This essay won 1st Place in the 2025 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Examine the evolution of a relationship between two countries in response to a global challenge. What lessons can other nations learn from their cooperation or conflict?”

“We wanted workers, but we got people instead”

Swiss writer Max Firsch’s view—or warning—on the “Gastarbeiter” scheme of the 1960s rings especially true in the story of Germany and Turkey. Gastarbeiter—or in English, guest worker—refers to foreign workers who had migrated to West Germany starting from 1955 in lieu of a series of bilateral treaties made with several European countries and Turkey—referred to in German as Gastarbeiterprogramm. Contemporary Turkish-German relations were forged through decades of migration and diaspora politics. Their shared history goes on to show how the constant global challenge that is migration, when politicized, can deepen conflict or ease it. 

After WWII, Germany was struggling to find laborers while Turkish workers were struggling to find jobs. This opportunity led the Turkish–German Labor Recruitment Agreement to go into effect in 1961 as a part of the Gastarbeiterprogramm. Throughout the 12 years in which the program was active, a total 650,000 –documented–Turkish guest workers had migrated to Germany. The recruitment of workers was based on a rotation principle –where one guest worker would return home after one or two years– and like their given name suggests, they would be guests. All across Germany, factories for Ford and Mercedes were now filled with Turkish guest workers, production and consumption were rising—the program seemed and felt like a success.

Maybe through the preconceived notion that the program would be temporary or due to its view as a domestic, economic policy, at that time, the effects the program would have in the long run were simply underestimated. Neither the workers themselves, the German government, nor its citizens would be able to foresee that these “guests” would go on to form communities, families, and eventually, a separate identity—Almancı, a Turkish word that translates literally to German-er. As Kahn puts it into words, there is a “perception that the migrants living in Germany (Almanya) have undergone a process of Germanization, rendering them no longer fully Turkish.”

Post-WWII and post-colonial migration rose steadily until the end of the Cold War; despite the cessation of the program in 1973. Workers who were supposed to go back home had already brought their families and traditions. Soon, Turks became the largest ethnic minority in West Germany. However, legal aspects such as citizenship issues and social integration lagged, setting up the stage for the current day crisis at hand. 

The harsh reality is there—it is inevitable for a migrant community to experience alienation and discrimination, no matter time and place. The bleak fate of a predominantly Muslim Turkish diaspora was furthered following the 9/11 attacks as Islamophobia and anti-immigrant sentiments grew across Europe and the Global West. Soon, tension and aggression replaced integration and acceptance. 

The breaking point came in 2015 with the refugee influx Europe experienced following the Syrian Civil War—millions of refugees were rushing toward the gates of Europe, but first, they were all going through Turkey. By 2016, 4 million documented refugees were living in Turkey, which led the country to strike a deal with the EU to continue hosting the surplus of refugees in exchange for financial aid. It became clear that Germany and the rest of Europe were now relying on Turkey’s border control to contain millions of refugees. 

 The refugee influx would still be felt in Europe, heavily, and this put a strain on Turkish-German relations with anti-immigrant sentiments rising across Europe. Diaspora and migration politics became a part of everyday life, affecting the Turkish diaspora who had been living in Germany for decades nearly as much as the incoming refugees. Turkish President Erdogan’s threats to literally “open the gates”, were not making things easier for the Turkish diaspora either. As they became the forefront of daily news and hate fueled tabloids, Turkish migrants began asserting more political visibility while the broader European backdrop shifted to the right—the far-right. The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a German far-right party founded in 2013, would campaign off of anti-immigrant sentiments, framing immigrants of Turkish origin as symbols of failed integration at any chance given. “Islam does not belong to Germany.” stated Beatrix von Storch, the deputy leader of the AfD, in 2017.

In contrast to the usual anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiments of the AfD, Maximilian Krah, the AfD’s top candidate for the recent 2024 EU election declared: “Turks in Germany should vote for the AfD”. The contradiction is apparent, the reason behind it is even more apparent—the Turkish diaspora is easily portrayed as outsiders but also worth courting as voters by far-right rhetoric. 

Unfortunately, exploitation through rhetoric wasn’t only from the German far-right. “Assimilation is a crime against humanity,” President Erdoğan stated in 2008. A brief –but explanatory– excerpt from a speech to a crowd of 20,000 Turkish immigrants in Cologne. His rebuke of assimilation isn’t a rebuke of integration, rather a strategy to maintain loyalty among migrants of Turkish origin. Besides, Turkey has long invested in this strategy through government-backed mosques or cultural centers in areas with a larger density of Turkish migrants. Although the number is debated, approximately 4 million people of Turkish origin live in Germany—the largest minority group in the country. Many retain Turkish citizenship, vote in Turkish elections, and consume Turkish state media, allowing the Turkish government to maintain its soft power in Germany. 

The Turkish diaspora is a community that has become a contested tool, both for Germany through the far-right and for Turkey through Erdoğan. For no one but themselves, they are human. A humanitarian crisis of hate crimes and the systematic discrimination of millions became a bargaining chip in geopolitical negotiation. 

Today, the world is defined by unprecedented connectivity and globalization; the movement of ideas, news, and people themselves is faster than ever. Labor-driven migration –whether it’s the 19th century transatlantic immigration to the U.S., the post-colonial migration to Europe or the current “brain drain” from the Global South to the West– is not something new. Yet, migration today faces a familiar but larger challenge: nationalism and far-right rhetoric pushed further by populist leaders. 

The relationship between Germany and Turkey illustrates that migration diplomacy requires mutual opportunism. The early years of the Gastarbeiterprogramm had provided much needed solutions to problems both countries were experiencing. But Turkey and Germany’s relationship –like every bilateral relationship between countries– is a balance game on a dingy tightrope. On the other hand, the unique history Germany and Turkey have has brought in a question: can diaspora communities build bridges between countries? Or are they bound to remain a tightrope? 

Germany and Turkey tell the world something different: that migrants can change borders—without a single line on the map actually moving. It reveals how systematic migration between two countries can completely transform bilateral foreign policy but it also goes on to show the dehumanization process millions go through. 

Pushing politics aside, what Mesut Özil, a Turkish-German who played for the German National Football Team, once said encapsulates the fragile sense of belonging felt by millions: “I am German when we win, but I am an immigrant when we lose.”

References 

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: German-Turkish Baklava Düsseldorf 2009, Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

Willis, Amy. “We Wanted Workers…” Econlib, 8 February 2017. https://www.econlib.org/archives/2017/02/we_wanted_worke.html.

Kahn, Michelle Lynn. “Between Ausländer and Almancı” History Faculty Publications, no. 147, University of Richmond, Spring 2020, pp. 53–55. https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=history-faculty publications. 

Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. “Migration and Transnational Politics: Turkish Migrants in Germany.”, pp. 115–138. Routledge, 2003. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9780203361627-6/migration-transnati onal-spaces-german-turkish-relations-eva-ostergaard-nielsen. 

Kahn, Michelle Lynn. “Between Ausländer and Almancı” History Faculty Publications, no. 147, University of Richmond, Spring 2020, pp. 55. https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=history-faculty publications. 

European Commission. “EU Support to Refugees in Türkiye.” EU Enlargement Policy. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/turkiye/eu-support-refugees-turkiye_en. ^[8] Smith, Helena. “I’ll Let Syrian Refugees Leave Turkey for West Unless Safe Zone Set Up.” The Guardian, 5 September 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/05/erdogan-ill-let-syrian-refugees-leave-turkey -for-west-unless-safe-zone-set-up.

Anadolu Agency. “Germany’s Turkish Community Worried” Anadolu Ajansı, 10 June 2024. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/germany-s-turkish-community-worried-as-far-right-parties gain-ground/3321593. 

Khan, L. Ali. “The German Far-Right” JURIST Commentary, August 2024. https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2024/08/the-german-far-right-a-critical-examination-of-th e-afd-manifesto. 

InfoMigrants. “How Germany’s AfD Party Tries to Win Over Voters” InfoMigrants, 13 May 2024. https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/57514/how-germanys-afd-party-tries-to-win-over-voter s-from-immigrant-backgrounds. 

National Review. “Erdogan’s Speech” National Review, 12 February 2008. https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/erdogan-assimilation-crime-against-humanity-speech -cologne. 

Old Faultlines. The Economist, 6 August 2016. https://www.economist.com/europe/2016/08/06/old-faultlines.

“Germany: Ethnic Groups.” Encyclopædia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/Ethnic-groups. 

Van Campenhout, Gijs, and Henk van Houtum. “Theorising on the Deservedness of Migrants in International Football, Using the Case of Mesut Özil.” Sport in Society 23, no. 12 (2020): 1865–1880. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17430437.2020.1865314.

This essay won 2nd Place in the 2025 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Examine the evolution of a relationship between two countries in response to a global challenge. What lessons can other nations learn from their cooperation or conflict?”

“I’ve ended up going to the hospital twice for bad air quality … it feels like a sudden flu, headache, and sore throat, plus itchy eyes,” a Taiwanese complained. In the past few decades, Taiwan struggled severely with environmental pollution. However, the pollution didn’t start there. Meteorological data shows that fine particulate matter, P.M., has drifted hundreds of kilometers across the Taiwan Strait, carried by northeastern monsoon winds from mainland China’s industrial zones. As global industrial activity intensifies, environmental degradation has emerged as one of the most urgent transboundary challenges facing the East Asian region and the world at large. But in the context of escalating geopolitical tensions between Beijing and Taipei, environmental cooperation carries implications that extend far beyond its technical domain.

Through the lens of cross-strait environmental status, Taiwan, most poignantly, faces a transboundary environmental risk: air pollution. Government data reveals that during peak haze seasons, up to 30–40% of airborne pollutants in western Taiwan originate outside the island.iii In Taipei, rising PM2.5 concentrations are associated with a 12% increase in pneumonia-related hospitalizations, highlighting a significant public health impact that accumulates to broader health concerns. Meanwhile, marine pollution and maritime accidents have also emerged as shared challenges for both governments across the Taiwan Strait. Oil spills, as marine pollution, emerge as a major issue following the launch of direct shipping links across the Taiwan Strait.

Local responses to manage such issues started early in 2009. Environmentalists from Taiwan and China met on the outlying island of Kinmen to discuss the solutions for marine pollution. The director addressed, “Against this backdrop (of increased trade), the probability of marine accidents has increased, and we are holding this seminar as the first step toward cross-strait cooperation in the field of environmental protection.”

Though these exchanges are limited in scope, their mechanisms of non-governmental implementation offer broader insights. Depoliticized engagement, defined by low sensitivity and high mutual benefit, can foster short-term consensus and lay the foundation for long-term reconciliation. It has evolved into a microcosm of broader global dynamics, and it is a pragmatic path other divided regions might emulate. This model of incremental engagement holds broader relevance beyond the Taiwan Strait. Other conflict-prone or diplomatically frozen regions- such as the Korean Peninsula, Kashmir, or even Arctic disputes- can take inspiration from this template.

Still, the occasional flicker of collaboration cannot obscure a more sobering reality. For the majority of occasions, the governments on either side of the Taiwan Strait do not share the same willingness or the ability to collaborate. There are no formal mechanisms for data exchange, warning systems, or coordinated response. A lack of national-level agreements makes the cooperation unable to unlock funding for joint
projects and set long-term emission targets.

Beijing’s attitude has further created institutional obstacles. Taiwan is marginalized in environmental international instituitions. It’s not a member of the United Nations, and by extension, it is shut out from key agencies such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In comparison, Mainland China commands vastly greater economic and scientific capacities. Its Ministry of Ecology and Environment oversees expansive data networks, regional emission inventories, and air quality monitoring systems that are integrated with international platforms like the World Meteorological Organization.

Underlyingly, the promise of local collaboration is constrained by underlying asymmetries in power and recognition. In regional and international cooperations, Taipei is often relegated to observer or ‘participant status’—terms that dilute its agency and reinforce a symbolic hierarchy. In contrast, Beijing controls the dominant institutional narrative, framing cross-Strait collaboration as a matter of ‘internal affairs’ or ‘local integration,’ rather than as a dialogue between equal entities. This expression itself implies a dominant-subordinate relationship.

Engagement with mainland China remains politically fraught in Taiwan, particularly under the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), where even technical exchanges risk being interpreted as undermining the island’s de facto autonomy. As one protester in Taipei explained during a rally against pro-China stances, “our relationship with China, from Taiwan’s perspective, should be one country on each side (of the Taiwan Strait). If we don’t stand up today, this would lead to being swallowed up (by China).” Such prevailing public sentiment illustrates the deep political sensitivities that constrain environmental governance, and moreover, reflects deeper structural differences in political systems. Thousands of kilometers away, Beijing faces relatively few domestic consequences for pursuing selective
engagement. Framed as part of its “One China” policy, mainland participation in environmental dialogues with Taiwan is portrayed as a unidirectional act of assistance or integration, not bilateral compromise. This creates a dilemma where Taiwan must constantly negotiate between technical necessity and domestic backlash, while China retains the option to engage or withdraw at will, without paying comparable political costs.

In this uneven landscape, what unfolds is more than a local dilemma. Others, watching from a distance, begin to reassess the terms under which cooperation is extended, and to whom. For governments already inclined toward collaboration, cross-Strait environmental cooperation offers a compelling vision, which is that the absence of formal recognition does not paralyze cooperation. In domains such as air quality monitoring and marine waste management, technocratic engagement has built quiet momentum beneath the din of geopolitical antagonism. Addressing that even without treaties or embassies, shared ecological threats can create real, measurable cooperation.

Otherwise, for parties unwilling to engage in cooperation and entrenched in opposition, the stronger government can leverage environmental issues as bargaining chips in diplomatic negotiations. The mechanism lies in the fact that environmental issues result in disproportionate consequences, which comparatively benefit larger powers while leaving smaller or diplomatically constrained actors more vulnerable. China’s expansive industrial base and international representation give it significant control over the sources of environmental degradation, while Taiwan, despite suffering directly from the consequences, lacks the institutional power to meaningfully shape upstream decisions.

Taiwanese leaders have learned the lesson, and it seems like the marginalization of Taiwan is irreversible. Nevertheless, such a disadvantage could be rechanneled. By invoking these injustices, Taipei could potentially mobilize international sympathy and emphasize the urgency of more inclusive governance mechanisms in its diplomacy. Thus, global challenges, such as pollution, rather than silencing marginalized actors, can empower them with new forms of mechanisms. While pollution continuously deteriorates the living standards of both sides, no treaties govern its arrival, and no protocols decide who is responsible. And yet, these items speak. They speak to an ecological interdependence that diplomacy has to catch up with.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Smog above Skyscrapers in City Downtown. Image sourced from Pexel | CC License, no changes made

Reddit – The heart of the internet. (2025). Reddit.com. https://www.reddit.com/r/taiwan/comments/1iz7xcs/really_bad_air_today/

Lin, C., Wang, Z., Chen, W., Chang, S.-J., C. Perry Chou, Sugimoto, N., & Xiu Song Zhao. (2006). Long-range transport of Asian dust and air pollutants to Taiwan: observed evidence and model simulation. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 7(2), 423–434. https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-7-423-2007

The Environmental Protection Administration has clarified and explained the impact of haze pollution in China on Taiwan. (2017). Moenv.gov.tw. https://enews.moenv.gov.tw/page/894720a1eb490390/2191c714-38e4-47a5-987a-98c2f47aa9a9?

Tsai, S.-S., Chiu, H.-F., Liou, S.-H., & Yang, C.-Y. (2014). Short-Term Effects of Fine Particulate Air Pollution on Hospital Admissions for Respiratory Diseases: A Case-Crossover Study in a Tropical City. Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health, Part A, 77(18), 1091–1101. https://doi.org/10.1080/15287394.2014.922388

台北時報. (2009, November 26). Taiwan, China experts discuss oil-spill prevention. Taipeitimes.com; Taipei Times. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/11/27/2003459521

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This essay won 3rd Place in the 2025 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Examine the evolution of a relationship between two countries in response to a global challenge. What lessons can other nations learn from their cooperation or conflict?”

“I hate Greece”, my Turkish mother once said when she was a child. My grandmother told me this story, not with pride, but to remind me how deeply the hostility between the two countries had shaped people’s thinking and language. I never held my mother responsible for feeling that way. I knew her animosity wasn’t born from her own experiences; it was inherited, shaped by decades of Greek-Turkish conflict, and passed down through stories. My ancestors lived through wars, and what they absorbed was a legacy of resentment. That legacy became a habit, passed from parent to child until it settled into everyday thinking. Even today, the tension between Turkey and Greece hasn’t fully disappeared. While attitudes toward each other have softened, chiefly among younger generations, the old resentments still echo in education, politics, and everyday conversation. Growing up as a Turkish child, I often questioned why we couldn’t just like each other. France and Germany had fought brutal wars, yet they moved forward. So why couldn’t we? Sometimes, it takes the earth itself to break apart for people to come together. That’s what happened in 1999—and again in 2023.

The relationship between Turkey and Greece is profoundly shaped by a longstanding tradition of enduring conflict and poignant historical grievances, which have significantly influenced the national identities and political trajectories of both countries for more than a century. It is a story of trauma passed down through generations, driven by conflict and forced migration, whose repercussions remain evident to this day. In 1922, during the war over Smyrna (modern-day Izmir), Turkish forces recovered the city from Hellenic troops. Much of the urban area was destroyed by fire, and about 1.5 million ethnic Greeks were forced to leave Turkey, while hundreds of thousands of Turkish people were forced out of Greece. Ernest Hemingway, reporting from the docks, described Greek mothers carrying the bodies of their children for days. This harrowing event inflicted lasting trauma on both sides, destroying entire ways of life.

In 1974, tensions escalated on the island of Cyprus. After a coup facilitated by Greek authorities sought to unite Cyprus with Greece, Turkey intervened militarily in northern Cyprus to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority. The invasion resulted in a divided island and the displacement of thousands of people. The conflict hardened nationalist feelings, and Cyprus remains divided today.

These historical events have caused enduring scars. Protracted disputes over maritime boundaries, airspace, and territorial rights continue to create tension. Despite this, moments of cooperation during natural disasters have shown that reconciliation is achievable, even if political issues remain unmet.

On August 17, 1999, at exactly 3:01 a.m., a magnitude 7.4 earthquake struck the city of Izmit in northwestern Turkey. The tremors reached across 2,000 square kilometers, reaching Istanbul – one of Turkey’s most populous cities, and the place where my family lived. My mother and her family slept in a parking lot for days, terrified to return home. My father lost his best friend in the collapse. The earthquake claimed over 18,000 lives, left more than 400,000 people unhoused, and either destroyed or severely damaged an estimated 330,000 residential buildings. Immediately after, grieving relatives dug through the rubble with basic tools—or even their bare hands—trying to reach loved ones. The devastation was immense. Yet what astonished many was that the first international rescue team to arrive came from Greece. Three military planes landed from Athens, carrying sniffer dogs, rescue workers, and field hospitals. Donations poured in. “As much help as it needed, for as long as it needed,” said Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou. In a moment of unimaginable grief, aid came from across the sea from the people my parents had been taught to fear.

Three weeks later, Athens was hit by a damaging earthquake. A 5.9 magnitude quake killed around 150 people and left tens of thousands without homes. Turkey responded without delay, mobilizing search and rescue teams. Turkish volunteers worked tirelessly to rescue Greek civilians trapped beneath the rubble. For many, it was a moment of insight. The images of Greek and Turkish flags featured on each other’s emergency supplies eased tensions between the countries, leading to a notable shift in public opinion. Within months, Greece dropped its veto against Turkey’s EU candidacy. Diplomats called it “Earthquake Diplomacy.” But the real change did not originate from foreign ministries; it came from ordinary citizens of two “enemy” nations recognizing each other’s pain and responding as humans.

In February 2023, disaster struck again. This time in southeastern Turkey, Greece responded by sending 25 EMAK rescuers, two search dogs, and 90 tons of humanitarian aid. This time, no one was surprised. In Thessaloniki, citizens organized relief drives, sending bilingual packages labeled in Turkish and Greek. A young diplomat in training reflected, “We are friends now with Turkey, but this might change again soon. It always does.” Even so, a local artist conveyed, “The Turkish people will never forget our solidarity.” What had once been a diplomatic anomaly had become a reflex. Yet, questions remained: was this genuine reconciliation or simply another truth born of tragedy?

What happened between Turkey and Greece embodies significance far beyond their shared sea. Earthquake diplomacy did not emerge from formal negotiations or treaties; instead, it was rooted in grief and profound human vulnerability. As Greek artist Aristeia Elbasidou put it, “It is propaganda that poisons our relations.” Reconciliation can start in chaos, not always in parliaments. It often emerges through the breakdown of formal barriers, when individuals interact beyond institutional frameworks and political divisions. Other countries might learn from this example. In South Asia, India and Pakistan, despite a long history of conflict, have cooperated on flood monitoring in Kashmir. Even amid ongoing disputes, shared threats can compel a degree of honesty. From that honesty, there is the chance for something new to emerge.

My family and I visit Greece every summer now. My mother, who once recoiled at the thought of Greece, now travels there with a sense of peace and connection. This change isn’t about politics; it’s about kindness and the choices we make. I’ve always dreamed of becoming a diplomat to help reshape the relationship between my country and Greece, yet I have come to realize that peace may not begin in embassies, it starts with the people, ordinary citizens choosing to connect beyond politics.

References:

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Nikos Dendias, Foreign Minister of Greece, visits Turkey. Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

“BBC ON THIS DAY | 20 | 1974: Turkey Invades Cyprus,” n.d. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/20/newsid_3866000/3866521.stm.

Kermeliotis, Teo. “Cypriot Children’s 1974 Journey Into the Unknown.” Al Jazeera, January 30, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/1/30/cypriot-childrens-1974-journey-into-the-unknown.

Nelsson, Richard. “Archive, 1974: Turkey Invades Cyprus.” The Guardian, July 17, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/17/archive-1974-turkey-invades-cyprus.

“Nation Building and the Lives It Changed Forever: A Reflection on the 100th Anniversary of the Greco-Turkish War | Ashes to Ashes: The Greco-Turkish War and the Burning of İzmir/Smyrna, 1919-1922 · Online Exhibits,” n.d. https://apps.lib.umich.edu/online-exhibits/exhibits/show/greco-turkish-war/burning-of-izmir-smyrna.

“The Greco-Turkish War, the Beginning of a Century of Displacement by Àlex Martínez Vega – Group for the Representation of Conflict,” n.d. https://webs.uab.cat/g4roc/activities/war-in-the-news/the-greco-turkish-war-the-beginning-of-a-century-of-displacement-by-alex-martinez/.

Euronews. “Greece and Turkey Hail Positive Meeting but Say More Work to Be Done on Maritime Dispute,” November 8, 2024. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/11/08/greece-and-turkey-hail-positive-meeting-but-say-more-work-to-be-done-on-maritime-dispute.

Mechanix, Web. “Cooperation Between India and Pakistan After Natural Disasters.” Stimson Center, November 27, 2022. https://www.stimson.org/2015/cooperation-between-india-and-pakistan-after-natural-disasters/.

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This essay won an honorable mention in the 2025 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Examine the evolution of a relationship between two countries in response to a global challenge. What lessons can other nations learn from their cooperation or conflict?”

On July 19, 2019, a South Korean man in his seventies set himself ablaze outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul, protesting Tokyo’s decision to restrict exports of critical semiconductor chemicals to South Korea. His desperate act was mirrored by others who mutilated their fingers and boycotted Japanese companies like Toyota and Sony. Yet, just a few years later, the two nations—once bitter adversaries—have forged multi-billion-dollar semiconductor partnerships, driven by the pressures of a global chip shortage and escalating US-China trade tensions.

The evolution of Japan and South Korea’s relationship is understood through the legacy of Japan’s wartime atrocities during its annexation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945–a painful chapter that continues to cast a long shadow through political disputes over apology and reparations. Ongoing tensions had escalated in 2019 after South Korean National Assembly Speaker Moon Hee-sang referred to then-Japanese Emperor Akihito as “the son of the main culprit of war crimes,” specifically referencing the sexual slavery inflicted by the Japanese military on Korean comfort women during WWII. Concurrently, the South Korean Supreme Court ordered the Japanese government to provide monetary compensation for the Korean laborers who were forcibly relocated and subjected to perilous working conditions. Japan attempted to cripple South Korea’s semiconductor industry in retaliation, while reaffirming its stance that all compensation issues had been settled in a $300 million normalization treaty in 1965. 

Ironically, Japan’s sanctions exposed the deep interdependence between the two nations and paved the groundwork for future collaboration. In 2018, South Korean semiconductor firms imported 44% of hydrogen fluoride, 88.6% of photoresist chemicals, and 90% of fluorinated polyimide from Japan, the global leader in producing these three essential semiconductor materials. This significant reliance plunged South Korea into a desperate scramble to diversify its domestic production and explore alternative sources after Japan’s sanctions. Conversely, according to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Observatory of Economic Complexity, South Korea accounted for 17% of Japan’s exports of chemicals for electronics–only second to the United States–in 2017. The feud’s effects were felt globally: Samsung and SK Hynix supplied 61% of memory chip components, and disruptions sent prices soaring, impacting giants like Apple and Huawei.

Further complicating matters, the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019 heightened the demand for laptops and tablets as people participated in Zoom calls and sought digital pastimes. Manufacturing bottlenecks, the intricate production process involving nearly 1,400 steps and 70 border crossings per chip, and external shocks—such as U.S. trade restrictions on China and a neon gas shortage caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine—pushed the already fragile system to the brink.

Amid these obstacles, political leaders and private tech firms from Japan and South Korea sought to reestablish ties. In March 2023, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida held their first bilateral summit in 12 years. Days later, South Korea withdrew its World Trade Organization complaint against Japan’s export curbs, and Japan lifted its bans. Business federations from both countries also pledged funds for cultural exchanges and youth scholarships, strengthening diplomatic ties.

Afterwards, the private sector took the lead in revitalizing trade connections. In mid-2023, Samsung’s Device Solutions head Kung Kye-hyun proposed a $219 million investment in a semiconductor R&D facility in Japan. The following year, JSR—a leading Japanese company specializing in inorganic EUV photoresists—announced plans to establish manufacturing facilities in Chungcheongbuk-do. This collaboration echoes a post-World War II pattern in which major conglomerates have driven economic recovery and policy influence in both countries.

On May 28, 2025, the two nations reaffirmed their alliance at a summit in Seoul, marking 60 years of diplomatic ties, signing new bilateral semiconductor agreements. Japan also pledged support for South Korea’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which could boost Korea’s economy by $86 billion annually, according to the Brookings Institution.

These initiatives complemented ongoing efforts to build manufacturing facilities in each other’s countries amid the growing pressures of the US-China trade war. Samsung’s reliance on its Xi’an, China factory for 40% of its NAND flash memory production exposes it to significant risk. Since the tariff skirmishes between the U.S. and China escalated in February 2025, economic collaboration between Japan and South Korea has deepened, as noted by Yoon Cheol-min, head of international trade at the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

However, in the backdrop of economic progress, many South Koreans are still unsatisfied with how Japan has yet to issue a formal apology to Korean comfort women and forced laborers in the May 28, 2025, meeting. On June 20, 2025, members of the Joint Action for Historical Justice and Peaceful Korea-Japan Relations protested outside Nippon Steel’s headquarters in Chiyoda, Tokyo. Activist Lee Guk-eon stated, “The buildings that currently house Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries were built by the blood, sweat, and tears of Korean laborers who were forcibly mobilized.” Additionally, the majority of the 50,000+ Korean comfort women have passed away without receiving any compensation from the Japanese government. 

During the upcoming Comfort Women Memorial Day on August 14, 2025, the world will be watching to see whether Japan has renewed its stance on apologizing for its wartime atrocities.

As key players in the global semiconductor supply chain, Japan and South Korea represent a relationship marked by both a painful past and pragmatic cooperation forged through shared challenges. A survey conducted between May 23-June 12, 2025 by the Nikkei and Maeil Newspaper indicates that 36.7% of Japanese and Korean companies want to step up collaboration–a substantial percentage considering the countries’ animosities just a few years before, evidencing a hopeful shift in national attitude. Clearly, Japan and South Korea’s partnership stands as a compelling example for other countries: when the private sector and governments collaborate amid global crises, they can create innovative solutions that transcend historical grievances. 

References 

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Cpu, Chip, Semiconductor Image. Free for use, taken on Jan 6, 2018, Photo by Zathris. Image sourced from pixabay | Pixabay Content License, no changes made

1. Sang-Hun, Choe. “South Korean Dies after Self-Immolation at Japanese Embassy in Seoul.” The New York Times, 19 July 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/world/asia/south-korea-fire-protester.html.
2. BBC News. “South Korea and Japan’s Feud Explained.” BBC News, 2 Dec. 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49330531.
3. Al Jazeera, News Agencies. “Japan Demands Apology from South Korea over Remarks on Emperor.” Www.aljazeera.com, 12 Feb. 2019, www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/12/japan-demands-apology-from-south-korea-over-remarks-on-emperor.
4. Mariem, Ben. “South Korea Court Orders Japan Company to Compensate Victims of Forced Labor during WW Ll.” Jurist.org, – JURIST – News, 23 Aug. 2024, www.jurist.org/news/2024/08/south-korea-court-orders-japan-company-to-compensate-victims-of-forced-labor-during-ww-ll/. Accessed 1 July 2025.
5. South. “Columbia Journal of Transnational Law.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 3 Nov. 2019, www.jtl.columbia.edu/bulletin-blog/south-korean-courts-decision-to-compensate-forced-laborers-from-world-war-ii.
6. Dumas, Loïc. JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA’S RIVALRY: The Semiconductor Industry Instrumentalization and Its Implication for the Future of Japan-South Korea Economic Interdependence ASIA FOCUS #157 ASIA PROGRAMME. 2021.
7. Kim, Jihyun, and David Ho. “Decades of Distrust: Japanese Firms May Suffer in South Korea Row.” Al Jazeera, 6 Aug. 2019, www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/8/6/decades-of-distrust-japanese-firms-may-suffer-in-south-korea-row. Accessed 1 July 2025.
8. Yen Nee Lee. “The Japan-South Korea Dispute Could Push up the Price of Your next Smartphone.” CNBC, CNBC, 23 July 2019, www.cnbc.com/2019/07/23/japan-south-korea-dispute-impact-on-semiconductor-supply-chain-prices.html.
9. Mohammad, Wassen, et al. “The Global Semiconductor Chip Shortage: Causes, Implications, and Potential Remedies.” IFAC-PapersOnLine, vol. 55, no. 10, 2022, pp. 476–483. ScienceDirect, www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405896322017293, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2022.09.439.
10. Wishart-Smith, Heather. “The Semiconductor Crisis: Addressing Chip Shortages and Security.” Forbes, 19 July 2024, www.forbes.com/sites/heatherwishartsmith/2024/07/19/the-semiconductor-crisis-addressing-chip-shortages-and-security/.
11. Kuhn, Anthony . “South Korea and Japan Host a Bilateral Summit for the First Time in 12 Years.” NPR, 16 Mar. 2023, www.npr.org/2023/03/16/1164053485/south-korea-and-japan-host-a-bilateral-summit-for-the-first-time-in-12-years. Accessed 1 July 2025.
12. Park. “Tokyo Lifts Export Curbs; Seoul Withdraws WTO Complaint.” Asianews.network, 2023, asianews.network/tokyo-lifts-export-curbs-seoul-withdraws-wto-complaint/. Accessed 1 July 2025.
13. Mari Yamaguchi , and Kim Tong-Hyung . “Japan and South Korea Mark 60 Years of Diplomatic Relations.” AP News, 22 June 2025, apnews.com/article/japan-south-korea-anniversary-history-diplomatic-relations-697c0a6b00cdf0a740e5f5dd0c0145ae. Accessed 1 July 2025.
14. Nussey, Sam, and Joyce Lee. “Samsung to Set up Chip Packaging Research Facility in Japan.” Reuters, 21 Dec. 2023, www.reuters.com/technology/samsung-set-up-chip-packaging-research-facility-japan-2023-12-21/.
15. JSR. “JSR Expands Global Development and Production Functions for Leading-Edge Photoresists | 2024 | News | JSR Corporation.” JSR Corporation, 30 Aug. 2024, www.jsr.co.jp/jsr_e/news/2024/20240830.html. Accessed 1 July 2025.
16. Niklas Tawast . “Japanese and Korean Giants – Understand the Nature of the Beast! – Intralink.” Intralink, 29 Aug. 2024, www.intralinkgroup.com/en-GB/Latest/Intralink-Insights/August-2024/Japanese-and-Korean-giants-%E2%80%93-understand-the-nature.
17. YAMAGUCHI, MARI. “Japan and South Korea Mark 60 Years of Ties despite Lingering Tension and Political Uncertainty.” Ajc, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 22 June 2025, www.ajc.com/news/2025/06/japan-and-south-korea-mark-60-years-of-ties-despite-lingering-tension-and-political-uncertainty/. Accessed 1 July 2025.
18. Yonhap. “S. Korean, Japanese Biz Leaders Agree to Boost Cooperation in AI, Chips, CPTPP Entry – the Korea Herald.” The Korea Herald, 28 May 2025, www.koreaherald.com/article/10498023. Accessed 1 July 2025.
19. Michael Plummer , Peter A. Petri. “Why South Korea Should Join the CPTPP.” Brookings, 2 Dec. 2020, www.brookings.edu/articles/why-south-korea-should-join-the-cptpp/.
20. Eun-jin, Kim. “Top-Ranking Chinese Official Tours Samsung’s Xi’an Semiconductor Plant amid U.S.-China Tension.” Businesskorea, 17 Apr. 2025, www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=240196. Accessed 1 July 2025.
21. Kawakami, Takashi . “40% of Japanese, South Korean Firms Plan More Collaboration with Each Other.” Nikkei Asia, 19 June 2025, asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-trends/40-of-Japanese-South-Korean-firms-plan-more-collaboration-with-each-other. Accessed 1 July 2025.
22. Maresca, Thomas . “Korean Wartime Forced Laborers Still Seeking Apology, Reparations from Japan – UPI.com.” UPI, 14 Aug. 2019, www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2019/08/14/Korean-wartime-forced-laborers-still-seeking-apology-reparations-from-Japan/8231565778812/. Accessed 1 July 2025.
23. Columbia Law School. “Military Sexual Slavery, 1931-1945 | Korean Legal Studies.” Columbia.edu, 2016, kls.law.columbia.edu/content/military-sexual-slavery-1931-1945.
24. Xu, Keyue. “Testimony of History: Japanese Organization Fights for Justice, Demands Its Government to Apologize and Compensate “Comfort Women” Survivors – Global Times.” Globaltimes.cn, 2025, www.globaltimes.cn/page/202506/1337249.shtml. Accessed 1 July 2025.
25. Dong-woo, Chang. “Over Half of S. Korean Firms Say Economic Ties with Japan Beneficial: Survey.” Yonhap News Agency, 18 June 2025, en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250619001700320. Accessed 1 July 2025.

This essay won an honorable mention in the 2025 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Examine the evolution of a relationship between two countries in response to a global challenge. What lessons can other nations learn from their cooperation or conflict?”

In a world where revolutions are increasingly fought with hashtags rather than bullets, digital governance stands as one of the defining fronts in the world’s reformation. A silent revolution began rippling across the world in the 2010s, not spread with bloodshed onto barricades but through algorithms, public data, and digital usernames. One of the many global issues that shaped bilateral relations during that period was the emergence of e-governance, and it could be deemed as the most powerful. Tunisia and Estonia, existing on two far-flung continents, both very diverse in culture and history, are bound by a common vision of transparent governance and citizen empowerment through digital means. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring (an anti-government uprising across Arab nations), Tunisia was faced with the challenge of rebuilding its institutions and improving public trust in them, whereas thousands of kilometers away, Estonia had already established itself as one of the most digitally advanced societies. Quite interestingly, their paths converged, a rare indication of how a small Baltic country and a post-revolutionary state from North Africa could build a partnership in digital democracy. 

From Protest to Platforming

In December 2010, a young street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi gained international attention when he self-immolated to protest against corruption and harassment by municipal officers he faced as a street vendor. His act of self-sacrifice set forth the Tunisian Revolution, bringing down President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and triggering the much wider Arab Spring. Tunisia, thus, began emerging after the revolution as the regional beacon of hope with its comparatively tranquil transition toward democracy. However, behind hopeful headlines, this country was dealing with institutional decay, public distrust, and an urgent need for fundamental reforms. In fact, the lack of transparency in government became a major issue that the new Tunisia faced after the revolution. Tunisia had no tools and very little infrastructure to produce a transparent and accountable implementation of public services. The lack of mechanisms to engage the citizenry and the absence of the ability to interact with government services digitally further distanced the people.

By 2012, Tunisia realized that digital governance could also be used as an asset for rebuilding civic trust, improving organizational efficiency, and recognizing the importance of Tunisia’s commitment to e-governance with respect to the consolidation of democratic gains. The initial programs included the National Digital Strategy (2014-2018), which envisioned the digitization of public records, the establishment of open data portals, and the adoption of e-participation tools. Lacking technical capacity and institutional experience, Tunisia needed to find a mentor, an international partner that could offer guidance on digital reforms while respecting Tunisia’s unique socio-political context. This situation unexpectedly opened the door for Estonia to become involved.

The Republic of Code

Often called “the most advanced digital society in the world,” Estonia is one of the e-governance leaders since the Soviet times. As explained in Sandra Roosna and Raul Rikk’s e-Estonia: e-Governance in Practice, the Estonian model is based on three major pillars: digital ID cards, health and legal records in blockchain, and X-Road, a variety of decentralized systems for seamless interoperability across government and private databases. In Estonia, citizens are able to use their digital ID for voting, paying taxes, obtaining digital prescriptions, and creating businesses online. The high-trust system reduces profound bureaucracy and corruption, thereby raising transparency and efficiency.

Notably, Estonia’s willingness to share its digital model with other nations represents not only the best thing one can imagine for the opportunity presented to them but also one of the most effective sites of soft power. Joseph Nye argues in his book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics that nations that export governance models are the ones that build networks of influence and credibility. Estonia perfectly embodies the idea that in 2002, it founded the e-Governance Academy to assist and train states aspiring to digitization. Tunisia became one of its key partners in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region.

A Bridge Made of Bytes

Tunisia’s formal relations with Estonia began to develop in 2013 when Tunisian officials from the Ministry of Communication Technologies contacted the e-Governance Academy. Supported through the Neighbourhood Policy of the European Commission and the EU4Digital initiative, Estonia has been providing direct training, workshops, and institutional partnerships to assist Tunisia in modernizing its public sector.

One particular area of focus was cybersecurity. Estonia’s experience with the 2007 cyberattack, in which its government infrastructure had been the target of a suspected Russian-backed operation, deeply ingrained in the Estonians the importance of digital security. Estonian experts helped Tunisia to develop an institutional cybersecurity strategy and trained personnel in data protection and the resilience of digital infrastructure, as these threats were timely for Tunisia, given increasing concerns about cyber threats and electoral interference ahead of the elections of 2014 and 2019.

Equally important was the creation of the digital ID framework based on Estonia’s model. Tunisia began creating a safe national identity system with the help of Biometric Update and the World Bank. Citizens used this system to access a wide range of e-services, including civil registration, tax filings, and educational records. Pilot programs were carried out in Tunis and Sfax with the technical assistance of Estonian consultants.

Tunisia and Estonia formed a formal bilateral agreement in 2022 to enhance cooperation on digital policy. By 2023, Tunisia launched the very first government transparency portal with an open API architecture that allows civil society organizations to monitor budgets and procurements in real-time. These initiatives were praised by the World Bank and Freedom House for strengthening Tunisia’s democratic infrastructure.

Digital Takeaways

The Tunisia-Estonia partnership sends a strong message to the world: global issues concerning digital transformation are not limited to wealthy countries or countries in close proximity. Instead, it offers intriguing opportunities for the creation of synergistic partnerships between seemingly unrelated allies. From revolutionary turmoil towards digital experiments, Tunisia has shown that even fragile democracies can make strong strategic gains if they decide to modernize their governance tools. Estonia significantly enhanced its diplomatic and development footprint by not just exporting the technology but also the institutional know-how.

Capitalizing on the symbol of modern diplomacy, the Tunisia-Estonia cooperation also underscores the district power of so-called alternative types of diplomacy in foreign relations. Karim Sabbagh and his collaborators in Understanding the Arab Digital Generation argue that 21st-century diplomacy has become increasingly focused on knowledge transfer, technical training, and collaboration founded upon values. The Tunisia-Estonia case is a textbook example in which the partners were least interested in commerce or military alliances and were principally more committed to their common worldview of civic participation, transparency, and inclusion.

In addition, this case illustrates how capacity needs to be built along with technological developments. As Rainer Kattel and Ines Mergel claim in Estonia’s Digital Transformation, most digital reforms fail because countries import software solutions without embedding them into sustainable governance structures. Accordingly, it was not simply about transferring digital blueprints to Tunisia on the part of Estonia: institution-building measures, human capital, and some level of iterative process needed to be included in the package.

Lastly, the Tunisia–Estonia model should inspire other emerging democracies to pursue unconventional partnerships, for in this multipolar world, where trust in global institutions is in decline, bilateral cooperation on pragmatic goals like digital literacy, cybersecurity, and civic tech may in fact become a key that is meant to protect democracy.

From Revolution to Resolution

Tunisia and Estonia’s relations started against the backdrop of revolution and grew at the forefront of innovation. What commenced as a struggle for democratic legitimacy after the Arab Spring became a fully-fledged digital transformation process supported by international solidarity and technical expertise. The partnership is indeed a stellar case for digital governance and a real-story case in twenty-first-century diplomacy, which uses the levers of statecraft with code, connectivity, and civic empowerment.

Answering the global challenge of digital transformation brought Tunisia and Estonia to a humble meeting across continents. Their cooperation serves as a reminder to others: democratization in the digital age is not about replication, but about adapting successful models to local contexts with mutual respect and a common ambition. In an era in which authoritarianism and digital surveillance are on the rise, such a partnership stands out as a rare example of unity through technology.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: MoU Tunisia-Estonia – 17 May 2022, Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

1. United Nations, “E-Government in Support of Sustainable Development | Public Institutions,” 2016, https://publicadministration.desa.un.org/publications/e-government-support-sustainable-development.
2. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014: The Democratic Leadership Gap (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2014), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2014_Booklet.pdf.
3. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Government at a Glance 2017, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2017/07/government-at-a-glance-2017_g1g74dbf.html.
4. National Research University Higher School of Economics, Centre for Institutional Studies – Public Administration and Social Studies of Technology in Non-Democratic Regimes (PaSSTn), https://we.hse.ru/en/irs/cas/passtn.
5.  e-Governance Academy, e-Estonia: e-Governance in Practice, Tallinn: e-Governance Academy, 2016, https://ega.ee/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/e-Estonia-e-Governance-in-Practice.pdf.
6. Tanel Kerikmäe, David Ramiro Troitiño, and Olga Shumilo, “An Idol or an Ideal? A Case Study of Estonian E-Governance: Public Perceptions, Myths and Misbeliefs,” Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum 7, no. 1 (Spring 2019): 71–80, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333681317_An_Idol_or_an_Ideal_A_Case_Study_of_Estonian_E-Governance_Public_Perceptions_Myths_and_Misbeliefs.(researchgate.net)
7. Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (PublicAffairs, 2004).
8. Ibid.
9. European Commission, eGovernment Benchmark 2020: eGovernment that works for the people, 2020,  https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/egovernment-benchmark-2020-egovernment-works-people. 
10. World Bank, “Citizens at the Center: Tunisia’s GovTech Success Story,” November 2023.
11.  Morozov, Evgeny. To Save Everything, Click Here (PublicAffairs, 2013).
12.  Tunisian Estonian Chamber of Commerce, “Tunisia and Estonia Sign MoU For Cooperation In The Field of Digitization And E-Governance,” May 2022.
13. International IDEA, “Protecting Tunisian Elections from Digital Threats,”May 10, 2019, https://www.idea.int/news/protecting-tunisian-elections-digital-threats.
14.  U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on Tunisia-Estonia Digital Cooperation,” 2013.
15.  e-Governance Academy, “Tunisia Learns from Estonia to Develop Their E-Government,” https://ega.ee/tunisia-learns-from-estonia-to-develop-their-e-government/. 
16. Ibid.
17. Freedom House, “Tunisia: Freedom in the World 2023,” Freedom in the World, https://freedomhouse.org/country/tunisia/freedom-world/2023.
18.  Karim Sabbagh et al., Understanding the Arab Digital Generation (Beirut: Booz & Company, 2012), http://www.investinlebanon.gov.lb/Content/uploads/Understanding_the_Arab_Digital_Generation.pdf.
19. Rainer Kattel and Ines Mergel, “Estonia’s Digital Transformation: Mission Mystique and the Hiding Hand,” in Great Policy Successes, ed. Paul Hart and Mallory Compton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 143–60, https://academic.oup.com/book/42635/chapter/358101931.

This essay won 1st Place in the 2024 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Evaluate an example of a foreign policy, historical or contemporary, that can be considered a success.”

One month’s salary should be enough to uphold a household, yet, it’s only enough to buy
a street hot dog in Venezuela.¹ In the past decade, Venezuelan citizens have been starved by hyperinflation and output shortages imposed by Venezuela’s corrupt leaders. This economic collapse has led to a mass exodus of over 7.7 million Venezuelan citizens — a feat that comes ranked highly in the largest forcibly displaced crisis in the world.² While surrounding countries such as Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, and Chile have instituted measures to limit these migrants through increased border security and required identification, one country opens its arms to the famished: Colombia’s open door policy to Venezuela serves as a beacon of success in humanitarianism — a light that shines brightly in a world of polarization and conflict.

The genesis of Venezuela’s economic crisis begins with Hugo Chavez, an esteemed
leader who built his platform by blaming government corruption and Venezuela’s elite for
economic inequality. With oil prices surging by 34% in 2004, Venezuela’s petroleum-dependant
economy skyrocketed.³ To maintain his presidency, Chavez strived for popularity with the poor,
spending billions to increase social welfare and healthcare through his Bolivarian Missions.⁴
Chavez’s spending led to a growing deficit of $3.8 billion in 2006, implying that if oil prices
dropped, these plans could not be continued — which is precisely what took place.⁵ After
Chavez’s death in 2013, his appointed right-hand man, Nicolas Maduro, faced the consequences
of a 45% plummet in oil prices in 2015.⁶

As professor Michael McCarthy states in Venezuela’s Crisis: Beyond Economic
Explanations: An Interview with Michael McCarthy, “due to the vested economic interests
entangled with the ruling coalition, Maduro essentially faced a choice to reform at the risk of
being sacked internally or cast his lot with the military to hold on to power.”⁷ Thus, Maduro,
unable to withstand the change and power-hungry, exploited Venezuela’s currency system by
setting an exchange rate only attainable by select allies (10 bolivars per US dollar).⁸ In doing so,
the Venezuelan currency became worthless; the majority of Venezuelans began obtaining their
dollars on the black market, where one US dollar is worth thousands more in bolivars.
Furthermore, with total control over the food supply, the Venezuelan military buys food at the
value set by Maduro and resells it on the black market for enormous profits — demolishing food supplies for Venezuelans nationally. Subsequently, Maduro’s power stays locked; the food
supply scheme allows his allies and military to continuously support him.

“…I want to leave, we’re out of power, I am with the kids and feeling desperate’, so I told
her,’ we have to go’” pleads a Venezuelan refugee.⁹

In this state of turmoil, Colombia reaches its hand out to Venezuela, implementing
multiple responses to assist the nearly three million migrants that crossed its border over the next
nine years.¹⁰ The initial migrations in 2015 resulted in heightened security and social work
presence on prominent points on the border between Venezuela and Colombia: emergency care,
childbirth care, shelters, vaccinations, legal assistance, psychological assistance, to name a few.
As numbers of Venezuelan migrants rose in 2017, the management of the migrant population
strengthened as the Colombian government opened additional migration stations, resulting in
seven open stations between both countries. Additionally, the creation of the Special Permanence
Permit (Permiso Especial de Permanencia or PEP), granted temporary residence and access to
social services and markets to Venezuelans residing in Colombia, allowing migrants to stay in
the country for up to two years and utilize its resources.¹¹ In 2021, the Venezuelan crisis
aggravated, yet, Colombia only responded with increased compassion by allowing renewals of
the PEP.. Since its commencement up until 2020, over 700,000 Venezuelan migrants have been
granted permanence. The Colombian government formally established a regularization procedure
for Venezuelan migrants with Decree 216 of 2021, enabling them to seek for a 10-year
temporary status (TPS).¹²

“Here in Colombia, selling sweets on the street is seen as a job, but in Venezuela we see
it as begging for money, like if I was saying ‘gift me something, help me out’” says a refugee.
In its cultural context, Venezuela and Colombia coexisted as allies in the past, and
furthermore, were one country referred to as Gran Colombia. Once formally abolished in 1831
and decades later in the 80s, Colombia faced its own internal crisis with a rebel group named the
FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). Subsequently, seven million Colombians
were displaced, to which many fled to Venezuela. In a way, Colombia’s compassion exists as the
returning of a favor from decades prior. Through a continuation of such a partnership,
Colombia’s open border policy accomplishes further unification.

While Colombia’s actions reflect humanitarian values for Venezuela, some limitations
fester. In the long run, Colombia may not be able to keep up with balancing the rising influx and
its own problems such as crime. Moreover, the Venezuelan migrants face issues of harsh
working conditions; 40% of migrants work more than 60 hours a week. ¹³Even more, refugees find it more difficult to find full time work; more than 25% work fewer than 20 hours a week.
This seesaw of employment provides for a shaky employment system that requires nuanced
attention.

“The people I have met have been an absolute blessing…In Venezuela when you get
together all you talk about is politics…whereas here you speak about food, about what you’re
going to have, you talk about sharing,” a refugee remarks. Alongside the migrant stations
between their border, both Venezuelan and Colombian music play simultaneously. On highway
signs, messages of “Colombia and Venezuela, united forever” display proudly.¹⁴ The chants of
“your flag is my flag” symbolize the cultural success of Colombia’s open door policy; a clear
cultural unity that glows in the face of starved adversity.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Colombia Fighting for Peace, taken on Oct. 20, 2016, Photo by Leon Hernandez | Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

1. Vox. “Why Colombia has taken in 1 million Venezuelans.” YouTube, Vox, 27 November 2018,
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NU0RqwweuWY&list=PLJ8cMiYb3G5czofUrrizDiyC_yNLOe_CF&index=95
   &ab_channel=Vox. ↩︎
2. “Venezuelan Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis – CDP.” Center for Disaster Philanthropy, 16 April 2024,
   https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disasters/venezuelan-refugee-crisis/. ↩︎
3. “WTI Crude Oil Prices – 10 Year Daily Chart.” Macrotrends, https://www.macrotrends.net/2516/wti-crude-oil-prices-10-year-daily-chart. ↩︎
4. “Venezuela’s Chavez Era.” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/venezuelas-chavez-era. ↩︎
5. Wallis, Daniel. “Venezuela’s PDVSA to keep funding socialist programs under Maduro.” Reuters, 15 April 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE93E0B5/. ↩︎
6. European Central Bank. “Recent Developments in Oil Prices.” Recent developments in oil prices, European Central Bank, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/mb200505_focus01.en.pdf. ↩︎
7. McCarthy, Michael. “Venezuela’s Crisis: Beyond Economic Explanations: An Interview with Michael McCarthy.”
   Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 2, 2017, pp. 129-136. JSTOR,
   http://www.jstor.org/stable/26396027. ↩︎
8. Carmody, Michelle. “What caused hyperinflation in Venezuela: a rare blend of public ineptitude and private enterprise.” The Conversation, 5 February 2019, https://theconversation.com/what-caused-hyperinflation-in-venezuela-a-rare-blend-of-public-ineptitude-and-private-enterprise-102483. ↩︎
9. “Venezuelans on foot: An insight into the last wave of Venezuelan migration.” Xchange,
   http://xchange.org/reports/Venezuelansonfoot.html. ↩︎
10. “Colombia’s Refugee Crisis and Integration Approach Explained.” USA for UNHCR, 18 April 2024,
    https://www.unrefugees.org/news/colombia-s-refugee-crisis-and-integration-approach-explained/. ↩︎
11. Figuera, Carolina. “Venezuela situation.” UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/venezuela-situation. ↩︎
12. GOVERNMENT REGULATION | Decree No. 216 Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan Migrants – Latin America & the Caribbean Migration Portal.” Latin America & the Caribbean Migration Portal,
    https://www.migrationportal.org/resource/government-regulation-decree-no-216-temporary-protection-statute-for-venezuelan-migrants/. ↩︎
13. “THE EXPERIENCE OF VENEZUELAN REFUGEES IN COLOMBIA AND PERU.” Tent Partnership for Refugees, https://www.tent.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/Tent_VenezuelanReport_v9-compressed.pdf. ↩︎
14. Elodie C. “Colombia and Venezuela: Countries torn apart by violence and economic disaster, supporting each
    other as “brothers” – On the Ground International.” On the Ground International, 13 September 2022,
    https://www.onthegroundnow.org/colombia-and-venezuela-countries-torn-apart-by-violence-and-economic-disaster-supporting-each-other-as-brothers/. ↩︎

This essay won 2nd Place in the 2024 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Evaluate an example of a foreign policy, historical or contemporary, that can be considered a success.”

Officially, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region is the city of Lhasa in Southwestern
China. Legislatively, executively, and judicially, though, the seat of the Tibetan government
lies in the quaint hill town of Dharamshala in India. This “government-in-exile,” as it has been
called, is part of India’s larger policy on China. Although criticised for its Laodicean approach
in falling short of recognising an independent Tibetan state, India’s Tibet Policy has been hailed
as a success for functioning as a bulwark against Chinese hegemony in the region.

Background
On October 7, 1950, the newly founded People’s Republic of China invaded Tibet in an attempt
to expand and consolidate the frontiers of the young nation. By 1954, resistance in Tibet against
the increasingly absolutist Chinese regime had grown and in 1959, the Dalai Lama, the spiritual
and political leader of Tibet, fled to India, never to return. In the backdrop of this political
unrest, Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, implemented India’s Tibet Policy that
intended to provide refuge to Tibetans. Domestically, the policy was popular among the public
who believed in the sovereignty of India and its leader post independence in 1948. Globally,
too, the policy gained little to no backlash owing to Nehru’s prominent role as one of the
pioneers of the Non-Aligned Movement. Today, while India does not officially recognise Tibet
as an independent state, India’s Tibet Policy extends shelter to Tibetans as “foreigners” under
domestic law, allows the Tibetan government-in-exile to operate out of Dharamshala under the
Dalai Lama and limits their involvement in Indian politics.

Standing Up to the Dragon
Clashes along the Galwan in 2020 and skirmishes along Arunachal Pradesh in 2022 have
marked a particularly turbulent period in Sino-Indian relations in recent years. The annexation
of Tibet in 1951 expanded China’s land border along India, Nepal and Bhutan and paved the
path for a strategic Sino-Pakistani axis. Given this precarious relationship, Tibet is a crucial
buffer zone between India and China. Maintaining close ties with Tibet provides India with an
ally in the face of Chinese aggression at the very least. In the best case, strengthening ties with
Tibet helps deter conflict owing to Chinese fears of a Tibetan uprising that might hamper any
such war effort. Beyond the political, though, the potential environmental ramifications of
China’s unchecked advances in Tibet warrant India’s Tibet Policy. China’s extensive mining
in the resource-rich Tibetan plateau threaten India’s waters, primarily the Siang, a major
tributary of the Brahmaputra River system. The strategic mining by China is also an attempt to
heavily populate the region with Chinese migrants to counter Indian influence in Arunachal
Pradesh. India’s Tibet Policy has so far kept that at bay.

Vasudhaiva Kutumbakum
The Indian mantra of vasudhaiva kutumbakum (one world, one family, one future) was
popularised during the G20 Summit in India last year. It is, perhaps, most relevant, though, to India’s intake of Tibetan refugees in the 1950s, a shot in the arm to India’s image on the global
stage as a newly independent nation at the time. In stark contrast to the reluctance of other
countries in the subcontinent, India welcomed Tibetan refugees with open arms. Ever since
India sheltered the Dalai Lama in 1950, it has taken up the issue of providing basic Indian
necessities to all Tibetan refugees residing in India. In 2014, India implemented the Tibetan
Rehabilitation Policy, under the larger Tibet Policy, which was intended to increase the benefits
available to Tibetan refugees in India. It provided these refugees with the access to Indian
amenities such as, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, Public
Distribution System, Indira Awas Yojana, National Rural Livelihood Mission, Rajiv Awas
Yojna, National Rural Health Mission and the extension of loan facilities by the Nationalised
Banks. India allowed Tibetan refugees residing in India to be in charge of their own foreign
affairs, defence and communication. All of this aided the preservation of Tibetan culture which
was under threat due to the Chinese invasion. The implementation of The Tibetan
Rehabilitation Policy successfully provided relief and rehabilitation for Tibetan refugees and
strengthened India’s Tibet Policy. In 2002, the Dalai Lama presented the International
Campaign for Tibet’s Light of Truth Award to Indian citizens for warmly welcoming Tibetans
for more than four decades.

The Way Forward
Critics argue that India’s Tibet Policy, which aimed at helping Tibetans, has failed to do so by
not recognising it as an independent nation as well as not according refugee status to Tibetan
exiles. On the contrary, India’s Tibet Policy must be lauded for taking a stand against China
while concurrently striking the right balance so as to avoid conflict. More can be done,
however, to further strengthen India-Tibetan ties. The first step would be for India to officially
recognise Tibetan exiles as “refugees” and to consider reversing at least partially its
unconditional recognition of Tibet as Chinese territory. The rest is a path best chalked not by
New Delhi and Beijing but by New Delhi and Dharamshala. Only then will the Snow Lion be
able to stand up to the Dragon.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Tibet – Mount Everest, taken on October 27, 2011, Photo by Göran Höglund (Kartläsarn) | Image sourced from Flickr | CC License, no changes made

1. Mehrotra, L.L. India’s Tibet Policy, May 2017, tibet.net/wp-
   content/uploads/2017/05/Inidas-Tibet-Policy.pdf.
2. Tibetan Refugees, 2014, www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/2022-
   08/FFR_ANNEXURE_A_17092019%5B1%5D.pdf.
3. Choetso, Tenzin. “Tibet: Time to Review India’s Tibet Policy – Central Tibetan
   Administration.” Central Tibetan Administration – Restoring Freedom for Tibetans,
   24 Dec. 2020, tibet.net/tibet-time-to-review-indias-tibet-policy/.
4. Reporter, Staff. “About CTA – Central Tibetan Administration.” Central Tibetan
   Administration – Restoring Freedom for Tibetans, 15 Dec. 2011, tibet.net/about-cta/.
5. International Journal of Humanities and Peace, 2004,
   www.proquest.com/docview/614350513/.
6. “Light of Truth Awards.” International Campaign for Tibet, 24 Aug. 2018,
   savetibet.org/what-we-do/light-of-truth-awards/.
7. International Campaign for Tibet. “India Should Formalize a Holistic Approach to Its Tibet Policy.” International Campaign for Tibet, 8 Sept. 2023, savetibet.org/india-should-formalize-a-holistic-approach-to-its-tibet-policy/.
8. Tsering, Dawa. “Recentering Tibet in India’s Approach to China – Central Tibetan
   Administration.” Central Tibetan Administration – Restoring Freedom for Tibetans, 3
   May 2023, tibet.net/recentering-tibet-in-indias-approach-to-china/.
9. Sikri, Rajiv. The Tibet Factor in India China Relations, 2011,
   www.jstor.org/stable/24385534.
10. Protective Area Permit to Visit Tibetan Settlements, papvt.mha.gov.in/. Accessed 11
    June 2024.
11. “Claudearpi.” India Tibet Relations 1947-1949 – India Begins to Vacillate ,
    www.archieve.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/60_01_22_ITA_Yatung.pdf
    . Accessed 11 June 2024.
12. Q. 495 – India’s Stand on Tibet, www.mea.gov.in/rajya-
    sabha.htm?dtl%2F10258%2Fq+495++indias+stand+on+tibet=. Accessed 11 June 2024.
13. Fang, Tien-sze. “The Tibet Issue in Sino-Indian Relations.” OUP Academic, Oxford University Press, 1 Oct. 2013, academic.oup.com/book/3687/chapter-abstract/145052956?redirectedFrom=fulltext.
14. Ministry of External Affairs – Government of India, 2 Apr. 2024, www.mea.gov.in/response-to-queries.htm?dtl/37761/Official+Spokespersons+response+to+media+queries+on+rena ming+places+in+Arunachal+Pradesh+by+China.
15. Chellaney. “Why Tibet Matters Ever More in India-China Ties.” Stagecraft and Statecraft, 1 Apr. 2019, chellaney.net/2019/04/01/why-tibet-matters-ever-more-in-india-china-ties/.

This essay won 3rd place in the 2024 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Evaluate an example of a foreign policy, historical or contemporary, that can be considered a success.”

“The wars of the next century will be fought over water.”

These words by Ismail Serageldin, former Vice President of the World Bank, were spoken in
1995 in response to the growing water scarcity issues faced all over the world (Boccaletti). His
words are even more relevant today as conflicts brew all over the world from Eastern Europe to
South America, over shared waterways. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 to
allocate the shared Indus River System between India and Pakistan, is a rare example of
international diplomacy that has lasted over the past six decades in spite of strained geopolitical
relations between the two countries.

In 1947, marking the end of British rule in the Indian subcontinent, British India was partitioned
into two independent countries – India and Pakistan (Bauer). Initially, the two newly-formed
nations faced significant turmoil most notably over the usage of the Indus River system. This
shared waterway flows through India into Pakistan, traversing Kashmir and the Punjab plain,
before emptying into the Arabian sea in Pakistan (Bauer) and is vital for agriculture, electricity
and more (Boccaletti). Due to ongoing conflicts following the partition, India began withholding
water from Pakistan in 1948, further escalating the existing animosity between the nations. This
triggered international intervention, most notably from The World Bank and led by its former
President Eugene Black. Six years later, on September 19, 1960, the Indus Water Treaty was
signed by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub
Khan, marking the end of almost a decade of a protracted and bitter dispute (Bauer). The Treaty meticulously divided the rivers of the Indus Water system allotting the water from the Eastern
Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India, and the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan
(Bauer). The “Permanent Indus Commission” was also created to ensure cooperation and handle
any potential disputes (The World Bank). After a 10-year Transition Period, between April 1,
1960 and May 31, 1970, the Indus Water Treaty was successfully integrated, providing both
countries with an ample supply of water and stability.

The IWT was a resounding success surviving three wars and over 60 years of hostile relations
between India and Pakistan (Sultan). Its triumph depended upon the simplicity of the treaty,
detailed legal provisions included incase of any future conflicts, and the presence of a neutral
mediator to handle any disputes. For instance, compare it with the 1944 US-Mexico Water treaty
intended to allocate water from the Rio Grande to southern states in the US and Mexico. This
treaty eventually failed due to the “extremely complex system of water rights” outlined in the
agreement creating lengthy and complicated policies that could not be sustained (Felbab-Brown).
By comparison, the straightforwardness of the IWT sets it up for success. Similarly, the IWT
includes detailed provisions and checks and balances to ensure that every issue is equitably and
fairly resolved. For example, the Permanent Indus Commission, overseeing the adherence to the
provisions of the treaty, is composed of a Commissioner from each country to address any
questions, a neutral expert to handle differences, and an “ad hoc arbitral tribunal” to handle any
disputes (The World Bank). This clear delineation of roles ensures fairness and that there are no
biased decisions. Furthermore, the treaty was mediated by the World Bank – an external, neutral
party. As India and Pakistan have had a history of war and distrust, this was crucial in facilitating
effective arbitration and resolution (Sultan). In spite of recent turmoil following the 2016 Uri attack where terrorists from Pakistan killed 19 Indian soldiers, and disagreements over India
building new hydroelectric dams such as Kishenganga and Ratle (The World Bank), the IWT’s
framing and thoughtful dispute resolution process have contributed to its sustained success.

While the IWT is a great accomplishment, it is time for it to evolve. Currently, it faces severe
limitations due to climate change. Due to increasing global temperatures, current projections
indicate that “the Indus River Basin will face a water deficit of 50 percent” by 2030 (Mathur).
With certain rivers drying up, this could potentially skew the proportion of water dedicated to
each country. Climate change is also expected to disrupt agriculture, trigger energy shortages,
and lead to unpredictable hydrological cycles such as erratic flooding and drought. In 2022,
Pakistan experienced devastating floods across a third of the country and extensive landslides in
the Indus River Basin leaving more than “30 million people homeless and result[ing] in 1000
deaths” (Hong et al.). To address these known and unknown challenges, the IWT should be made
future climate change proof through new ideas such as the “quantification and trading of river
resources” (Mathur) moving from a volumetric view of the water sharing to a more
relationship-based assessment of the benefits of using water. One suggestion could be an annual
trading window to renegotiate the water sharing percentage which can be offset in future years –
similar to a loss and share gain in the stock market to smooth out fluctuations.

From the Kakhovka Reservoir conflict between Ukraine and Russia, the partition of the Nile in
Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, and the dams built on the Mekong Basin in China, water wars
threaten the livelihood and sanctity of our world (Boccaletti). The IWT is a rare example of how
international mediation and clarity are crucial in constructing a long lasting agreement between two countries with strained relations (Sultan). The treaty improved the lives of roughly “300
million people” (Mathur) who use the waters from the basin and set a precedent of facilitating
cooperation to enforce change. It can be made future proof and taken from good to great by
adding provisions to address climate change keeping it a paragon of global excellence in foreign
policy.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Indus River in Ladakh, India – near Alchi bridge, taken on May 11, 2018, Photo by Bernard Gagnon | Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

1. Bauer, Patricia. “Indus Waters Treaty | History, Provisions, & Facts.” Encyclopædia Britannica,
   20 Mar. 2024, www.britannica.com/event/Indus-Waters-Treaty. Accessed 12 June 2024.
   
2. Boccaletti, Giulio. “The Water Wars Myth.” OpenMind Magazine, 9 June 2022,
   www.openmindmag.org/articles/the-water-wars-myth. Accessed 12 June 2024.
   
3. Felbab-Brown, Vanda. “Not Dried Up: US-Mexico Water Cooperation.” Brookings, 26 Oct.
   2020, www.brookings.edu/articles/not-dried-up-us-mexico-water-cooperation/. Accessed 12 June 2024.
   
4. Hong, Chi-Cherng, et al. “Causes of 2022 Pakistan Flooding and Its Linkage with China and Europe Heatwaves.” Nature News, Nature Publishing Group, 14 Oct. 2023, www.nature.com/articles/s41612023004922#:~:text=In%202022%2C%20Pakistan%20experienced%20a,one%2Dthird%20of%20the%20country.
   
5. Mathur, Smiti. “Climate-Proofing the Indus Water Treaty | New Perspectives on Asia | CSIS.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 Oct. 2023, www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/climateproofinginduswatertreaty#:~:text=Effects%20of%20Climate%20Change&text=Projections%20indicate%20that%2C%20due%20to. Accessed 12 June 2024.
   
6. Sultan, Saud. “The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exemplar of Cooperation.” South Asia@LSE, 25 June 2018, blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2018/06/25/the-indus-waters-treaty-an-exemplar-of-cooperation/. Accessed 12 June 2024.
   
7. The World Bank. “Fact Sheet: The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the Role of the World Bank.” World Bank, 11 June 2018, www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the-indus-waters-treaty-1960-and-the-world-bank. Accessed 12 June 2024.

This essay won an honorable mention in the 2024 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Evaluate an example of a foreign policy, historical or contemporary, that can be considered a success.”

In the Australian Outback, a wild bushfire can be a blessing. Through the flames of
chaos, new life can rise from the ashes. Looking back on Prime Minister Howard’s infamous
1998 letter to President Habibie of Indonesia, the sparks intertwined with the flames that
followed.

Throughout the 1990s, foreign relations between Australia and Indonesia were fixated
upon a single issue, that of East Timor.¹ At the time, East Timor had been forcefully occupied by
Indonesia for over 20 years; during which the government of Suharto perpetrated numerous
human rights violations and mass killings.² Although the global community condemned the
country for such acts, Australia was one of Indonesia’s lone supporters in the occupation.³

However, Australian public sentiment began to change by the 1990s, the result of
publicized atrocities such as the Dili Massacre.⁴ The precipice came in 1998, with the resignation
of Suharto following the Asian Financial Crisis. His successor was B. J. Habibie, an
unpredictable leader willing to loosen the occupation of East Timor.⁵ Having recently gained power in 1996, his counterpart Prime Minister Howard of Australia was also looking to assert himself in foreign affairs.

With both nations primed for change, Howard sent his letter to Habibie. Reversing
previous Australian policy, and attempting to match public sentiment, he urged Habibie to consider East Timorese independence.⁶ In doing so, he suggested a Timorese vote on secession be held within a few years.

What ensued was a complete domino effect, a direct result of the individuals and
pressures involved. Habibie overcompensated towards Howard’s ideas, choosing to hold an
independence referendum in only a few months rather than a few years.⁷ Both East Timor and
Indonesia were not ready for the result. After more than 70% of the East Timor population voted
for independence, Indonesian paramilitary groups revolted against the people.⁸ Hundreds of
thousands of Timorese were displaced in the violence.⁹ Circling back, Prime Minister Howard
took a peace-keeper position, sending Australian soldiers with Operation INTERFET.¹⁰

Unfortunately, by the time Australian soldiers arrived with UN forces, the events had
already taken their course. After a bright and violent flame, East Timor was on its way to
independence.

When analyzing Howard’s letter, there is a clear question of whether the ends justify the
means. Following the referendum, was the chaos of 1999 justified by the subsequent formation
of an independent East Timor? To answer, it is important to consider uncontrollability.

Following the fall of Suharto, the political change in Indonesia created a period of tension
both socially and economically.¹¹ Particularly in East Timor, the first few months under Habibie
were a unique time of law-lessness. Out of all parts of Indonesia, East Timor received the least
funding and support from the government.¹² The disarray following the referendum was a direct result of this disconnect between local and central government. In a sense, the political climate of
Indonesia was primed for unrest.

In a similar vein, it is important to note the leadership characters involved. Habibie was
an intense and fickle man, who was unpredictable in the degree of his choices. Being labeled an
interim leader, his intentions were often clouded by a need to assert control.¹³ At the same time,
Howard was at a point in his political career where he was willing to take unreasonable risks to
create public support. Having just been elected to his second term as Prime Minister, he also felt
the need to assert himself in the region.¹⁴ Thus, in Habibie and Howard, both sides had leaders
under pressure who were ready to make brash decisions.

From a “degree of difficulty” perspective of foreign policy analysis, both the Indonesian
political situation and personalities of leadership created volatility regarding the issue of East
Timor between Australia and Indonesia.¹⁵ Under this framework, Habibie’s knee jerk decision
and the crazed militias can be understood. The process of events in Timor never could’ve been
controlled, no matter the contents of Howard’s letter. There was an inevitability of chaos.

Thus, instead of the process, an analysis of Howard’s letter should hinge on the results. The ends rather than the means. In the context of the region as a whole, these end results manifested in two main categories: political and social.

From a geopolitical perspective, the relationship between Australia and Indonesia experienced mixed effects. Certainly, following the violence of the militia forces and the deployment of Australian troops in INTERFET, Indonesia developed a mistrust of Australia. Sustained into the 2000s even after Habibie’s exit from power, this tension leaked into later foreign issues such as the MV Tampa affair.¹⁶ However, at the same time, for decades the East Timor dilemma was the foremost problem between the two countries. The stalemate hindered other progress. Hence, at the cost of momentary tension, Howard’s decisions were beneficial in removing the roadblock of Timor for future generations.¹⁷

Although the consequences of Howard’s letter were balanced in a geopolitical sense, its positive social impact was immediately clear. The reversal in Australia’s stance with Indonesia boosted public sentiment throughout the country. In East Timor, Howard’s letter brought twenty five years of genocide to an end. Moving into the 2000s, previous religious turmoil between Indonesia and East Timor has been alleviated.¹⁸ Famines and rates of poverty have consistently decreased following the millennium.¹⁹ Most importantly, the people of East Timor have been able to govern themselves.

Howard’s letter to President Habibie, urging for East Timor to decide its own independence, was striking and chaotic from the very start. Moreover, it led to a firestorm of misinterpretations and violence. Through conflicting interpretations, the key is to distinguish between the result and the process. Political and societal reasons alike, a process of violence in East Timor was an inevitability. Howard’s letter was a necessary evil for future growth. In this sense, the social results clearly exhibit the letter as a successful piece of foreign policy. Sometimes, a lone spark is needed to light the brush ablaze. Only then can a new nation grow from the ashes.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: John Howard (cropped), taken on July 17, 2012, Photo by Helene C. Stikkel | Image sourced from Picryl | CC License, cropped

1. Don Greenless, “Remembering the Lessons and Legacies of Australia’s East Timor Intervention,” Asialink, last modified 2019, accessed 2024, https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/stories/remembering-the-lessons-and-legacies-of-australias-east-timor-intervention ↩︎
2. James Dobbins et al., “Chapter Six East Timor,” in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in
   Nation-Building (2013), 129. ↩︎
3. Angus L. Porter, “Chapter 3 the 1975 Indonesian Invasion,” in Windows of Opportunity: East Timor and Australian Strategic Decision Making (1975–1999), (2016), 27, accessed 2024, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13828.8?searchText=East+TImor+Genocide&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicS earch%3FQuery%3DEast%2BTImor%2BGenocide%26so%3Drel&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcont rol&refreqid=fastly-default%3A9fadb5e249d152f0786f7528c1428790. ↩︎
4. John Braithwaite, Hilary Charlesworth, and Adérito Soares, “Santa Cruz Massacre, 1991,” in Networked Governance of Freedom and Tyranny: Peace in Timor-Leste (ANU Press, 2012), 79, accessed 2024, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24h2jz.13?searchText=Dili+massacre&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3 FQuery%3DDili%2Bmassacre%26so%3Drel&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastlydefault%3A232c5bfd32ec40edcf13d1dd1286124c. ↩︎
5. Dionisio Babo Soares, “Political Developments Leading to the Referendum,” in Out of the Ashes, ed. James Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares (ANU Press, 2003), 60, PDF. 6. Richard Woolcott, “Howard’s ‘Noble’ Act Was Folly,” The Age, last modified 2003, accessed 2024, https://www.theage.com.au/national/howards-noble-act-was-folly-20030307-gdvcc9.html. ↩︎
6. Richard Woolcott, “Howard’s ‘Noble’ Act Was Folly,” The Age, last modified 2003, accessed 2024, https://www.theage.com.au/national/howards-noble-act-was-folly-20030307-gdvcc9.html. ↩︎
7. Woolcott, “Howard’s ‘Noble,'” The Age. ↩︎
8. Dobbins et al., “Chapter Six East,” 131. ↩︎
9. Dobbins et al., “Chapter Six East,” 129. ↩︎
10. John McCarthy, “The Myths of Australia’s Role in East Timorese Independence,” The Strategist, last modified 2020, accessed 2024, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-myths-of-australias-role-in-east-timorese-independence/. ↩︎
11. Dobbins et al., “Chapter Six East,” 129. ↩︎
12. Dobbins et al., “Chapter Six East,” 129. ↩︎
13. Woolcott, “Howard’s ‘Noble,'” The Age. ↩︎
14. James Walter, “John Howard and the ‘Strong Leader’ Thesis.,” Parliament of Australia, last modified 2006, accessed 2024, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22media/pressrel/09YI6%22. ↩︎
15. Stephen M. Walt, “Making the Grade,” Foreign Policy, last modified 2014, accessed 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/06/making-the-grade/. ↩︎
16. Sayomi Ariyawansa, “Boats of Diplomacy: Where to from Here for Indonesia and Australia?,” Right Now, last modified 2014, accessed 2024, https://rightnow.org.au/opinion/boats-of-diplomacy-where-to-from-here-for-indonesia-and-australia/. ↩︎
17. Greenless, “Remembering the Lessons,” Asialink. ↩︎
18. Robert W. Hefner, “Religious Ironies in East Timor,” Trinity College, last modified 2000, accessed 2024, https://www3.trincoll.edu/csrpl/RINVol3No1/east_timor.htm. ↩︎
19. The World Bank, “The World Bank in Timor-leste,” World Bank Group, last modified 2022, accessed 2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/timor-leste/overview. ↩︎

This essay won an honorable mention in the 2024 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Evaluate an example of a foreign policy, historical or contemporary, that can be considered a success.”

“I’m very worried I won’t find enough money to feed my daughter,” cried a 32-year-old Cambodian seamstress, whose husband had died in a previous civil war. “We’re frightened.”¹ Her words echoed the anxiety widely held by Cambodians after July 2, 1997, when the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) seized control of the capitol Phnom Penh and expelled the rival royalist FUNCINPEC party.² The violence led most foreign countries to withdraw aid, leaving Cambodia’s economy crippled.³ Japan’s continued aid and sponsorship of the 1998 election served as a lifeboat for Cambodia’s economic stability, social welfare, and democratization efforts throughout the crisis period and into the 2010s. 

The eruption of political violence in 1997 reminded the Cambodian and international community of the horrors of the previous decade, when from 1975 to 1979 the communist Khmer Rouge attempted to transform Cambodia into an agrarian society⁴ and murdered 1.5-2 million people.⁵ Thus, the 1997 political crisis destroyed international confidence in Cambodia’s future. Japan’s continued aid to Cambodia reflected popular sentiment in Japan for a foreign policy framework promoting democracy abroad.⁶ Policy makers in Tokyo believed that by securing “freedom from want” (basic economic needs) they could foster “freedom from fear” (political freedom), thus developing the underlying factors involved in cultivating a democracy.⁷ With this rationale, Japan conditioned economic aid on the CPP’s adhering to the Paris 1991 Accords, guaranteeing human-rights, and holding free and fair elections in 1998. As a result, Japan’s foreign policy played a significant role in the economic growth and the emergence of pro democracy movements in Cambodia in the late 1990s, early 2000s, and the decades to come. 

Japan’s consistent aid stabilized economic growth and improved living standards after the 1998 elections. While other foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows had stalled in Cambodia, Japan poured $720 million into the country from 1997 to 2007. Specifically, Japanese grants helped to develop Cambodian infrastructure: Japan provided millions of yen for the development of rural irrigation and financed the Neak Leoung Bridge, which has linked poorer rural regions to urban services such as medical care and education.⁸ Furthermore, Japanese interest-free grants funded Japanese-led medical training in Cambodian hospitals and critical medical technology.⁹ These advancements have improved healthcare outcomes, including reducing the maternal mortality ratio from 1,020 per 100,000 births in 1990 to 250 per 100,000 births in 2015.¹⁰ Japan’s aid thus stabilized Cambodia’s economic growth and improved the country’s physical and social infrastructure in the early 2000s. 

In addition, Japan’s willingness to continue FDI, alongside its endorsement of the 1998 election, encouraged other Western countries to resume aid gradually in the 2010s. International aid to Cambodia steadily increased from $149 million in 2000 to $3.7 billion in 2019.¹¹ The continuous flow of FDI from Japan and other countries resulted in rapid economic growth in Cambodia, with foreign firms employing nearly half of the working population in 2014.¹² Therefore, Japan’s foreign policy benefited Cambodia’s economy in the long run by paving the way for foreign investments from other countries. 

Japanese foreign policy also fostered a climate of increased dissent and democratic energy by supporting 1998 elections in Cambodia with conditioned aid and organizational support. In the lead up to the 1998 elections, Japan’s sponsorship allowed pro-democracy leaders to establish campaigning and organizational infrastructure, which led to the first modern democratic movements in Cambodia. In 1998, organized by opposition political parties, over ten thousand Cambodians protested the CPP’s unfair election practices through a sit-in in front of the National Assembly Building. The Democracy Square Movement, as it was called, was the largest pro-democracy movement in the previous two decades.¹³ Meanwhile, Sam Rainsy, leader of the anti-corruption party, organized the first labor union in Cambodian history, which protested workplace corruption and poor working conditions.¹⁴ Indeed, Sam Rainsy remarked that he hadn’t expected so many protestors, considering the lackluster support for previous movements in the late 1980s.¹⁵ Furthermore, the democratic precedents established by the 1998 election, such as the (albeit limited) right to protest, were followed by political demonstrators in 2013 and 2014. These protests resulted in the seating of several anti-corruption members who had previously been barred from parliament.¹⁶ The Japanese-sponsored 1998 election nurtured an environment of political defiance and enabled nascent democratic movements in Cambodia to make political gains for the common Cambodian. 

One would be remiss to declare Japanese democratization efforts in Cambodia an absolute success, but the flawed elections were in part due to Cambodia’s historical political environment. According to Downie, election observers from the U.S. and E.U. reported several election irregularities, including voter intimidation by CPP members and politically motivated murders.¹⁷ However, the lack of complete fairness in the 1998 election might be more appropriately attributed to the historic political environment of Cambodia. According to historian Serge Thion, Cambodian society is rooted in clientship and patronage,¹⁸ where “people with limited means sought protection” from the elite class.¹⁹ This enabled “strong men” like Hun Sen to obstruct external efforts to democratize the country. In fact, elections would have been considerably less fair without Japanese aid. Japan, threatening to withdraw aid, influenced Hun Sen to allow FUNCIPEC opposition leader Prince Ranariddh to campaign in opposition.²⁰ Moreover, Japan contracted thousands of election workers and donated election equipment to maximize the election’s integrity.²¹ Despite challenges stemming from Cambodia’s political culture, Japan’s conditional aid and organizational support played a vital role in enabling Cambodia’s historically-significant, albeit flawed, 1998 elections that advanced the country a step towards greater democracy. 

Japan’s use of economic diplomacy to positively guide Cambodian politics and society, though imperfect, stands out for its successful fostering of democratic reforms and economic stabilization in the late 1990s and early 2000s. And yet, the world’s largest donors have increasingly turned away from conditioned foreign aid. The United States, as the largest foreign aid donor, has preferred an unequivocal approach, issuing blank checks to countries despite their flawed democratic institutions while often ignoring countries exhibiting potential for democratic transformation. Japan’s foreign policy approach offers an effective intervention model to spur positive development in emergent democracies.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Phnom Penh : New construction project | Image sourced from Flickr

1. Keith Richburg, “Pullout by Foreigners Paralyzes Cambodia,” The Washington Post, July 16, 1997, accessed May 30, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/07/16/pullout-by-foreigners paralyzes-cambodia/7a641218-26c2-4e8b-a7f6-9d74a335090b/. ↩︎
2. Mikio Oishi and Fumitaka Furuoka, “Can Japanese Aid Be an Effective Tool of Influence? Case Studies of  Cambodia and Burma,” Asian Survey 43, no. 6 (2003): 893-895, JSTOR. ↩︎
3. Tony Kevin, “Cambodia’s International Rehabilitation, 1997–2000,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 3  (2000): 596, JSTOR. ↩︎
4. Alexander Laban Hinton, “Agents of Death: Explaining the Cambodian Genocide in Terms of Psychosocial  Dissonance,” American Anthropologist 98, no. 4 (1996): 818, JSTOR. ↩︎
5. National Research Council, 5, The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises: The Case of Cambodia,, ed.  Reed HE and Keely CB (Washington D.C: National Academies Press (US), 2001), 1, National Library of  Medicine. ↩︎
6. Maiko Ichihara, Understanding Japanese Democracy Assistance, March 25, 2013, accessed June 1, 2024,  https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/03/understanding-japanese-democracy assistance?lang=en¢er=global.
   securing “freedom from want” (basic economic needs) they could foster “freedom from fear.” ↩︎
7. Ibid. ↩︎
8. Koizumi Yukihiro, Neak Loeung Bridge (Tsubasa Bridge) Construction Project, https://www.jsce.or.jp/e/archive/project/pj12.html.. ↩︎
9. “Cambodia and Japan to Improve Maternal and Child Healthcare,” We Are Tomodachi, Summer 2020, accessed May 30, 2024, https://www.japan.go.jp/tomodachi/2020/earlysummer2020/cambodia.html. ↩︎
10. Ibid. ↩︎
11. Mah, “Industrial-Led Economic,” 9. ↩︎
12. World Bank, Cambodia’s Future Jobs: Linking to the Economy of Tomorrow, November 19, 2019, accessed May 30, 2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/cambodia/publication/cambodias-future-jobs-linking-to-the-economy-of-tomorrow. ↩︎
13. Caroline Hughes, The Political Economy of Cambodia’s Transition, 1991-2001 (London: RoutledgeCurzon,
    2003), 185-197, digital file. ↩︎
14. Ibid. ↩︎
15. Ibid. ↩︎
16. RFA Khmer Service, “Cambodian Opposition Leader Accepted as MP Ahead of Parliament Sitting,” Radio Free Asia, July 25, 2014, accessed May 30, 2024. ↩︎
17. Ibid, 49-52. ↩︎
18. Serge Thion, “The Pattern of Cambodian Politics,” International Journal of Politics 16, no. 3 (1986), JSTOR. ↩︎
19. Kheang Un, “State, Society and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia,” Pacific Affairs 79, no. 2
    (2006): 225-228, JSTOR. ↩︎
20. Oishi and Furuoka, “Can Japanese,” 895. ↩︎
21. Nalani Vittal, “Piecing the Peace in Cambodia: Return of Politics,” Economic and Political Weekly 35, no. 15 (2000): 1290, JSTOR. ↩︎