Introduction 

Since its inception 80 years ago, German democracy has been largely dominated by two major political parties, the Christian Democratic/Socialist Union sister parties (Union) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The Union and SPD have since been in coalition either together or with a smaller partner like the Greens or Free Democratic Party (FDP). In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, given the discontent surrounding German bailouts for other European Union (EU) member states, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party formed, leeching voters from the Union who were discontent with continued EU Membership. The AfD didn’t start as a far-right party, but its trajectory shifted under Frauke Petry, who chaired the AfD from 2015 to 2017. Her leadership marked a pivot to hardline nationalism, defined by anti-immigrant rhetoric, pro-Kremlin sympathies, and echoes of antisemitism.

The AfD has had particular electoral success in the Bundesländer (Federal States) which used to be part of the Communist German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The reason behind such a split can largely be attributed to the perceived social cleavage, where the populace of the east has yet to feel properly integrated with the rest of the country. This social cleavage is reinforced by the continued economic disparity between the east and west, and the disproportionate impact of the migration crisis, among other crises, on eastern Germans.¹ The 2017 federal elections were the first in which the AfD surpassed the five percent electoral threshold required to enter into the German Lower House of Parliament (Bundestag). Since their entrance into the Bundestag, the AfD has attempted to erode the quality of German democracy, historically and contemporarily considered as one of the strongest worldwide. 

Since its explosive rise in 2015, the far-right AfD has reshaped German politics, not by taking power, but by pushing the boundaries of democratic norms. While the party has yet to enter government, its influence is undeniable. This piece turns back the clock to the pivotal years from 2015 to 2018, well before the pandemic and recent surges in far-right momentum, to trace how the AfD’s radicalization and entry into the Bundestag began testing the strength of Germany’s democratic foundations. Understanding this earlier phase is essential to grasping that today’s democratic vulnerabilities didn’t emerge overnight. Even in one of Europe’s most robust democracies, the AfD has been building for years.

To assess its impact, we draw on political scientist Leonardo Morlino’s five-dimensional framework for evaluating democratic quality: rule of law, accountability, freedom, equality, and responsiveness. Did the AfD’s actions already start to erode these pillars, or simply expose cracks that were already there? By breaking these dimensions into procedural substantive and outcome-based categories, we can better understand how a party on the fringe pressures a democracy to confront its own limits. 

1. Procedural Level: Rule of Law and Accountability 

According to Morlino’s article What is a Good Democracy, the procedural level of democracy is composed of two separate but related dimensions: rule of law and accountability. Accountability refers to the idea that citizens, independently rather than through a third party, are able to evaluate their satisfaction with the government’s attempts to meet their needs. In the case of Germany, and most other western liberal democracies, this would refer to the idea that citizens are able to vote for the parties which best match with their aligned interests without any interference. The rule of law is the idea that the law is above all else, so that no political actor may act in manners which would go against the fundamental laws of the land. Germany holds a rigid constitution and very strict bureaucratic procedures in order to prevent the repetition of the atrocities of the Second World War. Hence, the rule of law has been at the heart of the new Federal Republic ever since its inception, and reinforced during the reunification of the country. 

The rise of the AfD would be considered by some to be proof that there is in fact strong accountability within the political system. Since Petry came into power, the AfD’s pivot into the rhetoric of anti-immigration as a centerpiece policy, although controversial, has led to the electoral success of the AfD. These shifts were notable not just nationally, but also regionally as the AfD made significant gains in the regional parliaments, especially in those of former East German states. While the rise of the AfD reflects a troubling shift in German politics, it nonetheless confirms that German democracy permits and responds to electoral accountability, as voters dissatisfied with the status quo were able to express their discontent through proper institutional methods. 

While accountability may still be intact, within German democracy, the rule of law has been called into question several times since the rise and radicalisation of the AfD. A cornerstone of German law has been an intolerance to the denial of the Nazi government’s persecution of Jews during the Second World War, confirmed through many notable cases of jurisprudence. However, despite its criminalization under the penal code, leaders of the AfD have almost consistently denied the atrocities of the Holocaust. Beyond Holocaust denial, leaders of the AfD continue to use many of the same anti-semitic slogans and conspiracy theories which still remain illegal under German law. The AfD’s reshaping of history, including Holocaust denial, is one of its many dangerous tools used in an attempt to erode the rule of law. 

In some cases, the AfD has not only been behind attempts to erode the rule of law, but also attempts to overthrow it all together. While only recently uncovered, the Tag X or “X-Day” conspiracy, which attempted the overthrow of the German government through the creation of a paramilitary ‘shadow army,’ has been long underway and investigated since 2017. While an extreme example, the explicit participation of several AfD party members and close ties between the organization and prominent AfD members is a clear warning of the existential threat the AfD poses to the rule of law. While concerning, the revelations of the AfD’s attempts to undermine German democracy shouldn’t come as a surprise, given the messages propagated by members, along with their background in the Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist Underground, NSU), and other Neo-Nazi groups.

While the AfD may enhance procedural democracy through accountability, they also significantly deteriorate it through their active efforts to undermine the rule of law. The success of the AfD was due to its shift to solve the discontent of many East Germans towards mainstream parties, as well as Germans who were unhappy with Merkel’s open migration policy. Yet the antisemitism and proper attempt at the complete overthrowing of the state are indicative that the AfD does not respect the rule of law. While German democracy may be improved through the AfD’s response to the distresses of citizens usually ignored by mainstream parties, the existential threat which it poses to the rule of law would affirm the idea that the AfD negatively impacts democracy on the procedural level.

2. Substantive Level: Freedom and Equality 

The substantive level, according to Morlino, is also composed of two dimensions, those of freedom and equality. The former refers to the respect of citizen’s rights “that are expanded through the achievement of a range of freedoms.” The latter dimension refers to the pursuit of citizens’ political, social, and economic equality through progressive policies. These two dimensions are inherently intertwined in the European liberal democracy, as redistributive policies, such as social security, are embedded into the freedoms and rights which are guaranteed to all citizens. 

In terms of the rights and freedoms provided, the AfD is not particularly against the idea of these kinds of rights, but is instead a proponent of limiting its application to the people of Germany or Volk, excluding minorities and immigrants. The AfD constantly uses liberal democratic concepts, such as citizenry, to normalize its illiberal exclusion of groups who do not fit within their understanding of the German people. Minority rights exist as a fundamental part of German law, attempting to exclude certain people groups from the Volk inherently breaches this principle of German law. 

Not only does the AfD actively attempt to exclude oppressed groups from the freedoms entitled to citizens, but they go further by trying to deprive them of their fundamental rights. Most notable would be the use of ‘Christian values’ in order to justify the restriction of same-sex marriage, trans recognition, and a womans rights to abortion. While it is obvious how the rights of the LGBTQ+ minority might be targeted by the former two, it is not so obvious for the latter issue. From an intersectional gender perspective, actions targeted against women disproportionately affect women of color and other minorities due to the intersection of oppressive factors such as race, socioeconomic class, and sexual orientation. The pursuit of these anti-gender equality policies, which the AfD is attempting to carry out throughout the whole country, would be a major affront to the fundamental rights of women, especially those who do not form part of the Volk so idealized by the AfD. 

With the AfD so vocally against the rights of those who would not fit into the German Volk in their perspective, it could be assumed that they would think similarly for Morlino’s dimension of equality. German Marxist theorist Bernd Belina would argue that the AfD pursues a more radicalized approach to the “abstract equality,” which is pursued by most capitalist societies in the present day. The equality is abstract in the sense that it applies only to those who engage in the national economy, hence unemployed people should not be afforded equality. Similar to other new right–wing parties, the AfD is even further against the Marxist sense of equality, as it follows a contradictory combination of neoliberal and ‘anti-elitist’ economic ideology. The combination of these two ideologies results in an economic system which would end up benefiting those who are already privileged economically (Belina, 2017). An economy which benefits those who are already privileged would correlate to the ideology of the German economy only for the Volk, although in practice the benefits only extend to elites rather than the entire Volk. 

While the AfD, according to left-wing theorists, benefits only the elites through neoliberal policies, this would be counterintuitive given the rise of the AfD at the aforementioned expense of the left in former East Germany. In reality, the AfD must pursue a much more nuanced approach to equality due to their reliance on former voters of the left party as their electoral base. The term “Ordoliberal Chauvinism” was first coined by Arnaud Brennetot to describe the strategic positioning of the AfD regarding its policies in response to Belina’s work. The term encapsulates the conflicting interest groups which the AfD must appeal to, those in the East who feel disillusioned with the German state and those in the West who are upset at the seeming left-wing interventionist policies of the Union. Ultimately, due to the incompatibility of chauvinism and ordoliberalism, one of the ideologies must take precedence or the entire political project could be at risk of failure. The choice of either chauvinism or ordoliberalism would fundamentally impact the direction of the party in neglecting or outright opposing equality. 

The change in leadership of the AfD after the 2017 federal elections serves as an indicator that the party leadership chose Chauvinism, and so actively opposed equality. The start of Alice Weidel’s leadership in 2017 showed a shift of the AfD to pursue a more nativist and populist approach, prioritizing the Volk and demonizing Islam among others, in order to secure electoral support. While some might argue that AfD chauvinism since 2017 has pushed equality between the east and west of the country, the active exclusion of immigrants, racial minorities, LGBTQ+ groups, etc. from Germany would lend to the idea that the AfD on a societal level actively pursues less equality. 

3. Results Level: Responsiveness 

The final level of analysis in Morlino’s framework on the quality of democracy would be the results level, focusing on the characteristic of responsiveness. Responsiveness, according to Morlino, is very highly related to the idea of accountability, in that it refers to citizens’ perception of the legitimacy of the government. In a state with high levels of responsiveness, the citizens should ultimately be confirming their satisfaction with the current ongoings of the government. However, the rise of the AfD may be indicative of a current unsatisfactory state with the state of Germany’s democracy. 

The creation and rise of the AfD itself can be considered a testament to the strong responsiveness within Germany’s young democracy. Since reunification, voters in Eastern Germany have consistently felt underrepresented by mainstream parties, as evidenced by their persistently lower voter turnout, averaging 72.5% in 2017 compared to 76.2% in western states, as seen above. The swift entrance of the AfD into the parliaments of many Bundesländer in the east supported by former leftist or undecided voters is indicative of such. While support for the left party in the East may have been attributed to their status of successor of the East German communist party, their inability to address the needs of the eastern people facilitated their electoral punishment and the rise of the AfD. The change in strategy under Petry, becoming the party for ordinary East German citizens treated worse than predominantly Muslim immigrants, facilitated the rise of the AfD as the largest member of the opposition. At the expense of other parties, the rise of the AfD remains a testament to the strong accountability of German democracy towards the voting population. According to Morlino’s dimension of responsiveness, a high-quality democracy must reflect the preferences and demands of its citizens, even when those demands lead to political shifts that challenge the status quo. 

However, a largely contested issue within the German system remains the high scrutiny of the AfD party by institutions, seen as a method of preventing the change of the vote. The establishment in Germany has long pursued a strategy of containment, attempting to minimize the influence of extremist parties primarily on the right of the political spectrum. Containment in Germany, or Ausgrenzung has resulted in the German system as an outlier from others in Western Europe with a very minimal influence on the development of the political system. Given the historical context of Germany it would make sense as to why the population has supported the mainstream parties in their attempts to curb far-right extremism. Despite all the institutional attempts to freeze out the AfD as too extreme to be elected, the 2017 election was indicative that enough of the population was no longer content with the status quo. While the AfD may have entered the Bundestag as the largest member of the opposition party, many continuous attempts have been made to reduce their influence in the political process. 

The perceived apathy of large German political parties to the situation of ‘regular Germans’ was made evident numerous times since the Euro and migration crises. Many Russian-speaking or Volga Germans made their stance quite clear in the aftermath of the migration crisis their discontent with the continued immigration of Arab speakers. While often dismissed for their irony, immigrant-origin Germans voting against immigration would be indicative of a larger shift towards nativism in the German population. Volga Germans immigrated to Germany due to their national ties with the country after the dissolution of the USSR, hence the dismissiveness of the mainstream parties would only add legitimacy to the AfD as the champion of the interests of the German people. Far-right parties can, with justification, argue that they are being frozen out of the political system arbitrarily, thus blaming the issue of the quality of democracy on the current institutions and mainstream political establishment. 

However, when looking at the issue of far-right parties and their inclusion into the political system, one cannot overlook the profound impact of the Third Reich on shaping the political system of the present. Most importantly, the “Grundgesetz puts explicit limits on the freedom of association” banning extremist beliefs, halted funding for parties who express such beliefs, and permisive political non-cooperation or Ausgrenzung with such parties. The legal limits on the freedom of speech set out in the constitution set a legal expectation for the exclusion of the AfD from the political process. Hence, attempts by the established parties to freeze out the populist anti-immigrant AfD are in fact a strong sign of German democracy defending its constitutional values.

Conclusion 

While the AfD has yet to enter government, multiple scholars indicate that they are not a good sign for the long term quality of German democracy since the era of their radicalization in the aftermath of the migration crisis. Taking into account Morlino’s three levels on the quality of democracy, the AfD constantly attempts to undermine the quality of democracy on all levels. Procedurally, while the AfD may be indicative of a higher level of accountability, their constant violations of the rule of law, seen through Holocaust denial, extremist views, and attempts to subvert democratic institutions, are indicative that overall, the AfD is a threat to the democratic order established in the mid twentieth century. On the substantive level, the AfD through its restructuring into a nativist Volk oriented party, has only pushed to undermine the rights and freedoms of minority groups and thus create an inherently unequal society where only the members of the Volk are set to gain. It appears that the AfD contributes to the responsiveness of German democracy, through their representation of groups such as the Volga Germans, who have largely been ignored by mainstream parties. However, their attempts at responding to a perceived democratic deficit serve only to legitimize their illiberal agenda and so would rather weaken German democracy. 

Though many would argue that the rise of the AfD is a testament to the democratic resilience of Germany’s political system, the ability of the AfD to erode the democratic institutions upon their entrance is often overlooked. In a country in which education is mandatory regarding the horrors of the Third Reich, as a result of the National Socialist Party’s strategic co-optation of democratic institutions, the rise of the AfD is surprisingly not seen with as much concern. While German democracy may remain strong, the radicalization of the AfD around 2017 serves as a critical turning point for its future. It is therefore all the more important to remain vigilant against the AfD’s ongoing attempts to erode liberal democratic norms, so that ‘never again’ remains not only a reflection on Germany’s dark past, but also a safeguard for a democratic and hopeful future. Considering the AfD is now the second largest political force in Germany, it is ever more crucial to ensure the tradition of the firewall against extremism, Brandmauer, is respected so the AfD remains unable to erode German democracy from a position of institutional power.

1.  Merkel, Angela, and Baumann, Beate. Freiheit. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2024. ↩︎

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Frauke Petry, Image sourced from Heute | CC License, no changes made

The the LGBTQ+ community has battled for decades to secure their basic human rights.  This article analyzes the varying degrees of success of LGBTQ+ movements in China and Japan, especially how they not only indicate different levels of freedom, but also the vital role that “people power ” has in society’s aptitude for development. 

China

Most LGBTQ+ gatherings in China have occurred in an underground environment. Its citizens don’t have much of a voice; with every political group affiliated under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and president Xi Jinping, China’s government is effectively a dictatorship where dissenting opinions can place people in danger.¹ LGBTQ+ communities gathered in secret over WeChat, the primary social media app in Asia, giving support to each other because they couldn’t confide in anyone around them.² Nearly sixty percent of the Chinese LGBTQ+ community is at a greater risk of depression due to loneliness, anxiety of being outed  and lack of identity affirmation, according to a health survey conducted by the Beijing LGBT Centre.³ They are also five times more likely to consider suicide. These WeChat groups, while hidden and online, have been integral for the LGBTQ+ community in China.

However, a lack of government support can shut down even the most successful attempts for the advocacy of LGBTQ+ rights. In 2014, an inspiring milestone within the Chinese LGBTQ+ community occurred when a judge ruled in favor of LGBTQ+ rights for the first time ever in the country. Yanhui Peng, co-founder of LGBT Rights Advocacy China and currently a visiting scholar at Yale Law School, had filed a lawsuit against conversion therapy and won the case.⁴ LGBT Rights Advocacy continued to file a dozen more cases and help those who needed representation in court.⁵ There were more movements scheduled to take place, but the lockdowns under China’s “zero-Covid” policy made it difficult for any events to be organized.⁶ Shanghai Pride canceled its annual pride event in 2020 after its organizers were harassed by the police.⁷ In July 2021, WeChat began shutting down any group chats that had formed to provide support and advocacy for LGBTQ+ people.⁸ Other social media content platforms deleted content relating to pride and the LGBTQ+ community. In this hostile environment, LGBT Rights Advocacy China shut down in November 2021.⁹ Covid-19 and China’s policies had an extensive negative impact on the LGBTQ+ community, making it difficult for its members to gather and have a voice.¹⁰ Lack of free speech is the main obstacle, with many worried about the consequences of speaking out and members of the community itself deciding to remain closeted for safety, LGBTQ+ topics continue to be thought of from a perspective of outlandishness and negativity by many in China. There isn’t a reliable way to mobilize or present dissenting opinions from the norm.

LGBTQ+ press in China has actually increased in positivity over recent years – the problem is that there is less press coverage occurring overall. Covid-19 has taken the spotlight in many Chinese news outlets, resulting in a 40% drop on LGBTQ+ related stories on publications.¹¹ Even while positivity toward LGBTQ+ topics has increased, such as straying away from HIV or other STDs and moving toward highlighting the struggles of LGBTQ+ people in work environments, they still face discrimination on a regular basis.  Further, while they are advocating for equal treatment and kindness, there isn’t a reliable way for the public to become aware of these developments.¹² The government also must grapple with pressing issues such as inflation and administration policies, resulting in LGBTQ+ policies being placed on the backburner.¹³ Censorship of LGBTQ+ content is also a sign that the government, while officially neutral, is leaning toward anti-LGBTQ sentiments.¹⁴ Leading social media and news platforms also don’t encourage diverse views which makes it difficult for progress to be made.

China’s culture, rooted in tradition, is another challenge for LGBTQ+ rights advocacy movements. The integration of many anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments in everyday life through advertisements, societal expectations, and gender norms makes it inherently difficult for the LGBTQ+ community to be made publicly aware in a positive light. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore announced on August 21st that his plan to “protect the nation’s definition of marriage” excluded same-sex marriage.¹⁵ Same-sex relationships had been decriminalized, but there are no laws protecting them against discrimination.¹⁶ In addition to discrimination in the legal setting, the cautious attitude toward LGBTQ+ content in Singapore feeds further into the negativity surrounding it. The Walt Disney film “Lightyear” portrays a scene with two females kissing, resulting in an adults-only rating which demonstrates the perpetuating sentiment that anything challenging societal tradition is a negative influence.¹⁷ The restriction of LGBTQ+ topics makes it harder for people to show compassion toward members of said community. Furthermore, Confucianism in China frowns upon the possibility of having no descendants. The saying for this is “不孝有三，無後為大 (bùxiào yǒusān, wú hòu wéi dà).”¹⁸ Hesitation or lack of support toward LGBTQ+ identities don’t stem from outright hostility, but rather because it goes against the ideology that continuing a family is one of the most important responsibilities in life. These clashing values of traditional ideology and the open mindedness required to support LGBTQ+ people are thes primary reasons why it’s difficult for China to be accepting of them. 

Japan

Japan, in comparison, has shown more steady progress toward public understanding of the LGBTQ+ community. An online survey conducted in 2019 by professor Yasuharu Hidaka of Takarazuka University revealed that nearly 67% of its 10,700 participants in Japan felt that “compared with five years ago, diversity of sexual orientation and gender identity is better recognized by society.”¹⁹ Although discriminatory remarks still exist in workspaces and school environments, the survey does show improvement over time. This is in direct contrast with the diminishing press of China’s LGBTQ+ communities in recent years. Therefore, the extent of the influence of the public voice is an important factor that determines the velocity of changing societal norms.

One of the most important factors allowing LGBTQ+ communities in Japan to achieve more success is press freedom. The World Press Freedom Index ranking this year placed Japan at 71st and China at 175th out of 180 countries.²⁰ The openness to new perspectives facilitates the normalization of different identities, which is highly important for historically marginalized communities such as LGBTQ+ groups. In addition, 2022 saw the most women and LGBTQ+ candidates running in political elections: 181 and 4, respectively.²¹ Four doesn’t seem very high, but it does mark an improvement because it’s the highest number there’s ever been in one election. More surveys have found that around eight to ten percent of the Japanese population identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, but there is currently only one member in the upper house who openly identifies as such. Furthermore, surveys also indicate that most Japanese citizens are in favor of more representation of minority groups in politics and legalizing same-sex marriage, but the official regulations or laws have not been put into place.²² All of these instances demonstrate that while Japan is showing progress on a societal level thanks to its press freedom, the LGBTQ+ community still struggles with legal barriers and low representation in political matters.

A major legal setback for the LGBTQ+ community in Japan was a court ruling in June 2022 stating that it’s constitutional for same sex marriage to be restricted.²³ This highlights two important ideas. First, there has been a lot of support and advocacy by the people to make this happen, which means that the setback was not a result of public opposition. Rather, the decision was met with disappointment from many LGBTQ+ activists and couples who filed lawsuits. Second, even though the people of Japan have advocated for more diversity in politics and fairer treatment of LGBTQ+ members, the societal pressure for change has yielded very slow legal results. Some cities like Ube in the Yamaguchi Prefecture introduced the concept of “marriage certificates” in response to the ruling. These certificates grant some rights to LGBTQ+ couples as if they were legally married, including the ability to get housing loans and apply for a mortgage.²⁴ The legal benefits are not nearly as extensive as those that heterosexual couples receive in Japan, but these certificates have inspired companies to give members of the LGBTQ+ community support that otherwise wouldn’t have been possible. It also resulted in more public awareness of the struggles that LGBTQ+ people face. 

There is still a lot of progress to be made in Japan of course. Many citizens who identify as being part of the LGBTQ+ community still feel isolated in everyday life and worry about the reactions of their families and close friends. Moreover, candidates in government positions still don’t proportionally represent the LGBTQ+ population. However, it is good news that Japan is slowly inching toward a more open environment.²⁵

“People Power” in Societal Progress

The difference in the strength of LGBTQ+ communities between China and Japan demonstrates an important concept: press freedom is crucial for societal development. China’s attempts to shut down gatherings is not just a reflection of the government’s opposition to LGBTQ+ rights, but also of the larger implications of a dictatorship. New ideas are shut down if they clash with tradition so it’s difficult for any new movements to be successful even if they might benefit the common good. On the other hand, Japan’s increased amount of press freedom has allowed the public to become more familiar with the LGBTQ+ community, resulting in relatively more support and understanding from its people over time.²⁶ Japan has shown that an incremental approach is effective in bringing change and that differing opinions are necessary for improvement to happen. The findings from this article show that while the fight for LGBTQ+ rights is still ongoing, there is hope everywhere. With press freedom, incremental changes, and open minds, it’s possible for the LGBTQ+ community to receive the support and kindness they need. 

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation:| Image sourced from Flickr

1. Jason Shvili, “What Type of Government Does China Have?,” WorldAtlas, March 18, 2021, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-type-of-government-does-china-have.html. ↩︎
2. Zong Zhang, “Yi Yang: Judicial Activist, Program Officer – LGBT Rights Advocacy, China,” Alturi, https://alturi.org/feature_items/yi-yang-judicial-activist-program-officer-lgbt-rights-advocacy-china/. ↩︎
3. Phoebe Zhang, “China’s LGBT community five times more likely to develop mental illness and consider suicide than general public, report finds,” South China Morning Post, June 25, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/people-culture/gender-diversity/article/3138728/chinas-lgbt-community-five-times-more-likely. ↩︎
4. Michael Lavers, “Chinese activist continues fight for LGBTQ, intersex rights from U.S.,” Washington Blade, August 30, 2022, https://www.washingtonblade.com/2022/08/30/chinese-activist-continues-fight-for-lgbtq-intersex-rights-from-u-s/; Yale Law School, “Yanhui Peng,” https://law.yale.edu/yanhui-peng. ↩︎
5. Zong Zhang, “Yi Yang: Judicial Activist, Program Officer.” ↩︎
6. Michael Lavers, “Chinese activist continues fight.” ↩︎
7. Nathanael Cheng, Molly Henry, Seojung Kim, “The Resilience of East Asia’s LGBTQ Community,” The Diplomat, September 24, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/the-resilience-of-east-asias-lgbtq-community/. ↩︎
8. Zong Zhang, “Yi Yang: Judicial Activist, Program Officer.” ↩︎
9. Huizhong Wu, “China LGBT rights group shuts down amid hostile environment,” AP News, November 5, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/technology-china-media-social-media-taiwan-348cab147964f24ccf83907403d4c84a. ↩︎
10. Nathanael Cheng, Molly Henry, Seojung Kim, “The Resilience of East Asia’s LGBTQ Community.” ↩︎
11. Yang Yi, “Not Quite a Rainbow: How Chinese Media Tells LGBT Stories,” Sixth Tone, May 17, 2021, https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1007486/not-quite-a-rainbow-how-chinese-media-tells-lgbt-stories. ↩︎
12. Yang Yi, “Not Quite a Rainbow.” ↩︎
13. Faris Mokhtar, “Singapore Debate on LGBTQ Rights Heats Up in Test for Leaders,” Bloomberg, August 26, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-26/singapore-debate-on-lgbtq-rights-heats-up-in-test-for-leaders.
    ↩︎
14. Nathanael Cheng, Molly Henry, Seojung Kim, “The Resilience of East Asia’s LGBTQ Community.” ↩︎
15. Faris Mokhtar, “Singapore Debate on LGBTQ Rights Heats Up in Test for Leaders.” ↩︎
16. Chen Lin, “Singapore will decriminalize sex between men, prime minister says,” Reuters, August 22, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/singapore-will-decriminalise-sex-between-men-pm-2022-08-21/. ↩︎
17. Faris Mokhtar, “Singapore Debate on LGBTQ Rights Heats Up in Test for Leaders.” ↩︎
18. UNDP, USAID, “Being LGBT in Asia: China Country Report,” United Nations Development Programme, 2014, https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/asia_pacific_rbap/rbap-hhd-2014-blia-china-country-report_0.pdf. ↩︎
19. “Quarter of LGBT people in Japan have experienced outing: survey,” Kyodo News, October 28, 2020, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/10/2b73ba83c419-quarter-of-lgbt-people-in-japan-have-experienced-outing-survey.html. ↩︎
20. “Asia-Pacific Absolute and Autocratic Control of Information,” Reporters Without Borders, 2022, https://rsf.org/en/classement/2022/asia-pacific.
    ↩︎
21. Eduardo Martinez, Mariko Tamura, “FOCUS: Record women, LGBTQ election hopefuls run to shake up Japan politics,” Kyodo News, July 7, 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/07/1415d868fd6f-focus-record-women-lgbtq-election-hopefuls-run-to-shake-up-japan-politics.html. ↩︎
22. Ben Dooley, “Japan’s Support for Gay Marriage Is Soaring. But Can It Become Law?,” The New York Times, November 27, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/27/world/asia/japan-gay-marriage.html; Elaine Lies, “Japan court rules same-sex marriage ban is not unconstitutional,” Reuters, June 20, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-court-rules-barring-same-sex-marriage-not-unconstitutional-lgbtq-rights-2022-06-20/. ↩︎
23. “Japan court says ban on same-sex marriage is constitutional,” National Public Radio, June 20, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/06/20/1106313824/japan-court-ban-on-same-sex-marriage-constitutional. ↩︎
24. “Yamaguchi city of Ube ratifies rights for LGBTQ couples,” The Japan Times, November 29, 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/11/29/national/social-issues/yamaguchi-ube-city-lgbtq-rights/. ↩︎
25. Ben Dooley, “Japan’s Support for Gay Marriage Is Soaring. But Can It Become Law?.” ↩︎
26. Brian Wong, “What Asia’s LGBTQ+ Movement Can Learn From Japan,” Time Magazine, March 30, 2021, https://time.com/5951039/asia-lgbtq-japan-lgbt/. ↩︎

Since President Rodrigo Duterte came to power in the Philippines in 2016, many have criticized his administration as undemocratic and even ruthless. Questions were raised about the extrajudicial killings supporting his ‘War on Drugs’, his iron grip over the press, and him fielding his daughter as the Presidential candidate for 2022, which in effect continues his influence and control of the administration despite a term limit. While this evidence seems to suggest that Philippine democracy is weakening, this paper argues that the Philippines, under Duterte, can still be termed a democracy. The Philippines still meets the definition of a democracy under a variety of measures, including the historical conception dating to ancient Greece, Robert Dahl’s contestation-inclusion measure, the dictatorship-democracy measure, and analyses from Freedom House and Polity IV.

Defining Democracy

Understanding the meaning of ‘state’ (in the Weberian sense^[1]) and ‘regime’ is essentially a first step in conceptualising democracy. A regime is a set of rules, norms, or institutions that determine how the people acting on behalf of the state are constituted, organised, and make major decisions.^[2] As Abraham Lincoln once said, democracy (originating from the Greek word demokratia – rule by the people) as a regime type can be defined as the set of runs, norms or institutions which are made “of, by and for the people”. While we might view the rule of the people as good and desirable, the Greeks (especially Aristotle and Plato) weren’t very fond of it. This is because Plato construed demokratia as the rule of the poor, uneducated people against the rich, educated elite. It was also seen as mob rule, combined with demagogue – leading to an undesirable mix.^[3] For a long time, history seemed to support this view. Democracies were less in number than other regime types and were primarily construed as inefficient. 

Nevertheless, the negative view of democracy developed over time into a positive one, especially with the end of the Cold War. With it came newer ways in which scholars conceptualised democracy. In his 1971 work, Robert Dahl proposed a set of two dimensions – contestation and inclusion. Contestation describes how free the people are to compete as opposing blocs and push for policy outcomes of their liking. Inclusion explains who gets to participate in the democratic process, which is not just limited to voting.^[4] According to this, regimes can be classified as more or less democratic, depending on where they fall on the two-dimensional area defined by the above two variables (contestation and inclusion being on the  and the -axis respectively). Hence, countries lying in the first quadrant of the graph can be termed truly democratic. In the case of the Philippines, the degree of contestation is sufficiently high. People can (in theory) and have (in practice) organised in opposing blocs and competed to win elections. In fact, the emergence of a united opposition, known as 1Sambayan – meaning One Nation/One People (with its own separate challenges), to Duterte for the upcoming 2022 general elections in the Philippines is proof of the existence of proper contestation.^[5] Additionally, at the macro level, no particular section/group/identity (racial, ethnic, gendered, class, etc.) is deprived of democratic participation – thus indicating a high level of inclusion as well. Based on this, it is safe to say that the Philippines meets  Dahl’s requirements of a democracy.

An alternative and more advanced definition of democracy was put forward by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland in 2010 known as the Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) measure. It measures whether a regime is democratic or not (in a binary) by evaluating four things – whether the chief executive (1) and the legislature (2) is elected, whether there are multiparty elections (3), and whether there is an actual power transfer (4).^[6] In the case of the Philippines, the chief executive – President Duterte – and the legislature – Filipino Congress – were both elected through elections conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The third and the fourth criteria of the DD measure are rather interesting. The third condition requires there to be ex ante uncertainty with respect to the election results (the opposition must have a real chance of winning) and ex post irreversibility (the elections cannot be reversed/disregarded). Constitutionally, both of these exist in the Philippines. In 2016, Duterte came to power by winning the general elections despite his incendiary campaign.^[7] It shows that even though he ran amidst controversy, it wasn’t clear who would win the elections beforehand; and when he actually won, the decision couldn’t be reversed, thus fulfilling the above requirements. However, one can argue that this was in the past. In today’s scenario, there is a high chance that Duterte’s party – Philippine Democratic Party (PDP-Laban) wins again in the upcoming 2022 general elections, thus determining the results ex-ante and compromising the democratic election process. However, if that happens, it will be due to the popularity and the populistic appeal^[8] of President Duterte. This appeal is largely owing to his harsh ‘War on Drugs’ policy^[9] and not a fault in the system. Finally, the fourth criterion of the DD measure requires an actual power transfer, on losing the mandate, to prove a commitment to democracy. The Philippines passes this criterion as well, since after the 2016 elections, there was an actual transfer of power that took place from Benigno Aquino III of the Liberal Party to Duterte of the PDP. Moreover, in 2022, Duterte cannot continue as the president even if he wanted to, since the current constitution prohibits him from running for office again. Owing to a sound election commission and the existence of public checks and balances through (real) opposition parties, as explained above, Duterte will have to abide by the law and cannot hold office beyond his tenure. In light of this, he has even announced his unwillingness to contest the upcoming elections. It is expected that his daughter Sara Duterte will run for office in her father’s place.^[10] Here, although the transfer of power would be to the next-of-kin (if Sara wins), it can be viewed as some kind of a power transfer since the DD measure makes binary observations. When viewed in a spectrum, the degree to which power is actually transferred would be low, nevertheless positive (validating some of the concerns over Philippine democracy). This is because technically, the power would be given to the next elected president and not retained by the incumbent forcibly. Since, all the four criteria are positively checked, the Philippines can be termed as a democracy as per the DD measure too. While some might view the binarity of the measure as its limitation, it helps the analyst qualify democracy from a very objective (read: technical) and procedural lens without getting entangled in the domestic narratives, which might be subject to heavy political biases/propaganda. 

Substantive vs. Procedural Definitions

Before moving onto the operationalisation of the concept of democracy, it is important to mark a key difference between the various definitions of democracy discussed above. The Greek view of democracy worked on a substantive definition of democracy. It defined democracy based on the desired outcome democracies are expected to achieve – increased public goods. This makes the analysis a tautology/trivial, meaning coming to deduce democracy from the results of democracy itself. Dahl, on the other hand, encourages analysts to use a procedural definition of democracy instead of a substantive one. According to procedural definitions, democracy is defined based on the institutions and constraints on the leader associated with the regime. This definition is much more useful while analysing regimes as it does not define democracy through its desired outcome and instead focuses on what it runs on.^[11] This distinction is particularly important because the results of democracy can also (sporadically) exist in non-democratic countries. Nevertheless, the mere existence of these does not guarantee their continuance, whilst a democracy, which arises from particular institutions (as described by the procedural definition) will tend to preserve its results over a longer time. This also alleviates the risk of misidentifying non-democratic countries as democratic by chance and makes it easier to locate the real drivers (root) of democracy instead of adjudicating on a country’s democracy simply by looking at the presence (or absence) of characteristics caused by democracy.

Operationalisation

In order to further analyse the Philippine regime, it is important to operationalise the concept of democracy. Operationalisation entails observing the abstract conceptualisations (thought/idea) of democracy through various quantifiable measures/indicators^[12]. As discussed previously, Dahl’s conceptualisation places regimes on a two-dimensional plane defined by the variables of levels of contestation and inclusion. Hence, it can be said that it is partially operationalised/measurable. Further, the DD measure can be understood as fully operationalised since it directly evaluates regimes based on four clear criteria. Since the direct quantification of these criterion is possible (through a Yes/No answer), its known as a measure^[13]. A key characteristic of the DD measure is that it is dichotomous in nature i.e., a regime can either be a democracy or not. It does not measure the extent/degree to which the regime is a democracy. Conversely, operationalisation of Dahl’s idea of a democracy is seen as continuous since it explains the degree to which a country is a democracy or not. Freedom House is another continuous indicator of democracies. It is called an indicator since it observes proxies of democracies – namely civil liberties and political rights.

According to the latest Freedom House report^[14], the Philippines was termed ‘Partly Free’ with an overall score of 56/100. One of the reasons for the low score of the Philippines is Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’, under which there have been many extrajudicial killings by the state. Suspected drug dealers and abusers are often killed without much verification due process.^[15] This implies that the Philippines is only barely democratic (not as democratic as the Dahl and the DD measure evaluate it to be). This is because such a measure considers civil liberties a means to help preserve a democracy. Therefore, if the government incarcerates or persecutes ‘offenders’ (read: civilians) extrajudicially, it is an impediment on the citizens’ civil liberties, making the country less democratic. However, there is a flaw in this argument. It uses the substantive definition of democracy and hence interprets civil liberties and political rights as necessary for democracy. However, these are often viewed as the desired outcomes of a democracy – thus resulting in the argument/implication in a tautology. This is why Freedom House has also received criticism from scholars across the world.^[16]

Polity IV is another continuous measure, developed by a team of researchers at the University of Maryland, that is often used to operationalise democracy. However, it only measures data on countries up to 2013.^[17] Nevertheless, there are significant nuances that can be obtained by looking at current day Philippines through its framework. It generates democracy and autocracy scores (in the range 0 to 10) and calculates the difference (Democracy Score – Autocracy Score) to obtain the final score ranging between (10 – most democratic to (-10) – most autocratic).^[18] These scores are generated by evaluating the competitiveness and regulation of political participation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive. The last of these (constraints on the chief executive/president) becomes quite interesting in the case of the Philippines. It can be argued that Duterte appears to have far less constraints on him in terms of what he can/cannot do as the president. This is because of his very controversial ‘War on Drugs’ wherein the regime has killed and incarcerated thousands of ‘suspected’ drug dealers and abusers without sufficient evidence or due process.^[19] The lack of constraint on Duterte is also due the populist support he enjoys by presenting himself as the ‘saviour’ of the masses from drugs. Hence, this is likely to receive a high autocratic score on Polity’s scale. However, the Philippines is expected to receive a high democratic score on the other four parameters (as explained earlier through Dahl and DD measure). Rampant corruption and vote buying especially during the elections can negatively affect the regulation of political participation, however it is so extensive and bi-partisan that it arguably be called ‘self-regulatory’ since corrupt politicians on either side of the spectrum act as a balance for each other – making public opinion valuable. Therefore, in totality, the Philippines is still expected to get a positive overall score – terming it as a democracy.

In conclusion, the paper argues that the Philippines under Duterte can be termed as a democracy. This is done by looking at the conceptualisation and operationalisation of democracy in the Philippines from 2016 to the present day under Duterte. All measures seem to qualify it as a democracy, though more advanced measures such as the Polity IV framework seem to raise some red-flags indicating the beginning of a shift towards autocracy. It is for the future to tell what course Duterte’s Philippines will take in the 2022 general elections – whether it will make a U-turn into autocracy (something the Philippines defeated with the fall of Marcos) or continue to uphold and savor democracy.

References:

^[1] According to Weber, the state is a human community that successfully claims monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in a given territory^#.

^[2] Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder. Principles of Comparative Politics. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2013 p. 146.

^[3] Ibid p. 145.

^[4] Dahl, Robert Alan. Polyarchy Participation and Opposition. New Haven, Conn: Yale Univ. Pr, 1973.

^[5] Palatino, Mong. “Can a United OPPOSITION Defeat Duterte at the 2022 Philippine

Elections?” – The Diplomat. for The Diplomat, May 17, 2021.

^[6] Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. "Democracy and

Dictatorship Revisited. Public Choice; 143, no. 1/2 (2010): 67-101. Accessed August

6, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40661005.

^[7] Harvey, Adam. “Controversial Mayor DUTERTE Wins Philippine Presidential Election.” ABC News. ABC News, May 10, 2016. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-10/rodrigo-duterte-wins-philippine-presidential-vote/7399658.

^[8] Regencia, Ted. “Why Is DUTERTE Still Riding High Despite RECESSION, COVID?” Business and Economy News | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, July 28, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/28/duterte-still-rides-high-in-polls-amid-pandemic-economic-slump.

^[9] Curato, Nicole. “Politics of ANXIETY, Politics of HOPE: Penal Populism and Duterte’s Rise to Power – NICOLE Curato, 2016.” SAGE Journals. Accessed August 6, 2021. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/186810341603500305.

^[10] Sara Duterte Says She’s Open To Run For President In 2022 Elections But…. “Sara Duterte Says She’s Open to Run for President in 2022 Elections but…” Philippine News, July 9, 2021. https://philnews.ph/2021/07/10/sara-duterte-says-shes-open-to-run-for-president-in-2022-elections-but/

^[11] Ibid p. 150.

^[12] Ibid p. 152.

^[13] Ibid p. 149.

^[14] “Philippines: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report.” Freedom House. Accessed August 6, 2021. https://freedomhouse.org/country/philippines/freedom-world/2021#CL

^[15] “Stop Extrajudicial Executions in the Philippines.” Investigate extrajudicial executions in the Philippines | Amnesty International. Accessed August 6, 2021. https://www.amnesty.org/en/get-involved/take-action/stop-extrajudicial-executions-in-the-philippines/

^[16] Ibid p. 161.

^[17] Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2016.” Center for Systemic Peace, n.d. https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2016.pdf

^[18] Ibid p. 155.

^[19] Caryl, Christian. “President Duterte’s Crazy Drug War Is Just the Beginning.” Foreign Policy, November 2, 2016. https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/02/president-dutertes-crazy-drug-war-is-just-the-beginning-philippines/

Introduction:

Robert Michels, a German sociologist with renowned political distinction, first put forth the idea of ‘The Iron Law of the Oligarchy’ in academic circles over seventy years ago. Michels was of the opinion that all organizations, regardless of their political ideologies or their position on the political spectrum, were nothing more than masquerading oligarchies. He placed particular emphasis on institutions that made claims to be ‘democratic’ in their intentions, saying that “The notion of the representation of popular interests, a notion to which the great majority of democrats cleave with so much tenacity and confidence, is an illusion engendered by a false illumination,”  (Summers 1984 ). The very nature of democratic organizations, such as political parties or trade unions, lend themselves to bureaucratic tendencies (Summers 1984 ). It is this perspective, this identification of a conceptual dissonance in politics, that ‘democratic’ systems and organizations create environments that allow characteristically undemocratic/oligarchy-esque practices and behavior to flourish, that creates the basis of the argument presented in this essay. While it almost exclusively occurs in ‘democratic’ states, the system of one-party dominance is definitively undemocratic/oligarchy-esque, and poses more harm to a country’s politics than good. This essay will aim to prove this, through a careful analysis of the advantages and disadvantages this one party-dominant system has had in the context of a post-Apartheid South Africa.

Theoretical preliminaries: Factors that enhance South African one party dominance

The preliminaries of this argument against one party dominance, involve firstly defining one party dominance for the purpose of this essay. One party dominance can be defined as “a country where the political landscape is perpetually overshadowed by a single dominant political party that wins consecutive elections and governs for a prolonged period” (Khambuhle 2019). In the South African context, this definition makes reference to the African National Congress Party, as it has won six national elections at the time of this essay, and each time was won with the overwhelming majority of votes, and has been the ruling party for over twenty-five years  (Khambuhle 2019).  For the sake of contextualization, it is important to briefly analyze the political history that lead to the ANC’s political dominance in South Africa, as well the political environment in which the ANC exercises its dominance presently.

The political period before South African democracy, and the ANC in power, was called ‘Apartheid’, which referred to the institutionalization and inclusion of discriminatory and racist policies into the very fabric of South African politics (Endoh 2015). This horrificly racist ideology subjugated black persons in South Africa for centuries, before the ANC, along with other activist parties, fought for and achieved the first democratic elections in 1994, as well as a complete eradication of all Apartheid laws (Endoh 2015). This piece of South African history is important to the content of this essay, because it explains the position the ANC plays, not only in South Africa’s political landscape, but in the cultural and social fabric of the country as well. This equation of the ANC to the end of Apartheid is an integral part of why they have achieved and maintained such political dominance in South Africa, and these unique circumstances influence the way one party dominance is presented in the South African political environment. This link is integral in forming and contextualizing the main argument of this essay: why this dominance is ultimately damaging to South Africa.

The advantages of one party dominance:

In the interest of remaining objective, and providing a balanced commentary on the subject matter, it is important to explore the various benefits that exist as a result of one party dominance, with a special interest in analyzing how these advantages present themselves in the South African political landscape. The generalized advantages of one party dominance include: quick decision making (theoretically, the party in power acts as homogenous entity in decision making, employing the unification of ideals to make political decisions quickly and easily, a characteristic that is undeniably useful to developing countries, which often do not have the benefit of time when the need for a decision arises) (De Jager 2009); centralized decision-making (because the decisions are coming from one source, i.e. the ruling party, the decisions made are more focused and direct, implying a better rate of success) (De Jager 2009); and finally its unique applicability to developing countries (it is often suggested that developing countries, while in the process of ‘developing’, are more suited to unified control that the one party dominant system employs, and that more parties and political voices would only lengthen the period in which a country stayed ‘developing’) (Monyani 2018 ).

To analyze whether or not these ‘advantages’ are present in South African one party dominance, is to take a closer look at its current political climate. It could be said that the ANC is ‘quick’ to make decisions for the country, having effective and well developed strategies for crises. For example, the vaccine rollout strategy to combat the Covid-19 pandemic was developed quite quickly  (Diseases 2021), though the ANC seemed unable to act upon it; South Africa has an exceptionally low rate of vaccines at the time of this essay (37.50%  of all adults, according to the latest vaccines statistics) (Government 2021). This inability to adhere to the time constraints and goals set forth in their plans, as illustrated in the Covid-19 example, can be characterized as an ongoing problem for the ANC, with factors such as corruption, mismanagement, or insufficient resources heavily affecting the degree to which their strategies are implemented. Centralized decision making and the unification of ideals also do not apply to the ANC, as their party has already had two major divisions that resulted in party splits, within their short period of power. The first took place in 2008 and resulted in the formation of the Congress of the People party, and the second took place in 2013, that resulted in the formation of the Economic Freedom Fighters party  (Khambuhle 2019). And finally, to address the idea that an one-party dominant system supports the quicker development of a third-world country, within the period of time that the ANC has been in power, South Africa’s development has made no substantial progress, even being rated as ‘non-investment grade’ or ‘junk status’ by the Standard & Global Rating system in 2020  (Wasserman 2020). To summarize, whatever perceived ‘advantages’ there are to a one party dominant system, they are not present in the South African political environment.

The disadvantages of one party dominance:

There are many disadvantages to the one party dominance, but this paragraph will only offer those that are most prevalent in the current political environment of South Africa. While one party dominant systems occur in democracies, more specifically countries with democracies that are in the process of consolidation, this system gives rise to characteristics that seem, at worst, undemocratic, and at best, heavily affecting the quality of democracy  (De Jager 2009). Examples of this include: lack of accountability (a democracy is maintained through agents of accountability, which include prominent opposition parties, of which the ANC has none) (De Jager 2009); limiting the scope of political and civil society; and the exchange of civil and political liberties for the provision of basic necessities  (De Jager 2009), which is exceptionally prevalent in South Africa, as proven by a recent survey that suggests a significant percentage of participants were willing to “sacrifice democratic procedures for the promise of law and order and improved services” (Lanegran 2001). Furthermore, it acts as a highly effective breeding ground for corruption, (as a result of the lack of agents of accountability), a problem that has been plaguing the South African political environment for years, as is illustrated by the exceptionally high ranking South Africa has achieved in the Corruption Perceptions Index (44^th out of 195 countries)  (Transparency International 2020). The one party dominance system of politics does more harm than good to the country it operates in and entails many disadvantages in South Africa since the ANC’s rise to power.

Conclusion:

This essay’s main aim was to prove that the political system of one party dominance carries more disadvantages than advantages for its host country, through the context of a post-Apartheid South Africa. It analyzed whether or not the theoretical benefits of the one party dominant system were illustrated in present day South Africa, determining that they are not. In addition, it explored all of the harm the one party dominant system has done to the South African political climate, and posed questions for South Africa’s future as a political entity.

Works Cited

De Jager, N. 2009. “Voice and accountability in one party dominant systems .” The University Of Pretoria 74 (12): 93.

Diseases, The National Institute for Communicable. 2021. The Covid-19 vaccine rollout strategy . Johannesburg: NICD.

Endoh, T. 2015. “Democratic constitutionalism in post-apartheid South Africa.” Africa Review 67 (79): 4-5.

Government, South African. 2021. SA Corona virus . Accessed October 16, 2021. https://sacoronavirus.co.za/latest-vaccine-statistics/.

Khambuhle, I. 2019. “Coexistence as a Strategy for Opposition Parties in Challenging the African National Congress’ One party Dominance .” South African Journal of Political Studies 46 (4): 1.

Lanegran, K. 2001. “South Africa’s 1999 Election: Consolidating a Dominant Party System.” Indiana University Press 48 (2): 2.

Monyani, M. 2018 . “One Party State: Is It Good or Bad for Governance?” E-International Relations , May 25: 2-5.

Summers, W. 1984 . “Democracy in a One-Party State.” Maryland Law Review 43 (1): 2-3.

Transparency International . 2020. The Corruption Perceptions Index . Transparency International .

Wasserman, H. 2020. “South Africa is ‘junk’ – here’s what that means to you.” Business Insider, March 30: 1-8.

Written by: Ryan Fuentes, Pauli Murray College ’23

This piece was published as part of our YMUN Pegasus series.

“Why don’t young people trust their government?”

The question, asked during a UN debate on democracy, felt inevitable. Young people are the heart of the future of democracy; they will decide what it means to our generation. Besides, it is the young people growing up in today’s world that most often find themselves at odds with their government’s choices.

The moderator had set the tone by first considering democracy “an ongoing dialogue between political and civil society.” The idea was not to measure democracy itself in traditional ways of votes or institutions. In the U.S., perhaps we too often forget that our democratic system does not define democracy itself. Rather, as different nations struggle with their own applications of democracy, so the UN debate between nationalities was not a single answer, but a conversation.

But any question about young people and trust cannot be answered by theory or speculation, but hard experience only. After all, when humans mistrust, it is most often because of a lack of understanding between two sides.

Looking around the room, I saw not many but a few young people, most notably a group of Swedish Scouts. The question was not for them. The moderator had directed it to an older man sitting at a panel up front. His name was Jay Naidu, and several decades ago, he left university to be a community organizer in South Africa’s anti-Apartheid movement. Back then, with many  expecting racial civil war, the largely peaceful end of Apartheid in 1994 gave people a lot to celebrate. “We were the political miracle of the world,” said Mr. Naidu. 

But just last year, as the moderator had also pointed out, fewer than 50% of South Africans voted in their elections. 

As Mr. Naidu saw the issue, people do not feel like their government cares about them. But voting is only one specific problem. In his view, democracy at its core is social justice. Nelson Mandela and other leaders may be gone now, but Mr. Naidu never expected them to deliver all the solutions. Instead, they put in place “the containers for us and future generations to do the work.”

Perhaps Mr. Naidu could not speak for today’s generation, but his own experience served as an important reminder: even in a room full of tenured adults, each one was at one point a young person who faced their own, though arguably the similar, kinds of challenges that we face today.

With respect to democracy, Mr. Naidu warned against our present use of older models. He feels that the post-war mindset after World War II still governs much of today’s thinking: “But 70 years later, we need to open the dialogue. We cannot just rely on experience of the past.”

He proposed greater intergenerational conversation. And although he did not say how, it seemed symbolic that many of the following questions from the floor were asked by the Swedish Scouts. One asked: “What can young people do to protect democracy?”

Mr. Naidu responded, this time with an old adage: “Who does this world belong to? We don’t inherit it from our ancestors. We borrow it from our children.” 

He argued that young people need to speak up, challenge their governments, and make change happen. He went on: “Democracy is not just about governments, it’s about civil society, too.” 

Mr. Naidu finally noted the significance of understanding the human relationship between people, regardless of things like race, language, culture, and sexual orientation. He pointed to the notion that together, we have all the wisdom we need to make the world a better place. In accordance, he finished by telling young people to believe in themselves.

His point is a strong one. In measuring particular aspects of democracy, like voting, we can easily bring up numbers; while just under half of South Africans voted last year, just over half of age-eligible Americans voted in 2016. But accounting for these numbers becomes much more personal and much harder to do. Mr. Naidu spoke from personal experience, not just in terms of specific actions but the kinds of choices that young people must make. He provided a powerful message, one that itself seemed to make a connection between his generation and mine.

For the future of democracy, Mr. Naidu placed his faith in young people. For our part, it seems young people must trust and believe in ourselves before we can put our faith into democratic government.

Written by Yixin Claire Ren

“Events do not deliver their meanings to us. They are always interpreted.”—The Gate of Heavenly Peace

While the 1989 student movement remains a topic of heated discussion in the West, in China, it is forced into national amnesia because discussion of and retrospection on the event have been strictly censored in China’s mainstream media, if not outright banned. Details of the crackdown on June Fourth have been kept from public disclosure since its occurrence, and the divergent yet individually coherent interpretations of the historical mystery between East and West suggest that there are multiple possible truths at work. Six years after the student demonstrations gripped global attention through massive media coverage, the release of The Gate of Heavenly Peace (hereafter abbreviated as The Gate) in 1995 brought back painful memories of the seven-week-long student movement in China. In the face of China’s denial of the massacre and US reluctance to endanger business interests and diplomatic ties, the directors Carma Hinton and Richard Gordon join a battle for the meaning of these events and self-consciously engage in the writing of history (Taylor). Interweaving videotaped scenes of the demonstrations and conversations with participants and eyewitnesses, The Gate provides a detailed chronicle from mid-April, when the public mourning of pro-democracy official Hu Yaobang provoked demonstrators’ expression of long-standing frustration with the lack of political freedoms, to June 4, when the sequence of protests culminated in a government crackdown.

Upon its premiere at the 1995 New York Film Festival, The Gate received wide acclaim. Hinton and Gordon amassed over 250 hours of archival footage from nine different countries and conducted lengthy, thoughtful interviews with intellectuals, workers, former government officials, and Chinese student leaders (Lee 134; Litzinger 837). Critics applaud that by including a multiplicity of different voices and a detailed historical background, “[the film] escapes the sensationalism that informed much of the media coverage” (Litzinger 828) and “presents a balanced and ‘dialogical’ perspective on the Tiananmen protests” (Litzinger 837). Acclaimed film critic Charles Taylor remarks that it has “the richness, clarity, and complexity that only the best documentaries afford,” and another critic goes further, saying “[s]uch richness of material is perfect for classroom teaching at the university level” (Lee 134). The Gate is also praised for its masterfully designed web page, a comprehensive digital collection of posters, photographs, music, videos and scholarly works that together explore the underlying themes of the student occupation, such as nationalism, human rights, reform, and revolution.

Situating the 1989 student movement in a larger historical background and analyzing it through the lens of political culture in China, The Gate achieves contextualization and demystification of the June Fourth events which other narratives—particularly those in the U.S. news media—fail to accomplish. By rejecting the dominant anti-communist rhetoric of those narratives, the film does not make the event an ideological commodity, but an object of critical debate and meaningful commemoration. However, The Gate’s subtle argument that demonstrators had been socialized in a political culture from which they could never escape causes the film to diverge from a completely distanced, objective account of June Fourth. Though subtle, the negative portrayal of radical students and ideological reading of the conflict between radical and conciliatory camps contribute to the framing of China’s international image, inadvertently reinforcing the “alienatingly different” image of China from the freedom-granting democracies of the West (Chen 18).

June Fourth in the American News Media: Decontextualized and Mystified

Back in 1989, the U.S. news media domesticated June Fourth to the American audience by media broadcasts that were refracted through the lens of democracy promotion. Among all the iconic images that appeared in the news coverage, Tank Man is the most memorable—alone and unarmed, an ordinary Chinese man standing motionlessly in front of a battalion of armored tanks, which rolled to Tiananmen Square in response to the Chinese government’s martial law. Cut from a video, Tank Man is condensed and mythologized into a single frozen image and has been generally understood to represent his bold defiance of inhumane state machinery and a heightened and unsolvable tension between an authoritarian state and powerless citizens. A shockingly wide dissemination of the Tank Man image in the U.S. media and the image’s entrenchment in collective memory are indicative of the prevailing anti-communist rhetoric of the Western discourse on the June Fourth events. Tank Man also appears in The Gate, but the directors present it in a meaningfully different way that undermines the validity of the established American interpretation.

Yasmin Ibrahim, an extensive publisher on international communications, uses Tank Man as an example to reflect on the problematic role of popular news images in representing events. The recurrence of Tank Man, in both media coverage then and anniversary commemorations in the following decades, affirms his “indexicality” to the June Fourth events (Ibrahim 583). Recalling and retrieving the events of 1989 through the Tank Man, a single evocative image, inevitably results in “collapsing complex events into image narratives and delimiting political analysis into a trope of pro-democracy struggles” (Ibrahim 583). In the process of recirculation, the Tank Man image is “disembedd[ed]” from the original complex historical background, obfuscating the history; meanwhile, it gets “relocat[ed] in popular culture” and consumed within the changing contexts dictated by dominant cultural values and political ideologies (Ibrahim 586). This process of “disembedding” and “relocation” causes decontextualization, and the discourse power of news media reinforces the anti-communist rhetoric that surrounds the June Fourth events.

Ibrahim’s view is echoed by Lee, Li, and Lee’s criticism that editorial news over-simplifies complex events according to pre-packaged ideology. In their article “Symbolic Use of Decisive Events: Tiananmen as a News Icon in the Editorials of the Elite U.S. Press,” Lee et al. examine references to June Fourth in the editorials of The New York Times (NYT) and The Washington Post (WP) over time, in an attempt to show that the meaning associated with the event has changed along with the evolution of U.S.-China relations in the past two decades. From 1989 to 1992, the descriptive lexicon employed in the editorial discourse is “killing,” “slaughter,” and “massacre,” revealing strong moral condemnations (Lee et al. 342). At the end of the Cold War, the elite U.S. press still viewed China as a communist threat from the East and solidified the image of Tiananmen as a symbol of inhuman authoritarianism in the minds of American people. As the mouthpiece of American political ideology, the press turned June Fourth into a tool to stoke anti-communist sentiment, which in turn strengthens the might and righteousness of American liberalism. In this sense, the “[s]ocial memory” of June Fourth is “stripped of context” and becomes “unstable at the level of information” but “stable at the level of shared meanings” (Ibrahim 589). June Fourth in the editorial discourse, therefore, became less of a complex historical event full of nuanced information than a means to propagate the dominant political ideology.

Lee et al. also show that the meanings associated with June Fourth have been reenacted “through the process of continual recirculation” (337). In the second period from 1993 to 2000, Tiananmen “evolved from a sweeping symbol of authoritarianism and Communist dictatorship into a more concrete and specific symbol of human rights abuse” (Lee et al. 345). Into the 2000s, U.S.-China relations took a friendlier turn because of strategic reciprocity—America declared war on terrorism for which China’s alliance was important; China needed America’s support to enter the World Trade Organization. The focus of NYT and WP’s editorials shifted to the personal stories of Chinese dissidents and activists, and the use of Tiananmen was less condemnatory than commemorative (Lee et al. 348). Over time, June Fourth has evolved artificially from a catch-all symbol of dictatorship to an allusion to Beijing’s indifference to human life, and finally to an entry point for the press to comment on the current repressive political climate in China. Different generations of audience are provided various versions of the story, causing them to perceive the same event in manipulatively different ways. The negative consequence is that June Fourth has been mystified over the course of circulation. In light of the persistence of journalistic accounts to either condense the sequence of events in 1989 to evocative images of debatable meaning such as the Tank Man, or to impart different symbolizations to a foreign event, it becomes easier to understand why the coherence of the global collective memory of June Fourth continues to be undermined by the discrepancies between various accounts of the story that correspond to changing national interests and cultural repertoire.

The Gate: An Attempt to Restore Historical Complexity to June Fourth

In contrast to foregoing decontextualizing and mystifying tactics utilized by other narratives to project self-serving ideologies, The Gate distinguishes itself by giving back historical complexity to June Fourth and narrating the event with distanced objectivity. The film succeeds in subverting, at least partially, the undercurrent of anti-communist sentiment that underlies most of the dominant American accounts. The first meaningful move taken by the film is to provide the video version of Tank Man at the beginning, counteracting the misleading message sent by the popular motionless version. In the static image, it seems as though the tank is about to crush the innocent young man, which tempts the viewer to condemn the overpowering state and the photograph has become a cultural symbol of resistance. In contrast, the video clip in the film shows that in fact, the tank is constantly changing its advance direction to back off from the man; it is the man who keeps harassing the tank and even climbs up on it to flaunt his prowess. By providing the original videotape of Tank Man, the film argues that it is not the callous authoritarian state machine that we have always assumed, but one that is capable of restraint and compromise. This argument sets the groundwork for the rest of the film to dissolve a series of misinterpretations that revolve around June Fourth.

In the rest of the beginning of the film is the reminder of China’s recent evolution until 1989. This lengthy recollection, which helps to provide insight into the historical roots of the event, orients the viewer to a larger historical context. Instead of directly delving into the events in 1989, the first thirty minutes of the film provide a fleshed-out account of decisive social transformations that China has undergone since the 20th century, from the May Fourth Movement, to the People’s Republic of China under Maoism, to the Cultural Revolution, to Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power, and finally, to the successes and ramifications of his economic liberalization initiatives.

The recounting of recent Chinese history is an important contextualization strategy: Instead of isolating June Fourth in a confined time span, which may very likely lead to simplistic conclusions due to a lack of context, the film equips the audience with the historical background necessary to understand the final crackdown in light of China’s inherited political radicalism. As Associate Professor of Cultural Anthropologist at Duke University, Ralph Litzinger points out, “the time the viewer is asked to inhabit is not only the chronology of events traced through April, May, and June 1989 but extends as well to the last imperial regime and the birth of twentieth-century Chinese nationalism and Maoist socialism” (838). Cutting back and forth between videotaped scenes of former historical events and student demonstrations in 1989, this film strategy places “student actions, comments, and reflections in the context of a history of student radicalism” (Litzinger 837). The viewer is invited to understand students and their movements “as products of their own culture and time” (Litzinger 383).

While other narratives, particularly those in the news media, tend to frame June Fourth as a bilateral confrontational drama between the students and the government, The Gate highlights the Chinese government’s multiple concessions and its willingness to cooperate with the dissidents. In the film, every time the government conducts dialogue with student representatives, the voice of radical students always drowns out that of reform-minded students. The hope of reconciliation is repetitively ruined by student extremists’ demand that transformation into a liberal democratic state be completed overnight. Thus, “the conflict of the movement was not just between the students and the government, but between the students and an older, more cautious generation of intellectual dissidents, and within the student organizations themselves,” writes Charles Taylor. “[T]he tragedy was even deeper than we assumed, a result of missed opportunities, past demons, and unyielding positions on both sides” (Taylor). A simplistic characterization of the Chinese government as bigoted and repressive is the very foundation upon which anti-communist narratives are based. By exposing the audience to the unrecognized moderate side of the state, The Gate cripples those biases at a fundamental level and brings a more balanced appreciation of the Chinese government.

Regretfully, the historical richness of The Gate that is “perfect for classroom teaching at the university level,” as one critic terms it, does not yield much discourse power due to its confined circulation among liberal scholars in the West (Lee 134). Lee gives insight into the reason why the mass media has monopolized the power in giving meaning to June Fourth: “[t]he overall effect is overwhelming and perhaps more than a little confusing for the average television viewer in the West, whose viewing habits have been shaped by countless smooth, quick-cutting Hollywood movies and the fast-moving linear narrative mode of television news programs that do not require long attention spans” (134). This statement can be corroborated by the fact that The Gate has reached a relatively small group of viewers compared to other documentaries. The film has not reached a large enough audience to exert otherwise considerable influence on the public discourse on June Fourth.

The Gate: Ultimately Joins the Meta-Narrative of Democracy and Freedom

The Gate satisfies many of the demands we have placed on documentary films, and the audience is given the opportunity to engage with the wider significance of the events in 1989. But it is a dubious practice to uncritically laud the film’s historical realism without also interrogating the ways in which it inadvertently joins the larger Western discourse that attempts to code the series of 1989 events as a failed experiment of democracy in the distant Communist East. The Gate’s strategic treatment of U.S. journalist Philip Cunningham’s interview with Chai Ling speaks to the ideological force of the film’s underlying argument that student demonstrators had been radicalized by the very political atmosphere they intended to transform.

Chai Ling was the self-proclaimed commander in chief of the Tiananmen occupation, throughout which she insisted on uncompromising antagonism against the state government even when there had been chances for reconciliation. The film returns to the interview in bits and pieces more than fifteen times, juxtaposing Chai’s stinging denunciation of the government and fanatical appeal for violent insurrection in stark contrast with other interview subjects, who chiefly speak with reasoned reflection and advocate less confrontational means of political organizing. Litzinger observes an interesting tension between the film’s overall complexity and its over-reliance on Chai’s dramatic account; he writes, “What is striking to me is how the film, on the one hand, is so intent to show the complexity and deep historical roots of the tragedy, while on the other hand, it draws so much dramatic attention to the figure, words, and performance of the Chai Ling interview, which was, in fact, a very small part of the overall event” (842). Geremie Barmé, an Australian sinologist as well as one of the screenwriters for The Gate, builds on Litzinger’s observation that the film is disproportionately devoted to the Chai interview, saying “[Chai] is seen as embodying, in a metonymic way, the Maoist State itself” and “[she is] forced to occupy the space of the incommensurable other” (qtd. in Litzinger 843). In the interview, Chai reflects on the bitter divisions between moderate and radical student factions, reiterates the importance of taking extreme approaches unyieldingly against the corrupt hardline state, and repeatedly identifies bloodshed as the only means to awaken Chinese to overthrow the brutal regime. All of her discussion of life and death, class division, and the red battle is reminiscent of the Maoist revolutionary rhetoric. The depiction of Chai—a gallant rebel speaking the very language of the Party that she seeks to dethrone—is consistent with the film’s underlying argument that these passionate, young political activists, despite their best intentions, may never escape the political culture that has shaped their actions.                       

In addition to Chai Ling, there were numerous other students and intellectuals who have gone to the extreme to defend their political beliefs. Demonstrators broke up into two opposite camps, reform-minded or revolution-inclined, and acute tension rose between them. As the movement proceeds, “[t]hey try to stifle alternative positions, accuse their opponents of being traitors, and attempt to manipulate events to their advantage to maintain power,” writes Gina Marchetti, a critical theorist on cultural studies at University of Hong Kong (223). “Perhaps even more than the old men in power, the demonstrators are ‘children of Mao,’ and they exhibit the legacy of Mao’s romantic revolutionary idealism” (Marchetti 223). A cruel irony thus operates in the film: The protesters, in their quest for democratic representation, are portrayed as having adopted the very instruments of oppression that they were seeking to eradicate. The political infighting among demonstrators reminds us of a staggering parallel between the dissident camp and the state: they have similarity in terms of suppressing dissenting views and persecuting political opponents. The Gate, by presenting this striking resemblance—not in words, but in its methods of reenactment—turns our attention again to the Chinese political culture that looms large in the background, which has been incredibly powerful in moulding the behaviors on both sides.                   

Moreover, The Gate’s portrayal of the idiosyncratic political culture in China joins the meta-narrative that promotes the most salient elements—democracy and freedom—of American national identity. Pauline Chen, a New York Times columnist, examines how the film creates an “alienatingly different” image of China:

For most Americans, the images of the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement offered a vision of the Chinese people as reassuringly similar to ourselves. . . . In the subsequent brutal crackdown by the Chinese government on June 4, 1989, the illusion of similarity receded, and we again saw China as alienatingly different. (Chen 18)

Presented with the painful disjunction between these two sets of images, the viewer is reminded anew that democracy and freedom, which are pivotal to American national identity, are still very far from being achieved in China. The audience, therefore, is invited to interpret June Fourth as a failed episode of pursuing democracy, a tale about how political freedoms and participatory democracy are still lacking in a monolithic state ruled by an outmoded socialist system. The way in which the film subtly encourages the use of political stereotypes about China has an actual effect of valorizing the values underpinning American liberalism. The Gate intensifies the United States’ ideology of seeing itself as the benchmark for and beacon of democracy and freedom. Hence, the film ends up joining the larger news media discourse that tries to peddle this ideological commodity, just like the strategic reenactment of Tank Man and by the elite editorials.

The Gate of Heavenly Peace ultimately participates in the dominant Western ideological discourse due to its problematic portrayal of Chinese demonstrators through the editing of interviews, its drawing of an analogy between protesters and the state to emphasize ingrained political radicalism and revolutionary idealism, and its subtle construction of an idiosyncratically different image of China that stands in stark contrast to paradigmatic American ideals. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to dismiss the film’s bold challenge of authoritative narratives of June Fourth in the West. The Gate has outstripped its numerous counterparts, primarily in the U.S. news media, by providing an objective reading of Tank Man, underscoring the moderate line within the Chinese government, and uncovering the complicated historical and political situations that lead to June Fourth. Through making sense of June Fourth in light of the larger historical context and inherited political culture in China, The Gate is a successful attempt to restore historical complexity to the event. The film’s astute and thoughtful reading of Chinese society interrupts the interpretive coherence constructed by the U.S. news media which largely oversimplifies and condenses June Fourth into an ideological package.

Viewed from this perspective, The Gate has a dual interpretive identity: on the one hand, it tries to recover the causes, consequences, and historical truth of June Fourth; but on the other, through igniting political stereotypes, it also successfully propagates American-flavored ideas of democracy and freedom. At the end of the day, the film does not escape the curse of the limit of representation—it is produced in a cultural environment that is imbued with stereotypical generalizations about June Fourth and about China, and it eventually joins the meta-narrative from which it intended to depart.

Bibliography

Chen, Pauline. “Screening History: New Documentaries on the Tiananmen Events in China.” Cineaste 22.1 (1996): 18-22. JSTOR. Web. 8 Nov. 2016.

Ibrahim, Yasmin. “Tank Man, Media Memory and Yellow Duck Patrol: Remembering Tiananmen on Social Media.” Digital Journalism 4.5 (2016): 582-96. Print.

Lee, Chin-Chuan, Hongtao Li, and Francis LF Lee. “Symbolic Use of Decisive Events: Tiananmen as a News Icon in the Editorials of the Elite U.S. Press.” The International    Journal of Press/Politics 16.3(2011): 335-56. Print.

Lee, Leo Ou-fan. “Visualizing the Tiananmen Student Movement.” The China Journal 35 (1996): 131-36. JSTOR. Web. 21 Nov. 2016.

Litzinger, Ralph A. “Screening the Political: Pedagogy and Dissent in The Gate of Heavenly Peace.” Positions 7.3 (1999): 827-50. Print.

Marchetti, Gina. From Tian’anmen to Times Square: Transnational China and the Chinese Diaspora on Global Screens, 1989-1997. Philadelphia:Temple University Press, 2006. Print.

Taylor, Charles. “A Tiananmen Square Documentary is the Holiday Movie of the Year.” Movie Reviews. Boston Phoenix, n.d. Web. 21 Nov. 2016.

The Gate of Heavenly Peace. Dir. Carma Hinton and Richard Gordon. Perf. Chai Ling, Wang Dan, Dai Qing, Ding Zilin, Han Dongfang and Wuer Kaixi. Ronin Films, 1995. Film.

Written by Michael Xizhuang Zhou

In early November, many had anticipated a “blue wave” during the U.S. mid-terms and expected the Democrats to take back the Congress. The wave did come, but in a far less decisive or overwhelming fashion than many had predicted or wanted. However, just weeks later, a more powerful blue wave swept across Taiwan, leaving its political landscape shaken.

From Green Land to Blue Sky

On November 24th, 2018, Taiwan’s ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was handed a rebuke in the island’s midterms, in which it lost 7 out of the 13 counties and cities up for grabs. More devastating to DPP were its significant losses in the island’s south, traditional DPP territory for decades, to its political archival, the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT).

Meanwhile, KMT’s victory in the south snatched Taiwan’s three biggest cities — New Taipei City, Taichung, and Kaohsiung — for its electoral basket. Assuming responsibility for the party’s electoral defeats, President Tsai Ing-wen resigned as DPP’s leader.

Particularly stinging to the DPP was its defeat in the mayoral race for Kaohsiung, a DPP southern stronghold for 20 years. KMT’s outsider politician, Han Kuo-yu, rode to victory as a dark horse candidate and defeated his DPP opponent, Chen Chi-mai, who, from the election outset, was expected to win easily. Analysts and pundits have argued that widespread dissatisfaction with the city’s sluggish economy and Tsai’s under-performing administration were put forth as crucial reasons behind Han’s surprise victory.

The DPP’s track record in Kaohsiung has been anything but impressive. Kaohsiung remained the world’s third-busiest container port in the 1980s and well into the 1990s. However, the city dropped out of the top 10 by the mid-2000s, today standing at a modest 13th position.[1]  The slump in the city’s international maritime competitiveness under DPP rule reflects a decline in Kaohsiung’s economic activities and the incompetence of its administration. Thus, unsurprisingly, Han’s campaign promises to assuage growing discontent among the city’s population and incite the return of Kaohxiung’s former glory — to make Kaohsiung the “richest city in Taiwan” (打造高雄,全台首富 dazaogaosiong — grabbed many headlines and resonated deeply with the locals.

In the eyes of Kaoshiungers, however, a vote for Han was not necessarily perceived to be a vote for the KMT. Instead, they saw it as a vote for a better economy and a more prosperous future.

Essentially, Kaohsiung’s election results give us a glimpse of the larger political picture of Taiwan’s midterm elections. KMT’s victory (borrowing local parlance)  to turn “the green land into the blue sky” (绿地变蓝天, lüdi bian lantian) cannot be interpreted merely as a KMT victory over the DPP. Neither does it make a convincing statement to the people’s rejection of DPP’s ideologies and party doctrines in favour of KMT’s. Instead, DPP’s elections debacle is illustrative of people’s opinions on President Tsai’s unpopular domestic policies and deteriorating relations with Beijing, which has caused severe political and economic ramifications.

The 2018 mid-term elections represent a decisive break from the traditional “Blue-Green” dichotomy in Taiwanese politics. In this sense, we can argue that it was not a blue but a democratic and popular wave across Taiwan. In many ways, ironic as it sounds, this represented democracy at both its vulnerable and finest moment.

The People’s Power

Despite intense politicking and makeshift campaign performances, it was the people’s voice that Taiwan — and the world — had heard. The ordinary folks had spoken. But they spoke not of ideologies nor politics. To be clear, a stagnant economy has severely dented President Tsai and her party’s credibility in the eyes of Taiwanese people. On elections day, voters wasted no time to make their frustration and dissatisfaction heard.

The outcomes of the elections should remind both DPP and KMT leaders that past election trends and party doctrines will no longer give them a new lease on political life in the future. Neither will public opinion swing between pro-independence or pro-Beijing sentiments. Moving forward, Taiwan’s political leaders should begin to reorient party objectives and goals to better respond to needs and challenges arising from prevailing and fast-changing political and social climates.

Understanding Democracy

President Tsai had warned Taiwanese that a vote for KMT was a vote against democracy.[2]  However, DPP’s devastating losses in the elections laid bare an inconvenient and hard truth: democracy is as much as concerned about ideology and values as it is about bread and butter issues.

Granted, oppression and authoritarianism are antonyms of freedom and democracy. But likewise, poor governance and a trust deficit between the government and its people are just as incompatible to democracy. A failing government plagued by a sluggish economy and poor policies does not fare any better than a government ruled by the iron hand of a dictator or whims of a tyrant in the democratic scoresheet.

The work of building a sturdier democratic infrastructure in our societies cannot be left alone to “Professor Democracy” or “Mr Politician” who are often so busy at winning rhetorical and political battles that they tend to neglect the lives of the silent and the inconspicuous. In the case of Taiwan, sadly, democracy in theory does not always retain its form in practice. Democratic values and principles are more brandished as slogans during campaigns or manipulated as politicking strategies. However, they are less converted into concrete policy steps to eradicate real-life problems and issues. 

As the elections backlash in Taiwan reveals, the process of democratisation in societies should not be treated as an end in itself. Instead, it entails a long process, one that provides hardworking and dedicated individuals with the means to attain a better life for themselves. Democratic ideas are not tools for us to briefly sketch what may or should work, but rather vital materials for us to construct what works. Democracy is not just about ideology but equally concerned with concretising action and policy on the ground. Democracy is not merely words of encouragement or hope to inform people of what they can aspire, but real action plans to help them achieve those that they want. Democracy is also not about condemning those that are different but offering the humility and generosity to accommodate and hear from them. In short, a true and healthy democratic process is one that brings progress, not stagnancy; it encourages cooperation, not partisanship.

President Tsai and her party may have succeeded in tearing down the towers of authoritarianism and political manipulation and lifting the banners of freedom and democracy at one point in time. However, the DPP has not managed to consolidate their gains and erect new structures from above its political foundation to help translate democratic ideas and principles into democratic action. A thriving civil society and a free press are essential to maintaining the health of a democratic community. But it is from a well-performing administration that is responsive to people’s livelihoods and a strong economy that provides people with opportunities to work toward a comfortable life that allow popular trust and support for democratic governance to be derived and sustained. While there has been evidence of political freedom and democratic building under the DPP leadership, however, these democratic gains failed to generate tangible economic and social outcomes for the Taiwanese people. As a consequence of this democratic gap, Taiwan’s political foundations crumbled as soon as the popular wave swept past.

Taiwan’s 2018 mid-term elections, indeed, have left behind important lessons on democracy and reminded political leaders and average folks of both the vulnerability and power of the democratic process. As world leaders prepare to place the finishing touches on the building of democracy, it is the opinion of the people, not political architects, that they should actively seek and consider — something that both DPP and KMT leaders would learn by now. 

About the Author: Zhou Xizhuang Michael is a second-year undergraduate at the National University of Singapore majoring in Global Studies and specialising in East Asia, Foreign and Public Policy, and the French language. Michael is interested in global governance and international relations and enjoys reading history and literary classics.

Endnotes

[1] “Top 50 World Container Ports,” World Shipping Council, 2019, http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/top-50-world-container-ports.

[2] James X. Morris, “KMT Shocks With Its Success in Taiwan Elections,” The Diplomat, November 27, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/kmt-shocks-with-its-success-in-taiwan-elections/.

Bibliography

Morries, James X. “KMT Shocks With Its Success in Taiwan Elections.” The Diplomat. November 27, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/kmt-shocks-with-its-success-in-taiwan-elections/.

“Top 50 World Container Ports.” World Shipping Council. 2019. http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/top-50-world-container-ports.

The Islamist Ennahda party in Tunisian parliament.

Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent establishment of Western liberal hegemony, American academics, politicians, and policy analysts have debated whether or not the United States should implement democracy in the Muslim world. In this paper, I will argue that it should not. Why? Islam’s tradition of mixing religion and politics means that liberal democracy is unlikely to flourish in Muslim-majority societies. Democracy, if it spreads in the Muslim world, will likely be of a strong Islamic and therefore illiberal character. Since history has shown that the U.S. will not allow illiberal democratization, often at the cost of Muslim self-determination and its own national security, it should not attempt to act on the neoconservative dream of democratizing Muslim societies—for both their good, and for its own.

Before proceeding, it’s important to distinguish between procedural and liberal democracy. Procedural democracy merely refers to the mechanism of competitive elections by which power is peacefully transferred. It implies no normative principles nor does it abide by any philosophical presuppositions. It is amoral, in other words, concerned primarily with ensuring regime change without bloodshed rather than establishing any basic ethical or political commitments. This is the minimalist, Schumpeterian conception of democracy as defended by the likes of Adam Przeworski, who calls it “just a system in which rulers are elected by competitive elections.”[1] Then there is “liberal democracy,” which is what American politicians, academics, and policy analysts typically mean when they speak of democracy. Unlike procedural democracy, liberal democracy is predicated on substantive ethical and social commitments. Under this definition, democracy is not merely the peaceful transfer of power via competitive elections: it is also characterized by free speech, religious pluralism, and most critically for this discussion, separation of church and state. As observed by Fareed Zakaria in his book Future of Freedom, “this bundle of freedoms has nothing intrinsically to do with democracy” as a mechanism of transferring power based on the popular will.[2] Liberal democracy, in other words, is grounded in principles beyond simple majoritarian rule. The will of the people is to be respected, but the will of the people is also expected to be liberal (in the classical sense), and therefore in favor of secular government.

Hence why liberal democracy resists easy exportation to the Muslim world. To be blunt, neither Islam nor most of its followers recognize any distinction between religion and politics. Unlike, say, Protestantism, Islam is not a matter of private faith; it’s a totalizing belief system replete with political, moral and societal prescriptions. The Prophet was as much a political leader as he was a religious one, and this dual heritage is reflected in the historical trajectory of Islamic civilization over the past 1400 years. The ideological trends that eventually partitioned religion from politics in the West—the Protestant Reformation’s privatization of faith, the Scientific Revolution’s skepticism, the Enlightenment’s secularism—have no analogue in Islamic history. The essentially Western (and Christian) character of the divorce between politics and religion is reflected in its name: separation of church and state, not mosque and state.

Therefore, in attempting to forcibly impose liberal democracy on Muslim-majority societies, the U.S. is doing more than simply instituting an alternate mode of governance; it is attempting the wholesale transformation of an entire culture’s social and political consciousness. Successfully implementing liberal democracy abroad would require the U.S. military to not merely topple rulers, but to also enforce a revolution in societal values—a process that could span decades, if not centuries. The unworkability and undesirability of such a scenario is evident in its potentially crippling financial costs and troubling imperialistic overtones.

To be clear, I am not advancing a pseudo-orientalist argument that the Islamic world “isn’t ready for democracy” or that religion has hindered its political evolution.  Such arguments transpire within a narrow philosophical framework that presupposes liberal democracy’s unqualified good and position as the “natural” endpoint of civilizational development (a la Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History).[3] Instead, I am arguing that if democracy were to take root in the Islamic world—and since most contemporary Muslim societies believe that democracy is the best form of government, that scenario is likely—it would be in a form unrecognizable to the West. [4]  This form is not necessarily inferior. However, especially as it pertains to mixing religion and politics, it will likely be illiberal. For example, although Indonesia is often praised as a rare example of secular Muslim democracy, roughly 72 percent of its Muslims favor rule by Islamic law. In some areas of Indonesia, sharia bylaws requiring that female civil servants wear headscarves have already been implemented.[5]

And thus we arrive at the dilemma that the U.S. faces in democratizing the Islamic world: if given the choice, the average Muslim would vote an Islamist party into power. History has repeatedly demonstrated the truth of this prediction. In 1989, when Algerians voted in local free elections for the first time, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won 62 percent of the popular vote.[6] Iraq’s 2005 parliamentary elections handed the Islamist National Iraqi Alliance roughly 41 percent of the vote against at least a dozen opponents.[7] Tunisia’s first free elections in 2011 saw the Islamist Ennahdha Movement Party win a plurality of 37 percent of the popular vote.[8] In 2012, Egyptians voted the Muslim Brotherhood into power with a nearly 52 percent majority.[9]

Far from constituting a radical program unmoored from popular preferences, then, political Islam as an idea enjoys at least as much support in Muslim-majority societies as the Democratic and Republican parties do in the U.S. This is not to imply that most Muslims are Islamists; rather, it’s merely to suggest that most tacitly or explicitly desire a significant role for Islam in public life. Such a deep groundswell of support for political Islam exposes as hollow any conception of Islamists as “extremists” outside of the political mainstream of the Islamic world. If anything, they are emblematic of it. Because no dramatic fallout between religion and politics ever occurred in the Muslim world, Islam still enjoys far more social currency in the public sphere than any religion does in the West. Worth noting, too, is that the Islamic world’s negative experience with secular governance has done much to discredit it as an appealing political option. In the West, “secularism” means “religious pluralism.” In the Muslim world, under “secular” leaders like Kemal Ataturk and Saddam Hussein, it has typically meant “state-mandated atheism”: not equal tolerance, but equal intolerance of all faiths. [10]

Thus, as argued by Shadi Hamid in his book Islamic Exceptionalism, liberal democracy is unlikely to ever find a stable home in the Middle East.[11] The question, ultimately, is whether the U.S. can bring itself to democratize Muslim countries, or allow them to be democratized, even with the understanding that they will not yield secular fruit. History suggests that it cannot. As explained by then-Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian in 1992, the U.S. typically supports democracy abroad but fears that allowing Islamist electoral victories would lead to “one man, one vote, one time,” as Islamists would presumably dissolve the democratic mechanism that had propelled them into power in order to retain governmental control. [12] The implication is that Islamist parties cannot be allowed to participate in democratic politics, however fair the elections.

Djerejian’s stance is as empty as the historical evidence to support it, then and now. Almost all Islamists parties across the Muslim world have demonstrated a willingness to respect election results and to cede power. The Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) has quietly participated in parliamentary elections since 1959.[13] Abdurrahman Wahid, founder of the Islamic National Awakening Party (PKB), won the Indonesian presidency in 1999 and stepped down when he finished his term in 2001.[14]  Ennahda, Tunisia’s major Islamist party, lost its parliamentary majority to the secular Nidaa Tounes party in the 2014 legislative elections but gracefully conceded its defeat.[15] Even the poster-boy for the ostensibly autocratic tendencies of Islamists, former Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi, was not particularly more authoritarian than any leader in a transitional democracy; in fact, he was less so.[16]

Thus, the apparent American concern that integrating Islamist political parties into a democratic framework of governance would lead to the collapse of said framework seems more grounded in paranoia than reality. The operative fear here appears not to be that Islamism will transmute democracies into illegitimate dictatorships, but rather that illiberal Islamist agendas will be legitimized and enabled via electoral victories. But since most Islamist parties willingly operate within democratic state structures and appear uninterested in antagonizing the West, it’s unclear why an “Islamic democracy” is such anathema to the U.S. and its allies. This wariness is doubly perplexing in light of their support for ultraconservative theocracies (Saudi Arabia) and brutal secular dictatorships (Mubarak, Sisi, Ben Ali, etc.), both of which grossly violate liberal principles and encourage the Islamist radicalization so central to national security concerns. The West’s sensationalist demonization of political Islam appears to have blinded it to the peaceful disposition of most Islamist parties, fostering a fallacious public discourse that categorizes organizations as disparate in objectives and methods as the Brotherhood and the Islamic State as “fundamentalist.” Tarring all Islamist organizations with the brush of radicalism has only hindered informed policy-making.

The U.S. government’s inability to accept an Islamic democracy instead of a secular one has often led it to violate both its ideals and its self-interest, hurting both the Western and Muslim worlds in the process. The first free Algerian elections in 1991 saw the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) win 188 of 231 parliamentary seats. Rather than allow the democratically elected Islamists the levers of power, the secular Algerian army dissolved the elections, arrested the party’s leaders, and slaughtered thousands of supporters. The anti-democratic but secular military coup received American approval.[17] In the aftermath, Djerejian made clear that American fear of Islamic politics fueled U.S. support for the coup.[18] The coup set off a decade-long civil war that destabilized the region and facilitated the radicalization of Islamists once amenable to peaceful democratic rule, thus endangering U.S. national security. The U.S. government’s support of the coup thus not only disregarded Algerian self-determination, but encouraged radical violence as the only avenue to power available to Islamists.

The self-destructive tendencies of US foreign policy have not changed since. In 2013, the U.S. again supported a coup that overthrew a democratically elected Islamist party and massacred its supporters, this time in Egypt. Two weeks after U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said that the military was “restoring democracy” in ousting Morsi,[19] it slaughtered nearly a thousand unarmed pro-Brotherhood protestors in the worst massacre in modern Egyptian history.[20] If the past is any guide, the military regime’s subsequent crackdown on moderate Islamists will fuel the radicalization of its surviving members, creating ISIS recruits and further destabilizing a region already teetering on the edge of collapse.[21] The consequences of this damage will reach the West, as they have already, in the form of terrorist attacks.

As demonstrated by the above history, so long as the U.S. insists on the separation of religion and politics in any fledgling Muslim democracy, it will fail to act in accordance with either its ideals or its self-interest. Although neither Tunisia in 1992 nor Egypt in 2013 were U.S.-installed democracies, the U.S.’s encouragement (or at least abetment) of their destruction doesn’t bode well for any democracy instituted by the US itself. So long as the near-inevitability of Islamic democracy in the Muslim world goes unrecognized by the U.S., it is likely to encourage the “correction” of illiberal democracies and thereby crush them in the process.

With this essay’s argument, I do not mean to reproduce Samuel Huntington’s thesis on the so-called “clash of civilizations,” which has been used to justify Western supremacy, paternalism, and intervention vis-a vis Muslim societies.[22] The U.S. should not implement democracy abroad, not because the Islamic world is inherently anti-democratic, but because its democratic vision differs from the West. Just as Western democracies respect the will of the people so long as it doesn’t violate liberal doctrine, so to do Islamic democracies respect the will of the people so long as it doesn’t violate the Quran and the Sunnah. Yet in spite of this philosophical difference, Islamic democracies can (and in the case of countries like Indonesia, already do) coexist with the liberal West. The Muslim world’s resistance to political secularization is not indicative of its “backwardness.” Rather, it’s evidence that it and the West have taken different paths to modernity. The West should not expect liberal democracy at the end of the Muslim road anymore than it should expect Islamic democracy at the end of its own.  Moving forward, both sides need to internalize a genuinely pluralistic understanding of global politics. For the U.S., real tolerance lies not in remaking foreign peoples in its secular image, but in permitting them to institute a system of governance of which it disapproves. Ironically, a democracy like the U.S. might be at its most liberal by allowing illiberal Islamic democracies to spring.

Bibliography

Hamid, Shadi. Islamic Exceptionalism: How the struggle over Islam is reshaping the world. New York: Saint Martins Griffin, 2017.

Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. W.W. Norton & Co., 2007.

Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin, 2012.

Przeworski, Adam. “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense.” P. 23-55, 1999

Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs. August 31, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations.

“Islamist Democracies: The West’s Worst Nightmare?” The Globalist. August 05, 2017. https://www.theglobalist.com/islamist-democracies-the-wests-worst-nightmare/.

Alkhateeb, Firas. “How Atatürk Made Turkey Secular.” Lost Islamic History. October 30, 2017. http://lostislamichistory.com/how-ataturk-made-turkey-secular/.

Michael R. Gordon And Kareem Fahim. “Kerry Says Egypt’s Military Was ‘Restoring Democracy’ in Ousting Morsi.” The New York Times. August 01, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/middleeast/egypt-warns-morsi-supporters-to-end-protests.html.

Wheeler, Shadi Hamid and Meredith. “Was Mohammed Morsi Really an Autocrat?” The Atlantic. March 31, 2014. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/was-mohammed-morsi-really-an-autocrat/359797/.

“Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS).” Wikipedia. November 28, 2017. Accessed November 29, 2017. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysian_Islamic_Party_(PAS).

Gall, Carlotta. “Islamist Party in Tunisia Concedes to Secularists.” The New York Times. October 27, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/world/africa/nidaa-tounes-ennahda-tunisian-parliamentary-election.html.

“Abdurrahman Wahid.” Encyclopædia Britannica. May 27, 2013. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdurrahman-Wahid

“Egypt, Democracy and Islam.” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. January 31, 2011. http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/01/31/egypt-democracy-and-islam/.

“CHANGES IN U.S. DIPLOMACY.” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/news/one-man-one-vote-one-time/.

“Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda party wins historic poll.” BBC News. October 27, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15487647

“All According to Plan | The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt.” Human Rights Watch. June 16, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt.

Clampdown and Blowback: How State Repression Has Radicalized Islamist Groups in Egypt | Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective. http://origins.osu.edu/article/clampdown-and-blowback-state-repression-egypt

Endnotes

[1] Przeworski, Adam. “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense.” P. 23-55, 1999

[2] Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. W.W. Norton & Co., 2007.

[3] Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin, 2012.

[4] “Egypt, Democracy and Islam.” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. January 31, 2011. http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/01/31/egypt-democracy-and-islam/.

[5] Hamid, Shadi. Islamic Exceptionalism: How the struggle over Islam is reshaping the world. New York: Saint Martins Griffin, 2017.

[6] “Islamist Democracies: The West’s Worst Nightmare?” The Globalist. August 05, 2017. https://www.theglobalist.com/islamist-democracies-the-wests-worst-nightmare/.

[7] “Iraqi parliamentary election, December 2005.” Wikipedia. November 16, 2017. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_parliamentary_election,_December_2005#Full_result

[8] “Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda party wins historic poll.” BBC News. October 27, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15487647.

[9] Kirkpatrick, David D. “Mohamed Morsi of Muslim Brotherhood Declared as Egypt’s President.” The New York Times. June 24, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslim-brotherhood-declared-as-egypts-president.html.

[10] Alkhateeb, Firas. “How Atatürk Made Turkey Secular.” Lost Islamic History. October 30, 2017. http://lostislamichistory.com/how-ataturk-made-turkey-secular/.

[11] Hamid, Shadi. Islamic Exceptionalism: How the struggle over Islam is reshaping the world. New York: Saint Martins Griffin, 2017.

[12] “CHANGES IN U.S. DIPLOMACY.” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Accessed November 29, 2017. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/news/one-man-one-vote-one-time/.

[13] “Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS).” Wikipedia. November 28, 2017. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysian_Islamic_Party_(PAS).

[14] “Abdurrahman Wahid.” Encyclopædia Britannica. May 27, 2013. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdurrahman-Wahid.

[15] Gall, Carlotta. “Islamist Party in Tunisia Concedes to Secularists.” The New York Times. October 27, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/world/africa/nidaa-tounes-ennahda-tunisian-parliamentary-election.html.

[16] Wheeler, Shadi Hamid and Meredith. “Was Mohammed Morsi Really an Autocrat?” The Atlantic. March 31, 2014. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/was-mohammed-morsi-really-an-autocrat/359797/.

[17] “Islamist Democracies: The West’s Worst Nightmare?” The Globalist. August 05, 2017. https://www.theglobalist.com/islamist-democracies-the-wests-worst-nightmare/.

[18] “Islamist Democracies: The West’s Worst Nightmare?” The Globalist. August 05, 2017. https://www.theglobalist.com/islamist-democracies-the-wests-worst-nightmare/.

[19] Michael R. Gordon And Kareem Fahim. “Kerry Says Egypt’s Military Was ‘Restoring Democracy’ in Ousting Morsi.” The New York Times. August 01, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/middleeast/egypt-warns-morsi-supporters-to-end-protests.html.

[20] “All According to Plan | The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt.” Human Rights Watch. June 16, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt.

[21] Clampdown and Blowback: How State Repression Has Radicalized Islamist Groups in Egypt | Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective. http://origins.osu.edu/article/clampdown-and-blowback-state-repression-egypt.

[22] Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs. August 31, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations.