In Conversation with Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan, Former Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan, conducted in December 2025
In 2025, Pakistan once again stood at a critical juncture in one of the world’s longest-running refugee crises. At that pivotal moment, the voices of those who had witnessed policy and diplomacy firsthand proved invaluable, as the country confronted one of the most complex displacement situations of our time.
What began as a humanitarian response to war in 1979 has since evolved into one of the longest protracted refugee situations in modern history. In 2025, the refugee question is no longer confined to humanitarian circles; it now sits at the intersection of security policy, regional diplomacy, internal stability, and state identity.
To better understand the stakes, I sat down with Mansoor Ahmed Khan, Pakistan’s seasoned diplomat who served as Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna (2018–2020) and later as Ambassador to Afghanistan until his retirement in 2023, witnessing firsthand the U.S. withdrawal in 2021. He currently serves as Director of the BNU Centre for Policy Research (BCPR) at BNU Lahore.
Having observed Pakistan–Afghanistan relations at close quarters during one of their most turbulent phases, Ambassador Khan offers a rare, unfiltered assessment of where policy hasn’t worked, and what a realistic path forward might look like.
Alishba Barech: Pakistan has hosted Afghan refugees for over four decades. How has it balanced its humanitarian obligations with its own security, economic constraints, and national capacity?
Ambassador Khan: Pakistan has hosted Afghan refugees in millions since 1979–80, when Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. Since then, at every phase, there have been at least three to five million refugees living in Pakistan, depending on the dynamics of that particular period.
What made this possible was the extremely friendly and open policies adopted by successive Pakistani governments. Refugees were not confined strictly to camps. They were allowed to move into towns and villages. They were given opportunities of education like Pakistanis, opportunities of work like Pakistanis, and access to health facilities far more openly than in many other countries, including Iran or even Western states.
A large number of refugees who received education in Pakistan later went back to Afghanistan and today work in Afghan ministries and public and private institutions. Pakistan has spent much more from its own resources than what UNHCR has provided. These refugees have been socially and environmentally absorbed into Pakistani society over decades.
Security concerns have existed at times, particularly when Pakistan faced waves of terrorism. But generally speaking, Afghan refugees themselves have not been involved in terrorism in Pakistan. The threats Pakistan faces come from groups like the TTP or BLA, not from refugee populations.
Alishba Barech: Refugees are often framed within security discourses. How does the state ensure Afghan refugees are not collectively stigmatized or securitized? How do we separate perception from evidence?
Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: The issue enters security discourse primarily because Pakistan and Afghanistan share a long, porous border. This border has been subject to cross-border militancy for decades: jihad, insurgencies, and now terrorism.
Despite this, Afghan refugees have generally not been found involved in major security breaches. However, the state has not been able to evolve a nuanced policy that distinguishes between different categories of refugees. This is where the problem lies.
When refugees stay for decades, when second and third generations are born in Pakistan, they become socially integrated. Many of them are culturally closer to Pakistan than to Afghanistan. Ignoring this reality and framing refugees as a ‘single’, ‘security’ category leads to collective stigmatization, which is neither fair nor effective.
Alishba Barech: Many Afghan refugees have lived in Pakistan since the 1980s, with second and third generations born here. How does the state view these long-term refugees, especially those who remain undocumented?
Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: I think this anomaly has to be addressed. In the last few years, the government of Pakistan or state of Pakistan has been facing serious security challenges. These challenges also require Pakistan to have a comprehensive review of this policy.
There are refugees who were born in Pakistan and are, in many ways, more Pakistani than Afghan in terms of culture, language, and societal affiliation. But when even after second or third generation born here can’t call the country home, it creates a psychological toll. They live in fear and uncertainty. Whenever policy changes, they can be sent back. Documentation is a real challenge, and the state has not sufficiently addressed this.
In my personal view, many of these people cannot go back. I have met people who speak Urdu better than Pashto or Dari. The government will eventually have to decide whether it continues to disown them or evolves a special legal status, or even citizenship, for them.
Alishba Barech: What criteria should guide Pakistan in deciding between repatriation (voluntary), deportation, or integration of Afghan refugees?
Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: According to international refugee law, repatriation should always be voluntary. Pakistan is not a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention, but international norms still apply.
What Pakistan needs is a comprehensive refugee policy based on categorization. There should be at least three categories: registered refugees eligible for repatriation, undocumented Afghans who must be documented, and those Afghans who were born in Pakistan.
Importantly, Afghans born in Pakistan, their return is neither realistic nor humane. Thus, for the third category, we need a politically difficult but pragmatic solution. The most plausible way forward would be to give them Pakistani citizenship in the next few years, or at least a special legal status.
For those eligible for repatriation, the process must be phased. If millions came over five decades, you cannot deport them in one or two months. That will create a crisis for both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
If, hypothetically, there are three million refugees to be repatriated, then repatriating 100,000 or 200,000 people per year would be sustainable.
Repatriation, must be slow, negotiated, and coordinated.
Forced deportation may seem the easiest option, but it will not deliver lasting results. Since the current Afghan government lacks the capacity to accept large numbers, forced returns are bound to fail. Without the Afghan government’s economic inability to absorb them, many will inevitably cross back into Pakistan given the porous nature of the border. Therefore, it is important that both the governments have to be engaged in terms of having a very comprehensive and holistic refugee policy.
Afghan government has an Afghan Ministry of Refugees Repatriation, MORR, and Pakistan has also a Saffron Ministry (Ministry of States and Frontier Regions under which the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees was established in 1980), which is dealing with refugee issues. So, the relevant state authorities, relevant security authorities can also be part of this dialogue. And then they should evolve a comprehensive policy on Pakistan side, a comprehensive repatriation or resettlement policy on Afghan side
Alishba Barech: What humanitarian risks do sudden deportations pose for vulnerable groups like women, children, and the elderly?
Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: This aspect has not been sufficiently thought through. Many families came in the 1980s as small units of ten people and today consist of forty or fifty members. Over time, they have built assets; homes, businesses, livelihoods.
When such families are suddenly deported without arrangements to manage their assets, it becomes a serious humanitarian issue. Afghanistan’s economy is not in a position to absorb them. This creates hardship not only for the refugees but also for the receiving state.
Alishba Barech: Ambassador Khan, I understand that the state points to education, health, and employment as evidence of opportunity. But we cannot gloss over the reality: without legal status, refugees cannot fully benefit. They live under fear and scrutiny, are excluded from higher-end jobs, and remain trapped in low-income strata.
Definitely, that is what defines the third category. These groups should be granted legal status or some form of permanent documentation, as this is an essential step toward ensuring their security and integration.
Alishba Barech: How do Pashtun cross-border communities complicate refugee policy, given cultural homogeneity across the western border of Pakistan?
Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: Pashtuns have lived on both sides of the border for centuries. These linkages are historical, cultural, and familial. There are more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.
We have to be cognizant of these realities. And these Pashtuns living in Afghanistan and living in Pakistan, they have been having close relations with each other, close interaction with each other for centuries. And Pashtuns are not only living in Pakistan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in Balochistan, but also even if there is a large Pashtun population in Punjab and in Sindh, in Karachi particularly. So, this issue should be seen as an important issue affecting intra-Pashtun dynamics and also Pakistan’s own national security dynamics.
Any refugee policy that ignores this reality risks destabilizing internal dynamics. We already see movements like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement emerging around rights and grievances. Unilateral deportations can exacerbate resentment and create space for non-state actors.
Groups like the TTP are already exploiting forced repatriation as propaganda against Pakistan. This is avoidable.
Alishba Barech: What diplomatic and strategic consequences does Pakistan face from mass deportations of Afghan refugees?
Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: Forced deportations always affect diplomatic relations. While every state has the right to deport undocumented individuals, exercising that right without foresight can damage long-term relations.
Pakistan’s image has already suffered in Afghan public opinion over decades. Forced repatriation of refugees who lived peacefully in Pakistan for forty years further worsens that image.
There are regional implications and from a strategic perspective, its not a positive development either.
Detractors like India gain space to criticize Pakistan on humanitarian grounds. Refugees become another fault line.
Generally, Pakistan has earned a very good name in the past four decades for hosting refugees in Afghanistan, I mean, we have earned a very good name in Afghanistan and we have earned a very good name, good reputation internationally. However, through forced mass repatriation, Pakistan risks undermining its decades-long tradition of hospitality and open accommodation, while simultaneously fueling resentment among Afghans and ethnic groups within state.
Alishba Barech: In your view, what does the future require in terms of Pakistan’s refugee policy?
Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: Pakistan needs a revised, comprehensive refugee policy that is humane, realistic, and security-conscious. Categorization is key. Documentation is essential. Repatriation must be phased and coordinated with the Afghan government.
Unilateral measures may appear decisive, but they create long-term instability. A farsighted approach, one that balances sovereignty with humanitarian responsibility and regional stability, is the only sustainable path forward.
For Afghan refugees born in Pakistan or those whose return isn’t possible, as they’re fully integrated, there can be a policy of specially giving them rights to citizenship. But this will also require some legislation, because there is a legislation on citizenship and that policy has to comply with the legislation. So, I think that is why there is a more in-depth consideration or examination of these issues is required rather than going for forced deportation. Forced deportation is perhaps the easiest way of trying to get rid of this issue, but it will not actually yield positive results for the government finally, and it will lead to some negative consequences internally for Pakistan also.
The Afghan refugee question is not merely a question of borders or documentation, it is a question of history, identity, and statecraft. Pakistan and Afghan state are engaged in a very complex relationship.
Pakistan’s image in Afghanistan has suffered for decades, and there are reasons for it. Now it can suffer more. Our challenge; therefore, in 2025, is not a lack of authority or security measures, but a lack of a coherent, long-term vision.
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