Electronic waste, or e-waste, has arisen as a critical global concern in today’s digitally-driven society, posing substantial environmental and health dangers. However, amidst this worldwide challenge, the Philippines stands out as a country disproportionately plagued by the e-waste problem. Wherever one goes, streets are ridden with broken appliances and discarded gadgets; the Philippines is one of Southeast Asia’s leading e-waste generators, with an estimated 3.9 kilograms of e-waste per capita in 2019.¹

Despite its vital significance, the dilemma of e-waste in the Philippines has received little attention in the worldwide and national media, hampering efforts to identify long-term solutions. This essay aims to shed light on the environmental impact of e-waste in the Philippines, investigate the factors that contribute to its under-reporting, and review current activities addressing the problem.

E-waste comprises old electrical devices; cell phones, tablets, computers, televisions, and other home gadgets that are outdated or undesirable. These are all examples of e-waste that have become a depressingly common and dangerous sight in the Philippines; based on a report by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the Philippines generated 32,664.41 metric tons of waste electrical and electronic equipment in 2019.² While most e-waste still contains usable materials like valuable metals, it also holds substances that are hazardous to one’s health, the environment, and the climate. As such, the rise of e-waste production and mismanagement in the Philippines is a pressing concern for the country and its future.

The urgency of eliminating e-waste in the Philippines is made clear by its effects on the Philippines’ environment. The country is a haven for a wide variety of aquatic life, including coral reefs, mangrove forests, and endangered species; improper e-waste disposal directly endangers these delicate ecosystems and results in irreparable damage and biodiversity loss. The deterioration of Manila Bay, a cornerstone of the country’s capital, underscores this issue.

Located in the heart of the city, Manila Bay is surrounded by landfills and similar informal disposals loaded with discarded electronics, gadgets, and other sources of e-waste. From there, toxic substances and chemicals seep into the ground and leach into the surrounding waters. Silt sediment samples taken from the bay’s seabed in 2019 reported traces of heavy metals such as mercury, lead, cadmium, arsenic, and zinc which are suggested to be the results of discarded e-waste and factory sewage.³ This has damaged the waters to the extent that most invasive species in other tropical estuarine ports cannot survive in Manila Bay.⁴

Nevertheless, the matter is under-reported both nationally and globally due to several factors. Primarily, limited awareness among the general public about the hazardous nature of e-waste and its detrimental impact on the environment and health prevents the subject from receiving widespread attention. To most, once an electronic outlives its usage, it is discarded with no further thought. According to a study by engineers of the University of the Philippines Department of Environmental Engineering, there were about 22 million mobile phones discarded in 2016, with 95 percent of the respondents of a separate survey having no knowledge of proper e-waste disposal.⁵

Moreover, the complexities of e-waste supply networks make reliable monitoring and tracking of disposal techniques difficult. Given that e-waste trade routes involve several intermediaries, it is difficult to identify guilty parties and hold them accountable for inappropriate disposal. Predatory economic interests similarly contribute to e-waste under-reporting, with more developed countries exporting their electronic garbage to developing countries like the Philippines under the pretense of waste management solutions or other similar misleading terms. In one such case, 25,610 kg of mixed plastic rubbish packaged in 22 sling bags packaged as “assorted electronic accessories” were sent back to Hong Kong after being shipped to Mindanao, the Philippines’ second-largest island.⁶

While the concern of e-waste remains prevalent in the Philippines to this day, efforts are being made to tackle the topic, with the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (Republic Act No. 9003) passed in 2000. The government act calls for proper waste disposal practices, including e-waste management, and encourages the construction of material recovery facilities, trash separation, and recycling. Additionally, international organizations such as the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) have collaborated with national agencies like the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to further address this point. One example is the E-Waste ‘to! Iwasto! Project, which hopes to raise awareness of proper e-waste management and provide Filipinos with the means to dispose of their household e-waste properly; through this, the e-waste can be safely salvaged and recycled.⁷

Despite this, however, the Philippines’ lack of infrastructure for safe and efficient e-waste recycling limits the success of any attempts to solve the issue. The government faces challenges in developing recycling sites that are equipped with adequate equipment to handle a wide range of electronic devices, and e-waste is commonly recycled informally “by hand,” which exposes the recyclers to hazardous and carcinogenic substances present.⁸ While progress has been made as UNIDO and the DENR have continued to install more e-waste disposal facilities across the country, it is still a long journey before the problem can be successfully managed in the future.⁹

In conclusion, e-waste in the Philippines demands immediate attention and concerted action. E-waste has troubled the Philippines for decades since the rise of industrialization and globalization, and will likely continue to harm the country’s citizens and environment unless further steps are taken and current efforts are pursued. It is through careful planning and collaboration between the government, organizations, and consumers that the issue of e-waste can finally be resolved; only through collective efforts and knowledge can the environment be safeguarded, human health protected, and a better future ensured for the Philippines and the world at large.

References

Featured/Headline Image Caption and Citation: Waste handling site in Patayas, Manila | Image sourced from Global Environment Facility

1. “The Philippines: making money making e-waste safe | UNIDO.” United Nations Industrial Development Organization. (September 28, 2022). https://www.unido.org/news/philippines-making-money-making-e-waste-safe.
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2. “EMB: National policy, regulatory framework already in place for e-waste management.” Department of Environment and Natural Resources. (October 29, 2020). https://www.denr.gov.ph/index.php/news-events/press-releases/1918-emb-national-policy-regulatory-framework-already-in-place-for-e-waste-mngt.
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3. Enano, J. O. “Silt taken from Manila Bay positive for heavy metals.” Inquirer News. (March 21, 2019). https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1098243/silt-taken-from-manila-bay-positive-for-heavy-metals#ixzz5kAhAmLqh.
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4. Vallejo, B. M., Aloy, A., Ocampo, M., Conejar-Espedido, J., & Manubag, L. “Manila Bay Ecology and Associated Invasive Species.” Springer International Publishing: In Coastal research library, 145–169. (2019b). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91382-7_5.
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5. Ballesteros, F., Jr., & Galang, M. “Estimation of Waste Mobile Phones in the Philippines using Neural Networks.” Global Nest Journal, 20(4), 767–772. (2018). https://doi.org/10.30955/gnj.002534.
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6. “Philippines Returns Illegal Plastic and E-Waste Shipment to Hong Kong, China (Groups Insist Philippines Not a Global Trash Bin) | IPEN.” International Pollutants Elimination Network. (2019, June 4). https://ipen.org/news/philippines-returns-illegal-plastic-and-e-waste-shipment-hong-kong-china-groups-insist.
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7. Dilim, J. “E-waste ‘to! Iwasto project reaches La Union.” PIA. (October 28, 2022). https://pia.gov.ph/features/2022/10/28/e-waste-to-iwasto-project-reaches-la-union.
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8. Argosino, F. “How to manage e-waste: Bring to a treatment, storage and disposal facility.” Manila Bulletin. (April 6, 2022). https://mb.com.ph/2022/04/06/how-to-manage-e-waste-bring-to-a-treatment-storage-and-disposal-facility/.
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9. Dilim. “E-waste ‘to! Iwasto project reaches La Union.” https://pia.gov.ph/features/2022/10/28/e-waste-to-iwasto-project-reaches-la-union.
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The Green Belt and Road Initiative

In light of the increasing pressure regarding the negative environmental implications of the BRI, China has begun introducing BRI “reforms.” On March 28, 2022, China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Ecology and Environment, and Ministry of Commerce published a joint statement on making the BRI more sustainable by reducing emissions and pollution while protecting biodiversity in BRI nations (de Boer 2022). In 2018, the Green Finance Committee of China and the City of London introduced Green Investment Principles for the BRI, which feature state-owned banks from BRI countries including the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Morocco, Singapore, Pakistan, and Mongolia among its signatories (Wang 2021). Now, while 12.8 gigawatts of Chinese overseas coal projects have been canceled, equivalent to more than one-third of South Korea’s 2021 coal power capacity, 19.2 gigawatts of BRI coal projects have already secured financing, contracts, or permits, and will likely be built. Additionally, no penalties exist for Chinese companies financing coal overseas, and regulations are opaque. In fact, at least two coal projects have already been secured following President Xi Jinping’s late 2021 commitment to end BRI coal projects (Liu 2022), and Chinese banks still finance over 70 percent of coal power plants in the world under the BRI (ANI 2022). Even worse, 7% more coal will be mined in 2022 than in 2021, which Li Shuo, a Greenpeace senior global policy adviser, criticizes by explaining that China’s pursuit of energy security trumps carbon neutrality. Especially since the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party has rested on economic growth since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, which is the keystone of the BRI, economic development is often prioritized over environmental concerns in China. Overall, while being phased out de jure, coal is still a prevalent and damaging de facto part of the BRI.

Coal Catastrophe

In terms of coal alone, China has been exchanging economic growth for environmental sustainability within developing countries through the BRI. For the past few years, Chinese companies have invested heavily in coal power in West African countries like Ghana (Nyabiage 2020). In fact, there have been 1600 coal power plants planned through the BRI (Gokkon 2018), with many still proceeding despite President Xi Jinping’s promise to eliminate coal from the BRI. Even worse, many of the new coal power plants being built are not equipped with efficient carbon capture technology. In fact, of the 240 coal power plants already built in 25 BRI countries, 58 percent were high emission, low energy plants. These plants alone released the equivalent of 11 percent of all CO₂ emissions in the United States (Hilton 2019).

Now, since China is aiming to eliminate coal use domestically to purportedly achieve the goals of the Paris Climate Accords, state-owned coal companies are shifting their operations abroad to developing countries to avoid bankruptcy and continue to stimulate the economy (Feng 2019). Thus, China can domestically build up its renewable energy sector while ensuring its state-owned coal companies have continued capital inflow from developing BRI nations. In fact, to facilitate domestic economic growth, China has historically attempted to offload coal energy to the developing world while ensuring that its state-owned construction companies employ Chinese labor to build those coal factories. Chinese enterprises were encouraged to invest in overseas coal projects in the early 2000s until countries began implementing protectionist policies to ban them (Hao 2017).

With the BRI, there has been a renewed emphasis on providing economic incentives and coercion to offload Chinese coal projects overseas (Hao 2017). Furthermore, the capacity for dumping coal into international markets through the BRI is only increasing as the scale of coal overcapacity in China has grown between 1.721 and 1.819 billion tons from 2017 to 2019 (Wang 2018). Even worse, any coal plants built now will lock developing countries into coal for at least 40 years because nations need to maximize their investments, which means that even if a nation wants to switch to green tech, they are stuck with coal (Inskeep 2019). On the economic front, as coal prices increase due to less global production and as clean air regulation becomes more stringent, many of the current coal power plants being constructed in developing countries will begin operating at a loss, creating a huge moral hazard for BRI investments in coal (Hilton 2019). In fact, while initial investments may be more expensive currently, clean energy sources such as onshore wind farms will become cheaper to operate over time as production capacity ramps up. Devastatingly, these coal plants will increase global coal emissions by 43 percent (Rotter 2017), eventually making BRI countries account for 50 percent of global emissions by 2050, up from 15 percent in 2015 (Zadek 2019). As such, the BRI in its current state will guarantee that the goals outlined in the Paris Climate Accords are not met in many BRI nations.

The Polarizing Polar Silk Road

Overinvestment in coal is not the only negative environmental impact of the BRI – the Polar Silk Road is a BRI initiative aimed at expanding Chinese infrastructure to the Arctic Circle in pursuit of energy, commercial, and geopolitical gains (Nakano 2018). Funded by Chinese money in Russian territory, the Polar Silk Road provides China and Russia access to over 35 trillion dollar’s worth of oil and gas underneath the melting polar ice caps (Jorbenadze 2022). Yet, Russia cannot drill oil in the Arctic without China’s BRI. Since Russia currently lacks the necessary resources to do so, the only way Russia can drill is by constructing new sea and land routes with China’s help (Dillow 2018). Russia requires outside financing and support for technology and Arctic infrastructure development (Gutierrez 2018), which is even more challenging to obtain from elsewhere especially given the massive international sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. Without China’s funding of the Polar Silk Road, Russia’s past drilling expeditions have failed (Nakano 2018).

Currently, China provides 80% of the equipment and 60% of the funding for Arctic expeditions (Gasper 2018). In the near future, China plans to invest trillions more into the Polar Silk Road (Bennett 2018). Concurrently, Russia has and will continue using the oil money from the Polar Silk Road to fund devastating wars in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine (Myrie 2022). In the long term, these far north shipping and drilling lanes would only be made possible by accelerating the melting of polar ice caps, which would also cause massive sea-level rise, devastating thousands of coastal cities in exchange for marginal economic growth for China and Russia (Gasper 2018). Ultimately, drilling Arctic oil will lead to over 5 degrees Celsius of global warming (Greenpeace 2015).

Furthermore, given how infrastructure expansion has historically correlated with significant biodiversity loss (Hughes 2018), the Polar Silk Road will also lead to many species becoming extinct. Even worse, the BRI does not implement the best practices to prevent biodiversity loss and actually increases alien species invasions by overlapping global diversity hotspots with high invasive potentials within BRI economic corridors. Ominously, the repercussions of this biodiversity loss will be as severe as those from climate change or nuclear conflicts (Liu 2019). As its cascading effects devastate entire regional food chains, biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Ultimately, biodiversity loss could even fuel the rise of terrorism, as climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria (Torres 2016). The United Nations Security Council corroborates the linkage between climate change and terrorism, highlighting the multiplier effect of climate change and biodiversity loss on poverty, weak governance, and terrorist activity. In fact, of the 15 countries that are most exposed to climate risks, eight have United Nations peacekeeping missions to address terrorism, including Mali, Iraq, and Syria (United Nations 2019).

Sand Storm

In addition to the inimical implications of the Polar Silk Road, BRI projects often also involve cement production and sand dredging, which is terrible for the environment. Cement requires extensive amounts of sand, stone, and energy, and is extensively used in construction (Spiegel 2020). China has been the biggest concrete producer in the world. In fact, if it were a country, the concrete industry would be the world’s third-largest carbon dioxide emitter, responsible for 4-8% of the world’s CO2 emissions (Watts 2019). However, to create concrete, China has been digging up excessive amounts of sand for the past few years, destroying coastline and fishing breeding areas (Apostolopoulou 2021). Now, China is closing its domestic cement plants under new pollution guidelines (Goh 2019) while creating hundreds of heavily polluting cement production lines in BRI countries (McNeice 2017). Furthermore, China is targeting countries with weak emissions and environmental standards and enforcement (Goh 2019). While host countries are responsible for approving high-polluting projects, governments may be lured by the economic benefits posited by Chinese state-owned enterprises (Lelyveld 2019). In fact, countries like Pakistan, which historically have suffered from climate change impacts, actually saw their CO2 emissions increase fourfold after joining the BRI (Zeb 2017). As such, massive infrastructure projects lacking sufficient environmental regulation and international oversight are extremely minacious for developing nations to undertake.

The Pernicious Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative

Ultimately, increasing production of coal, oil, and cement, climate change and melting ice caps will result in devastating heatwaves, decreased air quality, and drastically increased sea levels, leading to deaths, destruction of infrastructure, crops, and dramatically decreased quality of life (The Climate Reality Project 2019). In the long term, BRI projects are estimated to lead to 3 degrees Celsius of global warming (Hicks 19), which puts 4.6 billion people, more than 50% of the world, at risk of poverty (Byers 2018). By eliminating the BRI’s extremely polluting projects, even by only 0.5 degrees Celsius, 153 million lives would be saved by reducing air pollution alone, notwithstanding other factors (Shindell 2018). Therefore, by stopping 3 degrees Celsius of global warming, at least 918 million lives would be saved from the devastating human toll exacted by air pollution.

Besides just the human impact, BRI initiatives result in geopolitical tension with the United States and other Western powers, accelerating Western attempts to expand in BRI regions with their own initiatives like the Blue Dot Network, Build Back Better World, International Development Finance Corporation, and the Quad’s Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. Thus, the BRI could be a threat multiplier, causing disproportionate amounts of environmental devastation given its cheaper sticker tag pressuring Western initiatives to overlook onerous ecological regulations in developing countries to catch up with the BRI.

Potential Solutions

To alleviate some of the environmental issues propagated by the BRI, the United States and its allies should consider negotiating with China to create minimum infrastructure project standards. As such, multilateral infrastructure summits focusing on improving the environmental and social impacts of the BRI can push China toward making the BRI more transparent while potentially facilitating multilateral BRI projects (Economy 2018). Through working on multilateral solutions with China, a high-stakes infrastructure and development arms race where more projects are approved without proper environmental and safety regulations could be avoided. In a similar vein, joining the BRI could also aid in promoting American soft power as a counterbalance to China’s in many developing nations (Lind 2018).

In tandem, the international media should focus on the political, economic, and social implications of specific BRI projects (Chen 2019). Thus, given the current opaqueness of many BRI projects, citizens of BRI nations would have a better chance of being able to judge for themselves whether the benefits of specific BRI projects outweigh the harms. Especially with the proliferation of digital social media networks, political and environmental activism has become even more effective in terms of facilitating dissenting opinions and organizing protests. Often, the most effective change starts from within.

Conclusion

While it may promote economic growth and infrastructure development in developing countries, the BRI ultimately pushes forward a trifecta of environmental devastation in the forms of coal, the Polar Silk Road, and biodiversity loss. As such, it is integral to work comprehensively toward multilateral environmental solutions within the BRI and for Chinese companies and other nations to consider the ramifications of the BRI before signing on to a BRI-backed infrastructure project. Without carefully considering the environmental costs of the BRI, both from individual companies participating in the initiative on the microscale and countries signing on to the initiative on the macroscale, BRI participants may well cause billions to be killed or impoverished by the impacts of climate change.

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Zeb, Anam. 2017. “Pakistan to Quadruple Carbon Emissions despite Feeling Pain of Climate Change.” The Ecologist, July 24. https://theecologist.org/2017/jul/24/pakistan-quadruple-carbon-emissions-despite-feeling-pain-climate-change.

Growing tensions between citizens and police after days of civil unrest turned the peaceful demonstrations violent. In the capital city of Jakarta, reports of mass arrests and officers assaulting protestors with tear gas as people threw rocks, burned transit posts, and vandalized buildings mirrored scenes of chaos throughout the nation.^[i] The crowds consisted largely of labor union members, environmental activists, and university students who claimed the new law strips workers of their rights and exacerbates the nation’s existing deforestation issues. For many, the law demonstrates Indonesia’s struggle to reconcile its rapid economic growth with its goals for sustainable development.  

President Joko Widodo proposed the bill in 2019 as a means of dismantling administrative barriers in Indonesia’s hyper regulated market to encourage expanded domestic development and heightened foreign investment.^[ii] The bill attracted public scrutiny due to a lack of accessibility and transparency in the drafting process, which primarily consisted of advisors from the private sector and no union representatives.^[iii] The new law amends 79 existing laws, greatly diminishing workers’ rights and environmental protections. Central to the law’s criticism is its potential impact on Indonesia’s enduring deforestation crisis from decades of exploitation to supplement palm oil plantations, as it removes limitations on land cultivation and empowers the central government to permit industrial development in officially designated forests. Indigenous communities like the Iban and Orang Rimba fear the new policies will allow companies to encroach on customary lands, weakening their already tenuous authority in these regions.^[iv] Additional amendments relax standards for environmental impact assessments, dispose of the minimum provincial forest cover requirement, and absolve businesses of any strict liability for forest fires.^[v]  Calls for a repeal struggled to overcome the government’s firm position favoring market opportunity — a stance reinforced by economic contraction in Indonesia from the COVID-19 pandemic. As unemployment grips the nation and Indonesia no longer undergoes consistent economic growth, financial benefit to the state could continue to override social considerations. ^[vi]

Indonesia’s dilemma is part of a broader debate regarding economic development across Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia where nations are seen as new frontiers for large scale investment and market growth.^[vii] Countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam are all part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and present unique opportunities for investors seeking diverse business models and large labor pools. However, ASEAN members still struggle to reach the economic heights of neighboring industrialized nations such as China and Japan. Many Southeast Asian states lack the comparative economic strength of East Asian giants due to a tumultuous history of European colonization, shifting political systems, crude infrastructure, and crippling policies preventing global market integration.^[viii]  Furthermore, the economic development of Southeast Asian countries often comes at the cost of public welfare and environmental integrity, a stark contrast to Japan and other East Asian countries seen as global exemplars for balancing economic dominance with environmental consideration. ^[ix]

Asian nations continue to advance among leaders of the international environmental movement, but the results reveal regional disparities. Japan is the only non-European country, besides Australia, to rank among the Top 15 most sustainable nations in the 2020 Environmental Performance Index (EPI), increasing from #20 in 2018 to #12.^[x] It is followed by South Korea (#28) and Taiwan (#40), both East Asian nations. Singapore was the only member of ASEAN to break the Top 50 at #39, narrowly beating Taiwan, while Indonesia sits at #116. These rankings demonstrate the existing gap between developing and industrialized nations across Asia, and it is one with historical roots. 

Japan and South Korea developed the majority of their economies in the years preceding the modern movement for environmental protection, securing their positions in the international marketplace without the widespread scrutiny of global eco-activists. This then allowed them to better implement extensive environmental policies alongside rising demands for sustainable production. Many Southeast Asian nations do not have the same luxury today, expanding their vulnerable economies in a time of higher standards for environmental conservation, increased accountability, and expensive sustainability measures. The notion that Asia has seemingly mastered the balance of mass production and sustainability reform ignores the inherent privileges of established economies compared to those still facing rapid growth and the threat of foreign exploitation disguised as investment. 

The progressive environmental policies of Japan and many of its East Asian counterparts come after years of consistent economic strength in which financial stability breeds social improvement. In contrast, Indonesia’s law embodies a different dynamic where economic shifts, including positive growth, are often accompanied by diminishing social liberties and environmental losses as the government seeks financial gains. This cross-national disparity is prevalent throughout Asia, a continent home to countries ranked among both the richest and poorest in the world. ^[xii] However, this phenomenon is not without reason or exception. The immense geographical, social, and political diversity of the Asian continent eliminates the possibility for a standardized path toward sustainable economic development. By only focusing on the methods employed by industrialized nations, the unique needs of developing economies are often overlooked. The flaws of policy generalization are especially potent considering not even all industrialized East Asian nations are making significant environmental progress. China, the continent’s biggest economy, continues to rank lower on the EPI than the majority of ASEAN nations, sitting at #120. The case of China challenges the notion that an established economy promotes environmental advancement and suggests that, regardless of relative financial stability, nations must make a conscious effort to work toward environmental protection. Asia indeed stands at the forefront of a new movement for large scale sustainable production, but there remains significant room for progress in both Eastern and Southeastern regions. 

Indonesia’s omnibus law represents the compromises many developing nations make in the face of a daunting international financial system that deprioritizes internal methods in favor of monetary outcomes and reported growth. Yet, Indonesia and other ASEAN states with flexible economies are uniquely suited to showcase the potential for tailored social and environmental policies that permit developing nations to expand their global influence and incorporate progressive reform. In fact, efforts have already begun in Singapore to adopt a “green economy” with eco-friendly production and distribution in mind. ^[xiii] This economic framework focuses on utilizing clean energy, fair labor, efficient manufacturing, and sustainable agricultural processes to underpin market expansion with systemic change. The implementation of these green economies in Southeast Asia may be the next step in ensuring a more sustainable global market and setting a standard for socially conscious production.

References

^[i] Timmerman, Antonia. “Indonesia’s Omnibus Law: Jakarta MRT Partly Shut as Third Day of Protests Turn Violent.” South China Morning Post, October 8, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3104750/indonesias-omnibus-law-jakarta-mrt-partly-shut-third-day.

^[ii] Malik, Asmiati. “Jokowi’s Labor Law Reforms Risk Antagonizing Indonesia’s Unions.” Nikkei Asia, January 31, 2020. https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Jokowi-s-labor-law-reforms-risk-antagonizing-Indonesia-s-unions.

^[iii] Hamid, Usman; Hermawan, Ary. “Indonesia’s Omnibus Law is a Bust for Human Rights.” New Mandala, October 9, 2020. https://www.newmandala.org/indonesias-omnibus-law-is-a-bust-for-human-rights/.

^[iv] “Indonesia: New Law Hurts Workers, Indigenous Groups.” Human Rights Watch, October 15, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/15/indonesia-new-law-hurts-workers-indigenous-groups#.

^[v] Grita Anindarini Widyaningsih, Isna Fatimah, and Raynaldo Sembiring. “Indonesia’s Omnibus Bill on Job Creation: a Setback for Environmental Law?” Chinese Journal of Environmental Law 4, no. 1 (June 2020): 97-109. https://doi.org/10.1163/24686042-12340051.

^[vi] “Indonesia, Overview.” The World Bank, October 1, 2020. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/overview.

^[vii] Varma, Suvir; Boulton, Alex. “Investing in Southeast Asia: What’s Behind the Boom.” Bain & Company, November 13, 2018. https://www.bain.com/insights/investing-in-southeast-asia-whats-behind-the-boom/.

^[viii] Sally, Razeen. “What Can South Asia Learn from East Asia?” East Asia Forum, January 23, 2013. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/23/what-can-south-asia-learn-from-east-asia/.

^[ix] “Green Growth in Action: Korea.” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014. https://www.oecd.org/korea/greengrowthinactionkorea.htm; Smith, Brett. “Japan: Environmental Issues, Policies, and Clean Technology.” AZoCleantech, July 7, 2018. https://www.azocleantech.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=539; “Towards Green Growth in Southeast Asia.” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014. https://www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/Final%20SE%20Asia%20Brochure%20low%20res.pdf.

^[x] Wendling, Z.A., Emerson, J.W., Esty, D.C., Levy, M.A., de Sherbinin, A., et al. “2018 Environmental Performance Index.” Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy. https://epi.yale.edu/downloads/epi2018reportv06191901.pdf; Wendling, Z.A., Emerson, J.W., de Sherbinin, A., Esty, D.C., et al. “2020 Environmental Performance Index.” Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy. https://epi.yale.edu/downloads/epi2020report20200911.pdf.

^[xi] “East Asia in the 21^st Century.” Lumen, 2020. https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-worldhistory/chapter/east-asia-in-the-21st-century/.

^[xii] “Poorest Countries in the World 2020.” World Population Review, 2020. https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/poorest-countries-in-the-world.

^[xiii] Bain & Company. “The Green Economy: Unlocking a More Sustainable Future in Southeast Asia.” Business Insider Press Release, November 26, 2020. https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/the-green-economy-unlocking-a-more-sustainable-future-in-southeast-asia-1029840407.

Though environmental crises have often proven effective in bringing to light the adverse impacts of – and catalyzing subsequent action on – anthropogenic climate change, such crises were typically of a highly visible nature: the Santa Barbara oil-spill of 1969 led to the first Earth-Day protests, and the pesticide epidemic of the 1960s contributed to the establishment of the EPA.[7],[8]  In contrast, climate change is a somewhat less obvious phenomenon than oil in oceans or pesticides in produce, and it is often difficult for a mainstream audience to internalize the implications of a warming climate as spelled out in academic publications employing complex scientific techniques. Moreover, the climate changes in a non-linear fashion – e.g. warming global conditions facilitate permafrost thawing, which may contribute to an abrupt, widespread release of CO2 into the atmosphere – meaning that environmental harm can increase at a sudden and exponential rate after certain thresholds are exceeded.[9] In other words, these elements of non-linearity and (in)visibility obscure the true magnitude of climate crises and problematize the application of brinkmanship tactics to climate policy, as it is difficult to “get to the verge” if the cliff cannot be seen and objects are, in reality, much closer than they appear.

Furthermore, climate crises are different than missile crises as the latter can be resolved with few residual ramifications: missiles can be dismantled, blockades can be dismissed, and diplomacy can be restored. However, climate crises strain the environment in adverse and enduring ways. For instance, the chlorofluorocarbon crisis of the 1970s resulted in a nearly irreversible void in the ozone layer,^[10] and the recent increase in the incidence of weather extremes have resulted in the destruction of millions of habitats, eliminated carbon sinks, and contributed to consistently elevated levels of greenhouse gas emissions.^[11] As Naomi Oreskes summarizes in Merchants of Doubt, “Climate change is happening. It’s under way, and it’s not reversible.”[12] This element of permanence – of lasting effects – renders climate change a difficult issue to push to the brink, as it may not be feasible to walk back from the edge.

To tackle climate change with the frame of brinkmanship is to recklessly assume an enormous amount of risk: as Michael Klare writes in The Nation, rising global temperatures are “expected to diminish crop yields . . . adding to the desperation of farmers and very likely resulting in widespread ethnic strife and population displacement” and “as food and water supplies dwindle and governments come under ever-increasing pressure to meet the vital needs of their populations, disputes over critical resources are likely to become more heated and violent.”[13] Developments of this nature – Alfred McCoy predicts in “What Does it Take to Destroy a World Order” – are poised to destabilize communities on a national scale, which could further cause “the international cooperation that lay at the heart of Washington’s world order for the past 90 years [to] simply wither.”[14] However, the assumption of these risks is wholly unnecessary and avoidable. At a recent global security conference in Munich, top European and United Nations officials expressed concern over climate change’s role as a “threat multiplier” that could exacerbate geopolitical conflicts abroad – one of many indications that there exists tangible support for proactive, rather than reactive, coordinated global climate action.[15] Moreover, the 26 corporations comprising the U.S. Climate Action Partnership’s 2007-2010 lobbying effort for a federal cap and trade system, and the 58 senior military leaders citing climate change as a significant threat to national security in a recent open letter, suggests similar sentiments of support amongst both the public and private sectors.[16]

Still, mainstream politics eschews the realities of climate change, kicking the can down the road and in some instances, dismissing outright the prevailing scientific consensus of a warming climate. However, pushing the Earth to the brink of its planetary boundaries – holding out for absolute consensus (a virtual impossibility in science) or the manifestation of regular, worsening environmental crises – is negligence on an unfathomable scale and a dangerous game of brinkmanship that could well backfire.

Bibliography

Gilbert, Emily. “The militarization of climate change.” ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 11.1 (2012): 1-14.

Keller, Jared. “The White House Will Keep Challenging the Pentagon on the Threat of Climate Change Until It Gets an Answer It Likes,” Task & Purpose, February 20, 2019. https://taskandpurpose.com/trump-climate-change-national-security-panel.

Klare, Michael. “How Rising Temperatures Increase the Likelihood of Nuclear War,” The Nation (January 13, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/nuclear-defense-climate-change/.

Kozloff, Max. “American painting during the Cold War.” Artforum 11.9 (1973): 43-54.

Lewis, Jack. “The birth of EPA.” EPA J. 11 (1985): 6.

Lobel, Nathan. “Unraveling the U.S. Climate Action Plan: Explaining Corporate Participation in a Pro-Regulatory Advocacy Coalition,” Senior Essay, Yale Department of Political Science, December 9, 2016.

McCoy, Alfred. “What Does It Take to Destroy a World Order,” Salon (March 3, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/03/03/what-does-it-take-to-destroy-a-world-order_partner/

McNeill, John Robert, and Peter Engelke. The Great Acceleration. Harvard University Press, 2016.

Oreskes, Naomi, and Erik M. Conway. Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming. Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2011.

Paul Newman et al, “2018 Ozone Hole is a Reminder of what Almost was,” NASA: November 2, 2018. https://svs.gsfc.nasa.gov/13103.

Powell, Robert. “Nuclear brinkmanship with two-sided incomplete information.” American Political Science Review82.1 (1988): 155-178.

Rial, José A., et al. “Nonlinearities, feedbacks and critical thresholds within the Earth’s climate system.” Climatic change65.1-2 (2004): 11-38.

Weldes, Jutta. Constructing national interests: The United States and the Cuban missile crisis. University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

Wheeling, Kate and Max Ufberg, “‘The Ocean is Boiling:’ The Complete Oral History of the Santa Barbara Oil Spill,” Pacific Standard, November 7, 2018. https://psmag.com/news/the-ocean-is-boiling-the-complete-oral-history-of-the-1969-santa-barbara-oil-spill.

Endnotes

[1] Weldes, Jutta. Constructing national interests: The United States and the Cuban missile crisis. University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

[2] Weldes, 1999.

[3] Weldes, 1999.

[4] Powell, Robert. “Nuclear brinkmanship with two-sided incomplete information.” American Political Science Review 82.1 (1988): 155-178.

[5] Kozloff, Max. “American painting during the Cold War.” Artforum 11.9 (1973): 43-54.

[6] Jared Keller, “The White House Will Keep Challenging the Pentagon on the Threat of Climate Change Until It Gets an Answer It Likes,” Task & Purpose, February 20, 2019. https://taskandpurpose.com/trump-climate-change-national-security-panel

[7] Wheeling, Kate and Max Ufberg, “‘The Ocean is Boiling:’ The Complete Oral History of the Santa Barbara Oil Spill,” Pacific Standard, November 7, 2018. https://psmag.com/news/the-ocean-is-boiling-the-complete-oral-history-of-the-1969-santa-barbara-oil-spill.

[8] Lewis, Jack. “The birth of EPA.” EPA J. 11 (1985): 6.

[9] Rial, José A., et al. “Nonlinearities, feedbacks and critical thresholds within the Earth’s climate system.” Climatic change 65.1-2 (2004): 11-38.

[10] Paul Newman et al, “2018 Ozone Hole is a Reminder of what Almost was,” NASA: November 2, 2018. https://svs.gsfc.nasa.gov/13103

[11] McNeill, John Robert, and Peter Engelke. The Great Acceleration. Harvard University Press, 2016.

[12] Oreskes, Naomi, and Erik M. Conway. Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming. Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2011.

[13] Michael Klare, “How Rising Temperatures Increase the Likelihood of Nuclear War,” The Nation (January 13, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/nuclear-defense-climate-change/.

[14] Alfred W. McCoy, “What Does It Take to Destroy a World Order,” Salon (March 3, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/03/03/what-does-it-take-to-destroy-a-world-order_partner/

[15] Gilbert, Emily. “The militarization of climate change.” ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 11.1 (2012): 1-14.

[16] Nathan Lobel, “Unraveling the U.S. Climate Action Plan: Explaining Corporate Participation in a Pro-Regulatory Advocacy Coalition,” Senior Essay, Yale Department of Political Science, December 9, 2016.

Alexa Reilly

Introduction: Indigenous Movements and Multinational Extraction Activity in the Ecuadorian Amazon

Background

This year, several blocks of land in the Ecuadorian Amazon are planned for auction to oil companies in a process which will lock in contracts that give foreign companies permission to extract from the land for the next 20 years. Multiple rounds of extraction licensing sales began in 2018 and several more companies, which have already received licenses, plan to begin activities in the coming year. These are the latest of several rounds of sales which encourage corporations to explore and extract from Ecuadorian land, particularly in the Amazon region. Foreign oil companies have a significant history of extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon, beginning with the entrance of the American company Texaco in 1967.

The extraction activities of a consortium of oil companies including Texaco and the Ecuadorian state oil company Petroecuador have had lasting effects on the region in which they worked, the northern Ecuadorian province of Sucumbíos. Due to poor clean-up techniques, oil production residues can still be found in the soil and waterways of the region, leading to an array of health and environmental problems. In addition, the entrance of oil workers from other regions of Ecuador caused shifts in social and cultural structures of the region’s indigenous communities.  Land transformations and the entrance of mestizo farmer-colonists have caused some indigenous communities to move from their historic territory into territories of other groups, leading to disputes, and at times, violence. On the other hand, foreign oil companies have also had a huge impact on the economy, with crude exports now representing Ecuador’s largest economic sector.

Research Goals and Rationale

The beginning of Ecuador’s oil age was preceded by a history of indigenous organizations that led protest movements on issues such as land rights, economic reform, and official recognition of ethnic identity. Current social movements in the Amazon region work towards a variety of demands, often including a call for a complete withdrawal of foreign extractive corporations in ancestral territories, or beyond that, a move to an Ecuadorian economy that is no longer dependent on extractive exports. In response, I ask: How have indigenous groups in the Ecuadorian Amazon staged resistance again oil extraction on their land and to what degree has each movement been met with success or failure? How is “success” defined by participants in these movements and what outcomes result from participating in these movements beyond clear-cut “success” or “failure”?  The first question has normative implications for how protesters of transnational oil corporations could increase the likelihood of their demands being met, while the other question offers insight into less-studied questions on other significant results of movement participation beyond simply success or failure. These insights may have broader implications for participants both within and outside of the movements examined.

Chapter I. Historical Background of Extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon and Ecuadorian Indigenous Social Movements

Extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon: The Beginning

On a small scale, exploration for various forms of mining[1] had occurred in Ecuador’s Amazon region throughout the 20^th century. Targets for this exploration included oil, gold, and other minerals. Oil was discovered on the Ecuadorian coast in the 1920s (Ministry of Hydrocarbons). In the same decade, surveying for oil began in the Amazon rainforest[2] in nearby countries like Peru (Petroleum Technology Transfer Council), though the search for petroleum faced greater challenges in the Amazon than in many other regions, due to the terrain’s lower accessibility. Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil had first surveyed for oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon in the 1930s, though the process was largely unsuccessful, besides discoveries at a few well sites (Sawyer 68, “Firms Abandon Oil Search”). Shell, along with other corporations, re-entered Ecuador in the 1960s (Shell) and oil activity intensified in 1964 when Texaco began to surveil the land and build camps in the northern province of Sucumbíos[3]. The company established its first well in 1967, after commercial quantities of oil were found near the Cofán[4] settlement of Dureno and modern-day Lago Agrio[5] (Corte Interamericana 14). In 1972, the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline–which ran from Lago Agrio to the coastal city of Esmeraldas–was completed, and oil production surged.

Extractive Industries 1980s

While oil extraction was accelerating in the northern Ecuadorian Amazon, other provinces in the Amazon region were also experiencing an increase in the extraction of gold and other minerals which had first started in the early 20^th century (Cleary 1990 1). Additionally, indigenous people in the Ecuadorian Amazon had been facing conflict with westerners for centuries before oil and mineral mining accelerated, whether through interactions with missionaries, loggers, or others (Finer et al 2009). Gold exports form a significant part of the Ecuadorian economy, though not nearly as large an amount as oil exports (Banco Central del Ecuador 2018), and there are several large-scale gold mines in the Amazon region. Unlike oil, gold is more evenly distributed throughout Ecuador’s three continental regions: the coast, sierra (or highlands), and Amazon, making its effects less regional in scope. Copper and other minerals are also mined in the area. While I will focus centrally on oil extraction in this paper, it is important to keep in mind that various overlaps exist between people and organizations protesting oil extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon and those protesting similar industries in the same region.

In the 1980s, oil corporations began moving into the central-south region of the Ecuadorian Amazon (the provinces of Pastaza, Morona-Santiago and Zamora-Chinchipe) (Sarayaku vs. Ecuador 17), while mining of other minerals remains prevalent in these provinces.  (“Nuestra selva no se vende”). These mining operations are located in the territories of several ethnic groups, including the Shuar, Waorani, Kichwa and Achuar.

National Oil Policy 1970s-2017

The early years of the intensification of oil extraction which started with Texaco saw a wave of new laws and organizations created to regulate the industry. In the 1971 Hydrocarbons Law, the Ecuadorian government declared that oil was national patrimony to Ecuador, belonging to the Ecuadorian state. In 1972 the earliest version of Ecuador’s national oil company, then called CEPE (Corporación Estatal Petroloera Ecuador or Ecuadorian State Petroleum Corporation) was created (Salazar 50). This coincided with Texaco beginning production in established reserves in 1972 (Sawyer 11). In the early 1970s, the Ecuadorian government sold land in the Amazon to seven foreign oil companies, creating a consortium in which CEPE was the biggest stakeholder. Under Ecuador’s military dictatorship of the mid 1970s, this share was given to Texaco and the national oil company dissolved. In 1989, Petroecuador, a successor to CEPE, was created and soon came to hold the largest consortium share (Salazar 71). Meanwhile, administrations of the 1980s and 1990s implemented neoliberal policies such as decreased export taxes on extracted resources (Sawyer 13). These decreased taxes served to encourage foreign interest in the country’s crude oil sector. Furthermore, they scaled down internal processing and refinement, making Ecuador more dependent on foreign trade partners for refined petroleum goods like gasoline (Sawyer 12).

In 1992, Texaco ceased its operations in Ecuador, but left a country full of international oil companies. In the 1980s and 1990s, companies from the United States, Italy, Spain, and other countries had begun activity in the central-south Amazonian provinces of Orellana and Pastaza. During this time period, there were more examples of organized meetings between representatives of corporations and of indigenous organizations than before. For instance, Sawyer describes meetings between the oil corporation ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Company), the Organization of Indigenous People of Pastaza (OPIP), and smaller organizations. Many view such meetings as false consultations meant to seek confirmation for the oil companies’ plans.

By the early 2000s, Ecuador was beginning to recover from a financial crisis and many felt resentment towards previous neoliberal[6] policies, some of which were viewed as an iteration of western imperialism. In the early 2000s, post-neoliberal rhetoric became common in administrations. In 2007, Rafael Correa won the presidency, running on an anti-imperialist, anti-establishment platform. For instance, in his inaugural address, Correa spoke of changing global structures of power: “They are the superiors, the owners of our countries, the owners of our democracies, while we, as heads of state, are only their primary servers” (Discurso de Posesión del Presidente Rafael Correa). In addition, Correa promised to support underprivileged populations, including indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian citizens. While he found support in several indigenous groups, Correa also denounced many indigenous protests, labeling them as too extreme (Cepek 2018).

In his first year of presidency, Correa announced the plan for the Yasuní-ITT initiative. The initiative asked for donations from the international community in return for a permanent suspension of oil activity in Yasuní National Park, one of the world’s most biodiverse regions and home to several indigenous nationalities, including uncontacted peoples[7]. The plan was presented to potential international donors largely in terms of its ecological impact, rather than in terms of other cultural or non-environmental concerns. In 2013, the plan ended due to insufficient pledged funds and Correa announced land auctions to Chinese oil companies, such as CNPC (Chinese National Petroleum Corporation). Correa was criticized by some for taking actions that may have encouraged Chinese oil exploration before announcing the initiative’s failure; for example, an “oil corridor” was created that allowed the Chinese company Sinopec to extend their operations nearly to the ITT region (Hill). Meanwhile, during Correa’s presidency, protesters, particularly in the central-south Amazonian provinces, experienced more repression than they had under previous administrations. Several movement participants were jailed or threatened. At the same time, Correa attempted to exercise more control over the Ecuadorian press (Punín Larrea).  

In 2008, a new constitution was signed into law. The constitution included a “rights of nature” clause which stated that nature is not property of the government, but rather an entity with rights. The constitution also included references to Ecuador as being “plurinational” and new mentions of Pachamama, a Quechua/Kichwa[8] conception of the natural universe or Mother Earth[9]. While previous constitutions had included words like “multicultural,” they did not recognize that Ecuador is made up of different nations of people. The 2008 changes represent success for many Ecuadorian indigenous movements, which often included calls for official, written recognition of their cultural differences. The constitution also contains potentially contradictory pieces relevant to resource extraction. For example, under the “Development” section, the constitution declared that the government reserved the right to expropriate natural resources whenever deemed justified, (Ecuador 2008). On the other hand, the constitution of 2008 states that “prior free and informed consultation about plans and schedules of research, exploitation, and commercialization of non-renewable resources found in their territories that can affect them environmentally or culturally” is necessary and that affected populations must “share in the benefits” of such activity (Constitution 2008 Art. 57-7). This largely mirrors the language in the 1998 Constitution (1995 Constitution Art. 84-5). The constitution also says that the territories of peoples living in voluntary isolation are untouchable and will be free from all extractive activity (Constitution 2008 Art. 57). The various articles requiring consultation of and respect for populations living on extractive land create tension with the article that states that the national government has total ownership of subsoil resources. This tension has led to conflict between the government, extractive companies, and citizens.

Effects of Oil Activity

The wave of extraction which began in 1967 left devastating effects on ecology, human health, and culture in the area. Throughout their time in Ecuador, members of the Texpet consortium failed to comply with basic safety regulations, often choosing to construct installations as quickly as possible, without following their own company health and safety policies. Upon their departure, Texaco simply covered oil wells and pools, without cleaning or draining them beforehand (Beristain 2005). 600 open oil pools were left behind (Corte Interamericana 15). Flares, common structures for burning off waste oil, had long been running, killing large numbers of insects and birds (Toxic Tour, Cepek 2018 106).  It is difficult to measure exactly how much oil has entered nearby ecosystems as a result of Texpet’s operations, though some estimate that up to 18 billion gallons of oil were leaked into the waterways, both during and after Texaco’s time in Ecuador (“Chevron Fined for Amazon Pollution” 2011). As early as the 1970s, Cofán and Siona people began to notice changes in the color of their water, different tastes in the fish and meat they ate, and the development of new stomach and skin illnesses. Initially, most Cofán people did not attribute these changes to oil directly, though some worried that the westerners had brought the illnesses and had caused bad spirits (cocoya) to harm their game animals (Cepek 2018). People of other ethnic groups, including Kichwa and mestizos, experienced similar problems. It has been shown that those living in the areas closest to Texpet extraction installations have significantly higher rates of cancer, miscarriage, and stomach and skin illnesses (Beristain et al. 2005). Further, road construction often involves deforestation and breaks up animal habitats. Species diversity has been found to decrease with proximity to roads constructed by and for Texaco (Vaca Almeida 2017). The urbanization which came as a result of extraction also threatened many species’ habitats (Corte Interamericana 17). Additionally, many cultural changes rapidly occurred as a response to foreign company entrance. For example, oil employees introduced a money-based economy which led to higher levels of individualism (Becker 2018). This, in turn, further accelerated environmental impacts by encouraging commercial hunting and fishing. Traditional gender relations changed to more closely reflect western structures, as men were offered oil jobs while women were not encouraged to work. Women also experienced sexual violence at the hands of western workers (Baristain et al 2005).   

Outside of Sucumbíos, the effects of oil corporations on health, biodiversity, and culture are not as well-documented, though similar negative impacts have been reported (Orta-Martínez and Finer). Additionally, violent conflicts have occurred both between indigenous peoples and non-indígenas and between different indigenous groups in the Central-South. This increased violence has been attributed in part to oil incursion. The introduction of new diseases, construction of intrusive roads, and dying wildlife have led some communities to move to new locations outside of their traditional homes, causing conflict. For instance, in 2003, Waorani[10] warriors killed at least 12 members of the related Taromenone[11] tribe, in response to tensions between the groups which had escalated as the Waorani moved away from their historic land and onto Taromenone land. After continuing conflict, Waoranis massacred or kidnapped nearly all the known remaining Taromenone people in 2013 (“Death in the Amazon”). In other cases, movement outside of traditional land fortified and caused the growth of existing communities located deeper in the forest, such as the pueblo of Sarayaku discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. An additional effect of extraction throughout the region is the increased risk of injuries or even death on the job for those who work for the companies (Interview 6). Further, due to the economic importance of oil extraction, petroleum corporations have often had significant political influence (Corte Interamericana 13).

Anti-Extraction Social Movements

In the 1970s and 1980s, new indigenous organizations were created and became a primary actor in movements representing indigenous peoples throughout Ecuador (Sawyer 42). Indigenous peoples in the central and southern parts of the Ecuadorian Amazon observed oil activity in the north of the region and created new organizations to defend their land in case the activity spread south. These organizations (i.e. OPIP) fought primarily to legally secure ownership of historic indigenous lands (Sawyer 45), while also involving themselves in other movements, such as those for recognition of plurinationality and the expulsion of extractive companies.  

In the 1980s and 1990s, demonstrations against oil company entrance surged and some indigenous demonstrations (i.e. Cofán and Waorani protests) were successful at keeping petroleum companies off parts of indigenous land. As will be discussed in Chapter IV, a Texaco well was closed in 1987 after an extended period of time in which Cofán protesters blocked roads leading to the well site. Earlier in the 20^th century, Royal Dutch Shell ceased operations in Waorani territory after years of receiving violent threats from Waorani people near their camp (Lu et al. 17). Protests in other areas (i.e. Sarayaku, Pastaza) were frequent and elicited responses from the government and extractive companies. Anti-extraction social movements joined these disruptive protests with publicity campaigns and legal action.

Petroleum and Protest Today

Today, oil companies continue to enter and extract from the Ecuadorian Amazon. Chinese national oil companies buy the vast majority of currently available land, though other countries’ companies (i.e. Spain) are represented throughout the region as well. Oil is crucial to the Ecuadorian economy. In 2014, Ecuador produced approximately 500,000 barrels of oil per day, much of it coming from the northern and central Amazon provinces of Napo, Sucumbíos, and Orellana (Banco Central del Ecuador). The concessionary auction system, which started under Correa after the aforementioned failed Yasuní-ITT initiative, continues to this day. Three separate rounds of auctions began in 2018 (Secretaría de hidrocarburos 2018), and there are currently[12] 13 petroleum land blocks proposed for auction to the international market (“Nuestr selva no se vende”). For a map of how the oil blocks are delineated as of 2018, see Figure 1. 

There are currently a variety of anti-extraction movements in the Amazon region, involving both indigenous and non-indigenous people. These movements work alongside regional (i.e. UDAPT), national (i.e. CONAIE) and international (i.e. Amazon Watch) organizations. Many movements demand the removal of extractive companies from indigenous territories, alongside demands for increased recognition for indigenous propriety over the land. Additionally, organizations like Confeniae (Confederation of the Indigenous Amazonian Ecuadorians) include messaging about demands for rights to freer protest, without fear of persecution for staging non-violent movements. These demands are a direct response to Correa-era arrests of protesters in the region. Participants today are reaching a larger international audience than in previous decades. Many organizations have a large social media presence and several English-language documentaries about oil extraction in the region and the movements in response were released since the early 2000s and continue to be produced (i.e. Crude 2009, A Future Without Oil 2010, and The Last Guardians 2018). Additionally, several groups, including both the Cofán protesting Texaco and the Kichwa countering CGC, have turned to legal means to demand reparations from the companies that previously occupied their lands.

Note on the History of Ecuadorian Indigenous Movements

Indigenous movements throughout Ecuador have a long history, dating back to conquistador Pedro de Alvarado’s entry into Ecuador in the 16^th century. As Becker notes, many current forms of protest in various Ecuadorian indigenous movements have their origins in the alliances between leftist groups and indigenous groups which began to take shape in Ecuador in the 1920s. Historically, the largest indigenous movements took place on huasipungos or haciendas[13] in the sierra region of the country. These movements largely focused on demanding land distribution reform, recognition of and education about indigenous history, language, and culture, and fairer working conditions for indigenous workers. Movement members often marched to big cities or government offices, organized strikes, and staged protests on their haciendas. Throughout the 20^th century, several new indigenous organizations were formed, including the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians and the Ecuarunari (the Kichwa Confederation of Ecuador).

In short, the movements which exist against oil extraction and other mining in the Ecuadorian Amazon stem from the concurrence of two historical courses, the long history of Ecuadorian indigenous movements and the relatively newer impositions brought on by mining. Because of the economic and ecological implications of resource extraction in this region, the current indigenous-led movements against extraction attract attention from across Ecuador and the world, potentially creating a novel interplay between the long-entrenched indigenous movement dynamics and tactics of the past and the need to meet modern pressures and use contemporary tools.

Chapter II. A Review of Scholarly Literature

Introduction

Ecuadorian indigenous movements have been unusually successful in terms of causing change in government and social structures within the country (Jameson 2011). In comparison to movements in other Latin America countries—including those with similar sized indigenous populations—Ecuadorian indigenous movements have been more successful in inciting constitutional changes and electing leaders of their movements to national offices. In at least a handful of cases these movements have removed extractive companies from indigenous land (Cepek 2018). There is a large body of research examining factors behind the emergence and growth of indigenous movements in Ecuador, and in Latin America more broadly; most of these works have been produced from the 1990s to the present (Van Cott 2010). Additionally, works on social movements in Nigeria and other countries with extensive presence of extractive industries inform this review (Omeje 2017). A subset of the work reviewed here evaluates factors behind the effectiveness of the movements in achieving their demands and attempts to describe the ultimate results of the movements, beyond success and failure. Here, I pay particular attention to authors who specifically examine Ecuadorian indigenous movements that respond to the presence of extractive corporations, particularly those in the Amazon.

Arguments developed to explain factors influencing the efficacy of Ecuadorian indigenous movements draw from a variety of disciplines, including political science, sociology, history, and anthropology. Scholars typically operate within and between the following schools of thought: 1. political conditions (Yashar 1998, Van Cott 2009) 2. mobilization strategies (Bob 2005), 3. identity definition (Sawyer 2004, Canessa 2007), 4. coalition formation (Becker 2008, Cepek 2014, Cepek 2018), and 5. framing and continuity of messages (Jameson 2011, Yashar 1998). These categories denote the primary factor each author analyzed in explaining either emergence or outcome of movements, but it is important to note that overlap between the categories is common, and that authors tend to acknowledge that all the aforementioned areas of analysis contribute to the structure and outcomes of social movements.

Definitions

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is a term broadly used throughout sociological, economic, and political science work, particularly in Latin America. Neoliberalism can refer to both an economic theory and a general ideology. Generally, proponents of neoliberalism believe in the rationality of a free market economy, though the concept can be extended to individual freedoms in other areas like politics and social life (Ritzer 116). Economist Joseph Stiglitz’s describes it as, “a grab-bag of ideas based on the fundamentalist notion that markets are self-correcting, allocate resources efficiently, and serve the public interest well.” Sawyer defines neoliberalism as “a cluster of government policies that aim to privatize, liberalize, and deregulate the national economy as to encourage foreign investment and intensify export production” (Sawyer 7). While neoliberalism is deeply linked to globalization, it is not solely about foreign investment and also involves allowing market forces to shape the domestic economy. Scholars on Latin American indigenous movements, like Yashar and Becker, identify the general idea of neoliberalism as a common target for protests. Anti-neoliberal protests are also common in other regions of the world (Ritzer 115).  For the purposes of this paper, I use Sawyer’s definition which focuses on exports and foreign investment, as neoliberalism’s relationship with foreign investment is key in the extraction of Ecuadorian oil and in the objections that protestors have to it. Ecuador experienced a wave of neoliberal policies in the rapidly changing governments of the 1980s-1990s which sought to encourage investment from other countries, while recent governments have, at least in rhetoric, vocally rejected neoliberalism.

Schools of Thought

Political Conditions

The political conditions category encompasses works which focus on the national political structures and circumstances under which resistance movements have emerged. Yashar (1998) argues that incomplete political liberalization is needed for national and larger-scale subnational indigenous movements to form. In other words, marginalized indigenous populations must experience a partial increase in freedoms which allows them to strengthen their political power slightly, without actually attaining all the freedoms and services they want or need. Rather than making indigenous citizens more content with their situation, partial liberalization empowers them to demand more. While noting the importance of established social networks and other factors, Yashar posits that these factors will not provoke the rise of a movement unless freedoms of expression and association have increased nationally, without extending completely to indigenous groups. This idea of the importance of partial liberalization is repeated in Van Cott (2009), which examines cases in Ecuador and Bolivia. Comparative case studies like Van Cott’s are common in this school. Johnston argues that protests in democracies are more likely to occur when conditions have improved for a marginalized group and the group feels relative deprivation to other groups, but not complete deprivation. Inclán (2018) observes that Latin American indigenous movements of recent years have mirrored protest movements in western democracies, in the sense that they are a part of a normal political process and do not result in regime overthrow. Thus, Johnston’s theories of social movement emergence in democratic states are relevant here.

Mobilization Strategies

Scholars who study mobilization strategies examine how people are effectively recruited into and retained in a movement. This includes financing, rhetoric in recruitment messages, and forms of press and social media used to reach potential participants. In recent years, these scholars have increasingly used surveys of movement participants to analyze why they chose to be involved in a movement (Inclán). Bob (2005) argues that success of a social movement is more dependent on financial resources than any other factor, and that movements can most effectively be analyzed by looking at the marketing strategies that the movement adopts when seeking funding. He also posits the importance of technology use and of the consolidation of political power within social movement organizations. Scholars of coalition formation (i.e. Becker 2008) include resource mobilization in their work but do not analyze it as the main determinant of success. Meanwhile, scholars of mobilization strategies (Bob, Tilly) include coalition formation within their analysis, but focus more on the aspects that lead to an organization being able to use their resources to form coalitions, rather than on the effects of the coalitions once they are formed.

Identity

Though most researchers on indigenous social movements acknowledge the importance of identity definition to some degree, identity definition scholars argue that the essential factor influencing the emergence and success of indigenous social movements is the way in which identity is defined by members of the movement. Much of the scholarly work specifically focusing on anti-neoliberal Ecuadorian indigenous movements fall under this category, at least in part. Sawyer focuses on the social movements led by the Shuar and other Ecuadorian indigenous groups against the actions of foreign oil corporations in the late 1990s to early 2000s. She compares these movements to indigenous social movements in Ecuador’s past, focusing on the early 1990s, and states that Amazonian indigenous movements against extractivism have more to do with demanding racial equality and recognition of indigenous rights than they do with opposition to the health, environmental, and other types of direct effects of extraction. Sawyer identifies the drive for official national legal recognition of Ecuador as a “plurinational state”—one comprised of multiple nations, rather than one homogenous population—as a driving force behind the emergence of movements in roughly the decade leading up to her work. In Crude Chronicles, Sawyer notes that it was necessary for indigenous Ecuadorians to rethink their own identity in order to come together under the identifier of “indigenous” rather than “Cofán,” “Shuar,” “Kichwa,” or any other identifier. Sawyer also addresses how identity can be manipulated and weaponized by opponents of a social movement in order to delegitimize the movement, using the example of an oil company paying a family to separate from their community and form their own indigenous organization comprised of only themselves. Eisenstadt (2011), like Sawyer, discusses how indigenous identity is malleable and can be used as a tool in social movements. Eisenstadt’s work also looks at how communitarianism, a quality typically associated with Latin American indigenous groups, can be expressed in greater or lesser degrees depending on responses received by indigenous social movements.

Coalition Formation

Becker, too, addresses the role of identity redefinition and alignment on the formation and efficacy of indigenous movements. However, he, and other scholars of coalition formation, look primarily at how groups of separate identities form alliances to pursue common or related goals. Becker writes about the ways in which identity was maintained and altered in the relationships that indigenous Ecuadorians have formed with urban leftist organizations since the 1930s. He argues that the relationship was necessary for the incorporation of indigenous people into public activism and instrumental in defining the national collective indigenous identity. Becker argues that the relationship started out with leftists patronizing indigenous participants in their movement and essentially forcing members to identify themselves only along class lines, but that over time, indigenous people became more willing to identify themselves along multiple parameters, adding indigenous ethnicity to their public identity. Becker demonstrates that over time, indigenous people started controlling movements and urban blanco-mestizo people played more supportive roles in national movements. Becker argues that social movements have most likely been able to achieve their demands when people define themselves primarily by indigenous identity, while drawing on support from non-indigenous people who share their class identity. Kimerling (2007), like Becker, addresses patronizing coalitions, noting how alignment with foreign organizations can create unjust conditions in modern indigenous resistance operating through legal networks. Kimerling and Becker both demonstrate that coalitions with non-indigenous people can make movements more effective, but that this efficacy comes when indigenous people, rather than external groups, are in charge of the movement.

Cepek (2014) also emphasizes the importance of coalition formation. He argues that the Cofán have had unusual success in their movements against oil extraction, because they have an effective intermediary between their culture and the West, Randy Borman—a white man, born and raised in a Cofán town, fluent in English, Spanish, and A’ingay (the Cofán language). Cepek identifies cooperation with western NGOs as an important factor in movement development. This echoes Johnston’s idea that subnational movements are more successful when they situate themselves into transnational movements, such as the anti-neoliberal “global justice” movement. However, like Becker, Cepek recognizes the ruptures that emerge between Cofán collaborators and Western environmental organizations as well as the related divisions that emerge within Cofán communities in response to coalition formation. The dual nature of coalition building is seen globally (i.e. in Colombia, see Escobar and Restrepo 2010).

Abers and Von Bülow (2011) analyze specific variations in the role actors take on in coalitions. They give the name “brokers” to those actors who mediate between different stakeholders in a given situation. They find that certain broker roles, like translators, are easy to fill, while those filling representative roles of a group are more likely to be unsuccessful. Several authors also note the importance of coalitions between indigenous Amazonian groups and subalterns in other countries or of different ethnic backgrounds (Van Cott 2010, Bob 2005).

Continuity of Messages

Some view the various Ecuadorian indigenous-led social movements as different branches of a single indigenous movement, owing to consistent messages across several movements and organizations. While previously discussed scholars focused largely on why movements emerge, with some space dedicated to measuring their effectiveness, Jameson (2011) centrally seeks to understand why Ecuadorian movements, like Pachacutik, are more successful than indigenous movements in other Latin American countries. Jameson argues that the peculiar success of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement is due to the maintenance of a single, continuous message across time and across organizations. Like Sawyer, Jameson identifies the consistent message as the call for a plurinational state. This message, Jameson writes, provides a consistent direction for movements even in changing political conditions, and he predicts that if the message continues to take a central position in indigenous social movements, the movements are less likely to disappear or be co-opted in the future. Few other works focus specifically on the continuity of demand messaging. Some (Yashar 1998, Johnston 2011), however, note the importance of continuity in structures, arguing that movements created from pre-existing social structures are more effective than those which incorporate several disparate actors. Johnston (2011) argues for the importance of already existing social organizations in providing a common space for movements to begin and evolve, showing how social movements grow more quickly when they stem from well-established community structures, like churches. Yashar writes that pre-established trans-community actors are essential in Latin American indigenous movements.

Analysis

Together, these approaches offer insight into how indigenous movements emerge and expand, as well as potential outcomes of the movements. Political condition theories provide important information about how social movements emerge and their potential effects and can be generalized to look at various global situations. However, they do not directly address the unique agency of those creating and sustaining social movements. Further, because they generally rely on examination of a range of movements across countries, these theories are best suited for somewhat general questions of why a movement emerges and whether it will be mostly effective or ineffective, not for looking at the specific individual outcomes of a movement, or for looking at a specific geographic region within a country. Here, I use ideas of political liberalization to inform my research but do not focus on it exclusively.

In contrast with political conditions theorists, mobilization strategies scholars narrow the focus to look at specific qualities of the movements themselves but still tend not to focus on the agency of actors within the movements. Furthermore, social mobilization arguments do not adequately explain why some scholars argue that current Ecuadorian indigenous movements have not been met with as much success as they experienced in the 1990s (Van Cott). Having an understanding of mobilization strategies, in terms of financing and marketing to potential participants, is an important component of understanding Ecuadorian indigenous movements, but it cannot be viewed as the primary element. I do not focus on resource mobilization in this paper.

Each of the remaining schools of thought have a more situation-specific focus and are closely related, providing clear ties between the success of indigenous social movements and the unique culture and history of the region. As demonstrated above, coalition formation and identity definition scholars often overlap extensively because of the ways in which alliances change perception of identities and vice versa. Though they are both useful, the extent to which coalition formation and identity definition ideas have been applied specifically to Ecuadorian movements means another study within those schools may only be used if it also considers other factors that interplay with identity and coalition-forming. In fact, Van Cott remarks that most of the cases examined by identity and coalitions scholars are actually over-studied. She believes that by focusing so intensively on unusually successful movements like the Ecuadorian Pachacutik movement, our perception of the level of success of strategies used by indigenous social movements in Latin America becomes skewed.

Both of the aforementioned schools of thought can be used to illuminate the less often-emphasized area of framing continuity. This year (2018), several communities of indigenous people were confronted with the beginning of oil extraction on their land for the first time. It will be interesting to see whether or not extant organizations and previously declared messages will be incorporated into movements that arise in response to these new situations. Further, it is a critical time to examine if Jameson’s assertion that continuity of plurinationality demands is a determining factor in efficacy of Ecuadorian indigenous movements. Plurinationality was codified in the Ecuadorian constitution 10 years ago. With the success, on paper, of the ultimate goal of many indigenous movements, how will the message continue to be incorporated into movements, if at all? Is it accurate to label the movements for recognition of plurinationality as successful, and, if so, how will people connect their movements to movements which have already achieved their goal? Have pre-existing organizations that emerged in the movement towards this goal strengthened or weakened as a result? Answers to these questions will likely impact how indigenous Ecuadorians define themselves within their movements and the ways in which they connect with outside allies.

Summary, Conclusions, and Contributions

My research will apply findings from the reviewed schools to a specific geographic region and situation – subsurface resource extraction (especially oil extraction) in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Though there is a wealth of information on indigenous social movements in Ecuador, most of it focuses primarily on indigenous groups of the highlands, rather than on the Amazon. My focus on movements which respond to petroleum extraction further narrows my research area. However, there are various groups within the movements of eastern Ecuador, and I am still able to compare different groups throughout the region, just as seminal scholars like Sawyer and Becker did while using the entire country of Ecuador as the area of analysis. This scope of focus and deductive methodology allows me to examine a variety of examples while arriving at reasonably historically and culturally grounded conclusions.

I also directly examine efficacy and outcome of movements, much like Jameson. Published research which examines the effectiveness of indigenous movements in the Ecuadorian Amazon takes into account the most recent developments, such as the latest round of Amazon oil field auctions beginning in 2018. Many indigenous movements today respond directly to those sales. Nor do many scholarly works examine the effect of the 2008 constitution, which both recognizes Ecuador as a plurinational state and redefines “nature” as an entity with rights rather than a commodity of the government. These are just a few examples of changing contexts which underscore the importance of conducting new research in the field.

Additionally, many studies reviewed here focus mainly on the relationship between government bodies and the indigenous movements. As new communities face the incursion of foreign corporations, it will become even more important to understand what effect, if any, Ecuadorian social movements have on the corporations on their land and on other non-government actors, rather than focusing solely on change through government channels. In my work, I hope to acknowledge the role that direct movement-to-company communication can play in addition to movement-to-government communication.

Chapter III. Methods to Explore the Impact of Message Continuity on Indigenous Movement Success in the Ecuadorian Amazon

Hypotheses and Case Selection

How have indigenous groups in the Ecuadorian Amazon staged resistance against oil extraction on their land and to what degree has each movement been met with success or failure? What factors affect the degree of success attained? How is success defined? More broadly, what outcomes come from movement participation? In response to the second question, I hypothesize that if demands of the movements examined are clearly connected to the central messages of past indigenous movements, effectiveness will increase. This is because connected, continuous messages encourage stronger coalitions between organizations, attract more participants to the movement, and help prevent the movement’s demands from being forgotten with the passage of time. Additionally, I hypothesize that movements which have more and stronger connections with international organizations will experience more success, due to resulting external pressure on government and companies and potential resource augmentation that can come with international publicity. In addition, I believe that many movements, whether partially or fully successful or not successful at all, will experience other outcomes including increased interactions between geographically or culturally separate populations and increased movement activity in other, non-extraction related social movements.

I use qualitative, comparative analysis of different historical cases to test my hypothesis and then evaluate current cases using the same factors to provide an overview of how my findings may apply to current events. Case #1 is the movement against oil extraction in Sucumbíos, largely focusing on Cofán led protests and actions in 1982-1994. Case #2 is the movement against oil extraction in Pastaza, focusing on the Sarayaku Kichwa movement against various oil companies in 1989-2007. Current cases I evaluate in Chapter V include current multi-nationality movements against national company Petroamazonas[14] and various foreign companies and the multi-nationality legal movement against Chevron.

Operationalization and Methods

The degree to which each movement can be labeled as “successful” will be addressed more thoroughly within chapter IV. I define success on the basis of each demand, rather than labeling entire movements successful or unsuccessful. High success would mean the demand was clearly met and resulted in tangible changes. Moderate or mixed success refers to mixed outcomes (i.e. an official document demanded reforms but was not enforced in reality, or one part of the demand was met and another was not.) Low success or failure means the demand was not met.

To analyze past movements in terms of framing, allies and identity, external factors, and movement outcomes, I used primary (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) and secondary sources (Sawyer 2004, the Global Nonviolent Action Database for the Kichwa movement, and Cepek 2018 for the Cofán movement.) To look at current cases, I use a 2018 documentary called The Last Guardians, analysis of conferences between different communities affected by oil extraction and indigenous organizations in March 2018 and January 2019, and an analysis of messages posted on Facebook by groups representing the current anti-extraction indigenous movements. These groups include “Comunicación Confenaie” and “Conaie Comunicación.”

In addition, I conducted interviews to analyze both current and historical cases. These included in-person and Skype interviews with people currently involved in protests—all of whom have been involved for several years—along with representatives of organizations which are involved in social movements against oil extraction. I interviewed a variety of contacts, not focusing solely on those involved in the two cases described above. Questions focused primarily on relationships within and between different groups within the movement and outside stakeholders like the government and oil officials, along with questions on media representation and movement outcomes. All interviews were conducted in Spanish and were transcribed and analyzed for common themes, particularly regarding statements made by the interviewee about successes and failures experienced during their involvement in anti-extraction movements and their initial goals for the movement.

In summary, I have selected cases which give me high levels of control and variation. My qualitative approach allows me to gain a deep understanding of the dynamics of the selected movements and to draw on this knowledge to evaluate current movements. By having a variety of information sources, I can corroborate results or reveal and analyze discrepancies between the results from different sources. I believe my interview component has helped me generate new information in response to the latest government actions and developments within the social movement.

Chapter IV. Findings: Movements of Today

Today, the frontier of oil extraction has moved south to the provinces of Pastaza, Morona-Santiago, and Zamora-Chinchipe. Gold and other mineral extraction continues in this region as well. As previously described[15], the people of Sarayaku and neighboring communities (such as the nearby Zápara communities) continue to fight against the entry of oil companies. In the North, extraction has greatly decreased, and today the people of Sucumbíos demand reparations and collaborate with activists from other provinces to support their anti-extraction calls.

External Environment: National Government

Today, the pressures and opportunities presented by the national government, international community, and media all differ as compared to the 1980s to early 2000s. The presidency of Rafael Correa from 2007 to 2017 was a critical period for indigenous activists and other participants in anti-extraction movements. During his presidency, activists reported an increase in arrests linked to protest participation (Interview 1, Interview 4, Interview 6, Interview 7). This extends beyond the Amazon’s anti-extraction movement. For example, 35 participants in protests in the sierra in August 2015 were arrested. These arrests were immediately denounced by indigenous leader and CONAIE co-founder Luis Macas, among others. Aggressive anti-protest tactics were used not only in indigenous anti-extraction movements, but in various protests throughout the country (“Correa pierde el control en Ecuador: represión y arrestas”).

Threats were also common under the Correa administration. Interviewee 5 said he had been threatened and said, “The Correa government started to follow me.” Similarly, attorneys legally representing people affected by oil extraction reported threats from both extractive companies and Ecuadorian police (Interview 2, Interview 8) under the Correa administration. These threats from police and military personnel had not, to my knowledge, been reported on a large scale before Correa came to power and, according to interviewees, subsided soon after he left office. Interviewee 7 said that one of his colleagues[16] had been killed by the Ecuadorian military after participating in protests against the extraction of minerals near his home[17]. The interviewee described the protestor as “the man who fought the most against mining.” One interviewee described police killing protestors from his town and arresting others. Organizations like Confeniae publicly addressed this Correa-era suppression, for example writing on their website that the organization is “against the military suppression of their movements.” (Confeniae website). In addition to use of physical force, Correa kept a tight grip on the Ecuadorian press, leading to Ecuador receiving a “not free” rating from Freedom House’s annual report every year from 2013-2017. Correa often referred to journalists as “assassins with ink” (“Freedom in the World: Ecuador”).

It is worth noting that indigenous protestors are not the only ones affected by increased suppression tactics. A police officer had also died in December 2016 after being shot in the head while controlling protests in the central-south region under the Correa administration (La Voz de Galicia). Other officers had been injured at the same event (“Correa informa de un policía muerto”). Officers were also injured in a 2009 protest in Morona-Santiago (Mena Erazo).

Further, the protest suppression at the hands of police and military personnel, combined with the control over press, may have made the companies themselves and their allies more comfortable using threat tactics of their own. Interviewee 4 said that the Correa administration “normalized” violence. Interviewee 8 reported a break-in which appeared to come from someone connected to Chevron’s legal team. He said that early in his job working with the legal team representing the affected peoples, someone broke into his office, moved around all the documents, but left everything there, including his computer and objects of monetary value. This indicates that whoever did it was more interested in getting information for the court case and possibly scaring the new lawyer, rather than robbing the office.

Beyond outright suppression, the rhetoric of Correa and his administration regarding protest impacted anti-extraction movements. A 2015 article writes that Correa has described the indigenous protests as looking to “destabilize” the Ecuadorian government (Prensa Libre). This is just one example of several instances where he used wording which described indigenous protestors as a threat. According to a 2015 article, Correa responded to a CONAIE-led mobilization by saying that the indigenous protestors had no motive for their protest (Constante), showing an attempt to delegitimize indigenous protest. Interviewee 6 talked about the rumors started about him around this time: everything from generally calling him “subversive” to accusing him of terrorism and of being part of a guerilla group. Throughout his time as president, Correa also issued several “calls for dialogue” (“Mena Erazo”) between the protestors and government officials. When indigenous activists did not meet these calls, it likely became easier for him to call them subversive and violent. On the other hand, Correa frequently stated he was supportive of indigenous organizations throughout the country. For example, he said that he felt deeply for his “dear companions” in CONAIE after one of its members died in a protest (Mena Erazo). In regard to Sucumbíos, Correa’s rhetoric was often strongly against Chevron and in favor of those legally fighting against the company. A 2015 article in The Nation states “Correa accused the oil giant…of ‘deliberately polluting’ the Amazon rain forest in eastern Ecuador, of ‘shamelessly lying’ to evade its legal responsibility to clean up.” Correa also stated that the affected people of Sucumbíos “have all our sympathy” (North).

One reason for the apparent discrepancy between Correa’s rhetoric about Chevron and lack of denouncements for other oil companies currently in Ecuador is the different experiences of extraction in the North and Central-South, described in chapters I and IV. People in Sucumbíos have already publicly experienced death and destruction on a large scale as a result of oil extraction and are now fighting predominantly a legal battle for reparations. Their struggle generally hasn’t presented a threat to future extraction, nor has it been polemical in the eyes of the Ecuadorian public. The incentives for Correa’s administration to stifle their actions and support mining in their area seem low. Also, the attention which the general Ecuadorian public paid to the north was higher throughout Correa’s terms than that paid to central-south provinces. Meanwhile, incentives to shut down protests of people in Pastaza or other central-southern provinces which had the potential to disrupt the future of an industry worth billions of dollars to the national economy were high. This may explain why Correa’s treatment of social movements differed between the two regions. Further, Chevron embodies the archetype of a rich, powerful, imperialist business from the West that benefits from the neoliberalism which Correa vocally rejects. Neoliberal tenets of deregulation and privatization generally benefit large multinational corporations like the oil supermajors[18] (Smith-Nonini) while the smaller, non-American companies entering Ecuador in the recent past are not as good a target for Correa’s anti-neoliberalism. Lastly, Correa’s vocal support for peoples of Sucumbíos generally focused, and continues to focus, on their legal battle. For example, in November 2018, Correa retweeted a link to an article titled, “The Chevron Case is fundamental for the world.” (@MashiRafael). Correa may consider law a more “acceptable” movement tool than public protest. However, this does not mean that the Correa administration was always supportive of the actions of protestors from this province. Though Correa didn’t explicitly speak against activists in Sucumbíos, his administration’s protest suppression tactics did affect the larger, Ecuadorian Amazon-wide movement in which the activists of Sucumbíos took part.

Movement participants’ views on Correa vary. There is a significant number of indigenous people in Sucumbíos who have been affected by crude extraction who supported Correa and continue to believe in Correísmo, or his general political philosophy. Sucumbíos was the only Amazonian province in which Lenín Moreno, who was at the time viewed as an extension of Correa, won the 2017 presidential election (“El mapa bicolor del Ecuador”). Guillermo Lasso, his opposition, won in all other Amazon provinces. This fact alone doesn’t mean that the people of Sucumbíos are inherently bigger supporters of Correa than other people from the Amazon region. However, it does stand out as an interesting occurrence when taken alongside the vocal, continued support for Correísmo from some indigenous people of Sucumbíos that can be seen across social media. A 2017 El Comercio article describes the general support for Lasso throughout the rest of the Amazon region as, “the indigenous movement’s very clear disaffection towards the government due to the implemented mining policy and the persecution of indigenous leaders” (“Lenín Moreno ganó en 15 capitales de provincia”). This disaffection appears not to have extended completely to Sucumbíos.

Meanwhile, some who work in fields related to anti-extraction movements feel Correa was not special in terms of his attitude towards protest and level of support for extraction. Though suppression had intensified under Correa, one interviewee was clear that he feels all presidents are inherently pro-extraction and may just use slightly different tactics to attain their goals. He said, “The governments can be right, left, anarchists, whatever. They have different political ideologies but all, all of them are extractivist.” (Interviewee 2). This sentiment was also reflected by people working on the case against Chevron in the documentary Crude, soon after Correa’s election. A conversation was shown in which an Ecuadorian member of the team stood clearly against an American colleague’s expectations that Correa would somehow be different from past presidents in his support for indigenous peoples and his opposition to extraction. Other people don’t necessarily see Correa as strictly against the indigenous Amazonian peoples’ expressions of opposition to extraction but do note that they feel he says a lot without doing anything. For example, some call him “El Habla-Yo-Yo;” in other words, someone who constantly says “I will do x, I will do y” but never does it (Toxic Tour). Others did not speak so much of the Correa administration’s protest suppression but did say he betrayed the Amazon by ending the Yasuní-ITT fund[19] . Interviewee 5 also believed that Correa and other government officials appropriated aspects of indigenous cultures—i.e. the use of the Kichwa Sumak Kawsay in the constitution—for political gain without actually doing anything for indigenous communities. He also said, “It’s like, let’s say we have a car and we tell Correa to drive the car. And more people come on to travel in the car and we’re left outside, and they drive on whatever roads they want to in our car” (Interview 5). Though several interviewees stated that they had thought that Correa would be different from past presidents–more supportive of indigenous communities and less in favor of expanded extraction than past presidents (i.e. Interview 5, Interview 7) –all who said this also expressed disappointment or frustration with his policies and actions.

The current president of Ecuador, Lenín Moreno, was Correa’s former vice president and was expected to continue many of Correa’s policies throughout his presidency when he took power in 2017. However, in many ways, Moreno has not met this expectation. This is true in terms of anti-extraction protest control or suppression. When asked how indigenous demonstrations changed after Moreno took office, one interviewee simply said that Moreno has been “less bad, less problematic” (Interview 5). Another said that Moreno hadn’t really had any effect on anti-extraction movements yet, and that maybe over time they would start to see a clearer position towards the anti-extraction protests (Interview 1). Several interviewees felt that things are generally calmer under Moreno, though threats against movement participants do continue. For example, in January 2018 a leader in the Sarayaku community was attacked by an anonymous person who threw stones at her house and verbally threatened her. In April, the Zápara president received death threats (Amnesty). As stated above, one interviewee felt that all presidents are essentially the same: all are pro-extractive and Moreno, like Correa, is no exception (Interview 2). Overall, Moreno does appear to be just as extraction-friendly as past presidents and his administration continues to promote Ecuador’s oil resources (Secretaría de hidrocarburos). In response to lowered oil prices, his administration has advocated expansion of extraction. Further, Interviewee 8 described relationships between Moreno, the US government, and American companies like Chevron. He said, “We know Moreno met with Mike Pence and negotiated an exit from the Chevron case, an exit favorable to the company.” The Ecuadorian organization Center for Economic and Social Rights made the same claims, saying, “Vice President Mike Pence’s visit to Ecuador ‘seeks to align the country to U.S. influence [and] eliminate ‘irritating’ subjects like the Chevron case” (“Ecuador Rights Group Warns”). In this way, we see Moreno working against the indigenous movement’s demands and aiming for a favorable position with the United States and its corporations.

In terms of rhetoric, Moreno has tried to distance himself from his former ally, Correa. In January 2019, he publicly spoke of alleged corruption in oil sales under the Correa administration and said of an investigation into these corruption charges that, “The conclusions are so shameful and scandalous that I have decided to present a denunciation with the full reports…so that all these crimes that may have been committed can be investigated” (“Lenín Moreno pidió investigar los proyectos petroleros”). He made a public statement on April 2, 2019 denouncing “the quantity of unjustly incarcerated people” under Correa (@elcomercio). Like Correa, Moreno does frequently state his support for the indigenous people of the Amazon and throughout Ecuador. For instance, he tweeted on February 12, 2017 (soon before taking office), “Today in the Ecuadorian Amazon I reaffirm my commitment to the future of the indigenous pueblos and nationalities.” As Moreno’s presidency is still relatively young, time will tell how his policies affect social movements in the Amazon[20].

External Environment: Media Representation and Technology

Interviewees expressed mixed opinions on the way national and international newspapers and other news sources depict anti-extraction movements. One interviewee said he felt that the representation was fairly accurate. He said that news comes from local reporters familiar with the situations and local context, and that those stories then essentially get copied on the national and sometimes international levels (Interview 7). Reports are often created after journalists attend press briefings held by local leaders (Confeniae Facebook, Interview 5). These leaders are, in general, part of the anti-extraction movement. However, other interviewees expressed the concern that some media seemed to paint companies and governmental officials in a more favorable light than protestors and local leaders (Interview 2, Interview 8). Some noted that Chevron and other companies use their economic resources to buy publicity and space in press, which gives them an advantage over movement participants (Interview 2). One interviewee said that the type of publication mattered. He felt that foreign magazines or papers with an economic or business focus tended to describe protestors more negatively, or Chevron more positively, than other news sources (Interview 8). This can be seen in language used in articles from sources like Forbes, which typically do not use particularly negative language for the protestors themselves but do express disdain for courts that decide against Chevron, i.e. “Time to Hit Ecuador with Tariffs for its Bad Faith Towards Chevron” (Krauss). News releases from advocacy groups and some left-leaning newspapers tends to paint activists as strong people fighting for their lives, i.e. the National Resources Defense Council’s article, “A Village in Ecuador’s Amazon Fights for Life as Oil Wells Move In,” from April 2019.  No interviewee directly mentioned any impact that the Correa administration’s restrictions on press freedom may have had on the representation of the movement in Ecuadorian media sources.  

Further, a common theme in interviews was the feeling that press, especially foreign press, always focused on individual leaders or protest participants and sought to make heroes out of people. One of the interviewees who complained about this dynamic felt that he had been made into a hero in the legal battle against an oil company and expressed annoyance that journalists chose to focus on him rather than the large collective of indigenous protestors and their allies. He said, “The fight is the affected peoples’ and the documentaries ignore that.” He prefers to be viewed as a part of the large group of people who had been affected by extraction (Interview 2). One interviewee said, “It’s not about making people into figures like Rigoberta Menchú[21], it’s about a pueblo or a family” and that foreigners want to make stories “in a Hollywood way” (Interview 5). The same interviewee did feel like this trend towards individual-focused representation was less common within Ecuador, and that movement leaders like him often explicitly communicated to local NGOs and journalists that they do not want to be the subject of that sort of individualistic reporting (interview 5), which has led to some improvement. However, the interviewee feels that even with this communication, some western journalists continue to report on the actions of individuals, rather than collectives. This type of representation can be seen in the 2008 documentary Crude, perhaps one of the most well-known representations to western audiences of Ecuadorian social movements. The documentary focuses primarily on an American lawyer and an Ecuadorian lawyer and their actions, rather than on entire groups of people.

Another key external factor is the presence of social media and other modern technologies which are used within the movement. Many indigenous organizations (i.e. Confeniae, CONAIE) have Facebook accounts that post at least once each day, and Twitters that post even more frequently. Beyond posts from organized groups, many individuals involved in the movement also use Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp and other social media and messaging applications to share about their anti-extraction actions and views. These tools connect people and make it easier for the messages of movements to spread on the local and global levels, as has been seen in various social movements throughout the world[22]. The particulars of social media use will be discussed more in the Messaging and Framing section. Other technologies used widely within the anti-extraction movement include modern mapping tools, video editing, and cell phones.

The unique location of the new oil blocks further distinguishes the anti-extraction movement of today from the past. Many movement organizations today grapple with the fact that some oil blocks overlap with the territories of uncontacted peoples like the Taromenane. When asked about Confeniae’s position against the incursion of extractive corporations on this territory, interviewee 3 said, “That’s within our agenda, but it’s not a topic that we’ve been able to work on in any detail, because even we don’t know them…so it’s difficult to provide any answer for that demand.” Some Waorani people do have contact with these tribes, as uncontacted groups and the Waorani are closely related. Since uncontacted peoples have not been incorporated into anti-extraction movements, it is unclear how they will affect and be affected by the movement going forward. As of right now, they are often referred to when movement participants discuss cultural loss and damage, but activists are not sure how to turn this rhetoric into action.

Goals and Overall Methods and Actions

Today, the goal of those participating in anti-extraction movements mirrors demands of the past. Many state that they want all extractive corporations to be prohibited from entering indigenous territory. One interviewee made a further claim of hoping Ecuador can become a “post-extractive state” in which the economy no longer depends on extraction at all (Interviewee 5). Some people, especially those working in the north of the Amazon region, stated that they wanted reparations for damage already done and public recognition of the damage by companies involved (Interview 2). Several interviewees described themselves simply as “against mining” (i.e. Interview 4). Many also ask for informed consent and more equitable consultations (“Acción Ecológica and Ecuador: Indigenous Women Protest Lack of ‘Consultation,’”). Mirroring the consultations of the past touched on earlier, Interviewee 1 described a consultation in Mera, Pastaza in which the government only described the potential good that could come from extraction, without mentioning any risks. In this way, anti-extraction movements have remained fairly constant in their goals since the 1980s. Of note is that at Confeniae’s beginning-of-the-year meeting, community leaders, Confeniae directors, and other participants frequently mentioned oil extraction specifically when discussing their objectives for the year. However, in the written plans laid out for the year, in which central plans were listed next to actors involved with the topic and a time frame for addressing the goal, the words “oil” and “extraction” did not appear at all. Main plans included “training about the human rights of the Amazonian nationalities,” and, “elaborating and updating action plans for conservation and environmental protection.” (Confeniae 2019). These themes were then discussed verbally alongside conversations about extraction. Because of this, it appears that some people involved in anti-extraction movements see extraction as something that affects many of the goals that they work towards, though not necessarily as a central target in and of itself.  

It is important to note here that, though many people who live in communities which experience the effects of extraction support anti-extraction movements, not everyone in these communities does. Everyone who I interviewed made it clear that they were against extraction within indigenous territory. I asked four interviewees if they believed that the majority of people from the Ecuadorian Amazon agreed with this anti-extraction position. All said yes, at least in general. Interviewee 3 qualified his answer, by saying that he felt confident that the majority of people in the central-south region were in agreement but that he didn’t feel he could speak for the North. Of the North, he said, “They already live with this reality. So, they need to, often, negotiate with the businesses” (Interviewee 3). Starting around 2012, many people in the Cofán community of Dureno supported seismic exploration by oil companies on their land, as long as they would get a fair share of the profits of oil. Many thought that oil exploration in the area was inevitable. Since any nearby activity could end up drawing the crude oil out from directly under Dureno[23], it would be best if they had direct contact with the companies and could work out a way to profit from it (Cepek 2018 215-217). Therefore, activism for fair profits from extraction, and for safe and healthy extraction methods happens alongside movements against extraction in Dureno. In the past, this led to conflict, physical violence, and mistrust within the community. Cepek writes that initially, the conflict occurred mainly between generations, with younger people supporting oil extraction with fair terms and older people categorically rejecting extraction. However, over time, elders were convinced that if companies weren’t allowed to enter yet, the young people would simply allow it after older community members died, and therefore unfairly receive all profit that came from extraction (Cepek 214-215).  Other interviewees did point out that even in the Central-South, there are some people who support extraction within their territory, though Interviewee 6 felt sure that all those people had a deal with a company (i.e. a payment or a promise that a needed public service would be provided by the company). Interviewee 4 noted the different experiences of the North and Central-South much as Interviewee 3 had. However, in contrast with the image of Dureno outlined above, she felt that as a whole, the indigenous peoples of the North held the same view as those of the Central-South, and that their different experience actually fortified anti-extractivism. “We work with the nationalities of the Amazon region. So, in the North, they’ve worked against petroleum exploitation more than 40 years. They have lived in their own blood and seen the reality that they [extractive companies] have come to divide and to destroy.” It does seem that overall, anti-extractivism throughout the Ecuadorian Amazon region remains strong, though the goals of the movements take on different nuances depending on factors like location, generation, and personal experiences.

In general terms, the tactics used by the movements of today bear many similarities to previous movements. They rely on the use of various forms of media–including traditional news, social media, art installations, and documentaries–to create public campaigns about the situations they confront and about the movement. They also use marches and other large demonstrations, sometimes including disruptive tactics like burning tires to prevent road passage (“Llantas quemadas en vias de Ecuador”). For example, protestors last year (2018) camped outside the presidential palace in Quito in order to protest a law meant to allow local people to benefit from extraction in their land, which they felt did not address the concerns they had about threats posed by extractive companies. (“Indigenous Women Protest Lack of Consultation, Environmental Damage”). Further, people involved in the anti-extraction movement continue to fight legal battles. The most famous example is the ongoing litigation between Chevron and the affected peoples of Sucumbíos. This currently involves multiple cases being brought in several different countries, including Ecuador, the United States, Brazil, and Canada. Litigation is also being used by the Waorani of the Block 22 area in western Pastaza, and by others (“Waoranis presentan acción de protección para frenar licitación del bloque 22 en Pastaza”). More so than in the past, the anti-extraction movement involves building economic alternatives to extraction, particularly through community-based tourism and eco-tourism (Interview 1, Interview 5, Toxic Tour).

Messaging and Framing

Messages spread by movement participants today in many ways mirror those of past movements. Like the framing used in both Sucumbíos and Pastaza, people speak and write in terms of the death of ancient cultures and the extinction of Amazonian biodiversity. Like earlier protestors, leaders of communities and organizations today frequently talk in terms of territory and its historical meaning, beyond simply land (Confeniae meeting 2019). For example, in The Last Guardians, a Kichwa activist states, “We are here. This is our territory. This is our children’s territory.” In conferences between different movement participants, people also frequently discuss the themes of autonomy and self-determination (i.e. Confeniae 2019). The prevalence of these topics shows a connection to non-extraction related indigenous movements of the past which called for recognition of plurinationality and land reform–concepts clearly related to ideas of “territory”–and of the autonomy of indigenous groups. It is significant that these messages continue after plurinationality has been legally recognized in the Ecuadorian constitution.

Today, there appears to be even more appeals to the global importance of the region than before. In other words, not only should extraction be halted for the people and creatures who live in extractive zones, but also because this region of the Amazon provides oxygen for the world and because the continued reliance on fossil fuel will only put more people at risk of being negatively affected by climate change (Interview 4, Interview 5). Some even clearly assert the importance of their fight over similar struggles elsewhere. One interviewee stated that the battle against extraction differs between the Amazon and sierra and wrote that in contrast to the serranos (people of the sierra) who only need to protect their own small pieces of land, “we’re caring for it [the forest] for the world” (Interview 4). I did not see this sort of assertive, comparative statement while reviewing rhetoric of earlier movements. While this type of statement did not come up frequently throughout my research, its existence may be a sign of a necessity for participants to make their own movement stand out in a national and global sea of social movements.  

In public statements and in meetings within the movement, many appeal to what they describe as the dishonest and patronizing nature of the extractive companies. For example, in a meeting at Confeniae, a participant said, “They give us little candies” and “They lie to us” (Confeniae 2019). “Candies” refers to companies giving out or saying they will give out favors to those who cooperate with their plans. The use of this word emphasizes that these favors do not compensate for what many indigenous activists feel is lost when the companies work on their land.  While these quotes come from a meeting between local leaders, accusations of dishonesty and patronization are also repeated for the general public. For instance, Amazon Watch released a document called, “Chevron’s Ten Biggest Lies About Ecuador.”

One of the most striking differences between the movements of today and those of the 1980s-2000s is the decision to abstain from all direct communication with representatives of extractive corporations. As seen in Sawyer and Cepek’s accounts of, respectively, Pastaza and Sucumbíos movements against subsoil resource extraction in the 1990s to 2000s, nationality leaders and representatives of indigenous and ally organizations frequently met directly with representatives from oil corporations at that time. I asked 6 of 8 interviewees if they had had direct communication with any representative of an oil or extractive corporation, and only one said they had in the past, but had not directly interacted with oil representatives in years (Interview 2). This interviewee is a lawyer who had needed to directly talk to representatives of the corporation in the past. All other interviewees had said they do not directly communicate with extractive companies. Interviewee 3 said “The decision is to not have any type of dialogue with the businesses because generally the businesses search for a way to convince the leaders. The simple act of talking to them could lead to something happening.” Other interviewees echoed this sentiment or said simply that dialogue with the companies is “impossible.” (Interview 7).

Direct dialogues with government officials have been rocky, though it is not obsolete as is dialogue with oil officials. Interviewee 5 stated that there was no dialogue between the local government and Confeniae or organizations that partner with Confeniae from about 2007 to 2017, but that they are now in direct communication with governments on various levels. Representatives of the organization have communicated directly with President Moreno, as well as with local and provincial governments. The ten-year period in which the interviewee stated there was no dialogue were the same years Rafael Correa was in office. The interviewee said that it was when Correa left that communications “opened” at all levels of government. Interviewee 7 echoed this, saying, “this current government opened the national dialogue.” Interviewee 6 discussed trying to have dialogue with the government in the past (it was not specified when exactly these attempts were made), but that nothing ever came of it and ties, at some point, broke. Interviewee 8 echoed the idea that nothing ever comes out of direct conversations with Ecuadorian governments and describes this as being the result of the strong ties that exist between the government and extractive companies. He said that he just wanted the government to “not participate in this…not in favor of the company nor in favor of the affected.”

 Interviewee 5 stated that he had won in some ways in the past by working with local and national government and that he thought one potential strategy that could impact success in the future is working more directly with mid-level (i.e. provincial) governments. He said, “It is important to work on the level of, for example, Pastaza because these are the authorities that make public policies. At the international level there’s pressure from the UN, human rights bodies…but that’s not it [what is needed]. In this case, it’s not binding. If the state says, ‘I don’t want to pay attention,’ well then, no… but it was important for us to win on the international level.” No other interviewee specifically mentioned shifting towards increased communication with province-level governments, though this interviewee wanted to incorporate this type of dialogue into the movement.

A substantial change in messaging strategy is the current, extensive use of websites and social media. As briefly discussed earlier, many indigenous organizations (i.e. Confeniae, CONAIE) frequently post on platforms like Facebook and Twitter. Posts include photos taken at conferences, information about demonstrations, and campaigns surrounding critical dates (i.e. anniversaries of court decisions and International Women’s Day). Individual activists post and share posts about threats to their land or community and information about protests, alongside personal posts about their lives. This use of social media allows the movement participants to reach larger audiences and to disseminate information quickly to those who are involved in or following the movement. It also becomes easier for people outside the movement or on its outskirts to quickly contact players within the movements. A simple example is the ease with which I, in Boston, could email or Facebook message possible interviewees in Ecuador. The same would be true for other researchers, foreign or Ecuadorian journalists covering the movements, people living in extractive areas who don’t have close ties within the movements, or, essentially, anybody at all. This opens the possibility for western consumers of Ecuadorian resources, possible donors, or experts in organizing and other relevant skills to hear and be heard by Ecuadorian activists. Many organizations have directors of communication, and a large part of their job is managing social media accounts. Confeniae also has a program called “Lanceros Digitales” or “Digital Spear-Bearers,” which is made of people from multiple different communities who all communicate with press and post on the website to share the latest news from their own communities. The lanceros also collaborate with each other, for example creating and posting a video expressing their shared indigenous identity. Further, messaging apps change the way people communicate and allow for easier and quicker organization of demonstrations or coordination for meetings. For example, Interviewee 4 described organizing a conference for indigenous women and said that she simply uses WhatsApp to communicate with other leaders and directors involved.

Additionally, activists use a variety of creative, visual means of communicating messages about their movement. For example, activists in Sucumbíos collaborated with Quito-based art collective Nina Shunku to create a mural denouncing the actions of Texaco. It now stands in the center of Lago Agrio. Video is a common way to communicate the damages done by extraction and the movements against it. These include short videos shared on social media and websites (such as the Lanceros video described above) and full-length documentaries in both English and Spanish like The Last Guardians (2018). There are also musical projects meant to display the culture of indigenous communities living in extraction areas. For instance, there are young Cofán people currently working on a recording project to share their music and their oral stories, in both A’inguay and Spanish. Mapping technology is also being used. Waorani activists currently fighting the incursion of new gold mining companies recently released a map on social media and websites. The map overlays historical Waorani knowledge of the territory (i.e. animal habitats, sites of historic battles, the locations of medicinal plants, etc.) with current government maps which show oil blocks and current cities (“Mapping Waorani Territory”). This creates a clear visual for outsiders to get an idea of the conflicting views of the territory and its value.

Alliances and Identity

Today, movements against extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon are more connected with each other and with movements and Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) outside the region than ever before. Local organizations like Confeniae bring together smaller, single ethnicity organizations and individuals, leading to high levels of interaction between different peoples. Movement participants also work frequently with non-indígenas who have a variety of different backgrounds and careers. Several ecologists and biologists, both from the region and from other regions and other countries, play roles on an individual level, helping build eco-tourism initiatives and otherwise working directly with community leaders to protect the plants and animals within their territories.

Eco-tourism is an important product of alliances on the local level. It is seen by many protest participants see as an alternate to oil extraction (Interview 1) and has involved the collaboration of people of different ethnicities and with different knowledge backgrounds. Interviewee 1 expressed hope for eco- and community based-tourism initiatives, saying that as a result of eco-tourism, “there are some crazy biological results, some crazy cultural revitalization.” Interviewee 5 also supported increased community-based tourism, saying that, “It allows us to raise awareness about the importance of the Amazon ecosystem and especially indigenous territories.” While community-based tourism is growing and some scholars have expressed hope that it can help economically empower disenfranchised peoples (Inostroza), it does not yet appear that tourism would bring immediate profits on the same scale as petroleum extraction. Financial data on profits and costs of tourism in the region are not well-studied. A study of ecotourism in part of the Peruvian Amazon found that eco-tourism, when combined with compatible activities like small-scale pig farming, was the second-most profitable use of land next to logging. If ecosystem services and social benefits were to be factored into the measure of profit, the researchers predicted that ecotourism would even exceed logging (Kirkby et al.). While these results are promising, Ecuadorian ecotourism may face a larger challenge due to the fact that crude exports are a much larger part of the Ecuadorian economy than timber exports are in Peru.

On an international level, according to interviewees 4 and 5, relationships with COICA are currently very strong. Interviewee 4 discussed her excitement to organize a meeting between indigenous women from all the Amazonian countries, to be held at the COICA headquarters in Quito. Relationships with western allies, including NGOs, also continue to shape anti-extraction movements. I found mixed experiences in terms of partnerships with western organizations. In 2013, an already strained relationship[24] between Cofán communities and Acción Ecológica ended when Dureno decided to allow BGP to conduct seismic exploration on their land (Cepek 2018 193-194). Cepek writes that though the reasons for the ties breaking may be complex, many Cofán people from the area interpret the relationship’s end as a result of such organizations, “only being interested in them as opponents of the petroleum industry” (194). In this example, we see how it is necessary for indigenous protest participants to adhere to the belief systems of their allies if they wish to continue their partnership. In contrast with the ruptures between western NGOs and indigenous organizations outlined in the literature, few interviewees claimed to have experienced any negative consequences of partnering with western allies. Interviewee 3, for example, said that the organizations with which he had worked on both a national and international level had all held the same firm position against extraction that he had; he did not report any conflicts with these organizations.

The only criticism of allies that came up during interviewees is when Interviewee 5 said that he did experience cases when foreign NGOs, like the foreign press discussed earlier, wanted to make “public figures” out of certain individuals, particularly women. Though I didn’t see any evidence of concrete ways that alliances with foreigners may change the actual identities of indigenous movement participants, we can see how the participants feel the need to present certain aspects of their identity in easy-to-understand ways for western audiences. For example, indigenous activists often dress in more traditional clothing when addressing non-indígenas, while they may wear jeans and other western clothing in daily life. Interviewee 5 said that in response to this directing of identity representation, particularly the individualistic representation, he “reminds them [the organizations] to be very careful with that.” He went on to say that because of the clear reminders and communication from indigenous movement participants, no NGO has been able to “break the organic parts” of local organizations. This implies that though there is a struggle between the ways indigenous activists and their western allies want to depict the anti-extraction movement, this interviewee feels foreign actors were not able to change any essential piece of the identities of indigenous organizations.

Further, Interviewee 5’s comment about choosing female leaders as “heroes” is interesting. It may point to how organizations from the western world want to focus on certain identities that will appeal more to progressive western audiences. My interviews did not focus specifically on gender representation in the movement, and it is difficult to say to what extent different genders are represented and how exactly roles differ based on gender. However, it is clear that women have a unique, identity-based, and significant position within the movement. Groups like Mujeres Amazónicas—”Amazonian Women”—are comprised of women and focus centrally on the role of women in indigenous protest. Women take on roles as leaders in many communities, nations, and organizations, for instance in the leadership of Sarayaku or as directors in Confeniae. In her account of the movement in the 1990s, Sawyer shows that in the past, discussions between oil companies, governments, and indigenous representatives were male-dominated. Though it is difficult to judge the degree to which this is true today, I have seen indigenous women participating in meetings led by Confeniae and UDAPT, contrasting Sawyer’s description in which she was typically the only women at a table (119). Combined with the leadership roles held by women and women-centered SMOs, it does seem that the women are legitimately important forces within the movement. Becker wrote, “recognizing the central role of women as not exceptional but rather characteristic of Indigenous movements is key to understanding the development of popular movements in Ecuador” (8). Maybe today, these women who have always been driving anti-extraction and other indigenous movements are simply taking a more center-stage, visible role than they were able to in the past.

But, as interviewee 5 pointed out, some allied organizations and media sources intentionally center the images of women to the point of unreasonably exalting women activists. The 2018 documentary “The Last Guardians” has a section which focuses specifically on the women involved in organizing marches and otherwise leading the movement, featuring statements such as, “Us women have stepped up and taken the lead” alongside references to children’s futures. Additionally, while interning with UDAPT, I was told my interviews for a video I created for the organization would be best if I focused on women, especially mothers. This shows the desire to represent the movement as being led by women, and particularly to appeal to the idea of a protective, nurturing woman standing up for her children’s future. Though the role of women is genuinely important in this movement, it is difficult to separate how much of the depiction of women is an accurate representation of a movement and how much is attempting to appeal to an audience with either feminist beliefs or a general desire to protect women and children. Interviewee 5 concluded that, “The role of women is important, but it can’t be exploited.”

One form of alliances that I saw more in the modern movement than in the past is celebrity allies. When looking at the anti-extraction movement of the past, I did not find examples of any celebrities known outside of Ecuador involved. Today, global celebrities who have spoken or shared content about indigenous anti-extraction movements in the Ecuadorian Amazon include Leonardo DiCaprio, Roger Waters of Pink Floyd, actors Brad Pitt and Danny Glover, Sting, and Trudie Styler. Their involvement has increased international awareness of anti-extractivism in Ecuador and has gained funds for water filters in polluted areas and other public service installations.

One difficulty throughout the process of attempting to evaluate the costs and benefits of alliances formed in this movement is the simple fact that people may want to protect or speak well of their allies. Even if relations aren’t perfect, people may want to continue the relationships with allies and may choose to focus on the positive aspects of their partners in interviews. Interviewee 8 also noted that foreign NGO allies (i.e. Amazon Watch and Greenpeace) have faced threats from people representing oil companies. For this reason, it may be difficult for some interviewees to discuss their relationships with allies in detail. With that said, the information I was able to get about allies shows that alliances with SMOs help indigenous organizations mobilize and spread their messages, though at times the allies may misrepresent certain aspects of the movement (i.e. exalting the role of women).

Outcomes and Further Analysis

The movement of today has, at this point, only met some of its goals, as stated by the participants—the goals being end of extraction, payment of reparations, and transparency from extractive companies and in government-led consultations. A few of these goals, i.e. Ecuador developing a “post-extractive economy” are unlikely to be met anytime soon due to the nation’s high dependence on crude export revenues.

There have been some successes, mostly partial successes. For example, a 2011 Ecuadorian court ruling, which was then upheld in 2018, said that Chevron owes affected communities $9.5billion in reparations. This case was won by the affected peoples after filing the case in Ecuador in 2003, and a previous legal battle in New York dating back to 1993. However, the Ecuadorian court has not been able to enforce this ruling, the ruling has been declared fraudulent in a New York court, and no money has been paid. Recently, an attempt to try the case in a Canadian court failed (New York Times). Throughout the years of complicated litigation, the affected peoples have won some cases, but have never received any reparations or public acknowledgement of wrongdoing from Texaco or Chevron. Interviewee 8 said, “Winning the trial gave us nothing” and, “We can’t clean the Amazon with the paper on which the sentence is written.” While the movement’s success in winning a court case against such a large company and in gaining public recognition is acknowledged as success by the participants, many agree that these successes alone are “nothing.” There is a sign that this may change in some way. In 2018, a group of Chevron shareholders wrote a letter to the Chevron CEO, criticizing him for Chevron’s handling of the case in Ecuador (“Chevron Shareholders Slam CEO”). This could represent a step towards success for the affected peoples if Chevron does in fact start to handle the case differently as a result.

Some progress has already been more concretely realized in the North. The Cofán of Dureno experienced success when the Ecuadorian government paid for the construction of houses in the central Dureno community. This development is called the Ciudad del Milenio and will have cost the government millions of dollars by the time it is complete, showing a large investment in repaying the people of Dureno for harm done by Petroecuador. Though activists expressed that they will not be satisfied until Chevron fully pays for Texaco’s part of the damage in this area, many are excited that their demands are being met by the government (Cepek 229-230).

In 2012, the Kichwa of Sarayaku succeeded in winning a court case which forced the Ecuadorian state to publicly acknowledge their unconstitutional promotion of Sarayaku land for oil exploitation (Environmental Justice Atlas). In 2013, exploitation was indefinitely delayed within Sarayaku, though an interviewee said, “for now, there’s no exploitation,” (Interview 3) emphasizing that this may not be the permanent result the activists of Sarayaku want. New blocks which overlap with Sarayaku are now up for auction for exploitation. However, when asked if they had experienced failure during their time in the movement, interviewees didn’t label partial successes like these as failures at all. When asked, Interviewee 4 simply said “I haven’t yet had any failures.” Both interviewees 2 and 8, speaking from their experience with the Chevron case, suggested that they thought the international justice system had failed those in the movement, but that within the movement itself, there wasn’t any failure. Generally, my interviews show that movement participants are often unwilling to label their movement as successful or unsuccessful. None of the interviewees have attained their ultimate goals, but all have experienced some form of victory.

Beyond success and failure in relation to people’s initial demands, several of the interviewees mentioned some version of “unity” or “cooperation” as a major success. Interview 2 said, “Really it’s not easy to, for 25 years, maintain the unity of six different indigenous pueblos and peasants and mestizos. That’s a success.” When asked about successes, Interviewee 7 spoke of his time as president of an indigenous organization, saying “I achieved the unification of all the federations.” He said that before his time in the presidency, organizations “began to divide,” so he saw the “reconstruction of unity” as a success.  Interviewee 4 responded, “Here we are, women united. We have demonstrated the unity of women of different nationalities.” While people from different ethnic groups had collaborated with each other throughout Ecuador’s history[25], it is naturally not always easy to remain united as a single movement when that movement is comprised of people with different backgrounds, cultures, and vastly different experiences of extraction. Adding to the potential for division is the fact that historically, conflicts between different groups existed in some areas–i.e. between some Kichwa and Waorani groups in Pastaza (Sawyer 125). Further, as seen throughout Becker’s Indians and Leftists, adopting the broad, collective identity of “indigenous” doesn’t necessarily come naturally to many people. Therefore, the ability to work together under general identities like “indigenous” or “anti-extractivist” is seen as an accomplishment by many activists.

Interviewees also saw the increased public recognition of their fight as a success. For example, interviewee 2 mentioned that he found it amazing that people around the world now know about the Ecuadorian case against Chevron. Since a large component of Ecuadorian indigenous movements over time has been the demand for a recognition of indigenous identities and the country’s plurinationality, it is significant that some interviewees identified that more people throughout Ecuador and the world now know about their people and about the diversity of nations within Ecuador.

Another outcome is participants gaining valuable skills through their work in the movement. Interviewee 5 spoke of the need to be educated at a high level to be taken seriously by the government and oil company representatives. On one hand, this represents the cultural change of a need to turn towards western schooling, possibly giving up time with family or time spent doing traditional jobs to gain an education: a change which may have negative consequences for family relations. On the other hand, gaining this education has the potential to open up opportunities outside of the movement, which could better the social or economic standing of participants.

It appears that in the current movement, as in the past movement, external forces have a large effect on movement outcomes. In particular, the Correa government presented new challenges and costs for movement participants. We also see, perhaps more clearly than in the past, the importance of allies in changing outcomes. The public recognition that interviewees identified as important has been fostered by alliances between different groups on the local level and with international organizations like Amazon Watch. Additionally, changed strategies regarding dialogue engagement may make a difference in outcomes. In comparison with the past, dialogue with companies has decreased and dialogue with governments has been recently renewed. It is difficult to quantify the effects these changes have had and will have on movement outcomes, but these are new, potentially significant developments.       

Appendix Chapter V: Images of Today’s Movement

Chapter VI. Conclusions: Past, Present, and Future

Comparing the Past and Present

In summary, there are many similarities between the anti-extraction movements of today and those of the past. General tactics, including marches and disruptive protests, inter-community conferences, publicity campaigns, and legal action remained similar over the period from 1980 through today. Messaging and framing also remained similar across the years, often emphasizing indigenous sovereignty and indigenous concepts of territory. Messages of environmental preservation have also consistently been present, though with varying force. Alliance-formation remains an important part of the movements and today connections with potential allies may be facilitated by modern technology and forms of communication. Throughout the years, the general economic dependence on oil and pro-extraction stance of the federal government have remained constant.

 There are several major differences between the anti-extraction movement today and that of the past, both in terms of external pressures and opportunities and in terms of choices made by participants in the movement. One important external difference is the national political environment. The national administration changed frequently during the 1980s to early 2000s but remained committed to expanding extraction and promoting neoliberal ideas. In contrast, from 2007 to today, even after Correa’s time in office, the anti-neoliberal rhetoric and other tenets of Correísmo have remained present. Suppression of protests spiked under Correa and has dwindled in the early years of Moreno’s administration. The degree of communication between the movement and governments has fluctuated over the years as the government itself has changed. A stark difference between the past and present is the general commitment to having no dialogue with extractive companies, seen in the Central-South, as opposed to the frequent communication or attempts at communication with these companies in the past. Also significant is the change in technology available to and used by movement participants.

In terms of alliance formation, alliances with individual actors appeared very early in the anti-extraction movement, but larger-scale alliances with organizations, both domestic and foreign, have grown in recent years. Today, many of the local SMOs involved in this movement (i.e. Confeniae and single-nationality indigenous organizations) are well established, while in the 1980s, most were new organizations. Based on interview data, it seems that many activists today feel comfortable openly communicating their needs to allied organizations most of the time, contrasting the miscommunications and conflicts between the local participants and larger organizations in the past reported by authors like Cepek.

In both past and present, successfully causing the removal of an extractive company from a given territory has been very rare. Partial successes–i.e. contracts won in Sarayaku in the 1990s and cases won by UDAPT in the 2000s which were not enforced–are more common than total successes in which the demands of movement participants are met in the long term. My research has identified that success has so far been driven by not just one, but rather a combination of the factors discussed here, principally external factors and alliances. When asked what influenced any successes that they had experienced, several interviewees (discussing both the past and present) pointed to collaboration between different ethnic groups and organizations. Such alliances have contributed to greater awareness of the anti-extraction movement and, particularly as larger organizations came to be involved, more funding and external pressure. Additionally, chapter IV demonstrated how external factors like company contract terms affect movement success, as seen in the Cofán’s success against Texaco. Because framing mechanisms have remained essentially consistent throughout the history of the movement and are related well to the framing other Ecuadorian indigenous movements, it is possible that this continuity has influenced success as well. Today and in the past, concepts used in messaging about a variety of the overarching goals of indigenous organizations is thoroughly incorporated into statements in opposition to extraction. Further research would be needed to fully understand how this continuity in framing has shaped movement outcomes.

Further, I found variations in the movement’s goals in the past and present. Some activists today want an end to extraction, while others want extractive practices to be improved in some way. Others, especially in the northern part of the region, want reparations for past damage by extractive companies. Predicting exactly where these movements will head in the future and how their goals will change was not the focus of my work. However, based on the continuity of framing and in the content of goals throughout the anti-extraction movement and in earlier Ecuadorian indigenous movements, and on conversations with young people involved in the anti-extraction movement, I believe that the goals of removing extraction from indigenous territories will remain consistently strong in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, as extraction does expand or continue, those who grow up beside extraction all their lives will likely modify the views and goals of their parents and grandparents. As seen in some Cofán communities in Sucumbíos, young people in general may become more comfortable with some level of extraction. Instead of fighting against extraction entirely, they may focus their efforts on demanding monetary benefits, more eco-friendly extraction methods, and other modifications to already-existing extraction or to extraction which may begin in the near future.

Outcomes for Participants

As previously stated, many of the costs and benefits associated with becoming involved with anti-extraction movements have remained fairly similar over the years. Interviews and social media sources point to the fact that increased connections with people outside of one’s ethnic group, and the associated feeling of unity, are common outcomes of movement participation. Additionally, movement participants may gain valuable skills in communication and the use of certain technologies, like social media. Movement participants may be driven to gain further education more so than non-participants. This higher education can provide benefits in finding job opportunities or in other areas of life, as well as drawbacks for some individuals who otherwise may not have pursued a western-style education. On the other hand, movement participants are also likely to experience more danger as a result of their participation. The level of danger changes based on political climate and, possibly, based on public awareness of the protestors’ situation, as seen in discrepancies between treatment of protests in the North versus the Central-South.

Significance

These results are a basic stepping stone to understanding the current factors affecting anti-extraction movement outcomes in the Ecuadorian Amazon. The outcomes of the movements are hugely important not only for participants but also for anyone living in extraction zones, due to the myriad of social, environmental, health, and other threats of extraction already discussed above. Also, all Ecuadorians may be affected by changes in extraction due to the dependence of the Ecuadorian economy on oil and the government’s use of oil funds for public services. Further, the outcomes of social movements in the Ecuadorian Amazon have impacts beyond the region. If extraction rate is in any way affected by the anti-extraction movements, this could impact how countries like the United States[26] get their oil.  This may become especially important as the Venezuelan economic and political crisis continues, impacting another major source of oil in the region. Further, with the growing connections between movements in different countries, as exemplified by organizations like COICA, the success or failure of anti-extraction movements in one country has the potential to impact these movements elsewhere, not only within the Amazon, but throughout the world. Understanding how these anti-extraction movements function under different regimes and other varying external circumstances can help shed light on movements in other nearby countries which are experiencing change in political climate, or will be in the future, such as Brazil.

Limitations

My conclusions are limited by the scope of the research I was able to complete and by constraints on the methods I had at my disposal. For example, interview analysis involved only eight 20- to 45-minute interviews, and I was only able to spend a brief time (about ten days) in contact with interviewees and in their cities and communities. Further, due to travel limitations, I interviewed six people involved in movements in the central-south region and only two from the North, meaning the current views of people from Sucumbíos and other northern provinces are less well-covered here than those of the people of the Central-South. Additionally, access to primary sources–including newspaper articles and other media–from Ecuador prior to the 2000s is limited. In order to deal with these constraints, I used various sources (a combination of interviews, news reports, published ethnographies and secondary sources, social media, etc.) in order to corroborate the patterns I observed. However, it is important to keep in mind that any results discussed here should be further investigated in the future using more rigorous and thorough methods. A further constraint is my inability to access sources in any indigenous languages, or any language apart from English and Spanish. Furthermore, I did not have information about funding and other resource mobilization for groups within this movement.

Future Research

In the future, I would be interested in learning more about how people’s views of their own identity may change in response to outside pressures like alliances and representation in the media. My interview questions and overall methods did not provide a good basis to answer this question but researching it further would allow insight into how identities may shift when people become involved in anti-extraction movements. Additionally, how does media portrayal affect the success or failure of a movement? Though I talked to people about how they felt about media representation, the question of the effects on success levels was not clearly addressed by my research. I would expect that negative portrayals of activists (i.e. presentation as “terrorists” and “guerillas”) would make it harder for participants to gain public support and therefore harder to get the government’s help, funds, and other benefits that would increase success. This prediction was not explicitly verified in my research and could be investigated further in the future. Also, in regard to media, is it possible for uncontacted peoples have agency in influencing their own representation in media? As many indigenous organizations become more and more skilled in social media and public relations, is there a way for them to use this knowledge to protect the interests of people with whom they have no direct contact and who are not developing these skills themselves?

I would like to learn more about the historic and current gender representation of the Ecuadorian anti-extraction movement in the Amazon. At a conference I attended in March 2018, in which leaders from various nationalities each gave a speech about their fight against extraction, all main speakers were men. Similarly, most of the presidents of indigenous organizations that I have researched are men. These anecdotal incidents do not say a lot without a deeper understanding of the gender roles in the various cultures represented in this movement. Contrasting the gender composition which I saw, indigenous women are often the central focus of international media coverage (i.e. recent International Women’s Day campaigns, footage from The Last Guardians). Further, Interviewee 4 stated that she had never experienced sexism from her fellow activists. Interviewing more female activists in order to study the discrepancies between what media shows, what women in the movement feel, and what I (from my foreign perspective) see in terms of gender composition in the movement would be interesting and valuable.

Further, future research should address not just the success and failure of the faction of the movement that seeks a complete end to oil extraction, but also the faction which accepts some extraction but demands more transparency from extractive corporations and fairer sharing of profits. As noted earlier, many in Sucumbíos have shifted their attention to these goals rather than outright anti-extractivism. Further, even those who want extractive companies to leave altogether still demand more transparency from companies that are already on their land and from the Ecuadorian government. Though those I interviewed all wanted oil and mining companies to leave indigenous land altogether, all also noted and expressed annoyance or disdain at some degree of deception or lack of information from the companies. In response, it would be valuable to investigate further how movements can change the information which comes from extractive companies and how companies that are in the region may or may not change their behavior in response to social movements. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a related, interesting field of study. What effects might CSR efforts of companies extracting in the Ecuadorian Amazon have on the ultimate outcomes of extraction? In the case of the Ecuadorian Amazon, can negative effects of extraction truly be prevented through CSR and to what degree?

Lastly, taking into account the importance of national government which I identified, how will the apparent decrease in suppression under the Moreno administration impact the scope and success of these movements in the future? Will his administration’s policies lead to more protests as seen in studies examining partial liberalization in the past? Would this potential greater participation change the outcomes of the movements? Overall, there is much left to study in the field of indigenous anti-extraction, both inside and outside of the Ecuadorian Amazon. Studying these movements more will help us better understand how people can effectively advocate for themselves in the face of the immense economic and political power of multinational corporations and what happens when they choose to take on this advocacy role.

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“Lenín Moreno pidió investigar los proyectod petroleros construidos bajo el gobierno de Rafael Correa en Ecuador.” Infobae. 4 Jan 2019. Accessed at https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2019/01/04/lenin-moreno-pidio-investigar-los-proyectos-petroleros-construidos-bajo-el-gobierno-de-rafael-correa-en-ecuador/.

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“Llantas quemadas en vías de Ecuador el primer día de protesta indígena.” El Universo. 29 Jan. 2019. Accessed at https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2019/01/29/nota/7162949/llantas -quemadas-vias-primer-dia-protesta-indigena

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Endnotes

[1] Note that the term “mining” includes oil and gas extraction as well as excavating for other subsurface resources.

[2] “Amazon” is used in this paper to refer to the broad-leafed tropical rainforest which covers approximately 1.7 billon acres of land surrounding the Amazon river and its tributaries. This rainforest spans nine South American countries.

[3] Note: Sucumbíos was not yet established as a province at the time Texaco entered. It was declared a province in 1989 (Provincia de Sucumbíos).

[4] The Cofán are an ethnic group with a population of about 2000, spread throughout the Amazon region of Northern Ecuador and Colombia.

[5] This city is officially known as Nueva Loja, but is more commonly referred to as Lago Agrio, meaning “Sour Lake,” named after Sour Lake, Texas, the birthplace of Texaco.

[6] See Literature Review: Definitions for more information on neoliberalism

[7] “Uncontacted peoples” refers to indigenous groups, such as the Taegeri and Taromenone, who have voluntarily decided to isolate themselves from the outside world. Due to historical relationships and territorial proximity, these peoples have contact with some Waorani groups but not with other indigenous and non-indigenous groups of people. For more information, see Cabodevilla et al. 2005

[8] Quehua generally refers to a cultural group and language in Peru, Bolivia, and Chile while Kichwa refers to a related culture in Ecuador or the related cultural group and language in Ecuador and Colombia

[9] More information about Pachamama can be found in Zaffaroni 2011 (https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C22&q=la+pachamama&btnG=)

[10] The Waorani (also spelled Hauorani) are an indigenous group of the Ecuadorian Amazon whose traditional territory stretches from modern-day Puyo to the eastern border with Peru, covering large parts of Pastaza and Orellana provinces. https://www.amazonfrontlines.org/chronicles/mapping-waorani/

[11] An uncontacted population

[12] As of February 2019

[13] Estates in which peasants (usually indigenous people) worked for a landowner

[14] An Ecuadorian state-owned oil company

[15] Chapter IV

[16] “compañero”

[17] No details on his death were provided

[18] The supermajors are BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, and Eni

[19] See historical chapter

[20] Note added October 2019: This paper was written before the Moreno administration’s economic measures and subsequent indigenous-led protests in October 2019. These events are vital to understanding Moren’s relationship with indigenous movements.

[21] Indigenous Guatemalan activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner

[22] See Manuel Castells’ “Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age” for more information.

[23] Oil extraction from one area can often pull up oil from surrounding areas as well. If the company were to extract from an area outside the boundaries of Dureno, but nearby, they would likely be profiting off of Dureno’s oil.

[24] See chapter IV

[25] See Becker “Indians and Leftists” for more information

[26] The United States imports more Ecuadorian crude oil than does any other country

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a massive infrastructure integration project undertaken by the Chinese government in 2013 to improve the connectivity between Asia, Europe, and parts of Africa—covers more than half of the world’s population and a third of the world’s GDP. With price tags ranging in the trillions of dollars set to fund railways, roads, seaports, and airports among other investments in energy and telecommunications, the initiative has been hailed by Chinese president Xi Jinping as the “project of the century.” Despite a tremendous opportunity to untap the economic potential of the region and shape the future of global trade, the environmental impact of the initiative could be severe—and permanent. It is crucial that China’s government and business leaders strive for a “green” Belt and Road, developing renewable energy infrastructure and adhering to responsible environmental standards.

China’s Environmental Track Record

No country offers such bittersweet superlatives when it comes to energy and sustainability as China. Although no nation has emerged as a major industrial and economic power without inflicting substantial environmental damage, China’s unprecedented growth has led to the severe degradation of the environment well before the economy’s maturation. China, with a “pollute first, control later” model of development, has experienced tremendous growth since Deng Xiaoping initiated market reforms four decades ago. Despite recent slowdowns, China has posted growth rates upwards of 9 percent per annum since 1978 and managed to lift 800 million people out of poverty as the nation became the “world’s factory.”^[1]As a result of this explosive manufacturing growth, the world’s second-largest economy now tops the World Health Organization’s list for deadly outdoor pollution and is home to five of the most polluted cities in G20 countries.^[2]China, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, has failed to crack down on factories that flout emissions standards. Last year, environmental inspectors in northern China found that 14,000 companies, or 70 percent of the businesses they examined, failed to meet standards for controlling air pollution.^[3]Earlier this year, China’s environmental ministry said that the number of sources of pollution in the country increased by more than 50 percent in less than a decade.^[4]These transgressions, which lead to increased rates of lung cancer and other respiratory ailments, contribute to the premature deaths of an estimated 1.6 million people in China every year.^[5]

On the other hand, it must be recognized that China is in many ways an environmental leader. China is the world’s leading country in electricity production from renewable energy sources, with over double the generation of the second-ranking country, the United States. Driven by technological change and the falling cost of renewables, China invests more than $100 billion in domestic renewables every year (more than the combined annual investment of the US and the EU) and by 2017, had invested $32 billion–more than any other country–in renewables overseas.^[6]According to the International Energy Agency, China has one-third of the world’s wind power, a quarter of its solar capacity, six of the top ten solar-panel manufacturers, four of the top ten wind-turbine makers, and sells more electric vehicles than the rest of the world combined.^[7]In addition, the northern city of Xiongxian has derived all of its heating from geothermal energy since 2010 and Shenzhen, China’s tech capital, announced last year that all of its 16,359 buses had gone electric, marking the world’s first 100 percent electrified bus fleet. These impressive achievements, coupled with the nation’s environmental degradation, paint a unique picture for China’s climate and energy landscape.

Sustainability in the Belt and Road Initiative

As China attempts to broaden its political and economic influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (also known as the 21^st-century Silk Road), many BRI target countries—desperate for financing and with historically weak environmental governance—are vulnerable to exploitation by Chinese firms. Beijing’s attitude towards environmental governance will be key in helping the world meet its climate goals.

China has pursued an infrastructure-based development strategy within its borders and has become a global leader in infrastructure investment. Taking this economic model abroad has the potential to improve connectivity and to substantially reduce trade costs, leading to higher cross-border trade and investment regions along the BRI. Regional cooperation on new and improved transport infrastructure, along with accompanying policy reforms, can lead to significant growth in BRI member nations. However, as development within China proves, this economic growth will not come without a price. Building the new Silk Road requires an extensive series of construction sites,which can lead to high levels of water pollution and soil erosion. Furthermore, the initiative will inevitably boost the extraction and use of raw materials, e.g. sand and limestone for the production of concrete and cement, and fossil fuels—which will take a heavy toll on global carbon emissions. Additionally, the BRI’s corridors will cross the habitats of 265 threatened species, according to the World Wildlife Fund.^[8]The expansion of transportation networks through the new Silk Road is likely to increase pollution levels, the overexploitation of resources, and habitat loss.

A number of institutions around the world have taken note of the potentially catastrophic consequences of the Belt and Road Initiative. The United Nations, World Economic Forum, and World Wildlife Fund are just some of the organizations that have already released reports on “greening” the Belt and Road. Columbia University and China’s Renmin University co-sponsored an event titled, “Belt and Road Initiative Green Development Conference,” in November 2017 to discuss plans and policies for BRI energy infrastructure, highlighting the importance of sustainability in the new Silk Road. 

Facing international pressure, the Chinese government is fully aware of the importance of enhancing sustainability in their hallmark initiative. In May last year, the government released two directives: The Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan (BREECP), which entails 25 green BRI projects, and Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road to encourage a philosophy of environmentalism throughout the Belt and Road projects. The Guidance, issued jointly by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, and Ministry of Environmental Protection,  describes the prioritization of “infrastructure and capability building projects for energy conservation, emission reduction, and eco-environment protection;green guidance for corporate behavior” and the use of “policy-based financial institutions in guiding and channeling the funds of various parties to jointly support the development of green Belt and Road Initiative.”^[9]

Though these directives show promise for a sustainable Belt and Road, they lack specifics with respect to implementation or accountability mechanisms. Without adequate regulations on Chinese firms operating abroad, the BRI—given its nature and scale—is likely to have significant negative impacts on air and water quality in recipient countries, as well as on global carbon emissions.

Dr. Abdul Rauf, former graduate student at China’s Southeast University, shared his uncertainty regarding the BRI’s environmental standards. Dr. Rauf said, “China is only promoting one side of the coin of economic cooperation and trade, but they are not talking about the specific industries that will harm the environment.” Dr. Rauf, whose research focuses on the environmental impacts of the Belt and Road, went on to say that “China has not yet introduced many of the renewable energy projects they have marketed” and insisted that “China should be more focused on the environment. Right now, they only care about the economics [and] industry.”This is a criticism that has often been levied of the Chinese government, but as evidenced by the impressive renewable energy deployment and investment as described above, it is possible that they will instead view the Belt and Road Initiative as an opportunity to become a global leader in clean energyand assume the responsibility of “greening” the Belt and Road.

Despite the risks, there are plenty of opportunities for environmental cooperation projects and renewable energy development through the Belt and Road. From the construction of eco-friendly cities and responsible waste management to the potential for clean energy projects in Belt and Road countries, the Initiative could set an important precedent for growing economies early in their development. Malaysia, for example, has significant solar energy potential: large-scale solar plants could be developed to satisfy up to 20 percent of the country’s current electricity needs.^[10]While Malaysia is the third-largest producer of solar photovoltaic cells worldwide, solar plants remain mostly small-scale with less than 100MW of installed capacity to date.^[11]This contributes less than one percent of Malaysia’s total electricity supply.^[12]Similarly, Vietnam is considered to have the largest wind resources in Southeast Asia with an estimated economically viable wind potential of at least 24GW.^[13]However, Vietnam’s current share of wind power in total energy consumption is negligible.^[14]Furthermore, a number of countries across the African continent, with abundant endowments of solar, wind, and hydro-power, also have the potential to use Chinese-funded and developed renewable energy projects to meet their growing energy demands. The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis cite proposed clean energy projects to be developed by Chinese companies (e.g.200 MW solar farm to be built by PowerChina in Ghana, 244.5 MW De Aar wind farm being built by China’s Longyuan Power Group Corporation inSouth Africa) in a 2018 report to show the steps that have already been taken.^[15]Given the falling costs of renewable energy technologies, now is the time for policymakers and investors to push projects in these regions forward.

Opportunities for Green Finance

Projects in the BRI rely primarilyon three types of organizations: Chinese state-owned banks, special investment funds, and multilateral financial institutions. These institutions, together with private investors, will account for nearly $100 billion of investment annually.^[16]For example, China Development Bank (CDB) is expected to loan $40-45 billion annually to BRI projects.^[17]This is a significant commitment compared to multilateral development banks: the annual CDB budget for the BRI is at least $10 billion greater than the combined budget for BRI countries of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).^[18]The Silk Road Fund, a state-owned investment fund created in 2014by the Chinese government,has a total size of $55 billion and will focus entirely on funding BRI projects.^[19]Furthermore,  China’s National Development Bank (NDB) had signed more than 140 agreements since 2013 with countries covered by the initiative, which combined involve more than $130 billion worth of investments.Finally, some experts estimate that multilateral development banks and private investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, and foreign governments may provide up to half of BRI funding by 2030.

The entities and funds described above arehow the Belt and Road Initiative is being financed right now. However, as HSBC’s Chief Executive for Greater China, Helen Wong describes,China’s position as an infrastructure powerhouse presents the nation with a unique opportunity to play a leading role in green finance development. “China wants environmental protection to become one of its pillar industries. The sector was worth 4.5 trillion yuan by the end of 2015. By 2020, it is expected to be worth 17 trillion yuan. We therefore expect to see more initiatives to support the growth of the green technology sector – with the possibility of new green investment funds and green investment banks being launched to fill any gaps in the availability of funding,” Wong said.

BRI projectsin particularprovide an opportunity to continue to scale China’s green finance market as many of China’s domestic and foreign infrastructureand energyprojects can be financed with green bonds that address a wide variety of environmental issues. Green bonds, also known as climate bonds, are typically asset-linked bonds (just like the infrastructure and energy assets being built through the BRI) that are specifically designated for climate-relatedand environmentalprojects. Since 2015, China has become one of the world’s largest issuers of green bonds. According to Moody’s, China led issuance last year with $17.2 billion, closely followed by France with $17.1 billion and the United States at $11.7 billion.^[20]At the government level, financial institutions that specifically address environmental issues include the Green Silk Road Fund (GSRF)  with a volumeof $4.5 billionand the planned China Ecological Development Bank (CEDB)  at $16 billion. Though these are sizable funds, they are just a fraction of the annual investment promised by the CDB ($40-45 billionper year) and a negligible amount of the trillions estimated to be needed for the Initiative. Moreover, it is difficult to assess the role they will play in thecoming years, asGSRF has only invested in Chinasince its launch in March 2015, while CEDB has not yet been established.^[21]         

Conclusion

 The Belt and Road Initiative is the largest infrastructure program the world has ever seen. It has the potential to increase trade and accelerate development throughout Asia, Europe, and parts of Africa. However, the environmental impacts of the initiative may be severe. It is crucial that the Chinese government holds firms to high environmental standardsbeyond its borders. It can do so by pushing companies to integrate sustainable practices into the early stages of the construction process, demonstrating and supporting sustainable business opportunitiesthrough green finance development, and helping scale sustainable infrastructure projects. Promises of these objectives have been made by the Chinese government, but the country should consider making environmental standards mandatory to enhance social responsibility in Chinese corporations. A comprehensive, coordinated plan will be necessary to ensure that the Belt and Road Initiative is a success for both development and sustainability.

Bibliography

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“Going Green Is Just Good Business for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” HSBC Business. March 29, 2018. Accessed February 2, 2019. https://www.business.hsbc.com/belt-and-road/going-green-is-good-business-for-chinas-bri.

“GDP Growth (Annual %).” World Bank Data. Accessed February 24, 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2017&locations=CN&start=1961&view=chart.

“Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road.” Belt and Road Portal. May 18, 2018. Accessed April 29, 2019. https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/12479.htm.

McCarthy, Niall. “Air Pollution Contributed To More Than 6 Million Deaths In 2016 [Infographic].” Forbes. April 18, 2018. Accessed April 29, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/04/18/air-pollution-contributed-to-more-than-6-million-deaths-in-2016-infographic/#12300edd13b4.

Pike, Lili. “Are China’s Energy Investments in Africa Green Enough?” 中外对话China Dialogue. March 9, 2018. Accessed April 1, 2019. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10799-Are-China-s-energy-investments-in-Africa-green-enough-.

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Wong, Edward. “Nearly 14,000 Companies in China Violate Pollution Rules.” The New York Times. June 14, 2017. Accessed April 2, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/world/asia/china-companies-air-pollution-paris-agreement.html.

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Endnotes

^[1]“GDP Growth (Annual %).” World Bank Data. Accessed February 24, 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2017&locations=CN&start=1961&view=chart.

^[2]“Going Green Is Just Good Business for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” HSBC Business. March 29, 2018. Accessed February 2, 2019. https://www.business.hsbc.com/belt-and-road/going-green-is-good-business-for-chinas-bri.

^[3]Xiang, Bo. “Inspections Find 70 Percent of Firms Violated Environmental Rules.” Xinhua Net. June 11, 2017. Accessed January 29, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-06/11/c_136356860.htm.

^[4]Wong, Edward. “Nearly 14,000 Companies in China Violate Pollution Rules.” The New York Times. June 14, 2017. Accessed April 2, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/world/asia/china-companies-air-pollution-paris-agreement.html.Kuo, Lily. “China ‘Environment Census’ Reveals 50% Rise in Pollution Sources.” The Guardian. March 31, 2018. Accessed February 14, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/31/china-environment-census-reveals-50-rise-in-pollution-sources.

^[5]McCarthy, Niall. “Air Pollution Contributed To More Than 6 Million Deaths In 2016 [Infographic].” Forbes. April 18, 2018. Accessed April 29, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/04/18/air-pollution-contributed-to-more-than-6-million-deaths-in-2016-infographic/#12300edd13b4.

^[6]Woetzel, Jonathan, and Jiang Kejun. “China’s Renewable Energy Revolution.” McKinsey & Company. August 2017. Accessed April 29, 2019. https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/overview/in-the-news/china-renewable-energy-revolution.

^[7]“China Is Rapidly Developing Its Clean-Energy Technology.” The Economist. March 15, 2018. Accessed April 29, 2019. https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/03/15/china-is-rapidly-developing-its-clean-energy-technology.

^[8]“WWF and Greening the Belt and Road Initiative.” WWF Hong Kong. November 2, 2017. Accessed April 29, 2019. https://www.wwf.org.hk/en/?19680/Feature-Story-WWF-and-Greening-the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative.

^[9]“Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road.” Belt and Road Portal. May 18, 2018. Accessed April 29, 2019. https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/12479.htm.

^[10]“WWF and Greening the Belt and Road Initiative.” WWF Hong Kong. November 2, 2017. Accessed April 29, 2019. https://www.wwf.org.hk/en/?19680/Feature-Story-WWF-and-Greening-the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative

^[11]Ibid.

^[12]Ibid.

^[13]Ibid.

^[14]Ibid.

^[15]Pike, Lili. “Are China’s Energy Investments in Africa Green Enough?” 中外对话China Dialogue. March 9, 2018. Accessed April 1, 2019. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10799-Are-China-s-energy-investments-in-Africa-green-enough-.

^[16]Assume $4 trillion total cost, 40 year lifetime of BRI.

^[17]“WWF and Greening the Belt and Road Initiative.” WWF Hong Kong. November 2, 2017. Accessed April 29, 2019. https://www.wwf.org.hk/en/?19680/Feature-Story-WWF-and-Greening-the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative

^[18]Ibid.

^[19]Ibid.

^[20]“Going Green Is Just Good Business for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” HSBC Business. March 29, 2018. Accessed February 2, 2019. https://www.business.hsbc.com/belt-and-road/going-green-is-good-business-for-chinas-bri.

^[21]“WWF and Greening the Belt and Road Initiative.” WWF Hong Kong. November 2, 2017. Accessed April 29, 2019. https://www.wwf.org.hk/en/?19680/Feature-Story-WWF-and-Greening-the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative

Asmahan Simry, Palestinian citizen of Israel and human rights activist focused on the treatment of Palestinians, introduced her humanitarian technology organization to undergraduates on March 5^th at the Slifka Center for Jewish Life at Yale.

The organization is Comet-ME, an energy organization grounded in its goal of providing basic utilities to communities in the West Bank.

Comet-ME, an Israeli-Palestinian organization, began operations in 2007 with the goal of providing electricity to off-grid communities spread throughout the West Bank. In 2013, the organization expanded its work to provide water distribution services. The organization uses solar and wind energy to provide this infrastructure. 60 communities, about 6,000 individuals of a total 200,000 Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank, have benefitted from their services.

Comet-ME operates in the Israeli-Palestinian region, specifically rural areas of the West Bank without large Palestinian cities nearby. Known as Area C, these are areas of the West Bank under Israeli civilian and military control. In the communities Comet-ME serves, Bedouins live beside Palestinians, often leasing the Palestinian’s land after Israel expelled the Bedouins from their own homelands in the 1950s. Residents typically live in tents or caves. The primary source of income is from the wool and butter of their sheep and goats. Hours are spent doing chores that could be done much more efficiently with the help of electricity. Individuals travel far to find a space to recharge electronics. Many travel to access cisterns that hold collected rain to supply for their water needs. The limited access to unmonitored water, coupled with the residents’ inability to dispose of biological waste properly, creates severe health risk.

When Comet-ME partners with a community, they install solar panels, wind turbines, and an energy center to store accumulated energy. They supply power to the tents and caves that make up the inhabitants’ living quarters. If an electricity system is in place, Comet-ME can install water pumps connecting households to the existing cisterns, filter the water, and provide long term water quality monitoring. Most importantly, they train a member of the community to maintain the resources.

Simry emphasized that the organization views the communities they work with as both partners and beneficiaries. The work that they do is not charity – while Comet-ME does not charge for the instillation of the infrastructure, individuals do pay their own energy bills. Simry explained that this ensures that the communities have a sense of ownership over the resources newly made available to them. The residents retain their self-dependence and pride.

Area C of the West Bank is a land ridden with stark inequalities. Here, the tents and caves of Palestinian inhabitants find neighbors in Israeli settlements. Where the Palestinian communities usually lack basic utilities, the settlements are well equipped with the electricity, water, access roads, and other resources needed to live a modern lifestyle in a desert area.

The different living realities are a result of the hostilities within the region. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict manifests itself in long-term aggressive action. The Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) controls building and infrastructure development in Area C. They mandate building permits for the construction of any facilities. It can sometimes take five years for any decision on the permit application to be released. Even then, the ICA often rejects the application. The ICA qualifies the Palestinian buildings as illegal even while their own settlements are illegal according to international law.

At the same time, the Palestinian Authority is obligated to provide schools and health clinics to Palestinians living in the region. Continuous denial of building permits from the ICA has led them to construct these facilities without Israeli permission. Without permits, these buildings are often torn down. Subsequently, schools and health clinics that have successfully maintained operation in this region are sparse.

Still, Palestinian communities persevere in these conditions in the name of holding onto ancestral lands. Many stay because departing from these areas would leave Area C, which makes up 60 percent of the West Bank, in full control of the Israeli settlements.

Comet-ME aims to alleviate the difficulties of living in such a conflict-ridden environment. As a part of their mission, Comet-ME cites, “The poverty and marginalization [of Palestinian refugees] … and in particular the absence of energy infrastructure, is more a product of the political situation than of geography or economics.” The organization delivers basic utilities to enable the Palestinian’s resilience against the Israeli government. When asked if any of the Palestinians in Area C seemed likely to consider moving away, Simry said, “No. The people that are there, they are staying. But they do want to have access to services.”

Comet-ME has also experienced difficulty with building in the region. In June of 2017, Israeli authorities came to Jib al-Deeb, a community Comet-ME had been servicing, and cut the power lines to the solar panels generating the community’s energy. 96 solar panels and other expensive electronics were seized, and the community was left powerless for three months in the heat of summer. Three months later, Comet-ME managed to get the batteries returned and the photovoltaic system functioning again. Still, tensions between the community and the Israeli government remain.

Comet-ME addresses many of these issues with legal battles. Comet-ME works with their international partners to prepare for such encounters. Their partners include governmental representatives from Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. When the microgrid system was stolen from Jib al-Deeb, it was with the help of these partners that Comet-ME was able to press their case and get the technology returned.

Despite the difficulties faced in implementing their service, Comet-ME has succeeded in improving the lifestyles of many different communities. With access to energy, chores such as laundry, cooking, and churning butter have increased efficiency. The butter in particular is valuable as it is one of the primary products sold to support the Palestinians’ livelihood. Students can study after dark. With the services provided by Comet-ME, residents of the area gain not just utilities, but time, physical energy, and money.

Comet-ME seeks to make available resources that would ease the lives of those that inhabit the zone of conflict between Israel and Palestine. As an organization that provides service to support those affected by political strife, Comet-ME seeks to empower the resilience of communities seeking to stay in their homeland.