High School Essay Contest

Chip by Chip: How Japan and South Korea Transformed Historical Rivalry into Collaboration

Posted on by Iris Lee
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This essay won an honorable mention in the 2025 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Examine the evolution of a relationship between two countries in response to a global challenge. What lessons can other nations learn from their cooperation or conflict?”

On July 19, 2019, a South Korean man in his seventies set himself ablaze outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul, protesting Tokyo’s decision to restrict exports of critical semiconductor chemicals to South Korea. His desperate act was mirrored by others who mutilated their fingers and boycotted Japanese companies like Toyota and Sony. Yet, just a few years later, the two nations—once bitter adversaries—have forged multi-billion-dollar semiconductor partnerships, driven by the pressures of a global chip shortage and escalating US-China trade tensions.

The evolution of Japan and South Korea’s relationship is understood through the legacy of Japan’s wartime atrocities during its annexation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945–a painful chapter that continues to cast a long shadow through political disputes over apology and reparations. Ongoing tensions had escalated in 2019 after South Korean National Assembly Speaker Moon Hee-sang referred to then-Japanese Emperor Akihito as “the son of the main culprit of war crimes,” specifically referencing the sexual slavery inflicted by the Japanese military on Korean comfort women during WWII. Concurrently, the South Korean Supreme Court ordered the Japanese government to provide monetary compensation for the Korean laborers who were forcibly relocated and subjected to perilous working conditions. Japan attempted to cripple South Korea’s semiconductor industry in retaliation, while reaffirming its stance that all compensation issues had been settled in a $300 million normalization treaty in 1965. 

Ironically, Japan’s sanctions exposed the deep interdependence between the two nations and paved the groundwork for future collaboration. In 2018, South Korean semiconductor firms imported 44% of hydrogen fluoride, 88.6% of photoresist chemicals, and 90% of fluorinated polyimide from Japan, the global leader in producing these three essential semiconductor materials. This significant reliance plunged South Korea into a desperate scramble to diversify its domestic production and explore alternative sources after Japan’s sanctions. Conversely, according to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Observatory of Economic Complexity, South Korea accounted for 17% of Japan’s exports of chemicals for electronics–only second to the United States–in 2017. The feud’s effects were felt globally: Samsung and SK Hynix supplied 61% of memory chip components, and disruptions sent prices soaring, impacting giants like Apple and Huawei.

Further complicating matters, the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019 heightened the demand for laptops and tablets as people participated in Zoom calls and sought digital pastimes. Manufacturing bottlenecks, the intricate production process involving nearly 1,400 steps and 70 border crossings per chip, and external shocks—such as U.S. trade restrictions on China and a neon gas shortage caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine—pushed the already fragile system to the brink.

Amid these obstacles, political leaders and private tech firms from Japan and South Korea sought to reestablish ties. In March 2023, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida held their first bilateral summit in 12 years. Days later, South Korea withdrew its World Trade Organization complaint against Japan’s export curbs, and Japan lifted its bans. Business federations from both countries also pledged funds for cultural exchanges and youth scholarships, strengthening diplomatic ties.

Afterwards, the private sector took the lead in revitalizing trade connections. In mid-2023, Samsung’s Device Solutions head Kung Kye-hyun proposed a $219 million investment in a semiconductor R&D facility in Japan. The following year, JSR—a leading Japanese company specializing in inorganic EUV photoresists—announced plans to establish manufacturing facilities in Chungcheongbuk-do. This collaboration echoes a post-World War II pattern in which major conglomerates have driven economic recovery and policy influence in both countries.

On May 28, 2025, the two nations reaffirmed their alliance at a summit in Seoul, marking 60 years of diplomatic ties, signing new bilateral semiconductor agreements. Japan also pledged support for South Korea’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which could boost Korea’s economy by $86 billion annually, according to the Brookings Institution.

These initiatives complemented ongoing efforts to build manufacturing facilities in each other’s countries amid the growing pressures of the US-China trade war. Samsung’s reliance on its Xi’an, China factory for 40% of its NAND flash memory production exposes it to significant risk. Since the tariff skirmishes between the U.S. and China escalated in February 2025, economic collaboration between Japan and South Korea has deepened, as noted by Yoon Cheol-min, head of international trade at the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

However, in the backdrop of economic progress, many South Koreans are still unsatisfied with how Japan has yet to issue a formal apology to Korean comfort women and forced laborers in the May 28, 2025, meeting. On June 20, 2025, members of the Joint Action for Historical Justice and Peaceful Korea-Japan Relations protested outside Nippon Steel’s headquarters in Chiyoda, Tokyo. Activist Lee Guk-eon stated, “The buildings that currently house Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries were built by the blood, sweat, and tears of Korean laborers who were forcibly mobilized.” Additionally, the majority of the 50,000+ Korean comfort women have passed away without receiving any compensation from the Japanese government. 

During the upcoming Comfort Women Memorial Day on August 14, 2025, the world will be watching to see whether Japan has renewed its stance on apologizing for its wartime atrocities.

As key players in the global semiconductor supply chain, Japan and South Korea represent a relationship marked by both a painful past and pragmatic cooperation forged through shared challenges. A survey conducted between May 23-June 12, 2025 by the Nikkei and Maeil Newspaper indicates that 36.7% of Japanese and Korean companies want to step up collaboration–a substantial percentage considering the countries’ animosities just a few years before, evidencing a hopeful shift in national attitude. Clearly, Japan and South Korea’s partnership stands as a compelling example for other countries: when the private sector and governments collaborate amid global crises, they can create innovative solutions that transcend historical grievances. 

References 

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Cpu, Chip, Semiconductor Image. Free for use, taken on Jan 6, 2018, Photo by Zathris. Image sourced from pixabay | Pixabay Content License, no changes made

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