the Constitution in January of 2022. Shortly after seizing power, he suspended all political parties, indefinitely postponed all elections, and replaced democratically elected officials with military loyalists. He abolished the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), dismissing it as financially wasteful, ineffective, and vulnerable to foreign interference. As a substitute, Traoré transferred all electoral responsibilities to the Ministry of Territorial Administration, which operates under his direct control. By entrusting his junta government with control over election management and certification, Traoré has deprived all future elections of independence and credibility. Despite pledging to restore democracy within three years of his coup, Traoré has extended his rule through a transitional charter. Even though there are regional demands for democracy, Traoré has systematically dismantled democratic institutions while maintaining the face of legality. Additionally, in addressing anti-imperalist issues, Traoré has consolidated the executive power under his own authoritarian power. 

Beyond political centralization, Traoré has overseen widespread repression of dissent. Human rights organizations, many with Western funding, have been expelled, with their workers detained and their reports censored. Traoré has framed these actions as necessary to end western neo-colonialism. Opposition politicians and journalists who criticize his government have been labeled “unpatriotic” and expelled from the powerless national assembly. Egregiously, Traoré has used forced military conscription as punishment. Former foreign minister Ablasse Ouedraogo, who is seventy years old, was arrested and forced to fight on the front lines against Islamist insurgents. Judges who have investigated corruption allegations were similarly detained or drafted. In September 2024, the junta extended its repression by criminalizing homsexuality, further restricting personal freedoms. All of these actions have capitalized on legitimate public fear and resentment toward Western influence. Together, historic Western interference and Traoré’s repressive rule have reinforced the internal instability that contributes to the very political vacuum that Islamists insurgent groups like JNIM seek to exploit.   

When Traoré seized power, insurgents groups controlled roughly 40% of the country. Since then, they have expanded their control. Despite promising quick victory over these Islamist groups, Traoré’s government has continued to lose authority. The rise of insurgents linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS has destabilized the country and strengthened Traoré’s justification for autocratic rule. Following a major attack in 2023, Traoré suspended various media outlets for reporting on the deteriorating security crisis. He warned that journalists who “communicate for the enemy” will “pay for it.” His government has criminalized online criticism under the cover of combating those who incite terrorism. Yet, dissenting reporters and regular citizens have faced censorship, intimidation, and imprisonment. Ultimately, Traoré has weaponized the country’s increasing insurgent activity to legitimize his authority and suppress any opposition. 

Meanwhile, the government’s inability to secure territory has forced it to redirect resources away from vital social programs. As a result, schools, hospitals, and courts have closed. Additionally, public trust has collapsed, and rural communities have been forced to rely on insurgent groups for food, medicine, and protection. Traroré has used these failures to rationalize deeper centralization of power. He’s continuously insisted that strong executive control is the only path to defeating terrorism. Overall, these insurgents have become a threat and a political asset, allowing Traoré to suppress dissent, eliminate democratic institutions, and justify prolonged military rule in the name of national security.

Islamist insurgents, like JNIM, in Burkina Faso cannot be separated from the country’s political and imperial history. Decades of coups, corruption, and foreign intervention have eroded the national government’s legitimacy, leaving millions vulnerable to the threat of terrorism. Traoré’s authoritarian governance has not restored order, but has instead maintained the very instability that insurgents exploit. By silencing civil dissent, dismantling democratic institutions, and prioritizing regime survival over public welfare, his government has ceded the proper legitimacy and capacity to rule. Lasting stability in Burkina Faso will depend not on defeating jihadist forces, but on the construction of a stable, inclusive, and trustful government that is free from the cycles of foreign intervention.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: “Captain Ibrahim Traoré, President of Burkina Faso, Head of State,” Image Sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

When Carolina entered the United States, she imagined the opportunities that the United States were to bring. Instead, she found herself stuffing plastic bags, moving quickly enough so the pounding machinery would not nick her fingers. Living with a family member she had never met, she stated, “sometimes I get tired and feel sick, but I’m getting used to it.” But Carolina isn’t alone. Rather, these factories are filled with child migrant workers who live under the care of government “vetted sponsors” through the unaccompanied minor system.  

The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) vets sponsors to send unaccompanied children to live with. Once a UAC is in United States custody, they can be sent to relatives or other vetted sponsors while they wait for immigration proceedings. Yet, when a watchdog probed into the system of vetting these sponsors, they found that there were serious systemic failings with assessing the viability of sponsors. These findings correspond with a 152% increase in illegal child labor since 2018, highlighting a trend that suggests that these unaccompanied minors are at risk of child exploitation and human trafficking. In order to protect these vulnerable children, many of whom migrate to the United States alone, the Office of Refugee Resettlement must re-evaluate and adapt their vetting procedures and hold leadership responsible to ensure these children are not being exploited by their sponsors.

This article focuses on how the system fails this vulnerable group in cases where sponsors are not properly vetted before release. There are many successful cases, however, in which UACs are properly sponsored. This article aims to take a comprehensive approach to the issue, one that transcends political administrations, and identify changes necessary to protect UACs.

The Unaccompanied Children (UAC) System

The UAC system allows migrant children to be paired with a government vetted sponsor to live lawfully in the United States as immigration proceedings continue. For many families, sending their children to the United States alone is an opportunity to escape high crime rates and poverty, even if under the care of a sponsor or relative they hardly know. It’s then no surprise the number of unaccompanied minors that were released by ORR to sponsors skyrocketed to over 100,000 over the last four years, a massive jump from around 16,000 in 2020.

While in many cases, these unaccompanied minors are successfully paired with sponsors that are credible, many being family members, there is a worrisome fraction that are susceptible to abuse in a system that is not fit to protect them. By placing these children in the hands of irresponsible, improperly vetted sponsors, it makes them vulnerable to illegal work, human trafficking, and exploitation. Children as young as 12 and 13 are forced to work in factories, and, while the exact number is disputed and exaggerated by many sources, thousands of children go missing or become unresponsive under this system. The vetting and sponsorship system becomes a formality, and these migrant children are put at serious risk because of lackluster frameworks. 

Holes in the System

In 2024, the Department of Health and Human Service’s (HSS) Office of the Inspector General found that 16% of children’s case files lacked documentation on what checks were conducted and 19% of children’s case files who were released to sponsors with pending documentation were never updated. When questioned by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, the ORR Director was unable to properly answer questions about the 85,000 children that HSS had lost contact with over the last year. Between lack of transparency and lack of accountability, the very people who have the authority to directly protect these children put them at risk. An inability to properly communicate issues, and clear undesire to directly assess them, places the system at a disadvantage. 

Additionally, as applications flood the ORR, it makes genuine efforts to ensure credible sponsors more difficult. In many of these cases, it appears that information was not properly dealt with. Rather, unaccompanied children were carelessly sent to unfinished profiles that lacked documentation. Reports in 2021 from the Office of the Inspector General suggest that 35% of the files had “legibility concerns” from documents provided by the sponsors. When understaffed offices deal with a third of their documentation being near illegible, it becomes clear how these migrant children can be collateral damage in what becomes a lazy job. When combining how during the vetting process information is overlooked, and after there is no accountability or transparency, it paints a clearer picture of the situation. Those in power are unable to properly screen or follow up on their promises, with the lives and health of the children becoming a secondary issue that they provide no insight on how to remedy. 

Additionally concerning, however, is the perverse incentive of many sponsors to take on children and use debt to leverage power. In many of these cases where UACs are working essentially illegal jobs, sponsors leverage their position to enforce a debt system, where the children “owe” their sponsors monetary compensation for allowing them to be in the United States. For these individuals, many of whom are bad actors and not legitimate sponsors, they target the unaccompanied minor system as a way to exploit child labor for financial gain. 

Adjusting the System

With bad actors throughout all steps of the system, it can be difficult to construct meaningful changes and policies to reflect the interests of unaccompanied minors. However, it is critical to hold those in charge accountable, while providing clearer and  more comprehensive frameworks throughout the process to protect this vulnerable group from exploitation and human trafficking.

Prioritizing proper vetting of sponsors is critical to ensuring the safety of unaccompanied minors before they are able to be exploited. This includes instituting a more comprehensive follow-up system. Currently, sponsors are subject to interviews, background checks, forms, and fingerprinting to become a viable sponsor. However, as demonstrated above, many times proper documentation can slip through the cracks. It is important to conduct extensive interviews on candidates, including asking their reasons for applying to become a sponsor. Additionally, proper oversight of documentation and filing must be done. In many cases, sponsors will fill out multiple forms claiming that a UAC is their family member. When layered together, these sponsors allege to have unreasonable numbers of family members migrating. Some even use the same address under different names. It is important for the ORR to hire adequate amounts of people to search through these documents, ensure that all information is received before an unaccompanied minor is released, and follow-up with their cases in a timely manner. The follow-up procedure must be documented alongside the profile, whether it be by phone or in-person, and the Office should require that all unaccompanied minors are met with in-person upon a month, six months, and a year of release. Having the bandwidth to do this may be difficult, requiring the hiring of professionals who are able to satisfactorily ensure the work is done. However, these steps are critical to properly vet sponsors before UACs are released to them.

To combat the issue of transparency and accountability for the ORR, there must be guidelines in place, including reporting from the ORR of proper numbers and frequent checks on the Office to uphold their responsibilities. Allowing the Director of the ORR to be unresponsive to the thousands of children that may go missing under their office is unacceptable. Rather, real, coercive measures should be implemented to ensure that there is incentive for the ORR to act responsibly and credibly. This can include frequent House or Senate hearings about their work, mandating reporting, and checks from other HSS Offices. Ultimately, the ORR must be held accountable for their work and be transparent about the number of unaccompanied children that may be mistreated within their system in order to reform it. 

Conclusion

When unaccompanied minors show up to the United States, they come in the most vulnerable forms: exhausted, starved, and alone. In order to protect these children, it is critical that the government, and the systems that vet their sponsors, take accountability and adequately carry out their responsibilities. When children, like Carolina, are subject to harsh working conditions in the United States, it can exacerbate the already heavy mental toll. Ultimately, it is on the onus of the United States government to increase transparency and accountability, and provide more strict frameworks in the vetting system to protect these children against the very exploitation they came to the United States to escape. 

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: “South Texas Border – U.S. Customs and Border Protection provide assistance to unaccompanied alien children after they have crossed the border into the United States,” Image Sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

Syria’s Sunni Arab population greeted the collapse of Assad’s regime with elation. However, over a year later, the new government still faces many barriers to realizing the dreams that Syrians have held for their future ever since independence in 1946. Syria’s new government will need to overcome a gauntlet of challenges before it can build a functioning, independent, and unified state. The government has sought to find a middle ground between secular democracy, which would open the door to much-needed Western support, and Islamism, adherents of which formed the support base of the current president, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, during the Syrian Civil War. In addition, despite the government’s promotion of a unitary style of governance and promise of inclusion of minorities, many groups, especially major Kurdish and Druze factions, are distrustful of the government and advocate for a federal Syria. If Syria is to avoid slipping into the sectarian authoritarianism that has long characterized its politics, the country will need to build a unified state without violating the rights of minorities. 

Al-Sharaa, leader of the Islamist Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and an insurgent who was formerly sanctioned as a terrorist by both the U.S. and U.N. Security Council, has spent the past year trying to reform his and his followers’ image in an effort to appeal to the international community. The interim constitution promised rights for members of minority religions such as Judaism and Christianity; however, the constitution’s language is not clear whether such protections extend to Druze and Alawites. It is unclear whether this language also includes the Druze and Alawites. It has also made overtures towards ethnic minorities such as the Kurds, promising to protect their cultural, language, and educational rights.  It is unclear whether this language also includes the Druze and Alawites. The government designated Christmas and Easter as official state holidays and, in the constitution, merely claimed inspiration from Islamic jurisprudence rather than calling for adherence to Sharia law. This more neutral rhetoric seems to be a way to draw a compromise between hardline secularists and the base of HTS and other Islamist factions, which are strong advocates for political Islam. 

It is important that while President Al-Sharaa ostensibly supports the cultural and religious rights of minorities, this support does not extend to endorsing federalism or devolving political authority to regional militias and government structures. Al-Sharaa has stated that the political unity of Syria is non-negotiable and, in January 2026, under his direction, the Syrian Army made significant territorial gains against the Kurdish-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which autonomously governed the oil-rich Kurdish-majority northeast of Syria during the civil war. The relative success at autonomy that the SDF has achieved was to the chagrin of Turkey, which has been fighting a 40-year anti-Kurdish insurgency inside its own borders to which the SDF shares political and ideological ties. The offensive came after stalled talks on integration. The government’s progress spurred a new agreement in which the SDF will integrate into the Syrian Army and hand control of Syria’s largest oil field, Al-Omar, to Damascus after years of Kurdish control. The SDF’s capitulation was made possible by further troop withdrawals from northern Syria and a decline in support to the SDF by the U.S., as the Trump administration believes that the purpose of American support for the Kurdish forces, to fight Islamic State militants, has been fulfilled. 

Even under the assumption that the new Syrian government is as hostile to extremism as the American administration wishes it to be, the fragile condition of the Syrian army will be a major obstacle to its ability to contend with violent groups. Despite progress towards the disestablishment of autonomous militias, there remain many barriers to the creation of a national army. Agreements to integrate forces into the national army have proven slow, and Syria’s economic crisis, which persists despite the easing of Western sanctions, leaves the army critically underfunded. Developing a unified command structure, doctrine, and a universal training regime will take years. Furthermore, the plan for both a unified military and a Syrian political entity as a whole has been met with less than enthusiastic reactions by many members of Syria’s significant minority populations. 

The catastrophic state of the Syrian economy is another barrier to the state being able to project enough authority to protect minority rights and provide effective governance. Between 2010 and 2023, as a result of continuous warfare and foreign sanctions, Syria’s GDP contracted by 84% and its dollar reserves numbered in just the hundreds of millions, worrying given the hyper-inflation that the Syrian pound has experienced. 67% of the country’s population lives on less than $3.65 per day. Without the alleviation of Syrians’ economic woes, the government will struggle to discourage crime and prevent tribalism as competing groups struggle for the small amount of wealth left in the country. 

Given Al-Sharaa’s jihadist past, minority groups have been hesitant to embrace political integration. His inability, or unwillingness, to stop massacres of Alawites by ostensibly government-controlled militant Islamist groups in March 2025 has led many minority groups to believe that the government is either inept or malicious. In addition, a belated response to skirmishes between Druze and Bedouin militias was perceived as favoring the latter and pushed some Druze leaders to call for outright independence from Syria. Reservations about Syria’s ability to function as a unitary state without discrimination and violence towards Syrians not part of the Sunni Arab majority are the main reasons why so many Syrian minority leaders and international observers support a federalized Syria. In their view, an overbearing central government will simply increase resistance and heighten the chances that Syria breaks out into civil war once again. 

However, detractors of federalism argue that excessive federalization will benefit extortionate local ethnic militias and foreign powers to the detriment of Syria. They contend that without proper economic and political integration, corruption and ethnic tensions will grow as the central government will lack the power to contend with the roaming militias that are epidemic throughout Syria and operate through bribes and violence rather than a modern bureaucratic government system. Furthermore, detractors of a federal Syrian state worry that this system would make it easier for foreign powers to divide up Syria and weaken its ability to resist influence. The Israeli government justified its bombing of Syrian government infrastructure earlier this year by citing clashes between government forces and Druze militias, which Israel argues involved the targeting of Druze civilians. Its daily incursions into Syrian territory have likely soured the majority population’s perception of the cause that it champions. Intervention in internal Syrian affairs by foreign powers on behalf of minorities is not new to the region, and especially not in Syria, which was divided into several autonomous political units based on ethnoreligious lines under French occupation and struggled to emerge as a united country. Nationalist, anti-colonial currents within the country, especially amongst the majority Arab population, are likely to serve as a roadblock to the level of federalization sought out by many minorities. Many Syrians will want to avoid a repeat of the perceived exploitation of Syria that has been justified by the protection of minorities.

Not all foreign governments interested in Syria push for decentralization. Turkey, due to worries about Kurdish autonomy in Syria potentially emboldening Kurdish nationalists in eastern Anatolia, has vowed to support the revitalization of Syrian institutions. They have already held talks between banking authorities, aiming to introduce Turkish lenders into Syria to finance reconstruction and to reinvigorate trade that has drastically declined due to a multitude of financial factors. If Syria chooses to continue to embrace centralization, it will still have some degree of foreign support despite Israel’s objections. 

All things considered, the Syrian government must avoid excessive federalization that weakens its ability to maintain law and order and rebuild the country’s economic and defense infrastructure. At the same time, the government must safeguard minority rights in a way that avoids the abuses of the ethnocratic exclusionary governments of Syria’s past. If Syria cannot avoid straying too far into either centralization or federalism, it risks inflaming sectarian conflict and suffering a repeat of the catastrophic civil conflict that has plagued the country for decades. 

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: “Ahmed al-Sharaa in September 2025”, Image Sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

Chen Jian is a professor of history at New York University. His 2024 book, “Zhou Enlai: A Life,” is the first comprehensive biography of the powerful Chinese statesman. He is known as an expert in modern Chinese history and the history of Chinese-American relations. 

The interview was edited for length and clarity.

Vittal Sivakumar: First off, tell us a bit about what led you to write about Zhou Enlai. What in your career led to that decision?

Chen Jian: First, Zhou Enlai was an extremely important figure and a giant of the twentieth century— a statesman and a diplomatic giant. For more than half a century, he was a central figure in the Chinese Communist Revolution and in the Chinese Communist Party. Beginning in the mid-1920s, he served on the Politburo and later on the Politburo Standing Committee. After 1949, he served consecutively for 27 years as Premier of the People’s Republic of China and for 10 years as Foreign Minister. 

Internationally, he became the PRC’s diplomatic face and played a key role in major events such as the Geneva Conference of 1954 and the Bandung Conference of 1955. He also contributed significantly to the rapprochement between China and the United States. 

However, there had been no major Zhou Enlai biography before this one. In 2004, Melvin Leffler, a diplomatic historian, was editing a series on great statesmen of the 20th century. He invited me to write a brief biography of Zhou Enlai. To convince me, he said, “Chen Jian, you already published two major books. With your knowledge of Chinese foreign policy and Zhou Enlai, it would probably only take six weeks to complete the book.” Of course, this was wrong, and it took much longer. 

Finally, the project changed from a brief book to a major series because the publisher, Potomac Books, went bankrupt, so the original plan did not work out. Ultimately, it took 20 years to write the book rather than six weeks. 

Another reason was the timing. In 2004, when I was commissioned to write a biography of Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Foreign Ministry archives began to open. This opening lasted for about ten years. Then there was a system upgrade in 2014, and after the upgrade, all documents that were previously accessible could no longer be accessed. 

Sam Sanders: In your book, you mentioned that different generations of Chinese civilians and people outside China tend to view him differently. I’ve seen that in my own family. My grandparents’ generation viewed him as a hero who tempered Mao’s excesses during the Cultural Revolution. My mother’s generation admires him as the diplomat who helped open China and made it possible for people like her to come to America. 

But you mention in your book that younger Chinese people today tend to view him more critically, especially since new sources have shed light on what he was able to do and how he acted. Do you see this shift as part of a broader historical trend, perhaps a move into revisionist history or even a post-revisionist era? Do you see your biography fitting that middle ground of trying to synthesize the two strands?

Chen Jian: Let me put it this way. Even in China today, Zhou Enlai is generally regarded in a very positive light—not just in official discourse but also among everyday people. When Zhou Enlai died, people in Beijing poured into the streets to say farewell to him. There was overwhelming praise, admiration, and international acclaim. People regarded him not just as a giant, but also as a good person. 

But times have changed. Among younger generations, fewer people know Zhou Enlai’s name. I remember once giving a talk about Zhou Enlai after the publication of my book. A Chinese student from Shanghai who had attended high school there came to see a colleague of mine after attending the lecture, and asked, “Professor, who is Zhou Enlai?”

This change is largely due to the declassification of Chinese archives, memoirs, and other new sources that revealed previously inaccessible information, including the darker aspects of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Events like the Great Leap Forward, the Great Famine, and the Cultural Revolution became better known. Since Zhou Enlai was a main figure in the Chinese Communist Revolution, people began to regard him more critically. 

This trend became especially pronounced after 2003, when a highly influential Chinese book, “Zhou Enlai: His Later Years,” was published in Hong Kong. It was banned in mainland China. The author was the son-in-law of Zhou’s interpreter and had been the head of the Zhou Enlai biography research at the Central Documentary Research Institute of the Chinese Communist Party. In that book, he described Zhou’s performance during the Cultural Revolution in a very negative, critical light. 

As a result, Zhou’s previously entirely positive image had been overturned. This shift has less to do with historical trends like revisionism and more to do with the critical reassessment of China’s recent past, especially the history of the Chinese Communist Revolution.

Sivakumar: Your biography is the first complete English-language biography of Zhou Enlai. There have been others who have covered aspects of his life, and over the past couple of decades, there have also been English-language biographies published of other famous Chinese figures. Ezra Vogel, for example, published a highly acclaimed biography of Deng Xiaoping. How have those works influenced your biography?

Chen Jian: I learned from them, certainly, and I respect Vogel highly as a biographer. 

We talked about the Zhou Enlai biography, and I think there are two things that stood out to me. First, I believed that this biography needed solid documentary support. As I mentioned, there were other Zhou Enlai biographies published years ago. Dick Wilson, a journalist, published a biography of Zhou Enlai, but it lacked archival support. Another famous author, Han Suyin, wrote a biography of Zhou Enlai titled “Eldest Son,” largely based on interviews with people close to Zhou. Interviews are valuable, too, but the problem with interviews alone is that they’re oftentimes self-serving. You often find that interviewees can be influenced by very specific, subjective feelings, so it’s important to cross-check interview information against documentary sources. 

Secondly, as I write in this book, to understand Zhou Enlai, you must also understand China’s Communist Revolution. Why did it happen? Where and how did it go wrong? I personally experienced both the Great Famine and the Cultural Revolution. As a dissident student, I was put in jail twice as a teenager. So the question naturally arises: how could all this happen? 

Some people try to completely negate revolution, especially the Chinese Communist Revolution, labeling it as a radical leftist, transformative revolution. In my view, revolution itself is not a sin. I use the word sin, not crime. A revolution may involve crimes, but revolution itself arises because the previous regime created conditions that made it inevitable.

Revolutions have a transformative meaning: they attempt to transform human nature and bring about universal justice and equality. These goals are admirable. But when utopian visions are turned into policies, revolutions can go very wrong. When revolutions succeed, revolutionaries come to power. With power, especially unchecked power, corruption is at its most extreme. This is what happened in China. In that sense, Zhou and his comrades, including Mao, made the revolution, but they were also remade by the revolution. So I wanted the book to tell Zhou Enlai’s story and also explore the larger meaning. 

There are other important aspects, relevant particularly today. First, he was a revolutionary who tried to maintain a centrist position while others pushed politics to extremes. Today, we see politics polarized everywhere with no space for compromise. Second, Zhou was someone who tried to get things done. That was one of Zhou Enlai’s greatest achievements— the quality of his statesmanship, that even when the revolution was underway, destructive and mobilized by all kinds of labels, slogans, shouting, he prioritized maintaining equality and the quality of people’s everyday life. Political correctness alone does not justify policies and actions. Leaders must present workable plans. In that regard, Zhou Enlai has given us a good reference.

Sanders: It sounds like Zhou Enlai was a figure who could bridge the center of political authority in Beijing and translate its policies into on-the-ground action. It reminds me of the quote, “The mountains are high and the Emperor is far away.” In an age when technology shortens distances, many Chinese policies are becoming stricter in their crackdown on corruption and in imposing greater state reach into local bureaucracies. What role is there going forward for someone like Zhou? Can there be an intermediary figure, someone who can interpret policies and put them in place?

Chen Jian: You do need such figures. That’s why Zhou Enlai’s story is still so meaningful. 

He was not a person who simply carried out tasks. He was also a visionary. In China today, surveillance cameras are everywhere. There was a jewelry store robbery in Shanghai a few days ago, and the suspect was caught within an hour because cameras were everywhere. Street robbery has gone down to nearly zero. 

Still, you find corruption. Recently, nine three-star generals in China were disciplined for bribery and other crimes. This shows that systems, institutions, regulations, and laws are critical for checking and balancing power. 

China has discussed adopting a “Sunshine Law,” which requires all public servants to disclose their property. It was first proposed in 1988 and repeatedly raised at the National People’s Congress until 2008, but it was never passed. Simply punishing corruption will not be sufficient to wipe out the roots. That’s why China still needs to deepen these reforms. Opening up will require developing institutions, codes, laws, and regulations to check and balance power, preventing the emergence of unchecked, unbalanced, supreme power from persisting.

Sivakumar: I’m interested in Zhou Enlai’s time abroad. He spent time in Europe and Japan, and you yourself have spent much of your career abroad studying China. How have your experiences as part of the Chinese diaspora informed your understanding of Zhou Enlai’s time overseas?

Chen Jian: This is an absolutely great question. 

For Zhou Enlai, it’s clear that his experiences in Japan and Europe influenced him. He did not formally study in Europe. He quickly became a journalist and then a professional revolutionary, working in Germany, France, and for a short time in London. It opened his intellectual horizons and allowed him to see the larger world. That was the time, right after the First World War, when all kinds of ideological thoughts were spreading in different parts of the world.  Zhou Enlai was deeply aware of China’s backwardness and weakness after years of Western and Japanese Imperialism. His dream was to see China rise again. Through his experiences abroad, he was exposed to a range of ideologies: anarchism, pragmatism, liberalism, socialism, social divinism, and communism. 

In his diary and a lot of his correspondence, you can see him comparing the ideologies. Eventually, he concluded that the so-called “Russian past” — the Bolshevik Revolution — offered the most rapid way of changing China’s international status. In one of his letters from early 1922, he wrote that he had chosen communism and that his belief would not change. 

In my own case, studying and living in the United States was also eye-opening. It’s not just in terms of access to new opportunities and access to books; it’s a different cultural and global vision that you cannot obtain just by staying in China. In China and in other East Asian countries, there is a strong examination culture that teaches students to find the single correct answer. In the United States, education emphasizes critical thinking and trying to test the wrong answers and then come up with your own correct answers. I think this is extremely important. So in my own case, I think being overseas has changed my academic perspective and my outlook as a human being.

Sanders: Looking at Zhou Enlai’s early life and when he’s developing his leadership style, it seems like he rose to a high position for the CCP relatively early. Do you think his leadership style and personal qualities were developed from a multitude of experiences, or do you think there was one major turning point that shaped his worldview? 

Chen Jian: Early life matters. Zhou Enlai received a classical Chinese education. He then studied at the Nanhai School, a pioneer in China’s modern educational system. Then he went to study abroad. All of these experiences have combined to shape him. 

He was also raised by three women: his birth mother, his adoptive mother, and a nanny, which influenced his personality and temperament, thereby encouraging him to ambitiously pursue equality across China. However, as a youth, he lacked the kind of revolutionary ambition we see in others. Some people even called him gay because in his diary, he discussed a very unique perspective on marriage and his love interests. There is no direct evidence to confirm that he was gay. The decisive turning point in his personality was between 1921 and 1922. When he arrived in Europe, he was still comparing different ideologies. By 1922, he had committed himself to communism. At that time, he was writing for the Chinese newspaper Ye Shi Bao and reporting on the British miners’ strikes and European social conditions after the First World War. Meanwhile, China’s national crisis was deepening after the Paris Peace Conference.

All of these experiences convinced him that communism offered the best path forward for China’s transformation.

Sivakumar: There have been evolving interpretations of Zhou’s relationship with Mao. How have you grown to understand that in the course of writing this book?

Chen Jian: This is perhaps the most difficult question. 

A number of critics describe Zhou Enlai as Mao’s assistant or accomplice, arguing that without Zhou, Mao could not have implemented many of the disastrous policies. This is not untrue. 

However, Zhou’s role in helping Mao was far more complicated. When Mao entered the political arena, China was divided, weak, and plagued by warlordism, poverty, and illiteracy. When Mao died in 1976, China had become unified — except for China’s claim over Taiwan — and recognized as a major world power. Chinese people’s living standards and education have greatly improved. China’s production, despite the setbacks from the Great Leap Forward, had really advanced. Women’s social status had been greatly improved. At the same time, the suffering of the Chinese people was the price to pay for those achievements. Without Zhou Enlai, many achievements might not have been realized, because Zhou was the person who implemented policies and kept the government functioning.

On the other hand, Zhou also limited the damage caused by Mao’s radical policies. So when people ask me, “Is Zhou a good guy or a bad guy?” Yes and no. All great historical figures contain both elements. 

Sanders: Having studied and lived in the US and China for a long time now, what course of evolution do you see US-China relations taking, and what would Zhou have thought about the path forward?

Chen Jian: It’s a difficult question to answer because even in recent years, Chinese-American relations have shifted rapidly. Still, I’m cautiously optimistic. The reasons are quite simple. Both countries are big, and their biggest challenges are internal rather than external. Sometimes leaders emphasize external threats because it is easier to scapegoat than to address domestic problems. Both countries are nuclear powers with enormous capacity to undermine the other party. Historically, the American GPS was destroyed by the Chinese, and the United States retaliated by taking out its satellite system. You know, we have now brought warfare into our space. So, in other words, a confrontation would impose enormous costs on both sides, far exceeding the superficial victory either side could win. 

The question is how the two countries can reach some level of mutual understanding and compromise. Even within the United States, compromise between the political parties has become difficult, even though the American Constitution is built on compromise. 

I believe the risk of direct military confrontation between China and the United States remains low. Ultimately, people should understand that to address the main source of their challenges, they should pursue compromise. Even during the Cold War, Chinese and American leaders sought to avoid a direct, all-out confrontation. That restraint should remain the top priority. The second priority for the government is to prioritize people’s everyday lives. If both countries avoid full confrontation and prioritize practical improvements to people’s lives, relations can remain stable. That’s why I’m cautiously optimistic. 

Sanders: Thank you, Professor.

Featured/Headline Image: Jian Chen | NYU Shanghai, Image Sourced from NYU Shanghai Faculty Directory | CC License, no changes made

In Conversation with Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan, Former Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan, conducted in December 2025

In 2025, Pakistan once again stood at a critical juncture in one of the world’s longest-running refugee crises. At that pivotal moment, the voices of those who had witnessed policy and diplomacy firsthand proved invaluable, as the country confronted one of the most complex displacement situations of our time.

What began as a humanitarian response to war in 1979 has since evolved into one of the longest protracted refugee situations in modern history. In 2025, the refugee question is no longer confined to humanitarian circles; it now sits at the intersection of security policy, regional diplomacy, internal stability, and state identity.

To better understand the stakes, I sat down with Mansoor Ahmed Khan, Pakistan’s seasoned diplomat who served as Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna (2018–2020) and later as Ambassador to Afghanistan until his retirement in 2023, witnessing firsthand the U.S. withdrawal in 2021. He currently serves as Director of the BNU Centre for Policy Research (BCPR) at BNU Lahore.

Having observed Pakistan–Afghanistan relations at close quarters during one of their most turbulent phases, Ambassador Khan offers a rare, unfiltered assessment of where policy hasn’t worked, and what a realistic path forward might look like.

Alishba Barech: Pakistan has hosted Afghan refugees for over four decades. How has it balanced its humanitarian obligations with its own security, economic constraints, and national capacity?

Ambassador Khan: Pakistan has hosted Afghan refugees in millions since 1979–80, when Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. Since then, at every phase, there have been at least three to five million refugees living in Pakistan, depending on the dynamics of that particular period.

What made this possible was the extremely friendly and open policies adopted by successive Pakistani governments. Refugees were not confined strictly to camps. They were allowed to move into towns and villages. They were given opportunities of education like Pakistanis, opportunities of work like Pakistanis, and access to health facilities far more openly than in many other countries, including Iran or even Western states.

A large number of refugees who received education in Pakistan later went back to Afghanistan and today work in Afghan ministries and public and private institutions. Pakistan has spent much more from its own resources than what UNHCR has provided. These refugees have been socially and environmentally absorbed into Pakistani society over decades.

Security concerns have existed at times, particularly when Pakistan faced waves of terrorism. But generally speaking, Afghan refugees themselves have not been involved in terrorism in Pakistan. The threats Pakistan faces come from groups like the TTP or BLA, not from refugee populations.

Alishba Barech: Refugees are often framed within security discourses. How does the state ensure Afghan refugees are not collectively stigmatized or securitized? How do we separate perception from evidence?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: The issue enters security discourse primarily because Pakistan and Afghanistan share a long, porous border. This border has been subject to cross-border militancy for decades: jihad, insurgencies, and now terrorism.

Despite this, Afghan refugees have generally not been found involved in major security breaches. However, the state has not been able to evolve a nuanced policy that distinguishes between different categories of refugees. This is where the problem lies.

When refugees stay for decades, when second and third generations are born in Pakistan, they become socially integrated. Many of them are culturally closer to Pakistan than to Afghanistan. Ignoring this reality and framing refugees as a ‘single’, ‘security’ category leads to collective stigmatization, which is neither fair nor effective.

Alishba Barech: Many Afghan refugees have lived in Pakistan since the 1980s, with second and third generations born here. How does the state view these long-term refugees, especially those who remain undocumented?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: I think this anomaly has to be addressed. In the last few years, the government of Pakistan or state of Pakistan has been facing serious security challenges. These challenges also require Pakistan to have a comprehensive review of this policy.

There are refugees who were born in Pakistan and are, in many ways, more Pakistani than Afghan in terms of culture, language, and societal affiliation. But when even after second or third generation born here can’t call the country home, it creates a psychological toll. They live in fear and uncertainty. Whenever policy changes, they can be sent back. Documentation is a real challenge, and the state has not sufficiently addressed this.

In my personal view, many of these people cannot go back. I have met people who speak Urdu better than Pashto or Dari. The government will eventually have to decide whether it continues to disown them or evolves a special legal status, or even citizenship, for them.

Alishba Barech: What criteria should guide Pakistan in deciding between repatriation (voluntary), deportation, or integration of Afghan refugees?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: According to international refugee law, repatriation should always be voluntary. Pakistan is not a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention, but international norms still apply.

What Pakistan needs is a comprehensive refugee policy based on categorization. There should be at least three categories: registered refugees eligible for repatriation, undocumented Afghans who must be documented, and those Afghans who were born in Pakistan.

Importantly, Afghans born in Pakistan, their return is neither realistic nor humane. Thus, for the third category, we need a politically difficult but pragmatic solution. The most plausible way forward would be to give them Pakistani citizenship in the next few years, or at least a special legal status.

For those eligible for repatriation, the process must be phased. If millions came over five decades, you cannot deport them in one or two months. That will create a crisis for both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

If, hypothetically, there are three million refugees to be repatriated, then repatriating 100,000 or 200,000 people per year would be sustainable.

Repatriation, must be slow, negotiated, and coordinated.

Forced deportation may seem the easiest option, but it will not deliver lasting results. Since the current Afghan government lacks the capacity to accept large numbers, forced returns are bound to fail. Without the Afghan government’s economic inability to absorb them, many will inevitably cross back into Pakistan given the porous nature of the border. Therefore, it is important that both the governments have to be engaged in terms of having a very comprehensive and holistic refugee policy.

Afghan government has an Afghan Ministry of Refugees Repatriation, MORR, and Pakistan has also a Saffron Ministry (Ministry of States and Frontier Regions under which the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees was established in 1980), which is dealing with refugee issues. So, the relevant state authorities, relevant security authorities can also be part of this dialogue. And then they should evolve a comprehensive policy on Pakistan side, a comprehensive repatriation or resettlement policy on Afghan side

Alishba Barech: What humanitarian risks do sudden deportations pose for vulnerable groups like women, children, and the elderly?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: This aspect has not been sufficiently thought through. Many families came in the 1980s as small units of ten people and today consist of forty or fifty members. Over time, they have built assets; homes, businesses, livelihoods.

When such families are suddenly deported without arrangements to manage their assets, it becomes a serious humanitarian issue. Afghanistan’s economy is not in a position to absorb them. This creates hardship not only for the refugees but also for the receiving state.

Alishba Barech: Ambassador Khan, I understand that the state points to education, health, and employment as evidence of opportunity. But we cannot gloss over the reality: without legal status, refugees cannot fully benefit. They live under fear and scrutiny, are excluded from higher-end jobs, and remain trapped in low-income strata.

Definitely, that is what defines the third category. These groups should be granted legal status or some form of permanent documentation, as this is an essential step toward ensuring their security and integration.

Alishba Barech: How do Pashtun cross-border communities complicate refugee policy, given cultural homogeneity across the western border of Pakistan?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: Pashtuns have lived on both sides of the border for centuries. These linkages are historical, cultural, and familial. There are more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.

We have to be cognizant of these realities. And these Pashtuns living in Afghanistan and living in Pakistan, they have been having close relations with each other, close interaction with each other for centuries. And Pashtuns are not only living in Pakistan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in Balochistan, but also even if there is a large Pashtun population in Punjab and in Sindh, in Karachi particularly. So, this issue should be seen as an important issue affecting intra-Pashtun dynamics and also Pakistan’s own national security dynamics.

Any refugee policy that ignores this reality risks destabilizing internal dynamics. We already see movements like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement emerging around rights and grievances. Unilateral deportations can exacerbate resentment and create space for non-state actors.

Groups like the TTP are already exploiting forced repatriation as propaganda against Pakistan. This is avoidable.

Alishba Barech: What diplomatic and strategic consequences does Pakistan face from mass deportations of Afghan refugees?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: Forced deportations always affect diplomatic relations. While every state has the right to deport undocumented individuals, exercising that right without foresight can damage long-term relations.

Pakistan’s image has already suffered in Afghan public opinion over decades. Forced repatriation of refugees who lived peacefully in Pakistan for forty years further worsens that image.

There are regional implications and from a strategic perspective, its not a positive development either.

 Detractors like India gain space to criticize Pakistan on humanitarian grounds. Refugees become another fault line.

Generally, Pakistan has earned a very good name in the past four decades for hosting refugees in Afghanistan, I mean, we have earned a very good name in Afghanistan and we have earned a very good name, good reputation internationally. However, through forced mass repatriation, Pakistan risks undermining its decades-long tradition of hospitality and open accommodation, while simultaneously fueling resentment among Afghans and ethnic groups within state.

Alishba Barech: In your view, what does the future require in terms of Pakistan’s refugee policy?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: Pakistan needs a revised, comprehensive refugee policy that is humane, realistic, and security-conscious. Categorization is key. Documentation is essential. Repatriation must be phased and coordinated with the Afghan government.

Unilateral measures may appear decisive, but they create long-term instability. A farsighted approach, one that balances sovereignty with humanitarian responsibility and regional stability, is the only sustainable path forward. 

For Afghan refugees born in Pakistan or those whose return isn’t possible, as they’re fully integrated, there can be a policy of specially giving them rights to citizenship. But this will also require some legislation, because there is a legislation on citizenship and that policy has to comply with the legislation. So, I think that is why there is a more in-depth consideration or examination of these issues is required rather than going for forced deportation. Forced deportation is perhaps the easiest way of trying to get rid of this issue, but it will not actually yield positive results for the government finally, and it will lead to some negative consequences internally for Pakistan also.

The Afghan refugee question is not merely a question of borders or documentation, it is a question of history, identity, and statecraft. Pakistan and Afghan state are engaged in a very complex relationship. 

Pakistan’s image in Afghanistan has suffered for decades, and there are reasons for it. Now it can suffer more. Our challenge; therefore, in 2025, is not a lack of authority or security measures, but a lack of a coherent, long-term vision.

The current global landscape is fragmented and changing. The stability of the perception of the world order remains in question. Since the end of the Cold War, Western liberal democracy has seemed to cement its status as the dominant force on the global stage. Recently, however, the entire world has experienced democratic backsliding.

Autocratic Powers in the 21st Century

The authoritarian regimes driving the resurgence of autocratic power share common strategies of centralized control, suppression of dissent, and perhaps most importantly, projections of power. While inhumane, coercive, and mechanized authoritarian forces are slowly eroding the liberal international order and reshaping the global balance towards the East.

At the heart of the shift is the “Dictator Trio”: Kim Jong-Un of North Korea, Vladimir Putin of Russia, and Xi Jinping of China. To the general public, these names generally sound the same, symbolic of all dictators. However, the specific way each of them wields power makes the three fundamentally different from one another. 

Because of North Korea’s relative isolation, it heavily relies on nuclear posturing and close economic cooperation with newly emerging nations, especially those in Africa (e.g., training in Uganda), Southeast Asia (especially for cyber operations and sanctions evasions), and Latin America. This is especially dangerous due to the ideological manipulation and power that North Korea holds over these emerging economies. This is historically rooted in “Juche diplomacy,” a model for which Pyongyang sought to mold post-colonial states. Meanwhile, Putin’s Russia is currently entirely focused on the Ukraine War. It has primarily been driven by revanchism, a desire to reclaim Soviet-era influence and revenge through military power to reclaim lost territory with aggressive rhetoric and military policies. 

Xi Jinping, by contrast, is a whole different challenge and threat to the global order. Though China has been corrosive to the current world order through its structural and strategic influence, China under Xi has fused authoritarian control with technocratic governance and economic dominance. China’s extraordinarily long history grants Xi a unique level of legitimacy and power.  Even with the revisionist and modernized focus, which largely casts a negative light on pre-communist history, Xi has claimed selective legacies and nostalgic sentiments to strengthen nationalist legitimacy. This bolsters China’s soft power, especially in terms of diplomacy, economic partnerships, and ideological outreach. For instance, the “Three Summits” of 2022 illustrate how Beijing institutionalized its influence via the binding of Gulf Economies to Chinese digital infrastructure and energy cooperation frameworks. The main reason why Xi was able to gain respect from these Gulf leaders is due to his strategic recalling of pre-colonial trade routes between China and the Arab World. With that cultural affinity and long-standing historical ties, Xi plays into historical rhetoric and frames China and other states as equals. This is a good reason why countries in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, are more skeptical of modern Western nation-states than China. 

Due to the increasing ideological foothold that these authoritarian regimes have claimed, democratic systems have been weakening around the world. Specifically, authoritarian regimes target elections, media, and economic networks, undermining transparency and stability. China and North Korea have been engaging with the Global South, echoing the past strategic alignments of the Cold War through partnerships and political blocs that challenge Western leadership. This is especially true in the Middle East and Africa, where China’s involvement in local economies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, has strengthened diplomatic relations. This is compounded by China aiding the Global South through technological exchange, supporting innovation, and building human capital, further legitimizing China’s role in the Global South. Thus, the global south tends to have more positive opinions of China than the United States. The tension between the United States and China on the question of leading emerging economies and the upcoming world order is fracturing the current balance of the world. 

At a conference at Yale, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce Shanghai, Eric Zheng, remarked that “policymakers in Washington want U.S. companies to leave China, [because] they see China as a threat, an adversary, [and] nothing more than competition.” However, what this zero-sum thinking misses is that China’s strategy isn’t about challenging America directly. Instead, China’s strategy is to use aesthetics and order to focus on repositioning Asia as the center of gravity of world politics. Reminiscent of 1984 by George Orwell, China is seeking to alter the memory of the world through its posturing. Whether through massive parades, martial discipline, or rewriting history, China has implicitly set a significant precedent in abolishing the previous liberal international order. 

Strategies of Positioning or Posturing

China’s self-presentation is all about spectacle: military formations that synchronize and blur, leaders framed against blood-red backdrops, ancient Chinese motifs in drone light shows. These displays aren’t mere aesthetic displays, but show of power. They’re meant to impress China’s controlling governance.

To the domestic Mainland China audience, these displays are meant to unify and broadcast a message of stability. To the international audience, these displays are meant to be juxtaposed against the United States’ lackluster displays of power, contrasting its new, futuristic architecture and the outdated Western infrastructure. These parades broadcast China’s argument to the world that ironclad order triumphs over disorder. China also draws on centuries of Chinese cultural codes in these displays, such as discipline, hierarchy, and harmony. More specifically, they draw on the Confucian idea of li (ritual), stating that beauty is proof of virtue. China has rebranded authoritarianism into efficiency instead of oppression. Even if it is posturing, China sees it as an emblem of its civilization. 

Core Case Study

Take the 80th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese aggression: 12,000 troops, 500 weapon systems, and Xi flanked by Putin and Kim. From a Western perspective, this parade is clearly propaganda. However, propaganda is too small a word to describe the occasion. It’s a historical theatre, a deliberate rewriting of the history and memory of the 20th century: The United States’ version of World War II positions itself as the liberator and trailblazer of peace, while China’s version of history replaces the American narrative with a story of moving from victimhood to salvation. This precisely recalls an imagery of a phoenix, reborn from the ashes, leaving imperialism and the Century of Humiliation behind and transforming it instead into moral capital.

In this Chinese version, China is not just powerful, it is also righteous. Its Victory Day celebration combines spectacle and scripture, which philosopher Benedict Anderson may call a ritual of “imagined community.” This is the subtle genius of China. While America individualizes its triumphs via Hollywood war heroes, lone rangers, freedom as self-expression, and individualism, China collectivizes its memory. Its message isn’t “look what we did,” but more “look who we are,” and that message has traveled across the whole world. 

China’s narrative has landed most persuasively in the Global South, where countries are disillusioned by Western paternalism yet still hungry for alternative models of hope. Lin & Wang (2025) note that China’s diplomatic outreach increasingly frames Beijing as a “partner in sovereignty” instead of a patron, which resonates far more deeply than the paternalistic framing of the United States. Leaders in Dhaka, Jakarta, and Colombo yearn for partners instead of neoimperialism. Through China’s Belt and Road Initiative, digital Silk Roads, and security partnerships, China has built a network that combines infrastructure with ideology. In Pakistan, Chinese projects are marketed as investments into respectful partnerships. In Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, Chinese aid arrives without the moral lectures characteristic of Western institutions. 

Thus, for many leaders across the Global South, Beijing’s message of “order without interference” sounds more appealing than Washington’s offer of “freedom without conditions.” This is especially compounded by China’s roots in anti-colonial memory, which dovetails with South Asia’s own historical wounds. In essence, China doesn’t sell power to the Global South; instead, it sells dignity. 

Furthermore, the symbolic inclusion of foreign troops and observers at the parades and Asian leaders in Chinese media coverage contributes to a sense that Asia’s voice is finally being heard. Perhaps this is the most revolutionary aspect of China’s rise: Asian dialogue is speaking for itself as a dominant, independent voice instead of being shadowed or paralleling that of the West. 

Still, China’s view of order is paradoxical. Its harmony is enforced, not organic, so it depends on silence. For their structure and enforcement to work, they have to repress dissent, erase minority stories, and tighten borders. The unity that it presents is maintained through internal fractures and fragmentation. This tension exposes the limits of China’s narrative power. Their order is so perfect that it’s brittle. Southeast Asian nations understand this: their pragmatism toward China is equally rooted in caution. Case in point, Vietnam tentatively cooperates with China economically while still preparing militarily through securitization in the South China Sea. India, too, resists absorption, building its own network of influence through the Global South. 

Consequently, the question lies in whether China’s aesthetic of order can survive contact with Asia’s plural realities, or whether it will unravel due to its rigidity. For now, though, China only needs admiration, not unanimity. Even beyond geopolitics, China is playing a long-term game with epistemic legitimacy, i.e., the right to define what is “normal” in world politics. In reframing World War II and staging military order as moral order, elevating Asian unity as global virtue, China has tentatively succeeded in rewriting belief systems. The West once convinced the world that legitimacy comes from democracy and the rule of law. China, on the other hand, has proposed a new source: performance. In this view, legitimacy doesn’t come from elections and the political efficacy of the people. Legitimacy comes from the ability to deliver stability, growth, and continuity.

If this argument takes root in the Global South, international relations will evolve quickly. The world is currently rooted in a binary dynamic of liberal versus authoritarian and democracy versus autocracy. However, this doesn’t truly capture the moral imagination of the world beyond the West. Instead, the emerging world order is a contest of narratives of order, and China is currently in the lead.

The trio of Xi, Putin, and Kim may represent autocracy, but their alignment represents a realignment. China’s rise, especially, is economic, military, and, most importantly, a moral narrative. 

When future historians describe this era, they might not speak of “great power competition” but instead of a civilizational shift from the Atlantic’s democracy to Asia’s discipline and concrete order. Especially with Global South countries quickly evolving through the Demographic Transition Model and Western countries facing the worries of an aging workforce, the Global South will soon determine the fate of the new world order.

That doesn’t necessarily mean that the Global South will follow China’s script. South Asia, Southeast Asia, and smaller powers across the Global South still have agency. They can determine for themselves what “order” means next. Still, ignoring China’s narrative of history, ritual, and diplomacy into legitimacy would be blindness. The parade was never just a spectacle to counter Trump’s weak military parade. It’s an announcement that the axis of history is tilting eastward. As the EU, IMF, UN, and other Western democracies debate themselves into paralysis, Asia, led, but not wholly defined, by China, is slowly but stably recapturing the global stage. 

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: World leaders attending the 2025 China Victory Day Parade (2), Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

The South Caucasus has historically been at the center of great-power competition due to its unique location, which sits on the fault line between Europe and the Middle East. The nation of Georgia is now embroiled in domestic strife, as the ruling Georgian Dream party has faced massive protests against its erosion of democratic institutions and reversal of deepening ties with the West. Amidst this instability, China and Russia have stepped up their attempts to gain regional influence in the South Caucasus. Given the rising competition between the West and an emerging autocratic bloc over vulnerable states such as Georgia, the stakes are high.

Tamar Chugoshvili is a Georgian lawyer and democracy advocate, and is currently one of the sixteen Yale World Fellows. She previously served as the First Vice-Speaker of the Parliament of Georgia from 2016-2019, where she spearheaded various institutional reforms and anti-corruption initiatives. This interview was organized by YRIS and conducted with the assistance of Boston Risk Group, a student-led international relations research initiative at Tufts University.

Riley: Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. Let me just get a short introduction about who you are, what you do, and your work history.

Tamar: Thank you for having me for this interview. So my name is Tamar. I’m a Yale World Fellow. This is a program at Yale University that is run by the Yale International Leadership Center. This is the most competitive program here at Yale, which brings together 16 world fellows each year for one semester from different countries and backgrounds. I come from Georgia. I’m a lawyer and a former member of parliament, with 20 years of experience working in a civil office in politics. Most of my profile focuses on promoting, creating, and building democratic institutions, specifically in my case, reforming representative institutions like Parliament and local councils, and promoting accountability and transparency in executive institutions. 

Riley: All right. So our first question is, you’ve engaged closely with international institutions, from the Council of Europe to the Women Political Leaders Global Forum. What role do international partnerships and civil society play in sustaining democratic progress when political will falters?

Tamar: That’s a very interesting and very difficult question. I have experience working with both civil society organizations and state institutions. And I have represented Georgia on various important platforms, including the Council of Europe, but I also chaired the Georgian Parliament. I represented the parliament of Georgia to other legislative institutions such as the U.S. Congress, the Israeli Knesset, and other parliaments, so I know the role of formal national institutions and the role of non-state institutions, civil society organizations, both local and international. And I should say that cooperation between states and partnerships between countries are of crucial importance, especially for Georgia, considering we are a small country. But the civil society organizations, both nationally and internationally, have tremendous importance. And for years, organizations like Human Rights Watch, or many others, have been very instrumental for us in our democratic transformation, because we were going through a very challenging past. We were reforming ourselves from a post Soviet failed state into a European-style democratic state. That would have been impossible without the support and knowledge that came from all these non-state actors. 

Aiden: You have long been an advocate for transparency, parliamentary reform, and anti-corruption mechanisms. Georgia’s history has been marked by several periods of democratization and backsliding throughout the Saakashvili and Georgian Dream eras. Given these repeated patterns, what do you believe are the necessary preconditions for a durable and long-lasting democracy in Georgia?

Tamar: So indeed, you’re absolutely right. Basically, in my lifetime, I have observed Georgia completely collapse and be devastated, then rise from the ruins, and collapse again. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia had a war with Russia, a civil war, and complete anarchy to follow up. So we’ve been very vigilant on reforming, improving, and rising from this collapse. And I think that if we want to understand global politics, we should start not from Washington, DC. We should start with places like Georgia, like the Caucasus, and why? Because this is a place where these global interests really clash. 

So, geographically, we are located between the West and the East. It’s the meeting point of West and East, and throughout the centuries, interests from Eastern countries have sought to influence the region where Georgia lies. That is what China calls One Belt, One Road. This is a transit route that China wants to use to trade with the West, so the Caucasus is a very important region for them. This region is also very important to Russia, because Russia wants to maintain this part of the world as its backyard. It wants to prevent us from joining NATO. It also wants to prevent us from joining the European Union. And at the end of the day, the last thing they want to see is a country in the former Soviet order prospering as a democratic state. 

And while the United States and the West dominated world politics after the Cold War, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the presence of the United States and US politics in Georgia was very strong. The US was supporting Georgia to build our country up against a neighbor that really is our enemy. So for us to exist and to develop as an independent country, we needed a strong friend. And that strong friend for us has been the United States and the West. 

It was young people, people your age, years ago, who started working for very high offices in the civil service. Some of them became members of parliament. They themselves were contributing to the creation and passage of new legislation, new rules, that shifted our country. After the U.S. made the decision that it did not want to be the hegemonic power in the world, we saw the role of the West and the United States decrease. In our region, the power and interests of China and Russia are now increasing, and that has an immediate impact on democracy and what happens domestically. So Georgians were basically left feeling alone in this process to push back against massive powers and dictatorships.

Young Georgians are right now in a very difficult situation, because they are fighting desperately. Youth as young as 21 years old are imprisoned due to ongoing strife. For example, one year ago, a youth was just protesting in the street with thousands of other Georgians, and he was randomly arrested by the police. He was sentenced to four years of imprisonment despite committing no crime. So it is difficult for us, the citizens, to continue this fight for democracy without any outside support. 

All support from the United States, including USAID, the National Democratic Institute, and other American organizations, is gone. USAID was essential in providing funding and resources for people who wanted to build democracy in their own countries. All of that is gone with the Trump administration’s decision. That has left Georgia in a challenging situation where we see propaganda coming from foreign press. These foreign press coming from China, Russia, and even from inside Georgia are all trying to destroy the democracy that we have built up to now. It’s a difficult, challenging moment for us. So, for a small country like Georgia, it’s not enough to only have a people with a desire to build a democratic nation. We also need global powers to support our cause. 

Riley: You’ve been deeply involved in Georgia’s constitutional reforms, from the successful 2017-18 amendments that transitioned the nation to a Parliamentary Democracy to the failed 2019 effort to transfer to a fully proportional system by 2020. Given this experience, do you believe that state institutions are strong enough to prevent the GD from amending the constitution to codify their hold on power? Furthermore, how likely do you see this as happening?

Tamar: The ruling party, even though they very much want to amend the Constitution, our Constitution is very good in that it is very clear in stating that the future of Georgia is in integrating with the European Union and NATO. I believe the ruling party wants to remove this statement from the Constitution, but they cannot do so because it’s very difficult to amend the Constitution in the Georgian system. Constitutional amendments require a very high amount of support in the parliament and must be supported in two separate parliamentary sessions. The ruling party does not have enough members of parliament to make such a change, and I hope they will never get enough seats to amend the Constitution. So at this point, the only thing they’ve managed to capture is basically all the state institutions. The Constitutional Court is no longer independent. The Parliament cannot function effectively, but the majority is still not powerful enough to amend our constitution in a way that would allow them to delete whatever they dislike.

Aiden: I saw in an article you mentioned that the Georgian opposition could improve its effectiveness through greater unity among opposition parties and by adopting nontraditional protest methods to increase visibility. However, what stood out to me was your call for greater participation from the business sector, which has increasingly opposed the GD. How and why do you believe that business could play such a critical role in political opposition?

Tamar: I’ve been quite critical about how the opposition has handled the process, but it’s very difficult for me to speak about it right now. Most of the opposition leaders are in jail, and you cannot criticize people who are political prisoners. So I’m trying not to do that. 

As for the business sector, the political process needs money. Somebody has to fund the political competition, and the ruling party is led by a billionaire oligarch. That party has all the resources in the world. They control the entire state budget. They have a world salesperson in the country leading them, and they have all of Georgia’s major businessmen surrounding them and supporting them. Even if businesses do not really like them, businesses still have to support the ruling party because of the system. They don’t want to make enemies with the system. 

However, to have a competitive political process, someone has to fund the opposition as well. How can you oppose the ruling party, which has so many resources, if there is no funding on your side? So it is very important to find independent sources to fund campaigning. Even though it is difficult to secure this funding from the business sector, an unusual phenomenon is occurring: crowdfunding. We’ve seen people donating small amounts of what they own, even though they are not wealthy, and often lack resources themselves, but they are still contributing to the opposition’s cause. These funds are used to help political prisoners and their families. I think crowdfunding can help us in the future, not just to create political resistance, but also as a source of income and funding for the opposition. Without funding, it’s impossible to engage in a campaign and challenge the ruling party.

Riley: Moving to a more global level, Georgia stands at a unique crossroads geographically, historically, and geopolitically. It lies along both the ancient Silk Road and today’s Belt and Road Initiative, while navigating the competing influences of major powers. How can Georgia position itself as a connector politically and economically while preserving genuine strategic autonomy?

Tamar: This is difficult to do when you’re a small nation facing global powers, but we must do so. That’s the only way Georgia can maintain itself and its identity as a country of Georgians. We need to prosper as a democratic state and integrate more with the West, but we also need to be able to engage with other powers such as China. However, that can only happen if Georgia can continue to count on and retain support from the West, through the European Union and the United States. These are the only powers that would respect a small nation as an independent and sovereign country. Russia does not respect the independence or sovereignty of its neighboring smaller nations. Russia considers us as part of their territory, to which they can do whatever they want. This is why Georgia wants to be part of the West: European countries respect other nations, cultures, languages, and territories. Russia does not. The only way for Georgia to maintain its sovereignty and identity is to keep integrating with the European Union and to become a member state. While we seek to have constructive relationships with powers such as China or Russia, I don’t think this is currently possible.

Aiden: On the topic of regional stability, the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has had significant implications for security in the South Caucasus. Do you believe this is a genuine turning point towards greater regional stability or perhaps an invitation for more great power competition in the South Caucasus?

Tamar: It is very important that the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict in the Caucasus permanently ends. This conflict has been going on for decades and has been devastating. It is impossible to focus on constructive things, such as the economy and the well-being of the people, when two of the three countries in the South Caucasus are at constant war.

A positive development that occurred was the United States’ role in striking a peace deal between the two countries. But this peace is still too fragile. We still don’t know whether this deal will last. There is still a lot of work that needs to be done for lasting peace. Anything could spark a new conflict. If a long-lasting peace is achieved, this will enable greater opportunities for the region. It would allow us to work on joint economic projects that would allow all of us in the region to become powerful forces in the future.

Riley: I’d like to talk about Ukraine for a moment. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Georgia’s geopolitical importance has sharply risen. From Zelenskyy’s initial pressure on Georgia to open a second front against Russia to the thousands of Georgian volunteers in Ukraine, these cases highlight the ties between the nations. Do you think Ukraine has become a polarizing issue in Georgian politics, and how have both political sides framed it? And finally, how do you see the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine affecting Georgia? 

Tamar: This war has had a tremendous impact on Georgia and our government. I’m ashamed of what our government did in this regard. The Georgian government has been using Russia’s devastating invasion of Ukraine for its own benefit. Basically, the central message of the Georgian government has been that Ukraine could have avoided the war if it had played smart, and it did not. So the government is blaming Ukrainians for this war instead of saying what really happened. And what really happened is that the Russians invaded Ukraine. As simple as that. There is no blame on the Ukrainian side, and no one can blame it on them, which our government shamefully does. The Georgian ruling party is trying to convince Georgian citizens that it is a good party to have in power because it will keep Georgia out of war. Because Georgians have trauma from its numerous past wars, people are really traumatized and weary of future wars. Instead of showing proper support to Ukrainians, I think that the Georgian government has been very negative, and in the most negative way has manipulated the war in Ukraine for their own benefit. That is a very shameful thing to do. 

Aiden: So it seems like there’s a very big generational divide among Georgians. Why do you think that older people drew the lessons from the wars in the 90s and the 2008 war to be highly risk-averse and not to incite another conflict? And on the other hand, why might younger people view foreign affairs from a more nationalist and revanchist perspective?

Tamar: There is definitely a national generational divide. We have one generation that was born and raised in the Soviet Union. We have another who was born and raised in an independent and democratic country. The mindsets of these people are entirely different. Young people want freedom, independence, and opportunities in their own country. They want to live like the young people across Europe, where there are many possibilities for them, where they can think what they want, and say what they want. They want the ability to make decisions and achieve success in their lives.

The older generation is driven by a fear that there is worse to come. This is something difficult to overcome, but it can only be overcome over time. Older generations have the beliefs they do about politics because they grew up in a dictatorship, where this was the normal state of affairs. They were also victims of constant conflicts and wars, so it’s very difficult to convince them to change their mindset because that is what they grew up with. 

For the young people, though, it’s hard to get used to the idea that they should have no opportunities or freedom. Unfortunately, in their own homeland, the only way to find a better life is to escape, go somewhere else, and run away to start a new life. That’s our dilemma. However, the future is still with Georgia’s youth. Young people are always the future. The law is always with young people, so I think they will prevail.

Aiden: I wanted to ask a little bit about the foreign agents law passed last year that drew close comparisons to similar laws in Russia and Belarus. This law has significantly restricted the ability of civil society institutions to function. I would like to know if you see this event as a watershed moment, codifying a shift in foreign policy toward Russia, or as part of a continuing trend of closer ties to Russia?

Tamar: It was definitely a very significant moment, but it was one piece in a longer chain of developments. The foreign agents law is a terrible invention of Russia, enabling the government to label anyone who is a critic of the regime as agents of foreign countries. One of the fellows at Yale is from Russia, and he has been labeled by the Russian government as a foreign agent under a similar law. This law is an instrument to silence and demonize people. Many claim the government has political prisoners, that it’s not good to have them, and that it’s not good to send young people to jail for nothing. Those people are then denounced as foreign agents. Instead of accepting the truth, these regimes, through this terrible piece of legislation, dehumanize people who try to speak the truth.

The initial attempts to pass this law sparked a huge public outcry. Major protests prevented the government from enacting the law for over a year. But now it’s been enacted. It is one piece of a broader government strategy to drift away from the West and bring Georgia closer to Russia. Georgian civil society had been receiving funding from international organizations for nearly three decades, including the European Union and USAID. German and Swedish funds were crucial in the past, but under this foreign agents law we can receive this funding only with the Georgian government’s permission. So imagine that you’re seeking funding for a project that is pursuing anti-corruption work or helping political prisoners in Georgia. You’d need funds for that. The government says you can’t receive that funding without their permission. The government would never enable anyone to receive funds for work that would expose their corruption or other wrongdoings. It has eliminated civil society organizations, especially government watchdogs. 

Riley: One final question: looking ahead, what gives you the most confidence in Georgia’s political future? What should the next generation of global leaders understand about the challenges of small state governance? 

Tamar: Even though the developments are very adverse at this stage, I see this whole ordeal as a process. Throughout Georgian history, the country has fallen and risen and fallen and risen again. I see this current ordeal as another stage, a difficult period for us, but one from which we will find our way out. The primary source of hope for us in the region is that the people just do not want to spend their lives under a single dictator and are fighting to reclaim their dignity and freedom. Unfortunately, political parties and processes have not been able to channel the public’s will into real political and governmental change.

However, what is essential is that Georgia should be taken as a lesson not just for small countries, but for bigger nations as well. This conflict began due to rising polarization. Everything started with the spread of lies used to divide society, so people refuse to talk to each other or communicate opposing opinions. The polarization and hatred are a product of the propaganda machinery of state television and foreign sources, especially the influence of Russia and China. Those actors can divide society in a dramatic and very negative way. When it comes to democratic institutions, there are some signs that people have to watch for: any attack on the judicial system is very dangerous, and polarization is very dangerous. So I hope Georgia’s present situation can serve as a lesson for other nations to identify and detect those worrisome traits in their early stages and then eliminate them.

“Aiden Wasserman is the President of Boston Risk Group, a student-led initiative at Tufts University providing pro bono research support to NGOs, Embassies, NGOs, and Think Tanks on a variety of geopolitical issues. You can find out more about BRG here.”

The heavy rains of late November 2025 devastated many countries in South East Asia. Indonesia was hit the hardest, with more than 953 lives lost in Aceh, Sumatra Utara, and Sumatra Barat in the floods and landslides. The tragedy kindled public anger, and social media has been flooded after the resurfacing of a 2024 speech by President Prabowo, where the President undermined the risks that result from increasing oil palm production as well as the deforestation that has been happening in Sumatra. Beyond momentary outrage, these events have signaled a deep reflection for Indonesia about palm oil and the international political economy of our everyday lives. 

Opportunity & Meeting Global Demands 

Ever since 1970, the demand for palm oil has increased fortyfold. In 2024, Indonesia had the largest consumption of palm oil in the world at 20.35 million metric tons. To meet such demands, not to mention the export-led growth targets, Indonesia has rapidly increased its palm oil production, and now is the largest producer in the world. However, alongside this change game a range of social and environmental grievances. Sumatra, the region hit hardest by the recent floods, contains the most extensive palm oil plantation area in Indonesia. This is no coincidence.

Palm oil production in Indonesia is complex interplay between state corporations, private corporations and smallholders. The majority of palm oil production in Indonesia is controlled by private corporations. The state has supported plantation expansion and eased trade barriers since the post Soeharto era of private corporations who can produce faster with their technology, to increase foreign-exchange earnings. Moreover, private corporations rely heavily on monoculture systems. Given that private corporations operate on large-scale areas of land, monoculture significantly reduces biodiversity and weakens soil stability as oil palm trees have shallow roots. Therefore, it increases the risk of flooding and soil erosion. 

Environmental Responsibility

The environmental consequences of Indonesia’s massive palm oil production play out alongside a shifting global political economy agenda that is more climate-conscious. On one hand, China, one of Indonesia’s largest importers of palm oil, has begun an ambitious path towards greener supply chains. On the other hand, Indonesia faced a trade dispute with the European Union over environmental concerns of palm oil production. Although Indonesia recently won the dispute, it cannot ignore the mounting global expectations for sustainability. Many countries have also developed more international environmental standardization in trade. For instance, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), a voluntary internationally recognized certification, has also gained more usage in Indonesia, but its reach remains limited. 

To raise environmental standards and international competitiveness, Indonesia currently has the Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO), a certification regulation introduced in 2009. Although the number or certificate holders have increased, as of 2025, only 39.33% have obtained ISPO certification. Additionally, Presidential Decree No. 16 of 2025 has pushed for stronger implementation, however overall compliance remains low and slow. However, critics argue that the ISPO falls short in addressing key issues such as post-plantation land rehabilitation. 

The moratorium regulation aimed at halting the expansion of palm oil plantations in Indonesia between 2018-2021 was deemed as a step forward in sustainability efforts. However, the policy was not renewed, and expansion in regions such as Sumatra has continued.

Overlooking the Smallholders & Everyday Lives

Smallholders, defined as those who own less than 25 hectares of land, make up roughly 40% of oil production in Indonesia. Despite this, they are often overlooked and occupy a precarious position. Some smallholders are associated with private corporations, while others are fully independent. The latter has less financial capacity, knowledge and technology, making them vulnerable within the supply chain compared to private corporations. Moreover, they do not have the access to the markets that private corporations do.

A study on palm oil justice movements in Indonesia highlights how the dominating practices of state elites and private corporations have not only weakened smallholders’ political and economic aspirations, but also cause the most environmental damage. 

The November floods pose a strong reminder that the government’s negligence to govern palm oil production has ultimately impacted the lives of the grassroots communities such as smallholder farmers. The palm oil sector supports more than 16 million workers, whose livelihoods bear the immediate heaviest burden—losing homes, schools, and roads to the very mud of private corporations misconduct and policies. 

As consumers, without realising, palm oil is embedded in our everyday lives whether it be the food we eat or the products in our bathroom cabinets. Hence, we cannot simply stop consuming it, especially since many people depend on the industry for their livelihoods. While we can make more mindful choices, the government must make a more strategic position.

Moving Forward

Several research studies have suggested that the “bottom-up” approach of supporting smallholders may be a practical solution to reconcile higher output with environmental protection. Approaches include investing in capacity building and exposure to international markets. Evidence also shows that the adoption of sustainable practices leads to increased productivity.In light of the hundreds of lives lost, focusing on the narrative of the palm oil industry as a ‘blessing from the almighty’ that should be expanded ignores the failure of the government to empower and protect those who contribute the most. Focusing on corporate expansion while ignoring the power asymmetry of smallholders undermines environmental implications, long-term competitiveness and rural welfare. If the government lacks the political will to empower and protect those at the base of the supply chain, the cost of the next flood will be even higher.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Menstrual Products, Image sourced from Roboflow Universe | CC License, no changes made