When the United States loses sight of its foreign policy goals, decisions that affect millions of people often devolve into emblematic gestures and political theater. With regards to Cuba, the U.S. has always sought to stand with its people while opposing their authoritarian oppressors. For over six decades, different administrations’ approaches have swung like a pendulum, switching between inflexible isolation and abrupt engagement, to no end. This cycle has left the Cuban people behind. It’s time the U.S. acts on its unique leverage and reaffirms its commitment to a free and democratic Cuba. 

Raúl Castro stepping down as Cuba’s President in 2018 and First Secretary of the Communist Party in 2021 marked an end to the decades-long Castro era. Many hoped this vacuum might spark a wave of political and economic reform that would finally end totalitarian rule. Glimpses of hope came with the drafting of Cuba’s 2019 constitution that included reforms such as the recognition of private property and imposition of presidential term limits. 

It soon became clear, however, that the Castros’ handpicked successor, Miguel Díaz-Canel, would not bring an end to the Cuban people’s plight. The regime’s totalitarian grip has been emboldened via brutal crackdowns on dissent and free expression. Failed economic reform and the mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic led to large-scale protests in July of 2021, which were met with the arbitrary detainment and horrific treatment of thousands of political prisoners, in addition to the harassment and persecution of journalists and activists. 

This isn’t anything new. Since Fidel Castro’s ascent in 1959, the Cuban government has ruled with an iron fist—imprisoning opponents, confiscating private property, suppressing free expression, and engaging in mass surveillance. In response to the seizure of American assets, alignment with the Soviet Union in the Cold War-era, and blatant human rights abuses, the United States imposed a trade embargo on Cuba beginning in 1960. The goal was clear: to pressure the regime to reform or, more optimistically, collapse. 

That was over six decades ago. 

The most serious criticisms of the embargo—outside of being a clear geopolitical failure—are its implications for human development. The embargo has isolated Cuba from the global market and stunted its economic growth. Yes, it ensured American capital hasn’t been used to embolden the Communist regime, but it undeniably left the economy stagnant and dragged the Cuban people down with it. 

Nowadays, and arguably more importantly of interest, the embargo has become political fuel for the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC): giving the regime an excuse for its own failures and oppressive behavior. Leaders use the embargo as a scapegoat for shortages and persistent poverty, all while rallying against it to boost nationalist fervor. 

The Trump Administration, spearheaded by Secretary of State Marco Rubio—the son of Cuban exiles—remains set on enforcing America’s hardline approach to Cuba. This strategy runs contrary to the pro-engagement efforts of the Biden and Obama eras. The U.S. has doubled down on sanctions on the Cuban regime and even reinstated Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. 

Taking a stand against the oppressive regime and standing with the country’s freedom fighters is admirable. The United States, leading with moral clarity, must take a stand to support a free Cuba. Simply lifting the embargo would send a message that would reward and reinforce the Cuban regime and similar authoritarian governments’ behavior; it’s nothing more than full-on capitulation. Furthermore, it would be a missed opportunity for the U.S. to give up the greatest piece of leverage it has over Cuba without guaranteeing any concessions. Yet, Cuba remains in desperate need of economic reform; blackouts plague the nation and the government, in the past few years, has even had to make pleas for American aid. 

It’s time for American policymakers to adopt a smarter, more dynamic strategy where leverage actually means change. The prospect of lifting the embargo and providing relief needs to be tied to guarantees of reform in Cuba. The 1996 Helms-Burton Act provides a framework for this proposal. It states that the embargo can only be lifted once Cuba legalizes all political activity, frees all political prisoners, ensures the protection of private property, and permits international observers to monitor elections and human rights protections, among other stipulations. 

To that end, the United States ought to approach both the Republic of Cuba and the international community with a proposal of conditional engagement. The agreement would combine an incremental easing of restrictions in exchange for steps toward democratization, market liberalization, and the institutionalization of the rule of law. Reforms must include: the release of all political prisoners; protections for free speech, a free press, an open civil society, and an unrestricted internet; the legalization of political parties that oppose the PCC; the scheduling of open elections under international scrutiny; guarantees of judicial independence; the implementation of anti-corruption measures within the government; and greater protections for private property. 

If Cuba meets these requirements, as verified by international observers from groups like the UN or Organization of American States (OAS), the U.S. would begin the easing of sanctions and restrictions: authorizing remittances, allowing tourism, diplomatic normalization, and permitting American economic activity with the Cuban private sector.

This approach ensures the pressure stays where it belongs: on the Cuban government. The embargo and its restrictions on Cuba’s access to the American market remain the U.S.’ greatest source of leverage over the island. Calls for an end to the embargo from Cuba and the UN can finally be answered. Any excuse for the PCC’s failures in governance would be gone. In offering a strategic bargain, Washington forces the Cuban regime’s hand. If they accept, it’s a victory for its people. If they refuse, the regime shows its populace and the world their true colors—it would rather maintain power than pursue progress, deepening dissent and internal pressure. 

So long as the Cuban regime embraces its people’s desires, the embargo will finally begin to be lifted. Power will return to the hands of the Cuban people. Polling data shows that Cubans overwhelmingly support greater private ownership, believe there is a necessary, growing dissent against the government, and hope to see regime change in the country. Rejecting appeasement and blind isolation while leveraging American influence ensures the U.S. actually stands with those it has claimed to defend for decades and offers a pathway to the future they demand. 

Ultimately, it’s time that purpose returns to prescribing the U.S.’ foreign policy. The Trump Administration has clearly laid out its posture of “promoting a stable, prosperous, and free Cuba” via a firm policy stance to hold the Cuban regime accountable. However, to truly advance that goal, symbolic toughness and blanket restrictions won’t be enough. America’s embargo on Cuba must no longer be the all-or-nothing litmus test of American politicians’ anti-Communist convictions. Rather, it should be tied to meaningful reforms that empower the Cuban people. 

The framework of America’s strategy towards Cuba should not be to simply punish the government for punishment’s sake. Rather, it’s time to create a transparent roadmap that provides hope to a distressed people while leaving their captors with little room to stall or spin. The pendulum must no longer swing. Via conditional engagement, the U.S. shifts its focus solely to the progress of Cuba’s people—creating a more stable and prosperous Latin America.

History supports this idea. In the late 1980s, under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union undertook perestroika (a policy of economic liberalization), glasnost (increasing political freedoms such as speech and the press), and electoral reforms including the country’s first semi-competitive election. Together, these reforms allowed for an open civil society that enabled the discourse and dissent that brought about the collapse of the Soviet regime. It’s a very real possibility Cuba goes down the same path under this proposal.

The Cuban people demand change. It’s time to set the stage for a future of prosperity.

America has the opportunity to use its unique and strategic leverage to stand with the people of Cuba. A freer and more just society can be built in the Pearl of the Antilles… it might just take a little bit of outside-the-box diplomacy.

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Ukrainian Flag, Image sourced from Wikimedia Commons | CC License, no changes made

In 1962, President John F. Kennedy announced an embargo on all trade with Cuba. This proclamation followed an organized effort by the United States to isolate the country from any communist influence. [1] The United States had positioned Cuba as a security threat and moral antagonist and introduced the embargo as a means of confronting it. Now, 60 years later, the embargo remains one of the most persistent economic sanctions in the history of the United States. It has left the people of both countries to question what threat Cuba really poses, and if the United States’ record can truly serve as an example of democracy, and human rights, for other countries to follow.

American rhetoric against Cuba since 1962 sheds light on why the embargo persisted for so long. Kennedy’s proclamation was followed by President Ronald Reagan’s tightening of the embargo’s restrictions on Cuban immigration and the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, which aimed to push political reform within the country. [2] The Helms-Burton Act, which punished foreign countries that conducted international trade with Cuba, followed shortly after in 1996. [3] Each of these measures was explicitly designed to push for democratic reforms in Cuba and ensure the United States served as an example of what a possible democratic future should look like. [4] 

In recent years, the United States has continued to justify the embargo through appeals to human rights. In a 2021 statement by the U.S. Department of State, Secretary Blinken expressed “The United States has imposed additional sanctions on Cuban military and security leaders in response to the Cuban regime’s continued violent suppression of freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly…We stand in solidarity with every brave Cuban in their call for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” [5] After 185 countries at the United Nations 2022 General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution calling for an end to the United States embargo on Cuba, the United States defended its vote against the resolution by claiming the Cuban government engaged in repression. [6] This rejection of such a resolution by the United States came only two years after the United States Embassy in Georgia criticized the prospect of Cuba joining the United Nations Human Rights Council. The embassy released a statement in 2020 claiming Cuba held a “dismal record on human rights” and engaged in the repression of LGBT, Afro-descendant, and human rights activists. [7] 

The United States’ long-standing insistence that Cuba has engaged in repression and failed to protect human rights, however, is hypocritical in light of women’s and LGBTQ rights in both countries. On September 25th, 2022, Cuba enacted a new family code in the Cuban constitution that is largely recognized as one of the most progressive in the world. [8] The new family code solidifies rights for LGBTQ couples to marry and adopt, expands rights for grandparents, promotes equality between women and men in the home, and includes measures against gender-based violence. [9] Mariela Castro Espin, Director of the Cuban National Center for Sex Education and niece of Fidel Castro, praised these new changes as “revolutionary.” [10] The passage of the family code, which 66.9% of voters participating in the election voted in favor of, followed 15 years after Cuba’s minister of public health signed Resolution 126, securing full coverage of gender-affirming care for all trans people. [11] It also followed 60 years after the island legalized abortion, fully covering abortion under its national healthcare system today. [12]

The Cuban election responsible for one of the most progressive family codes in the world was held only months after the United States overturned Roe v. Wade, effectively removing the precedent for abortion rights. [13] Trans people in America were also met with hundreds of pieces of legislation targeting their healthcare, educational, and public accommodation rights during the same year, and the year after to follow. [14] As people all over Cuba overwhelmingly voted in favor of new constitutional protections for women and LGBTQ people, American citizens began rallying against a state that rolled back these very protections. [15] This contrast between the policy efforts of the two countries is absent in the United States’ continuous justification for the embargo against Cuba. President Biden, like officials before him, continues to insist the embargo is solely a defense of human rights and freedom for the Cuban people. [16] 

According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, protections for LGBTQ people and full reproductive autonomy to women are indicative of a country’s commitment to human rights. [17] It is clear that, even while facing consequences from U.S. economic punishments, Cuba has successfully met these expectations. U.S. arguments for upholding such economic punishments can no longer be credible.

As the people of the United States grapple with growing threats to abortion access and LGBTQ rights, Cuba’s successful defense of these rights serves as an example for the United States to follow. It is time for the United States to lift the 60-year blockade against Cuba and begin allowing the island to serve as an example. Not as an enemy.

References

[1] Kennedy, John. “Proclamation 3447—Embargo on All Trade with Cuba | the American Presidency Project.” www.presidency.ucsb.edu, February 3, 1962. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-3447-embargo-all-trade-with-cuba.

[2] Wong, Kam. “The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: The Extraterritorial Scope of Section 1706(A).” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law 14, no. 4 (1994). https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1537&context=jil.; Reagan, Ronald. “Proclamation 5517 — Suspension of Cuban Immigration.” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum, August 22, 1986. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/proclamation-5517-suspension-cuban-immigration.

[3] Hoffmann, Bert. “The Helms-Burton Law and Its Consequences for Cuba, the United States and Europe,” 1998. http://www.biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/ar/libros/lasa98/Hoffmann.pdf.

[4] Solis, Anthony. “The Long Arm of U.S. Law: The Helms-Burton Act.” Loyola of Los Angeles International Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 19, no. 3 (1997): 709–10. https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1426&context=ilr.

[5] Blinken, Anthony J. “Sanctioning Cuban Officials in Response to Violence against Peaceful Protestors.” United States Department of State, August 19, 2021. https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-cuban-officials-in-response-to-violence-against-peaceful-protestors-2/.

[6] Press.un.org. “Adopting Annual Resolution, Delegates in General Assembly Urge Immediate Repeal of Embargo on Cuba, Especially amid Mounting Global Food, Fuel Crises,” November 3, 2022. https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12465.doc.htm.; Kelley, John. “Explanation of Vote after the Vote on a UN General Assembly Resolution on the Cuba Embargo.” United States Mission to the United Nations, November 3, 2022. https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-vote-after-the-vote-on-a-un-general-assembly-resolution-on-the-cuba-embargo/.

[7] U.S. EMBASSY TBILISI. “Cuba’s ‘Outrageous’ Bid to Join the U.N. Human Rights Council.” U.S. Embassy in Georgia, September 1, 2020. https://ge.usembassy.gov/cubas-outrageous-bid-to-join-the-u-n-human-rights-council/.

[8] Waller, Buchanan. “Cuba’s 2022 Family Code: A Different Model for Social Progress.” Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality, n.d. https://lawandinequality.org/2022/11/02/cubas-2022-family-code-a-different-model-for-social-progress/.

[9] aljazeera.com. “Cuba Overwhelmingly Approves Same-Sex Marriage in Referendum,” September 26, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2022/9/26/cuba-overwhelmingly-approves-same-sex-marriage-in-referendum.

[10] Frank, Marc. “Cubans Split over More Liberal Family Code as Referendum Nears.” Reuters, March 30, 2022, sec. Americas. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/cubans-split-over-more-liberal-family-code-referendum-nears-2022-03-30/.; Kirk, Emily J., and Robert Huish. “Transsexuals’ Right to Health? A Cuban Case Study.” Health and Human Rights 20, no. 2 (December 1, 2018): 215–22. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6293354/.

[11] Frank, Marc. “Cubans Approve Gay Marriage by Large Margin in Referendum.” Reuters, September 27, 2022, sec. Americas. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/cubans-approve-gay-marriage-by-large-margin-referendum-2022-09-26/.

[12] Mineo, Liz. “Lesson from Latin America for U.S. Abortion Rights Movement.” Harvard Gazette (blog). Harvard Gazette, October 26, 2022. https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2022/10/lesson-from-latin-america-for-u-s-abortion-rights-movement/.; Grossman, Daniel, Kate Grindlay, and Bridgit Burns. “Public Funding for Abortion Where Broadly Legal.” Contraception, 2016, 453–60. https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/centers/crrj/zotero/loadfile.php?entity_key=RW826BU9.

[13] General Customs of the Republic of Cuba. “Díaz-Canel Highlights Affective and Ethical Value of the Family Code,” September 6, 2022. https://www.aduana.gob.cu/en/news/diaz-canel-highlights-affective-and-ethical-value-family-code.; SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. “Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,” June 24, 2022. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf.

[14] Redfield, Elana, Kerith J. Conron, Will Tentindo, and Erica Browning. “Prohibiting Gender-Affirming Medical Care for Youth.” Williams Institute, March 2023. https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/bans-trans-youth-health-care/.; Astor, Maggie. “G.O.P. State Lawmakers Push a Growing Wave of Anti-Transgender Bills.” The New York Times, January 25, 2023, sec. U.S. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/25/us/politics/transgender-laws-republicans.html.; Thurston, Andrew. “How Will Anti-Trans Laws Impact Transgender and Gender-Diverse Youth Mental Health?” The Brink. Boston University, March 24, 2023. https://www.bu.edu/articles/2023/how-will-anti-trans-laws-impact-transgender-and-gender-diverse-youth-mental-health/.

[15] Reilly, Katie. “Emotional Scenes around the U.S. After Supreme Court Ends Roe v. Wade.” Time, June 24, 2022. https://time.com/6190852/protests-roe-v-wade-photos-supreme-court/.

[16] Biden, Joe. “Statement from President Biden on Political Prisoners in Cuba.” The White House, December 9, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/09/statement-from-president-biden-on-political-prisoners-in-cuba/.

[17] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. “Recognition of the Rights of LGBTI Persons,” December 7, 2018. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/lgbti-recognitionrights2019.pdf.; IACHR. “IACHR Urges All States to Adopt Comprehensive, Immediate Measures to Respect and Protect Women’s Sexual and Reproductive Rights.” www.oas.org, October 23, 2017. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2017/165.asp.

North America and Caribbean Desk

Written by: Chase Finney, Saybrook College ’22

In the past two decades, the city of Havana has continued to develop slowly but surely. Heavy investment reliance on countries such as China and Russia seems to signal accelerated progress in the near future, especially on the technological and economic front. However, it is not guaranteed that this will spell well for the city, or more generally Cuba, in the long-run.

In the meantime, as culturally vibrant as Havana is, it’s no surprise that some of the city’s residents have not let this potential future overshadow their artistic and entrepreneurial desires. Established in 2014, La Fábrica de Arte Cubano (aka F.A.C) quickly became a weekend go-to spot for Cubans ages 18 to 88. The venue mainly serves as an art gallery and nightclub. However, everyone can easily find something to enjoy on the three levels of the building. 

Strangely enough, the building now known as F.A.C was originally a cooking oil factory that operated through the early 20th century. Following the Depression of the 30s, the factory fell into disrepair and was not in use until 2010, when a group of local musicians and artists acquired the space as a centralized location to share their works. From this artistic community, musician X Alfonso worked to spread the community to larger Havana, eventually spearheading F.A.C as it stands today.

The original purpose of the space is evident at every turn. The various galleries showcase bold and compelling exhibits. For example, at the time of my visit, exhibits explored themes such as the diversity of beauty in Cuban women, the emasculation of wealthy men, and the modern application of traditional diasporic Yoruba symbols. Additionally, each level hosts various music styles, allowing visitors to choose the musical environment for their night. My favorite set was performed by a live group that described their music as “electronica-jazz-funk-rock.” I can attest that their unique sound provided one of the most interesting and enjoyable head-nodding jams I’ve ever attended.

This being said, U.S. influence is also fairly prevalent in F.A.C. For example, the walls of the room in which the aforementioned set was performed are lined with posters featuring artists ranging from The Jackson 5 to U2. When I entered one of the bar spaces on the second level, I was greeted with a large projector playing Lizzo music videos. This form of international familiarity is likely a contributor to the venue’s recent popularity amongst tourists. In fact, F.A.C was named in this year’s TIME Magazine edition of the World’s 100 Greatest Places. 

With the success that F.A.C has seen in just five years of operation, hopefully, this incredible space and its vision will continue to bring Cubans and even tourists together for years to come. 

Works Cited

“Fábrica de Arte Cubano: The World’s 100 Greatest Places of 2019.” TIME, TIME Magazine, 2019, https://time.com/collection/worlds-greatest-places-2019/5654125/fabrica-de-arte-cubano-havana-cuba/

Moya, Valentina. “More Investment in Cuba: Russia Increases Its Economic Presence.” Latin American Post, Latin American Post, 19 February 2019, https://latinamericanpost.com/26481-more-investment-in-cuba-russia-increases-its-economic-presence.

Siegelbaum, Portia. “Havana’s New Place To Be – In a Factory Transformed.” CBS News, CBS News, 28 March 2014, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/havanas-new-place-to-be-in-a-factory-transformed/.

Urrechaga, Raimundo. “Cuba Welcomes More Chinese Investment, Visitors to Boost Tourism.” Xinhua, Xinhua, 20 September 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/20/c_137481986.htm.

Written By Kiran Chokshi

Economic sanctions are a common tactic used by the United States government when dealing with hostile countries. Often, those sanctions are imposed along with a UN resolution or other countries. But in the 1990s under President Bill Clinton, the US undertook an extremely unilateral sanction policy towards the Castro regime in Cuba. The most interesting example was the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) of 1996, also known as the Helms-Burton Act, where strict sanctions were passed into law by Congress. The US received a great deal of international backlash from its allies, and it was accused of having broken international law by attempting to limit the ability of other sovereign nations to trade with Cuba.

The Helms-Burton Act and unilateral US sanctions against Cuba were unwarranted during the 1990s and did not promote US foreign policy interests at the time. President Clinton, succumbing to domestic pressure, signed the legislation but later blocked its most controversial clause. Proponents of the bill articulated it as a crucial step in felling the Castro government and bringing democracy to Cuba. But it is clear that this was not the core reason that the bill was ultimately passed, and the codification of the embargo into law tied future presidents’ hands. This decision would undermine US credibility abroad with its close allies as well as cause unnecessary pain to the Cuban economy and people. Prior US sanctions policy on Cuba such as the Cuban Asset Control Regulations of 1963 and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 had primarily focused on putting economic pressure on Cuba. Both had the eventual hope of either toppling the Castro government or providing a road map to normalization of relations, dependent on significant economic or political changes. But importantly, Helms-Burton was an example of unprincipled foreign policy that succumbed to domestic political pressure which could not have been motivated by the hope of bringing down the Cuban government.

Historical Context

The US maintained an embargo with Cuba dating back to the Eisenhower administration in 1960. When the Cubans and Soviets signed an agreement that favored Cuba to trade sugar for heavily subsidized oil in 1960, the US State Department ordered US oil firms in Cuba to stop refining oil. This resulted in the Cuban government nationalizing the refineries and eventually expropriating all US property, which was valued at $1 billion.[i] This included property that had belonged to Cuban exiles but who had moved to the US and became citizens.

Thirty years later, the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s largest trading partner, greatly damaged the Cuban economy. Total Soviet assistance had previously averaged at least 15 percent of Cuba’s GDP, and it started disappearing around 1989.[ii] The period from 1989 to 1993 was known as the Período especial, or Special Period. This time of economic crisis caused widespread famine and a breakdown in transportation and agriculture sectors.

It was during this disastrous time in Cuba’s history that the US Congress passed the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) sponsored by Robert Torricelli (D – NJ), with the stated mission of “wreck[ing] havoc on the island”.[iii] Torricelli’s campaigns were largely funded by the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) lobbying group, which had spent over $1 million on Senate and House candidates.[iv] It is thus particularly interesting that Torricelli took a conservative position on the embargo due to his Cuban-American constituency despite being a liberal on most other issues.[v] But the bill, passed in 1992, received support from then President George HW Bush and then Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton. It stipulated that no foreign-based subsidiaries of US companies could trade with Cuba. Opponents of bill, like the New York Times, argued the bill was a product of election year politics aimed at currying favor with Florida and New Jersey Cuban exiles.[vi] CANF was so powerful that members of Congress supported the CDA, even though their aides ridiculed it in private. According to at least one Congressional aide, most Democrats supported the bill to put the Bush Administration on the wrong side of the CANF.[vii]

But by 1994 and 1995, Cuban GDP per capita started rising again. Through austerity measures, strategic enterprise support, and partial liberalization of some sectors of the economy, the Castro regime took steps to reform the economy and was able to recover from the previous disaster in a homegrown productivity surge.[viii] But these limited market-oriented reforms were not enacted to meet the demands of the CDA and they did not fundamentally change the communist nature of the Cuban economy.[ix] It is quite clear that the Cuban Democracy Act seemed to do little or nothing on its own in tackling communism in Cuba.

Lack of US National Interest in Cuban Sanctions

By 1995, the US seemed to lack a compelling national interest in a tighter embargo against Cuba. Without Soviet backing, the Cuban military was seriously weakened, and the Castro regime had little interest in military confrontation with the United States. After the fall of USSR, Havana was forced to cut the military’s size and budget by 50 percent.[x] There was no longer a pressing security threat to the US posed by Cuba or the spread of Communism in the Western hemisphere after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Regarding US economic interests, an embargo prevented American businesses from gaining access to the Cuban market. In terms of promoting democracy and human rights, the Castro regime had already survived 40 years of US embargo and the shock of the fall of the Soviet Union. A tightened embargo policy would only serve to further harm the living conditions of the Cuban people, with little chance of toppling the government.

Helms-Burton Act of 1996

Sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms and Dan Burton in early 1995, the Helms-Burton bill aimed to increase US sanctions against Cuba with the stated goal of discouraging foreign investment in Cuba and speeding the fall of the Castro regime.[xi] It consisted of four titles: strengthening international sanctions against Cuba, assistance toward a free and independent Cuba, protection of US citizens’ property rights in Cuba, and exclusion of aliens who engage with confiscated US property in Cuba from the US.

The bill referred to the property owned by US citizens that was confiscated by the Cuban government back in 1959. Title III, which gives the ability to sue nationals of other countries “trafficking” US property in Cuba, was the most controversial because its broad definition meant that foreign companies using old US equipment, plants or land could be sued in American courts.[xii] Title III entailed the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and seemed to go against the act of state doctrine previously asserted by the US in international law.[xiii] The Clinton administration publicly opposed Helms-Burton. In an April 1995 interview, Clinton argued that the bill was unnecessary because of the existing CDA and that it would overly limit the President’s flexibility in dealing with a rapidly developing situation like that in Cuba.[xiv] The Clinton administration also thought Title III was counterproductive and wrongly prioritized property issues above relationships with allies.

Catalyst for Passage, and Subsequent Neutering of Helms-Burton

On February 24, 1996, the Cuban government shot down two US civilian aircraft. These aircraft were piloted by Brothers to the Rescue, a Miami-based nonprofit right wing organization opposed to the Cuban government. Before this incident, it had conducted unauthorized flights into Cuban airspace, even dropping anti-government propaganda leaflets over Havana.[xv] It was disputed whether they were shot down over international waters or Cuban airspace. In Miami, the Cuban exile community reacted quickly to the shoot-downs. Jorge Mas Canosa, head of CANF, condemned the attack. He said, “For two warplanes from the Castro government to shoot down two unarmed civilian planes with American flags on a humanitarian mission should be considered an act of war against the US.”[xvi] But the fundamental situation had not changed regarding US national interest. The shoot-down of the provocative civilian planes did not present a fundamentally new national security threat to the US. The Castro regime did not want war with the US given Cuba’s economic and military condition.

This catalyst of the shoot-down led Helms-Burton to be re-tabled and passed by Congress and Clinton on March 12, 1996. Even though CANF had lost much of its political sway by this time, Cubans in Miami mobilized against the shoot-down.[xvii] So it is no surprise that Clinton, wanting to appeal to Cuban voters in Florida in anticipation of the 1996 election, passed the bill.  The passage resulted in prompt threats of retaliation from important US allies like the EU, Canada and Mexico, believing the act to infringe on national sovereignty.[xviii] The Canadian response was to issue “claw-back” measures, which would allow Canadian companies to counter-sue US companies in Canadian courts.[xix]  Under this foreign pressure, Clinton chose to suspend the ability to sue under Title III for at least six months in July of 1996. This suspension weakened the power of Helms-Burton substantially, since Title III was the central clause that deterred international investment and trade in Cuba. He continued the suspension for the rest of his presidency, as has every American president that has come after him.

Loss of Credibility

This decision to flip-flop represented a lack of a foreign policy guiding principle or higher interest. Rather, it was a political compromise by Clinton as he was juggling domestic and foreign pressures. He chose to forgo the better foreign policy choice of vetoing Helms-Burton because of a one-off shoot-down of provocative civilian planes and the political power of vocal Cuban-American minority in Miami.

In this process of this appeasement, he generated ill-will from the Castro government and, more importantly, long-standing US allies. As long as the law exists, there is the potential for legal action and infringement of international law if suspensions are not continued. Furthermore, US citizens technically maintain the right to sue foreign companies, even if they cannot actually act upon it. This legacy of Helms-Burton is a smear on our otherwise friendly and respectful relationships with our allies and our ability to be a role model for the world.

Clinton also reduced the future power of the executive branch in its ability to take a flexible approach vis-à-vis sanction policy with Cuba. While a president could in effect nullify Title III because he could suspend suing, he/she could do nothing about Title IV, which prevented foreigners who had “trafficked” US property from getting US visas. Helms-Burton went further in the direction the CDA had already begun by restricting the President’s discretion to oversee or restrict trade with US enemies as established in the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917.[xx] This precedent has broad implications for legislation that restricts presidents’ ability to conduct sanction policy at their judgment.

Nonetheless, one cannot place too much blame on President Clinton since he inherited the CDA, which had already codified most of the US embargo; Clinton had to deal with the practical reality of being president and the need to satisfy domestic political needs. If one looks at what the Helms-Burton Act with a suspended Title III added on top of the CDA, the Cuban sanctions did not become dramatically harsher. Clinton probably thought passing Helms-Burton was an expedient and convenient way to deal with the plane shoot-downs and Cuban-American domestic pressure.

Conclusion

President Clinton could have broken from his predecessors and worked towards a less adversarial relationship with Cuba. Even though he inherited the CDA, he had the time to observe that dire economic circumstances, sanctions included, would not topple the Castro government. As President, he could have worked to weaken the terms of the CDA and warm relations with Cuba. But the shot-down planes combined with powerful domestic pressures and incentives enabled him to make a poor choice for US national interests and the Office of the President that we have to live with today. An interesting area of future inquiry would be a comparison of Helms-Burton to the examples of US sanctions on Iran and Syria. How do they differ in presidential discretion? How did domestic political environments shape foreign policy and these levels of presidential discretion?

Endnotes

[i] Hufbauer, Gary, et al. Case Studies in Economic Sanctions and Terrorism. Case 60-3 US v. Cuba. Peterson Institute for International Economics. 2011.

[ii] Hernández-Catá, Ernesto. The Fall and Recovery of the Cuban Economy in the 1990s: Mirage or Reality? International Monetary Fund. 2000, 4.

[iii] Franklin, Jane. “The Politics behind Clinton’s Cuba Policy.” Baltimore Sun, 30 Aug. 1994, articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-08-30/news/1994242173_1_jorge-mas-canosa-cuba-president-clinton.

[iv] Bell, Jason S. “Violation of International Law and Doomed U.S. Policy: An Analysis of the Cuban Democracy Act.” The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, vol. 25, no. 1, 1993, pp. 77–129. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40176331. pp. 94

[v] Koçak, Canberk. “Interest Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy towards Cuba: the Restoration of Capitalism in Cuba and the Changing Interest Group Politics”. Class, Race and Corporate Power. 4 (2). doi:10.25148/CRCP.4.2.001664, 5.

[vi] NY Times Editorial Board. “Making Poor Cubans Suffer More.” The New York Times. June 15, 1992, page 00018. Print.

[vii] Bell, Jason S. “Violation of International Law and Doomed U.S. Policy: An Analysis of the Cuban Democracy Act.” The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, vol. 25, no. 1, 1993, pp. 77–129. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40176331. pp. 95

[viii] Hernández, 9.

[ix] Sullivan, Mark (2018). Cuba: US Policy in the 115th Congress (CRS Report No. R4422). Retrieved from Congressional Research Service website: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44822. pp. 15

[x] Eland, Ivan. Putting “defense” Back Into U.S. Defense Policy: Rethinking U.S. Security in the Post-Cold War World, 2001.

[xi] Greenhouse, Steven. “Bill to Ease Cuba Suits Faces a Veto By Clinton.” The New York Times. August 20, 1995, page 001004. Print.

[xii] Sanger, David E. “Clinton Grants, Then Suspends, Right to Sue Foreigners on Cuba.” The New York Times. July 17, 1996, page A00001. Print.

[xiii] Lowenfeld, Andreas F. “Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act.” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 90, no. 3, 1996, pp. 419–434. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2204066, 420.

[xiv] William Jefferson Clinton, “Interview with Wolf Blitzer and Judy Woodruff on CNN,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 31 (14 April 1995): 624-25.

[xv] Court testimony from the Cuban spy trial, referred in The Miami Herald March 13, 2001 at “Basulto testifies”

[xvi] “U.S. TIGHTENS SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA AFTER DOWNING OF TWO EXILE PLANES OFF CUBAN COAST”. In NotiSur – Latin American Political Affairs ISSN 1060-4189, Volume 6, Number 9 March 1, 1996 

[xvii] LeoGrande William M. 1998. “From Havana to Miami: U.S. Cuba Policy as a Two-Level Game”, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 40 (1): 80-1.

[xviii] Kalowatie Deonandan (2005) The Helms-Burton Bill and Canada’s Cuba Policy: Convergences with the US, Policy and Society, 24:1, 124-149, DOI: 10.1016/ S1449-4035(05)70052-7

[xix] Ibid., pp. 127.

[xx] U.S. Congress. United States Code: Trading with the Enemy Act of , 50a U.S.C. §§ 1-40 1958. 1958. Periodical. https://www.loc.gov/item/uscode1958-010050a002/.