Setting it all Ablaze: John Howard’s 1998 Letter to B.J. Habibie

This essay won an honorable mention in the 2024 YRIS High School Essay Contest for its response to the following prompt: “Evaluate an example of a foreign policy, historical or contemporary, that can be considered a success.”

In the Australian Outback, a wild bushfire can be a blessing. Through the flames of
chaos, new life can rise from the ashes. Looking back on Prime Minister Howard’s infamous
1998 letter to President Habibie of Indonesia, the sparks intertwined with the flames that
followed.

Throughout the 1990s, foreign relations between Australia and Indonesia were fixated
upon a single issue, that of East Timor.¹ At the time, East Timor had been forcefully occupied by
Indonesia for over 20 years; during which the government of Suharto perpetrated numerous
human rights violations and mass killings.² Although the global community condemned the
country for such acts, Australia was one of Indonesia’s lone supporters in the occupation.³

However, Australian public sentiment began to change by the 1990s, the result of
publicized atrocities such as the Dili Massacre.⁴ The precipice came in 1998, with the resignation
of Suharto following the Asian Financial Crisis. His successor was B. J. Habibie, an
unpredictable leader willing to loosen the occupation of East Timor.⁵ Having recently gained power in 1996, his counterpart Prime Minister Howard of Australia was also looking to assert himself in foreign affairs.

With both nations primed for change, Howard sent his letter to Habibie. Reversing
previous Australian policy, and attempting to match public sentiment, he urged Habibie to consider East Timorese independence.⁶ In doing so, he suggested a Timorese vote on secession be held within a few years.

What ensued was a complete domino effect, a direct result of the individuals and
pressures involved. Habibie overcompensated towards Howard’s ideas, choosing to hold an
independence referendum in only a few months rather than a few years.⁷ Both East Timor and
Indonesia were not ready for the result. After more than 70% of the East Timor population voted
for independence, Indonesian paramilitary groups revolted against the people.⁸ Hundreds of
thousands of Timorese were displaced in the violence.⁹ Circling back, Prime Minister Howard
took a peace-keeper position, sending Australian soldiers with Operation INTERFET.¹⁰

Unfortunately, by the time Australian soldiers arrived with UN forces, the events had
already taken their course. After a bright and violent flame, East Timor was on its way to
independence.

When analyzing Howard’s letter, there is a clear question of whether the ends justify the
means. Following the referendum, was the chaos of 1999 justified by the subsequent formation
of an independent East Timor? To answer, it is important to consider uncontrollability.

Following the fall of Suharto, the political change in Indonesia created a period of tension
both socially and economically.¹¹ Particularly in East Timor, the first few months under Habibie
were a unique time of law-lessness. Out of all parts of Indonesia, East Timor received the least
funding and support from the government.¹² The disarray following the referendum was a direct result of this disconnect between local and central government. In a sense, the political climate of
Indonesia was primed for unrest.

In a similar vein, it is important to note the leadership characters involved. Habibie was
an intense and fickle man, who was unpredictable in the degree of his choices. Being labeled an
interim leader, his intentions were often clouded by a need to assert control.¹³ At the same time,
Howard was at a point in his political career where he was willing to take unreasonable risks to
create public support. Having just been elected to his second term as Prime Minister, he also felt
the need to assert himself in the region.¹⁴ Thus, in Habibie and Howard, both sides had leaders
under pressure who were ready to make brash decisions.

From a “degree of difficulty” perspective of foreign policy analysis, both the Indonesian
political situation and personalities of leadership created volatility regarding the issue of East
Timor between Australia and Indonesia.¹⁵ Under this framework, Habibie’s knee jerk decision
and the crazed militias can be understood. The process of events in Timor never could’ve been
controlled, no matter the contents of Howard’s letter. There was an inevitability of chaos.

Thus, instead of the process, an analysis of Howard’s letter should hinge on the results. The ends rather than the means. In the context of the region as a whole, these end results manifested in two main categories: political and social.

From a geopolitical perspective, the relationship between Australia and Indonesia experienced mixed effects. Certainly, following the violence of the militia forces and the deployment of Australian troops in INTERFET, Indonesia developed a mistrust of Australia. Sustained into the 2000s even after Habibie’s exit from power, this tension leaked into later foreign issues such as the MV Tampa affair.¹⁶ However, at the same time, for decades the East Timor dilemma was the foremost problem between the two countries. The stalemate hindered other progress. Hence, at the cost of momentary tension, Howard’s decisions were beneficial in removing the roadblock of Timor for future generations.¹⁷

Although the consequences of Howard’s letter were balanced in a geopolitical sense, its positive social impact was immediately clear. The reversal in Australia’s stance with Indonesia boosted public sentiment throughout the country. In East Timor, Howard’s letter brought twenty five years of genocide to an end. Moving into the 2000s, previous religious turmoil between Indonesia and East Timor has been alleviated.¹⁸ Famines and rates of poverty have consistently decreased following the millennium.¹⁹ Most importantly, the people of East Timor have been able to govern themselves.

Howard’s letter to President Habibie, urging for East Timor to decide its own independence, was striking and chaotic from the very start. Moreover, it led to a firestorm of misinterpretations and violence. Through conflicting interpretations, the key is to distinguish between the result and the process. Political and societal reasons alike, a process of violence in East Timor was an inevitability. Howard’s letter was a necessary evil for future growth. In this sense, the social results clearly exhibit the letter as a successful piece of foreign policy. Sometimes, a lone spark is needed to light the brush ablaze. Only then can a new nation grow from the ashes.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: John Howard (cropped), taken on July 17, 2012, Photo by Helene C. Stikkel | Image sourced from Picryl | CC License, cropped

1. Don Greenless, “Remembering the Lessons and Legacies of Australia’s East Timor Intervention,” Asialink, last modified 2019, accessed 2024, https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/stories/remembering-the-lessons-and-legacies-of-australias-east-timor-intervention ↩︎
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