Chen Jian is a professor of history at New York University. His 2024 book, “Zhou Enlai: A Life,” is the first comprehensive biography of the powerful Chinese statesman. He is known as an expert in modern Chinese history and the history of Chinese-American relations. 

The interview was edited for length and clarity.

Vittal Sivakumar: First off, tell us a bit about what led you to write about Zhou Enlai. What in your career led to that decision?

Chen Jian: First, Zhou Enlai was an extremely important figure and a giant of the twentieth century— a statesman and a diplomatic giant. For more than half a century, he was a central figure in the Chinese Communist Revolution and in the Chinese Communist Party. Beginning in the mid-1920s, he served on the Politburo and later on the Politburo Standing Committee. After 1949, he served consecutively for 27 years as Premier of the People’s Republic of China and for 10 years as Foreign Minister. 

Internationally, he became the PRC’s diplomatic face and played a key role in major events such as the Geneva Conference of 1954 and the Bandung Conference of 1955. He also contributed significantly to the rapprochement between China and the United States. 

However, there had been no major Zhou Enlai biography before this one. In 2004, Melvin Leffler, a diplomatic historian, was editing a series on great statesmen of the 20th century. He invited me to write a brief biography of Zhou Enlai. To convince me, he said, “Chen Jian, you already published two major books. With your knowledge of Chinese foreign policy and Zhou Enlai, it would probably only take six weeks to complete the book.” Of course, this was wrong, and it took much longer. 

Finally, the project changed from a brief book to a major series because the publisher, Potomac Books, went bankrupt, so the original plan did not work out. Ultimately, it took 20 years to write the book rather than six weeks. 

Another reason was the timing. In 2004, when I was commissioned to write a biography of Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Foreign Ministry archives began to open. This opening lasted for about ten years. Then there was a system upgrade in 2014, and after the upgrade, all documents that were previously accessible could no longer be accessed. 

Sam Sanders: In your book, you mentioned that different generations of Chinese civilians and people outside China tend to view him differently. I’ve seen that in my own family. My grandparents’ generation viewed him as a hero who tempered Mao’s excesses during the Cultural Revolution. My mother’s generation admires him as the diplomat who helped open China and made it possible for people like her to come to America. 

But you mention in your book that younger Chinese people today tend to view him more critically, especially since new sources have shed light on what he was able to do and how he acted. Do you see this shift as part of a broader historical trend, perhaps a move into revisionist history or even a post-revisionist era? Do you see your biography fitting that middle ground of trying to synthesize the two strands?

Chen Jian: Let me put it this way. Even in China today, Zhou Enlai is generally regarded in a very positive light—not just in official discourse but also among everyday people. When Zhou Enlai died, people in Beijing poured into the streets to say farewell to him. There was overwhelming praise, admiration, and international acclaim. People regarded him not just as a giant, but also as a good person. 

But times have changed. Among younger generations, fewer people know Zhou Enlai’s name. I remember once giving a talk about Zhou Enlai after the publication of my book. A Chinese student from Shanghai who had attended high school there came to see a colleague of mine after attending the lecture, and asked, “Professor, who is Zhou Enlai?”

This change is largely due to the declassification of Chinese archives, memoirs, and other new sources that revealed previously inaccessible information, including the darker aspects of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Events like the Great Leap Forward, the Great Famine, and the Cultural Revolution became better known. Since Zhou Enlai was a main figure in the Chinese Communist Revolution, people began to regard him more critically. 

This trend became especially pronounced after 2003, when a highly influential Chinese book, “Zhou Enlai: His Later Years,” was published in Hong Kong. It was banned in mainland China. The author was the son-in-law of Zhou’s interpreter and had been the head of the Zhou Enlai biography research at the Central Documentary Research Institute of the Chinese Communist Party. In that book, he described Zhou’s performance during the Cultural Revolution in a very negative, critical light. 

As a result, Zhou’s previously entirely positive image had been overturned. This shift has less to do with historical trends like revisionism and more to do with the critical reassessment of China’s recent past, especially the history of the Chinese Communist Revolution.

Sivakumar: Your biography is the first complete English-language biography of Zhou Enlai. There have been others who have covered aspects of his life, and over the past couple of decades, there have also been English-language biographies published of other famous Chinese figures. Ezra Vogel, for example, published a highly acclaimed biography of Deng Xiaoping. How have those works influenced your biography?

Chen Jian: I learned from them, certainly, and I respect Vogel highly as a biographer. 

We talked about the Zhou Enlai biography, and I think there are two things that stood out to me. First, I believed that this biography needed solid documentary support. As I mentioned, there were other Zhou Enlai biographies published years ago. Dick Wilson, a journalist, published a biography of Zhou Enlai, but it lacked archival support. Another famous author, Han Suyin, wrote a biography of Zhou Enlai titled “Eldest Son,” largely based on interviews with people close to Zhou. Interviews are valuable, too, but the problem with interviews alone is that they’re oftentimes self-serving. You often find that interviewees can be influenced by very specific, subjective feelings, so it’s important to cross-check interview information against documentary sources. 

Secondly, as I write in this book, to understand Zhou Enlai, you must also understand China’s Communist Revolution. Why did it happen? Where and how did it go wrong? I personally experienced both the Great Famine and the Cultural Revolution. As a dissident student, I was put in jail twice as a teenager. So the question naturally arises: how could all this happen? 

Some people try to completely negate revolution, especially the Chinese Communist Revolution, labeling it as a radical leftist, transformative revolution. In my view, revolution itself is not a sin. I use the word sin, not crime. A revolution may involve crimes, but revolution itself arises because the previous regime created conditions that made it inevitable.

Revolutions have a transformative meaning: they attempt to transform human nature and bring about universal justice and equality. These goals are admirable. But when utopian visions are turned into policies, revolutions can go very wrong. When revolutions succeed, revolutionaries come to power. With power, especially unchecked power, corruption is at its most extreme. This is what happened in China. In that sense, Zhou and his comrades, including Mao, made the revolution, but they were also remade by the revolution. So I wanted the book to tell Zhou Enlai’s story and also explore the larger meaning. 

There are other important aspects, relevant particularly today. First, he was a revolutionary who tried to maintain a centrist position while others pushed politics to extremes. Today, we see politics polarized everywhere with no space for compromise. Second, Zhou was someone who tried to get things done. That was one of Zhou Enlai’s greatest achievements— the quality of his statesmanship, that even when the revolution was underway, destructive and mobilized by all kinds of labels, slogans, shouting, he prioritized maintaining equality and the quality of people’s everyday life. Political correctness alone does not justify policies and actions. Leaders must present workable plans. In that regard, Zhou Enlai has given us a good reference.

Sanders: It sounds like Zhou Enlai was a figure who could bridge the center of political authority in Beijing and translate its policies into on-the-ground action. It reminds me of the quote, “The mountains are high and the Emperor is far away.” In an age when technology shortens distances, many Chinese policies are becoming stricter in their crackdown on corruption and in imposing greater state reach into local bureaucracies. What role is there going forward for someone like Zhou? Can there be an intermediary figure, someone who can interpret policies and put them in place?

Chen Jian: You do need such figures. That’s why Zhou Enlai’s story is still so meaningful. 

He was not a person who simply carried out tasks. He was also a visionary. In China today, surveillance cameras are everywhere. There was a jewelry store robbery in Shanghai a few days ago, and the suspect was caught within an hour because cameras were everywhere. Street robbery has gone down to nearly zero. 

Still, you find corruption. Recently, nine three-star generals in China were disciplined for bribery and other crimes. This shows that systems, institutions, regulations, and laws are critical for checking and balancing power. 

China has discussed adopting a “Sunshine Law,” which requires all public servants to disclose their property. It was first proposed in 1988 and repeatedly raised at the National People’s Congress until 2008, but it was never passed. Simply punishing corruption will not be sufficient to wipe out the roots. That’s why China still needs to deepen these reforms. Opening up will require developing institutions, codes, laws, and regulations to check and balance power, preventing the emergence of unchecked, unbalanced, supreme power from persisting.

Sivakumar: I’m interested in Zhou Enlai’s time abroad. He spent time in Europe and Japan, and you yourself have spent much of your career abroad studying China. How have your experiences as part of the Chinese diaspora informed your understanding of Zhou Enlai’s time overseas?

Chen Jian: This is an absolutely great question. 

For Zhou Enlai, it’s clear that his experiences in Japan and Europe influenced him. He did not formally study in Europe. He quickly became a journalist and then a professional revolutionary, working in Germany, France, and for a short time in London. It opened his intellectual horizons and allowed him to see the larger world. That was the time, right after the First World War, when all kinds of ideological thoughts were spreading in different parts of the world.  Zhou Enlai was deeply aware of China’s backwardness and weakness after years of Western and Japanese Imperialism. His dream was to see China rise again. Through his experiences abroad, he was exposed to a range of ideologies: anarchism, pragmatism, liberalism, socialism, social divinism, and communism. 

In his diary and a lot of his correspondence, you can see him comparing the ideologies. Eventually, he concluded that the so-called “Russian past” — the Bolshevik Revolution — offered the most rapid way of changing China’s international status. In one of his letters from early 1922, he wrote that he had chosen communism and that his belief would not change. 

In my own case, studying and living in the United States was also eye-opening. It’s not just in terms of access to new opportunities and access to books; it’s a different cultural and global vision that you cannot obtain just by staying in China. In China and in other East Asian countries, there is a strong examination culture that teaches students to find the single correct answer. In the United States, education emphasizes critical thinking and trying to test the wrong answers and then come up with your own correct answers. I think this is extremely important. So in my own case, I think being overseas has changed my academic perspective and my outlook as a human being.

Sanders: Looking at Zhou Enlai’s early life and when he’s developing his leadership style, it seems like he rose to a high position for the CCP relatively early. Do you think his leadership style and personal qualities were developed from a multitude of experiences, or do you think there was one major turning point that shaped his worldview? 

Chen Jian: Early life matters. Zhou Enlai received a classical Chinese education. He then studied at the Nanhai School, a pioneer in China’s modern educational system. Then he went to study abroad. All of these experiences have combined to shape him. 

He was also raised by three women: his birth mother, his adoptive mother, and a nanny, which influenced his personality and temperament, thereby encouraging him to ambitiously pursue equality across China. However, as a youth, he lacked the kind of revolutionary ambition we see in others. Some people even called him gay because in his diary, he discussed a very unique perspective on marriage and his love interests. There is no direct evidence to confirm that he was gay. The decisive turning point in his personality was between 1921 and 1922. When he arrived in Europe, he was still comparing different ideologies. By 1922, he had committed himself to communism. At that time, he was writing for the Chinese newspaper Ye Shi Bao and reporting on the British miners’ strikes and European social conditions after the First World War. Meanwhile, China’s national crisis was deepening after the Paris Peace Conference.

All of these experiences convinced him that communism offered the best path forward for China’s transformation.

Sivakumar: There have been evolving interpretations of Zhou’s relationship with Mao. How have you grown to understand that in the course of writing this book?

Chen Jian: This is perhaps the most difficult question. 

A number of critics describe Zhou Enlai as Mao’s assistant or accomplice, arguing that without Zhou, Mao could not have implemented many of the disastrous policies. This is not untrue. 

However, Zhou’s role in helping Mao was far more complicated. When Mao entered the political arena, China was divided, weak, and plagued by warlordism, poverty, and illiteracy. When Mao died in 1976, China had become unified — except for China’s claim over Taiwan — and recognized as a major world power. Chinese people’s living standards and education have greatly improved. China’s production, despite the setbacks from the Great Leap Forward, had really advanced. Women’s social status had been greatly improved. At the same time, the suffering of the Chinese people was the price to pay for those achievements. Without Zhou Enlai, many achievements might not have been realized, because Zhou was the person who implemented policies and kept the government functioning.

On the other hand, Zhou also limited the damage caused by Mao’s radical policies. So when people ask me, “Is Zhou a good guy or a bad guy?” Yes and no. All great historical figures contain both elements. 

Sanders: Having studied and lived in the US and China for a long time now, what course of evolution do you see US-China relations taking, and what would Zhou have thought about the path forward?

Chen Jian: It’s a difficult question to answer because even in recent years, Chinese-American relations have shifted rapidly. Still, I’m cautiously optimistic. The reasons are quite simple. Both countries are big, and their biggest challenges are internal rather than external. Sometimes leaders emphasize external threats because it is easier to scapegoat than to address domestic problems. Both countries are nuclear powers with enormous capacity to undermine the other party. Historically, the American GPS was destroyed by the Chinese, and the United States retaliated by taking out its satellite system. You know, we have now brought warfare into our space. So, in other words, a confrontation would impose enormous costs on both sides, far exceeding the superficial victory either side could win. 

The question is how the two countries can reach some level of mutual understanding and compromise. Even within the United States, compromise between the political parties has become difficult, even though the American Constitution is built on compromise. 

I believe the risk of direct military confrontation between China and the United States remains low. Ultimately, people should understand that to address the main source of their challenges, they should pursue compromise. Even during the Cold War, Chinese and American leaders sought to avoid a direct, all-out confrontation. That restraint should remain the top priority. The second priority for the government is to prioritize people’s everyday lives. If both countries avoid full confrontation and prioritize practical improvements to people’s lives, relations can remain stable. That’s why I’m cautiously optimistic. 

Sanders: Thank you, Professor.

Featured/Headline Image: Jian Chen | NYU Shanghai, Image Sourced from NYU Shanghai Faculty Directory | CC License, no changes made

In Conversation with Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan, Former Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan, conducted in December 2025

In 2025, Pakistan once again stood at a critical juncture in one of the world’s longest-running refugee crises. At that pivotal moment, the voices of those who had witnessed policy and diplomacy firsthand proved invaluable, as the country confronted one of the most complex displacement situations of our time.

What began as a humanitarian response to war in 1979 has since evolved into one of the longest protracted refugee situations in modern history. In 2025, the refugee question is no longer confined to humanitarian circles; it now sits at the intersection of security policy, regional diplomacy, internal stability, and state identity.

To better understand the stakes, I sat down with Mansoor Ahmed Khan, Pakistan’s seasoned diplomat who served as Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna (2018–2020) and later as Ambassador to Afghanistan until his retirement in 2023, witnessing firsthand the U.S. withdrawal in 2021. He currently serves as Director of the BNU Centre for Policy Research (BCPR) at BNU Lahore.

Having observed Pakistan–Afghanistan relations at close quarters during one of their most turbulent phases, Ambassador Khan offers a rare, unfiltered assessment of where policy hasn’t worked, and what a realistic path forward might look like.

Alishba Barech: Pakistan has hosted Afghan refugees for over four decades. How has it balanced its humanitarian obligations with its own security, economic constraints, and national capacity?

Ambassador Khan: Pakistan has hosted Afghan refugees in millions since 1979–80, when Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. Since then, at every phase, there have been at least three to five million refugees living in Pakistan, depending on the dynamics of that particular period.

What made this possible was the extremely friendly and open policies adopted by successive Pakistani governments. Refugees were not confined strictly to camps. They were allowed to move into towns and villages. They were given opportunities of education like Pakistanis, opportunities of work like Pakistanis, and access to health facilities far more openly than in many other countries, including Iran or even Western states.

A large number of refugees who received education in Pakistan later went back to Afghanistan and today work in Afghan ministries and public and private institutions. Pakistan has spent much more from its own resources than what UNHCR has provided. These refugees have been socially and environmentally absorbed into Pakistani society over decades.

Security concerns have existed at times, particularly when Pakistan faced waves of terrorism. But generally speaking, Afghan refugees themselves have not been involved in terrorism in Pakistan. The threats Pakistan faces come from groups like the TTP or BLA, not from refugee populations.

Alishba Barech: Refugees are often framed within security discourses. How does the state ensure Afghan refugees are not collectively stigmatized or securitized? How do we separate perception from evidence?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: The issue enters security discourse primarily because Pakistan and Afghanistan share a long, porous border. This border has been subject to cross-border militancy for decades: jihad, insurgencies, and now terrorism.

Despite this, Afghan refugees have generally not been found involved in major security breaches. However, the state has not been able to evolve a nuanced policy that distinguishes between different categories of refugees. This is where the problem lies.

When refugees stay for decades, when second and third generations are born in Pakistan, they become socially integrated. Many of them are culturally closer to Pakistan than to Afghanistan. Ignoring this reality and framing refugees as a ‘single’, ‘security’ category leads to collective stigmatization, which is neither fair nor effective.

Alishba Barech: Many Afghan refugees have lived in Pakistan since the 1980s, with second and third generations born here. How does the state view these long-term refugees, especially those who remain undocumented?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: I think this anomaly has to be addressed. In the last few years, the government of Pakistan or state of Pakistan has been facing serious security challenges. These challenges also require Pakistan to have a comprehensive review of this policy.

There are refugees who were born in Pakistan and are, in many ways, more Pakistani than Afghan in terms of culture, language, and societal affiliation. But when even after second or third generation born here can’t call the country home, it creates a psychological toll. They live in fear and uncertainty. Whenever policy changes, they can be sent back. Documentation is a real challenge, and the state has not sufficiently addressed this.

In my personal view, many of these people cannot go back. I have met people who speak Urdu better than Pashto or Dari. The government will eventually have to decide whether it continues to disown them or evolves a special legal status, or even citizenship, for them.

Alishba Barech: What criteria should guide Pakistan in deciding between repatriation (voluntary), deportation, or integration of Afghan refugees?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: According to international refugee law, repatriation should always be voluntary. Pakistan is not a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention, but international norms still apply.

What Pakistan needs is a comprehensive refugee policy based on categorization. There should be at least three categories: registered refugees eligible for repatriation, undocumented Afghans who must be documented, and those Afghans who were born in Pakistan.

Importantly, Afghans born in Pakistan, their return is neither realistic nor humane. Thus, for the third category, we need a politically difficult but pragmatic solution. The most plausible way forward would be to give them Pakistani citizenship in the next few years, or at least a special legal status.

For those eligible for repatriation, the process must be phased. If millions came over five decades, you cannot deport them in one or two months. That will create a crisis for both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

If, hypothetically, there are three million refugees to be repatriated, then repatriating 100,000 or 200,000 people per year would be sustainable.

Repatriation, must be slow, negotiated, and coordinated.

Forced deportation may seem the easiest option, but it will not deliver lasting results. Since the current Afghan government lacks the capacity to accept large numbers, forced returns are bound to fail. Without the Afghan government’s economic inability to absorb them, many will inevitably cross back into Pakistan given the porous nature of the border. Therefore, it is important that both the governments have to be engaged in terms of having a very comprehensive and holistic refugee policy.

Afghan government has an Afghan Ministry of Refugees Repatriation, MORR, and Pakistan has also a Saffron Ministry (Ministry of States and Frontier Regions under which the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees was established in 1980), which is dealing with refugee issues. So, the relevant state authorities, relevant security authorities can also be part of this dialogue. And then they should evolve a comprehensive policy on Pakistan side, a comprehensive repatriation or resettlement policy on Afghan side

Alishba Barech: What humanitarian risks do sudden deportations pose for vulnerable groups like women, children, and the elderly?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: This aspect has not been sufficiently thought through. Many families came in the 1980s as small units of ten people and today consist of forty or fifty members. Over time, they have built assets; homes, businesses, livelihoods.

When such families are suddenly deported without arrangements to manage their assets, it becomes a serious humanitarian issue. Afghanistan’s economy is not in a position to absorb them. This creates hardship not only for the refugees but also for the receiving state.

Alishba Barech: Ambassador Khan, I understand that the state points to education, health, and employment as evidence of opportunity. But we cannot gloss over the reality: without legal status, refugees cannot fully benefit. They live under fear and scrutiny, are excluded from higher-end jobs, and remain trapped in low-income strata.

Definitely, that is what defines the third category. These groups should be granted legal status or some form of permanent documentation, as this is an essential step toward ensuring their security and integration.

Alishba Barech: How do Pashtun cross-border communities complicate refugee policy, given cultural homogeneity across the western border of Pakistan?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: Pashtuns have lived on both sides of the border for centuries. These linkages are historical, cultural, and familial. There are more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.

We have to be cognizant of these realities. And these Pashtuns living in Afghanistan and living in Pakistan, they have been having close relations with each other, close interaction with each other for centuries. And Pashtuns are not only living in Pakistan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in Balochistan, but also even if there is a large Pashtun population in Punjab and in Sindh, in Karachi particularly. So, this issue should be seen as an important issue affecting intra-Pashtun dynamics and also Pakistan’s own national security dynamics.

Any refugee policy that ignores this reality risks destabilizing internal dynamics. We already see movements like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement emerging around rights and grievances. Unilateral deportations can exacerbate resentment and create space for non-state actors.

Groups like the TTP are already exploiting forced repatriation as propaganda against Pakistan. This is avoidable.

Alishba Barech: What diplomatic and strategic consequences does Pakistan face from mass deportations of Afghan refugees?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: Forced deportations always affect diplomatic relations. While every state has the right to deport undocumented individuals, exercising that right without foresight can damage long-term relations.

Pakistan’s image has already suffered in Afghan public opinion over decades. Forced repatriation of refugees who lived peacefully in Pakistan for forty years further worsens that image.

There are regional implications and from a strategic perspective, its not a positive development either.

 Detractors like India gain space to criticize Pakistan on humanitarian grounds. Refugees become another fault line.

Generally, Pakistan has earned a very good name in the past four decades for hosting refugees in Afghanistan, I mean, we have earned a very good name in Afghanistan and we have earned a very good name, good reputation internationally. However, through forced mass repatriation, Pakistan risks undermining its decades-long tradition of hospitality and open accommodation, while simultaneously fueling resentment among Afghans and ethnic groups within state.

Alishba Barech: In your view, what does the future require in terms of Pakistan’s refugee policy?

Ambassador Mansoor Ahmed Khan: Pakistan needs a revised, comprehensive refugee policy that is humane, realistic, and security-conscious. Categorization is key. Documentation is essential. Repatriation must be phased and coordinated with the Afghan government.

Unilateral measures may appear decisive, but they create long-term instability. A farsighted approach, one that balances sovereignty with humanitarian responsibility and regional stability, is the only sustainable path forward. 

For Afghan refugees born in Pakistan or those whose return isn’t possible, as they’re fully integrated, there can be a policy of specially giving them rights to citizenship. But this will also require some legislation, because there is a legislation on citizenship and that policy has to comply with the legislation. So, I think that is why there is a more in-depth consideration or examination of these issues is required rather than going for forced deportation. Forced deportation is perhaps the easiest way of trying to get rid of this issue, but it will not actually yield positive results for the government finally, and it will lead to some negative consequences internally for Pakistan also.

The Afghan refugee question is not merely a question of borders or documentation, it is a question of history, identity, and statecraft. Pakistan and Afghan state are engaged in a very complex relationship. 

Pakistan’s image in Afghanistan has suffered for decades, and there are reasons for it. Now it can suffer more. Our challenge; therefore, in 2025, is not a lack of authority or security measures, but a lack of a coherent, long-term vision.

The South Caucasus has historically been at the center of great-power competition due to its unique location, which sits on the fault line between Europe and the Middle East. The nation of Georgia is now embroiled in domestic strife, as the ruling Georgian Dream party has faced massive protests against its erosion of democratic institutions and reversal of deepening ties with the West. Amidst this instability, China and Russia have stepped up their attempts to gain regional influence in the South Caucasus. Given the rising competition between the West and an emerging autocratic bloc over vulnerable states such as Georgia, the stakes are high.

Tamar Chugoshvili is a Georgian lawyer and democracy advocate, and is currently one of the sixteen Yale World Fellows. She previously served as the First Vice-Speaker of the Parliament of Georgia from 2016-2019, where she spearheaded various institutional reforms and anti-corruption initiatives. This interview was organized by YRIS and conducted with the assistance of Boston Risk Group, a student-led international relations research initiative at Tufts University.

Riley: Thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. Let me just get a short introduction about who you are, what you do, and your work history.

Tamar: Thank you for having me for this interview. So my name is Tamar. I’m a Yale World Fellow. This is a program at Yale University that is run by the Yale International Leadership Center. This is the most competitive program here at Yale, which brings together 16 world fellows each year for one semester from different countries and backgrounds. I come from Georgia. I’m a lawyer and a former member of parliament, with 20 years of experience working in a civil office in politics. Most of my profile focuses on promoting, creating, and building democratic institutions, specifically in my case, reforming representative institutions like Parliament and local councils, and promoting accountability and transparency in executive institutions. 

Riley: All right. So our first question is, you’ve engaged closely with international institutions, from the Council of Europe to the Women Political Leaders Global Forum. What role do international partnerships and civil society play in sustaining democratic progress when political will falters?

Tamar: That’s a very interesting and very difficult question. I have experience working with both civil society organizations and state institutions. And I have represented Georgia on various important platforms, including the Council of Europe, but I also chaired the Georgian Parliament. I represented the parliament of Georgia to other legislative institutions such as the U.S. Congress, the Israeli Knesset, and other parliaments, so I know the role of formal national institutions and the role of non-state institutions, civil society organizations, both local and international. And I should say that cooperation between states and partnerships between countries are of crucial importance, especially for Georgia, considering we are a small country. But the civil society organizations, both nationally and internationally, have tremendous importance. And for years, organizations like Human Rights Watch, or many others, have been very instrumental for us in our democratic transformation, because we were going through a very challenging past. We were reforming ourselves from a post Soviet failed state into a European-style democratic state. That would have been impossible without the support and knowledge that came from all these non-state actors. 

Aiden: You have long been an advocate for transparency, parliamentary reform, and anti-corruption mechanisms. Georgia’s history has been marked by several periods of democratization and backsliding throughout the Saakashvili and Georgian Dream eras. Given these repeated patterns, what do you believe are the necessary preconditions for a durable and long-lasting democracy in Georgia?

Tamar: So indeed, you’re absolutely right. Basically, in my lifetime, I have observed Georgia completely collapse and be devastated, then rise from the ruins, and collapse again. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia had a war with Russia, a civil war, and complete anarchy to follow up. So we’ve been very vigilant on reforming, improving, and rising from this collapse. And I think that if we want to understand global politics, we should start not from Washington, DC. We should start with places like Georgia, like the Caucasus, and why? Because this is a place where these global interests really clash. 

So, geographically, we are located between the West and the East. It’s the meeting point of West and East, and throughout the centuries, interests from Eastern countries have sought to influence the region where Georgia lies. That is what China calls One Belt, One Road. This is a transit route that China wants to use to trade with the West, so the Caucasus is a very important region for them. This region is also very important to Russia, because Russia wants to maintain this part of the world as its backyard. It wants to prevent us from joining NATO. It also wants to prevent us from joining the European Union. And at the end of the day, the last thing they want to see is a country in the former Soviet order prospering as a democratic state. 

And while the United States and the West dominated world politics after the Cold War, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the presence of the United States and US politics in Georgia was very strong. The US was supporting Georgia to build our country up against a neighbor that really is our enemy. So for us to exist and to develop as an independent country, we needed a strong friend. And that strong friend for us has been the United States and the West. 

It was young people, people your age, years ago, who started working for very high offices in the civil service. Some of them became members of parliament. They themselves were contributing to the creation and passage of new legislation, new rules, that shifted our country. After the U.S. made the decision that it did not want to be the hegemonic power in the world, we saw the role of the West and the United States decrease. In our region, the power and interests of China and Russia are now increasing, and that has an immediate impact on democracy and what happens domestically. So Georgians were basically left feeling alone in this process to push back against massive powers and dictatorships.

Young Georgians are right now in a very difficult situation, because they are fighting desperately. Youth as young as 21 years old are imprisoned due to ongoing strife. For example, one year ago, a youth was just protesting in the street with thousands of other Georgians, and he was randomly arrested by the police. He was sentenced to four years of imprisonment despite committing no crime. So it is difficult for us, the citizens, to continue this fight for democracy without any outside support. 

All support from the United States, including USAID, the National Democratic Institute, and other American organizations, is gone. USAID was essential in providing funding and resources for people who wanted to build democracy in their own countries. All of that is gone with the Trump administration’s decision. That has left Georgia in a challenging situation where we see propaganda coming from foreign press. These foreign press coming from China, Russia, and even from inside Georgia are all trying to destroy the democracy that we have built up to now. It’s a difficult, challenging moment for us. So, for a small country like Georgia, it’s not enough to only have a people with a desire to build a democratic nation. We also need global powers to support our cause. 

Riley: You’ve been deeply involved in Georgia’s constitutional reforms, from the successful 2017-18 amendments that transitioned the nation to a Parliamentary Democracy to the failed 2019 effort to transfer to a fully proportional system by 2020. Given this experience, do you believe that state institutions are strong enough to prevent the GD from amending the constitution to codify their hold on power? Furthermore, how likely do you see this as happening?

Tamar: The ruling party, even though they very much want to amend the Constitution, our Constitution is very good in that it is very clear in stating that the future of Georgia is in integrating with the European Union and NATO. I believe the ruling party wants to remove this statement from the Constitution, but they cannot do so because it’s very difficult to amend the Constitution in the Georgian system. Constitutional amendments require a very high amount of support in the parliament and must be supported in two separate parliamentary sessions. The ruling party does not have enough members of parliament to make such a change, and I hope they will never get enough seats to amend the Constitution. So at this point, the only thing they’ve managed to capture is basically all the state institutions. The Constitutional Court is no longer independent. The Parliament cannot function effectively, but the majority is still not powerful enough to amend our constitution in a way that would allow them to delete whatever they dislike.

Aiden: I saw in an article you mentioned that the Georgian opposition could improve its effectiveness through greater unity among opposition parties and by adopting nontraditional protest methods to increase visibility. However, what stood out to me was your call for greater participation from the business sector, which has increasingly opposed the GD. How and why do you believe that business could play such a critical role in political opposition?

Tamar: I’ve been quite critical about how the opposition has handled the process, but it’s very difficult for me to speak about it right now. Most of the opposition leaders are in jail, and you cannot criticize people who are political prisoners. So I’m trying not to do that. 

As for the business sector, the political process needs money. Somebody has to fund the political competition, and the ruling party is led by a billionaire oligarch. That party has all the resources in the world. They control the entire state budget. They have a world salesperson in the country leading them, and they have all of Georgia’s major businessmen surrounding them and supporting them. Even if businesses do not really like them, businesses still have to support the ruling party because of the system. They don’t want to make enemies with the system. 

However, to have a competitive political process, someone has to fund the opposition as well. How can you oppose the ruling party, which has so many resources, if there is no funding on your side? So it is very important to find independent sources to fund campaigning. Even though it is difficult to secure this funding from the business sector, an unusual phenomenon is occurring: crowdfunding. We’ve seen people donating small amounts of what they own, even though they are not wealthy, and often lack resources themselves, but they are still contributing to the opposition’s cause. These funds are used to help political prisoners and their families. I think crowdfunding can help us in the future, not just to create political resistance, but also as a source of income and funding for the opposition. Without funding, it’s impossible to engage in a campaign and challenge the ruling party.

Riley: Moving to a more global level, Georgia stands at a unique crossroads geographically, historically, and geopolitically. It lies along both the ancient Silk Road and today’s Belt and Road Initiative, while navigating the competing influences of major powers. How can Georgia position itself as a connector politically and economically while preserving genuine strategic autonomy?

Tamar: This is difficult to do when you’re a small nation facing global powers, but we must do so. That’s the only way Georgia can maintain itself and its identity as a country of Georgians. We need to prosper as a democratic state and integrate more with the West, but we also need to be able to engage with other powers such as China. However, that can only happen if Georgia can continue to count on and retain support from the West, through the European Union and the United States. These are the only powers that would respect a small nation as an independent and sovereign country. Russia does not respect the independence or sovereignty of its neighboring smaller nations. Russia considers us as part of their territory, to which they can do whatever they want. This is why Georgia wants to be part of the West: European countries respect other nations, cultures, languages, and territories. Russia does not. The only way for Georgia to maintain its sovereignty and identity is to keep integrating with the European Union and to become a member state. While we seek to have constructive relationships with powers such as China or Russia, I don’t think this is currently possible.

Aiden: On the topic of regional stability, the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has had significant implications for security in the South Caucasus. Do you believe this is a genuine turning point towards greater regional stability or perhaps an invitation for more great power competition in the South Caucasus?

Tamar: It is very important that the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict in the Caucasus permanently ends. This conflict has been going on for decades and has been devastating. It is impossible to focus on constructive things, such as the economy and the well-being of the people, when two of the three countries in the South Caucasus are at constant war.

A positive development that occurred was the United States’ role in striking a peace deal between the two countries. But this peace is still too fragile. We still don’t know whether this deal will last. There is still a lot of work that needs to be done for lasting peace. Anything could spark a new conflict. If a long-lasting peace is achieved, this will enable greater opportunities for the region. It would allow us to work on joint economic projects that would allow all of us in the region to become powerful forces in the future.

Riley: I’d like to talk about Ukraine for a moment. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Georgia’s geopolitical importance has sharply risen. From Zelenskyy’s initial pressure on Georgia to open a second front against Russia to the thousands of Georgian volunteers in Ukraine, these cases highlight the ties between the nations. Do you think Ukraine has become a polarizing issue in Georgian politics, and how have both political sides framed it? And finally, how do you see the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine affecting Georgia? 

Tamar: This war has had a tremendous impact on Georgia and our government. I’m ashamed of what our government did in this regard. The Georgian government has been using Russia’s devastating invasion of Ukraine for its own benefit. Basically, the central message of the Georgian government has been that Ukraine could have avoided the war if it had played smart, and it did not. So the government is blaming Ukrainians for this war instead of saying what really happened. And what really happened is that the Russians invaded Ukraine. As simple as that. There is no blame on the Ukrainian side, and no one can blame it on them, which our government shamefully does. The Georgian ruling party is trying to convince Georgian citizens that it is a good party to have in power because it will keep Georgia out of war. Because Georgians have trauma from its numerous past wars, people are really traumatized and weary of future wars. Instead of showing proper support to Ukrainians, I think that the Georgian government has been very negative, and in the most negative way has manipulated the war in Ukraine for their own benefit. That is a very shameful thing to do. 

Aiden: So it seems like there’s a very big generational divide among Georgians. Why do you think that older people drew the lessons from the wars in the 90s and the 2008 war to be highly risk-averse and not to incite another conflict? And on the other hand, why might younger people view foreign affairs from a more nationalist and revanchist perspective?

Tamar: There is definitely a national generational divide. We have one generation that was born and raised in the Soviet Union. We have another who was born and raised in an independent and democratic country. The mindsets of these people are entirely different. Young people want freedom, independence, and opportunities in their own country. They want to live like the young people across Europe, where there are many possibilities for them, where they can think what they want, and say what they want. They want the ability to make decisions and achieve success in their lives.

The older generation is driven by a fear that there is worse to come. This is something difficult to overcome, but it can only be overcome over time. Older generations have the beliefs they do about politics because they grew up in a dictatorship, where this was the normal state of affairs. They were also victims of constant conflicts and wars, so it’s very difficult to convince them to change their mindset because that is what they grew up with. 

For the young people, though, it’s hard to get used to the idea that they should have no opportunities or freedom. Unfortunately, in their own homeland, the only way to find a better life is to escape, go somewhere else, and run away to start a new life. That’s our dilemma. However, the future is still with Georgia’s youth. Young people are always the future. The law is always with young people, so I think they will prevail.

Aiden: I wanted to ask a little bit about the foreign agents law passed last year that drew close comparisons to similar laws in Russia and Belarus. This law has significantly restricted the ability of civil society institutions to function. I would like to know if you see this event as a watershed moment, codifying a shift in foreign policy toward Russia, or as part of a continuing trend of closer ties to Russia?

Tamar: It was definitely a very significant moment, but it was one piece in a longer chain of developments. The foreign agents law is a terrible invention of Russia, enabling the government to label anyone who is a critic of the regime as agents of foreign countries. One of the fellows at Yale is from Russia, and he has been labeled by the Russian government as a foreign agent under a similar law. This law is an instrument to silence and demonize people. Many claim the government has political prisoners, that it’s not good to have them, and that it’s not good to send young people to jail for nothing. Those people are then denounced as foreign agents. Instead of accepting the truth, these regimes, through this terrible piece of legislation, dehumanize people who try to speak the truth.

The initial attempts to pass this law sparked a huge public outcry. Major protests prevented the government from enacting the law for over a year. But now it’s been enacted. It is one piece of a broader government strategy to drift away from the West and bring Georgia closer to Russia. Georgian civil society had been receiving funding from international organizations for nearly three decades, including the European Union and USAID. German and Swedish funds were crucial in the past, but under this foreign agents law we can receive this funding only with the Georgian government’s permission. So imagine that you’re seeking funding for a project that is pursuing anti-corruption work or helping political prisoners in Georgia. You’d need funds for that. The government says you can’t receive that funding without their permission. The government would never enable anyone to receive funds for work that would expose their corruption or other wrongdoings. It has eliminated civil society organizations, especially government watchdogs. 

Riley: One final question: looking ahead, what gives you the most confidence in Georgia’s political future? What should the next generation of global leaders understand about the challenges of small state governance? 

Tamar: Even though the developments are very adverse at this stage, I see this whole ordeal as a process. Throughout Georgian history, the country has fallen and risen and fallen and risen again. I see this current ordeal as another stage, a difficult period for us, but one from which we will find our way out. The primary source of hope for us in the region is that the people just do not want to spend their lives under a single dictator and are fighting to reclaim their dignity and freedom. Unfortunately, political parties and processes have not been able to channel the public’s will into real political and governmental change.

However, what is essential is that Georgia should be taken as a lesson not just for small countries, but for bigger nations as well. This conflict began due to rising polarization. Everything started with the spread of lies used to divide society, so people refuse to talk to each other or communicate opposing opinions. The polarization and hatred are a product of the propaganda machinery of state television and foreign sources, especially the influence of Russia and China. Those actors can divide society in a dramatic and very negative way. When it comes to democratic institutions, there are some signs that people have to watch for: any attack on the judicial system is very dangerous, and polarization is very dangerous. So I hope Georgia’s present situation can serve as a lesson for other nations to identify and detect those worrisome traits in their early stages and then eliminate them.

“Aiden Wasserman is the President of Boston Risk Group, a student-led initiative at Tufts University providing pro bono research support to NGOs, Embassies, NGOs, and Think Tanks on a variety of geopolitical issues. You can find out more about BRG here.”

The Trump Administration’s policies have had global ramifications for America’s place in preserving stability and peace. For many, these policies are destructive to America’s capacity to maintain peace and stability. However, for others, they highlight the cracks within the supposed liberal order and represent an opportunity for the world to do away with an American-backed global system. In this interview, Hal Brands discusses the state of American Grand Strategy under the second Trump administration. 

Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Professor Brands is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He specializes in the study of US foreign policy and defense strategy, and has previously worked as a lead writer for the National Defense Strategy Commission and a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

This interview was edited for length and clarity. 

Will Trinh: Thank you so much, Professor Brands. I wanted to first talk about the liberal international order in the context of the Trump administration. You briefly touched on this in July when you published a column in Bloomberg titled Three Ways that Trump Might End America’s World Order. The third potential reason that you mentioned in your article is that flouting the rules of the liberal international order and the ensuing hypocrisy could lead to the destruction of the global order. However, many argue that there have been many times when America has refused to comply with international rules. These include its refusal to abide by ICJ decisions in the Nicaragua case, its refusal to ratify UNCLOS, or the fact that it still uses weapons such as cluster bombs that are banned by the international community. My question is, why does Trump’s second administration uniquely pose a threat, considering that for the last 30 years, at least for some, America hasn’t been the most faithful to the international order it attempts to construct?

Hal Brands: Well, hypocrisy is always the prerogative of the hegemon, and there have certainly been times when the United States has decided that international law or the judgments of international institutions should not be binding upon it. I note, though, that at least one of the cases you mentioned, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, is more complicated than it sounds, because it’s true that the United States has not ratified it. However, it actually observes it. 

Nonetheless, what makes the second Trump administration potentially different, with the emphasis on potentially different, is that it’s hard for me to think of a time when the United States has fundamentally assaulted the central rules and norms of the post-1945 international order. And the most fundamental norm of the post-1945 international order is that you cannot conquer or extort territory by force and have that recognized by the international community. The norm exists because widespread disregard for it before World War II led the world down a very dark path. 

It’s potentially a departure because the Trump administration has talked a lot about acquiring or taking territory from Panama, Canada, and Denmark. It hasn’t brought that about, so we may look back on this period where the United States threatened some hazardous things but didn’t follow through. It’s also possible the Trump administration will come back to this at some point during Trump’s administration and pursue the agenda more seriously through harsher, coercive pressures and things like that, in which case, I do think we are in a different place regarding America’s relationship to the body of norms that it has tried chiefly to uphold since 1945.

Phoenix Boggs: Professor Brands, I wanted to ask about something you mentioned. You emphasize the potentiality of this instability and say that that potentiality rests on one factor in particular. Is there something that uniquely would enable us to be good or bad players in the international order moving forward? Do you think that factor is independent of Trump being in office?

Hal Brands: Well, good and evil is in the eye of the beholder; the international system has served America’s interests very well. As a general proposition, American policies that strengthen that system and make it harder for Russia, China, and other revisionary actors to disrupt it would be beneficial. That thickened cooperation between the United States and other countries, particularly other democracies that support that system, is good. 

All of that would be sort of favorable behavior from my perspective, and generally speaking, if the United States behaves in a way that is likely to disrupt or dismantle that system because it is pursuing its own revisionist projects, that, generally speaking, that would be bad. But it’s essential not to assume that everything about the existing international system suits America. Everything that changes or modifies it would be bad for America. That’s not the case, and there have been plenty of times in the past when the United States has decided that aspects of that system needed to be revised, reformed, or renegotiated. One example is when America dropped the gold standard in 1971; it seemed, for a time, that it might be a disaster for the international system, which was basically a Western system at that point. It unleashed this reinvention process, giving American leadership in the Western world a new lease on life. And so reform can sometimes be constructive, and the devil is in the details.

Will Trinh: On this topic of autocratic entities, I was actually very interested in a specific other autocratic entity, and you touched on this in an interview with Decoding Geopolitics podcast. You often mentioned that North Korea threatens global stability as part of this axis of resistance. I’m very curious because we frequently see North Korea in the news for its most recent nuclear weapons test or other provocative comments. Why is it the case that a country with one of the lowest levels of development and a GDP of less than $30 billion poses a significant threat to the liberal order?

Hal Brands: North Korea has traditionally posed two threats. One is to destabilize the region of Northeast Asia. It’s obviously a direct military threat to South Korea and Japan, both of whom are US allies. It has posed a larger challenge to the International Non-Proliferation regime, which is an American Non-Proliferation regime, and has played an essential role in keeping the number of nuclear powers in the world relatively small over the past 80 years. I think that the North Korean challenge has grown because of two or three factors. One is that North Korea either now has, or soon will have, pretty significant capabilities to hit the United States, with nuclear weapons delivered via missiles. And as it does that, and as that capability expands, it poses questions about the credibility of US security guarantees for South Korea. So the challenge of that alliance becomes more pronounced. 

The North Korean threat is also getting more significant because of the greater integration and cooperation it has pursued with global autocratic powers, particularly Russia. And it appears, based on published reports, that Russia is now aiding North Korea’s defense industrial base in essential ways. And then, last, don’t forget that North Korea has engaged in what we would call global power projection and sent upwards of 10,000 troops to fight in a war in Europe, which is something that I don’t think anybody had on their bingo card even two or three years ago.

Therefore, North Korea is not in the same category as China or Russia. In some ways, even Iran has been able to pursue a larger degree of regional influence. But it poses a real regional threat, and in many ways, the danger is getting worse as its partnerships and capabilities expand, right?

Will Trinh: I wanted to touch on nuclear non-proliferation briefly. You mentioned that nuclear non-proliferation has been a cornerstone of US foreign policy and grand strategy ever since the NPT was a treaty. When it comes to other atomic states that are more integrated within the international system, Israel and Pakistan come to mind. They may be more unstable due to terrorism within the region or because of other provocative statements that they have often made, which make them pariah states for the rest of the international community. Do these nuclear states also necessarily pose threats to the liberal order? Or do these atomic states pose the same, not necessarily the same danger, but a similar threat to global stability as North Korea does to international stability?

Hal Brands: Well, I mean, let’s put Israel and Pakistan in two very different categories. I know some people consider Israel a pariah state, but I don’t put myself in that category. I think it’s a democracy that is going through some challenges right now and faces challenging circumstances, that lives in a crazy neighborhood, and in many ways, has to deal with a set of challenges unlike those faced by pretty much any other democracy in the world. 

Pakistan, I think, is a different case. Pakistan has long been involved in supporting international terrorism and supporting our enemies like the Taliban, and I think those are the two very different types of geopolitical players. I don’t think either of them, and especially Israel, poses the same sort of international threat as North Korea. Still, North Korea is kind of the quintessential rogue regime; it is committed to the obstruction of the sovereignty of its neighbor, South Korea. It has a history of aggressive conduct. It defines the United States as an enemy, and so, from my perspective, as an American, nuclear weapons of that sort of power are far more dangerous than they are in the hands of a country like Israel. I would also just say in Pakistan’s case, it is a somewhat different challenge. And so yes, there is a possibility that the state of Pakistan might do something to destabilize the region while it possesses nuclear weapons. It was reported in the news late last year that Pakistan is trying to develop longer-range missiles that could potentially reach the United States. But the other part of the danger has always been that Pakistan would somehow lose control of its nuclear arsenal because of insider threats or internal instability. And again, I think that’s a different challenge than we face in other cases, right? 

Phoenix Boggs: I’m approaching this issue from an international environmental awards perspective. I’m curious about China’s evolving image in the world in the face of changes in the US’s role in the liberal order. The US almost allows China to be the good guy in the climate regime, particularly in the UNFCCC or the Paris Climate Accords. Is that a fair assessment? I’m concerned about how we’re elevating China almost at our own expense. And if that’s a fair assessment, does it extend to other international fields?

Hal Brands: In general, the Chinese government has been trying to position itself as a force for stability, moderation, and multilateralism, in contrast to the United States. The Chinese government’s position is that the United States is now engaged in bullying and coercion on a global scale. We can argue about the merits of that critique, and in many ways it’s hypocritical, and in many ways it’s exaggerated. 

Of course, it ignores all of the coercive and bullying behavior that China itself engages in the economic realm of the South China Sea, and in any number of other categories. But I think what the Chinese government accurately perceives is that American behavior is currently understood by large swaths of the world, particularly in the developing world, but not just in the developing world, to be destabilizing, to be somewhat damaging to the international trade system that other countries rely on, and to be a source of uncertainty and in some cases concern. 

Again, I don’t want to overstate that, but that is the perception in many other countries worldwide. And so China certainly believes that there is diplomatic money to be made by playing up those aspects of U.S. behavior, and trying to create a contrast. And China’s ability to do so is greater than before 2025, but it’s also limited by the unappealing aspects of China’s behavior, right? So China can talk about how it is a force for stability and multilateralism, but you know the countries it pushes around in the South China Sea know better, right?

Will Trinh: Early in September, Xi Jinping invited this access of resistance, alongside many other countries, to a military parade to celebrate the end of World War II. Do you believe this parade represents a symbolic show of resolve in solidarity among these states, or does it represent a firmer and more open relationship between these autocracies, either economically or militarily?

Hal Brands: It is symbolic, but the relationships are genuine. North Korea and Russia have a military alliance, which we’ve seen put into action when North Korea deployed troops to help fight against Ukraine. And Russia, North Korea, and China have a military alliance. It is a little bit more strained, and there are many ways in which North Korean behavior creates trouble for China, but it’s real nonetheless. There is a progressively tightening relationship, not quite an alliance, as Americans would understand it. 

Still, a deep strategic partnership between Russia and China has included a lot of economic and technological integration, which had been happening for a while, but really sped up due to the Ukraine war and Russia’s isolation from the West. It’s also happening in the military technological sphere. Suppose you look at some US officials’ statements about that military technological relationship. In that case, there are many areas in which China and Russia are developing capabilities together. They are increasingly operating and exercising together. They’re getting into some fairly sophisticated capabilities. And last year, the US Director of National Intelligence warned that Russia and China might operate together in a future crisis or conflict in the western Pacific. These things don’t look exactly like America’s alliances, but that’s not surprising because America’s alliances are unusual. They’re exceptional, and the cooperation between these countries is genuine, whatever label we affixed to the relationship.

Will Trinh: Right, but now I want to pivot slightly to Ukraine. As you just mentioned, North Korea has sent thousands of North Korean troops to the front lines of a European war. For the last three years of its grand strategy and foreign policy, the United States has made an effort to have firm commitments, either militarily or economically, to Ukraine. However, recently, the Trump administration, through multiple statements, has undermined this credible relationship that the United States would always be willing to defend Ukraine. I just wanted to ask, how do you believe the United States can reverse ship to counter this North Korean and Russian military alliance? Does this involve showing a firmer commitment to Ukraine, and what would that look like under a Trump administration?

Hal Brands: Well, the United States has not defended Ukraine. The United States has helped Ukraine protect itself by providing the things, whether weapons, intelligence, or money, that Ukraine uses to defend itself. The distinction is necessary because you don’t have American forces serving in Ukraine. 

This is not a direct war between the United States and Russia. It’s a war in which the United States provides some capabilities. Then Ukraine bears the burdens itself; that strategy has been pretty successful, if you think about the projections for how quickly Ukraine was supposed to fold after Russia was attacked. Here we are, three and a half years later, Ukraine still stands. The trajectory of US assistance to Ukraine was pointing downward at the end of the Biden administration, and it has continued to point downward under the Trump administration. The Trump administration hasn’t moved to deliver more support for Ukraine; it briefly shut off certain aspects of our support for Ukraine. 

However, there has still been a trickle of US weapons going to Ukraine over the past year, as well as intelligence support and some other things, which is likely enough to prevent Ukraine from losing the war. It’s not enough to help Ukraine win the war in the sense of conclusively kicking Russia out of its territory. And it’s not entirely clear that any amount of US assistance, short of direct involvement, would be sufficient to kick Russia out of Ukraine fully and to bring the war to a sustainable end. There have sometimes been hints that the Trump administration might pivot toward a more aggressive posture that’s meant to bring about a more limited objective, which is essentially a cease-fire or an end to war with Russia hanging in the balance for Ukraine. Doing so through harsher sanctions or by pursuing some of these partnerships with the Europeans would free up additional capabilities for Ukraine. The Trump administration has been reluctant to do so for a variety of reasons, but a lot of them are just that Trump doesn’t see this as his war. He always talks about this as Biden’s war and argues it would never have broken out if he had been President. So, he is reluctant to put himself in the position of making the war his own, as Biden did.

Will Trinh: You already mentioned that the United States has never directly put troops in Ukraine. But let’s say we live in this hypothetical world where US intervention would be necessary to solve further Russian annexation of Ukrainian sovereign territory. Do you believe that the United States, if it comes to it, should put troops on the ground? Or do you think this is a line in the sand that the United States should never cross?

Hal Brands: Well, I wouldn’t say that it should never cross that line in the sand, but you know, the bar for doing that should be pretty high, because we’re talking about military collision with a nuclear-armed country, so that should never be taken lightly. And I think it would depend on what it was meant to avert. If it’s meant to avert Russia taking the rest of Donetsk, do I think the US should do that? No, I don’t think so. Should the US consider intervening militarily to prevent Russia from overrunning all of Ukraine? If that were possible, I don’t think it is, but if it were possible, maybe because a Russian-dominated Ukraine would pretty fundamentally change the balance of power in Eastern Europe, and so that stake is significant enough that you should at least be willing to sort of have the conversation. But it’s, you know, a big move, and so it’s something you should only do, probably over fairly big stakes, right? Certainly a last resort. 

Phoenix Boggs: Thank you so much. It’s been wonderful having you here to discuss some of these questions. 

Image courtesy of the American Enterprise Institute

Zhiguo He is a Chinese economist and James Irvin Miller Professor of Finance at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Before joining the Stanford faculty, he was a professor at the Chicago Booth School of Business. Aside from teaching, He also serves as a faculty research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and the executive editor of the Review of Asset Pricing Studies.

This transcript has been edited for length and clarity.

Sarah Jeddy: Thank you for taking the time to speak with me. I was wondering if we could start with a brief introduction?

Zhiguo He: I am an economist from China, and I came to the United States in 2001. At that time, China was definitely a developing country, although the economy started opening up a little bit, everybody would agree that China was still lagging behind the US or other countries quite a bit. And when I arrived in 2001, 9/11 happened, and to a lot of people, that’s a game changer. Another event happened at the end of 2001, was the WTO. So China got accessed, entered the WTO in December of that year, and that was definitely a game changer for China’s economy, just that the entire labor force found a way to fuel the economy. It’s also that I wanted to mention a lot is that just Chinese are fundamentally, at least for two generations, they want to work. They work very hard. They are extremely diligent. And they just feel like, if they are working to earn money, it’s part of their consumption. That’s very, very weird. Weird kind of attitudes towards usual people, and hard to understand, to be honest, from outside, but that’s how hard working. And also, you know, just save for the future family to feel the growth of China, I guess, in the past 20 years, in the first part of the 20 years, which is 2001 to 2020 basically.

Sarah Jeddy: Yeah that makes sense. So then what do you think is, like, the cause of, or the relevant history, of the financial relationships between the United States and China?

Zhiguo He: The United States saw bigger investment opportunities in China in the beginning of 2000 when the WTO started opening up China. VCPs got into China in the early 2000. This is where the kind of textbook kind of financial connection started to be established. Before it was like DFI, most direct foreign investment, right? Those examples, including, let’s say, GM invests in Shanghai automobiles. Basically, foreign companies have both the technology as well as intellectual property. They know how to do stuff. China knows nothing. Only have labor, and then they start to collaborate. Beijing, from the very beginning, very clear that, you know, it’s okay, we give you the market, but you need to teach us. How do you do these things? This is now the debate—whether China is stealing technology or not. I just feel like this crazy debate, even this is from the very beginning, very clear. If you can come here, we will learn from you, you know, and oftentimes, we will say that this so-called technology transfer is a premise for you to open up, and it’s all agreed at that time. China is learning super fast. That’s a problem.

One interesting example—when GM started to open up in Shanghai to produce cars, they chose the cars to be made. It was basically in the 70s, already out, and nobody doing this anymore in the U.S. That was a response to this. They knew it. That’s the important part of this, direct foreign investment. Then, finance—true finance investment. Think about jd.com, think about these early internet-based companies. You see very big foreign venture capital names everywhere. Another layer is mutual funds—foreign investors like professional funds start to invest in China, in stocks. That’s the secondary market. The VC is the primary market. FDI is kind of zero level. The third party is also big, through so-called stock connect—where, say, Fidelity or Vanguard can use access in Hong Kong to directly invest in A-shares. Starting from 2016 that was a big exposure. When COVID happened and China’s growth slowed down, a lot of foreign money stayed at first, thinking maybe they’ll have to come back. Eventually, they decided to get out because after two or three years, they kept losing money. I think the lowest point is 2024—most of them are completely out. Now Beijing is doing something to convince them to go back, and that is gonna take a long time. I think they should come back, but it’s beyond my pay grade to really change anything.

Sarah Jeddy: So then, what role do you think that the tariffs imposed by President Trump play in these relations?

Zhiguo He: It will hit the Chinese export industry. I would guess that the GDP will be affected by at least 1%. I’m more on the optimist side. It’s only 1% if Trump indeed launched a blanket tariff. What happened in the past was there’s a lot of exemptions that you can apply for. So a lot of impact can be shielded in the median one. What we already saw last time was that there’s a lot of shifts in the supply chain from China to other countries, and the impact won’t be that large. So in short, tariffs hurt China’s GDP growth. Will that completely change the way people think about China? No, because China is not doing well, just from the very beginning.

Sarah Jeddy: That makes sense. So then I guess, kind of in the same vein we’ve seen efforts from like, both China and the US to decouple financially. So how do you think that would affect global financial stability, if at all?

Zhiguo He: I think decoupling is really happening at the heart of technology. There’s another area where decoupling is heavy—science. I worry about it. I don’t think there’s any solution to that. A lot of researchers would like to travel to both sides, but both governments are influenced by certain interest groups. In China, there are groups that try to convince Beijing that we need to prepare for the worst—potential U.S. military actions. I can imagine the other side does too. So all the sensitive exchanges, including financial, will be cautioned to an extreme extent. On that side, I am pessimistic. I think in the time of Trump, as well as Xi, it’s harder to get any progress. One thing I do see is that Singapore benefits. Most of these kinds of meetings happen in Singapore now.

Sarah Jeddy: So do you think that Singapore is going to play an increasingly large role?

Zhiguo He: They already play a role. They enjoy their position very, very well.

Sarah Jeddy: Do you think they would try to leverage that for more? Do you think they will succeed?

Zhiguo He: They already succeeded. It’s an extremely small country. For a while, there were a lot of Hong Kong businessmen going to Singapore because they were worried that Hong Kong is not politically stable. I always went to Hong Kong, and there’s always a group of very lefty people versus extremely right. People who want a Hong Kong with no attachment to Beijing. Others believe Hong Kong can survive only because of Beijing and are very grateful. I wouldn’t say that I agree with everything, but Beijing just wants political stability. It’s not trying to discourage economic diversity. For instance, cryptocurrencies—in the mainland it’s all banned, but in Hong Kong, it flourished. Hong Kong even tried to compete against Singapore as another center for cryptocurrencies. And Beijing is very happy about this outcome.

Sarah Jeddy: Okay, so kind of pivoting, I guess. What role do you think China will play in shaping global financial markets in the coming years?

Zhiguo He: Little.

Sarah Jeddy: Little? Do you think it’s going to shift towards Singapore then?

Zhiguo He: In the old times, China got people’s attention not because of its financial market—it was booming. People went there to make money. But the power you felt was from the real business: jd.com, Alibaba, Tencent, Ant Financial. Now Deep Seek. Financially? It’s little. What people might sense is that because of its economic growth, because its trade was growing so fast, its currency became popular. The RMB, Chinese yuan, became a hard currency in Pakistan, East Asia. Beijing is excited about seeing that. They want to make the currency more influential. Replacing the dollar? Almost impossible. But becoming important locally—Southeast Asia—yes. That’s standard.

Hong Kong helped foreign investors get access to the onshore market where they can do hedging and other instruments. In that sense, it affects global financial markets. But China has closed capital accounts, which means money cannot move freely. So the impact China has on the world is through the real economy—not through financial markets.

Sarah Jeddy: So then, what do you think the real impacts will be in the coming years?

Zhiguo He: Manufacturing. China has impacted the world through this extremely complete, sophisticated value chain. Everything—China can produce. They’re moving away from extremely low-end work. Some things are moving to Vietnam or India. But when it comes to iPhone-level production—high-end parts—other countries cannot do it. Think about where chips reside—not the chips themselves, but the circuit boards. You need sophisticated manufacturing to do those things.

Sarah Jeddy: So those were all my questions. If you have any more comments.

Zhiguo He: I actually wanted to say something about what Neil was talking about this morning—entrepreneurs and private business in Beijing. Also related to industrial policy. I’m very neutral, slightly positive, towards industrial policy—China trying to promote hardcore technology over, say, food delivery apps. Beijing thinks that kind of thing is less useful than chips, for example. I think that’s fine. They’re slowly figuring out the best way is not to pick winners themselves. What’s good about the recent EV car industry is they subsidized consumers. First, they built out charging stations—only the government can do that. Second, they subsidized purchases. Not always 100% useful, but the best any government can do. The U.S. does it too. The issue is when governments subsidize the firms directly. The better way is to subsidize the consumers—let the market pick the winners. Customers still want the best product. Whoever wins the market gets the money. That explains the fast growth of EV cars in China in the past three years.

Sarah Jeddy: Yeah, that makes sense. Perfect, thank you so much for taking the time to talk to me. I really enjoyed this!

Zhiguo He: Thank you!

Image courtesy of Zhiguo He

This transcript is from an interview conducted on March 9, 2025, in partnership with the Brown China Summit (BCS). Founded in 2014, the Brown China Summit is Brown University’s student-led hub for all things China. Their mission is to promote and facilitate constructive dialogues about China’s global role on all fronts. This year’s annual conference, BCS 2025: Silk Roads and Cyber Paths, featured panels on China’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy, China’s financial markets, US-China Relations and their impact on Southeast Asia, Religion in China, and the Chinese real estate crisis. Keynote speakers included Xiao Geng, seasoned financial regulator and Chairman of the Hong Kong Institution of International Finance, as well as Susan Thornton, former US Diplomat to China and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Besides their annual conference, BCS hosts regular Chinese movie screenings, talks with Chinese entrepreneurs/industry leaders, and other discussion events throughout the year. See their website for more information: https://www.brownchinasummit.org/

This interview was conducted with Liqian Ren, Director of Modern Alpha at WisdomTree Investments. She came to the United States almost 30 years ago after receiving her bachelor’s degree in computer science from Peking University in Beijing, China. Liqian Ren later received her master’s degree in economics from Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis and then her MBA and Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago. 

This interview has been edited for length and clarity. 

Niemiec: Can you share your thoughts about the current state of China’s economy and finances? 

Ren: I think because China’s equity has had a lot of volatility in the last couple of years, it is investable–but it has a lot of risks. Clients are reminded that for [investing in] China, you need to know not only how much risk you can take, but also how much risk you are willing to take. China can endure for two or three years, but before the recent run, there was lots of very negative sentiment on China equity. It makes people wonder: did they make the right investment? There are a lot of opportunities in China to make money, but it’s also very risky. 

The US and China are in competition, and the US does have a lot of tools that it could use. Some of those tools are not yet used. If the relationship deteriorates further, I assume that the US will use a lot of those tools, like limiting investment, for example. The US currently limits private equity investment in certain Chinese industries. It could be broader. It is possible that the US may also limit public market investment. China is still very vibrant in terms of entrepreneurship, so that is a positive.

Rivas: How do you think the current geopolitical tensions between the US and China are influencing investment strategies and opportunities? 

Ren: The US-China relationship directly impacts China’s equity. If you look at tax sanctions and the trade war, these are generally negative for China and Chinese companies. Companies will not be able to make as much money as before. Tax sanctions are going to be the number one factor. On the other hand, China’s equity is also very driven by local factors. For example, of the two biggest rallies in the last six months, one was in September, which was driven by Chinese policy, and the second one was DeepSeek, which was driven by China’s AI development. It is true that the US-China relationship is a factor; but I will say, if I have to put it in a quantitative form, that China’s equity is 60 percent driven by domestic and local factors and 40 percent driven by the US-China relationship. 

Rivas: Can you elaborate on DeepSeek? 

Ren: DeepSeek itself and its technology are still not as good as ChatGPT. What really changed is people’s perception of Chinese AI development. The US in the last couple of years has been using mostly two tools to limit Chinese AI research. One is tax sanctions and not allowing China to acquire any chips. The second tool is limiting Chinese access to US research capability. Chinese students and researchers do have a hard time coming to the US to study. 

DeepSeek is a little bit of a counter to these limits. The US was successful but not as successful as they thought they could be because DeepSeek, first, was able to develop China’s generative AI, using software investment in improvements, instead of chips, which is hardware, which the US is putting sanctions on. Secondly, a lot of DeepSeek’s researchers came from top Chinese universities like Zhejiang University. That is also kind of a signal that the US limiting the Chinese from coming and studying in the US is not working. A lot of people here thought, hey, if we don’t allow them to have chips, we don’t allow them to study, then China is not going to be able to develop AI in the near term. But it turns out, within about two years, you have a player that comes and delivers a good enough technology, again, not as good as the US, but good enough. But good enough is good enough for China. 

Niemiec: Do you think DeepSeek could get as good or even better than what we have now? 

Ren: Right now, I think the US is still the tech leader. China, in AI, will be a little bit behind until it’s the same as the US. However, in a few selective strap areas, like batteries, China’s technology probably is now very close to the US. With DeepSeek, I think what China demonstrated is that it was close enough. If China didn’t develop AI in the next five years, then it would indicate it’s really behind. DeepSeek was able to be developed within two or three years. That suggests to people that if the US has sanctions, if there’s a lead, the lead time is probably closer to three years instead of ten years, as many people originally thought it was. 

Rivas: How will the tariffs recently imposed by Donald Trump on China impact the Chinese economy? 

Ren: It’s definitely negative, because China does rely on exports. On the other hand, if you remember, during the first trade war, China was able to continue to export to counter some of those negative impacts. So yes, it is negative; on the other hand, because China is a producer, and it does have a skill economy and a lot of things like clothing, where even though some of it has been moved outside, China still retains much of it. I personally love fashion, but if you go into stores and you check some of the clothes that are usually made in China, these clothes are slightly on the higher price end. The reason is that China’s supply chain is still very resilient and if stores want a piece of really complex construction to be done, they prefer it be done in China, considering the quality. So yes, it has a negative impact. But China also has some resiliency in these trade tariffs. 

Niemiec: In terms of resilience, there have been a couple news sources reporting retaliatory tariffs that could be imposed on the US. What is your opinion on those? Do you think that was a good move? 

Ren: A lot of these retaliations are mostly for the media. The Chinese government also has local public pressure, right? If it doesn’t do anything, it will be perceived as weak. They do have pressure to come up with something. But if you actually look at what China came out with, the retaliatory measures, it’s very low-skill, very targeted. The impact is nothing like a counter. So I will say those are mostly for China to do something to show that it is willing to fight back a little. But it’s not yet completely a trade war. China still hopes to navigate this to come up with some understanding with the US while also trying to open up a market for Chinese goods outside the US. Chinese exports to the US are still a huge part of its economy, but China is also trying to sell to other countries. I think there it goes back to the US being the ultimate buyer. The US has a lot of leverage, but I think the main purpose of China’s retaliations is about doing something, about communicating to the local public that we are going to do something, but the actual retaliation is very limited. 

Rivas: What sectors of the economic market in China do you believe have the most promise for long-term growth and why? 

Ren: So a lot of times investment is different from extra growth. I will say in China, high-end manufacturing will continue to grow, because it is now not just for economic growth, it’s also a government countermeasure against the US. But that does not necessarily mean that if you just buy stocks in high end manufacturing, you need to be able to sell to expand the market outside. I would say the areas that will see more growth are more manufacturing-related, more technology-related. This is mainly because they are also going to get more government-oriented money. The other area of growth is probably Chinese domestic brands. For many Chinese locals, luxury brands used to be very dominated by Western businesses like Louis Vuitton. Because China’s economy is not in a good condition, not as positive as before, a lot of Chinese consumers want high quality products but also cheaper prices. Chinese brands are trying to develop a lot within the higher luxury space. Chinese luxury brands don’t have the name recognition of other top brand names, but they domestically are able to offer good value and high quality clothing. A lot of these domestic brands and branded goods are likely to grow in popularity. Before, you didn’t hear about Chinese brands because manufacturers usually sell for American brands, but now, because the US wants to decouple, these Chinese manufacturers need to find something and they found having a brand actually helps the profitability. I think we will see a rise of these Chinese brand activities. 

Rivas: Billionaires and people of wealth are having an increasing impact on politics. Do you think such individuals will affect relations between the US and other countries, including China? 

Ren: That’s very interesting. We are in uncharted history here. I tried to go back and read history, but honestly, I wasn’t able to find anything. During the Cold War, there were American entrepreneurs who also had business interests in the Soviet Union, but the Soviet economy was never as tapped globally as China’s is now. It really is an uncharted history. That’s the way I’m seeing it. China right now doesn’t need the foreign direct investment, but I don’t think they will go against these entrepreneurs. Actually, China is very welcoming of companies like Tesla. Sometimes they do a little bit of limiting, for example preventing Tesla cars from going into government compounds. Even that comes and goes, and now they say they don’t do that anymore. Tesla’s self-driving software is now being tested in China. The US is not allowing Chinese workers to come to prevent a “sphere of spying”. yet China is still allowing Tesla to be a self-driving system. I think on these issues, China probably will use them as a way to show that China doesn’t want to decouple as much. I think the pressure will be coming more from the US side. If the US public feels that Elon Musk’s business is impacting his judgment, the public opinion in the US will probably shift first. I think generally China is courting these entrepreneurs instead of doing negative things to them. They prefer American firms to come and invest. 

Niemiec: For clarification, would you say that foreign investment in China is mostly private investors or international investors that invest in Chinese equities? 

Ren: If it’s a strategy listed in the US, then it’s still mostly US investors, even though people have been—before the recent run—much more negative on those. One of the panelists mentioned China as uninvestable. I personally think it’s investable. It’s just that it has a lot of risks. If it’s a strategy outside, it’s still the US public and the US institutions. I think pension funds are now going to leave China due to the political pressure. The state pension fund, especially in the more conservative states, is probably going to be the first mover. But if the relationship deteriorates, any investor or pension funds can be subject to scrutiny. I think we have not gone to that end yet. In direct investment, it’s definitely American firms. I think American firms, if you see banks and pharmaceutical firms, have reduced their investment significantly. Foreign direct investment in China has really gone down significantly, but companies like Tesla are still investing in China.

Image courtesy of WisdomTree

This transcript comes from a written interview conducted in February 2025 with Nimi Princewill. Nimi Princewill is a news producer with CNN based in Abuja, Nigeria. 

In early 2025, the Rwandan-backed rebel group M23 launched a large-scale offensive in the DRC. This marked a major intensification in a conflict between the M23 and the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, ongoing since 2022. M23’s advance has captured Goma and surrounding mining towns, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths.

In March 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s President Félix Tshisekedi and the Rwandan President Paul Kagame met in Qatar to begin discussing a ceasefire between the two countries. As of early April 2025, the M23 group had also agreed to participate in talks, with more conferences to come in Doha, Qatar. 

The following interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Niemiec: Can you summarize the current situation between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda for someone unfamiliar with the issue?  

Princewill: Militia violence has been rife in the impoverished but mineral-rich DRC for decades. This is partly connected to its vast mineral wealth. The DRC harbors a stash of several valuable minerals, including the world’s largest reserves of cobalt and coltan – both essential to the production of electronics. The scramble for control of these resources has fueled the violence in the country, with more than a hundred armed groups competing for territory. There’s very little infrastructure in the DRC, and its military has been severely weakened and overstretched.

We are now witnessing a renewed ethnic and resource-driven armed rebellion by the M23 militia, which is a dominant part of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) rebel coalition. The M23 claims to protect the interest of the minority Rwandaphone communities in the DRC, which it alleges are marginalized and persecuted. It also receives military support from Rwanda. Rwanda does not outrightly deny this.

Niemiec: You’ve previously written about the cobalt industry in the DRC. Can you comment on how the conflict impacts the working conditions in this industry and others?  

Princewill: The mining sector in the DRC is impacted by the conflict, as it fuels child labor and the unrestrained exploitation of artisanal miners in rebel-controlled areas. The working conditions are deplorable in some of those mining sites. There are reports of human rights abuses and frequent tragedies, including fatal mining accidents. The conflict also creates a pathway for militia groups to profit from smuggled minerals. 

Niemiec: NBC News reported that M23 warns it will continue to push further into the DRC after ceasefire talks. Why do you think they are rejecting the ceasefire?

Princewill: In my interactions with Congolese authorities and the M23, both parties blamed each other for reneging on truce agreements. Additionally, the M23 told me they were gunning for a regime change and would march on the national capital, Kinshasa, where they plan to overthrow President Felix Tshisekedi.

Niemiec: What should the United States’ response to the conflict be? Should we get involved in any capacity?  

Princewill provided a link Amnesty International’s robust expectation of the US. According to Amnesty International: “Actions that can be taken by the United States government include ‘lead[ing] a review of Rwanda’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations—something that is of great reputational interest to Rwanda’ and immediately restoring ‘all aid to the DRC’ to support the country’s already underfunded healthcare and food systems.” 

Niemiec: Do you believe the conflict will come to an end anytime soon?  

Princewill: There are no clear signs of the conflict abating anytime soon. The unrest in the DRC is deeply entrenched in complex issues that span years. If it isn’t the M23 today, it would be another militia.

Niemiec: Does the conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda highlight any underlying concerns to which the world should pay more attention?  

Princewill: The international community needs to be stricter in curbing the spread of conflict minerals. The global demand for cobalt and coltan (which are largely smuggled from the DRC) has triggered the rapid expansionist agenda of the M23. It’s not a coincidence that the coltan-rich Rubaya and Nyabibwe mines in eastern DRC have both fallen to the rebels.

Niemiec: Why should people be aware of what is happening between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda?  

Princewill: Anyone who uses a smartphone should be aware and concerned about the DRC conflict because their gadget plays a role in fueling the violence.

Image courtesy of CNN

In December, the YRIS Interviews and Events Team sat down for an interview with Fausto Belo Ximenes, a member of the 2024 Maurice R. Greenberg World Fellows Program. A human rights advocate and public policy practitioner, Ximenes was the Country Director for Timor-Leste with Oxfam International. He has worked with various grassroots and international organizations in Timor-Leste to promote inclusive economic development, human rights, climate justice, and civic participation.

The YRIS Interviews and Events Team discussed with Ximenes his journey into community advocacy and his experience promoting transitional justice in one of the youngest independent nations in the world. Throughout our conversation, Ximenes shared with us his belief in a model of community justice that is deeply rooted in education, grassroots empowerment, and personal connection. In an age where the dynamics of international development are sizeably shifting, Ximenes’ insights are incredibly powerful for anyone interested in global advocacy.

You can find the full interview to listen to above or read selected quotes from our interview with Ximenes below. Note that all quotes have been edited for length and clarity.

Vittal Sivakumar: Could you introduce yourself and tell us about your journey to your rule at Oxfam International?

Fausto Belo Ximenes:  Of course. My name is Fausto Belo Ximenes, and I am from Timor-Leste. In case some of the listeners don’t know where it is, it is a small island country located between Australia and Indonesia. Its political history includes 450 years of Portuguese colonization until 1975, and in 1975, it declared its independence for about two weeks, and after that, it was invaded by Indonesia, which led to the 24 years of subsequent occupation by the Indonesian military. Timor-Leste restored its independence in 2002.

I grew up under Indonesian military occupation. Growing up under occupation,  I witnessed a lot of human rights violations, violence, discrimination, and exclusion. At some point in my youth, I had been a recipient of international humanitarian assistance and witnessed the work of international development workers. This exposure led me to think deeply about what I wanted to do when I grew up whenever Timor-Leste became peaceful and independent. 

I finished my early education in Timor-Leste under the Indonesian occupation, including after Timor-Leste became an independent country, during which I was still in high school. I moved to the United States to attend Stony Brook University on Long Island, where I studied International Relations and Comparative Politics. This later led me to do graduate studies in public policy at Oxford and in human rights practice at Roehampton University.

For the past 14 years, I have been doing exactly the kind of work I wanted to do while growing up under occupation. This includes having worked with US government international development programs on access to justice, legal aid, rule of law, and democratic governance. 

Recently, prior to coming to Yale, I was the Oxfam International Country Director in Timor. We worked on an array of topics and themes, including responding to the COVID-19 and flood crises, working with youth groups, and working with women’s and girls’ groups to further their inclusion in the policy-making process.

Abla Abdulkadir: How would you describe your philosophies regarding peace building and international development?

Fausto Belo Ximenes:

When you work in the international development and humanitarian aid sector, especially in countries where there are contexts of conflict or post-conflict, there are a number of things to think about. Consider, for example, that you work and lead an organization of about 40-50 staff. It is really important to understand what your own staff are going through. One main reason they are part of your team is for job security and to provide food to their families, but many of them also may be going through things that you haven’t seen. There can sometimes be a disconnect between leaders and their teams when they haven’t experienced violence or war in countries with contexts of conflict. This gap in experience can prevent people from being leaders who are sensible and conscious about what impacts team performance. Leadership is not just about indicators and results. As critical as they are, the people behind successes and performances are also incredibly important. When you are a leader of an organization, you want to deliver, make an impact, and understand the well-being of your own team that is contributing and creating these impacts. 

What does this idea mean with regard to community? International development organizations are shifting today, although maybe not at the ideal pace. There are more efforts now to make sure that local communities, local organizations, and grassroots groups are the leaders of change that they want to see in their communities. Traditionally, international development has been rooted in colonialism. The dynamics of international development have been framed as the Global North supporting so-called less developed and developing countries. So there has always been a sort of divergence in the perception of people living in countries supported by international development. As somebody who has led international organizations, we think deeply about how to challenge these perceptions.

Abla Abdulkadir: What are some of the biggest challenges and efforts in promoting climate action and gender equality within the cultural and political context of Timor-Leste?

Fausto Belo Ximenes:

New countries definitely have their own challenges. Timor-Leste is a small half-island country. Half-island because East Timor, or Timor-Leste,  is a sovereign country. West Timor is part of Indonesia. Timor-Leste has a population of 1.3 million people, about 70 – 75% percent of which are under the age of 35. 

If you’re familiar with the youth bulge, it basically just shows that a country’s population is predominantly young people. Timor Leste has one of the most youthful populations in Asia-Pacific region I believe, or only just behind Afghanistan and a few other countries, This youth bulge can turn into a dividend with strategic investments when there are jobs for youth, when they are being prepared properly to enter into the market, and to be able to contribute to society. So basically, the youth dividend is just another way of saying a blessing. But, there can also be the opposite scenario. If a country is not making adequate investments in its youth, and if there are very few job prospects, we cannot see this youth dividend. If the education system is poor, and the quality of education, the actual substance of what’s been taught in schools and universities has not been designed to actually reflect today’s societal needs, and give youth a competitive edge, you cannot see a youth dividend. A youth bulge can translate into your dividend and can be a blessing with the right investments, but it can also be a curse. So what happens when you don’t invest in young people? Young people are the other leaders that we have to put in all the effort to actually support and prepare to lead countries going forward. Especially in post-conflict settings, where most of my professional work has taken place, there is that big risk of us not investing in youth, especially in countries as young as Timor-Leste.

Another critical challenge that the country faces is climate change. It’s beginning to impact communities more and more heavily. You see a greater number of climate-related or climate-induced disasters in Timor-Leste, and that is one, and I think most of the small island countries in the Pacific or in the Caribbeans or in other regions of the world are facing similar sort of challenges as well. It’s very important for these countries and territories, including Timor-Leste, to have collective voices in the global discussions around climate change and the impact on their islands, communities, and livelihoods. Timor-Leste is part of an association that is called Small Island Developing States, and it has been an advocate for global leaders to take into account the level of fragility and vulnerability that countries like Timor-Leste and other small island countries and territories are facing. Small island developing countries, all of them combined, have contributed the least to climate change. 

As leaders, as global leaders, whether you’re an American President or a British Prime Minister or the Head of the EU, when we are talking about supporting communities that are affected by climate change, we need to know who are affected the most. Our solution has to be such that these individuals, these households, these groups, and these countries have their needs met, not only when a program is fully designed and delivered but also during the process of developing programs. I know that there are now a couple of finance mechanisms to support these communities. So you have funding mechanisms like the Global Environment Facility, the Green Climate Fund, which have spoken about loss and damage funds, mostly proposed and advocated for strongly by small island developing nations. I think it’s very, very important that we know and understand and put resources where they’re most needed. Because these communities, these countries, these islanders have had little to do with climate change, and that’s the reason why I said earlier that we can’t just talk about climate change. We have to talk about climate justice and what talking about climate justice means.

Q: What advice do you have for young leaders who are looking to make a difference in the area of International Development?

International development is called international development because it’s most likely operating outside your own country. Say you’re from the States and you’re working in a developing country, and with actors that are diverse and systems and processes based on a global sort of systems and procedures that your organization has developed that apply to multiple different countries. Advice that I could provide to you and to all the listeners who are young and interested in joining international development is it is an exciting area, and you get to really support communities that you want to support. You get to see the impacts. You get to engage. And not only with the government. You engage with the communities. You engage with local leaders that oftentimes are like centers of powers that impact the work that we deliver. You also get to meet a lot of international people, bringing in different experiences and lives that enrich you and your team. So for me, of course, you see a lot of poverty, you see a lot of challenges, and you see a lot of suffering that people go through. Some are actually happening as you are in those countries. Some are just recovering, or barely recovering from those. So you see a lot of difficult situations, and you can’t have beautiful situations without also understanding and embracing difficult situations. You have to think about how you can contribute to improving those situations. So I would say that as young Yale College students, go out there and explore. Go out there and experience and experiment. And if it’s not for you, there’s always some other things that you could do, not necessarily international development, but there are always other work that you could be doing. But I would say, you know, the great thing about being young is time, right? You’ve got time, plenty of time on your hands. So that means, you know, exploring and testing. And see if that’s for you. For me, I started doing that before I went to college, and then I went back and kept doing that, and I’m still sticking to it because it’s not just a job, as I said, it’s a conviction. It’s a personal and professional conviction that I would like to continue supporting communities and countries that are struggling in multiple ways through international development and humanitarian aid work.

Image courtesy of the Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs

As part of a series of conversations with the 2024 Class of the Maurice R. Greenberg World Fellows Program, Abla Abdulkadir, Sarah Jeddy, and Owen Haywood of the YRIS Interviews and Events team sat down to interview the founder and Group CEO of Affinity Africa, Dr. Tarek Mouganie. Affinity Africa is a digital bank that specializes in providing banking services to underbanked populations in Africa, as well as lending for small businesses and micro-enterprises that otherwise struggle to access credit.

Mouganie discussed his journey from childhood in Ghana to the founding of Affinity Africa, during which time he obtained a PhD in physics from Cambridge and worked for eight years as a director at a hedge fund. Mouganie has sought to apply his financial experience towards his goal of African socioeconomic development by focusing Affinity Africa’s efforts on providing banking services that are more readily accessible in Africa. During the interview, Mouganie also shared his love for science, triathlons, and Afrobeats, as well as his advice for students looking to the start of their careers: “not to take things too seriously.” Mouganie’s desire to apply his talents to make a positive impact on the area of socioeconomic development shines through as an example for any student looking to make a difference in their career.

You can listen to the full interview linked above, or read selected quotes from our discussion with Dr. Tarek Mouganie below. All quotes have been edited for length and clarity.

Abla Abdulkadir: Could you go into depth on what Affinity Africa is, your role at the company, and what led you to found it? I am also interested in how your scientific background and interest in exploration and design shaped your ideas for Affinity Africa.

Tarek Mouganie: I was sort of obsessed with this idea of investing in Africa and the knock-on socioeconomic implications. After spending all this time at this hedge fund, I decided to get up one day and I quit my job, thanks to my mom. She was the catalyst. She said I was intolerable working for this fund, “What have they done to you, quit your job and come back home.” I quit my job, moved back to Ghana, and started focusing on this idea of getting investments into the continent, and in particular, supporting small businesses. I became obsessed with that idea. After trying to figure out how to build a fund that would invest in African startups and African small businesses, I then had this sort of aha moment. I had all this guilt of, like, eight years working for a hedge fund. “What did I do? Why did I waste my time, my life? Why was I there for so long?” And then I kind of paused, and I thought to myself, “I understand banking because of these eight years.” All the pieces just clicked, you know? And I was like, that’s what I’m gonna do. I’m gonna start a bank. And that was it. 

The first thing that I did, getting back to your question on informed design, is I tried to figure out why banking has failed Africa. Just to throw out the statistics, looking at Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, only 42% of adults have a bank account. It’s crazy. I mean, the start of your financial freedom, financial journey is to actually be included in financial services. Even worse than that, less than 10% of businesses have access to credit. How can you grow without a loan? You have an idea. You want to start a business. You might be able to survive on the revenue that you generate in the cash flow, but to unlock your full potential, you need access to credit.

I realized that banking was invented and developed in the Global North, right? So it assumes, like all of us here who have a bank account in a country from the Global North, it assumes you’re formalized. It assumes you have a formal ID, you have an address, and you can prove that you have the address, too. You probably are formally employed and getting a check or at university, and you have to show that. So as a result, those are the three kinds of documentation that you need to actually go into a bank here in the US and actually open an account. Well, guess what? The majority of Africans, 87% of Africans, don’t have that information. So we had to try and understand, using informed design, how we could reinvent banking for the masses. 

And it wasn’t easy. We had a lot of stages of iteration…We actually only launched in January this year with a product in the market that we’re happy with. In March, we put out a product that we’re super happy with, and since then, we’ve actually onboarded 40,000 customers – and almost 10,000 accounts in the last six weeks alone. So it’s going like gangbusters. 62% of our customers are women, which is awesome. And almost 90% of our customers were opening their first ever bank account, which is pretty cool.

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Sarah Jeddy: What makes small businesses so important for economic development?

Tarek Mouganie: I often use the comparison between OECD countries and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  So small businesses and micro enterprises are the drivers of social and economic growth. It’s crazy, you know. In the US and UK, they are actually 99.9% of registered businesses and they employ over 60% of the population. We have a highly informal sector in Ghana and in Africa in general. By creating companies that employ in the formal sector you actually unlock that potential. It’s crucial because there’s a huge opportunity in our part of the world. By 2050 one out of four people will be African, and one out of three young people will live in Africa as well. The Global North is shrinking. The global majority is growing, and Africa has a huge potential to unlock its human capital so job creation needs to follow through as well too. That’s the first thing I wanted to say. 

The second thing is, if you take a look at OECD countries the tax-to-GDP ratio is around 36%. If you take a look at countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, it’s 18% – and if you take a look at countries like Ghana, Nigeria, and any of the countries that have extractive economies like Angola, South Africa, it’s as low as 6%. Our governments make money from extractives. They sell extractives. For example, if you have a chocolate bar, the cocoa probably comes from Ghana. Gold, oil are other examples. But what’s very important is diversifying that revenue for governments. Our taxpayer base is very, very, very narrow, so part of additional revenue is generated by generating and supporting small businesses. They are the drivers of revenue for the government. We’re talking corporate tax, we’re talking income tax, we’re talking VAT [value-added tax], we’re talking everything that is collected through those small businesses. 

The other thing that’s super important about this tax, the thing that I’m kind of obsessed with, which forms the majority of that OECD 36% tax-to-GDP ratio that I talked about, is that it creates accountability between civilians and their governments. If I buy a bottle of water and I’m poor, I’m rich, I’m paying the same amount of VAT. It’s indirect and it’s regressive, right? But if I’m earning an income or I’m a small business owner and I pay tax, there is a fiscal contract between me and my government. I’m paying money to you, for you, to provide you with a service that doesn’t really exist in that part of the world, because of the hugely informal sector. So if we see an element of formalization, and I don’t know what that looks like, and I’m not here to villainize the informal sector, you know, or romanticize them, but they’re a huge part of our economy. But over time, if we see an element, basically, of formalization and an increase in the taxpayer base, and an increase in direct taxation as well, too. I would like to think that there would be more civilian accountability to leaders in the continent as a result.

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Owen Haywood: How have you worked to bridge your diverse array of interests and experiences throughout your career?

Tarek Mouganie: I guess my life and my career only makes sense now looking backwards and trying to connect the dots – I think Steve Jobs said that, right? But in the middle of it all, I wasn’t really thinking. I knew I wanted to work in investment management. It was actually a friend from university that said, “Oh, I work for this company. Why don’t you consider joining?” And I thought, “hey, sounds great. I’ll give it a shot.” You know, what’s the worst that could happen? I would fail. I would move on with my life. And then when I left, the idea of starting a bank was out of coincidence, because I’d spent all this time, even though it wasn’t intentional, working in financial services, investing in banks, and understanding banking strategy. I think it only makes sense looking backwards at it.

The only kind of advice that I can give is not to take things too seriously. I’ve had a lot of students reach out to me here [to network], which is somewhat disappointing. Like 20 years ago, when I did my undergrad degree, everyone would go into investment banking and work for like a consultancy firm. I thought those days were over. surely there are other options out there, you know. And I’m not saying that there’s anything wrong with being an investment banker or, you know, or working for a consultancy firm. I did in the past, too. But don’t be afraid to make mistakes in the early stages of your career. You have chances to mess up and correct them later in your career, and when you make a mistake earlier, it’s a lot less grave than it is in the later stages of career. 

But what I wanted to say is stay curious, don’t lose that. Think to yourself, “What is your North Star?” If you want to fix health care, if you want to fix inclusion, if you want to work in the field of climate justice or whatever, why do you care about that? Which part of the value chain do you care about as well, too? And how do you start thinking through how to get to a situation where you think you can maximize your impact. Whether it’s working for a consultancy firm, fine, as long as you’re aware of that and getting the right skill set. Whether it’s working for an established startup where you get a ton of exposure because you want to be an entrepreneur yourself, or whether it’s working for a corporation that has a department in there that looks at sustainability, is also another option. Just make sure that you have all the options laid out to stay curious and always question everything.on, if you want to work in the field of climate justice or whatever, why do you care about that? Which part of the value chain do you care about as well, too? And how do you start thinking through how to get to a situation where you think you can maximize your impact. Whether it’s working for a consultancy firm, fine, as long as you’re aware of that and getting the right skill set. Whether it’s working for an established startup where you get a ton of exposure because you want to be an entrepreneur yourself, or whether it’s working for a corporation that has a department in there that looks at sustainability, is also another option. Just make sure that you have all the options laid out to stay curious and always question everything.

Image courtesy of the Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs

Last month, the YRIS Interview and Events Team sat down with Babra Ontibile Bhebe, a member of the 2024 Maurice R. Greenberg World Fellows Program. A native Zimbabwean, Dr. Bhebe has been at the forefront of democratic and civil society activism in Zimbabwe and across Africa throughout her career. She has experience working in numerous organizations in the governance and human rights sectors. This includes her current role as Executive Director of the Election Resource Centre.

The YRIS Interviews and Events Team discussed a range of issues with Dr. Bhebe, from her motivation to work as an advocate for civil and political rights and her career experience to her thoughts on American democracy and advice for how young leaders can support global democratic activism. Dr. Bhebe’s open passion for political rights and compassion for her fellow humans was made clear throughout the interview. At a time when democratic backsliding is a major concern across Africa and the world, Dr. Bhebe’s optimistic, diligent, and thoughtful approach to addressing this problem offers a compelling model for anyone looking to make a difference in the fight for civil and political rights.

You can listen to the full interview linked above, or read selected quotes from our discussion with Dr. Bhebe below. All quotes have been edited for length and clarity.

Owen Haywood: Can you briefly introduce yourself and explain your background?

Babra Bhebe: Sure. My name is Babra Ontibile Bhebe. I am a Zimbabwean. I was born and raised in Bulawayo, which is the second-largest city in Zimbabwe.  I started having an interest in human rights and governance work because of the environment that I grew up in, an environment where I witnessed a lot of poverty around me. When I was growing up, I interacted with some families who were struggling to send their children to school. For a long time, I tried to help these children to get access education by paying their fees, buying their school uniforms, and giving them all the material support that they needed

Then, after high school, I decided to do temporary teaching. This is where you go to a school and teach for a few months before you start university in Zimbabwe. I started teaching at a school in one of the marginalized areas in Zimbabwe that is called Binga. What I saw in that community was quite striking for me. Some of the students were coming to school barefooted, and without warm clothes when it was cold. That really touched my heart. I started helping again, paying for shoes and uniforms. 

When I went to university, the same thing happened. I began to interact with children that were in the same situation, and I started doing the same thing – paying fees, tutoring students.. I also started asking other students to join me. We started an initiative called Little Souls Foundation to help take care of these children. But after college, we all went in different directions. It became difficult for me to continue to support these children.

That was when it dawned on me that the problems that were facing the different communities in my country were bigger than me and that I needed to join a movement or an institution that was directly influencing policies around anti-corruption or accountability. Policies that were going to help ensure that the government becomes more accountable and more responsible in terms of supporting communities and addressing the root causes of these problems. I realized that just paying fees and buying shoes wasn’t going to be enough because more and more children kept coming. 

Most of the work that I’m doing currently is more related to civil and political rights, but that I do that work because of my desire to see the socioeconomic rights of the citizens in Zimbabwe being realized. I do not see you know the disconnection between the two sets of rights. I think civil and political rights are connected to the rights that have to do with people’s lived experiences, in terms of whether they have something to eat or whether the children are accessing education, amongst other things.

…

Hailey Seo: How can the global community do better to support pro-democracy movements and electoral transparency in Africa?

Babra Bhebe: There are many things that the global community can do to support our work – not just the Election Resource Centre’s work, but the work of citizen election observer groups across the continent. The first thing is to support the work of independent election observer mission groups. Deploying that work requires financial resources, but it is helpful in getting more independent views on how an election was held.  

However, I think there is a need to support the work of election organizations between election cycles. Funders must not just give to organizations when there’s an election, leave, and then come back only when there’s another election. The work of citizen election observer groups must be supported in between elections because that is where electoral processes are shaped. That is when you work on electoral reforms that are necessary for free, fair, and credible elections. That is when you get the first-time voter registrants to register to vote. That is when you get citizens to understand electoral processes and get them to decide on whether they are going to participate or not. That’s when you advocate for different things that you want to change, including some of the administrative processes that may need to be changed to make the environment more conducive. That work is critical between the elections; elections are not just an event.

… 

Ben Plana Trajtenberg: How do you view the state of American democracy?

Babra Bhebe: Let me say this with a disclaimer. I am not really an expert on American politics, so my comment is going to be based on what I’ve read. …  I must say that the interesting thing with America is that while democracy is under attack, we’ve also seen elements of resistance, elements that try to ensure that democracy is protected. We’ve seen how strong institutions enable resisting autocracy or resisting attacks on democracy. About 725 people who were involved in the January 6 attack on the Capitol were arrested afterward. I think that shows that the rule of law is still respected in this country. When I look at America what I’ve learned is that democracy will always be under attack. There are always forces that do not want democracy to thrive. However, there are others that want democracy to survive. And it is the institutions that are set up in a country that enable democracy to withstand attacks and not to fall.

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Ben Plana Trajtenberg: What advice do you have for young leaders who are looking to make an impact on the future of democracy but feel like the issue is out of their control?

Babra Bhebe: Young people have an opportunity now to take the stage and say, “This is our time.” Now is the time for young people to stand and support democracy. You can join an organization that’s dealing with issues that you are passionate about. If it’s elections, you can join an organization like the Election Resource Centre.  You can join either as a volunteer, or you can apply for a job.  But there are other organizations, some that are way bigger than the Election Resource Centre, that are doing work in different parts of Africa, or globally, that you can join. Join these organizations and join the group of people who are making an impact.

Secondly, you can also find a way of helping these organizations to think about how they can harness technology to advance democracy. Do research on that. Some are working with technology, or are even developing new technology, that can be tested in different contexts to improve the civic sphere. There are more innovative ways that we need to employ in doing work in civil society as it pertains to civic engagement. Young people have an opportunity to do things in a different way. You cannot join the movement and still do things the same way. You need to bring in innovation from past [methods].

…

I think you should also write a lot. Follow events. Write. Get your voices to be known. Get your opinions about democracy known. The internet and technology are both a force for good and for evil. So we need more people, more voices that are going to speak the same language, and that are going to say we need a more equal society, we need a more just society.  And I’m hoping that you all are going to be amongst that group of people.

Image courtesy of the Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs