CHASING THE (LATIN) AMERICAN DREAM? AN EXAMINATION OF US-BACKED REGIME CHANGE SINCE WORLD WAR II

INTRODUCTION

The history of Latin America is dominated by political instabilities, foreign interventions, and economic volatility. Prior to independence in the first quarter of the 19^th century, Latin America faced European colonization, particularly from Spanish and Portuguese settlers.^[1] Even after a wave of revolutions, Latin America has largely been under the semi-direct, and often direct, influence of the United States (U.S.) under the pretenses of the Monroe Doctrine.^[2]Over the past two centuries, Latin America has been subjected to a continuum of foreign actors directly shaping its domestic institutions. Actions by these external players shock Latin American political and economic institutions; yet, despite these setbacks, Latin America’s state structures prevail in the modern global order. To what extent has the history of foreign intervention, specifically, efforts undertaken by the U.S. over the past 50 years, influenced Latin America’s democratic development in the short-term and long-term? This paper aims to empirically investigate the aftershocks of U.S.-backed regime change throughout the Cold War (1945-1991) on democracy across Latin America. For this paper, I define the short-term as the time from the first regime change until the restoration of a prior regime or transition to a new regime. For instance, Chile’s short-term coding spans from 1973, the year of its military coup, to 1988, the year of Chile’s national plebiscite to restore democracy.^[3] I define the long-term as the period starting from the emergence of the “new” or restoration of the previous regime until 2018. Again, using Chile as an example, the long-term constitutes the period from 1988 until 2018.^[4] I divide these periods of examination between regime change duration and the post-regime change era to investigate the effects of U.S. intervention from two distinct, yet equally valuable perspectives.

I examine the independent variable (x)—successful-U.S. backed regime change—as a categorical variable: a state in Latin America either experienced successful regime change, or it did not; against the dependent variable (y)—the level of the Latin American state’s democracy—using POLITY IV’s Time-Series dataset. I hypothesize that U.S.-backed regime changes led to lower, if not virtually non-existent, levels of democracy in the short-term, but more robust democratic stability and growth in the long-term by comparison. First, this paper examines the history of U.S. intervention in Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the present day. Second, it summarizes the twenty states in Latin America investigated in this large-n study to assess historical socio-political differences. Third, it uses bivariate analysis to study the short-term and long-term effects on democratic trajectory and stability following U.S. intervention. Fourth, it examines limitations and avenues for further research. Ultimately, this essay shows how U.S interventions in Latin America contributed to democracy and stability in the long-term.

AMERICA’S BACKYARD? A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine came in response to Latin America’s push for independence from Europe in the first quarter of the 19^th century.^[5] In his 1823 State of Union Address, U.S. President James Monroe called on the U.S. to commit to maintaining the liberty and happiness of its “fellowmen on this side of the Atlantic.”^[6] Further, he emphasized that the U.S. had no inherent right, unless if its security were at stake, to engage in European wars.^[7] Thus, the Monroe Doctrine grew out of the American commitment to peace and stability in the western hemisphere.^[8] The Monroe Doctrine is considered a political standard, in that the U.S. alone created the policy, and the U.S. alone owns the right to act on it.^[9] In 1823, the U.S. was an emerging middle-power without intentional authority, rather than the global hegemon seen today. Nonetheless, the U.S. demonstrated an early commitment to maintaining influence on Latin America, a trend that continued during the Cold War.

Truman Doctrine

Under the Harry S. Truman’s administration, the U.S. underwent a drastic change in their foreign policy, shifting from the isolationist ideology of the 1920s and 1930s, to Cold War-era Containment.^[10] This policy change grew from the knowledge that World War II (WWII) did not mark the end of American involvement in maintaining the stability of the global order (i.e., internal struggles in China, the rise of the Soviet Union.)^[11] After analyzing Edward F. Willett’s Dialectical Materialism and Russian Objectives and George Kennan’s Long Telegram, Truman was convinced that action needed to be taken on the Soviet question.^[12] Following events in Turkey and Greece –  two more threats to the order of global democracy, the Truman Doctrine was born.^[13] The Truman doctrine is the policy that the U.S. must limit the spread of communism     .^[14] Truman’s famous adage, “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” echoed this commitment to contain the spread of communism.^[15] This policy eventually manifested in programs such as the Marshall Plan of 1948, whereby the U.S. provided $16 billion in aid to the crumbling post-war Western European countries.^[16] Beyond post-WWII reconstruction, the Truman Doctrine became a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War. In much of Latin America, the U.S. sought to intervene against the spread of communism,attempting to quell Soviet influence in the western hemisphere. Such a policy was already perceived as the inherent right of the U.S., with ideological roots dating back to the adoption of the Monroe Doctrine.

METHODOLOGY

Research Scope

The scope of this paper covers the twenty sovereign Latin American states speaking a Latin-origin language, Spanish, Portuguese, or French. While most of the Caribbean is excluded based on this language requirement, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti are included under this study’s parameters. Areas such as the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico and the French territories of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint-Barthelemy, and Saint-Martin, which fit the language description, are not counted in the study because they are non-sovereign dependencies.^[17] Not all of the twenty states under review experienced successful U.S.-backed regime change, allowing for a comparative methods of analysis. This analysis breaks into two sections to investigate the democratic trajectory from post-WWII (1945) to the present day (2018). First, a state’s democracy from the start of a state’s regime change up to either the restoration of the pre-U.S. regime change, or the transition into a new regime; and second, the time from the beginning of the restored or newly founded regime up to 2018. This historical tracking allows for an in-depth examination of a state’s democratic trajectory, and to what extent successful U.S.-backed regime changes played in shaping its development. 

TABLE 1. U.S. Involvement in Latin America during the Cold War (1945-1991)

Research Hypothesis

I posit two relationships: first, a negative relationship between successful U.S.-backed regime change and democracy score in the short-term, and second, a positive relationship between U.S.-backed regime change and democracy scores in the long-term. Two causal theories support these hypotheses. First, in the short-term, U.S.-backed regime-change reduces national democracy because new regimes suspend state constitutions and restrict the rule of law, allowing unchallenged directives. Second, in the long-term, U.S.-backed regime changes result in significant increases in democracy scores because affected states placed a larger emphasis on maintaining their newfound or newly restored democracy. In the long-term case, regime change had an intensifying effect on a state’s democratic trajectory. Again, states that did not endure a U.S.-backed regime change lacked this intensifying effect and continued on their initial democratic course unchallenged.

Datasets

To perform bivariate analysis, I used POLITY IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2018 dataset to operationalize the dependent variable, Latin America’s democracy levels. POLITY scores a state’s democracy on a 21-point scale from -10 (non-existent democracy) to +10 (perfect democracy).^[20] More specifically, POLITY labels states scoring between -10 and -5.5 as autocracies; states scoring between -5.5 and +5.5 as anocracies; and states scoring between +5.5 and +10 as democracies.^[21] POLITY calculates this score by subtracting the autocratic practices (“AUTOC” score), measured on an 11-point scale from a set of defining characteristics, including the Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment; Openness of Executive Recruitment; Constraints on Chief Executive; Regulation of Participation; and Competitiveness of Participation, on a weighted scale from the democratic practices (“DEMOC” score), also measured on an 11-point scale against the same characteristics.^[22] From this data, I conducted a time-series analysis to visualize a Latin America state’s democratic evolution throughout the Cold War and into the present-day using R software.

ANALYSIS

Statistically Significant: Short-Term U.S. Intervention

Figure 2 shows the level of democracy throughout the Cold War in each state that experienced U.S. intervention under the short-term hypothesis. Each plot displays the POLITY IV polity democracy score on a 21-point scale (y-axis) during the Cold War years of 1945-1991(x-axis). Within each plot, the vertical lines indicate the exact year when the successful regime change occurred, and the year the subsequent regime fell. The analysis shows that Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay support the short-term hypothesis of a negative relationship between U.S. intervention and democracy scores, while Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama refute the hypothesis.

In Argentina, the start of U.S. intervention directly coincides with a 15-point drop in democracy from (+6) in 1975 to (-9) in 1976. In 1975, the U.S. backed a military coup d’état to install Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla as the head of Argentina, replacing President Isabella Perón.^[23] This regime was part of the continental-wide Operation Condor, a CIA-backed mass regime change plan throughout Latin America.^[24] Videla’s incumbency marked the beginning of Argentina’s notorious Dirty War, which spanned from 1976 until 1983, resulting in the deaths and ‘disappearance’ of over 400 political dissidents per month.^[25] Videla’s military dictatorship remained in power until the 1983 election of President Raul Alfonsin.^[26] Alfonsin’s election, and the subsequent restoration of democracy, directly coincides with the end of U.S. intervention on Argentina’s short-term graph, marking a 16-point increase in polity democracy score, from (-8) to (+8) between 1982-1983. It is important to note that the other large democratic dip Argentina faced between 1964-1972 resulted from another military coup that was not the result of the U.S.^[27]

In 1964, Bolivia experienced a U.S.-backed military coup d’état resulting in an 18-year far-right regime.^[28] This 1964 coup directly corresponded to a subtle decrease in polity score from (-3) to (-4) in 1963  and caused a continuous downward trend to (-7) in 1971  until finally changing course in 1982 with a  15 point increase to (+8). 

In 1964, a U.S. military coup d’état took place in Brazil to remove social-democratic President João Goulart.^[29]Here, Brazil’s coup coincides with a drastic democracy score decrease from a few years prior. Between 1958 and 1962, Brazil’s polity score ranged from (+6) to (+5), but following the 1964 coup, it severely dropped to (-9) until 1973, when it increased by 5-points to (-4), which remained until 1984. In 1979, Brazil elected President João Figueiredo, a former military general who sought to steer Brazil’s regime back into a democracy.^[30] Figueiredo returned state power to civilian rule and passed amnesty laws to pardon political opponents convicted during the dictatorship.^[31] In 1985, Brazil’s polity score jumped 11 points to (+7) and continued to rise  into the 21^st century.

In 1973, Chile experienced a CIA-backed military coup d’état to overthrow democratically elected socialist President Salvador Allende.^[32] In 1972, Chile scored a (+6) on the polity scale, and the following year’s coup dropped Chile 13-points to a (-7). Under a new military regime spearheaded by President Augusto Pinochet, Chile experienced numerous civil and human rights violations for 15 years, until a national plebiscite in 1988 restored democracy.^[33] This plebiscite raised Chile’s polity score 5 points, from a (-6) to a (-1) from 1986-1987, and another 9 points from (-1) to (+8) by 1989.

From 1954 until 1989, Paraguay experienced the longest standing military dictatorship in Latin America’s history. In 1954, as part of Operation Condor, a coup d’état overthrew President Federico Chavez’s government.^[34] Alfredo Stroessner gained power, and the far-right Partido Colorado maintained control of Paraguay until 1989.^[35] In 1953, a year before the military coup took place, Paraguay scored a (-5) on polity; the subsequent coup saw this score drop 4 points to (-9). Admittedly, this event is a minor change in democracy compared to other countries, but Paraguay stands out among the rest of South America because of its historically high rates of national poverty and a persistently low score of democracy.^[36] Under the Stroessner regime, Paraguay faced consistent polity scores of (-8) or (-9) for 34 years. Finally, in 1989, another military coup took place to oust the Stroessner regime.^[37] Successful opposition forces exiled Stroessner to Brazil. Andres Rodriguez became Paraguay’s new president, immediately reversing many of Stroessner’s repressive policies.^[38] The successful 1989 coup saw Paraguay’s democracy score increase by 15 points, from (-8) in 1988 to (+2) in 1989, and eventually to (+7) by 1992.

Last, Uruguay shows confidence in the short-term hypothesis. In 1973, Uruguay underwent a U.S.-backed military coup d’état, which installed a civil-dictatorship until 1984.^[39] The coup suspended Uruguay’s 1967 constitution and provided President Juan María Bordaberry control until 1976.^[40] Following Bordaberry’s removal in 1976, Uruguay appointed three other political figures to rule the civil dictatorship until its collapse in 1985.^[41] In 1984, following rampant civilian protests against the state of the dictatorship, Julio Maria Sanguinetti became President of Uruguay through a democratic election.^[42] Sanguinetti’s tenure as president saw the country enact new economic policy and merged the transition back to a fully-fledged democracy in 1985.^[43] Uruguay’s 1973 military coup directly coincides with a stark decrease in their democracy score. Between 1967 to 1970, Uruguay maintained a consistent polity score of (+8), and following the coup in 1973, they experienced a 16-point decrease to (-8). This severely weakened democracy persisted until 1985, when they experienced a substantive 16-point increase from (-7) to (+9), a trajectory of near-perfect democracy, which continued strongly into the 21^st century. 

Refuting the Hypothesis: Short-Term, U.S. Intervention

Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama refute the short-term hypothesis. First, Costa Rica maintained a perfect 10 in democracy score throughout the entire Cold War, even though they experienced a U.S.-backed regime change. Costa Rica’s case is unusual in the broader trend of U.S. intervention because of its duration and intensity. U.S. involvement in Costa Rica took the form of supporting one faction in the 1948 Costa Rican Civil War.^[44]The civil war only lasted one month, from 12 March 1948 to 24 April 1948, and resulted in the death of 2,000 people.^[45]Within two years, Costa Rica reinstated presidential elections and accordingly did not experience a long lapse in democracy. Costa Rica is a peculiar example of U.S.-backed regime change because: 1) it appeared significantly earlier than other interventions–almost 10-years before the next regime interference in Paraguay; 2) the newly installed regime was not a dictatorship and lasted less than two years; 3) the conflict was mild compared to those other Latin America states faced in the following decades. Following the civil war, Costa Rica notably abolished its military, preventing any future military coups.^[46]

El Salvador, in part, credits the hypothesis but with a slight caveat. Initially, Table 2 shows a severe decline in democracy scoring coinciding with the start of the U.S.-backed military coup d’état and the civil war.^[47] Interestingly, El Salvador appears to experience democratic growth around 1983, much earlier than the official end of hostilities in 1991. By 1982, the conflict between the two sides subsided, and peace negotiations began. The civil war continued to rage, but prior attempts at brokering peace explain the out-of-place spike in democratic growth around the early 1980s. 

Guatemala’s democratic trajectory is perhaps the most complex of all the Latin American cases. In 1954, the U.S.-backed the military coup against President Jacobo Arbenz installed Carlos Castillo Armas as a military dictator.^[48]This move came as a direct response to Arbenz’s push for land reforms against the commercial interests of the United Fruit Company, a major U.S. corporation.^[49] As noted in Table 2, the coup was successful and coincided with Guatemala’s fall on the polity scale from (+2) in 1953 to (-6) in 1954. The Armas regime ended in 1957 with his death but was not the end of Guatemala’s instability. The effects of the coup lasted into the next decade, igniting the Guatemalan Civil War that waged from 1960 to 1996.^[50] Interestingly, in 1965, during the civil war, there was a dramatic increase in democracy despite the internal conflict. 

Of all of Latin America, Nicaragua endured the worst of U.S. interventions. In 1981, the Nicaraguan Revolution ousted the U.S.-supported Somoza dictatorship and installed the Sandinista regime, which reigned until 1990.^[51] As this event was a push for democracy, Table 2 shows a slight increase in democracy score from (-5) in 1981 up towards (-1) by the mid-1980s. The U.S. countered the Sandinista’s pursuits by funding the Contra rebel group with arms and military deployments in nearby Honduras. Although the U.S. did not directly alter the Nicaraguan regime in 1981, their actions sparked intense political instability, eventually forcing the hand of the Nicaraguan electorate in 1990 to choose the Sandinista opposition to conclude the conflict.^[52]  

Last, Panama presents an outlier case. Between December 1989 to January 1990, the U.S. invaded Panama after its President Manuel Noriega, a long-time CIA accomplice, was found guilty of drug trafficking and racketeering.^[53]After arresting and extraditing Noriega to the U.S. to serve his sentence, Guillermo Endara was sworn in as president.^[54]Similar to Costa Rica, Panama faced U.S. intervention during the Cold War, but their democracy indices did not exhibit an apparent volatile shift because of: 1) the timing of the intervention occurring late into the Cold War; 2) the short length of the intervention, and 3) the weak intensity exhibited from the intervention. There is no analysis of the “short-term” of non-U.S. intervened states because this paper’s definition of “short-term” implies an interim period following a successful U.S. intervention. 

TABLE 2. Short-term Democracy Scoring: U.S. Interventions

NOTE: x-axis marks years from 1945 until 1991, with the exception of Guatemala ending in 1996 marking the end of short-term; y-axis marks polity score from -10 to +10.

TABLE 2. Continued

NOTE: x-axis marks years from 1945 until 1991, with the exception of Guatemala ending in 1996 marking the end of short-term; y-axis marks polity score from -10 to +10.

Statistical Significance: Long-Term Non-U.S. Intervention

TABLE 3. Democratic Stability and Growth in ‘Long-Term,’ States Without U.S.-Backed Regime Change

NOTE: Democratic Stability & Growth Range from (-1) to (+1), as do Mean Scores.

The long-term range for non-regime changed states in Table 3 shows the opposite effect than that seen in Table 4. For non-regime changed states, the long-term period does not show large growths in democracy. The overwhelming trajectory in this period was either maintenance of democracy score, a largely fluctuating democracy score, or a declining democracy score. Whereas nearly all regime-changed states experienced positive democratic growth, we can say the direct opposite for most non-regime changed states. The results support the second hypothesis on the long-term effects of U.S. regime-change. States that did not experience a U.S. regime-change      lacked the democratic intensifying effects into the long-term period. Instead of establishing democracy organically, they continued on their slow and volatile democratic trajectory. Venezuela and Haiti present unique cases because their democracy scores decline later in the 2010s. Although their democratic degradation is attributed to U.S. involvement, its timeframe falls beyond the scope of this paper because it occurred after 1991. However, these recent cases show that U.S. desires to control Latin America did not end following the Monroe Doctrine’s commitment to curtail European influence on the Western hemisphere, nor did it stop once the ideological confrontation of the Cold War concluded in 1991.

 TABLE 4. Long-Term Democracy Scoring: non- U.S. Intervention

NOTE: x-axis marks years from 1945 until 2018; y-axis marks polity score from -10 to +10.

TABLE 4. Continued 

NOTE: x-axis marks years from 1945 until 2018; y-axis marks polity score from -10 to +1.

Statistical Significance: Long-Term U.S. Intervention

TABLE 5. Democratic Stability and Democratic Growth in Long-Term, States with U.S.-Backed Regime Change

NOTE: Democratic Stability & Growth Range from (-1) to (+1), as do Mean Scores.

Table 5 gauges the long-term effects of U.S.-intervened states. The long-term hypothesis posits a positive relationship between U.S. intervention (x) and polity scores of national democracy (y) in the period after the dissolution of the U.S. regime until 2018. Similar to the analysis on short-term U.S. intervention, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay lend credence to the hypothesis, along with the notable additions of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama. 

Following the 1983 restoration of democracy in Argentina, the state reached unprecedented levels of democracy. Throughout the Videla regime, Argentina maintained polity scores as low as (-9). Post-1983, Argentina maintained democratic levels well into the (+7), (+8), and (+9). Likewise, following the Videla regime, Argentina reached a democratic equilibrium, ceasing volatility in democratic scoring.

Brazil’s long-term trajectory reflects much of the same noted in Argentina. During the Goulart regime, Brazil maintained a low polity score of around (-9). However, since 1984, Brazil routinely maintained polity scores between (+7) and (+9) and experienced no significant shifts in national democracy into the 21^st century.

In 1982, Bolivia experienced a dramatic 15-point increase in democracy to move from a (-7) in 1981 to a (+8) in 1982, becoming a full-fledged democracy. This trend of resilient democracy continued strongly into the 21^st century. Recently, however, internal conflicts within the Bolivian state threaten this democratic stability.

Chile’s long-term trajectory again lends credence to the long-term hypothesis. Between 1989 and 2018, Chile’s democracy score sat between a (+8) and a perfect (+10), showing a high level of democratic prosperity and stability over the long-term.

Paraguay is the most noteworthy case of all the long-term examples showing a dramatic rise and stabilization of democracy. For much of Paraguay’s history, even before the U.S.-backed military coup, low levels of democracy were standard     . Unlike most other cases under the short-term investigation—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay—all of whom had a history of somewhat democratic regimes before      U.S. intervention, Paraguay was an unlikely candidate to become fully democratic. Since Paraguay’s 1989 military coup to overthrow the Stroessner regime, the country reached unprecedented levels of democracy. In 1988, Paraguay scored a (-8) in national democracy, but by 1992, it experienced a 15-point increase to (+7). This trend continued into the 21^st century, with Paraguay scoring (+9) in national democracy in 2018.

Costa Rica remains a strange example of democracy scoring amidst successful U.S. regime change. Scoring a perfect-10 in democracy from 1945 to 2018, Costa Rica does not benefit the short-term hypothesis on initial democratic decay, nor does Costa Rica lend credence to the long-term hypothesis’ position on democratic growth by this definition. However, Costa Rica does lend credence to the long-term hypothesis specifically on democratic stability since it scored a perfect 0.000 on the sample standard deviation measure. 

El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama all shifted positions from the short-term to the long-term hypothesis. In the short-term, none of these four states overtly mimicked the trends seen in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, or Uruguay. However, in the long-term, these four states lend credence to both aspects of the long-term hypothesis by exhibiting strong democratic growth from the short-term and maintaining strong democratic stability. Overall, this analysis supports the short-term theory to an extent, but more strongly supports the long-term hypothesis based on empirical results.

TABLE 6. Long-term Democracy Scoring: U.S. Interventions

NOTE: x-axis marks years from 1945 until 2018; y-axis marks polity score from -10 to +10.

TABLE 6. Continued 

NOTE: x-axis marks years from 1945 until 2018; y-axis marks polity score from -10 to +10.        

The scoring mechanism draws on the effects of each state’s democracy trajectory in the long-term period. I measured democratic stability by using the sample standard deviation of each state’s long-term democracy scoring compared to the mean democracy score. 

EQUATION 1. Sample Standard Deviation

Where N is the number of data points investigated,  is the mean democracy score in the set of data points, and is each data point. This formula allows for a consistent and objective measure of a state’s democratic stability in the long-term for comparative analysis. I used sample standard deviation instead of population standard deviation because the long-term democracy scores measured represent a portion of the entire existing POLITY IV data available for each state. I measure each state on democratic stability—how volatile their democracy is using the following measures:

• Strong Stability – little if any democratic shift receives +1 and corresponds to a sample standard deviation of 0.00 – 1.50;
• Moderate Stability – little to conservable shifts in democratic scoring receive +0 and a sample standard deviation score of 1.151 – 3.00; and
• Weak Stability – large and consistent fluctuations in democracy score receive           1 and a sample standard deviation of 3.01 and above.

Therefore, the lower a state scores in its standard deviation, the smaller the extent of volatility in its democracy scoring, and thus the greater the scope of its democratic stability.

Next, I measured each state on their long-term democratic growth by accounting for the difference between a state’s mean long-term democracy score and their mean short-term democracy score. For regime changed states, the short-term begins in the year where the U.S. intervened; for non-regime changed states, the short-term starts on the mean value of regime change start years in the short-term—which is 1964—as a substitute to a ‘start’ date. To measure democratic growth, I apply the following parameters: 

• Strong Growth – a continual and obvious upward trend in democracy scoring corresponding to +7.001 and above in long-term short-term difference;
• Moderate Growth – little if any democratic movement upwards corresponding to a long-term/short-term difference between +0.000 and +7.000, receive (+0); and
• Negative Growth – democratic movement downward, otherwise stated as democracy in decline corresponds to a long-term, short-term difference of – 0.001 and under, receives (-1).

Comparative analysis of democratic stability lends credence to the long-term hypothesis. The democratic stability of states that experienced successful U.S.-backed regime change is significantly higher (+0.727) than the stability witnessed in non-regime changed states (+0.00). The causal theory explains this phenomenon as states that experienced regime change and military dictatorships become more averse to any damaging effects on democratic institutions as a result of their recent experience with a limited or a complete lack of democracy. Although many regime-changed states experienced repressive military dictatorships, their subsequent relationship with the U.S. placed them in a favorable position for economic growth. Past research has shown a statistically significant positive relationship between economic prosperity and democratic resilience.^[60] Conversely, non-regime changed states did not experience immediate and drastic shifts to their democracy and thus had less of a reason to actively maintain their democracy. Non-regime changed states continued to be ruled by incumbents against U.S. interests, specifically Cuba and Peru’s far-left regimes. In either case, regime-change also means establishing U.S. favourability, manifesting in better trading relations, limited sanctions, and increasing the chances for overall economic prosperity, signifying the added perks of submitting to U.S. regime change. 

LIMITATIONS

Theoretical Limitations 

Latin America is a beneficial region for comparative analysis because of the similarities between states in culture, history, and language. However, there remain vast discrepancies between states. For example, although most states have access to either the Pacific or Atlantic Oceans, Bolivia and Paraguay remain landlocked, resulting in lower levels of economic development and, thus, democratic scoring. Next, as similar as Latin America states are in culture, in the early 20^th century, countries like Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile experienced disproportionately higher levels of Western European immigration, changing the ethnic and cultural demographics with regard to the rest of the region.^[61] Last, prior to U.S. intervention, democracy scores and prosperity differed between states; such as Paraguay scoring low in democracy and high in poverty, and Uruguay scoring high in democracy and low in poverty. 

Theoretical limitations also manifest as issues in logical implications on dependent variable analysis. This paper posits a short-term negative relationship and a long-term positive relationship between democracy (y) and successful U.S.-backed regime change. To what extent can we rule out the possibility of a third, confounding variable (z) affecting the relationship between independent or dependent variables? For one, natural resources may exist as a confounding variable. As a large portion of U.S. involvement in Latin America had its roots in maintaining a monopoly or ease of access to natural resources (i.e., United Fruit Company in Guatemala 1954), the extent to which a state has an abundance of natural resources beneficial to the U.S. interests may alter the dynamic of the bivariate relation through omitted variable bias. Assuming the relationship between (x) and (y) is denoted as β > 0. When the bivariate relationship does not account for (z) natural resources, it is denoted as β*. Natural resources have a negative impact on democracy and thus assume a negative relationship with the dependent variable, shown as γ < 0. Likewise, natural resources show a positive relationship with U.S. military coups, denoted as α > 0. When not accounting for natural resources, the relationship between successful U.S. regime change and democracy faces an overestimation bias in the short-term hypothesis and an underestimation problem in the long-term hypothesis. In the short-term hypothesis, omitting the role of natural resources falsely exacerbates the perceived effects U.S.-backed regime change had on shaping democracy. This can be attributed to the fact that the role of natural resources on both independent and dependent variables is inverse to the effects the independent variable has on the dependent variable. Likewise, for the long-term hypothesis, these same dynamic manifests as an overestimation bias since the relationship of the confounding variable run in the same direction as that between independent and dependent variables. Thus, when accounting for the effects that U.S.-backed regime change has on shaping Latin America’s democracy, one must be cautious of many potential confounding variables and the impacts they pose when omitted.

Methodological Limitations

A critical flaw in the analysis of long-term democratic stability and growth between U.S.-intervened states and non-U.S.-intervened states arises from comparing when exactly the long-term begins. For example, among U.S.-intervened states, the long-term began anywhere from 1983 to 1991, with Costa Rica, a noted outlier starting in 1948. For non-U.S.-intervened states, this analysis begins in 1984 as this is the mean start date. However, although the two ranges are not a perfect comparison, it is important to note that in every case (except for Costa Rica) the comparisons are less than 10-years apart and should not be discounted. 

Additionally, since this paper investigates U.S.-backed regime change as a categorical variable, the analysis cannot fully explore the intensity for regime change. As elaborated in the analysis of Costa Rica and Panama, the intensity of regime change may play a role in the effect that the regime change had on shaping democracy in the short-term. Further research on this topic may look into what intensity meant for regime change and how the number of causalities, length of installed regime, and/or extent of ideological shift in regime had on affecting democracy. 

Data Limitations

The key limitation on the data is that social scientific concepts such as a democracy score cannot be measured in absolute terms because of competing definitions and scoring systems. It is not possible for one dataset to fully capture the nuances of a country’s democracy. Further analysis can mitigate this issue by examining a wider range of datasets such as V-Dem, Freedom House, A Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy besides only POLITY IV to provide a more robust overview of the topic. Analysis of multiple datasets allows for additional investigation into the different scoring methods and discrepancies between datasets.

CONCLUSION: DO THE ENDS JUSTIFY THE MEANS?

There is reason to be confident in a negative relationship between U.S. intervention in Latin America and short-term effects on democracy. By comparatively judging the long-term democratic trajectory of states that experienced U.S. intervention and those who did not, a positive relationship appears between U.S. intervention and democratic growth. However, this is not a claim to causality between the limitations stemming from unaccounted factors between the independent and dependent variables. 

This paper illuminates that, in the long-term, U.S. intervention may have been good for institutional development. Ironically, U.S.-interventions in Latin America and other areas of the world promote U.S. hegemony, undermine state sovereignty, and cause egregious human rights violations, contradicting the very tenants of democracy the U.S. claims to uphold. These adverse effects mirror a decline in democracy immediately following U.S.-intervention. Indeed, the long-term effects of U.S-intervention, leading to democracy reinforce bellicist theory and Tilly’s famous adage that “war makes the state and the state made war.” States which evaded U.S. intervention stand to pay the price in weaker democratic stability and growth.

Works Cited

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Andrews, George Reid. “Spanish American Independence: A Structural Analysis.” Latin American Perspectives 12, no. 1 (1985): p.105-32. www.jstor.org/stable/2633564.

Anslover, Nicole L. Harry S. Truman: The coming of the Cold War. New York: Routledge Publishing, 2014 

Barash, David P. “Costa Rica’s peace divided: How abolishing the military paid off.” Los Angeles Times. Dec 15, 2013 https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2013-dec-15-la-oe-barash-costa-rica-demilitarization-20131208-story.html

Dermot, Keogh. “The Myth of the Liberal Coup: The United States and the 15 October 1979 Coup in El Salvador.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, VOL. 13, NO 2. (1984):  p. 153-183 https://journals-sagepub-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/doi/pdf/10.1177/03058298840130020601

De Haan, Jakob, and Clemens L. J. Siermann. “New Evidence on the Relationship between Democracy and Economic Growth.” Public Choice 86, no. 1/2 (1996): p. 175-198 www.jstor.org/stable/30027075

Fournier, Dominique, and Sean W. Burges. “Form Before Function: Democratization in Paraguay.” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne Des études Latino-américaines Et Caraïbes25, no. 49 (2000): p. 5-32. https://www-jstor-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/stable/pdf/41800123.pdf?ab_segments=0%252Fbasic_SYC-5152%252Fcontrol&refreqid=excelsior%3Aef8ad9077f04e135dd4ca5c041c25501

Getchell, Michelle Denise. “Revisiting the 1954 Coup in Guatemala,” The Soviet Union, The United Nations, and “Hemispheric Solidarity.” Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 17, Number 2, (Spring 2015): p. 73-102  https://muse-jhu-edu.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/article/582435

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Kirkland, Robert O. “Colonel Edward Fox and the 1964 Bolivian Coup.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 18 (2005): p. 473–482 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08850600590945443?journalCode=ujic20

Kohler, Charles. “The Monroe Doctrine A Complete History.” Savannah. GA Copyright 1925https://heinonlineorg.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/HOL/Page?collection=beal&handle=hein.beal/monrodch0001&id=16&men_tab=srchresults

Marshall, Monty G. and Ted Robert Gurr. “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016.”, POLITY™ IV PROJECT https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2016.pdf7

Morales, Mauricio. & Fernando Rubilar. “El efecto de las predisposiciones politicas y las condiciones sociales en una eleccion semicompetititiva. Chile 1988.” Revista Española de Ciencia Política (2017): p. 95-121 https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=6260964

Olander, Marcia. “Costa Rica in 1948: Cold War or Local War?” The Americas 52, no. 4 (1996): p. 465-493 https://www.jstor.org/stable/1008474?seq=1

Pillet, A. “The Monroe Doctrine.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (1914): p. 131-33. www.jstor.org/stable/1012581.

Rull, Joan Piñol I. “Los Asuntos de las Actividades Militares y Paramilitares en Nicaragua y en Contra de este Estado (Nicaragua Contra Estados Unidos de América).” Revista Española De Derecho Internacional 39, no. 1 (1987): p. 99-119. Accessed April 9, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/44296257.

Scharpf, Adam.” Ideology and state terror: How officer beliefs shaped repression during Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’.”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 55(2) (2008): p. 206–221 https://journals-sagepub-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343317748346

Serra Padrós, Enrique and Ananda Simões Fernandes. “A gestação do golpe no Uruguai: o governo Bordaberry e o papel dos militares (1972-1973).” Estudos Ibero-Americanos, PUCRS, v. 38, n. 1, , (jan./jun. 2012): p. 27-44 http://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ojs/index.php/iberoamericana/article/view/11584/8009

Taroncher, Miguel Ángel. “El proceso de inestabilidad político institucional en la Argentina: el golpe de estado de 1966 y algunos aspectos de la opinión pública”. Estudos Ibero-Americanos, PUCRS, v. 38, n. 1, (jan./jun. 2012): p. 45-61 http://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ojs/index.php/iberoamericana/article/view/11585/8010

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Zanchetta, Barbara. “Between Cold War Imperatives and State-Sponsored Terrorism: The United States and “Operation Condor”.”  Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 39 Issue 12, (December 2016): p. 1084-1102 https://journals-scholarsportal-info.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/details/1057610x/v39i0012/1084_bcwiasttusac.xml

“About Polity, The Polity Project, Center for Systemic Peace, https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html

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References

^[1] George Reid Andrews, “Spanish American Independence: A Structural Analysis,” Latin American Perspectives 12, no. 1 (1985): p.105. www.jstor.org/stable/2633564

^[2] A. Pillet, “The Monroe Doctrine,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (1914): p. 132. www.jstor.org/stable/1012581

^[3] Peter Winn, “Dictatorships and the Worlds of Work in the Southern Cone: Argentina, Brazil and Chile,” International Labor and Working Class History 93, (Spring, 2018): p.5. http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1017/S014754791700028X

^[4] Mauricio Morales & Fernando Rubilar, “El efecto de las predisposiciones politicas y las condiciones sociales en una eleccion semicompetititiva. Chile 1988,” Revista Española de Ciencia Política (2017): p. 95. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=6260964

^[5] Charles Kohler, “The Monroe Doctrine A Complete History,” Savannah. GA Copyright 1925, p.12. https://heinonline-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/HOL/Page?collection=beal&handle=hein.beal/monrodch0001&id=16&men_tab=srchresults

^[6] Ibid, 13.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Alejandro Alvarez, The Monroe Doctrine: Its Importance in the International Life of the States of the New World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924): p.3.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Nicole L. Anslover, “Harry S. Truman: The coming of the Cold War,” (New York: Routledge Publishing, 2014), p.49. https://books-scholarsportal-info.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/en/read?id=/ebooks/ebooks4/taylorandfrancis4/2018-06-05/6/9781136175091#page=1

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] Ibid, 51, 53.

^[13] Ibid, 61.

^[14] Ibid.

^[15] Ibid, 60.

^[16] Ibid.

^[17] “Dependencies and Areas of Special Sovereignty”, Independent State in the World, U.S Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, March 7, 2017.https://www.state.gov/dependencies-and-areas-of-special-sovereignty/

^[18] Harris Hermione, “Nicaragua: two years of revolution,” Race and Class, Volume: 23 issue: 1 (July 1981): p.3. https://journals-sagepub-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/doi/abs/10.1177/030639688102300101

^[19] Piñol I. Rull Joan. “Los Asuntos de las Actividades Militares y Paramilitares en Nicaragua y en Contra de este Estado (Nicaragua Contra Estados Unidos de América),” Revista Española De Derecho Internacional 39, no. 1 (1987): p. 111. www.jstor.org/stable/44296257

^[20] Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016”, POLITY™ IV PROJECT, p.14, p.16-17. https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2016.pdf7

^[21] “About Polity, The Polity Project, Center for Systemic Peace, https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html

^[22] Monty G, Marshall, “Political Regime,” p. 14, p.16-17 

^[23] Peter Winn, “Dictatorships and the Worlds of Work in the Southern Cone: Argentina, Brazil and Chile,” International Labor and Working Class History 93, (Spring, 2018): p.5. http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1017/S014754791700028X

^[24] Barbara Zanchetta, “Between Cold War Imperatives and State-Sponsored Terrorism: The United States and “Operation Condor,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 39 (Issue 12), (December 2016): p. 1084. https://journals-scholarsportal-info.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/details/1057610x/v39i0012/1084_bcwiasttusac.xml

^[25] Adam Scharpf, “Ideology and state terror: How officer beliefs shaped repression during Argentina’s ‘Dirty War,’” Journal of Peace Research 2018, Vol. 55(2): p. 210. https://journals-sagepub-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343317748346

^[26] Cinthia Wanschelbaum, “La educación durante el gobierno de Raúl Alfonsín (Argentina, 1983-1989),” Ciencia, Docencia y Tecnología, vol. XXV, núm. 48, (mayo, 2014): p. 75. https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/145/14531006004.pdf

^[27]Miguel Ángel Taroncher, “El proceso de inestabilidad político institucional en la Argentina: el golpe de estado de 1966 y algunos aspectos de la opinión pública”, Estudos Ibero-Americanos, PUCRS, v. 38, n. 1, p. 45-61, (jan./jun. 2012): p. 45. http://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ojs/index.php/iberoamericana/article/view/11585/8010

^[28] Robert O. Kirkland, “Colonel Edward Fox and the 1964 Bolivian Coup,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence: vol 18 (2005): p. 473. https://journals-scholarsportal-info.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/pdf/08850607/v18i0003/473_cefat1bc.xml

^[29] Peter Winn, “Dictatorships and the Worlds of Work in the Southern Cone: Argentina, Brazil and Chile,” International Labor and Working Class History 93, (Spring, 2018): p.5. http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1017/S014754791700028X

^[30] “Figueiredo” Brazil Five Centuries of Change, Brown University Centre for Digital Scholarship, https://library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-7/military-rule/figueiredo/

^[31] “Figueiredo” Brazil Five Centuries of Change, Brown University Centre for Digital Scholarship, https://library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-7/military-rule/figueiredo/

^[32] Peter Winn, “Dictatorships and the Worlds of Work in the Southern Cone: Argentina, Brazil and Chile,” International Labor and Working Class History 93, (Spring, 2018): p.5 http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1017/S014754791700028X

^[33] Mauricio Morales & Fernando Rubilar, “El efecto de las predisposiciones politicas y las condiciones sociales en una eleccion semicompetititiva. Chile 1988,” Revista Española de Ciencia Política: p. 95 https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=6260964

^[34] Dominique Fournier and Sean W. Burges, “Form Before Function: Democratization in Paraguay,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revue Canadienne Des études Latino-américaines Et Caraïbes, 25, no. 49 (2000): p.7  www.jstor.org/stable/41800123.

^[35] Ibid, 5

^[36] Ibid, 22

^[37] Ibid.

^[38] Ibid, 6

^[39]Enrique Serra Padrós and Ananda Simões Fernandes, “A gestação do golpe no Uruguai: o governo Bordaberry e o papel dos militares (1972-1973),” Estudos Ibero-Americanos, PUCRS, v. 38, n. 1, p. 27-44 ( jan./jun. 2012): p. 27 http://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ojs/index.php/iberoamericana/article/view/11584/809

^[40] Ibid.

^[41] “La agonía de una democracia. Proceso de la caída de las instituciones en el Uruguay (1963-1973) by Julio María Sanguinetti, reviewed by Andrés Medellín. Foro Internacional 51, no. 3 (205) (2011): p. Resenas www.jstor.org/stable/23035609

^[42] Ibid.

^[43] Ibid.

^[44] Marcia Olander, “Costa Rica in 1948: Cold War or Local War?” The Americas 52, no. 4 (1996): p.466. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1008474?seq=1

^[45] Ibid, 468.

^[46] David P. Barash, “Costa Rica’s peace divided: How abolishing the military paid off”, Los Angeles Times, Dec 15, 2013. https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2013-dec-15-la-oe-barash-costa-rica-demilitarization-20131208-story.html

^[47] Keogh Dermot, “The Myth of the Liberal Coup: The United States and the 15 October 1979 Coup in El Salvador,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, VOL. 13, NO 2. (1984):  p. 153. https://journals-sagepub-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/doi/pdf/10.1177/03058298840130020601

^[48] Michelle Denise Getchell, “Revisiting the 1954 Coup in Guatemala,” The Soviet Union, The United Nations, and “Hemispheric Solidarity”. Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 17, Number 2, (Spring 2015): p. 74.https://muse-jhu-edu.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/article/582435

^[49] Ibid, 74.

^[50] Ibid, 77.

^[51] Hermione Harris, “Nicaragua: two years of revolution,” Volume: 23 issue: 1 (July 1981): p.1.https://journals-sagepub-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/doi/abs/10.1177/030639688102300101

^[52] Philip J. Williams, “Elections and Democratization in Nicaragua: The 1990 Elections in Perspective,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 32, no. 4 (1990): p. 13. https://www.jstor.org/stable/166114?seq=1

^[53] Eytan Gilboa. “The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4 (1995): p. 539. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2151883.pdf?seq=1

^[54] Ibid, 553.

^[55] Difference between long-term and short-term mean democracy scoring are as follows: Colombia -0.259; Cuba +0.075; Dominican Republic +6.234; Ecuador +5.478; Haiti +9.254; Honduras +5.245; Mexico +9.588; Peru +8.229; Venezuela -3.714.

^[56] Standard deviations are as follows: Colombia 0.698; Cuba 0.338; Dominican Republic 7.171; Ecuador 6.194; Haiti 5.504; Honduras 0.736; Mexico 4.138; Peru 3.525; Venezuela 4.163.

^[57] Difference between long-term and short-term mean democracy scoring are as follows: Argentina +14.458; Bolivia +13.058; Brazil +13.276; Chile +15.055; Costa Rica 0.00; El Salvador +2.852; Guatemala +9.465; Nicaragua +9.295; Panama +0.862; Paraguay +15.283; Uruguay +16.817

^[58] Standard deviations are as follows: Argentina 0.609; Bolivia 0.854; Brazil 0.288; Chile 2.016; Costa Rica 0.000; El Salvador 0.492; Guatemala 0.000; Nicaragua 1.185; Panama 0.351; Paraguay 1.937; Uruguay 2.872

^[59] Costa Rica maintained a perfect 10 democracy score throughout all of 1945-2018.

^[60] Jakob De Haan and Siermann L. J. Clemens. “New Evidence on the Relationship between Democracy and Economic Growth,” Public Choice 86, no. 1/2 (1996): p. 175 www.jstor.org/stable/30027075

^[61] “History of International Migration”, Migration to Latin America, Universitiet Leiden, http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/migration/chapter53.html