The Trump Administration’s policies have had global ramifications for America’s place in preserving stability and peace. For many, these policies are destructive to America’s capacity to maintain peace and stability. However, for others, they highlight the cracks within the supposed liberal order and represent an opportunity for the world to do away with an American-backed global system. In this interview, Hal Brands discusses the state of American Grand Strategy under the second Trump administration.
Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Professor Brands is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He specializes in the study of US foreign policy and defense strategy, and has previously worked as a lead writer for the National Defense Strategy Commission and a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense.
This interview was edited for length and clarity.
Will Trinh: Thank you so much, Professor Brands. I wanted to first talk about the liberal international order in the context of the Trump administration. You briefly touched on this in July when you published a column in Bloomberg titled Three Ways that Trump Might End America’s World Order. The third potential reason that you mentioned in your article is that flouting the rules of the liberal international order and the ensuing hypocrisy could lead to the destruction of the global order. However, many argue that there have been many times when America has refused to comply with international rules. These include its refusal to abide by ICJ decisions in the Nicaragua case, its refusal to ratify UNCLOS, or the fact that it still uses weapons such as cluster bombs that are banned by the international community. My question is, why does Trump’s second administration uniquely pose a threat, considering that for the last 30 years, at least for some, America hasn’t been the most faithful to the international order it attempts to construct?
Hal Brands: Well, hypocrisy is always the prerogative of the hegemon, and there have certainly been times when the United States has decided that international law or the judgments of international institutions should not be binding upon it. I note, though, that at least one of the cases you mentioned, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, is more complicated than it sounds, because it’s true that the United States has not ratified it. However, it actually observes it.
Nonetheless, what makes the second Trump administration potentially different, with the emphasis on potentially different, is that it’s hard for me to think of a time when the United States has fundamentally assaulted the central rules and norms of the post-1945 international order. And the most fundamental norm of the post-1945 international order is that you cannot conquer or extort territory by force and have that recognized by the international community. The norm exists because widespread disregard for it before World War II led the world down a very dark path.
It’s potentially a departure because the Trump administration has talked a lot about acquiring or taking territory from Panama, Canada, and Denmark. It hasn’t brought that about, so we may look back on this period where the United States threatened some hazardous things but didn’t follow through. It’s also possible the Trump administration will come back to this at some point during Trump’s administration and pursue the agenda more seriously through harsher, coercive pressures and things like that, in which case, I do think we are in a different place regarding America’s relationship to the body of norms that it has tried chiefly to uphold since 1945.
Phoenix Boggs: Professor Brands, I wanted to ask about something you mentioned. You emphasize the potentiality of this instability and say that that potentiality rests on one factor in particular. Is there something that uniquely would enable us to be good or bad players in the international order moving forward? Do you think that factor is independent of Trump being in office?
Hal Brands: Well, good and evil is in the eye of the beholder; the international system has served America’s interests very well. As a general proposition, American policies that strengthen that system and make it harder for Russia, China, and other revisionary actors to disrupt it would be beneficial. That thickened cooperation between the United States and other countries, particularly other democracies that support that system, is good.
All of that would be sort of favorable behavior from my perspective, and generally speaking, if the United States behaves in a way that is likely to disrupt or dismantle that system because it is pursuing its own revisionist projects, that, generally speaking, that would be bad. But it’s essential not to assume that everything about the existing international system suits America. Everything that changes or modifies it would be bad for America. That’s not the case, and there have been plenty of times in the past when the United States has decided that aspects of that system needed to be revised, reformed, or renegotiated. One example is when America dropped the gold standard in 1971; it seemed, for a time, that it might be a disaster for the international system, which was basically a Western system at that point. It unleashed this reinvention process, giving American leadership in the Western world a new lease on life. And so reform can sometimes be constructive, and the devil is in the details.
Will Trinh: On this topic of autocratic entities, I was actually very interested in a specific other autocratic entity, and you touched on this in an interview with Decoding Geopolitics podcast. You often mentioned that North Korea threatens global stability as part of this axis of resistance. I’m very curious because we frequently see North Korea in the news for its most recent nuclear weapons test or other provocative comments. Why is it the case that a country with one of the lowest levels of development and a GDP of less than $30 billion poses a significant threat to the liberal order?
Hal Brands: North Korea has traditionally posed two threats. One is to destabilize the region of Northeast Asia. It’s obviously a direct military threat to South Korea and Japan, both of whom are US allies. It has posed a larger challenge to the International Non-Proliferation regime, which is an American Non-Proliferation regime, and has played an essential role in keeping the number of nuclear powers in the world relatively small over the past 80 years. I think that the North Korean challenge has grown because of two or three factors. One is that North Korea either now has, or soon will have, pretty significant capabilities to hit the United States, with nuclear weapons delivered via missiles. And as it does that, and as that capability expands, it poses questions about the credibility of US security guarantees for South Korea. So the challenge of that alliance becomes more pronounced.
The North Korean threat is also getting more significant because of the greater integration and cooperation it has pursued with global autocratic powers, particularly Russia. And it appears, based on published reports, that Russia is now aiding North Korea’s defense industrial base in essential ways. And then, last, don’t forget that North Korea has engaged in what we would call global power projection and sent upwards of 10,000 troops to fight in a war in Europe, which is something that I don’t think anybody had on their bingo card even two or three years ago.
Therefore, North Korea is not in the same category as China or Russia. In some ways, even Iran has been able to pursue a larger degree of regional influence. But it poses a real regional threat, and in many ways, the danger is getting worse as its partnerships and capabilities expand, right?
Will Trinh: I wanted to touch on nuclear non-proliferation briefly. You mentioned that nuclear non-proliferation has been a cornerstone of US foreign policy and grand strategy ever since the NPT was a treaty. When it comes to other atomic states that are more integrated within the international system, Israel and Pakistan come to mind. They may be more unstable due to terrorism within the region or because of other provocative statements that they have often made, which make them pariah states for the rest of the international community. Do these nuclear states also necessarily pose threats to the liberal order? Or do these atomic states pose the same, not necessarily the same danger, but a similar threat to global stability as North Korea does to international stability?
Hal Brands: Well, I mean, let’s put Israel and Pakistan in two very different categories. I know some people consider Israel a pariah state, but I don’t put myself in that category. I think it’s a democracy that is going through some challenges right now and faces challenging circumstances, that lives in a crazy neighborhood, and in many ways, has to deal with a set of challenges unlike those faced by pretty much any other democracy in the world.
Pakistan, I think, is a different case. Pakistan has long been involved in supporting international terrorism and supporting our enemies like the Taliban, and I think those are the two very different types of geopolitical players. I don’t think either of them, and especially Israel, poses the same sort of international threat as North Korea. Still, North Korea is kind of the quintessential rogue regime; it is committed to the obstruction of the sovereignty of its neighbor, South Korea. It has a history of aggressive conduct. It defines the United States as an enemy, and so, from my perspective, as an American, nuclear weapons of that sort of power are far more dangerous than they are in the hands of a country like Israel. I would also just say in Pakistan’s case, it is a somewhat different challenge. And so yes, there is a possibility that the state of Pakistan might do something to destabilize the region while it possesses nuclear weapons. It was reported in the news late last year that Pakistan is trying to develop longer-range missiles that could potentially reach the United States. But the other part of the danger has always been that Pakistan would somehow lose control of its nuclear arsenal because of insider threats or internal instability. And again, I think that’s a different challenge than we face in other cases, right?
Phoenix Boggs: I’m approaching this issue from an international environmental awards perspective. I’m curious about China’s evolving image in the world in the face of changes in the US’s role in the liberal order. The US almost allows China to be the good guy in the climate regime, particularly in the UNFCCC or the Paris Climate Accords. Is that a fair assessment? I’m concerned about how we’re elevating China almost at our own expense. And if that’s a fair assessment, does it extend to other international fields?
Hal Brands: In general, the Chinese government has been trying to position itself as a force for stability, moderation, and multilateralism, in contrast to the United States. The Chinese government’s position is that the United States is now engaged in bullying and coercion on a global scale. We can argue about the merits of that critique, and in many ways it’s hypocritical, and in many ways it’s exaggerated.
Of course, it ignores all of the coercive and bullying behavior that China itself engages in the economic realm of the South China Sea, and in any number of other categories. But I think what the Chinese government accurately perceives is that American behavior is currently understood by large swaths of the world, particularly in the developing world, but not just in the developing world, to be destabilizing, to be somewhat damaging to the international trade system that other countries rely on, and to be a source of uncertainty and in some cases concern.
Again, I don’t want to overstate that, but that is the perception in many other countries worldwide. And so China certainly believes that there is diplomatic money to be made by playing up those aspects of U.S. behavior, and trying to create a contrast. And China’s ability to do so is greater than before 2025, but it’s also limited by the unappealing aspects of China’s behavior, right? So China can talk about how it is a force for stability and multilateralism, but you know the countries it pushes around in the South China Sea know better, right?
Will Trinh: Early in September, Xi Jinping invited this access of resistance, alongside many other countries, to a military parade to celebrate the end of World War II. Do you believe this parade represents a symbolic show of resolve in solidarity among these states, or does it represent a firmer and more open relationship between these autocracies, either economically or militarily?
Hal Brands: It is symbolic, but the relationships are genuine. North Korea and Russia have a military alliance, which we’ve seen put into action when North Korea deployed troops to help fight against Ukraine. And Russia, North Korea, and China have a military alliance. It is a little bit more strained, and there are many ways in which North Korean behavior creates trouble for China, but it’s real nonetheless. There is a progressively tightening relationship, not quite an alliance, as Americans would understand it.
Still, a deep strategic partnership between Russia and China has included a lot of economic and technological integration, which had been happening for a while, but really sped up due to the Ukraine war and Russia’s isolation from the West. It’s also happening in the military technological sphere. Suppose you look at some US officials’ statements about that military technological relationship. In that case, there are many areas in which China and Russia are developing capabilities together. They are increasingly operating and exercising together. They’re getting into some fairly sophisticated capabilities. And last year, the US Director of National Intelligence warned that Russia and China might operate together in a future crisis or conflict in the western Pacific. These things don’t look exactly like America’s alliances, but that’s not surprising because America’s alliances are unusual. They’re exceptional, and the cooperation between these countries is genuine, whatever label we affixed to the relationship.
Will Trinh: Right, but now I want to pivot slightly to Ukraine. As you just mentioned, North Korea has sent thousands of North Korean troops to the front lines of a European war. For the last three years of its grand strategy and foreign policy, the United States has made an effort to have firm commitments, either militarily or economically, to Ukraine. However, recently, the Trump administration, through multiple statements, has undermined this credible relationship that the United States would always be willing to defend Ukraine. I just wanted to ask, how do you believe the United States can reverse ship to counter this North Korean and Russian military alliance? Does this involve showing a firmer commitment to Ukraine, and what would that look like under a Trump administration?
Hal Brands: Well, the United States has not defended Ukraine. The United States has helped Ukraine protect itself by providing the things, whether weapons, intelligence, or money, that Ukraine uses to defend itself. The distinction is necessary because you don’t have American forces serving in Ukraine.
This is not a direct war between the United States and Russia. It’s a war in which the United States provides some capabilities. Then Ukraine bears the burdens itself; that strategy has been pretty successful, if you think about the projections for how quickly Ukraine was supposed to fold after Russia was attacked. Here we are, three and a half years later, Ukraine still stands. The trajectory of US assistance to Ukraine was pointing downward at the end of the Biden administration, and it has continued to point downward under the Trump administration. The Trump administration hasn’t moved to deliver more support for Ukraine; it briefly shut off certain aspects of our support for Ukraine.
However, there has still been a trickle of US weapons going to Ukraine over the past year, as well as intelligence support and some other things, which is likely enough to prevent Ukraine from losing the war. It’s not enough to help Ukraine win the war in the sense of conclusively kicking Russia out of its territory. And it’s not entirely clear that any amount of US assistance, short of direct involvement, would be sufficient to kick Russia out of Ukraine fully and to bring the war to a sustainable end. There have sometimes been hints that the Trump administration might pivot toward a more aggressive posture that’s meant to bring about a more limited objective, which is essentially a cease-fire or an end to war with Russia hanging in the balance for Ukraine. Doing so through harsher sanctions or by pursuing some of these partnerships with the Europeans would free up additional capabilities for Ukraine. The Trump administration has been reluctant to do so for a variety of reasons, but a lot of them are just that Trump doesn’t see this as his war. He always talks about this as Biden’s war and argues it would never have broken out if he had been President. So, he is reluctant to put himself in the position of making the war his own, as Biden did.
Will Trinh: You already mentioned that the United States has never directly put troops in Ukraine. But let’s say we live in this hypothetical world where US intervention would be necessary to solve further Russian annexation of Ukrainian sovereign territory. Do you believe that the United States, if it comes to it, should put troops on the ground? Or do you think this is a line in the sand that the United States should never cross?
Hal Brands: Well, I wouldn’t say that it should never cross that line in the sand, but you know, the bar for doing that should be pretty high, because we’re talking about military collision with a nuclear-armed country, so that should never be taken lightly. And I think it would depend on what it was meant to avert. If it’s meant to avert Russia taking the rest of Donetsk, do I think the US should do that? No, I don’t think so. Should the US consider intervening militarily to prevent Russia from overrunning all of Ukraine? If that were possible, I don’t think it is, but if it were possible, maybe because a Russian-dominated Ukraine would pretty fundamentally change the balance of power in Eastern Europe, and so that stake is significant enough that you should at least be willing to sort of have the conversation. But it’s, you know, a big move, and so it’s something you should only do, probably over fairly big stakes, right? Certainly a last resort.
Phoenix Boggs: Thank you so much. It’s been wonderful having you here to discuss some of these questions.
Image courtesy of the American Enterprise Institute
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